DOCSLIB.ORG

Special Operations Forces

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/ Foreign Military Studies Office Volume 8 Issue #8 OEWATCH August 2018 FOREIGN NEWS & PERSPECTIVES OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES EURASIA INDO-PACIFIC 3 The Russian Perspective of “Friction” and “Wear” in Hybrid 28 The PLA Army Tests Its Special Forces Capabilities 55 Iran to Re-Launch “Helicopter Carrier” War 29 The Emergence of the PLA Navy’s “Jiaolong” 56 The IRGC Wins Multibillion Dollar Economic Projects 4 Russian Combined Arms Armies Are Implementing Commando Unit 57 Turkish Armed Forces Continue to Professionalize Automated C2 System 58 Questions on Shortfalls in Electricity Generation in Iran 30 The PLA Air Force’s “Thunder Gods” Airborne 5 Syria and the Russian General Staff Academy 59 Achieving Gasoline Self-Sufficiency in Iran 6 New Russian Armor Tactics from the Syrian Experience Commando Unit 60 Accepting FATF is Absolutely Forbidden 8 Slavic Brotherhood 2018: Applying the Syrian and 31 China: Achieving Strength through Big Data and 61 Turkish Foreign Security Policy Under an Executive Presidency Donbas Experience to the Balkans? “New Quality Combat Forces” 9 CIS Members Reject Russian Request for Assistance in Syria 32 Building More Capable Overseas Chinese Security Forces: The Next Priority? AFRICA 10 International Political Pressure Mounts against Russian 62 With Learning Chinese, a Dose of Indoctrination Troop Presence in Moldova 33 The Lessons China Taught Itself: Why the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Matters 63 If Somaliland and Puntland Go to War, the Winner Could Be 11 China Praises Cooperation with Belarus and Its 35 Davao City: An Innocent Tourist Attraction or a Stop Al-Shabaab Special Forces Toward Further Militarization 64 Crossfire Creates Displacement from Burkina Faso to Mali 12 Chechnya’s Special Forces University to Offer 36 The Indian Government’s Response to Chinese Maritime 65 Africa’s Deadliest Group: Militant Herders Mountain Tourism Activities 66 MINUSMA Investigates Abuses in Mali 13 Another Russian Base in Kyrgyzstan? 38 Sea Trials for China’s Second Aircraft Carrier Point to 67 South Sudan: With Few Details, a Palatable Peace Deal 14 Putting Science Companies to Work Accelerating Growth in Capability 68 Africa’s Four Types of Organized Crime 16 Russia is Shortening Officer Training and Adjusting 39 Singapore’s Cyber-Security Strategy 69 Can Justice Systems Counter Terrorism? Conscription Standards 40 Japan Develops Islands in Indonesia’s Natuna Sea 17 Assessing Russia’s Ten-Year Military Spending Plan 41 Differing Narratives Explain Myanmar Violence LATIN AMERICA 19 Improving Medical Care in the Russian Military 70 Brazil in Final Phase of Constructing Country’s First Cruise 21 Military Support for Pension Reform? MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA Missile 22 Successful Russian IO Campaign 71 Weaponized Drones Target Baja California Secretary of Public 42 The Role of Turkish Special Forces in Operation 23 Anchors Away in the Arctic Security’s Residence 25 China Adding Nuclear-powered Icebreakers in the Arctic Olive Branch 72 Chinese Interest in Bolivia 25 Join the Army and See the Snow 43 Egypt’s Thunderbolt Forces: Image and Reality 73 Cubazuelaruso Oil 26 More Energy for Europe 44 Visit of Chinese Military Delegation to Iran 74 Living Conditions in Venezuela Are Not Improving 27 Spain and Catalonia 45 Iran to Launch New Satellite by Year’s End 75 The Coming Death of UNASUR? 46 Iran’s Simorgh Satellite Ready for Launch 75 Bolivarian Military Solidarity with Ortega 47 Iran Preparing to Host Nanotechnology Festival 76 Mexico-Cuba Nexus? 48 Central Asia: Next Stop for Syria’s Foreign Jihadists? 77 Is Ecuador Realigning? 50 Turkish Concern over its Southern Border Security 78 Bolivarian Influence in the Caribbean Softening 51 Turkish Dams Cause Water Conflict in the Middle East 79 Drug Routes between Venezuela and the Dominican Republic 52 Khamenei on Strategic Patience 80 Guatemalan Authorities Find First Ever Coca Field in Country 53 Yemen: Increased UAV Employment by Houthi-Led 81 Operation Jaque Ten Years On Coalition approved for public release; distribution is unlimited The Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is part of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command G-2, whose mission is to Understand, Describe, Deliver, and OEWATCH Assess the conditions of the Operational Foreign News & Perspectives Environment. For over 30 years, FMSO of the Operational Environment has conducted open source research Volume 8 | Issue 8 August | 2018 on foreign perspectives of defense and security issues, emphasizing those topics that are understudied or unconsidered. Regional Analysts and Operational Environment Watch Expert Contributors provides translated selections and commentary from a diverse range Eurasia Chuck Bartles Ray Finch of foreign media that our analysts Les Grau and expert contributors believe will Robert Kurz give security professionals an added Matthew Stein Sergey Sukhankin dimension to their critical thinking Boris Vainer about the Operational Environment. Tom Wilhelm Indo-Pacific Abigail Grace The views expressed in each article are those of Cindy Hurst the author and do not represent the official policy or Matthew Stein position of the Department of the Army, Department Peter Wood of Defense, or the US Government. Release of this Jacob Zenn information does not imply any commitment or intent on the part of the US Government to provide any Middle East, North Africa Ihsan Gunduz additional information on any topic presented herein. Michael Rubin The appearance of hyperlinks does not constitute Lucas Winter endorsement by the US Army of the referenced site Africa Robert Feldman or the information, products, or services contained Jacob Zenn therein. Users should exercise caution in accessing hyperlinks. Latin America Robert Bunker The Operational Environment Watch is archived Geoff Demarest and available at: https://community.apan.org/wg/ Brenda Fiegel tradoc-g2/fmso/. Alma Keshavarz ON THE COVER: Editor-in-Chief Tom Wilhelm Belarusian special units eliminate mock terrorists’ base during 2nd stage of Slavic Bortherhood 2018 tactical drills (Rayevsky training ground, Editor Matthew Stein Krasnodarsky Krai). Design Editor Lucas Winter Image Source: Russian Ministry of Defense, http://eng.mil.ru/en/multimedia/photo/gallery.htm?id=58405@cmsPhotoGallery, CC 4.0. EURASIA The Russian Perspective of “Friction” and “Wear” in Hybrid War OE Watch Commentary: In their writings about hybrid war, the Russians never claim to be practitioners, only the victims of it. Instead, they describe their actions as “counter- “The state is losing monopoly over hybrid” operations. In the article “‘Friction’ and ‘Wear’ of Hybrid Wars” by A. A. Bartosh, use of force.” published in Russia’s military theory journal Военная Мысль (Military Thought), there are some insights into the Russian view of hybrid war and also an opportunity to view the Source: “Трение и Износ гибпридой войны doctrinal practice of Russian military science. (Friction and Wear of Hybrid Wars),” Военная In his article, it is noteworthy that Bartosh defers to the definition of hybrid warfare Мысль (Military Thought), No. 1 2018, pp. 5-12. attributed to the London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies: “the use of “The Russian model of countering hybrid military and non-military means in an integrated campaign aimed at creating a surprise warfare should be constructed taking into effect, capturing initiative, and gaining psychological advantages to be used for diplomatic account the nonlinear forms and methods of purposes; large scale and rapid informational, electronic, and cyber operations; covert and the attacking forces and should reflect the clandestine military and intelligence activities combined with economic pressure.” While following key objectives of national defense. One, accepting this definition, Bartosh also warns that this descriptor cannot be used officially, ability to quickly and definitively respond….. as it requires more scientific proof. two is to enable the country to promptly Bartosh breaks down the “friction” of hybrid war into five “peculiarities” that he claims concentrate….efforts and resources…three is augment Clausewitz’s “seven sources of general friction” in warfare. The first is that conduct continuous intelligence and [interagency hybrid warfare “makes the adversary deal with several phases all at once.” The second is coordination] and minimize friction and wear the difference in the military and political command structures with regard to how they factors on the implementation of the chosen would handle “the subject and objects of hybrid war” (This is key phraseology used in strategy…four is educating, training, and Russian military science to focus deliberate attention to emerging doctrinal concepts). The selecting high-quality personnel….” third is that an “altered balance of military and non-military means of warfare…creates a new form of transnational conflict.” Terrorism gets its own special category due to its complexity and unpredictability. Given that Russian military science strives to build thought structures to make things quantitatively predictable, terrorism is a kind of antithesis to such structure and a special kind of friction. The fifth characteristic is migration. Given Russia’s economic and demographic challenges, the issue of non- Russians migrating into the state, according to Bartosh, is of special strategic concern. The author is sweeping (and resonant in Russia) in his description
Recommended publications
  • 14. Conventional Arms Control

    14. Conventional Arms Control

    14. Conventional arms control ZDZISLAW LACHOWSKI and MARTIN SJÖGREN I. Introduction The year 2006 marked the seventh ‘lean year’ since the signing of the 1999 Agreement on Adaptation of the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), and no signs of further progress were evident at the Third CFE Treaty Review Conference in May. The ‘hard’ conventional arms control regime remains stalled by disagreements between Russia and the West over political texts adopted at the 1999 Istanbul Summit of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).1 As a result, entry into force of the adapted CFE Treaty remains hostage to the completion of Russia’s promised military pullouts from Georgia and Moldova.2 The March 2006 Russia–Georgia agreement, supplementing their 2005 agreement on the with- drawal of Russian military bases and other facilities from Georgia, indicated further progress in the withdrawal process, but deadlock persists over Russian personnel and equipment in Moldova. In 2006 the OSCE continued to review and develop arms control-related endeavours, including confidence- and stability-building measures and other arrangements, to address the common risks and challenges facing Europe. Globally, progress on tackling ‘inhumane weapons’ continues, and Protocol V of the 1981 Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Convention on explosive remnants of war (ERW) entered into force.3 This chapter analyses the major issues and developments in conventional arms control in 2006. Section II discusses critical elements of the imple- mentation of the CFE Treaty. Arms control-related efforts to promote con- fidence, render assistance and foster stability in the OSCE area and elsewhere are addressed in section III.
  • Satellite Ice Extent, Sea Surface Temperature, and Atmospheric 2 Methane Trends in the Barents and Kara Seas

    Satellite Ice Extent, Sea Surface Temperature, and Atmospheric 2 Methane Trends in the Barents and Kara Seas

    The Cryosphere Discuss., https://doi.org/10.5194/tc-2018-237 Manuscript under review for journal The Cryosphere Discussion started: 22 November 2018 c Author(s) 2018. CC BY 4.0 License. 1 Satellite ice extent, sea surface temperature, and atmospheric 2 methane trends in the Barents and Kara Seas 1 2 3 2 4 3 Ira Leifer , F. Robert Chen , Thomas McClimans , Frank Muller Karger , Leonid Yurganov 1 4 Bubbleology Research International, Inc., Solvang, CA, USA 2 5 University of Southern Florida, USA 3 6 SINTEF Ocean, Trondheim, Norway 4 7 University of Maryland, Baltimore, USA 8 Correspondence to: Ira Leifer ([email protected]) 9 10 Abstract. Over a decade (2003-2015) of satellite data of sea-ice extent, sea surface temperature (SST), and methane 11 (CH4) concentrations in lower troposphere over 10 focus areas within the Barents and Kara Seas (BKS) were 12 analyzed for anomalies and trends relative to the Barents Sea. Large positive CH4 anomalies were discovered around 13 Franz Josef Land (FJL) and offshore west Novaya Zemlya in early fall. Far smaller CH4 enhancement was found 14 around Svalbard, downstream and north of known seabed seepage. SST increased in all focus areas at rates from 15 0.0018 to 0.15 °C yr-1, CH4 growth spanned 3.06 to 3.49 ppb yr-1. 16 The strongest SST increase was observed each year in the southeast Barents Sea in June due to strengthening of 17 the warm Murman Current (MC), and in the south Kara Sea in September. The southeast Barents Sea, the south 18 Kara Sea and coastal areas around FJL exhibited the strongest CH4 growth over the observation period.
  • The CFE Treaty One Year After Its Suspension: a Forlorn Treaty?, SIPRI

    The CFE Treaty One Year After Its Suspension: a Forlorn Treaty?, SIPRI

    SIPRI Policy Brief January 2009 THE CFE TREATY ONE YEAR SUMMARY w The prolonged crisis over the AFTER ITS SUSPENSION: 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe is a A FORLORN TREATY? refl ection of the wider spectrum of strategic, political, military and other issues that zdzislaw lachowski divide the OSCE community of states rather than a specifi c confl ict in its own right. On 12 December 2007 the Russian Federation offi cially declared that it The main protagonists— would no longer be bound by the restrictions under the 1990 Treaty on Con- Russia, the United States and ventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty). Russia explained its deci- NATO—share the guilt for the sion as being motivated by the treaty’s ‘divorce from reality’. Nonetheless, present confrontation and all of Russia assured the other parties to the treaty that it had no plans to build up them risk losing from it. Russia or concentrate heavy armaments on its borders. Over shadowed by other has ignored its political developments in Euro-Atlantic relations, the Russian ‘moratorium’ has commitments; the USA has long attracted little public attention and, consequently, the possible solutions to demonstrated its disinterest the issue have gathered little momentum. Now, one year after the suspen- and treated the CFE regime as a sion, it is time to reassess the condition and prospects of the CFE regime. pawn in the broader political Acclaimed as the ‘cornerstone of European security’, the CFE Treaty game with Russia. The European NATO states have regime remains by far the most elaborate conventional arms control regime aligned themselves with the worldwide.
  • Kurdish Political and Civil Movements in Syria and the Question of Representation Dr Mohamad Hasan December 2020

    Kurdish Political and Civil Movements in Syria and the Question of Representation Dr Mohamad Hasan December 2020

    Kurdish Political and Civil Movements in Syria and the Question of Representation Dr Mohamad Hasan December 2020 KurdishLegitimacy Political and and Citizenship Civil Movements in inthe Syria Arab World This publication is also available in Arabic under the title: ُ ف الحركات السياسية والمدنية الكردية ي� سوريا وإشكالية التمثيل This publication was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author. For questions and communication please email: [email protected] Cover photo: A group of Syrian Kurds celebrate Newroz 2007 in Afrin, source: www.tirejafrin.com The views and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). This document is issued on the understanding that if any extract is used, the author and the LSE Conflict Research Programme should be credited, with the name and date of the publication. All rights reserved © LSE 2020. About Legitimacy and Citizenship in the Arab World Legitimacy and Citizenship in the Arab World is a project within the Civil Society and Conflict Research Unit at the London School of Economics. The project looks into the gap in understanding legitimacy between external policy-makers, who are more likely to hold a procedural notion of legitimacy, and local citizens who have a more substantive conception, based on their lived experiences. Moreover, external policymakers often assume that conflicts in the Arab world are caused by deep- seated divisions usually expressed in terms of exclusive identities.
  • Country of Origin Information Report Somalia July 2008

    Country of Origin Information Report Somalia July 2008

    COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT SOMALIA 30 JULY 2008 UK BORDER AGENCY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION SERVICE 30 JULY 2008 SOMALIA Contents Preface LATEST NEWS EVENTS IN SOMALIA, FROM 4 JULY 2008 TO 30 JULY 2008 REPORTS ON SOMALIA PUBLISHED OR ACCESSED SINCE 4 JULY 2008 Paragraphs Background Information GEOGRAPHY ............................................................................................. 1.01 Maps .............................................................................................. 1.04 ECONOMY ................................................................................................. 2.01 Currency change, 2008 ................................................................ 2.06 Drought and famine, 2008 ........................................................... 2.10 Telecommunications.................................................................... 2.14 HISTORY ................................................................................................... 3.01 Collapse of central government and civil war ........................... 3.01 Peace initiatives 2000-2006 ......................................................... 3.14 ‘South West State of Somalia’ (Bay and Bakool) ...................... 3.19 ‘Puntland’ Regional Administration............................................ 3.20 The ‘Republic of Somaliland’ ...................................................... 3.21 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ........................................................................... 4.01 CONSTITUTION .........................................................................................
  • Russia to “Launder” Warpath the Inf Treaty Iranian Oil?

    Russia to “Launder” Warpath the Inf Treaty Iranian Oil?

    MONTHLY October 2018 MONTHLY AugustOctober 2018 2018 The publication prepared exclusively for PERN S.A. Date of publication in the public domain: 19th17th NovemberSeptember 2018. 2018. CONTENTS 12 19 28 PUTIN AGAIN ON THE GREAT GAME OVER RUSSIA TO “LAUNDER” WARPATH THE INF TREATY IRANIAN OIL? U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR PUTIN’S ANOTHER BODYGUARD JOHN BOLTON GLADDENED 3 TO BE APPOINTED GOVERNOR 18 MOSCOW’S “PARTY OF WAR” RUSSIAN ARMY TO ADD MORE GREAT GAME OVER THE INF 4 FIREPOWER IN KALININGRAD 19 TREATY PURGE IN RUSSIA’S REGIONS AS RUSSIA AND PAKISTAN TO HOLD PUTIN GETS RID OF POLITICAL JOINT MILITARY DRILLS IN THE 6 VETERANS 21 PAKISTANI MOUNTAINS SECHIN LOSES BATTLE FOR ITALY TO WITHDRAW FROM 7 RUSSIA’S STRATEGIC OIL PORT 22 ROSNEFT PROJECT SPETSNAZ, FLEET AND NUCLEAR GAS GAMES: POLISH-RUSSIANS FORCES: RUSSIA’S INTENSE 24 TENSIONS OVER A NEW LNG DEAL 9 MILITARY DRILLS RUSSIA GETS NEW ALLY AS SHOIGU GAZPROM TO RESUME IMPORTS 25 PAYS VISIT TO MONGOLIA 10 OF TURKMEN GAS MORE TENSIONS IN THE SEA 12 PUTIN AGAIN ON THE WARPATH OF AZOV: RUSSIA TO SCARE ON 27 EASTERN FLANK NOVATEK DISCOVERS NEW 13 PROFITABLE GAS DEPOSITS 28 RUSSIA TO “LAUNDER” IRANIAN OIL? NOT ONLY BALTIC LNG PLANT: MOSCOW HOPES FOR IRAQ’S CLOSE TIES BETWEEN SHELL 29 NEW GOVERNMENT 15 AND GAZPROM GAZPROM AND UKRAINE FACE PUTIN VISITS INDIA TO MARK ANOTHER LITIGATION OVER 16 PURCHASE OF RUSSIA’S MISSILES 31 GAS SUPPLIES www.warsawinstitute.org 2 SOURCE: KREMLIN.RU 8 October 2018 PUTIN’S ANOTHER BODYGUARD TO BE APPOINTED GOVERNOR According to the autumn tradition, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin dismisses some governors while appointing new ones.
  • The Kurdish Movement: Politicians and Fighters

    The Kurdish Movement: Politicians and Fighters

    March 31, 2016 The Kurdish Movement: Politicians and Fighters Since July 2015, when the conflict between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)–a Kurdish militant group designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey as well as the United States–resumed after a period of intermittent ceasefires and a series of abortive peace efforts, the division between the two separate wings of the Kurdish movement in Turkey, the political Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) and the militant PKK, has become more distinct. Despite President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s assertion in May 2015 that the HDP was “ruled by the mountain”-a reference to the leadership of the PKK-and had “no will [of its own],” the HDP has in fact diverged from the PKK on many occasions. For its part, the PKK has also highlighted its differences with the HDP both through word and action. Consequently, along with the imprisoned PKK founder and leader Abdullah Ocalan, who has a unique role fluctuating between fighter and politician, the PKK commanders and the HDP are the three poles of the Kurdish movement and share a symbiotic but competing tripartite relationship. Origins of the Modern Kurdish Problem When the Ottoman Empire ceased to exist after the First World War, the Turkish Republic, its nation state inheritor, effectively found itself as a binational state. Although there were other minorities in Turkey, their numbers were minuscule compared to Kurds. The new republic had a core project to build a novel polity based on the uniqueness of the Turkish language, culture and history, a foundational principle that remains as a constitutional axiom in the Turkish system, in sharp contrast to the multi-ethnic, polyglot Empire that preceded it.
  • On Deck Part 2

    On Deck Part 2

    PART 2 The New Zealand Company of Master Mariners March 2015 SNIPPETS FROM THE MARITIME BIOSPHERE US NAVY’S NEW LASER WEAPON. “At less than a dollar per shot, there’s no question DOES THIS SPELL THE END OF about the value LaWS provides,” said Klunder. “With CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS? affordability a serious concern for our defense budgets, this will more effectively manage resources to ‘Shades of Buck Rogers’ ensure our Sailors and Marines are never in a fair The U.S. Navy has achieved a historic milestone with a fight.” cutting-edge new laser weapon system that can In the future, factors from the successful deployment destroy targets for less than $1 per shot. and demonstration aboard the USS Ponce will help The Navy made the announcement recently that for guide the development of weapons under ONR’s Solid- the first time ever the new laser weapon system, known as LaWS, was successfully deployed and State Laser-Technology Maturation program. According operated aboard a Navy ship in the Arabian Gulf. The to the U.S. Navy, combat-ready laser prototypes that weapon, which uses a form of concentrated directed- could be installed on vessels such as guided-missile energy to destroy a target, has been under destroyers and the Littoral Combat Ship in the early development by the Office of Naval Research for 2020s. several years. See it in action here: http://gcaptain.com/watch-u-s- navys-new-laser-weapon-action-photos- video/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&u tm_campaign=Feed%3A+Gcaptain+%28gCaptain.com %29 TIME-LAPSE VIDEO: ALLSEAS AUDACIA OFFSHORE PIPELAY VESSEL IN ACTION Check out this greatMIKE time SCHULER-lapse video showing exactly what Allseas’ newest pipelay vessel was built to do.
  • A Kurdish-Speaking Community of Change: How Social and Political Organising Takes Shape in the PYD-Controlled Areas in Syria

    A Kurdish-Speaking Community of Change: How Social and Political Organising Takes Shape in the PYD-Controlled Areas in Syria

    A Kurdish-Speaking Community of Change: How Social and Political Organising takes Shape in the PYD-controlled Areas in Syria Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts In Middle Eastern Studies Author: Harriet Ida Rump Advisor: Lory Janelle Dance Examiner: Vittorio Felci Date: 11.12.14 Acknowledgements I devote my deepest gratitude to the brave and engaged participants of this research, without their reflections, insights, and generous will to share ideas, this thesis would never have been realised. In the same breath I sincerely thank Lina Myritz for taking the travel with me to Syria, and for inspiring me continuously. I strongly thank my supervisor Lory Dance, she is an inspirational role model with her critical thoughts and writings, which open up for new methods of research. I am particularly appreciative of all the inputs and perspectives from Farhiya Khalid, Mia Sung Kjaergaard, Søren Rafn, Frederik Johannisson, and Mette Lundsfryd, who all have encouraged me with significant comments. A special thank goes to Lasse Sander for carefully proofreading the thesis in high speed. Finally, for the love and support of all my wonderful friends and family, I am truly thankful. 2 Abstract This thesis explores current trends in social and political organising in Northern Syria, an area controlled by the PYD.1 The research is built on discussions between eight participants from the Syrian Kurdish-speaking community living in the areas. While most discourses on Syria and the Kurdish-speaking community have a macro-political focus and produce racialising descriptions of “Kurdishness” in Syria, less attention is granted to bottom-up organising and the plurality of Kurdishness.
  • Ending Colombia's FARC Conflict: Dealing the Right Card

    Ending Colombia's FARC Conflict: Dealing the Right Card

    ENDING COLOMBIA’S FARC CONFLICT: DEALING THE RIGHT CARD Latin America Report N°30 – 26 March 2009 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY............................................................................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. FARC STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES................................................................... 2 A. ADAPTIVE CAPACITY ...................................................................................................................4 B. AN ORGANISATION UNDER STRESS ..............................................................................................5 1. Strategy and tactics ......................................................................................................................5 2. Combatant strength and firepower...............................................................................................7 3. Politics, recruitment, indoctrination.............................................................................................8 4. Withdrawal and survival ..............................................................................................................9 5. Urban warfare ............................................................................................................................11 6. War economy .............................................................................................................................12
  • Break the Spell Or More of the Same?

    Break the Spell Or More of the Same?

    Break the spell or more of the same? 1 Colombian Platform for Human Rights, Democracy and Development Secretaría Técnica Corporación Cactus Correo electrónico: [email protected] Carrera 25 Nº 51-37, oficina 301 Tels.: (571) 345 83 40 - (571) 345 83 29 Comité Editorial: Corporación Cactus, Colectivo de Abogados José Alvear Restrepo (Cajar), Instituto Latinoamericano de Servicios Legales Alternativos (ILSA) Edición: Carlos Enrique Angarita Foto carátula: Jesús Abad Colorado Fernanda Pineda Palencia Caricaturas: Vladdo: Cortesía Revista Semana – Publicaciones Semana S.A. Antonio Caballero: Revista Semana – Publicaciones Semana S.A. Chócolo: Cortesía del autor Preparación editorial: Marta Rojas Traducción: Luke Holland Diseño: Paola Escobar Versión impresa en español: Ediciones Antropos Bogotá, Colombia, Noviembre de 2009 Los artículos que aparecen en este libro son responsabilidad de sus autores. Se permite la reproducción parcial o total de esta obra, en cualquier formato, mecánico o digital, siempre y cuando no se modifique su contenido, se res- pete su autoría y se mantenga esta nota. 2 Break the spell or more of the same? 3 ho IND 6 Presentation PART 4: COMMODIFICATION OF THE TERRITORY PART 1: CONTEXT 126 Rural and food issues under the Uribe government Juan Carlos Morales González 11 The Democratic Security Policy in its regional context: old affinities with the North, new contradictions with the Southr 139 The human right to water, environmental crisis Consuelo Ahumada and social mobilisation INDEX Rafael Colmenares Faccini 19 The bankers get rich while misery spreads Jorge Iván González 149 Commodifying public goods: deepening exclusion and poverty An analysis of waste management policy 24 In time of crisis, the bank doesn’t serve during the Álvaro Uribe government Juan Diego Restrepo E.
  • Ending Colombia's FARC Conflict

    Ending Colombia's FARC Conflict

    ENDING COLOMBIA’S FARC CONFLICT: DEALING THE RIGHT CARD Latin America Report N°30 – 26 March 2009 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY............................................................................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. FARC STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES................................................................... 2 A. ADAPTIVE CAPACITY ...................................................................................................................4 B. AN ORGANISATION UNDER STRESS ..............................................................................................5 1. Strategy and tactics ......................................................................................................................5 2. Combatant strength and firepower...............................................................................................7 3. Politics, recruitment, indoctrination.............................................................................................8 4. Withdrawal and survival ..............................................................................................................9 5. Urban warfare ............................................................................................................................11 6. War economy .............................................................................................................................12