The Impact of Rising Ultra-Nationalism on Global Humanitarian Assistance

THE IMPACT OF RISING ULTRA-NATIONALISM ON GLOBAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

KIMEU JOSEPH NZAU

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTERS OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATION (MIR)

UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY-AFRICA

SUMMER 2019

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that all the information in this thesis is my original work and has not been presented in any other institution other than the United States International University-

Africa for academic credit.

Signed: ————————————————– Date: ——————————————

Kimeu Joseph Nzau – 638385

This thesis has been presented for examination with my approval as the appointed supervisor.

Signed: ————————————————– Date: ——————————————

Dr. Fatuma Ahmed Ali

Supervisor

Signed: Date:

Prof. Martin C. Njoroge

Dean, School of Humanities and Social Sciences (SHSS)

Signed: Date:

Ambassador. Prof. Ruthie Rono

Deputy Vice Chancellor, Academic and Student Affairs

This work is the product of the author and no part of this paper shall be reproduced or transmitted electronically, mechanically including photocopy, reprinting or redesigning without the prior permission of the author.

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the hundreds and thousands of unnamed souls who lost their lives in the Mediterranean journey seeking a better life.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

First and foremost all thanks and praise goes to the Most High for making this academic journey bearable and possible, there were nights where I spent asking God to make this a reality and after this journey I am reminded that God is eternally faithful. I would like to give a special acknowledgement to my loving parents John and Mary Kimeu for facilitating my education and being supportive and committed to the accomplishment of my degree. My mother many times made me feel as though she was doing this study alongside me, she provided everything without question and at this point she has given me something that cannot be taken away and that is knowledge. I am eternally grateful to her.

Special recognition goes to the invaluable role of my supervisor, Dr. Fatuma Ali without whom it would be impossible to carry out this study. My professor has taught me a lot of things during this process, her character and personality are to be admired. Aside from the academic guidance, Dr. Ali impacted in me a sense of moral and ethical conduct that I will carry with for the rest of my life. She made me realize the importance of having honour.

Throughout the process Dr. Ali was patient and still thorough and if I had to undertake a doctorate it would be because of her inspiration.

I would like to thank the role played by my thesis reader, Dr. Elijah Munyi who also guided me over the last six months. I still remember coming to his office to discuss my topic and he greatly helped in developing the topics and areas of study. Dr. Munyi was like my second supervisor, working with me in complementarity with my supervisor and I appreciate all the insights he revealed to me. Additionally, thanks to the head of our Humanities and

Social Sciences Professor Cassandra Veney, who also played a key role to placing the foundation for this study, Prof. Veney was the first to assist me to narrow my topic, she had

iv frankly told me my initially topic would not have worked. Without her initial insights I would not have gotten far in this thesis.

Finally I would like to acknowledge specifically the USIU-Africa library staff for being supportive during the process of the work. In particular I would like to thank the lady at the library top floor in the printing office. She was very kind and helpful to me when on two occasions I explained to her that I had to print the work but had no access to my student‟s account. She allowed me to send her the work and printed it from her office, afterwards she wished me luck and I cannot forget her kindness and assistance. Special thanks to Trevor

Mahiri for his eagerness to read my work right from the start and I had to disappoint him by telling him he will not see it till August. Thank you, Ian Raititi for your support and encouragement, I will forever remember the confidence you showed in me, having congratulated me well before my defence of the thesis. And I would not forget to thank my other supportive friends who pushed me on; Nashon Mwangemi, Daniel Njuguna, Ian

Collins, Ludwig, Cynthia. God bless you all.

TABLE OF CONTENT

Declaration……………………………………………………………………….…………..i

Dedication……………………………………………………………………………….…...iii

Acknowledgment……………………………………………………………………………iv

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms……………………………………………….……...ix

Abstract…………………………………………………………………………….…….....xii

Chapter One: General Introduction …………………………………………………...... 1

1.0 Introduction……………………………………………………………………... 1

1.1 Background of the Study……………………………………………………….. 3

1.2 Statement of the Problem……………………………………………………….. 9

1.3 Objectives of the Study…………………………………………………………. 10

1.4 Research Questions………………………………………………...…………… 10

1.5 Justification and Significance of the Study……………………………………... 11

1.6 Theoretical Framework…………………………………………………………..12

1.6.1 Liberalism …………..…………………………………………………13

1.6.2 Primordial Theory...…...…………………………...…….……….....…16

1.7 Literature Review……………………………………………….….…………... 19

1.7.1 The Philosophical Background of Nationalism in Europe…………….19

1.7.2 Humanitarian Action in Europe……………………………….….…....25

1.7.3 Forced Migration and Rising Ultra-nationalism...……….……..……...27

1.8 Research Methodology…………………………………………………...….…..34

1.9 Organization of the Thesis ………………………………….……….…....…..…36

Chapter Two: Contextualizing the European Union’s Role within the Global

Humanitarian System…………………………………………………………………....…38

2.0 Introduction………….………………………………………………………………...... 38

2.1 The European Union‟s Impact on Humanitarianism……………………………..………41

2.2 The Ideological Context of Humanitarian Aid in the European Union……….…………49

2.3 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………..60

Chapter Three: The Role of the Right-wing Leadership on Humanitarian Assistance: the Case Study of Austria…………………………………………………………...……...62

3.0 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………...... 62

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3.1 The Background of Nationalist Politics in Austria……………………………………....65

3.2 Austria‟s Humanitarian Aid System…………………………………………………..…70

3.3 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………….....…74

Chapter Four: The Contemporary Global Humanitarian System………………...…...76

4.0 Introduction……………………………………………………………………….……..76

4.1 The Current Trends and Challenges of the Humanitarian Aid System………………….79

4.2 Politicization of Humanitarian Assistance……………………………………………....88

4.3 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………….....93

Chapter Five: General Conclusion…………………………………………………....…..95

5.0 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………….95

5.1 Recommendations………………………………………………………………….…....99

5.2 Suggestions for Future Research Areas…………………………………………...…….105

References………………………………………………………………………..………...106

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADA Austrian Development Agency

AfD Alternative for Germany

ALNAP Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance

AMISOM Africa Union Mission in Somalia

AU African Union

BBC British Broadcasting Corporation

CAR Central African Republic

CDU Christian Democratic Union

CI Categorical Imperative

CoE Council of Europe

CRED Centre of Research on Epidemiology of Disaster

DAC Development Assistance Committee

DRC Democratic Republic of Congo

EC European Commission

ECHO European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office

EDF European Development Fund

EU European Union

EUCAP European Union Capacity Building Mission

EUTM European Training Mission

FN Front National

FPO The Freedom Party

GNI Gross National Income

HRP Humanitarian Response Plan

HRW Human Rights Watch

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross

IHL International Humanitarian Law

INGO International Non-Governmental Organizations

IOM International Organization for Migration

IOs International Organizations

MNJTF Multi-National Joint Task Force

MSMEs Micro Small and Medium Enterprises

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

ODA Official Development Assistance

OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

OeEB Austrian Development Bank

OVP Austrian People‟s Party

PPV Parti Voor de Vrijheid/ Dutch Party for Progress

R2P Responsibility to Protect

SDGs Sustainable Development Goals

SNA Somalia National Army

SPO Social Democratic Party of Austria

TCCs Troop Contributing Countries

TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

UK United Kingdom

UN United Nation

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNDRR United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction

UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees

UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

US United States of America

USSR United Soviet Socialist Republic

VdU League of Independents

WEF World Economic Forum

ABSTRACT

The rising phenomenon of European ultra-nationalism has signalled a significant shift in the continent‟s politics, as more radical right-wing leaders and parties come into power.

Many of the ideologies of these radical parties and individuals have often been viewed as discriminatory and exclusionary; more so toward non-European groups, arriving in the continent and fleeing conflict at home and thus threatens Europe‟s intervention in humanitarian action. This research explored the issues of rising ultra-nationalism in Europe, the influx of immigrants from other parts of the world and how nationalist governments have reacted to this recent humanitarian crisis thus affecting aid/assistance initiatives/systems. The research studied the historical, cultural, political, economic and philosophic aspects impacting ultra-nationalism in European society and in so doing, attempted to correlate this with the rising threat of Europe‟s retreat from and adherence to international humanitarian laws and norms

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CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Following the mass atrocities and gross mistreatment of mankind witnessed during the inter-war period between the 19th and 20th Century the world quickly rallied to formulate internationally agreed upon principles, laws and institutions mandated with the prevention of unnecessary suffering of innocents at such a massive scale. The European continent, having emerged from the ashes of two devastating wars in the 20th Century, alongside their

American counterparts, championed global efforts towards the spread of international liberalism and institutionalism, democratic values and universalism of liberal norms especially those pertaining to certain inalienable rights and freedoms (ICRC, 2004).

The efforts to spread liberalism, for over seventy years bore fruit as a global liberal order took pre-eminence over other politico-economic ideologies theorized over time. This seemed especially true after the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the later adoption of liberalism by its former satellites states (Krugman, 1994). Many of which demonstrated to the world the success of liberal governance as many of these states were able to achieve political stability, after such a catastrophic period of war at the same time they were able to significantly advance their economies. Similarity emerged in the form of the prospering Asian Tigers adoption of liberal economics between the 1960s and the 1990s (Krugman, 1994). These countries were able to expand their export markets supported by growing industrial sectors in the midst of relative international stability, global cooperation and increased commerce and trade (Krugman, 1994).

Consequently developmentalism evolved as a focal point of sustaining the productive structures of a nation and these structures could be improved with the help of active economic policy and because some economic activities are more conducive to growth and thus development is differential, those lagging behind would be integrated into the industrialized nations (Reinert, 2010). Years of progress is now threatened by the increasing popularity of the far-right and ultra-nationalist leaders as well as political parties, evidenced by their recent sweep into political power across a number of regional elections in the

European continent (BBC, 2018). Many of these ultra-nationalist leaders espouse discriminatory anti-immigration, anti-establishment sentiments and acute Islamophobia that has driven up xenophobic and racist attitudes within the European masses against civilians seeking refuge from conflict zones. BBC (2018) reports that nationalist parties had garnered very high scores, in the 2017 European Parliamentarian elections and opinion polls, with some nationalist leaders who did not acquire power still maintaining key positions as opposition figures. These victories by the far-right in the European Union (EU) Parliament in addition to other national elections is reflective of a wider European attitude that is prejudiced, drawn to ultra-nationalist principles and practices (BBC, 2018).

The BBC (2018) reported that in Italy the Five Star Movement and the right-wing Party

League, both ultra-nationalist and anti-establishment, had come into power in the 2017 regional elections. Italy as one of the major migrant destinations into Europe has had to compound with the issue of rising immigrant arrivals, a struggling domestic economy and rising unemployment, ever since the 2008 Financial Crisis providing political opportunities for the right-wing. Consequently Matteo Salvini, Italy‟s Interior Minister and leader of the far-right League Party has recently endorsed radical propositions from his party for nation- wide mass deportation of undocumented immigrants, violating the International

Humanitarian Law (IHL) principle of non-refoulement. In Berlin the far-right Alternative für

Deutschland-Alternative for Germany (AfD) threatens to displace the long-time popularity of

Chancellor Angela Merkel‟s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party in German politics

(BBC, 2018). The AfD came into power for the first time in 2017, an indication of discontent with Chancellor Merkel‟s „Open-Door Policy‟ toward immigrants from conflict zones and the government‟s response to a worsening humanitarian crisis in the Mediterranean Sea. In

Austria no centralist party made it to the presidential run-off and the right-wing The Freedom

Party (FPO) was the major victor. Hungary‟s Viktor Orban went on to win a third term in the

2017 presidential elections, one that was dominated by immigration issues. Orban, an ultra- nationalist, warned of the dangers of Muslim immigrants and the threat of a European mixed population with no sense of identity (BBC, 2018).

Europe as a major contributor to humanitarian aid and support of the various actors mandated with providing these services for any suffering populace in conflict zones is at crossroads, amidst the impact of rising ultra-nationalism among these key funders of humanitarian initiatives. Therefore this study seeks to explore how rising ultra-nationalist politics and leaders in Europe impact global humanitarian assistance and the continent‟s continued commitment to contemporary liberal values, especially towards the plight of those suffering amidst an increase in intra-state conflicts.

1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

The concept of humanitarianism in Europe is not a new development; on the contrary it can be traced back to early European ideas of charity, modelled around Christian values of empathy and the belief of helping the needy. Humanitarian ideas were viewed as encompassing a general moral obligation to act and played a key role in the emergence of liberal aid. As the British philosopher Mill (1859; p.100) put it, “It is too late in the day to tell us that nations may not forcibly interfere with one another for the sole purpose of stopping

3 mischief and benefitting humanity.” Mill appealed for the development of humanitarian intervention in instances of gross abuse of humankind; his justification for forceful intervention was the prevention of abusive practices that were prominent within Europe‟s tyrannical monarchs. Such ideas still inform modern day liberal interventionism in conflict zones and in deterring authoritarian regimes that are unsympathetic to their people‟s rights and freedoms. Mills would be later echoed in contemporary times by Kofi Annan, who argues that, if humanitarian intervention is indeed, an assault on sovereignty, then how should we respond to gross and systematic violations of rights that offended every precept of our common humanity (UN, 2000).

The war periods in the 19th Century contributed to the flourishing of aid initiatives, this was evidenced by the creation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in

1863 as a prime example of early thoughts on humanitarianism. However, humanitarian action took on a different dimension following the 20th Century interwar periods that greatly impacted Europe‟s response to conflict and war. Kent (1987) noted that it was the atrocities after the Second World War that begun the period of greater international interventions as governments started to recognize the plight of disaster stricken-people. The war itself left millions of causalities unprecedented in history, approximately 34 million people died in the

European continent alone (Roberts, 1996).

Liberal values would later spread to the decolonized regions, themselves facing mounting internal crises from political instability, economic collapse, natural disasters, that left thousands of civilians in destitute situations. Davey et al. (2013) argues that these crises in the emerging economies were as a result of the negative impacts of World War Two, the effects of which were resonating across the globe. Furthermore, Watenpaugh (2010) noted that this led to renewed focus on modern humanitarianism one that is designed to be more responsive to global changes and actions that are more transnational, institutional and

4 permanent and that understand and address the root of suffering, a feat that the international community has made significant progress in addressing especially in the 21st Century.

The progress achieved in mitigating the suffering of civilians in disaster zones and providing for international aid is now threatened by the rise of ultra-nationalist politics in

Europe that advances illiberal practices more so against migrants and refugees arriving in

Europe. There are current contradictions in the simultaneous spread of nationalist particularism on one hand and on the other hand, support for democracy. Nationalist politics are setting up a dangerous precedent that could gradually erode the respect for international law and previously held social norms of universalism of rights in European society and instead replace it with isolationist, prejudiced and xenophobic sentiments that contribute to the mistreatment of asylum-seekers in European countries (Szakacs, 2015).

The shifting tides in Europe and the embrace of parties viewed as radical far-right groups has contributed to the rise in anti-immigration, anti-Muslim and anti-establishment sentiments as the far-right gained appeal in recent elections, gaining record votes in France,

Austria, Netherlands, Hungary, Sweden and Belgium (Venho, 2016). However, Venho

(2016) acknowledges that these attitudes compound deeper issues of economic instability in the EU. Many of these radical far-right movements have propagated the notion that acceptance of increasingly more refugees and migrants, especially from the Middle East, has burdened EU‟s economy and security.

A number of these parties share similar feelings of discontent with the EU itself and have criticized the institution for its handling of the recent migrant crisis, rising Eurosceptic attitudes to their highest since the 2008 Financial Crisis (Venho, 2016). Consequently, Marie

Le Pen, leader of the French right-wing party Front National (FN) argues for the abolishing of the Schengen Zone as a means for France to ensure the safety of its people, as the EU

5 humanitarian policies are viewed as diminishing national sovereignty and the right of France to decide who it may admit into the country (Szakacs, 2015). Ms Le Pen is not isolated in this regard as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban shares similar sentiments on anti- immigration policies, Prime Minister Orban has gone ahead to state that there is an absolute link between refugees from the Middle East and the growing terror threat in Europe and has blamed migrants for the current unemployment pressures (Szakacs, 2015). The Hungarian government under the leadership of the Fidesz (Hungarian Civic Alliance) has constructed fences along its southern border with non-EU countries, effectively denying hundreds of desperate immigrants and asylum-seekers access to aid services, even with these efforts to keep out refugees, the Fidesz is quickly losing popularity to Jobbik, an even more radical ultra-nationalist party (Szakacs, 2015). Thus, showing Hungarians are still not content with the manner in which Prime Minister Orban has addressed the migrant crisis.

Although these ultra-nationalist parties are agitating for a number of varied issues one commonality that has remained consistent between all of them is the issue of anti- immigration and how to respond to this worsening humanitarian crisis. Geertz Wilders, leader of the Dutch Party for Freedom (Parti Voor de Vrijheid, PPV) is known for advocating anti-

Muslim immigration policies and has been recorded making disrespectful comments towards the Muslim immigrants, in what seems like public relations and propaganda, Mr Wilders went a step further by assigning himself personal security for his own protection (Deutsch and Escritt, 2015). Although racist attitudes have had historic roots within German society this time it is being diverted into mainstream political movements by right-wing parties, this has legitimized holding hateful views and attacks on German mosques over the past years

(Lewicki, 2016).

Rupp (2017) puts forward that the rise of fascism, xenophobia and ultra-nationalism in several European countries correlates with the recent influx of immigrants and refugees

6 and the popularity of the far-right leaders has perpetuated the „politics of fear‟ and the unknown and thus increased Islamophobia among the public. Rupp (2017) further argues that the rise of these negative attitudes against Muslim minorities in Europe has little to do with the emerging migrant crisis but rather is reflective of inculcated political beliefs by certain nationalist leaders. He observes that due to a general fear of the presence of Muslims and a perceived threat to traditional European values, nationalism has peaked more in Central and

Eastern Europe, states not heavily burdened by influxes of refugees compared to the their

Western counterparts. These Central and Eastern countries are more concerned about the preservation of the wider traditional European values thus events in the West are deemed as similarly dangerous for those states in the Eastern and Central regions (Rupp, 2017).

Heywood (2013) notes that in the wake of the increased migrant flow Europeans are more concerned with preserving their liberal traditions, perceived to be under threat from

Islamization of the continent leading to refusal to admit immigrants from the Mediterranean, a claim that is often exaggerated (Byman, 2015).

The security incentive toward populism further complicates the issues compounding

Europe as a number of terror attacks have occurred over the region in recent years, for examples in Paris, 2015 and in Brussels and this has shifted the blame to the rising immigrant population and arrivals from Muslim countries (Traynor, 2015). This linkage between domestic security and refugees/immigrants has been exploited by various ultra-nationalist parties which in turn has reproduced prejudiced, racist and anti-Islam ideas as well as the accompanying abuse of Muslim minorities arriving and living in some parts of Europe

(Traynor, 2015).

The International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2017) recorded a 27% increase in migrant deaths worldwide compared to 2015 and a 43% increase compared to 2014. More than 5,000 deaths were recorded in the Mediterranean Sea in 2016 and there was an 83%

7 increase of recorded African migrant deaths along the Central Mediterranean which is seen as the most dangerous migrant route (IOM, 2017). These statistical figures are mostly, as the

IOM reported that there were hundreds of undocumented deaths and disappearances due to shipwrecks caused by overloaded vessels or individuals who had succumbed to the destitute and unhealthy living conditions in these vessels during the dangerous journey such as fire hazards, fuel inhalation, hunger and malnutrition, dehydration and hyperthermia (IOM,

2017). Many of the arrivals through the Central Mediterranean also happen during the winter seasons without deterrence from the harsh climatic conditions, the IOM (2017) ascribes this to increasingly dangerous North African smuggling groups particularly in Libya that coerce immigrants into boarding with threats and acts of violence.

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA,

2018), estimated that $25.39B was required to continue its global humanitarian initiatives but had received only $8.71B, a financial coverage of only 34.3%. Additionally, an estimated 13 million people were in need of aid across Syria, including 6 million displaced by the civil war in that year according to UNOCHA (2018). At the same time, the body warned that despite particular focus on addressing wars in the Middle East current trends threatened to side-line other conflicts around the world. In Cox Bazar, Bangladesh, the UNOCHA (2018), reported that the humanitarian crisis brought about by the monsoons-600mm of rain fell in just five days- this is the average rainfall for the entire month of June. The rains left in their wake over

2,000 damaged shelters and affected approximately 18,000 people (UNOCHA, 2018). In the

Central African Republic, there was a 70% increase in internally displaced people in the first quarter of 2018 compared to the same period in 2017 resulting to the number of people in need of humanitarian aid jumping from 2.2 million in 2017 to 2.5 million in 2018 amidst a multiplication of conflict hotspots (UNOCHA, 2018). And in the Democratic Republic of

Congo the number of civilians in need of aid nearly doubled in 2018 from 7.3 million to 13.1

8 million in 2018 (UNOCHA, 2018). UNOCHA (2018) stated that one of the most acute constraints to effectively address the suffering of needy people around the world is the availability of funds thus underscoring Europe‟s key role in the continued support for international humanitarian actors such IOs, NGOs, INGOs and other key actors.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Europe as a key contributor of liberal humanitarianism and its various actors is instrumental to the survival, improvement and sustenance of the liberal humanitarian order.

However, the recent rise in the popularity of various ultra-nationalist leaders in Europe and their victories in several regional and general elections has shifted public opinion and perceptions on humanitarian action for the worse. This shifting paradigm in European politics has created strong anti-immigration and xenophobic feelings that ultimately threaten to derail humanitarian assistance to millions in need of help.

This study is undertaken in a period when the world is compounded with a rise in humanitarian crises and natural disasters that have left millions of innocent civilians desperately in need of aid and relief. These occurrences have led to a rethinking once more of how the world ought to address the plight of some of these states and their respective capacity to control mass migrant flows, especially as Europe and America further isolate themselves from the international community. This absence spells almost certain doom for the contemporary humanitarian system which has for the last decades supported the alleviation of suffering. Therefore there is the need for a scholarly investigation on the impact of rising ultra-nationalism on global humanitarian assistance.

1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The general objective of this study is to explore the effects of rising ultra-nationalist politics in Europe and how it impacts international humanitarian assistance.

The study also sought to achieve the following specific objectives:

1. To analyse the philosophical background of ultra-nationalism affecting politics in the

European continent.

2. To examine the role that the European Union plays in global humanitarian assistance

both in the contemporary and in the past.

3. To investigate the impact of right-wing politics on humanitarian assistance: The Case

of Austria.

4. To explore the current trends exhibited in today‟s humanitarian system and the

various challenges.

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This study seeks to answer the following questions.

1. What are the philosophical factors that have influenced ultra-nationalism in European

politics?

2. What role does the EU play in the modern humanitarian system?

3. How does the growing populist politics in Europe impact international humanitarian

assistance?

4. What are the current trends and challenges impacting global humanitarian assistance?

1.5 JUSTIFICATION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This study identifies gaps that exist within the discourse of nationalism and humanitarian assistance through exploring other dimensions that influence European ultra- nationalism such as philosophy, economics and culture thus moving away from the political aspect that has remained the eminent avenue of studying this phenomenon. In this regard there is increasingly more need for research on the problem of global mass movements. In addition this study contributes to literature aimed at devising the way forward for the future of international humanitarian assistance, should Europe abandon its international obligations and further isolate itself from the plight of millions of destitute individuals.

This research is of importance to scholars in the pursuit of bridging the knowledge gap that exists in this particular topic. Indeed, this research espoused the lack of adequate empirical research, thus, this study is a contribution to the existing literature as well as an appeal for more scholars to dedicate their efforts to a better understanding to the humanitarian crisis happening along the Mediterranean and how politics plays a key role in the on-going crisis. Expansion in this literature and addressing the identified gaps will in turn help formulate and direct the debate on humanitarian assistance and populist politics thus offering new opportunities for scholarly work that provides explanations to derive possible solutions to emerging phenomenon in different social settings across the world.

In addition, this study is helpful to policymakers involved in government immigration and more so those agencies, public or private, tasked with humanitarian action and ensuring the protection of refugee and immigrant rights and freedoms. The study highlights key issues that that may hinder delivery of effective humanitarian assistance to vulnerable groups from around the world and can be beneficial to charity organizations, donor groups or aid/relief institutions working in similar fields of humanitarian aid and/or development aid. Central to

11 this study is the importance of cohesive policymaking frameworks among donor states and even among other actors. As such the information gathered in this thesis can help contribute to various discourses on achieving global cohesive policies that are politically agreed upon and that enhance the performance of the contemporary humanitarian system.

Furthermore, this study is of significance to security officials concerned with the multiplication of conflict zones across the world, especially as perceptions of needy immigrants leading to increased crime and terrorism in host countries continue to rise across the world. This study contributes to this security dilemma debate, affecting the wider international community and looks at how on several occasions needy groups such as asylum-seekers have been falsely identified as the sources of increased criminality in host countries. This is not only an issue touching on the rights of needy and vulnerable groups from conflict zones but is also a topic of interest to security agencies and officials around the world, more so in host countries with significantly higher numbers of refugees.

The thesis is likewise important to justice organizations, firms or individuals interested and passionate in the delivery of justice to victims and the protection of human dignity, it is an appeal for the continued protection and participation in global efforts to secure rights and privileges of any human being at any place. Notwithstanding it is important for international law students or those involved in legal/justice studies and presents an interesting perspective on further investigation on how the current responses to emerging crises may be altering set-out international laws, norms and principles.

1.6 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In understanding contemporary rise of ultra-nationalism in Europe this study found that the Liberalism and Primordial theories take eminence in the current challenges in Europe despite the existence of other theories that explain this research.

1.6.1 LIBERALISM

The influence of liberal thought on the existence of the contemporary humanitarian system in Europe traces its roots from history, as several Western liberal philosophers appealed to current humanitarian ideals and contributed to the adoption of liberal traditions.

Early 19th Century philosophers like Mill (1859) in defining liberalism; incorporating national identity considerations into liberal political thought (Breuilly, 2011). However Paul

(2015) posits that both liberalism and nationalism are two distinct ideologies but nevertheless share similar roots of origin that is through the French Revolution (Smith, 1998). Paul (2015) defines liberalism by its individualistic qualities; it regards the individual as real and having fundamental value with his/her own rights to freedom and equality. Liberal ideals were integrated into political philosophy in the 18th Century and from that time it has impacted how groups are accommodated within liberalism/liberal theory.

Liberalism is best understand through the works of classical philosophers such as

John Locke and Immanuel Kant who pioneered ideas that are still relevant to today‟s international system. Kant and Locke advanced philosophies of an ethical and moralistic approach towards politics through recognition of the individual as an entity with certain freedoms not subject to anyone‟s authority but subject to the laws of nature (Locke, 1948).

According to Locke and Kant, the individual being a rational being is morally obligated and expected to behave in an ethical manner including giving due consideration for others in need of aid (Arneson, 2015). Thus liberalist values become self-perpetuating in Western societies based on the individual and hence, this was the natural order of the liberal system. The philosophies of Locke and Kant are heavily influenced by Christian values and are a testament of how culture impacted the development of liberal humanitarianism and helped in the creation of normative principles within Europe.

In his publication Second Treatise of Government published in 1689, Locke emphasizes the idea of individual liberty and moral rights even further advocating for the equal treatment of women in European society, as beings with equal moral status to men. In the second chapter of his book: The State of Nature, he theorizes that the existence of the self/individual is what induces natural and obvious duties towards others and was the basis for early European humanitarianism. This is the principle that influenced growth of contemporary humanitarianism with a view of a moral mandate to act and prevent widespread suffering, an effort Locke ascribes to the natural reasoning of any individual

(Bennett, 2017). Furthermore, Locke argues that even in the absence of social order, institutions or governments, the principle of universal morality applies throughout as every person has the executive right to enforce the laws of nature and block others‟ violations of anyone‟s rights, to even apprehend and punish violators (Arneson, 2015). According to

Locke‟s philosophy even the current nationalistic fever in Europe should not be enough to constrain the roll-out of relief services instead the wider international community is expected to carry-on with provision of assistance to those in need.

Immanuel Kant on the other hand, in his works on classical liberalism argued on the primacy of morality as a standard of rationality in what he described as the „Categorical

Imperative‟ (CI). Similar to Locke, he continues with the same thought of ethical philosophy within liberalism by defining CI as an objective, rationally necessary and unconditional principle consistent throughout, regardless of natural desires or inclinations. However, various scholars have criticized these assumptions. Opposing positions in the modern debate can trace their roots to Locke especially on the matter of the objectivity of political morality and its assumed universalism, something that is being challenged by current nationalistic waves across Europe (Arneson, 2015).

Liberalism can also be defined as a social theory rather than an ethical or moralistic stance as elaborated in the works of Adam Smith and his influence in Western liberal thought. Paul (2015) points out that there exist similarities between Smith‟s philosophy and those of the early liberal philosophers. However, the marked difference with Smith‟s position was his focus on government action and emphasis on the civil society, commerce and open trade as the ultimate generators of natural liberty (Paul, 2015). Smith dismissed the assumption that liberal states were simply juridical constructs based on ethical claims. In

Lectures on Jurisprudence, published in 1763, Adam Smith argues that all societies are not just closed juridical systems of rights but instead transition through three major primordial stages ultimately culminating in the fourth and final stage of commerce and civil liberty, a commercial society where boundaries between polities are porous and open to trade and commerce (Smith, 1896). Smith theorized that borders would hold little relevance as trade and commerce grew between liberal states. These ideas by Smith informed the later creation of the Schengen Zone and built the foundations for the origins of modern liberal institutionalism as evidenced by the later creation of the EU.

In explaining the historical relationship between liberalism and nationalism, that is the contradiction that exists between these ideologies as previously observed by Paul (2015), this research also adds the ideas of the 20th Century liberal sociologist Gellner, (1983) who posited that nations are primarily a feature of modernity, as opposed to naturally occurring entities based on culture and moral rights as previously suggested by classical thinkers like

Locke. Gellner (1983) added that nationalism is associated to state-building. Thus, nationalism place within the liberal school of thought is to present states with mechanisms to consolidate their power, secure legitimacy and to reproduce themselves in the international system (Gellner, 1983). Early theories by Mill (1849) supported this understanding; he also

15 claimed that the explicit role of nationalism within the liberal order is to be used as a tool for securing political stability and effective governance.

Additionally, Calhoun (2007) theorized that nationalism serves to support a liberal representative government in the face of the rise of democracy, this was earlier described as

„liberal nationalism‟ by Mill that supported and legitimized the nation-state and has little similarity with current manifestations of ultra-nationalism and right-wing parties in Europe.

The ideas of Mill‟s liberal nationalism were intended to minimize coercive legitimation (legal legitimacy due to norms or values attached) and allow for liberal ideals of a „soft‟ and non- invasive government, consistent with the arguments by Smith (1896). The benefits of a minimalist government in liberal order is also consistent with Locke‟s ideas on the limitation of legislative power, through this observation we can see a marked departure from such nationalist notions that all the same embraced liberal values in the contemporary rise of the far-right. Paradoxically, Mill however held traditional beliefs of the hierarchy of nations, that due to differentials in development nations were not equal, it was thus the obligation of the

„culturally superior‟ societies to assimilate those nations into the privileges of a „civilized and highly cultured‟ people (Paul, 2015).

1.6.2 PRIMORDIAL THEORY

Primordial theory helps us to better understand the roots of the cultural differences impacting Europe today and can explain the recent backlash against refugees and migrants especially from Muslim countries, which has led to unfounded fears of Islamization of the continent. This perceived threat has catalysed the popularity of the radical right-wing in

Europe as more nationalist leaders continue to exploit the resultant conservative feelings of the masses and pledging to preserve traditional European/white values. According to Viera

(1998) it is the historic events and new streams of thought that have brought new reflections

16 on the nation-state, national and supranational matters and adds that similar cultural conflicts emerged most notably in Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union leading to a proliferation of new nation-states struggling to formulate unique national identities. Current trends in Europe have led to several countries becoming ultra-nationalist and embracing Eurosceptic attitudes, going as far as to question the legitimacy of the supranational policies from the EU (Viera, 1998).

In understanding the Primordial theory, it is important to consider the literature from

Clifford Geertz (1963) in which he posits that primordial „attachments‟ to culture is one that stems from the „givens‟ or the assumed „givens‟ of human social existence. Geertz (1963) defines these „givens‟ as the immediate contiguity and kin connections and also as emerging from being born into a particular community, religion, shared mother-tongue and similar social practices. Thus, primodialism is the individual attachment to the community and these attachments are created at a social level upon years of interactions and social crystallization

(Geertz, 1963).

Primordialist congruities of blood, speech, belief, attitudes and customs are perceived as inexpressible but all the same overpowering (Geertz, 1963). He argues that nationalism is a naturally occurring phenomenon due to kinship and neighbour kinships, which helps contextualize the inherent fear, dislike and mistreatment of the Muslim population sharing little similarities with traditional European beliefs. From this rationale, it is possible for us to see how ultra-nationalism in Europe has gradually led to racist and xenophobic attitudes toward groups from outside Europe and the increased resistance toward refugee/migrant arrivals by many Central and Eastern European countries, as noted by Viera (1998).

Malkki (1992) compounded that primordialist notions have led to deep national metaphysics strongly centred on the nations; “God divided the people into groups on our

17 earth and sowed the seeds of nations,” thus arguing that attachments toward the nation and inclinations toward it as a „given‟ in all societies. Natural existence of these loyalties to the nation is considered perennial in primordial theory, so much so that being outside the nation in any way is both for individuals and the community suspicious if not almost pathological

(Malkki, 1992). The historic and cultural crystallization of European societies around the nation is attributive of the current fears, suspicion and rejection of needy migrants from

Muslim nations and the rising appeal of embracing the far-right.

Both the liberal and primordial theories hold ground when analysing current trends in rising ultra-nationalism within Europe, they help contextualize the new challenges facing

Europe through an understanding of historical, philosophical, cultural and political thought that still has a lasting impact on contemporary Europe. Additionally, these two theories complement each other in that liberalism provides for the examination of the factors that have led to the growth of modern international humanitarian assistance, principles, ideals and efforts and how Europe, especially European Union members, have played a sustaining factor within the system over the last decades. Liberal theory in this study is also used to explain the cultural/ethnic prejudices that impact perceptions on aid, having originated from classical

European liberal scholars and philosophers, who espoused racial prejudice. From this perspective it is possible to draw similarities between liberal theory and revisionist sentiments re-emerging in Europe, and better explained through the primordial theory. On the other hand primordial theory helps explain the recent pushback against liberal ideals that have in themselves positively impacted humanitarian assistance. Primordial theory is important in analysing how and why revisionist attitudes have risen in most Central and Eastern European countries and how populist leaders are forming and leading this debate in the continent.

1.7 LITERATURE REVIEW

This section of the study focuses on the historical dynamics and experiences with

European nationalism in the continent‟s politics and briefly looks at the development of humanitarian assistance in Europe. It concludes by analysing the complex and intertwining relationship between nationalism, politics and the perennial issues of forced migration into the continent.

1.7.1 THE PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND OF NATIONALISM IN

EUROPE

Nationalism as an ideology developed in the 18th Century and before this period people organized themselves into groups based on common characteristics, however, the birth of nationalism as a political ideology can be traced back to the French Revolution

(Smith, 1998) and has influenced European political discourse for centuries. Bijsterveld

(1994) found that there exists a link between the rise of 20th Century European dictators and nationalism ideologies as he noted that these leaders emerged from the same period of nationalism and their role still impacts politics in their countries today.

Bijsterveld (1994) findings are based on a literature study of various 20th century dictators who similarly promoted nationalistic ideas but ironically the study deliberately leaves out Soviet dictator Josef Stalin in its historic analysis of European ultra-nationalism at that time period. The reason given for this exclusion of a notorious European tyrant is due to

Bijsterveld‟s doubts on whether the Soviet leader was indeed a nationalistic-dictator holding absolute power in the Soviet Union. This doubt arises from what has been a historic construction of negative perceptions around communism and thus negative views on the persona of Stalin, hence preventing a truthful depiction of him throughout history. However,

19 this argument remains questionable despite the demonization of Stalin by the West. Josef

Stalin is documented to have played a major role in USSR nationalist politics that would later inform Soviet expansionism and the creation of satellite states, within these annexed territories Stalin undertook rapid cultural assimilation measures to ensure the voluntary or forceful „russification‟ of these non-Russian communities along Soviet nationalist sentiments

(Weeks, 2010).

Nevertheless, an analysis on the analogy of 20th Century dictators and European nationalism is vital in understanding how this form of radical nationalism leads to acceptable xenophobic, anti-black, anti-universalism and anti-immigration attitudes often perpetuated by political leaders. The rise of Italian dictator Benito Mussolini had a wide impact on populist politics in Europe and the emergence of discriminatory fascist ideas of which the government of Mussolini supported. Payne (1983) explains that the rise of Mussolini to power in Italy resulted in support for similar fascist politics that were emerging in Nazi Germany. Payne

(1983) adds that even though the variety of fascism advocated by both Mussolini and Hitler cannot be clearly defined; there is wide consensus that it is characteristically linked to nationalism. The agitations of both fascist Italy and Nazi Germany also appealed to the economic distress experienced in the respective countries and led to the rise of ultra- nationalist politics, something that is similar to the current trends Europe impacting change in politics as domestic economies struggle (BBC, 2018).

Griffin (1991) in addressing European nationalism found that often the re-emergence of far-right sentiments was as a result of the palingentic myth or the notions of national rebirth. Mussolini romanticised the past glory of the Roman Empire and its global hegemonic power, using this as a pretext to advance Italian racial superiority over other races. This according to Griffin (1991) justified Mussolini‟s expansionist ambitions through the historic claim over the Mediterranean area and Italy‟s cultural and historic superiority. In similar

20 fashion, Adolf Hitler upon coming to power in Germany also advanced the palingentic myth, he decried the negative effects of the 1920s Treaty of Versailles on the German people as well as it domestic economy. To Hitler the treaty was not simply reparations for the actions of Otto von Bismarck‟s German state in the First World War but instead Hitler viewed the concessions made under the treaty as a humiliation of the „superior‟ German race

(Bijsterveld, 1994). The Nazi leader reasoned along ethno-nationalist sentiments and dismissed early German acts of aggression that led to severe human suffering by maintaining that Germany had the right to the domination of other weaker or „inferior‟ states (Griffin,

1991).

The rationale of Hitler and Mussolini in arguing out the primacy of their races has deep linkages to the works of past liberal philosophers and scholars, more so the works of

Immanuel Kant, who Mba (2018) described as paradoxically having played a role and still plays a significant role in the rise of anti-black, fascist and nationalist sympathies that are naturally discriminatory towards certain people until today. Mba (2018) analysed the historical roots of Nazism through the works of earlier philosophers such as Hegel, Kant and

Nietzsche whose influences were regarded as sacred to national achievements. Hitler himself exuded great fascination in the philosophical arguments of Kant even though he led a dictatorial far-right regime (Sherratt, 2013).

Sherratt (2013) goes on to say that it is this historic link between nationalist and liberalist ideals that led to the acceptance of inherently abusive and discriminatory policies and practices that were seemingly normalized in Europe by some of these liberal thinkers.

This is especially true when considering the role of Kantian political morality in liberalism that perpetuated views of a hierarchical racial structure, often overlooked by researchers.

According to Kant‟s philosophy the international order is broadly a conglomeration of inferior and superior societies and these sentiments have solidified racist attitudes and

21 mistreatment of certain groups over time. It is however ironic that Nazism and liberal Kantian morality emerged during the same period of European Enlightenment, when ironically he

(Kant) was advocating for freedoms, autonomy and universal equality (Sherratt, 2013). From this perspective, it is possible to contextualize the historic contradiction that has persisted in

European liberal politics.

Sherratt (2013) further argues that it is not that Adolf Hitler admired liberal ideas of

Immanuel Kant but rather it was an historical usurpation of Kant‟s work to better support

Nazi ideologies. However, Mba (2018) dismissed this idea of usurpation of Kant‟s intellectual property by pointing out that, like many other pre-Nazi philosophers Immanuel

Kant was a racist who believed only certain cultural groups could fully appreciate the universalism of freedoms and rights. In four separate essays in the early 1770s, Kant attempted to demonstrate that some human groups were incapable of developing distinct culture due to individual characteristics (Mba, 2018), this racist outlook allowed Kant and his subsequent followers to view the subservience of some nations and thus their domination as morally upright. This racist inclination is most evident in Kant‟s infamous 1788 publications titled On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy whereby he collectively dismisses people from Africa and India as lacking a drive to activity, as a result they do not have the mental capacity to be self-motivated and successful in the northern climates, thus they become nothing more than drifters (Palter, 1995). This may explain why European inaction in humanitarian aid is agreeable to many of the European public if indeed some regions are perceived as characteristically incapable of progress and development.

Palter (1995) found that Kant‟s racial prejudice extended beyond the cultural groups of India and Africa, as he also laboured to show that Native Americans were weak and inert, thus, incapable of any culture, instead describing them as „semi-races‟ stunted in development because of ancestral migrations before they fully adapted to their environments.

With this in mind, it is not difficult to see why genocidal practices were employed by the groups of European immigrants who later settled in the new American continent. He continues to say that even migration and intermingling would not in any way present the

„weaker states‟ with any hope of enlightenment as historic action is from „the stem species‟ also echoing the racist views of another philosopher; David Hume who claimed in his anthropology that blacks were naturally inferior to whites and are never eminent in action

(Kleingeld, 2007). Historically, the stance of these Western scholars seems to allude to the flawed assumption that non-European societies had never developed or played any significant role in the development of the international system and is today impacting the provision of aid services by ensuring the selective relief of some regions while others synonymous with certain ethnicities receive little probably due to the flawed view on ethno-racial superiority.

Hitler‟s Germany ascribed to many of these culturally racist and prejudiced views leading to the condemnation of the Jews as culturally sterile, a people with no nation whose very existence violated fundamental laws of nature (Birken, 1995) as described in the works of Locke and Kant in their versions of cultural racism and thus warranted elimination. Peikoff

(1982) found that German idealist philosophers such as Hegel Georg Wilhelm (1770-1831) further denigrated the Jewish nation and the entirety of their religion by expressing anti-

Sematic sentiments thus setting the stage for in the gruesome events witnessed in the Jewish

Holocaust. Philosophers like Nietzsche et al, (1997) in the writings titled; Daybreak; Of the

People of Israel, Nietzsche greatly contributed to the propaganda, fear and suspicion of

Jewish minorities in Europe by stating that “…their (the Jews) die is cast…all that is left is for them to become masters of Europe or to lose Europe as they once a long time ago lost

Egypt, where they had placed themselves before a similar either-or” (Nietzsche et al, 1997. p.205) .These sentiments demonized the Jews and the entirety of their religion setting them up as a threat. Similar trends are observed currently as noted by Bonikowski (2013) where

23 false propaganda has been peddled by various nationalist leaders that has resulted to the fear and suspicion of Muslims groups seeking refuge.

On the other hand Smith, (1988; 1998) found that the key challenge to analyse

European nationalism was how research has been conducted in a reductive manner and failed to take into account the within-country heterogeneity. This exclusion of within-county factors that have led to rising ultra-nationalism has been widespread in literature leading to the creation of a sort of „methodological nationalism‟. Wolf (1976), in quoting the philosophies of Hans Kohn, described countries in Europe as advocating for Western nationalism, one that is civic and based on elective representation in a political community and others as embracing

Eastern nationalism, which is ethnic-based and formulated on the ascriptive criteria of national membership, contextualized first and foremost by the community of descent. This dichotomy of European nationalism emerged after the end of the Cold War, when newly independent satellite states of the former Soviet Union struggled to form their own national identity leading to more ethnic tensions especially in the Balkans while Western Europe continued to adhere to democratic principles (Viera, 1998). Consequently, ultra-nationalism has been influenced to some degree by the fear of groups without European descent.

Brubaker (2005) found that although „groupism‟ has become essential in understanding European politics, nationalist feelings are better understood through relative salience of multiple conceptions of the nation-state. He further contended that analysing nationalism through relative salience we observe no real dichotomy in European nationalist politics but instead Brubaker (2005) argued the trends are as a result of major-level events whose impact on the nation is interpreted and framed by political/intellectual elites and the mass media. In this study, these major-level events might be seen as the recent immigration crisis that has led to a rethinking of the nation-state in Europe. This finding is consistent with

Mba (2018) emphasis on the impact of intellectual elites in defining European nationalist politics.

Similarly, Brubaker (2005) writes that nationalist fevers across Europe have been widely diffused and thus, some of the accompanying aspects of racism and discrimination have been institutionalized overtime, these are then everyday expressions of the public.

Billing (1995) agreed with this view adding that these ideas have been continually reproduced by the education systems and the mass media as well as countless interactions between national populations and powerful national symbols from flags, historic books, to place names and currency. Accordingly racist, xenophobic attitudes that exist in Europe can be linked to institutionalized discrimination that is replicated countless times to future generations through education, history and the media.

1.7.2 HUMANITARIAN ACTION IN EUROPE

According to Davey et al, (2013) the historical development of humanitarianism can be traced back to centuries old humanitarian gestures influenced by the Christian religion which demonstrated a willingness to alleviate the suffering of others in need. However, the development of the modern humanitarian system can be located both geographically in the

Western and especially European experience of war and natural disasters. Different periods of development can be divided into four: from the 19th century to the First World War, then to development of humanitarianism from the Second World War (neo-humanitarianism), the third stage was through the Cold War period and finally the period from the end of the Cold

War to the present (liberal humanitarianism). Hobsbawm (1994) on the other hand, divided the period of European humanitarian actions as marked by the major eras of 1914-45 and

1946-89.

Aeberhard (1994) found that French historical accounts place this development of modern humanitarianism on the significant events of the Cold War and specifically the Biafra

Civil War (1967-70). Humanitarian action has evolved into a wide-range of conflict and natural disaster support for displaced people in acute and protracted crises and encompasses risk reduction, preparedness and early recovery, livelihood support, conflict resolution and peace-building (Davey et al, 2013). Interestingly, Kalpagam (2000) found that important but complex relationships exist between historical colonial trends and the spread of contemporary humanitarian aid in some formerly colonized regions, a good example being in India and the

Famine Codes, developed by the imperialists and established the definition of famine and devised ways to measure it, provided guidelines for prevention and response. Kalpagam

(2000) reported that these relief actions in colonized territories had deep Victorian influence from the 1880s even as they were spread to other regions. The development and progress made in this sector may be reversed by anti-humanity policies from a number of nationalist governments in Europe, threatening to disrupt international relief systems as previously witnessed prior to 1914 (Carlton, 1906).

According to Harvey et al. (2012) overtime these efforts of prominent humanitarian actors like those of INGOs, states, international agencies, the Red Cross/Crescent Movement- have merged into loosely connected systems with links on various levels of finance, operations, personnel and values. These actors have likewise worked in close collaboration, complementarity or competition with other humanitarian organizations such the affected community themselves, national actors, militaries and the private sector (Harvey et al., 2012).

This is demonstrative of how the global aid regime has evolved to be more complex, engaged in a number of operations with an ever growing list of humanitarian actors from all over the world.

Davey et al (2013) suggests a deeper study of the past as a sure method of ensuring a humanitarian system that is self-aware, clearer about its identity and better prepared for engagement with the world in which it operates, this is especially necessary in bridging the knowledge gaps that exist due to a lack of sufficient empirical research. The global aid institution within the first two decades of the 21st Century has been confronted by challenges to both its composition and presumed universality highlighted by growing crises from conflicts in Sri Lanka to civil war in Syria to highly destructive natural calamities. Additional humanitarian actors have had to compound with more protracted conflicts in Afghanistan,

South Sudan and Sudan hence requiring even more support from European donors in addressing these challenges but Davey et al, (2013) reports that the system is still confronted by actors with little interest in its work.

1.7.3 FORCED MIGRATION AND RISING ULTRA-NATIONALISM

To understand how populist politics affects humanitarian assistance around the world, it is important to understand the dynamics surrounding the mass movement of people into the continent and how this has likewise affected Europe‟s political discourse. The refugee crisis provides a canvas by which to study Europe‟s commitment to global humanitarian action.

Bank (2014) focuses on issues of forced migration of asylum-seekers and refugees with particular emphasis on the legal framework on immigration policies by the Council of Europe

(CoE) the EU. His study helps to explore how legal developments in Europe can influence the interpretation of international law and protection of refugees. Through the mechanisms of the CoE, EU members, in their protection of migrant rights, are governed by legally binding norms of international human rights law (Bank, 2014). He adds that these binding laws have their full force flowing from the continental supranational framework.

From a historical perspective, Bade (2003), argues that prior to the Second World

War, Europe was a continent of emigration, attracting little voluntary immigrants from other continents or European countries. It is within the context of World War Two and the resulting migrant flows and people fleeing atrocities, was the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees adopted, leading to its codification and forming the foundations of the CoE

(Bank, 2014). Early forced migration in Europe was as a result of the Cold War tensions, as people fled communist oppression. However, Bank (2014) notes that acceptance of immigrants at this period was greatly influenced by political motives and the migrant flows constituted less numbers compared to today‟s flows.

UNHCR, (2016) reports almost a doubling of people requiring assistance, from approximately 30 million in 2011, to 63.9 million in 2015 and by 2017 this number had grown to 67.7 million people, with thousands fleeing violent conflicts and persecution compounded with rising food insecurity, environmental degradation and poor governance.

These factors have driven more than 3 million people to leave their countries as refugees and asylum-seekers in 2016, a reflection of the upheaval and complexities that affected displaced populations, especially in Iraq and Syria (UNHCR, 2016). Large scale arrivals of refugees and migrants in Europe in 2015 brought the plight of the millions suffering to the public consciousness, although often the refugee has been politicized, sometimes deliberately fuelled by nationalistic tendencies and xenophobia (UNHCR, 2016). On the other hand, the

UNHCR budget for financial support of international humanitarian aid in 2016, stood at

$7.51 billion, the organization reports an income of $3.90 billion and an expenditure of $3.96 billion, with 87% of funds donated from the EU.

Notwithstanding, UNHCR (2017) finds that there has been a multiplication of life- threatening crises, with an estimated 71.4 million people of concern to the organization including displaced people, refugees, returnees and stateless people. Nearly 1.2 million new

28 cases for resettlement were identified with major migrant movements emanating from the

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Myanmar, South Sudan and Syria (UNHCR, 2017).

There has been a marked weakness in international cooperation and in the ability of political leaders to mitigate conflict; solidarity has been mainly affected by different state-to-state responses amidst on-going politicization of the refugee crisis at a domestic, regional and international level (UNHCR, 2017). With this increase in groups requiring humanitarian attention, UNHCR (2017) records that the organization added eight new supplementary budgets, totalling $832.1 million and resulting in a net increase of the annual budget by $653 million from the beginning of 2017, with top donors being the US having contributed $1.450 billion (37%), Germany, $476.9 million (12%) and the EU, donating $436 million (11%).

According to UNHCR (2018) it is critical for support to be availed for other non- traditional actors in the humanitarian sphere, this is important in mobilizing and improving aid effectiveness. In 2017 Turkey hosted the largest number of refugees worldwide for the fourth consecutive time with 3.5 million refugees; on the other hand, Uganda hosted 1.4 million refugees, Pakistan-1.4 million, Bangladesh-932,200 and Sudan-906,600 (UNHCR,

2017). Additionally, UNHCR (2018) registered 1,889 new arrivals in August in Kenya, with

Nairobi receiving 1,090 refugees, 724 in Kakuma, 71 in Moyale and 7 in Dadaab camp.

Dadaab as of August 2018 accommodated 208,891 refugees (44%), Kakuma hosted 186,205 people (16%) and various other urban centres had 72,355 refugees. The top donors to these efforts in Kenya are the US, contributing $14 million, the EU provided $8 million and Japan with $3 million. Funding and support for Kenya‟s humanitarian intervention is however lacklustre, as evidenced by UNHCR (2018) report that shows as of August only $37.75 million (20%) was available for funding and $153.6 million (80%) remained unfunded.

The migrant journey along these travel routes has been transformed into a dangerous

„lottery‟ for a chance of getting any positive decision (Bank, 2014). Consequently, he adds

29 that the responsibility of providing assistance and protection is determined by the initial point of illegal entry into Europe therefore chances of obtaining asylum depends on which state is responsible in the processing of such claims. Legal protection of immigrants and refugees remains inconsistent across Europe because states at their discretion have chosen which laws to abide by and ones to overlook, a fragmentation of the legal situation (Bank, 2014).

Bank (2014), argues that this limited harmonization of assistance/protection policies is due to the prevalence of national over European thinking in the EU Council negotiations.

He continues to say that there is a perceived need within Europe to maintain the national status quo especially in countries that receive higher levels of new immigrant arrivals. For example, Malta, a small island nation of about 400,000 inhabitants struggled with between

1300-2600 arrivals per year in 2007-2011 and the government reacted by detaining asylum- seekers and refugees, often placing them under deplorable conditions and called on other nations to take more decisive actions (UNHCR, 2011). Similar mistreatment of asylum- seekers can be found in Greece where HRW (2002) reports of immigrant detentions in poor living conditions, often overcrowded, cockroach infested facilities with inadequate health services. Bank (2014) correlates these practices to the present day whereby the government has responded through routine detentions under appalling conditions and even after release from detention the Greek government does not provide any access to asylum procedures nor any kind of different reception agreement for the thousands in need of help.

Consequently, Mavroudi (2010) adds that resistance to migrants‟ stems mainly from the very assumption that states still form a crucial part of the modern day nation-state system and thus inclusion of migrants and the diaspora is seen as challenging the system or transgressing. He adds that nationalism in the 21st Century is not changing to become more inclusive, instead it has a tendency toward purity and homogeneity of society. Issues of perceived marginalization and perceptions of others as a threat can create more inward

30 looking tendencies and a need to maintain cultural, national, regional and other forms of place-based purity and attachment (Mavroudi, 2010). This argument is consistent with Viera,

(1998) findings on primordial notions rising in Central and Eastern Europe and a desire to protect traditional European values.

From the primordial thought, nationalism is transformed to a defensive, xenophobic and politically amiable notion that breeds the kind of manipulation that has reproduced ethnic and religious conflict (Said, 2001). This is because nationalism relies on defined territorial homeland, common culture, language and identity and individuals/groups that exist outside these qualities are viewed as problematic. Despite its potential to unite a state at the onset, as argued by Locke, more often than not nationalism is characteristically exclusive, insular and dangerous hence creating a desire to form ethnically pure states (Fine, 1999). Additionally,

Chatterjee (2005) posits that the danger arises in how nationalism is being used as a tool for ideological control or surveillance although, it is still undergoing changes and challenges to be further explored. Mavroudi (2010) links this new attraction toward ultra-nationalism to the classical ideas of Smith (1999) in which he stressed the major importance of nationalism in enabling autonomy and commonality during state-building. It is this insistence on homogeneity, stability and history that gives it a public and political appeal and invokes it into current political debates across Europe even in supposedly tolerant and multicultural

Western states (Mavroudi, 2010).

A broader understanding is presented by Shapiro (2000) whereby he argues that nationalist constructs encompass varying norms like societal behaviour, culture, religion, ethnicity and history, a lack of which creates the perception of “othering”. Those deemed as different, such as migrants and refugees, are seen to be in need of incorporation to an imagined homogenized nation (Mavroudi, 2010). Societal tensions may occur due to the need to homogenize immigrants seeking assistance, as certain out-groups may find it difficult to

31 realize this incorporation if presented in more extreme and patriotic ways such as is the case with ultra-nationalism‟s extreme ideas (Abell et al. 2017). Migration can therefore promote patriotic and ultranationalist tendencies in host countries (Mavroudi, 2010).

Despite the resistance to immigrants in need of assistance, Schuster, (2003) explains that there exists a paradox between Europe‟s restrictive immigration policies and the continent‟s economic need for immigrants; he describes this as the new „liberal paradox‟.

Whereby acceptance of migrants is vital for Europe‟s economies but at the same time reproduces feelings of racism and xenophobia among the public and strong desires for border control. Thus, many immigration policies from European governments eventually turn to exclusionary practices that hinder assistance and promote purity and homogeneity of the nation (Hage, 2000), as evidenced by several European countries seemingly retreating from multi-culturism in the contemporary (Mitchell, 2004). This paradox is highlighted by

Hollifield (2004) who states that the situation in Europe is whereby borders are open for economic purposes, for high skilled professionals but remain closed for low, unskilled migrants and asylum seekers.

According to Grillo (2003) the main problem with ultra-nationalism and how it affects forced migration is its elevation to a definitive trait of humanity and using this to justify a refusal to mix. He goes on to say that ultra-nationalism is reproduced throughout time and places by those tasked with studying it, eventually ending up highlighting migrants‟ perceived hybridity and transgressive aspects of their identities. Rapport and Dawson (1998) found similar patterns of how ultranationalist sentiments are recurring within Europe‟s education system and through mass media. In contemporary Europe, nationalist and racist versions of culture continue to dominate the popular imaginary accordingly increased differences; pluralism and diversity that exist are imagined as something to fear and to be constrained for the sake of effective governance and control of minority group integration

(Mavroudi, 2010). These recurring negative attitudes towards immigrants creates numerous challenges for resettlement assistance and integration efforts, causing minority groups to face hostility. Abbas (2007) adds that this has led to a situation of “self-segregation” more so in the UK, where minority groups often turn inward towards their ethnic communities to deal with hostility they face in host countries.

In regard to integration policies, Guarnizo and Smith (1998) point out that a major literature gap exists when analysing forced migration and ultranationalist politics, they argued that the assumption that immigrants will simply give up their roots and origins for the sake of integration as a flawed assumption and misguided approach toward provision of aid.

Similarly, Vertovec (2004) claims that immigrants themselves have an increased tendency to poses transnational economic, social, political and cultural connections with their countries‟ of origin and in turn transnational connections have led to a raise in host governments‟ concerns over political loyalties and ability for these migrants to integrate. It is hence very important for more research to be undertaken to adequately understand how immigrants and asylum-seekers construct collective identities of their own and form self-essentializing or homogenizing qualities through the process of re-territorialisation (Brubaker, 2005).

Additional research will help us understand how and why nationalism changes over time and spaces within places and how real people are involved in this process (Kivisto, 2001).

Mavroudi (2010) also contends that reactionary and extreme measures to protect national security have become commonplace as strategic, manipulative, romanticized and historical myths of the nation are encouraged, thus more research is also required on issues of everyday interactions in relation to mis-information.

1.8 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study uses the application of qualitative analysis to study the main issues presented. A qualitative research method which is most suitable in exploring abstract ideas found in different European cultures, attitudes, perceptions and ideologies. A qualitative research approach helps to better understand the prevailing attitudes within Europe‟s society, which may be otherwise difficult to analyse and interpret in statistical or quantitative terms.

This is a desktop research; therefore, secondary sources such as reports, books, reviews, academic journals, working papers and documents from the United States

International University-Africa library, organizations such as the United Nations Library and online resources will be used. All the sources used in carrying out this research will be acknowledged in a list of reference in line with the university‟s academic policy as well as to avoid any issues arising from academic dishonesty. Data presented in this research is first analysed through a descriptive analysis that helps to summarize the findings and find existing patterns in the study, more so in reporting UN statistical findings. From this an inferential analysis is made that attempts to show multiple and complex relationships among various groups and hence correlates this data to make predictions.

The study sought for information from the examination of documents and recorded communication objects such as pictures, audio, published articles, records of previous statements or video artefacts, making it possible to make inferences about the characteristics and nature of communication thus allow for systematic and objective description of social phenomenon. This is vital in showing the relationship between social phenomenon and psycho-linguistics, as well as their impact on attitudinal and behavioural responses to communication. The study also uses discourse analysis method which allows for the examining of such discourse items like writings, conversations and communication events,

34 taking into account their different sociolinguistic context. Through discourse analysis we can examine how knowledge, debates and conversations are produced and replicated within different discourse, it allows for us to analyse the current discourse/debates generated by elites in European society; (the media, populist politicians) as well as ultra-nationalist political parties and how they are presented to the general public.

1.9 ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS

This thesis is comprised of five main chapters;

Chapter One covers the introductory part of the study and comprises the background of the study, statement of the problem, research objectives, research questions and the justification and significance of undertaking this research. This chapter also covers the theoretical framework, which forms the basis of the major arguments posited in this research.

The literature review sections explores past academic works on ultra-nationalism in Europe, it explores the historical dynamics of populist politics and leadership in Europe and briefly looks at the development of the contemporary humanitarian system. Finally the chapter concludes by linking today‟s ultra-nationalism to the issues of forced migrations.

Chapter Two focuses on the role, values and overall impact of the EU‟s presence and action within the international humanitarian system; it explores how interventionist the

European institution is in global humanitarian affairs and some challenges it faces in this endeavour. Finally this chapter analyses the ideological dynamics influencing EU member states‟ attitudes and responses to humanitarian crises.

Chapter Three investigates the impact of rising populism in European politics on humanitarian aid through the lens of Austria‟s experience. It centres on the background of nationalism that has been perennial in Austrian society and how various right-wing leaders have framed and reframed the national discourse on humanitarian assistance.

Chapter Four examines current trends and challenges affecting the modern international aid system and thus briefly attempts to draw some generalized conclusions on the future of the contemporary system.

Chapter Five provides the general conclusion of the study and provides the findings of this thesis. It also elaborates on some recommendations for the future study of European political affairs.

CHAPTER TWO: CONTEXTUALIZING THE EUROPEAN

UNION’s ROLE WITHIN THE GLOBAL HUMANITARIAN

SYSTEM

2.0 INTRODUCTION

Europe is described as a northern continent from the viewpoint of most the US cities and is surrounded by bodies of water, including the Atlantic Ocean-to the West, the Artic

Sea-to the North and several other major seas, lakes and rivers that line the various peninsula and coastal regions (Berglee, 2012). Ready access to some of these major water sources has been historically and economically beneficial for the region, ready entrances to these water bodies has allowed Europe to leverage on its resources for transformative change like for instance, access to these sites has transformed the fishery industry into a major natural resource (Berglee, 2012). Indeed, Europe‟s growth to become a major economic powerhouse was greatly favoured by its geography and cultural factors.

Europe‟s cultural history plays an important role in understanding the growth and unification of the EU during the contemporary. From the Greek thinkers, who brought forth ideas, philosophies and organizations to European society, the Romans, who connected their vast empire (spanning regions of North Africa to southern Europe) with roads, ports, aqueducts and bridges and formed the earliest structures for a common market to the Vikings of Scandinavia, who albeit skilled warriors, were also skilled craftsmen and sea navigators.

All these early civilizations helped place the foundation for future European unification

(Berglee, 2012).

Initial efforts towards unification of the continent came after the horrors of the Second

World War and in order to prevent such happenings from occurring again, the three countries of Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg signed the Benelux Agreement in 1944 (Berglee,

2012). Although the Benelux Agreement of 1944 was aimed primarily at the collective security of the three smaller nations against potential future aggression by major powers, it also served as the first example of the possibility for regional cooperation and integration that would be later emulated by other European countries, as major powers such as West

Germany and France joined the union. The accession of these states to EU membership and their support historically played a leading role in enhancing the credibility of the institution over time.

On 25th March 1957 the EU was officially formed and since then has experienced a steady growth in memberships from the founding states of Belgium, Netherlands,

Luxembourg, France, Italy and Germany to now comprise 28 countries and as of 2018 had a total population of 507 million people, covering an area of 4 million KM2 (EU, 2018). In economic terms, the EU‟s cumulative GDP as of 2016 was 14.904 billion EUR, trading in imports stood at 14.8% of the total global share while trade in exports was 15.6% of the total global share (EU, 2018). The expansion of the EU still continues till the present day with at least five other countries expressing their desire to also join the union namely; Serbia,

Macedonia, Turkey, Albania and Montenegro (EU, 2018).

The EU is a supranational entity, which is an alliance of sovereign states (EU, 2018).

The institution is based on supranationalist structures, in which three or more independent states voluntarily associate and yield/cede some of their sovereignty for collective benefit

(Berglee, 2012) or limit some of their decision-making powers and competences to community institutions under the terms of the Lisbon Treaty (EU, 2018). Areas defined under the Lisbon Treaty are likewise legally bound by the terms of the agreement and are expected

39 to interpret and implement legal instruments, from either the European Commission, Council of Ministers or the European Parliament; these instruments are primary as they take precedence over domestic laws (EU, 2018).

Similar to the states that comprise the institution, the EU administrative configuration is broadly structured into three major organs, which are the executive-the European Council, the European Commission, the legislature-the European Commission, Council of Ministers, the European Parliament and the judiciary-Court of Justice of the EU, European Courts of

Auditors, (EU, 2018). As of 2018 Germany took the leading position in the European

Parliament with 96 seats out of 747, followed by France with 74 seats, the UK with 73 seats

Italy with 70 and Spain holding 54 seats (EU, 2018). Other organs of the EU include but not limited to; European Central Bank-tasked with managing the monetary policy of the

Eurozone, the European Economic and Social Committee-made up of interest groups that voice their opinions and advice the Commission, the Committee of Regions-which comprises local and regional authorities who similarly voice local concerns and advice (EU, 2018). The current European Commission is headed by Jean-Claude Junker, Donald Tusk is the current

President of the European Council and Federica Morgherini is the Union‟s High

Representative on Foreign Affairs and Security Policy as well as the vice president of the

Commission (EU, 2018). The EU in itself is a behemoth of organs and structures that cannot be exhausted in this study however we contend that the institution is a marvellous exemplar of regional unity, coordination and integration and is an astute demonstration of the potential of regionalism and its manifold benefits.

This chapter examines the crucial role that the EU plays in upholding the modern humanitarian system through various multilateral initiatives and programs that support aid agencies/organizations and are funded by several EU member states. It seeks to paint a picture of what the aid regime stands to loss in the event of EU absence. In this section we

40 attempt to evaluate how interventionist is the EU in humanitarianism and how nationalist politics arising in the continent affects the discourse on humanitarian assistance and in extension the manner in which EU member states respond to emerging needs from multiple groups in need of humanitarian assistance worldwide.

To address this issue this segment of the research starts by using official economic statistics, particularly on Official Development Assistance (ODA) data from Development

Assistance Committee (DAC) members which allows us to examine bilateral/multilateral contributions and observe trends in financial flows overtime. It closes off by analysing the impact of the far-right political parties in EU member states and how these groups generate and influence national debates on contemporary issues, in particular the treatment and integration of refugees and asylum-seekers from Muslim majority countries, fleeing conflict and war. The focus on the migrant crisis is crucial for this study and examining treatment of vulnerable groups, as empirical evidence suggests a linear relationship between the increase of Muslim immigrants and the rise of the far-right in Europe. There is increasing emphasis on a European identity in the Right, usually associated with the increasing construction of Islam as the „other‟ of Europe (Zuquete, 2008).

2.1 THE EUROPEAN UNION’S IMPACT ON

HUMANITARIANISM

Is the EU obliged to intervene in global humanitarian challenges or is it allowed to think no more of its mandate? It is important for this research to first look into the legal/ policy framework that binds EU member states to act in emerging global humanitarian crises.

The major aims of the EU‟s humanitarian action centre on providing assistance, relief and protection for victims of natural or manmade disasters and in carrying out these efforts aid is conducted in compliance with International Law and humanitarian values (European

Commission, 2012). The budget structure for humanitarian aid comprises three major sources; the EU budget, the European Development Fund-EDF and the Emergency Aid

Reserve- EAR (Orbie, 2008). Any and all humanitarian assistance projects implemented within the borders of the EU must follow principles of International Humanitarian Law, in compliance with Council Regulation (EC) No.1257/96 of June 20th 1996 and as enshrined in

Article 214 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union/ TFEU (European

Commission, 2012). Seeing as EU members are also members of the UN, the primary legal/policy framework guiding EU intervention in international assistance is the Charter of the United Nations and the humanitarian principles enshrined therein (Harat et al. 2015).

Other frameworks exist in the form of the European Commission Humanitarian Aid

Office (ECHO), formed in 1992, which operates as the legal basis for the EU‟s humanitarian action and aid (Harat et al. 2015). ECHO‟s mission is focused on providing and improving emergency aid, resilience-building, aid for refugees and disaster/risk reduction (Harat et al.

2015). Additionally, EU global assistance is informed by the 1949 Geneva Conventions and its Additional Protocols (Harat et al. 2015) which provide for the member-states‟ responsibilities in upholding and protecting humanitarian values and their expected conduct, especially during war-time and while in conflict regions. Under the European Consensus of

Humanitarian Action the EU is required to observe principles of impartiality, independence, humanity and neutrality in the provision of aid irrespective of political, economic or military constraints and calls on member states to respect IHL and Refugee Laws (Harat et al. 2015).

Although the number of people affected by humanitarian crises and conflicts lowered in 2011-2012 (UN, 2012), the threat of natural hazards and economic damages caused by disasters remained to be a real concern. In 2011, the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk

Reduction (UNDRR) reported 302 incidences of different natural disasters that killed almost

30,000 people, affecting an estimated 206 million and resulted in economic damage estimated

42 at €300 billion (UN, 2012). During 2016 nearly 800 million people were at risk of starvation and between the periods of 2014-2016 an estimated 5.9 million children below age 5 died from preventable illnesses (UN, 2016). As problems in unemployment, lack of education, poor health systems, climate change, governance and wars further precipitate migrant flows and refugees (BMZ, 2011) there is even greater need for more cooperation, especially as most

DAC-EU members failed to meet the pledge of 0.7% of net ODA-to-GNI ratio toward international aid and development (Weiss et al, 2018). Commitment of the EU toward global humanitarian assistance plays a leading role in today‟s aid regime. The year 2014 recorded high international responsiveness toward humanitarian needs, with humanitarian assistance reaching a high of $24.5 billion which was a 19% increase from 2013 at $20.5 billion

(Spencer, 2015). Increased assistance was influenced by emerging crises in South Sudan,

Syria and the outbreak of the Ebola virus in West Africa. Global estimates indicate that by the end of 2014 over 59.5 million people- the highest recorded- were forced to flee violence and persecution (UNHCR, 2015) and according to the Centre of Research on Epidemiology of Disaster (CRED) 107.3 million people were affected by disasters and natural hazards in

2014 (CRED, 2015).

By 2016, EU institutions comprised the second highest multilateral donors internationally, contributing up to 30% of total ODA behind International Development

Associations (31%), (OECD, 2018). In 2018, the European Commission remained to be the world‟s leading humanitarian aid donor helping millions of people across 80 different countries (UNOCHA, 2018). This was accomplished through a budget split into various sectors but more so focused on the immediate needs of vulnerable people, who received cash transfers for food, medicine and other primary needs. Other priority sectors that received funding were in; food security, health, shelters and settlements, water and sanitation and education in emergencies (UNOCHA, 2018). In addition, the EU operated 48 humanitarian

43 field offices comprised of 150 international humanitarian experts and 315 national staff worldwide (UNOCHA, 2018), addressing humanitarian needs within key interventions in the

Horn of Africa, Syria, Yemen, West Africa, Iraq, Colombia, Venezuela, Central African

Republic, D.R.Congo.

In 2018, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD,

2019) report shows the US as the top donor from DAC members, allocating aid/assistance amounting to $34.3 billion. EU member states still comprised the global top donors, Germany was the second highest donor ($25.0 billion) followed by the United Kingdom ($19.4 billion),

Japan ($14.2 billion) and France at $12.2 billion (OECD, 2019). This is attributive of the important role the EU states have in the continued assistance to developing and conflict- prone regions however these aid flows have steadily declined. The OECD noted that net

ODA flows by DAC members showed an overall decline of 2.7% to reach $27.6 billion, compared to 2017‟s figures (OECD, 2019). On the other hand humanitarian aid amounted to

$15.3 billion, a fall of 8% and preliminary data shows net bilateral ODA flows to Africa were

$29.7 billion, indicating a decline of 40% compared to 2017, within this was $25.9 billion for

Sub-Sahara Africa, a drop of 4.4% compared to 2017 averages (OECD, 2019).

On average the net ODA from DAC-EU member countries stood at $ 87.4 billion, a regression of 12%, this as loan facilities extended to developing countries dropped by 2.1% compared to 2017 (OECD, 2019). The overall global net ODA contributions rose in 17 countries, most notably Iceland and New Zealand but declined in 12 other countries, the largest falls being recorded from Austria, Finland, Greece, Italy, Japan and Portugal. A number of these countries reduced their contribution rates partially due to cuts in donor refugee costs (OECD, 2019) but some countries were influenced by other in-country factors.

Even though the refugee crisis has stabilized in recent times compared to 2015-2016 period, thus impacting ODA flows, this explanation does not adequately account for why several

44 other regions and sectors in need of aid and support experienced drops in assistance from the

EU.

The EU‟s aid is a vital contributor towards development, security and stabilization of the various regions and the institution is actively involved in various conflict-prone zones with bilateral and multilateral operations aimed at improving the standards of living and governance in these regions where they have been dismally low over the years. Mostly, this is influenced by the policy rationale of using foreign aid to deter migrant flows (Clemens and

Postel, 2018), essentially the thinking is that development and prosperity can be achieved with the use of foreign aid to recipient countries thus lowering incentives to immigrate to

Western countries. Increased migration issues have been the main feature of European development agencies since the 1990s and continues to impact aid policy today (Knoll and

Sherriff, 2017). To that end, the EU has provided assistance to developing economies in the

Africa over the years, with focus on fragile states ranging from Sudan-$736 million, South

Sudan-$664 million and Somalia-$458 million (Spencer, 2015) to mention a few. In particular the EU has been a positive humanitarian partner to Somalia, demonstrated by its allocation of €119 million through flexible funding for drought responses in 2017 that helped avert effects of a looming and life threatening famine, with thousands still left vulnerable

(EC, 2018). The EU in Somalia is involved in multifaceted sectors such as; security partnerships, political change, development assistance and aid (EC, 2018). For the period between 2015-2020 the EU and member states‟ committed a total of €3.5 billion, which included funds allocated for humanitarian aid, development aid as well as peacekeeping operations in Somalia (EC, 2018).

For EU support, security is a major consideration and to that effect the EU prioritizes the strengthening of the Somali National Army (SNA) capacity. There are three major EU missions that focus on capacity building and these include; 1. Military Training Mission-

45 through the European Training Missions (EUTM) to help build up the SNA ranks; 2. EU

Operation ATALANTA- which involves suppression and deterrence of piracy and other transnational crimes alongside SNA and 3. European Union Capacity Building Mission in

Somalia (EUCAP) Somalia- according to the (Council of the Europe Union, 2018) press release, this involves the long-term commitment (till 31st December 2020) of enhancing the maritime civilian law enforcement capacity of Somalia and strengthening Mogadishu‟s ability to respond to and address the insecurity challenges along the Indian Ocean (EC,.

2018).

This support has been instrumental in securing peace in the region, however the progress made is seemingly threatened, shown through the EU‟s decision in July 2016 to place caps on the amount it would provide for the Africa Union Mission in Somalia

(AMISOM). The EU‟s decision led to a widening rift between the mission and its partners and eventually the decision by the AU to prematurely withdraw from Somalia (Omar and

Ani, 2017). The 2016 decision to cap funding for AMISOM resulted in the reduction of troop allowance‟s from $1,082 to $822 per month (20% decrease) and caused an uproar in Troop

Contributing Countries (TCCs) like Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Burundi (Omar and Ani, 2017). Most important to note is the rift caused by the EU‟s decision and the negative responses elicited by its partners, primarily the (TCCs), which is a call for concern over the future of the Somali mission and securing the gains already made, like the recaptured territories in Central and Northern Somalia through a large and successful offensive in 2010

(Omar and Ani, 2017).

Notwithstanding it brings into focus the debate on reliance to external aid and support, a situation that is worsened by the AU‟s poor financial capabilities in providing troop allowances and funding peacekeeping operations (Lobakeng, 2017). Consequently, the victims in this impasse and seeming rift between the EU and the TCCs is not the AU but

46 rather the Somali people who are reliant on these peacekeeping operations to ensure their safety against al-Shabaab violence and has additional ramifications for the mission and its future mandate (Omar and Ani, 2017). The EU ambassador to Somalia, Michele Cervone, stated that if it had not been for the EU, the mission would not have been formed (AU, 2016).

Somali people would not be exaggerating if they feared abandonment to the hands of the barbaric devices of extremists still active in the country.

One major factor contributing to dwindling developmental aid and support from EU member states is donor fatigue. There has been rising discontent in EU donor countries over the large amounts of funds committed to AMISOM over the last decade (Omar and Ani,

2017) arising from questions over the AU‟s effectiveness and future mandate as well as concerns over views of it as sole contributor. Arguably economic challenges back in Europe may also account for lower donors‟ financial support for AMISOM, as Gelsdorf (2010) noted the global economies contracted by 1.7% in 2007 and continued to weaken ever since more so in Europe, pointing out to the economic effects of the 2007 Financial Crisis had on the EU and impacted its ability to respond humanitarian needs. The European Commission (2012) similarly emphasized economic challenges that hamper on-going donor activities in humanitarian aid, noting that between 2007-2011 food prices increased by more than 40% and oil prices rose by 30% thus worsening transportation costs incurred by donors and their partner agencies while delivering aid to developing countries. Economic challenges are further compounded by a multiplication of conflicts since 2011, unprecedented in the EU; these conflicts emerged in the Chad Basin, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of

Congo, Mali and the Lord‟s Resistance Army (LRA) forces in Central Africa (Omar and Ani,

2017).

Notwithstanding financial difficulties have informed EU‟s rethinking and shifting of priorities, leading policymakers to avail more material support and aid for regions perceived

47 as high priority areas at the risk of some crises being side-lined. Similar EU missions exist in

West and Central Africa. The Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) receives similar support from the EU in confronting the atrocities and abuse of human rights by the Boko

Haram militant group, also the EU has provided €50 million for the formation of a joint force in the Sahel, the G5 Sahel Mission also aims at combating rising terrorism and transnational crimes (Omar and Ani, 2017). In CAR the situation is more deficient where there is a deepening humanitarian crisis, a volatile situation with regular attacks on civilians including targeted and indiscriminate attacks on humanitarian actors (Gauthier, 2018). The CAR crisis has not been at the forefront of the agenda with massive underfunding over the years, from

65% received in 2014 to 36.5% in 2017, from 2014-2017 its Humanitarian Response Plan

(HRP) received respectively 68.2%, 53.5%, 37.9% and 36.5% of requested funds (Gauthier,

2018). This has thus negatively impacted on shelters, protection, water and sanitation, health and food programmes. According to Gauthier (2018) DAC countries contributed about 2% of total humanitarian appeals in CAR while 75% of contributions were less than $10 million and only a third of DAC members (9/27) fulfilled their share of humanitarian appeal.

The effect of this multiplication of humanitarian crises and growing donor fatigue in

Africa has led to lower financial support coupled with disproportionate funding of various actors dependent on the EU. According to the Global Humanitarian Overview report (2018), the year 2017 saw rising humanitarian needs for more than 2.5 million people in need of protection and basic services but received only 36.5% of total funding for its Humanitarian

Response Plan, which fell short of the required $316 million (Global Humanitarian

Overview, 2018). This data correlates with (UNOCHA, 2017) report that estimated the population of vulnerable persons grew from 2.2 million to 2.5 million, an increase of almost

50%. The HRP for 2018 amounted to $518 million (Gauthier, 2018). Data presented here shows a worrying trend in donor funds and humanitarian assistance that has been dwindling

48 over the years, what is more disconcerting is the fact that crises and disasters have likewise increased. Without the invaluable support of EU member states it is difficult to foresee how many of the affected countries with limited capacities will be able to improve the humanitarian conditions of their populace.

2.2 THE IDEOLOGICAL CONTEXT OF HUMANITARIAN AID

IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

While previous chapters have focused on the Christian values (moralistic approach) that influenced the start of Europe‟s intervention in humanitarianism, this section of the chapter looks at contemporary political ideologies surrounding aid and developmental assistance. It focuses on an analysis of political rhetoric from some far-right party leaders and looks at how this shapes perceptions, attitudes and admission of people from conflict-zones.

As noted economic challenges back in Europe have prompted the shift in EU‟s humanitarian focus as funds for some actors have steadily decreased. However, political ideology has recently dominated this issue among European donor states, especially with the rise of refugees seeking sanctuary in EU member states. The financial and refugee hardships have affected EU capacity to respond to trans-boundary crimes, this as political parties and nationalist governments campaign on this basis in explicit opposition to central European norms (Boin et al. 2018). Although this on-going debate surrounding refugee rights in EU states may stem from complex and interrelated factors, such as; redistributive costs of increased integration, independence and market integration, (Boin et al. 2018) contends that resistance also stems from the competing understanding of central norms governing liberal democracy. From this angle we can then analyse the role of political ideology in framing and reframing national discourse, thus impacting people‟s perceptions and attitudes toward humanitarian aid and a country‟s commitment.

Of interest to note is the impact of advancements in technology which has greatly improved early detection of crises, this has played a double role in that it has improved responsiveness to humanitarian issues and invented more effective instruments for prevention and management but it has also led to increased „crisification‟ of these problems (Cohen et al.

1972). Cohen et al. (1972) point out to the „hunting around‟ for issues that can be identified as crisis in the wake of new technology. In the contemporary this is truer when we consider the various positions of far-right parties in the refugee crisis and perceptions on their origin countries, nationalist parties have in recent times painted the influx of refugees and the increased integration of Muslims into European society as a threat, one that warrants to be perceived as a real crisis should it persist. This unsubstantiated fear of vulnerable people leads to the push-back against refugees witnessed since 2015 and impacts the capability of the EU to respond effectively to the needs of people escaping war and conflict.

As noted by Boin et al (2018) reframing of humanitarian needs as a crisis or crisification, is a major factor in the recent trends in backsliding on government commitments and this may explain the intentional rejection of legal norms by nationalist governments who frame the dialogue along place-based, ethno-political lines of purity and attachments to justify isolationism from the aid system (Mavroudi, 2010). Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a shifting understanding of what encompasses civil protection for people from crisis zones, whereby it has moved from a military understanding to include identification of other major threats in environment and natural disasters (Boin et al. 2018). Even now the definition is still changing; all the while the far-right continues to move from the margins of

European politics to the mainstream (Mudde, 2013) creating their own rhetoric on various issues. The right has influenced the styles of leadership and discourse of mainstream parties

(Goodwin, 2012).

Hainsworth (2000) argues that far-right parties are influencing the agendas, policies and discourse of major political parties and governments, drawing especially the far-right and centre-right parties closer to each other. Essentially, in today‟s Europe, we are seeing the politicization of humanitarian issues led by party leaders and key government officials who have subsequently polarized the migrant influx (Boin et al, 2018). Far-right parties and their political stance have had an impact on perceptions on whether Europe is obligated to be as interventionist. Hence, Boin et al (2018) urges need for more research on this matter, drawing from established or developing literature on populism, Euro-scepticism and constitution politics, especially how it affects constitutional norms. It is interesting to note how identity politics is affecting the EU itself as recent trends in backsliding presents an overall threat to

EU‟s unity more so on legality frameworks or legal coherence across member states, this leads to different understandings, reactions and responses to needed aid and assistance.

The manner in which issues are defined goes a long way in shaping people‟s opinions and mind-sets and if we briefly look at the dichotomy between the left-wing and the right- wing we can see how items are defined, perceived and thus the responses that are generated.

Rosas and Ferreira, (2013) argue that before the left-right dichotomy was dominated by politics, in the past the difference centred on symbolism, for instance; the right was associated with cleanliness, males and good while the left was associated with dirt, females and evil. Laponce (1981) contends that the political spectrum was properly defined in the later years of 1890s, where the political undertones were brought to the forefront of the debate. According to Bobbio (1999) the left is defined by its egalitarian sympathies toward aspects of equality while the right-wing is more restrictive, for instance, the left tends to be more inclusive in „equalizing‟ policies such as voting or access to healthcare, while the right tends to be more restrictive toward equality criteria.

On the other hand Lukes (2003) distinguishes the left-right spectrum in terms of what he calls „the principle of rectification‟ whereby the right accepts facts of inequality more easily and the left-wing identifies issues in order to rectify them. Through social theories and policies, the left-wing has sought to rectify inequalities that exist in wealth, sex, age, gender, culture and opportunities (Rosas and Ferreira, 2013). On the other hand the right-wing side of the spectrum has been sceptical of the „rhetoric to rectify‟ often viewing it as futile, as the aims to rectify fail to meet their set-out aims (Hirschman, 1991). Additionally the right-wing has remained critical of the left‟s drive to rectify inequalities and has thus argued that such actions have only created new inequalities and contributed to the demise of liberty

(Hirschman, 1991). Another key distinction is between the progressive and conservative aspects of the right-left debate. Historically the left was viewed as always progressive and the right as conservative, although Rosas and Ferreira, 2013) emphasize this is not always the case, as the left and right may shift from progressive to conservative and vice versa, at any moment. Lukes (2003) proposes that the right-left debate is defined by the differences in individualism and holism factors, whereby the right is seen as holistic involving a feeling of community and the right (although libertarian) remains individualistic and more concerned with the qualities of a person as an individual rather than groups.

In the contemporary era there is debate on left-right dichotomy along the lines of liberty versus authoritarianism, the left-wing is seen as espousing liberty while the right is perceived as authoritarian, however, Rosas and Ferreira, (2013) emphasize the fact that there are liberal and authoritarian lefts as there are liberal and authoritarian rights. According to

Therien (2002), debates on the definition of aid along Left-Right ideological lines may seem like a simplistic approach but it provides a vital factor in identifying varied responses to aid needs. On a broader scale the debates bring two arguments to the forefront of

52 humanitarianism, that is; moral principles (left-leaning) or cost-benefit analysis of results

(right-leaning) (Therien, 2002).

The refugee crisis in the Mediterranean Sea (and its peak in 2015-2016) highlighted the way in which certain issues can be identified as „crisis‟ at particular points in time rather than others (Boin et al, 2018). Thus, at any particular point in time humanitarian aid can be differential from country to country depending on the political alignment of a certain country.

It may be safe to then assume that resistance to refugees and backsliding can be ascribed to

Leftist-Rightist understanding of what comprises aid itself. A constant dynamic in research on aid is that the Left is more favourable than the Right to aid and assistance (Therien, 2002).

The Right‟s concern over result-based funding/contributions plays well into the narrative of economic hardships alongside donor-fatigue, the argument over lower funds going to stalled operations finds a ready audience in today‟s European society.

From a legal perspective, refugee assimilation policies may be differential as the dichotomy between Left and Right definitions continue to spur the debate within EU member states, most data however shows nationalist leaders play a divisive role in the quest for common policy (Boin et al. 2018). Another key dichotomy between the two is how the populist right-wing is characterized by authoritarianism and „nativism‟ referring to the congruence between state‟s population and a native group (Mudde, 2007) and opposition to pluralist democracy. The Right-wing‟s perspective is of aid being wasteful and having no clear effect on growth or the policies of developing countries (Tsikata, 1998) and also aid is seen as wasted on non-democratic governments, hostile to Western values (Bauer, 2000).

Within Europe the far-right itself has behaved in more illiberal ways than those it has accused of being undemocratic in developing countries, although most of the Right claims to not be racist, an overwhelming number of these groups exude exclusionary policies that encourage the idea that social welfare benefits ought to be reserved for the dominant ethnic majority

(Gowland et al. 2006). Nearly all far-right parties share an exclusivist understanding of the nation as homogeneous (Minkenberg, 2011), in what Oner (2014) described as replacement of democracy with „ethnocracy‟ whereby the dominant ethnic group and religion is framed as

„Us‟ and other groups as „Them‟.

The Right-wing within the EU has deepened political cleavages leading to different interpretations of what constitutes a crisis requiring humanitarian intervention; without cohesive policy, this discourse is open to reframing at a national or even sub-national level.

Despite the centre-right, European People‟s Party and the centre-left, Socialist Democrats forming the largest bloc in May 2019 EU elections, they lost considerable seats to the centre- left and nationalist-right parties (BBC, 2019), and thus we ought to expect the political debate and cleavages to only widen, as populist parties continue to gain an edge.

Another form of backsliding can be seen from the political perspective in the form of the reversal of democratic values in some post-Communist EU members (Kurecic and Kuhar,

2019). Within some of these post-Communist countries there are persuasions by right-wing leaders to impact public attitudes and through content analysis of various speeches and debates elicited by right-wing parties and political leaders, we can better contextualize EU responses to humanitarian and development aid. The crisification talked about by Boin et al.

(2018) is a common instrument of mainstream populist parties especially concerning the migration crisis, whereby some Central European far-right parties have used the threat of non-existent immigration waves to attack common values embraced by the EU (Kurecic and

Kuhar, 2019). This has generally impacted how needy people are accommodated within EU member states and how they are treated under existing legal frameworks or even if they are accorded social protections once they arrive in Europe.

In their work, Kurecic and Kuhar (2019) focus their study on the political ideology currently impacting Central Europe where primordial sentiments of a „glorified past‟ has led to a casual abandonment of humanitarian obligations manifested through Euro-sceptics, advocating for nationalism and isolationism. This study similarly emphasized the current positions of Central and Eastern Europe where primordial feelings are highest compared to their counterparts in Western Europe and where there has been characteristically strong sentiments on preserving the wider European values even if it meant lesser intervention in aid and assistance. The following section of this study will highlight some speeches and sentiments shared by popular far-right leaders, we analyse the specific content of these sentiments and draw conclusions on how they influence public attitudes and understanding of real crises happening around the world, crises that require cooperation between donors as well as recipient countries.

The first analysis is of France‟s Marie Le Pen, although the leader of the Front

National (FN) lost to Emmanuel Macron, her campaign for presidency caused headwinds not least of all due to her far-right sentiments and criticism of the EU as a supranational government. Here we shall analyse segments of one of her speeches;

"Today, prefects (representatives of the state in the local government) deal with only

one thing, migrating migrants. Never in history have we experienced that some people

voluntarily organize the irretrievable subjugation of their territory, that some people

deliberately work on the destruction of their social funds, plan to contest their culture

and thus prepare the disappearance of its identity." Criticizing President Macron, she

adds: "He does not want to admit the failure of globalization which he so heartily

defended and praised." (Kurecic and Kuhar, 2019, p.5).

In this statement Miss le Pen paints the current government as bystanders in the EU, describing the leadership as simply prefects, this is in line with the Right‟s view of the EU as a body dictating policies from Brussels for member states to adopt, without due considerations on state sovereignty. In calling the leadership prefects, Marie le Pen also gives the idea of a weak and inactive government, with little authority over its own issues by attacking the political elites. Criticism of current government is a typical feature of populist discourse because it is characterized by non-constructivism and accusations of opponents that would undermine its trust and credibility (Kurecic and Kuhar, 2019). She frames the current government as one that takes directions from elsewhere in this case the EU. Additionally, crisification of the migrant issue is highlighted here; first, through the claim that the local government “deals with only one thing, migrating migrants…” and secondly it features in the exaggerated claim that the French government is “voluntarily organizing the irretrievable subjugation of their territory, work for the destruction of their social funds and plan to contest their culture…” and from this claim we deduce three major concerns from Miss le

Pen‟s political camp, that is: (1). The criticism of globalization (multilateralism); (2).

Economic challenges associated with increased intake of migrants and (3). Cultural concerns over the identity of the French nation (Kurecic and Kuhar, 2019). This political reframing of a real time issue distorts the truth of the matter by once more defending illiberal treatment of vulnerable groups, seeking refugee through economic and social justifications of exclusion.

Essentially, refugees from conflict-zones are hence perceived as the source of multiple challenges arising in the European continent, from this perspective it becomes easier to understand the resistance toward integration at the risk of denying refugees and asylum- seekers their rights to access humanitarian protection.

Italy‟s Matteo Salvini, who served as Italy‟s Interior Minister and Deputy Prime

Minister since 1st June 2018. Upon passage of the anti-immigration bill that prevents

56 humanitarian protection of refugees, by the Italian government in December 2018, Mr Salvini had this to say:

“It‟s a law that gives greater rights to real refugees, who in the chaotic system that we

had were often lumped in with pretend refugees.” He further reiterated on his Twitter

that: “Italian ports are CLOSED” (Politico, 2018), he tweeted in one of a series of

posts on social media, reaffirming: “The traffickers of men and their accomplices

know that our ports are closed, STOP!” (Kurecic and Kuhar, 2019, p.6)

According to Kurecic and Kuhar (2019) Matteo Salvini is a political leader whose interest is to appear as a tough, untouchable politician, it is also clear that he treats illegal immigrants in the same way without recognition of different categories. The Deputy Prime Minister also creates a sort of thematic confusion when referring to „real immigrants‟ begging the question who is a real immigrant or a false one, depending on the Italian government understanding of the term. Even to this date Mr Salvini maintains a coarse relationship with the EU supranational body, of which he has had a squabble over tax-debt cuts-24th June-(Al Jazeera,

2019). As the leader of the most powerful ruling party in the coalition government, Salvini has manoeuvring space (Kurecic and Kuhar, 2019). Such a trend is increasingly worrying for the future of humanitarian rights within Italy, whereby their right to be accorded protection has been stripped away by a far-right government and most likely the aim of such anti- immigration policies is to deter migrants from arriving on the Italian shores.

Hungarian Prime Minister and leader of the National Conservative Party Fidesz;

Viktor Orban, is seen in the EU as one of the fiercest opponents to illegal migration. Kurecic and Kuhar (2019) place Orban‟s political rhetoric as laced with demagoguery as he praises

Matteo Salvini as “a hero that migration on the coast of Italy”. He professes ideas of the

57 creation of unrealistic democracy and creating paranoia among voters about a whirlwind of external enemies that systematically jeopardize Hungary‟s survival.

"Hungary wants to see the anti-immigration majority in the future first in the

European Parliament, then in the European Commission and ultimately through the

national elections of the member states and the European Council. Migration is not

just a question that will be at the heart of European parliamentary elections, but also

an important issue that deeply transforms European politics. The traditional division

of parties to the left and to the right is replaced by a new division based either on pro

migration or anti-migration. (Kurecic and Kuhar, 2019, p. 6-7).

From the above statement we can identify the issue of crisification present in most far-right political rhetoric whereby a non-existent wave of immigrants is heading for Europe, furthermore Mr Orban frames these needy groups in a negative manner, singling them out as potential threats or enemies. Orban‟s speech also creates its own rhetoric by claiming today‟s

Europe has not Left-Right parties but rather the divisions are based on pro- or anti-migration stances. This reframing of contemporary issues in Europe is a simplistic method of analysing the EU‟s major problems and singles out people in need of humanitarian help. The challenges of today‟s EU cannot be adequately explained through simple perceptions of migrants but is rather a conglomeration of different and intertwined issues. Advocacy by Mr Orban for a larger anti-immigration majority to dominate Europe‟s governing structures does not bode well for the future of humanitarian assistance.

Finally, we look at the sentiments expressed by the far-right leader of the AfD ( a party that is Eurosceptic, anti-immigration and opposed to same-sex marriages (Kurecic and

Kuhar, 2019) in Germany, Alexander Gauland, concerning the passage of the UN Global

Migration Agreement, says that:

“The document can lead to the incitement of the arrival of illegal migrants and the

pursuit of state benefits as human rights, for example, we promise that all migrants

regardless of status can realize their human rights by safe access to standard state

benefits. Less tolerant people (towards immigrants) call it "migration into social

benefit systems” (Kurecic and Kuhar, 2019, p.4).

From this speech there is a „dangerous Othering‟ of the illegal immigrants, non-

Europeans are generally painted in a negative light by Gauland, they are viewed as migrating to Europe so as to benefit from the social welfare programmes in these states, what Alexander

Gauland describes as „migration into social benefit systems‟ (Kurecic and Kuhar, 2019). He also decries the UN documents allowing for safer passage of migrants, emphasizing it is such open policies that encourage refugees to move to Europe. Alexander Gauland stance is from a traditional debate over whether social welfare structures in Europe and America precipitate migrant flows by acting as an incentive. Notwithstanding Gauland frames the issue of humanitarian aid for needy and vulnerable people as the key reason why unwanted migrants keep flowing into Europe. Hence such a discourse threatens the future of humanitarianism, if and when European governments start to view their efforts towards aid as incentivizing illegal migrant flows. Conversely the reaction would be to then reduce such assistance/support and thus deter mass movements.

The overall speech of the leader of the German AfD is also unsurprisingly dotted with criticism of globalization and unfounded fears over loss of national identity through the emergence of a European mono-culture (Kurecic and Kuhar, 2019). It would appear liberalism is under attack from different fronts when it comes to Germany. France 24 (2018) reported that the Berlin government made the decision in 2015 to adopt an Open-Door

Policy, that loosened border controls, allowing over 800,000 asylum-seekers to enter

Germany, it however received so much backlash from the Conservatives in Merkel‟s own

59 government and propelled the AfD into parliament. Although the policy allowed some 1.6 million people to enter Germany starting 2014, it received so much hostile responses that it threatened to destabilize a fragile coalition government. Ultimately, what followed was the reversal of the policy and a compromise to tighten border controls and restrict migrant flows.

In this case, Germany is just one example of how ultra-nationalist parties in Europe, even those not in governments, can influence state policy towards humanitarianism. And similar to other countries experiencing a surge in populism, the issue of migrant rights, their protection and integration into European society remains a key factor in our understanding of contemporary challenges.

2.3 CONCLUSION

In this section, we have looked at the impact of EU member states‟ intervention in the sustenance and improvement of the global humanitarian system and undoubtedly EU members play a major role in the survival of today‟s aid regime. Through various bilateral and multilateral initiatives the EU in past years had solidified its reputation as a champion for liberal democratic values. We have also seen how EU presence in aid and development is multifaceted, involving various actors, ranging from NGOs, IOs and even governments and addressing several sectors across a wide range of countries worldwide. Through a selection of official ODA data and statistics, this part of the study determined to demonstrate the magnitude of financial flows availed by EU member states in its mandate of meeting humanitarian needs. The data presented here shows large amounts of financial and technical commitment by the EU and certainly attributive of the institution‟s invaluable role. However, trends in financing also show steady declines in this commitment from the EU, influenced by a number of factors, not least of all populist politics rising in Europe. Of particular importance is how political leaders and parties have been able to sway public opinion by

60 reframing issues along their own rhetoric and thus impacting responses to aid for the vulnerable.

Migrant issues feature pre-dominantly in this part because of how they have impacted the rise and popularity of the Right-wing in Europe and thus offer a suitable assessment on which to base our analysis on how identity politics may hinder aid responsiveness. It also offers an explanation as to why nationalist leaders have found a ready audience willing to accept their often exaggerated rhetoric as facts and truth, in the midst of economic hardships.

In the EU grievances about immigration in host countries were consistently used by all successful populist right parties (Ivarsflaten, 2008). In conclusion the theoretical explanation in this part of the study aims at showing the dangers of identity politics espoused by the

Right-wing, to global aid from the EU and highlights existing loopholes that provide opportunities for the Right-wing to emerge in the forefront of national discourse and debates.

The rise of more populist leaders/parties in the EU presents a significant hurdle in forming cohesive humanitarian policies; above all the Right-wing has traditionally been the divisive force in this endeavour.

CHAPTER THREE: THE ROLE OF THE RIGHT-WING

LEADERSHIP ON HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE: THE

CASE STUDY OF AUSTRIA.

3.0 INTRODUCTION

According to the Austrian Embassy (2019) report, Austria is a country that is landlocked in Central Europe, with a population of approximately 8.7 million people and is bordered by the Czech Republic, Germany to the north, Slovakia and Hungary to the east, Slovenia and

Italy to the south and Switzerland and Liechtenstein to the west. The largest city which also serves as the nation‟s capital is Vienna with a population of approximately 1.8 million people. The embassy records that majority of the Austrian population speaks German, which is also the national language. Austria is a parliamentary representative democracy and is a federal state consisting of nine independent provinces namely; Burgenland, Carinthia, Lower

Austria, Upper Austria, Salzburg, Styria, Tyrol, Vorarlberg and Vienna. Austria has been a member of the EU since 1955; it signed the Schengen Agreement in 1995 and adopted the

Euro currency in 1999.

The Federal Republic of Austria was formulated following the collapse of the Habsburg

Empire in the 1920s; the Habsburg Monarchy had been a multi-ethnic empire, accommodating different ethnicities into its populace (Bussjager et al. 2018). The Austria that we know today is a by-product of the re-thinking of the Austria-Hungarian

Ausgleich/Compromise, which formed the basis of a dual monarch (Burgess, 2006) and after its abolition the Austrian Republic stood independent as a sovereign. The Federal

Constitution adopted on 1st October 1920 was subsequently revised in 1929 and reinstated on

1st May 1945 and ever since it has undergone frequent revisions and reassessments (EC,

2015).

Legislative and executive mandates are conducted by a bicameral Federal Parliament, consisting of the National and Federal Councils and legislative power is shared between the

Federal Parliament and the nine provincial parliaments also known as the Lander (EC, 2015).

The National Council (Nationalrat) consists of 183 elected members with a five year mandate by proportional representation of the parties, while the Federal Council (Bundesrat) comprises 61 elected officials by each of the provincial parliaments (EC, 2015). Customarily the number of seats held by each Lander depends on its population, thus the higher the population of the province the more seats it is allocated in the Bundesrat (EC, 2015).

On the other hand, executive power is held by the Federal Government which is headed by the Federal Chancellor, answerable to the National Council. The Federal President, elected by popular vote for a six year term, acts as the head of state and in addition is tasked with appointing the Chancellor, usually from the leading party in the National Council (EC, 2015).

The President of the Federation also nominates the Vice Chancellor and Federal Ministers, upon the advice of the Chancellor (EC, 2015). The current head of state in Austria is

President Alexander Van der Belen and the current head of government is Chancellor Brigitte

Bierlein, sworn in on 3rd June 2019 to replace Sebastian Kurz, who served as the Austrian

Chancellor from December 2017 t until May 2019.

Austria is one of the wealthiest countries in the world with a nominal GDP of $46,972 per capita; according to the Austrian Embassy records in 2019.Additionally the Federal government of Austria played a key role as one of the founder of the OECD. According to the

Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO, 2018) the country experienced robust

63 economic performance in 2017 and with the global economy expected to grow (favourable external environment) Austria‟s exports are expected to increase and in turn stimulate manufacturing output and employment in 2017. WIFO (2018) adds that the strong momentum witnessed in the country‟s economy is projected to increase GDP by 3.2% although this pace is also expected to slow in the latter parts of 2018-1019. Gross domestic exports amounted to $202 billion in 2016, accounting for 59% of GDP and gross domestic imports were $187 billion-54% of GDP (OECD, 2017).

The previous chapter concentrated on nationalism affecting the wider European continent, more so on EU member states however, this chapter will focus on the specific case study of

Austria. The aim here is to draw correlations to the current trends affecting European politics and making similar inferences using the case study of Austria. We shall hence tackle this through a deductive approach that is the study moved from ultra-nationalism issues in the continent to concentrate on more specific and sub-national matters affecting global humanitarianism. Austria presents an appropriate case study for this analysis since many of the key variables used in this research also present themselves in Austria, for instance; right- wing populism, immigration pressures, anti-immigration attitudes, a presence in the humanitarian system, as shall be elaborated below. Austria also presents an ideal example of how Right-wing populist parties and their leaders can influence issues of humanitarianism indirectly even when not in power which is a major theme in this study.

The analysis of the key issues in this chapter is twofold; first a look into the background of the right-wing nationalist politics, this helps in understanding that the surge of nationalism in some European countries has been historically perennial and this is rather a resurgence of nationalism. A historic relation with the right-wing nationalism in Austria has continued to be a major guide to understanding its politics throughout time until the present day. The second

64 part deals with Austria‟s humanitarian contribution, giving an overview of its interventionist policies and aid system.

3.1 BACKGROUND OF NATIONALIST POLITICS IN AUSTRIA

Much of the recent upsurge of Austrian nationalism has been characterized by the rise of the Freedom Party (FPO) in the 1990s and by this time the party had already embraced radicalism more so toward treatment of foreigners. The FPO was founded in 1956 as an extension of the post-Nazi, League of Independents/ (VdU). On its part, the VdU represented a deeply bitter and politically powerless „second-class citizenry‟ that felt isolated from mainstream politics by bigger coalition parties thus a Third Force Movement was formed in

Austria (Riedlsperger, 1978). It condemned excessive bureaucracy, inefficiency and inflation caused by the two ruling parties of the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPO) and the

Austrian People‟s Party (OVP) (Parkinson, 1989). Most of its supporters at this time comprised of craftsmen, tradesmen, shopkeepers, former Nazi and German nationalists

(Parkinson, 1989). The leader of the new FPO party, Anton Reinthaller, was a former Nazi minister while the founder, Jorg Haider, was renowned internationally for his controversial anti-foreigners and pro-Nazi sentiments (Jeltema, 2001) contrary to EU values. It is interesting to note the quick rise of the FPO within Austria, especially as of 1999 and what this meant for the European nation. In 1986, the party only garnered 5% of votes but in 1999 it managed to get 27% of votes (Plasser et al,, 1999) hence forming part of the coalition government.

According to Oner (2014) post-Nazi Austria in 1945 had resolved to exclude any far- right leaning groups and disassociate with Nazi Socialism (Thaler, 2000) thus such parties like the Freedom Party remained marginalized during this period. The government of the second republic went as far as banning former German nationalists and members of the

National Socialist Party and censoring media over Nazi sentiments (Hurdes, 1973). However, this situation changed between the years of 1986-1999 mostly due to an ineffective grand coalition government between the two major parties, which in turn had the effect of enhancing the FPO‟s position as the major opposition (Howard, 2001). FPO supporters in the elections comprised a number of youths, about 23% were college students and the majority of the supporters were aged 44 and below (Jeltema, 2001). Similarly, these findings are correlated by the Austrian Weekly Profit‟s data that suggested at least 40% of those under age 30 voted for the FPO (Baumgartl, 2000). These demographics are however interesting in that these are not the conventional groups that usually form the base of the Right, most nationalist supporters had been older and less educated citizens (Plasser et al,, 1999). Similar arguments have been put forward in the contemporary resurgence of nationalist politics in

Europe, begging the question why youth groups and well-educated citizens tend to support right-wing parties.

Jeltema (2001) notes that this rise in popularity of the FPO was happening during a time when the international community was embracing liberal democratic values and a period when such nationalism was too reminiscent of Nazi-Germany. As such the inclusion of the

FPO into the Austrian coalition government in 1999 was received by immediate EU diplomatic sanctions including; reduced contact with Austria‟s ambassadors and opposition of Austria‟s candidates to international positions, however, one year later normal diplomatic contact resumed (Howard, 2001). Such a stance by the EU demonstrates its intolerance of radical right groups that undermine the values and liberal norms of the institution, however, in the current crisis it is questionable if it will commit to such a strong resolve and act to curtail populism and send out a symbolic message to EU member states.

From the periods of 1956-1966, the FPO was increasingly restless and more radical under the leadership of Jorg Haider, as he transformed the party from a small German

66 lager/camp-party to a radical, right-wing populist party with numbers equal to the traditional parties dominating mainstream politics after World War Two (Riedlsperger, 1999). It is also during this period that the FPO became a major political force in Austria, standing as the only credible opposition to the coalition government (Jeltema, 2001) and once the coalition collapsed the party gained more ground in Austrian politics. Haider‟s success in reaching the public was most likely due to the prevailing socio-economic climate, with discontent being expressed on issues similar to today‟s crisis, that is; inefficient central government, EU expansion to include non-European members (particularly Turkey‟s bid to join the EU), anti- immigration, rising crime rates and unemployment (Riedlsperger, 1999).

However, this impact had a continued effect on nationalism in Austria. Populist leaders like Haider are part of the original stimuli of the „communicative activity‟ (Ferree et al. 2002). He is presented as a starting-point actor, such actors help to analyse how contents of debates are framed and by whom (Trenz and de Wilde 2005) and how these debates capture media attention (Tilly, 2008). Haider‟s FPO was the better option compared to the failing „establishment politics‟, he was charismatic and aggressive enough to win votes of those who would have cast blank votes or stayed at home (Riedlsperger, 1999). The far-right as an alternative to traditional establishment parties is a major debate currently surrounding

European politics as more populists fan the discontent with those parties that are in power.

The FPO for many years has peddled the perception of unemployment rising due to an influx of immigrants since the 1980s-1990s; in 1999, it campaigned on issues on unemployment, expulsion of immigrants, EU threat to sovereignty, abuse of social welfare and intensifying problems with cheap labour (Jeltema, 2001). In 1996, Haider is quoted saying that, “there were 300,000 unemployed in Austria and 300,000 foreigners”

(Haiderwatch, 2000). At the same time, he accused African immigrants of drug dealing as the

FPO continued to reproduce the image of economic and cultural dangers of migrants (Anti-

Defamation League, 2000). However, FPO claims were a crisification of national issues, just like today‟s populist political rhetoric, much of these claims were baseless and broadly grounded on identity politics in Austria. Unemployment rates in 2000 were in fact below 5% according to standard EU measurements (Kuhn, 2000).

Populist leaders are able to exploit such fears in so doing impacting public perceptions on groups seen as non-natives and far-right leaders like Haider understand this fear, saying “An Austrian‟s right to his homeland is stronger than a foreigners‟ right to live with his family,” (Haiderwatch, 2000). National identity is a prominent feature within politics in Austria and seemingly steered by the Right for decades, as the FPO party policy has aimed at a strong national defence and immigration policy that keeps „Austria Austrian‟ (Pomerantz,

2000). This exploitation of public sympathies/fears is noted by a study conducted by the

European University Institute, which argued that the foreigner theme and xenophobia have been institutionalized in Austria by the Right-wing for their own power interests and political ends (Baumgartl, 2000).

The Freedom Party did not soften its rhetoric concerning foreigners in the country even after the resignation of Haider in 2002 instead these feelings were revisited by then FPO leader, Strache in 2007, stating that Austria‟s cultural, religious and political identity are under threat by globalization and immigration and the creation of an Islamic mono-culture if they do not fight back (Strasser, 2008). Once more a nationalist leader frames vulnerable and needy people as a general threat to Europe‟s way of life and categorizing these groups as

„Others‟. Economic and cultural cleavages in Austria are central in defining the political space and major conflict lines notwithstanding this discourse are dominated by the far-right

(Kriesi et al. 2008). Politicization of these two issues (economics and culture), has been recurrent in Austria impacting matters concerning domestic politics, bilateral and regional relationships and national security policy (Therrien, 2018) and this may likewise impact

68 humanitarian responsiveness directly or indirectly. The strength of the far-right and its domination of the ethnic context act as a determinant toward state integration policies, policies that Baubock et al. (2006) argue are centred on ethnic-based models and are restrictive towards naturalization. Hence, it is not surprising in the contemporary time to see the push-back against integration of migrants and a willingness to expel non-natives even those present in the country for sanctuary.

Muslim immigrants face discrimination more so on their freedoms and religious rights that are framed as contrary to traditional European values, in the past there have been major conflicts over increase of Islamic buildings (Mudde, 2007) thus highlighting Austria‟s cultural conflict with groups it strives to accommodate. Dolezal et al (2010) argues that

Austrian political actors are mobilizing certain issues and influencing major conflict lines and consequentially, citizen‟s negative attitudes. Even though a number of Muslim immigrants have lived in Austria for years, a vast majority are not accorded citizenship, as census data indicates approximately 71.1% of Muslims in Austria lack proper citizenship (Dolezal et al.

2010). Such a situation is not to be taken lightly when we consider that some of these needy groups arrive there escaping persecution and oppression, only for them to have their rights curtailed in Europe. The US State Department (2008) noted that denial of citizenship resulted in migrants‟ limited access to certain privileges and services that they need.

Nationalist rhetoric from right-wing leaders has in the past and the present, encouraged adoption of several exclusionary policies in defence of naturalization; however, there real impact is felt by vulnerable groups who are degenerated to be akin to second-class citizens in Austria. It is clear that the manner in which Right-wing parties frame their political rhetoric not only has an influence in public perceptions but can also pressure the government and thus have their say in national policy directives. In Austria, this was demonstrated by the

FPO‟s rise, which over the years was able to gain public sympathy for the party‟s far-right

69 ideologies and received a ready audience for its criticism of the more liberal policies of the

SPO/OVP grand coalition government.

3.2 AUSTRIA’S HUMANITARIAN AID SYSTEM

Post-World War Two Austria remained in a perpetual neutrality stance that for a long time informed Austria‟s interventionist policies toward humanitarian assistance. Jeltema

(2001) explains that Austria‟s policy during this period could be described as „involved neutrality‟ in that the government remained an active participant in the UN although refused to commit its own troops in peacekeeping operations. Through neutrality, Austria aimed at avoiding the entanglements associated with Cold War superpower competitions and thus prided itself as a „buffer‟ zone between East and West. Through neutrality, it was able to successfully create a transit point for over 250,000 Jewish emigrants fleeing persecution in the Soviet Union from 1976 (Library of Congress, 1993). Neutrality was also a major factor towards considerations of a bid for EU membership and for a long time this policy restricted

Vienna‟s involvement with the European Community especially during the Cold War

(Jeltema, 2001). After being part of Europe‟s bloody history, Vienna‟s rationale regarding

EU membership not only centred on appearing neutral but also revolved around concerns over ceding state autonomy and sovereignty in a continent prone to wars (Jeltema, 2001).

Later on, as noted, events in the 1990s offset this policy stance and necessitated deeper involvement in humanitarian issues.

Traditionally, the main development actors in Austria comprised of the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance and the Austrian Development Agency (ADA)

(UNOCHA, 2017) in partnership with other agencies. The Austrian Development Agency was created in 2004 and is a non-profit agency owned by the federal government and tasked with implementation of all bilateral ODA programmes. According to UNOCHA (2017)

Financial Tracking Services, Austria‟s budget for humanitarian aid was focused on

Afghanistan, which received 16% of total allocations, followed by Iraq-14.5%, Uganda-

12.5%, Syria-8.5% and Ethiopia at 7.6%. Austria‟s bilateral aid allocations focused on a total of 15 priority countries with intervention in 2/3 sectors per country with the main areas of intervention including conflict-sensitive approaches to strengthening of justice, security systems and boosting local organizations‟ activities in the field (Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

2006). The ODA report (2017) for Austria showed the key priority sectors with emergency shelter and non-food items having received the highest alloacation-49.4%, followed by early recovery-20.8% and health-6.0%. International organizations which obtained the highest amount of funding from Austria included; the ICRC at 32.7%, the United Nations

Development Programme (UNDP)-14.3% and the UNHCR-14.0% (UNOCHA, 2017).

More concrete examples of Austrian interventionism can be seen through its country- specific humanitarian efforts. According to it Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the government has committed to the assistance of Jordan, which hosts over 1.3 million Syrians. It plays a supportive role to Azraq refugee camp where it provided emergency grants in cash for food, medicine, gas and other primary needs for over 10,000 people (UNOCHA, 2017). In Iraq, it supported the rebuilding of dilapidated water infrastructure for 150,000 people and the

ADA‟s financial grants to Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) resulted in 10 to

20,000 people starting their own businesses. Similar financial policies aimed at development of MSMEs were applied in Mozambique to boost smallholders in the regions of Sofala, Tete and Manica provinces and consequently extended support to some 88,750 people dependent on agricultural commerce (UNOCHA, 2017). The Lebanese population has also benefited from this aid policy; where over 90% of businesses are MSMEs, representing 50% of

Lebanon‟s job market (UNOCHA, 2017) and by end of 2017 72 enterprises had received financial support. Therefore, ODA is directed mostly to the growth of local businesses in

71 developing countries, consistent with the opinion that development aid ought to be result- based and have tangible impacts.

At the centre of the policy to develop MSMEs is the Austrian Development Bank

(OeEB) which commits itself to the achievement of the UN SDGs with particular focus on poverty reduction-SDG 1, sustainable economic growth-SDG 8, combatting climate change-

SDG 13 and global partnerships for development-SDG 17 (OeEB, 2017). Net disbursements to humanitarian agencies from the OeEB were mostly directed towards the EU which received 26.83%, International Financial Institutions-21.97%, donor-tied technical assistance-

11.99% and UN Agencies-2.04% (UNOCHA, 2017). Through targeting smallholders, the

OeEB offers alternatives to local commercial banks whose capacity may be limited in providing funds for growth or stabilization. According to the OeEB December 31st report

(2017), projects for MSMEs contracts amounted to EUR.85.47 million in terms of new contracts. Notwithstanding, the OeEB extended three new credit lines to the world‟s poorest developing regions; one credit line was extended to intermediaries in Bangladesh and two credit lines to financial institutions and microfinances in Sub-Sahara Africa (OeEB, 2017).

The bank‟s core interests are similar to the main priority areas outlined by the Austrian government and envisioned in the SDGs, some of these include rural development, education, sustainable energy, water and sanitation, gender equality and women empowerment, good governance, human rights and private sector development, among others.

Austria‟s aid system is however compounded by challenges that hinder effectiveness of aid disbursement efforts and policy loopholes that may be inadequately defined and that are open to different interpretations. The OECD (2009) report highlights that the

Development Co-operation Act and its 2003 Amendments do not specifically set-out humanitarian objectives, such a case presents problems in the quest for cohesive humanitarian action during crises. Lack of coherent legal frameworks and the failure to

72 implement proper institutionalization of humanitarian policy explains differentiated responses towards the plight of needy people. Furthermore, Austria‟s aid is directed through three ministries all with different budgets, which presents a challenge in co-ordination and thus appears to depend on ad-hoc co-ordination and personal contacts rather than formal structures

(OECD, 2009). Such a situation may not only hinder Austria‟s delivery of aid but also is a point of confusion for external partners concerning dialogue and decision-making.

In the absence of a politically-endorsed policy statement, humanitarian assistance programmes in Austria are left in the control of the civil service to design and implement

(OECD, 2009). The organization also observed that there was lack of policy debates on international aid within Austria and consequentially limited public discourse on the matter, there appears to be no national consensus on aid policies, strategies and objectives and this makes it hard to assess desired outcomes. It becomes easier to understand how aid may be framed or perceived as undesirable and as having no impact on developing countries.

Although statistics may establish Austria‟s interventionism in aid and poverty eradication, a traditional Christian Catholic faith has encouraged years of charitable-giving, this solidarity however does not translate to political support for development aid and assistance (OECD,

2009).

Furthermore the OECD (2009) note that debates on humanitarian aid and assistance are minor political issues and rarely feature in Austrian political discourse nor are such debates brought forth to the public. Coupled with lack of institutionalization of legal frameworks on aid policies to guide desired outcomes, we can also see a lack of communication to the public on aid matters and the ambiguity presented here can be seen as one of the loopholes we earlier described. They present additional challenges in monitoring and reporting of development related expenditure and as a result Austria‟s humanitarian aid budget is much more fragmented compared to other DAC-EU member states (OECD, 2009).

According to the Austrian government, public support for humanitarian aid as of 2007 showed that 40% approved to provision of aid as much as other EU states, 5% supported aid to be more than other EU countries while 31% advocated for aid to remain unchanged, at the same time the government reported that 70% of Austrians also claimed to be poorly informed about development co-operation (GfK Austria, 2007). The absence of an active public discourse may lead to misunderstandings on the significance and impact of aid and may be open to political rhetoric of the national parties. The political context in Austria has resulted in mainstream parties being restrained over the possible politicization of aid matters; consequentially aid is not necessarily a priority in politics (OECD, 2009). Although motions on development are brought forth in parliament by the sub-committee, in actuality it has no decision-making authority and the development agenda is rarely on plenary sessions (OECD,

2009) thus some humanitarian crises may not be discussed, may be side-lined or have facts misrepresented.

3.3 CONCLUSION

This chapter focused on the issues of populist politics affecting Austria today and in the past, what we observe is thus a perennial relationship with ultra-nationalism that has various connections to the incidents of increased immigration in the country. Austria in this case presents a condensed approach for generalizing nationalism vis-à-vis humanitarianism, as the major analytical variables are present in Austria‟s case. Historically, the political debate on aid in Austria has two dichotomies, that is the Leftist side (moral principles) and the Right (cost-benefit), however, in the contemporary era it would seem this debate is driven and dominated by the Right. From the observations, made we can thus conclude that the strength and appeal of right-wing nationalism in Austria is deep-rooted and is a resurgence rather than an emerging phenomenon. In it, political parties along with their leaders have

74 impacted Vienna‟s aid system directly by pressuring government to shift policy or indirectly through swaying public perceptions on the usefulness or necessity for aid disbursements.

Worth noting is the manner in which the Right‟s political rhetoric has led to exclusionary and discriminatory treatment of vulnerable groups arriving in the country and this has negative effects on Austria‟s obligations toward refugees and asylum-seekers.

Although Vienna‟s contribution towards humanitarian intervention has been up to the standards of other DAC-EU members, we note that aid policies face serious challenges, more so in their implementation and legal frameworks. What is worrying in this instance is that the political space has failed to bring humanitarian issues to the forefront of national debates and this can affect aid effectiveness and how the public views aid and development assistance.

Without political consensus and proper policy frameworks, Austria‟s humanitarian mission is at risk of fragmentation amidst the existing confusion and lack of cohesiveness.

Notwithstanding, the ambiguity present in state policy is a disadvantage to Austria in its fulfilment of statutory obligations. Additionally, the fragmentation and lack of clear outcomes make it hard for actors to monitor, evaluate and manage humanitarian activity effectively and so this becomes a major problem for an Austrian population that is more concerned about the cost-benefit/result-based funding. Without proper instruments of reporting the reality to the public then it is possible for the populace to be persuaded on the ineffectiveness and wastage that aid allocation presents. Ambiguity in state policy leaves these matters open to anybody‟s interpretation and might present a ready avenue for populist political rhetoric that is harmful to aid and development distribution.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL

HUMANITARIAN SYSTEM

4.0 INTRODUCTION

The bloody atrocities witnessed in the inter-war period are a key influencer in the development of today‟s humanitarian system, more so after the First World War, when humanitarianism was at its infancy and occurrences during that time were seen as a profound affront to human dignity (Cabanes, 2014). Even with an armistice in place, 1915 marked a particularly violent period, especially for Europe, as refugees fled famine, epidemics, civil wars, revolutions, persecution, the year 1915 also marked the beginning of the Arminian

Genocide (Cabanes, 2014). Cabanes (2014) notes that even after the atrocities and brutality seen during the First World War, it did more than just create disaster but instead it fostered deep and long-term pacifist attitudes in a majority of the world‟s population, now willing to concern itself with the protection of victims of war, soldiers and civilians alike.

Unfortunately following the end of the war, Cabanes (2014) contends that the trials that took place in Leipzig in 1921, to persecute the accused perpetrators of gross crimes, were nothing but a mockery of justice. The trials did little to address key issues, reconcile justice for victims or punish violators of laws and customs of war; of the initial list of more than 800 war criminals, only 45 were prosecuted-many of them mid-level German officials (Cabanes,

2014) and these injustices set out the stage for further humanitarian abuses in the coming years. On the other hand, Barnett (2011) expansively explains the origins of today‟s humanitarianism by dividing its development into three distinct periods. From the 19th

Century to the Second World War-whereby humanitarianism was utilized for colonialism, commercial reasons and a Western „civilizing‟ mission, to the Cold War era-when it became

76 a weapon between East-West competitions and finally to the end of the Cold War-where aid was transformed to an ambitious project simultaneously being used as a tool to spread liberalism and human rights (Barnett, 2011).

The modern humanitarian system is primarily based on four core principles of impartiality, neutrality, humanity and independence, these principles are meant to ensure that aid can reach affected people in disaster zones or in complex emergencies (OCHA, 2012).

Promoting and ensuring that these four principles are adhered to is essential in guaranteeing effective humanitarian coordination and are drawn from the ICRC main principles. OCHA

(2012) defines impartiality as provision of humanitarian needs to all that require it without bias based on nationality, ethnicity, race, gender or political opinion, neutrality is defined as provision of assistance without getting mixed-up in the controversies of a political, religious, racial or ideological nature (OCHA, 2012). Humanity is the provision of aid to all needy persons in order to prevent human suffering, protect human life and dignity and independence is the exclusion of military, economic or political objectives in humanitarianism (OCHA,

2012).

There are a multitude of actors in today‟s aid system with the major ones being the states involved in the global system. The state is not only obligated to uphold and comply with humanitarian principles but is likewise expected to act responsibly in order to prevent the suffering of its own people and as a way of fulfilling its obligations (OCHA, 2015). This responsibility to act is enshrined in the UN General Assembly resolution 46/182 (1991), that reaffirms the State‟s primary responsibility is to provide assistance and protection and it also sets the framework for the coordination and delivery of UN-led international humanitarian action (OCHA, 2015). The UN, through its agencies, mostly through the UNOCHA, plays a leading role in humanitarian matters. The OCHA is part of the UN Secretariat and was established in 1998 to further strengthen the humanitarian role carried out by the Office of the

UN Disaster Relief Coordination-which was established under the General Assembly resolution 2816 in 1971 (OCHA, 2015).

This chapter of the study centres on an overview of the current humanitarian system and its various dynamics. It examines the status of the contemporary system developed during the post-Cold War era and the interrelated issues driving debates on humanitarianism in the 21st

Century. Hence, it attempts to paint a generalized picture of the present and what to expect of the future of the humanitarian system. Furthermore, it explores the trends and challenges affecting the humanitarian system in today‟s emerging crises across the globe and how this impacts aid delivery to vulnerable groups in need of assistance. It looks at the involvement of several actors in the system, ranging from NGOs, IOs and INGOs and in particular responses/participation of key donor governments (in the context of the US and Europe) and their place within a growing aid system.

Secondly, this chapter will briefly delves into the political dimension that exists within the contemporary humanitarian system. Unlike in previous chapters, which explored the historic development and impact of ultra-nationalism, this chapter instead endeavours to demonstrate that ultimately humanitarian assistance is part of a political process. As a political process, humanitarian aid can be impacted by the prevailing political attitudes and perceptions that in turn influence decision-making in policy. This chapter of the study investigates how humanitarian assistance is transformed and utilized as a foreign policy instrument to achieve political goals or other ulterior interests, by both supporters and opponents of humanitarian assistance.

4.1 THE CURRENT TRENDS AND CHALLENGES OF THE

HUMANITARIAN AID SYSYTEM

The post-Cold War era in the 1990s, was marked by emergence of more complex humanitarian emergencies and these crises were characterized by; deteriorating or collapsed central government authority and parts of the civil society (contributing to increased intra- state conflict), intermittent periods of food insecurity (often deteriorating to mass hunger), economic pressures in the form of macro-economic collapse (under hyperinflation, mass unemployment and notable decrease in overall Gross National Product) and mass movements of populations, more so refugees escaping conflict or searching for natural resources

(Dijkzeul, 1999). Within such a conflict-prone international system, the necessity of aid became evident however perceptions on traditional humanitarianism are being challenged in the contemporary. The inadequacies of the humanitarian assistance system and perceived failures in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina, have contributed to a tarnished reputation of aid actors, especially UN agencies, which has likewise impacted perceptions on current humanitarianism (Hampson, 1996).

Some have argued that today‟s system of intervention in humanitarian matters is a positive evil, contributing to a worsening of crises, as presented in the case of the US intervention in Somalia (Maren, 1997). In particular failures of the Somali mission highlighted the limits of today‟s conceptualization of how interventions ought to be conducted, the military approach to intra-state conflicts proved inadequate and in addition to the bloodshed, US response diminished local coping mechanisms and local needs were insufficiently recognized (Dijkzeul, 1999). Essentially, what was supposed to be a humanitarian mission to prevent suffering of civilians in Somalia turned to a failed military operation that did more harm than the assumed good it offered.

From the findings presented by Dijkzeul (1999), the challenges experienced within the aid system in the 1990s are similar to the very issues impacting humanitarian efforts in the present. Some of these issues include; conceptual roadblocks within the international community and UN system that hinders preparedness and ways of intervening, difficulties in linking humanitarian relief, rehabilitation and development in a continuum approach, decrease in ODA flows in the 90s and conflicting roles/relationships and management of various aid actors involved in operations (Dijkzeul, 1999). These challenges have continued to plague the responses to the current crises and have seemingly only worsened overtime. It would appear that obligations towards humanitarian principles does not necessarily translate to actions on the ground, as Dijkzeul (1999) points out, the Western donors are paying lip- service to humanitarian matters but demonstrate a lack of preparedness and commitment. He further emphasizes the important role of the EU in the aid system and its moral obligation to act in war-torn countries, especially considering that most of them were colonies of European powers. Dijkzeul (1999) however notes with irony that the same trends that drew Europe together like; free markets, nation state and information technology, are the same forces driving disintegration and marginalization of countries that do not succeed in these trends.

One of the noted and commonly ignored trends in today‟s system is ironically lack of public awareness. Public discourse as a driving factor in today‟s aid system is often overlooked in the academic literature (Keukeleire and Delleux, 2014). According to an EU survey almost half of the respondents admitted to not being well informed on humanitarian assistance and nearly a third of respondents were not aware of EU‟s humanitarian activities

(European Commission, 2012), the outcome of the survey is consistent with earlier findings of this research that found public discourse on aid is highly lacking in a number of donor countries thus impacting awareness of humanitarian issues. Moreover, lack of information on the EU‟s relief activities contributes to the casual dismissal of its relevance in the

80 contemporary aid system even by the European public itself, ignorant of the important role the institution plays in the sustenance of the aid system.

Emerging and complex conflicts are a major challenge to today‟s system and has caused a rethinking of conventional responses (McGoldrick, 2011). Not only are actors compounded by assisting the vulnerable fleeing violence but they are meeting the increasing needs of „environmental refugees‟. According to a report by the German Advisory Council on

Global Change (2007), climate change is expected to be a major contributor to the further scarcity of food and water resources thus triggering mass migrations, mounting tensions and giving rise to new conflicts. This situation is expected to worsen when we consider that the global population continues to grow and is giving rise to new phenomena like „environmental refugees‟ (Chhabara, 2008). Rapid urbanization in spite of population growths are factors expected to continue impacting the humanitarian system, for example Pakistan with a population of 185 million is projected to have a population of almost 315 million by 2050, centred in urban cities such as Karachi, where over the years urban territory has been a battlefield for opposing political/ethnic factions (UN Department of Economic and Social

Affairs, 2011).

So what is the state of the current humanitarian system? According to the Active

Learning and Network for Accountability and Performance report ALNAP (2010), governments (not counting remittances) were the largest source for humanitarian funding in

2008 with the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Canada and Ireland comprising the top donors to humanitarian contributions. In addition; there was a significant increase in non-DAC countries‟ contributions but mostly owing to improved reporting by these governments, nonetheless, Saudi Arabia recorded the highest contributions in the past four years averaging an increase of 2,465% (Stoddard and Harmer, 2009). In 2008, there

81 were a total of 210,800 aid workers specifically assigned to crisis response and rehabilitation activities (ALNAP, 2010).

Although the EU still played a leading role in the current system (18% of all

European ODA was channelled through the EU (OECD, 1999), issues of EU‟s potential isolationism in humanitarian action have been on-going. These issues are further discussed in the OECD (1999) report that warned of the impact of EU‟s absence, stating such a direction would impact the institution‟s confidence and functionality and this would only further worsen refugee streams instead of halting it. Europe‟s long-running resistance towards migrants is characterized by a fear of importing conflicts (especially from on-going conflicts in Yugoslavia and Cyprus) and thus has become increasingly xenophobic (OECD; DAC,

1999), this trend is extended into the present system, whereby there is resistance to accommodate and meet the needs of vulnerable groups escaping conflict and violence in various parts of the world out of unfounded fears of introducing insecurity to the continent, a claim often fanned by political leaders. All these issues have a negative impact on the effectiveness of the current aid system and help shape public opinion on matters.

In 2014, there was a significant increase in humanitarian aid, mostly targeted toward

Syria, which was the source of massive population movements (ALNAP, 2016). The year also recorded increased instability, volatility and vulnerability in new conflict zones including; C.A.R, Mali and South Sudan, that led to an overall expansion in large groups needing help (ALNAP, 2016). Roughly 4,480 organizations were actively participating in provision of humanitarian aid and this increase in non-governmental organizations has translated to increased number of actors from 274,000 in 2012 to 319,000 in 2015-marking a

16% growth (ALNAP, 2016). The report also indicated that governments (individually or through inter-governmental organizations such as the EU and African Union), continued to be at the forefront of humanitarian contributions, accounting for the largest providers for

82 external contributions to humanitarian emergencies (ALNAP, 2016). The top donor government remained to be the US, followed by the EU and the UK, who made up 50% of total humanitarian contributions. ALNAP (2016) although points out that there had been no significant changes in this sector of donors (government contributions) for the last seven years and any significant changes in contributions were reactionary and influenced by high- profile and sudden on-set natural disasters. For instance; the 2010 Haitian earthquake saw private contributions jump to 20% but normally humanitarian contributions to conflict-related issues has averaged below 10%, 8% in 2013 and 6% in 2012 (FTS, 2015).

ALNAP (2018) reported that from 2017 the humanitarian system recorded the highest number of forcibly displaced people by conflict and violence, the numbers reached 68.5 million but majority of the funding was allocated to a small number of complex situations over the last three years in Syria, Yemen, South Sudan and Iraq. These accounted for half of all humanitarian assistance, with Syria alone being allocated 28% of total contributions notwithstanding 2017 saw significant shifts in geopolitical focus of aid from Sub-Sahara

Africa to the Middle East (ALNAP, 2018). There was again a growth of field personnel active in operations worldwide as more agencies employed 570,000 people into operations, marking a 28% growth from 2016, while the largest donors were the US, Germany, the UK and the EU, with the three largest donors making up 59% of all government contributions

(ALNAP, 2018). Recent policy shifts have seen a preference for multilateral channels of funding for donor aid instead of individual/bilateral donations this new shift explains the simultaneous growth in NGOs and other private firms active in humanitarian action.

Learning from past mistakes in the Somalia military intervention, Stewart (2011) presents an interesting case of how donors with capacity, in this case the US, acted to save thousands of lives through US actions against the Libyan government following the Arab

Spring. The military intervention and subsequent ouster of Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi,

83 was initially hailed as a success for the Obama administration as it upheld the humanitarian principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and achieved its objectives of preventing mass atrocities on civilians without need to deploy American troops on the ground (Stewart, 2011).

The intervention in Libya‟s war, unlike that of Somalia, served the dual purpose of meeting humanitarian needs and achieving military/strategic objectives with minimal cost for the US.

Stewart (2011) emphasizes that for this reason the case of Libya also proved that humanitarian intervention and the application of norms such as R2P will always be selective and highly restricted by geopolitical considerations, political will and considerations on resources. It will continue to be guided by considerations of state interests and not exclusively moral impulses. On political will, Stewart (2011) contends that the future success of such actions that in the humanitarian space will ultimately depend on future US presidents and the American people‟s attitudes, he asks “Will they be willing to devote resources and potentially the lives of American troops, to address the suffering of strangers?” On the other hand (McGoldrick, 2011) suggests that such humanitarian interventions are part of the trends in military interventions in humanitarian situations, resulting from the influences of the

Global War on Terror which has blurred the lines between terrorism and war and legal frameworks governing them.

McGoldrick (2011) notes that there is growing politicization of aid as debates over the role of the state continue to be at the forefront, this instrumentalization of humanitarian agencies combined sometimes with the unprincipled/unprofessional performance of some actors has led to harsh criticism of the humanitarian assistance system. In its perceived selectivity within evolving crises, the current system continuously challenges the humanitarian principles such as impartiality and neutrality (McGoldrick, 2011). Weak international humanitarian assistance governmental frameworks has led to weak implementation of IHL when some actors are tempted to serve selected communities based

84 on an ethnic/religious criteria and deliberately ignore others (McGoldrick, 2011). In the midst of legal ambiguity, research suggests that there is an overall decline in state respect for IHL

(ALNAP, 2011). This can be an avenue for humanitarian issues to be manipulated for ulterior political motives or governments may insist on their understanding of humanitarian assistance like limiting it to strictly emergency relief (McGoldrick, 2011).

The forms of politicization of aid issues are categorized into three parts, namely; instrumentalization, militarization and developmentalization (Dany, 2014) which are shifting humanitarian policy from its principled norm. Instrumentalization is defined as the use of aid to advance political, economic and security interests, in it, donors have moved aid to more strategic regions of interest (DARA, 2010). Militarization is the use of aid functions to meet military strategies/objectives, wherein the actions of humanitarian actors and those of the military are becoming increasingly blurred (Dany, 2014). Developmentalization is defined as widening/expanding the scope of humanitarian assistance to encompass long-term political tasks and mostly accomplished through in-cooperation of liberal ideals like human rights and democracy to the aid allocated (Barnett, 2009). Dany (2014) links the political instrumentalization of aid to the increased contestation of traditional European norms and identifies it as a key influence in today‟s policy fragmentation. The lack of consensus as well as an unwillingness to implement policies grounded on wider consensus by some EU members (European Commission, 2011) and amongst other donor governments, therefore has divided opinions on the current system.

The current aid system is being challenged by new trends that have emerged involving incoherence in policies and political deadlocks that are spreading across Europe and is likewise causing panic and retreat behind national borders (Dennison and Janning,

2016). There has also been a rising fear that EU elites/leaders are losing control of the situation. The increased phobias are mostly driven by the right-wing‟s narrative of the on-

85 going crisis and are characterized by rising nationalism, xenophobia and anti-EU sentiments causing the re-emergence of borders and leading to formulation of short-sighted tactics amidst an EU blame game (Dennison and Janning, 2016). Continued blame games between

European countries has contributed to persistent policy incoherence affecting humanitarian assistance, coordination and partnerships. The WEF (2017) contends that the magnitude of today‟s crises are affecting whole systems in healthcare, water and sanitation, education and housing services and this has placed a strain on actors‟ capacity to respond and repair the system. Simply put the current make-up of the traditional system seems inadequate in meeting evolving protracted conflicts and needs. According to the WEF (2017), the system can no longer cope with the new dynamics and transformations of conflict and violence as it is strained by a gap between emerging needs and available capacity.

The cleavages that exist between EU member states have manifested themselves in mainly two forms; one group that is accepting refugees albeit with moderations and restrictions and the so called „Visegrad groups‟-mostly Balkan states and led by Austria, which are opposed to open borders (Dennison and Janning, 2016). In fact, in February 2016 the Austrian government decided to shut its borders, effectively sealing off the Eastern entrance point into Europe (Dennison and Janning, 2016). These divisions and tensions between European countries further hinders the quest for coherent policy and is negatively affecting EU cooperation and broader partnerships, with the example of the EU-Turkey deal.

The deal is meant to mitigate refugee and migrant flows through an approach of „burden- sharing‟. However, it has been legally contested based on arguments on whether Turkey is a safe destination for vulnerable groups, this despite statistics showing Turkey as one of the leading non-traditional humanitarian actors, hosting the largest number of refugees worldwide in 2017 (UNHCR, 2018). As noted by Donini and Stuart (2016) the strength of multilateral approaches in the international governance of the humanitarian system is on the

86 decline as national sovereignty and self-interests undermine ideals of human rights and

International Humanitarian Law.

Notwithstanding fragmentation within the system has contributed to abuse of classical humanitarian norms elaborated in the context of denial of refugee and essentially human rights by some governments. The WEF (2017) reports that there have been huge advancements in technology in what it described as „digital humanitarianism‟ thus improving satellite imagery of conflict zones, participatory mapping, read-write webs, and big data analysis among other benefits. Social media in recent times has played a key role in galvanizing awareness and sparking debates on matters humanitarian and this new trend cannot be ignored. However, refugees arriving in some parts of Europe are denied their right to information when devices are seized by authorities or when access to connectivity is hindered by affordability and digital literacy. Coupled with these difficulties, refugees in

Europe also face challenges in accessing labour markets and state services including issuance of work permits (WEF, 2017).

These highlighted weaknesses in the system are nothing new in international relations instead the inconvenient truth is that these short-comings are well rehearsed. Primarily the key hindrance to delivering the transformative promise of IHL principles and changing the status quo is Western bias of how to interpret principles, a situation in which individuals are not placed at the centre of the system but are instead defined through their victimhood, their poverty and helplessness (DuBois, 2018). Western bias in interpreting humanitarian challenges along rich/poor, developed/needy or donor/receiver approaches are demonstrations of the application of hierarchies of power in aid and are engrained bias levels that leave us unable to see humanitarian work as nothing more than a universal imperative

(Bennett et al, 2016).

Domination of the humanitarian system by the West has provided little incentives and few mechanisms for changing the status quo that would improve aid effectiveness (Mowjee,

2015). Western bias as a result has reduced victims of persecution to stereotypes, devoid of human traits and leading to casual responses to crises with the rationale „anything is better than nothing‟ (Hilhorst and Pereboom, 2016). It has additionally influenced public attitudes towards conflicts away from their borders whereby conflicts in the geographical periphery, for instance, Rakhine, DRC or Haiti are contextualized as „s-holes‟ with persistent humanitarian problems, always to be addressed in a humanitarian nature (DuBois, 2018).

Presently, the system centres on geopolitics, the balance of power and a clash between imperialist ideals versus humanity impulses (Damboeck, 2012). Labelling of victims along

Western bias is consistent with earlier findings of this study that elaborated the manner in which Western classical philosophers emphasized on cultural prejudices in humanitarian considerations. Public debates on the aid system are inappropriate and laced with appeals of

Western heroism that whitewashes the reality of aid (DuBois, 2018) as expressions on crises are contextualized as black/white, good/evil and problem/solution approaches. DuBois (2018) dismisses this long-running myth of Western nobility in aid by pointing out serious shortfalls in ethical conduct, aid mistakes and programme failures.

4.2 THE POLITICIZATION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Even though most aid practitioners maintain that humanitarian aid is apolitical in nature, Watts (2017) argues that it is indeed a political act, describing it as a bias and selective, politically-tainted system, whereby in the contemporary system aid workers are compounded by moral-political dilemmas. His argument in linking the two draws from the classical realist perspective, where international relations is a zero-sum game thus through intervention the donor maximizes and guarantees its power. State reputation and relative

88 power considerations exist within the rationale of the current system and not only moral/legal obligations, as it may be cheaper to intervene compared to the political cost of indifference

(Watts, 2017). Intervention in humanitarian crisis is therefore framed in terms of power politics and may also explain selective interventions as noted in the previous section and thus the two features (politics and humanitarianism) become intertwined in this sense.

Watts (2017) continues by stating that the current system is a façade of expansionist policies aimed at increasing the relative power of the intervener and have little to do with the suffering of the vulnerable rather it morphs into a political calculation. For example; the US after the Haitian earthquake and the resulting cholera outbreak, was forced to act due to political calculations on a possible spill-over and mass exodus of groups to the US. Similarly, in Europe arguably the chief concerns remain to be issues of national security, identity and influx of foreign workers that tramp humanitarian objectives (Watts, 2017). The realist argument in aid still holds when we consider non-traditional or emerging donors such as

Japan, Brazil and Germany, who remain highly participative in aid action but do so with considerations of aid as a foreign policy tools to achieve membership the UN Security

Council (Watts, 2017). Similar to claims by Hilhorst and Pereboom (2016), Watts (2017) argues that humanitarian intervention is a continuation of domestic politics aimed at upholding a certain reputation to appear to be doing something and of which the UN and other IOs hinge their credibility and legitimacy upon (Watts, 2017). Krause (2014) criticizes humanitarian actors during the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, whereby INGOs and UN

Agencies used it as an avenue to market their projects to Western donors.

Humanitarian assistance is necessarily political because it is a project in the political world (Slim, 2003). Today‟s conflicts actors in conflict zones are required to negotiate with armed groups or insurgents in order to create aid corridors to convey needed assistance to regions under rebel control and reach civilians trapped behind battle lines (Watts, 2017).

Actors are also compelled to negotiate with alternative groups in cases where the local government is the perpetrator of abuses to human rights (Watts, 2017). Such a situation highlights the existing political and moral dilemma. Changes in the nature of conflict and war, perceived failures of the system and domestic politics in donor countries are all contributing to the politicization of aid (Curtis, 2001). Humanitarian assistance linkages with the political world should not, however, be confused with its politicization/instrumentalization, for the purposes of this study „political instrumentalization of aid‟ is defined as the use of humanitarian assistance to pursue political aims or the use of humanitarian functions to achieve political ends (Bhattarai, 2018).

These new trends have led to the questioning of NGOs and UN agencies‟ over their commitment to key humanitarian principles especially during complex humanitarian emergencies (Bhattarai, 2018) where actions/responses widely vary from crisis to crisis

(Humphries, 2013). Aid indeed has become an extension of domestic political interests and also a mechanism of achieving these goals; Bhattarai (2018) acknowledges that today‟s system is increasingly perceived as a strategic tool aimed at meeting certain political objectives or interests. It is a system in which new and complex conflicts and crises are shaping and evolving the nature of the system itself to be seen as an industry, comprising many organizations with multiple missions, mandates and agendas (Humphries, 2013).

Hence, the existence of different actors with different interests‟ impacts humanitarian intervention when political objectives are factored in, the expected effect of aid is then diminished by other priorities. Barnett (2011) highlights this situation by examining the slow humanitarian response from agencies to act in the Somalia Civil War by 1992, before the US intervention compared to the over 900 agencies (excluding the UN agencies and ICRC) who were operating in Haiti in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake.

In understanding the recent politicization of aid, one must revisit the effect of 9/11 and the subsequent US response, which was unprecedented and marked a major departure from traditional humanitarianism. Bhattarai (2018) argues that this single intervention challenged classical IHL principles, further blurring the lines between politics, military and humanitarianism. Bhattarai (2018) further asserts that US response and the follow-up of the

Global War on Terror, greatly contributed to the securitization of humanitarian aid and effectively drawing issues even closer to the political realm. The use of humanitarian functions for conflict management and counter-insurgency strategies has compromised guiding principles and worsened the work space of relief/aid workers (McGoldrick, 2011). In

Afghanistan key principles of neutrality and impartiality were abandoned in favour for counter-insurgency support, with severe consequences for the local population (Hofmann and

Delaunay, 2010).

Due to the blurred lines between political interests, military actors/objectives and humanitarian actors/objectives one can observe a certain push-back against humanitarian assistance by some recipient governments and in certain conflict-zones (Bajoria, 2011) as the overall, often uncertain outcomes of humanitarian action, start to be viewed as suspicious and thus unwelcome. For example, the Sri Lankan government in 2009 denied UN aid workers access to internally displaced persons and civilians trapped in-between on-going skirmishes between the country‟s military and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam armed rebels

(Bajoria, 2011), the key concern for the Sri Lankan government was general suspicions that such aid allocation would only strengthen the capacity of the rebel group and its foothold in the region. Similarly, the Chadian government for a period of time has continuously restricted humanitarian agencies access to the Lake Chad region further worsening the humanitarian crisis (Hamer, 2016).

This confusion and lack of solidarity in policy and implementation frameworks presents opportunities for the Right to pedal its false narratives, especially concerning migrants. Inconsistencies are influenced by political framing/narratives of crisis and emergencies that were classified as external threats of which a number of nationalist parties in Sweden, the UK and France, benefitted from and promoted such narratives and as a result had their popularity increase significantly (Newman, 2018). As noted earlier in this study the far-right is leading the debate centring on humanitarian issues because they have primarily been the divisive force within Europe in achievement of a continental-wide humanitarian policy; it constitutes a breakdown of the Schengen Agreement-at least temporarily-in favour for nationalist approaches and cooperation (Roderick, 2015). UNHCR (2015) in response to actions of Europe during 2014-2015 amidst a growing migrant crisis, criticized the increased return rates of migrants to unsafe regions, violence against asylum-seekers, arbitrary detentions, denial of access to health services, housing, food and sanitation. The organization also decried the use of racist and xenophobic language against migrants by political leaders across Europe, expressing sentiments that are often dehumanizing. Overall, the response and performance of a number of EU members was summarized as a complete disregard for human dignity (UNHCR, 2015).

At best the future of the humanitarian system is bleak considering the persistence of current trends that are influencing multiple changes in states‟ humanitarian interventionism.

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra‟ad al Hussein, stated that such rhetoric surrounding issues was in fact xenophobic and in some cases overt racism,

“reminiscent of 1938 when countries refused to take in a significant number of Jewish refugees, fleeing Germany‟s annexation of Austria” (The Guardian, 2015). Other powers in the system like Russia continue to fan the waves of populist politics in Europe. In an interview with the Financial Times on Wednesday the 26th of June 2019, Putin described

92 liberalism as obsolete in today‟s world and trumpeted the rise of populist movements in

Europe and the US, further claiming Russia‟s Western partners had admitted some elements of liberal ideals, like multi-culturism were no longer tenable (Financial Times, 2019). The immediate backlash that has revived this debate is neither a defence nor a criticism of

President Putin‟s remarks by itself but can be seen instead as manifestations of Europe‟s deepening moral-political dilemmas.

4.3 CONCLUSION

In summary this chapter explored the current trends that are emerging to influence the humanitarian system and also add the past and present challenges experienced within donor countries and their approaches towards needs of the vulnerable. It looked at the rationales or determinants behind humanitarian interventionism of major donor countries. What can be observed is that many of these issues compounding the system are systematic in nature, are interlinked and stem most noticeably from the reform eras in the post-Cold War world order.

Of the major challenges highlighted here are issues to do with consistency in donor aid and funding of humanitarian operations worldwide, this has been worsened by protracted crises both man-made and natural. Consequently, there has been a retreat by donors in the form of funding shortfalls as well as unmet pledges due to donor fatigue, populist leaders and questions over the effectiveness/necessity of aid disbursement. Raging debates and criticism on the weakness of the current humanitarian system seem to emanate from both the Left

(proponents of liberal ideals) and the far-Right (opponents of liberal norms). Mostly this discourse within donor countries is inadequately informed, as a majority of European citizens remain ignorant of IHL principles and others are unaware of the EU‟s activities/presence in the humanitarian scene.

Thus, without proper communication channels on the real facts and without civic awareness initiatives, there then exists an avenue for political manipulation and reframing of issues according to self-interest. Populist parties have used this lack of public discussions on aid to gain rapid popularity, through a narrative that is needlessly untruthful, exclusionary and bias, focusing on the recent refugee crisis. Notwithstanding, we find that it is not only the populist narrative that is harmful to the system but also the overall Western bias in interpreting humanitarian assistance which in recent time has highlighted its ethnic and racial prejudices that undermine the very dignity and humanity of certain cultural groups from certain geographies. Western bias is then institutionalized in aid agencies leading to its reproduction in international relations. The politicization of aid, which makes humanitarianism a tool for achieving political objectives, has further impacted the distribution of assistance, it is from this bias and politicization of aid that we conclude the current system intervenes selectively based on a number of criterion separate from classical humanitarian principles.

CHAPTER FIVE: GENERAL CONCLUSION

5.0 CONCLUSION

The primary aim of this study is to link the recent rise in ultra-nationalism and its impact on global humanitarian assistance, with a focus on Europe and the US, as major players in the formation and sustenance of the aid system. A mostly Western ideology based on moralistic instincts, guided by Christian influences that dominated the Western world.

Close to this was the idea of liberalism which Western powers, led by the US and its key allies in Europe endeavoured to project all over the world. Classical liberal philosophers such as Kant and Locke and more have been hailed with helping to form core traditional European values and norms; they have been credited with influencing European leaders. However their moralistic attitude toward the plight of the needy is noticeably intertwined with notions of cultural superiority/bias. The expansion of liberalism to other parts of the world is framed in terms of civilizing an otherwise uncivilized people.

We find that the narrative from the West on humanitarian assistance is broadly based on a constructed social hierarchy and scholars have argued aside from morality the Western- based humanitarian system is a projection of power. Over time these ideas have become institutionalized, solidified and reproduced in European society, thus feelings toward national and ethnic identity are strong and play a major historical role in Europe‟s politics. Part of the challenges that have negatively affected humanitarianism is the dominance of the Western interpretation of aid and assistance, of which though the scope has widened and significantly expanded to address a wide range of issues, the dimensions of this scope may change from time to time, are inconsistent and in many cases selective. Additionally, Western bias is laced with sentiments of heroism, painting the Western actors as saviours of an otherwise historically destitute people. Such a narrative propels the negative notions of vulnerable

95 people as always in need of assistance throughout time, coupled with donor fatigue this narrative plays well into justifying reduced intervention over time.

This rationale in humanitarian aid has impacted who gets what and how much. In the contemporary era we can especially see a deviation from principles of neutrality and impartiality with bias aid disbursements becoming more prominent. Humanitarian assistance has evolved in its links with politics to become a tool or mechanism of attaining political objectives. In this regard it has been securitized by major donors, stripping it of its humanity qualities and shifting it to strategic considerations. This new development has diminished the effectiveness of aid as its core principles are similarly foregone for national interests. What we observe is then a cosmetic response to the needs of vulnerable people, actions that mask political inaction but have no real transformative effect on those who aid is directed towards.

In attaining political/security strategies the requirements of needy people are thus subsequently ignored or aid allocation remains inadequate because there is lack of due consideration for different needs.

From the very start, there seems to be a historic contradiction between the embrace of liberalism and democratic values by European countries, after the interwar period and the strong presence of identity politics which still influences today‟s politics. This situation has affected how Europe responds to crises around the world as a key donor. The recent migrant crisis has put Europe and especially the EU‟s commitment to humanitarian principles to the ultimate test and this study centres on the analysis of various dynamics in the migrant crisis to explore current issues. Worth noting is how the recent refugee crisis has exposed Europe‟s humanitarian weaknesses and challenges in meeting today‟s conflicts. Identity politics has featured at the forefront of this debate and has been led by the far-right in Europe, which of late has gained popularity amidst resurgence of nationalism.

Again the manner in which humanitarian matters have been framed has had a counter- productive impact on global humanitarian efforts. Directly-nationalist leaders in power have formulated restrictive border policies with the narrative of securing the country, in reality they have sealed off deprived and suffering people from accessing humanitarian as well as human rights. Indirectly, these leaders have also preyed on the current environment that is welcoming of their nationalist sentiments, the reason they have found acceptance among the

European public is based on a whole variety of issues, ranging from; domestic economic pressures, rising feelings of insecurity, distrust of supranational bodies including the EU and the UN, lack of proper public awareness and thus public advocacy for humanitarian assistance among European countries. It would seem nationalism poses a threat to the EU itself through disunity and its divisive qualities, what danger does this pose for fragile

European governments contested by populist leaders.

Generally, the lack of public debate stems from lack of common EU and in extension

European humanitarian policy, what we see is loopholes in which nationalist leaders have found to exploit public sympathies. This has been done through targeting the elite and the

EU, as the primary source of Europe‟s problems and the singling out of the migrant crisis in today‟s politics. Nationalists have been able to frame the current ruling elite as weak and lacking in control, this is demonstrated by the influx of refugees, deemed an essential failure on the part of the current leadership. Nationalist leaders have benefitted from this state of affairs and continue to lead the debate. What is concerning about the rise of the far-right is that its criticisms of liberal ideals in humanitarian assistance offers no viable or concrete solutions aside from isolationism and ambiguous promises, a vote to for a populist seems like a short-sighted vote for an uncertain future. It remains indeterminate whether the EU will be able to formulate common policies in the near future that address humanitarian aid as fragmentation and distrust persist among member states.

The rise of nationalist politics has laid-bare the disunity that is emerging within the continent and especially between EU member states. We cannot assume nor predict whether the rise of nationalism in Europe is a temporary disruption to international relations norms or if this state of affairs will spread and linger, forming the new normal as some leaders have painted it. What can be said with certainty is that the current nature of populist politics re- emerging in Europe is potentially harmful to humanitarian assistance in a number of ways, both direct and indirect. The resulting situation is whereby there has been reduction of donor funds and overall engagement in humanitarianism. The belief that Europe has done the most and should retreat at this point is a flawed notion, as some scholars‟ point out that some of these protracted crises have their initial origins from interactions with Western powers and a good example is the degraded position of the post-colonial territories once under European administration and control. How then can some members feel that they have done enough and ought to isolate themselves? How does the Western world claim heroism, through humanitarian assistance, to crises that stem from their own actions?

The future of the humanitarian system is at peril, as nationalist leaders continue to fan the flames of nation-based approaches and the increasing retreat from the international scene with dire consequences for humanitarianism all over the world. As demonstrated in this study a retreat by the EU would be disastrous considering mounting complex crises which would only multiply in this vacuum of European action. The current state of affairs presents numerous challenges for the future of humanitarianism in Europe which seems to hinge on the verge of complete breakdown/collapse under the pressures of increasing, complex and protracted conflicts. With statements from world leaders like US President Donald Trump and Russia‟s President Vladimir Putin, it is with concern that we note an increasing trend in criticism of liberalist ideas, most of which comprise the frameworks of International

Humanitarian Law.

5.1 RECOMMENDATIONS

One of the challenges to be addressed here is primarily political reform which will produce better approaches toward humanitarianism. The political dynamics within humanitarianism clearly impact actions on the ground it is therefore vital that donors increase political cooperation among themselves. It is important for liberal actors, those still carrying the torch of humanity amidst retreat like Germany, to find like-minded partners and grow these partnerships and deepen cooperation. States still championing traditional European norms need to realise that despite the increase of populism in their neighbourhood, still there is much potential offered by new and emerging non-traditional actors in humanitarianism.

Efforts should significantly now focus on building relationships with wider actors in other parts of the world. Deepened cooperation with developing regions, rather than retreat, will be most beneficial in addressing the root problems, especially those related to mass movements of people. Of particular importance in such an approach, is the potential new non-traditional help generate a new universal narrative that is not Western-based thus not as bias as we have seen.

On partnerships, it is essential for donors to increase and sustain the already improved cooperations with NGOs, IOs, private and public firms as well as individuals in communities.

This goes a longer in creating a common sense of purpose and value. Expansion of partnerships to involve other actors, offers major advantages in the form of improvement of the responsiveness and preparedness to meet aid/emergency as there are more actors active in the field. Second, wider participation by more actors ensures that funding resources are similarly expanded, this acts as an advantage in mitigating donor fatigue and the perception that some donors are seen as sole-actors. Third, involvement of private/public firms as well as the individual addresses the issue of humanitarian project/programme ownership thus

99 ensuring that launched projects are impactful and relevant to the specific needs of vulnerable people. Here, we emphasize that the growth of non-governmental aid actors is only to be encouraged as it shifts focus from state dominance over aid matters. In doing, so humanitarian aid is once again restored to its civilian-focused purposes and further distanced from political interests associated with it. Fourth, this provides an opportunity for tapping into the unrealized potential offered through engagement with small-stake holders such as

MSMEs, whose support would provide a multiplier effect in that their businesses create local employment. On its part, job creation will mitigate the pressures of economic migrants flooding to European shores. Policies directed to addressing the long-term root causes of humanitarian crises are generally more beneficial than reactionary responses to emergent crises and act as proactive steps that are preventative in nature.

Beck (2003) identifies monitoring as a key weakness within the system and limited progress seems to have been made, as such accountability has also deteriorated in the aid system. Recipients of humanitarian assistance surveyed by the Listening Project in Ethiopia credited the failures in the quality of goods and services to a lack of monitoring and follow up by aid agencies (CDA 2006). In Sri Lanka, by far the most concerning issue that people raised regarding donor‟s roles and responsibilities was the importance of regular monitoring visits (CDA 2007) that promote accountability. Donors and actors have the important responsibility of enhancing accountability if true reforms are to be realised. It is up to these actors to not only build trust among themselves but to also improve their accountability in the humanitarian scene and reclaim their tarnished reputations. Accountability mitigates the adverse effects of non-compliance and violations to EU laws. Member states need to understand that deserting their humanitarian responsibilities or diverting from them in favour of more illiberal practices, bear serious consequences. The EU as an institution cannot afford to be seen as relenting or tolerating the illiberal acts of some of its members and must

100 promote accountability for the sake of the humanitarian system. The institution ought to refocus on its role as an enforcement body, regulating state interests and guaranteeing that commitments by members are met. The institution must do this to similarly protect and enhance its own credibility which has been called into question in recent years.

Considering the lack of proper public awareness on humanitarian matters actors can similarly benefit from the wealth of information, data and statistics held by agencies/firms that are active in the field. Many of these private/public firms and NGOs have a better understanding of the reality on the ground. As such they hold valuable information that can help inform how aid is allocated, to whom and what is required. Data from these actors can be used as a basis of improving communication channels through utilizing it in proper civic education programmes that promote awareness. The practice of date-sharing between governments, firms, organizations and individuals fosters transparency in the aid system which in turn improves trust, something that is lacking today among multiple actors. Without trust among actors, there is conversely an effect on unity and cooperation which itself negatively affects coordination of humanitarian action.

Notwithstanding, this effort will assist in pushing for a public debate on humanitarian assistance, more so such efforts should be targeted towards the public in donor countries. The attitudes of the local populace as we have seen, has a profound impact on government policy and it is important to shape these perceptions into the positive light, this can be achieved through proper communication to the public and help dispel the misleading narratives of the

Right-wing. Similarly, actors should incorporate the assistance of civil society organizations in humanitarian action, partnerships with foundations and churches, not only improves reputation of the actor but also refocuses morality at the centre of issues, taking it away from cold-ruthless foreign policy strategies and state interests.

101

Donors also need to focus funding on the further improvement of digital infrastructure as an asset to humanitarian assistance. Digital technology has been revolutionary when it comes to the coverage of emerging or on-going crises, with ever more efficient devices actors are able to prepare and intervene appropriately to the needs of individuals. Social media has been vital in promoting humanitarian advocacy from around the world especially toward forgotten/marginalized conflicts. In the present, the on-going political crisis in Sudan remained in the margins of the mainstream until social media users adopted the use of a blue display picture for their applications, as a reminder to the rest of the world and as a show of solidarity with the Sudanese people. It is therefore important to significantly invest in the digitalization of the system to meet new conflicts requiring new solutions. Digitization plays a key role in timely responses in that with new technology is easier to detect crises and act faster.

Additionally, building on connectivity is a major advantage to the operations of relief workers, in, reporting, monitoring, timely responses, coordination and connectivity among actors and even victims, especially those active in conflict areas isolated from these types of infrastructure or with dilapidated technological infrastructure. Improvement in digital communication also benefits victims of persecution or oppression, as needy people are able to access and contact various organizations that they may require assistance from. In most desperate situations, this technology has helped in keeping migrants and refugee families connected even while they are significantly far away, thus improvement of digital technology accords vulnerable people access to information and assists in keeping families together.

Actors need to be mindful of the respect for human dignity and rights that has recently experienced a reversal especially at the height of the migrant crisis. The treatment of asylum- seekers and vulnerable groups by some European countries was wanting and a total departure from traditional European liberal norms. Detention of migrants, violence toward immigrants,

102 denial of resettlement and citizenship, confiscation of personal belongings, relocation to unsafe areas, high rates of refoulment violations, all these serve to undermine the rights owed to these suffering individuals. EU member states need to broaden the scope of humanitarian assistance to also place undocumented migrants at the centre of issues instead of imposing stricter controls that isolate illegal immigrants. This step should also apply to all major point- of-entry country as this will decriminalize undocumented refugees and allows them access to government services. It is important to act with haste on this matter as the probability of undocumented migrants forming a bulk of the refugees is a feasible assumption thus a majority of vulnerable groups will be denied services owing to their undocumented status. To increase efficiency points of entry into Europe ought to set up desks to assess asylum-seekers at their border points, this will also decrease the number of undocumented migrants sneaking into Europe.

Since development aid and humanitarian assistance have become increasingly intertwined, there is a need to develop better complementarity between development, humanitarian and peace operations. Ensuring a smooth flow between all three dynamics is crucial to building a more cooperative and cohesive system, on the other hand, a failure to do so leads to unwarranted contestations and inconsistent actions from donors. Complementarity can work best in conflict-prone regions whereby a standard application of all three ensures real transformative change to vulnerable communities.

It is important for donors to evaluate their actions and ensure they are conflict- sensitive, that they minimize the harm caused by any intervention and maximise positive effects on engagements. This means aid assistance must remain focused on its principled potential rather than adhering to strategic or foreign policy goals. This is especially a good reminder considering today‟s willingness by states to intervene in conflict-zones, often with little considerations on providing assistance. It is a call for the reduction for the necessity of

103 military action in humanitarian intervention which does more harm than good as history has attested.

Increased fragmentation of the modern aid system is further compounded by the existence of multiple actors which despite its possible potential in enhancing the system can present negative effects in fragmentation of aid in the form of unhealthy competition that often overlooks the real needs of humanitarian situations. Fløgstadt and Hagen (2017) define fragmentation as the presence of higher numbers of donors focusing on a similar country thus affecting the effectiveness of global humanitarian assistance. Fragmentation has increased in recent years with a multiplication of different aid actors within the current system and according to Fløgstadt and Hagen (2017) only four European countries recorded a decline in aid fragmentation between 1998 to 2005 and 2006 to 2013 and these included; Sweden,

Denmark, Netherlands and France.

We must ask ourselves whether resources meant for humanitarian assistance are enough in the global aid system. According to ALNAP (2018) new appeals by UN Agencies is a reflection of arising humanitarian needs and only 58% of these appeals were met from

2008-2017. This attributive of the fact that resource availability is still insufficient in the current humanitarian system, this ought to be a call for donors and other countries to step up efforts in boosting sufficiency of required resources. In addition the ALNAP (2018) report decried the selective allocation based on country or sector, arguing that this further hindered improvements in resource sufficiency for all needs. For instance, food security was on average 57% funded, emergency shelter was only 29% funded and disaster preparedness was just 3.7% funded in 2016 (ALNAP, 2018).

Developing countries worldwide similarly need to invest more of their resources in addressing the plight of those suffering in their own societies instead of relying on foreign

104 assistance and developmental aid. Developing countries need to develop and enhance capacities and capabilities in delivering humanitarian assistance in a timely manner to prevent the mass movement of desperate groups to regions where they would fare much better than their respective countries. As such leadership issues and the integrity of such leaders will play a key rule to the future of global humanitarian assistance and in ensuring that developing countries are able and willing to take care of their own people and assist in mitigating various challenges arising in developing economies worldwide. African leaders need to develop a sense of duty and responsibility towards their populace and act accordingly to protect their dignity as human beings, deserving of a life free from persecution, oppression and exploitation. Whenever the chance arises, the public in developing countries ought to elect qualified and reliable leaders who are concerned about the people‟s needs and are visionary in their agendas for transformative change in their countries.

5.3 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH AREAS

The study identifies the following relevant areas for future research.

1. The impact of rising migrant flows worldwide on European politics.

2. The cultural and social influences affecting perceptions on vulnerable people

and hence perceptions on humanitarianism.

3. The political dynamics that define current humanitarianism.

105

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