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From Eu Membership to the Eu-14 Sanction Measures 1995–2000

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From Eu Membership to the Eu-14 Sanction Measures 1995–2000 715 VIII . FROM EU MEMBERSHIP TO THE EU-14 SANCTION MEASURES 1995–2000 1 . GENERAL INTRODUCTION: “EURO” AND EASTERN ENLARGEMENT ARE COMING – ASSUMPTION OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION TASKS The Treaty of Maastricht that was signed on February 7, 1992 provided a time- table for integration through the end of the twentieth century, while the Treaty of Amsterdam that was signed on October 2, 19971 attempted to introduce con- crete steps in order to bring the EU “closer to the citizens” and to strengthen the “ European identity” both within and from the outside. It started up where the fur- ther development of the treaty basis of the EC (the Single European Act, which en- tered into force in 1987, and Maastricht, which entered into force in 1993) had left off and continued on from there. The Treaty of Amsterdam included the Schengen Agreement (the removal of internal border controls with the strengthening of EU external borders) into the EU legal system and changed or supplemented the two main European union treaties (the ECSC and the EEC) as well as the Union Trea- ty of Maastricht upon which the Community construction was based. In addition, a “Stability Pact” at the Dublin Summit on December 13–14, 1996 was adopted for the adherence to the budgetary discipline in the European Monetary Union (EMU).2 Through this, it was possible to introduce the euro within the stipulated period of January 1, 1999. From that time forward, twelve states belonged to the euro zone (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain introduced the euro as their official non-cash currency – Greece followed in 2000). The strengthening of social and employment policy and the creation of new jobs remained, however, a matter of concern that was only realized to a small degree. Through additional resolutions by subsequent Council meetings, smaller partial successes were achieved. The Three Pillar Model that was established in Maastricht remained as the structure: The first pillar comprised the supra- national dimension with the EU Treaty and the expanded areas (EMU, social 1 Michael GEHLER, Europa. Ideen – Institutionen – Vereinigung – Zusammenhalt, Reinbek/ Hamburg 2018, 382–385; on this chapter see documents 87–92 in the appendix „Documents“. 2 GEHLER, Europa, 418–421, 673–677. 716 VIII. From EU Membership to the EU-14 Sanction Measures 1995–2000 policy, employment, vocational training, etc.); the second pillar concerned the inter governmental Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), equipped with a High Representative, the former NATO Secretary General Javier Solana and the taking over of the “Petersberg Tasks” from the Western European Union (WEU) which, in addition to peacemaking measures, also comprising “tasks of combat forces”; the third pillar included the areas of justice and home affairs which, at the time, were still intergovernmental areas but which, in the wake of September 11, 2001, were subjected to tendencies of integration such as a Europe-wide arrest warrant and coordination with regard to the fight against terrorism.3 Amsterdam had already pointed the way for enlargement. On December 12, 1997, the European Council summit in Luxembourg began the accession pro- cess with the Northern European and Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) as well as Cyprus, which led on March 30, 1998 to negotiations with a first group of accession applicants (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Es- tonia, and Slovenia). The European Council in Helsinki on December 10, 1999 decided to expand the negotiations to include a second group (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, and Slovakia), and these began on February 15, 2000. With a view towards the approaching enlargement, the statements from the Trea- ty of Amsterdam about the “increased cooperation” (“flexibility”) represented something new: opting out, which up until that point was regarded as an inte- gration policy “sin”, had now turned into a permissible alternative option. Thus, a paradigm shift in integration policy also took place and the United Kingdom’s long-time goal in Europe policy was achieved. Enlargement received a clear pri- ority over extension, or to put it a different way: enlargement proceeded more and more at the expense of deepening, and in fact the latter was thus made virtually impossible. After the introduction of the euro, great qualitative leaps in integra- tion could also hardly be expected any time soon.4 The Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force on May 1, 1999. At the Europe- an Council in Cologne in June 1999, resolutions were passed that would set the course for the strengthening of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as a Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) that was to create the preconditions for taking over the tasks of security and defense policy by the EU as a complement to NATO, which was to be brought about by taking over the tasks of the Western European Union (WEU) and the quasi-merger of the EU and the WEU.5 3 Ibid., 373–376, 382–385: 382. 4 Ibid., 473–492; on the Eastern Enlargement see beside document 87 also documents 90 and 91 in the appendix “Documents”. 5 On the foreign and security policy of the EU in the development from the European Political Co- operation (EPC), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) see: Gernot STIMMER, Die Außenbeziehungen der EU. Politik, Ökonomie, Sicherheit, Kultur, Wien 2019, 68–85. 2. Cooperation in Institutions, but Limited Engagement 717 The EMU Stability Pact adopted in 1997 set a country’s budget deficit at 3% and its debt at 60% of the GDP. The Commission was able to check compliance and impose sanctions in the event of deviations. When Germany and France failed to comply with these criteria, the Commission only issued warnings, but the Commission stuck to the rule.6 2 . COOPERATION IN INSTITUTIONS, BUT LIMITED ENGAGEMENT The scope for shaping economic policy shifted more and more to the level of the Union. These possibilities remained largely closed to Austria. According to the economy historian Felix Butschek, this dimension remained “largely closed” to the country.7 Helmut Kramer correctly stated in this context: “The desire to actively participate in the European integration process played a secondary role, at least for economic policy considerations. It was not so much designing and supporting European solutions that motivated Austrian politics, but rather not being discriminated against in the pursuit of national interests.”8 Butschek reinforced this verdict. Austria‘s EU commitment was initially due to Mock and Vranitzky, which led to a positive referendum result: “In principle, the relationship of the Austrian population to the EU remained distanced to bro- ken. [...] The country’s activities were limited to technical cooperation, as it were, within the Commission’s administrative apparatus. Political initiatives almost exclusively concerned the representation of – supposedly – national interests.”9 How can we analyze and judge the relationship Austria-EU at the very early stages of its membership? In a first phase, Austria strove to implement a policy 6 GEHLER, Europa, 367, 382, especially 455–456, 886. 7 On EU accession and EU policy see Felix BUTSCHEK, Vom Staatsvertrag zur EU. Öster- reichische Wirtschaftsgeschichte von 1955 bis zur Gegenwart, Wien – Köln – Weimar 2004, 135–143: 142. 8 Helmut KRAMER, Österreichs Wirtschaftspolitik im Rahmen der EU, in: Heinrich NEIS- SER – Sonja PUNTSCHER-RIEKMANN (Hrsg.), Europäisierung der österreichischen Po- litik. Konsequenzen der Mitgliedschaft, Wien 2002, 267–294: 275; for the weakening of a pro- active political approach in Austria’s EU policy see IDEM, Austrian Foreign Policy 1995– 2015, in: Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 45 (July 2016), 2, 49–57: 51–53; also: IDEM, Plädoyer für eine Reaktivierung der Außen- und Neutralitätspolitik Österreichs, in: Thomas ROITHNER – Ursula GAMAUF (Hrsg.), Am Anfang war die Vision vom Frieden. Weg weiser in eine Zukunft jenseits von Gewalt und Krieg. Festschrift zum 90. Geburtstag von Gerald MADER, Wien 2016, 343–356. 9 BUTSCHEK, Vom Staatsvertrag zur EU, 142, see also Anton PELINKA, Innenansicht: Rol- lenbild und Rollenwahrnehmung Österreichs als Akteur in der EU, in: Heinrich NEISSER – Sonja PUNTSCHER-RIEKMANN (Hrsg.), Europäisierung der österreichischen Politik. Konsequenzen der Mitgliedschaft, Wien 2002, 17–36; Peter A. ULRAM, Einstellung der Ös- terreicher zur EU, in: NEISSER – PUNTSCHER-RIEKMANN (Hrsg.), Europäisierung der österreichischen Politik, 65–79. 718 VIII. From EU Membership to the EU-14 Sanction Measures 1995–2000 of adaptation to the union’s structure and adoption of the community’s rules of the game (1995–99). The government had assumed roles and responsibilities for nominating and appointing functional staff. The former Agricultural Minister Franz Fischler (1989–1994) (ÖVP) became a member of the European Commis- sion, responsible for agricultural matters (1999–2004) and later on also for fishery policies (2004–2009).10 In addition, twenty-one Austrians assumed responsibilities as elected mem- bers in the European Parliament. But when it came to civil service positions, they had a deficit, compared to other candidates for accession. In the Translation Centre, it was not easy for candidates to get hired because the department respon- sible for German was already staffed by Germans. While there were 112 Finns and 99 Swedes,
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