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Religious Authorities in Wahhabi States ISSUE BRIEF 05.06.19 Religious Authorities in Wahhabi States Courtney Freer, Ph.D., London School of Economics Wahhabism is a central element of region of Saudi Arabia and forged a close debates on Islam and religious extremism, relationship with the Saudi political leadership, especially in educational institutions in the the al-Saud family. This relationship Arabian Peninsula. The structures linked to underlies the institutionalization of religious Wahhabism, one of the most conservative authorities in the form of Wahhabi scholars strands of Islam, are perhaps the most who are state employees in Saudi Arabia. opaque in the Middle East, leading to Although Qatar is also officially a Wahhabi considerable misconceptions about this state, the religious sphere is not similarly religious ideology and the figures linked to it. bureaucratized, with no institutionalized form In Saudi Arabia, the practice of Wahhabism of state religious authority in the form of a is also undergoing significant changes grand mufti or bureaucratized state ulama under the leadership of Saudi Crown Prince (religious scholars). In fact, most religious Mohammad bin Salman. While traditionally authorities in the country are not Qatari, and the strictures of Wahhabism have influenced so an indigenous and state-linked ulama has everyday life in the kingdom and have even not emerged as it has in Saudi Arabia. been enforced by a religious police force, Our regionwide survey mapping the this arrangement appears to be changing, religious landscape in the Middle East with restrictions on gender segregation offers key insights on the influence of and entertainment recently having been Wahhabism—a previous report discussed the partially lifted and with the institutionalized results in detail for Saudi Arabia and Qatar clergy and police increasingly separate from (https://bit.ly/2U61ptU). The survey was part the mechanisms of central political power. of a larger Baker Institute study on religious While traditionally the In Qatar, the role of religion in public life authority in the Middle East (https://bit. strictures of Wahhabism has generally remained static during this ly/2WfoqXT). In examining the survey results have influenced period, with the political leadership largely from Qatar and Saudi Arabia, I find that in everyday life in the separate from religious authorities. This brief both countries religious figures linked to the evaluates whether the Wahhabi countries state, such as figures of the bureaucratized kingdom and have of Saudi Arabia and Qatar are qualitatively ulama in Saudi Arabia and figures linked to even been enforced different in terms of which religious the Ministry of Awqaf in Qatar, are more by a religious police authorities are followed, how religious affairs likely to be trusted. The three most trusted force, this arrangement are managed by the state, and what the scholars in Saudi Arabia, among a nearly appears to be changing. implications of such differences are. equal number of nationals and non-nationals, Wahhabism is linked to Salafism in its were all Saudis from the Council of Supreme emphasis on returning to the original sources Scholars (Shaykh Saad bin Nasser al-Shethri, of Islam and the Hanbali school of Islamic Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdulaziz bin Abdullah jurisprudence.1 Unlike Salafism, however, al-Sheikh, and Sheikh Saleh Al-Sheikh), Wahhabism has its origins in the work of which is appointed by the king and is the only eighteenth-century theologian Muhammad body permitted to grant religious rulings in ibn Abd al-Wahhab who preached in the Najd that state. RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 05.06.19 Meanwhile in a Qatari sample that fatwa, or official religious ruling, from the was overwhelmingly expatriate, Wahhabi Supreme Council against demonstrations.4 Shaykh Anwar al-Badawi, who is a Qatari Further, state-linked authorities who Islamic judge and head of Qatari Islamic were once considered widely influential Judges, was ranked most trusted, followed across borders no longer wield the by another Qatari Wahhabi scholar, Shaykh influence they once did, which is most State-linked authorities Abdullah bin Zayd al-Mahmud, who clearly evidenced by the overwhelmingly who were once had a major role in putting together the negative endorsement effect we saw for considered widely country’s judicial system and is based at the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar. As a result, the government-funded Islamic Cultural engagement with local ministries of awqaf influential across Center in Doha. Interestingly, Tariq Ramadan, is perhaps the most important means of borders no longer wield the Europe-based scholar and grandson ensuring that messaging about religion is the influence they once of Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim diffused in a manner that resonates with did, which is most Brotherhood, ranked third in terms of local populations of both expatriates and trusted religious authority in Qatar. There citizens. The role of ministries is critical clearly evidenced by is more variety, then, in which religious given the finding that state-linked religious the overwhelmingly authorities are followed in Qatar, reflecting authorities remain important in influencing negative endorsement the fact that the state is less directly religious belief and practice. effect we saw for involved in religious life compared to Saudi Second, economic incentives are not Arabia. While both states house considerable likely to effect social and political change the Grand Imam of expatriate populations (87 percent in Qatar in the wealthy countries of the Arabian Al-Azhar. and 27 percent in Saudi Arabia),2 citizens Peninsula. Because governments of these and non-nationals have similar opinions states benefit from hydrocarbon wealth, about which religious authorities they trust, they are able to provide handsomely for at least in the Saudi case where we had a their citizenry, granting them free education nearly even number of each group and health care, as well as high-paying of respondents. public sector jobs. As a result, groups like the Muslim Brotherhood that provide materially for their followers do not have POLICY IMPLICATIONS an advantage over other types of groups My findings about the power of state- as they do in places like Egypt and Jordan, where governments provide less for their Engagement with linked religious authorities lead to four core recommendations for policymakers. First, citizens. Indeed, among Saudi nationals, 12.9 local ministries of when it comes to influencing messaging percent reported that they had received awqaf is perhaps on citizen and non-citizen populations in assistance from the government, compared the Gulf, it is important to engage with to 4.5 percent from the Muslim Brotherhood, the most important 2.9 percent from Salafis, and 1.8 percent means of ensuring state religious authorities since they hold considerable sway in the religious sector from Sufis. Results were similar for non- that messaging about and in society more broadly. It is also nationals, even though they have less religion is diffused in a essential to understand their limitations, access to state resources: 8.2 percent had manner that resonates since their authority, though significant, is received assistance from the government, compared to 5.4 percent from the Muslim with local populations not absolute. Indeed, it is for that reason that independent Islamist movements Brotherhood, 4 percent from Salafis, and 1.5 of both expatriates have managed to emerge even within percent from Sufi groups. In Qatar, only 8 and citizens. Saudi Arabia, as evidenced most clearly percent had sought aid from a government by the rise of the Sahwa movement in religious agency, followed by 5.7 percent the 1990s and more recently in 2011 from the Muslim Brotherhood, and 3 percent when independent clerics linked to that from Salafis, again demonstrating that the movement, including Shaykh Salman government is the primary dispenser of al-Odah, collectively sent a petition to the aid to both nationals and expatriates. As Saudi leadership requesting reform.3 This expected, there is overall little need or at move, among others, led to the release of a least little use made of religious groups for material support. For religious organizations 2 RELIGIOUS AUTHORITIES IN WAHHABI STATES to hold influence, they must hold ideological Wahhabism across different countries will appeal or provide a social function since likely be unsuccessful, even in nations they cannot attract followers with material that appear similar at first glance like Qatar disbursements greater than those provided and Saudi Arabia. Neither state allows by the rentier governments of the Gulf. opportunities for meaningful political Third, expatriates follow and are reform, yet Saudi Arabia institutionalizes influenced by local religious authorities to the religious sphere and more stringently a larger extent than we may realize, which enforces the strictures of Wahhabism. By needs to be taken into account in messaging contrast, Qatar has a largely foreign class to these countries. The most trusted of ulama and does not enforce the social religious authorities in both countries were tenets of Wahhabism. Thus, political and state-affiliated, reflecting either their appeal social context matter despite similarities in or the ubiquity of state-sanctioned religious religious practice or doctrine. messaging. It is also quite interesting how the influence of state-affiliated Wahhabi religious leaders
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