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ISSUE BRIEF 05.06.19 Religious Authorities in Wahhabi States

Courtney Freer, Ph.D., School of Economics

Wahhabism is a central element of region of and forged a close debates on and religious extremism, relationship with the Saudi political leadership, especially in educational institutions in the the al-Saud family. This relationship Arabian Peninsula. The structures linked to underlies the institutionalization of religious , one of the most conservative authorities in the form of Wahhabi scholars strands of Islam, are perhaps the most who are state employees in Saudi Arabia. opaque in the Middle East, leading to Although is also officially a Wahhabi considerable misconceptions about this state, the religious sphere is not similarly religious ideology and the figures linked to it. bureaucratized, with no institutionalized form In Saudi Arabia, the practice of Wahhabism of state religious authority in the form of a is also undergoing significant changes grand mufti or bureaucratized state under the leadership of Saudi Crown Prince (religious scholars). In fact, most religious Mohammad bin Salman. While traditionally authorities in the country are not Qatari, and the strictures of Wahhabism have influenced so an indigenous and state-linked ulama has everyday life in the kingdom and have even not emerged as it has in Saudi Arabia. been enforced by a religious force, Our regionwide survey mapping the this arrangement appears to be changing, religious landscape in the Middle East with restrictions on gender segregation offers key insights on the influence of and entertainment recently having been Wahhabism—a previous report discussed the partially lifted and with the institutionalized results in detail for Saudi Arabia and Qatar clergy and police increasingly separate from (https://bit.ly/2U61ptU). The survey was part the mechanisms of central political power. of a larger Baker Institute study on religious While traditionally the In Qatar, the role of in public life authority in the Middle East (https://bit. strictures of Wahhabism has generally remained static during this ly/2WfoqXT). In examining the survey results have influenced period, with the political leadership largely from Qatar and Saudi Arabia, I find that in everyday life in the separate from religious authorities. This brief both countries religious figures linked to the evaluates whether the Wahhabi countries state, such as figures of the bureaucratized kingdom and have of Saudi Arabia and Qatar are qualitatively ulama in Saudi Arabia and figures linked to even been enforced different in terms of which religious the Ministry of Awqaf in Qatar, are more by a religious police authorities are followed, how religious affairs likely to be trusted. The three most trusted force, this arrangement are managed by the state, and what the scholars in Saudi Arabia, among a nearly appears to be changing. implications of such differences are. equal number of nationals and non-nationals, Wahhabism is linked to Salafism in its were all Saudis from the Council of Supreme emphasis on returning to the original sources Scholars (Shaykh Saad bin Nasser al-Shethri, of Islam and the school of Islamic Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdulaziz bin Abdullah jurisprudence.1 Unlike Salafism, however, al-Sheikh, and Sheikh Saleh Al-Sheikh), Wahhabism has its origins in the work of which is appointed by the king and is the only eighteenth-century theologian Muhammad body permitted to grant religious rulings in ibn Abd al-Wahhab who preached in the Najd that state. RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 05.06.19

Meanwhile in a Qatari sample that fatwa, or official religious ruling, from the was overwhelmingly expatriate, Wahhabi Supreme Council against demonstrations.4 Shaykh Anwar al-Badawi, who is a Qatari Further, state-linked authorities who Islamic judge and head of Qatari Islamic were once considered widely influential Judges, was ranked most trusted, followed across borders no longer wield the by another Qatari Wahhabi scholar, Shaykh influence they once did, which is most State-linked authorities Abdullah bin Zayd al-Mahmud, who clearly evidenced by the overwhelmingly who were once had a major role in putting together the negative endorsement effect we saw for considered widely country’s judicial system and is based at the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar. As a result, the government-funded Islamic Cultural engagement with local ministries of awqaf influential across Center in . Interestingly, , is perhaps the most important means of borders no longer wield the Europe-based scholar and grandson ensuring that messaging about religion is the influence they once of Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim diffused in a manner that resonates with did, which is most Brotherhood, ranked third in terms of local populations of both expatriates and trusted religious authority in Qatar. There citizens. The role of ministries is critical clearly evidenced by is more variety, then, in which religious given the finding that state-linked religious the overwhelmingly authorities are followed in Qatar, reflecting authorities remain important in influencing negative endorsement the fact that the state is less directly religious belief and practice. effect we saw for involved in religious life compared to Saudi Second, economic incentives are not Arabia. While both states house considerable likely to effect social and political change the Grand Imam of expatriate populations (87 percent in Qatar in the wealthy countries of the Arabian Al-Azhar. and 27 percent in Saudi Arabia),2 citizens Peninsula. Because governments of these and non-nationals have similar opinions states benefit from hydrocarbon wealth, about which religious authorities they trust, they are able to provide handsomely for at least in the Saudi case where we had a their citizenry, granting them free education nearly even number of each group and health care, as well as high-paying of respondents. public sector jobs. As a result, groups like the that provide materially for their followers do not have POLICY IMPLICATIONS an advantage over other types of groups My findings about the power of state- as they do in places like and , where governments provide less for their Engagement with linked religious authorities lead to four core recommendations for policymakers. First, citizens. Indeed, among Saudi nationals, 12.9 local ministries of when it comes to influencing messaging percent reported that they had received awqaf is perhaps on citizen and non-citizen populations in assistance from the government, compared the Gulf, it is important to engage with to 4.5 percent from the Muslim Brotherhood, the most important 2.9 percent from Salafis, and 1.8 percent means of ensuring state religious authorities since they hold considerable sway in the religious sector from Sufis. Results were similar for non- that messaging about and in society more broadly. It is also nationals, even though they have less religion is diffused in a essential to understand their limitations, access to state resources: 8.2 percent had manner that resonates since their authority, though significant, is received assistance from the government, compared to 5.4 percent from the Muslim with local populations not absolute. Indeed, it is for that reason that independent Islamist movements Brotherhood, 4 percent from Salafis, and 1.5 of both expatriates have managed to emerge even within percent from Sufi groups. In Qatar, only 8 and citizens. Saudi Arabia, as evidenced most clearly percent had sought aid from a government by the rise of the in religious agency, followed by 5.7 percent the 1990s and more recently in 2011 from the Muslim Brotherhood, and 3 percent when independent clerics linked to that from Salafis, again demonstrating that the movement, including Shaykh Salman government is the primary dispenser of al-Odah, collectively sent a petition to the aid to both nationals and expatriates. As Saudi leadership requesting reform.3 This expected, there is overall little need or at move, among others, led to the release of a least little use made of religious groups for material support. For religious organizations 2 RELIGIOUS AUTHORITIES IN WAHHABI STATES

to hold influence, they must hold ideological Wahhabism across different countries will appeal or provide a social function since likely be unsuccessful, even in nations they cannot attract followers with material that appear similar at first glance like Qatar disbursements greater than those provided and Saudi Arabia. Neither state allows by the rentier governments of the Gulf. opportunities for meaningful political Third, expatriates follow and are reform, yet Saudi Arabia institutionalizes influenced by local religious authorities to the religious sphere and more stringently a larger extent than we may realize, which enforces the strictures of Wahhabism. By needs to be taken into account in messaging contrast, Qatar has a largely foreign class to these countries. The most trusted of ulama and does not enforce the social religious authorities in both countries were tenets of Wahhabism. Thus, political and state-affiliated, reflecting either their appeal social context matter despite similarities in or the ubiquity of state-sanctioned religious religious practice or doctrine. messaging. It is also quite interesting how the influence of state-affiliated Wahhabi religious leaders undermines the sway that IMPLICATIONS Saudi Arabia is unique mainstream Islamist leaders hold elsewhere The divergent religious structures and in terms of the extent in the region. For example, Islamists Rachid to which the religious Ghannouchi of the Tunisian Ennahdha party religious authorities in the two Wahhabi and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan states of Qatar and Saudi Arabia reveal sector is bureaucratized, had the strongest negative endorsement a number of common threads in both which leaves less effects among both nationals and expatriate countries, such as the enduring strength of state-linked religious figures, the limits of space for independent populations in Saudi Arabia, suggesting that religious activity or of the strand linked to the support for Islamist political and religious Muslim Brotherhood is unfavorable. In Qatar, leaders, and the extent to which Muslim support for non-state the strongest negative endorsement effect expatriates appear to reflect their local religious actors. The was for Grand Imam of Al-Azhar Ahmed El religious environments. Saudi Arabia is clear co-optation unique in terms of the extent to which Tayeb, followed by Recep Tayyip Erdogan. of the religious These results demonstrate the extent to the religious sector is bureaucratized, which expatriates also appear to be swayed which leaves less space for independent sphere, illustrated by local religious authorities and the degree religious activity or support for non-state by the government’s to which Islamist leaders or leaders of religious actors. The clear co-optation employment of Islamic authorities like Al-Azhar do not hold of the religious sphere, illustrated by the government’s employment of clergy, has clergy, has neutralized influence across borders, contrary to my the ability of the initial expectations. neutralized the ability of the religious On a related note, this strong negative sphere to challenge the state on religious religious sphere to endorsement effect of religious leaders practice. This arrangement thus ties a challenge the state on specific religious ideology to the state and linked to the Muslim Brotherhood or more religious practice. broadly to mainstream Islamist ideas its legitimacy. Nonetheless, despite the reflects some Gulf governments’ efforts fact that preachers have traditionally been to depoliticize Islam in a way that enables employees of the state with exclusive power them to strengthen their control over local to release religious rulings, independent populations for whom Brotherhood-linked clerics like Salman al-Odah and independent figures once held appeal. This dynamic movements like Sahwa have emerged. could lead to greater popularity of Salafi Since Mohammad bin Salman rose to or Wahhabi figures instead, or to a general power, however, both state-linked and weakening in terms of appeal of figures independent clerics have lost power: the linked to politically engaged Muslim groups. religious police no longer has the power to Fourth, Wahhabism shows variation make arrests; social functions like concerts based on sociopolitical environment, and cinema openings are occurring despite underscoring the flexibility of Wahhabism the contestation of some members of the 5 despite the rigidity its proponents claim. As state ulama; and several independent a result, a single strategy to engage with clerics and activists were imprisoned in 3 RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 05.06.19

September 2017.6 In a famed interview 3. Stéphane Lacroix, “Comparing the with in April 2018, Mohammad Arab Revolts: Is Saudi Arabia Immune?” bin Salman went so far as to question the Journal of Democracy 22, no. 4 (2011): 50-51. existence of Wahhabism itself: “No one can 4. Madawi al-Rasheed, “ define Wahhabism. There is no Wahhabism. as Counter-Revolution: Saudi Responses to We don’t believe we have Wahhabism.”7 the ,” Studies in Ethnicity and Clearly, a reconfiguration is under way in Nationalism 11, no. 3 (2011): 520-521. Saudi Arabia in terms of the relationship 5. Ben Hubbard, “Saudi Prince Asserting This report is part of between the state and religious authorities, Power, Brings Clerics to Heel,” The New York with the central political leadership eager Times, November 5, 2017, https://www. a two-year project on to demonstrate its dominance over the nytimes.com/2017/11/05/world/middleeast/ religious authority in religious sphere. Meanwhile in Qatar, saudi-arabia-wahhabism-salafism- the Middle East. notwithstanding efforts to educate an mohammed-bin-salman.html. The study is generously indigenous clergy, the relationship between 6. “Saudi Arabia ‘Arrests Clerics supported by a grant the state and religion remains largely in Crackdown on Dissent,’” BBC News, unchanged. Qatar did reassert its place as a September 13, 2017, https://www.bbc.co.uk/ from the Henry Luce Wahhabi state by naming its state mosque news/world-middle-east-41260543. Foundation. Shaykh Mohammad ibn Abdul Wahhab in 7. Jeffrey Goldberg, “Saudi Crown 2017—a move that provoked Saudi anger Prince: Iran’s Supreme Leader ‘Makes Hitler and claims that the Qatari ruling family is not Look Good,’” The Atlantic, April 2, 2018, linked to Wahhab himself, demonstrating https://www.theatlantic.com/international/ the extent to which links to Wahhab remain archive/2018/04/mohammed-bin-salman- an important part of establishing religious iran-israel/557036/. legitimacy for these states.8 8. “Saudi Family Wants Qatar Mosque The ’s two Wahhabi Name Changed,” Gulf News, May 28, 2017, states are not exceptional because of the https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/saudi/ strict form of Islam embraced in these saudi-family-wants-qatar-mosque-name- See more issue briefs at: contexts; rather, the results of our survey changed-1.2034425. www.bakerinstitute.org/issue-briefs demonstrate the extent to which political and social context matters in terms of This publication was written by a researcher (or researchers) who religious attitudes. Given the results of this AUTHOR participated in a Baker Institute project. survey, I therefore stress the importance Wherever feasible, this research is of engagement with official religious Courtney Freer, Ph.D., is a research fellow reviewed by outside experts before it is authorities and the inclusion of expatriate at the Programme, LSE Middle East released. However, the views expressed populations in discussions about religious Centre, and a former research assistant at herein are those of the individual trends in the Wahhabi states of Qatar and the Brookings Doha Center. She holds a author(s), and do not necessarily doctorate from the University of , a represent the views of Rice University’s Saudi Arabia. Baker Institute for Public Policy. master’s degree in Middle Eastern studies from George Washington University, and a © 2019 Rice University’s Baker Institute ENDNOTES bachelor’s degree from Princeton University. for Public Policy Her research interests focus on domestic 1. The Hanbali School of jurisprudence in the Gulf states, with particular This material may be quoted or is the smallest and strictest of the four emphasis on and tribalism. reproduced without prior permission, traditional schools of Sunni jurisprudence, provided appropriate credit is given to the author and Rice University’s Baker deriving primarily from the Institute for Public Policy. and and seen as textualist in its interpretation. Cite as: 2. Courtney Freer, Rentier Islamism: The Freer, Courtney. 2019. Religious Influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gulf Authorities in Wahhabi States. Issue brief no. 05.06.19. Rice University’s Monarchies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Baker Institute for Public Policy, 2018), 6. Houston, Texas.

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