Political Islam and Counterterrorism in Southeast Asia: the Stanley an Agenda for US Policy Foundation Ince Late 2001, After the Interven- Asia
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Policy Bulletin Political Islam and Counterterrorism In Southeast Asia: The Stanley An Agenda for US Policy Foundation ince late 2001, after the interven- Asia. On the one hand, it has returned tion in Afghanistan, the United the region to the US “policy screen.” On SStates has focused attention on the other, it views Southeast Asia in a “second fronts” in the war on terrorism, single dimension—that of Islamic 44th Strategy assuming that Al Qaeda would disperse extremism—which can result in unbal- for Peace its operatives and resources more widely. anced, even myopic, policies. Conference Southeast Asia, a region of prime impor- tance during the Cold War, holds both Despite these contradictions, counterter- threat and promise. Indonesia, the largest rorism cooperation between the United October 16-18, 2003 country in the region, is home to more States and Southeast Asia has met with Muslims than all Arab states combined. some success. Greater awareness of Airlie Center, Warrenton, VA Southeast Asian Islam has traditionally extremist networks in the region has been moderate, but in the past decade resulted in tighter law enforcement and radical Islamists—indigenous and the arrest of some key terrorists. At the foreign—have made strides both same time, however, the United States is underground and in the public arena. at risk of encouraging greater radicalism in Southeast Asian Islamist communities Washington counts several Southeast with policies that often do not accurately Asian governments as military or politi- reflect local conditions and concerns. cal allies, but allegiance to the United States is far from automatic. After the To address the difficulties of formulating fall of Saigon in 1975, American foreign new policies in the post-September 11 policy centered on other regions. era, the Stanley Foundation chose to Southeast Asia’s response was to foster examine political Islam and counterter- greater independence in foreign policy rorism in Southeast Asia as one topic in and to balance relations with the United its 44th Strategy for Peace Conference States with stronger ties to other powers, on “New Security Challenges in notably China. In this interim, globaliza- Southeast and South Asia.” Participants tion and democratization have made identified specific challenges in the More information on the Asia-Pacific domestic populations more vocal, and region and formulated recommendations Initiatives program is they are increasingly critical of US poli- on both paradigm shifts and concrete available online at cies. Fearing political consequences, gov- policy measures. api.stanleyfoundation.org. ernments are reluctant at times to pursue This Policy Bulletin Islamist radicals, particularly if they are Policy Challenges summarizes the primary perceived as bowing to US pressure in findings of the conference as A majority of participants in the round- interpreted by the rapporteur. doing so. table agreed that US counterterrorism Participants neither reviewed nor approved this bulletin. policy tends to conflate political Islam Therefore, it should not be assumed that every The new US focus on counterterrorism and terrorism worldwide. In the words of participant subscribes to all as an organizing principle in foreign pol- one participant, “US policy tries to of its recommendations, observations, and conclusions. icy is a mixed blessing for Southeast reduce the entire Muslim world to the Arab street.” In Southeast Asia a connection Global media has made Southeast Asians exists between Islamist extremism and terror- more aware of the plight of Muslims in ism in some cases, but it is generally narrower other areas. As a result, Southeast Asian and weaker than that found in some other Muslims are increasingly concerned about regions, particularly the Middle East. A the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, among greater effort is needed to distinguish Muslim others, and more inclined to subscribe to a political expression from terrorism. Along need to defend Islam worldwide. The US these lines, participants identified eight chal- intervention in Iraq has strengthened this lenges in crafting US counterterrorism policy universalist view among Southeast Asian in Southeast Asia: Muslims and damaged the US image in some quarters. Recent polls indicate that • Understanding political Islam in approval of the United States has fallen by Southeast Asia. In the past decade, politi- 75 percent in Indonesia in the past 18 cal Muslims have often been viewed from months. One participant maintained that, the outside as part of a global “Algerian despite administration insistence that the dilemma,” a reference to the 1992 election United States is not waging war against in that country that brought to power an Islam, “The data just doesn’t support In Southeast Islamist party (with an insurgent base) that.” The United States has heretofore Asia a that sought to end secular rule. This tended to view Southeast Asia as more connection model assumes that political Muslims are parochial in its foreign policy interests and invariably militant. Some participants dis- in Islamic issues. exists agreed and pointed to moderate groups between seeking political expression for Islamic • Plotting the intersection between sepa- Islamist issues in Southeast Asia. In Malaysia, ratism and terrorism. In counterterrorism political Islam is embodied by the oppos- policy, Washington is primarily concerned extremism ing Islamic Party of Malaysia (Parti Islam with international groups—particularly and terrorism SeMalaysia, or PAS). Competing for those that threaten the United States— in some cases, power in the formal political arena has while some Southeast Asian governments given PAS a motivation to distance itself are faced with security threats from several but it is from terrorist groups. In Indonesia, politi- sources. In Indonesia, there is no evidence generally cal Muslims are generally not driven by to date that the Acehnese separatist group, narrower Islamic ideology; instead, they are found Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh across a spectrum of parties and often Merdeka, or GAM), has connections to Al and weaker pursue pragmatic policy goals. Radical Qaeda or other foreign terrorist groups. In than that Islamic parties pose little threat, and failed Jakarta’s view, however, GAM presents a found in...the to win even 3 percent of the vote in the clear threat to Indonesian internal stability. last election. A different problem is presented by the Middle East. Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in • Placing Southeast Asia in a global con- the Philippines. Although the MILF spo- text. Despite the fact that Southeast Asian radically engages in peace talks with Islam is broadly a moderate strain, world Manila, recent intelligence suggests that events have nurtured a global Islamic con- the group’s home territory in Mindanao sciousness among Muslims in the region. has become “the new Afghanistan”—a Southeast Asians who joined the muja- training ground for the Jemmah Islamiyah, hadin against the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia’s regional terrorist network. Afghanistan in the 1980s developed ties Thus far, the United States has resisted bids with radical groups from other regions. from Indonesian and Philippine leaders to 2 declare both of these groups to be terrorist, as at least an equal threat, since terrorist although the case of the MILF presents an groups often recruit from them. Second, a obvious dilemma. focus on the educational system may be misplaced. Instead, policymakers also need • Separating violent radical Islamists from to consider unemployment as a spur to nonviolent ones. Several participants made extremism, a problem that is linked to edu- a distinction between Islamist radicals in cation but not exclusively defined by it. Southeast Asia who support the use of violence and those who do not. It follows • Identifying the most effective actors in that policy should attempt to widen and Southeast Asian security. A major dimen- strengthen that difference, but such a sion in US global policy has been the use policy—particularly from an external of military force to counter terrorism. power—is inherently delicate and risky. However, there are few if any terrorist How can radical nonviolent Muslims be threats in Southeast Asia that are likely to drawn into dialogue and the mainstream respond to a military solution, particularly political process? Should the United States one involving foreign troops. The excep- make direct efforts in this regard, such as tion has been the Philippines, where US identifying nonviolent Muslim radicals for and Philippine armed forces have com- Although exchange programs, or take a backdoor bined in a joint training exercise to pursue some approach, by supporting indigenous the Abu Sayyaf Group, a small Islamic Islamic processes that offer alternatives to this splinter group reputed to have connections group? to Al Qaeda. But as in almost everything educational relating to Southeast Asia, few rules apply institutions • Dealing with ambiguous institutions, par- across the board. In Malaysia and are breeding ticularly educational systems. Although Singapore, longstanding internal security some Islamic educational institutions are laws place the police and intelligence grounds for breeding grounds for extremism and ter- agencies automatically in control of coun- extremism rorism in Southeast Asia, the majority are terterrorism. In Indonesia, counterterror- and not. Nevertheless, their potential to serve ism policy is focused on police but