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Assessing Political Islam Whether It Has Been Failed in the Light of Two Muslim Majority Countries: Egypt and Pakistan Md. Didar

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Assessing Political Islam Whether It Has Been Failed in the Light of Two Muslim Majority Countries: Egypt and Pakistan Md. Didar Assessing Political Islam whether it has been failed in the light of two Muslim majority countries: Egypt and Pakistan Md. Didarul Islam PhD researcher, University of Leeds Assistant Professor University of Dhaka Email: [email protected] 1 Assessing Political Islam whether it has been failed in the light of two Muslim majority countries: Egypt and Pakistan Introduction Islamist movements in the global world is featured with a response to the western modernity which subsequently drifted the rise of political Islam or Islamism in a ‘modern’ fashion. Political Islam, dating back from 19th century, has found its modern stand in Egypt, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan giving rise a good number of Islamic political organizations such as Muslim brotherhood in Egypt and Jamat-i-Islami in Pakistan. Strategically and politically, these countries are different in many aspects resulting a different nature of political Islam in these regions. Hasan-al-Bannah, the founder of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Abul ala Al Maududi, the founder of Jamat-i-Islami in Pakistan set the cornerstone of modern political Islam or Islamism. They tried to brought legitimacy with a vision of returning to the original text of Islam; the Quran and the Sunnah; and to the earliest community of Islam (Roy, 1994, p. viii). In this article, it has been argued that the emergence of Islamist movements or political Islam in two Muslim nation states, Egypt and Pakistan respectively is a feature of modern political phenomenon. Political Islam in these two countries have taken distinctive forms in societies having some common characteristics and differences. For a critical exposition, the cases of Muslim brotherhood (MB) in Egypt and Jamat-i-Islami (JI) in Pakistan will be analysed. In addition, the argument of Oliver Roy (1994, pp. 9-10) that the main projects of political Islam have failed has been supported from two grounds; the deviation of political Islam from its earlier promises and their failure to establish a perfect sharia based Islamic society. 2 Islamist Movements: Emergence and Theoretical Genesis Before starting the historical analysis of Islamic movements, it is important to understand political Islam or Islamism. Oliver Roy (2004, p.58) defines political Islam as the brand of the modern political fundamentalism which is premised on establishing a true Islamic society by not only imposing sharia alone but also establishing Islamic state through political actions. Modern day Islamism started its journey based on Salafist ideology with a view to returning to the Quran, hadith and the sharia by rejecting any kind of historical commentary, four Sunni schools of law and Islamic civilization after the four caliphs (Roy, 1994, p. 36). In addition, Islamism considers that society can be Islamised only through social and political action. This is why, Islamism consider politics as integral part of religion which will ensure the totality of religion. Roy (1994, p. 37) writes that Islamism adapts the classical version of Islam (Quran, hadith and Sharia) as complete and universal system as ‘ahistorical’ phenomenon. Thus, Islamism rejects the necessity of modernise Islamic interpretation but they objectify Islam to implement Islamic injunctions in the modern society. For being an Islamist movement or being in the domain of political Islam, there is no need to be involved in direct power dynamics in the state. Charles Hirschind (2016) showed that within the framework of political Islam, there are groups who focus on dawah or preaching of Islamic teachings instead of urging to capture state power. Many other Islamist movements are engaged in charity, alms giving, medical care, mosque building and other welfare activities. But the reason Hirschkind (2016) considers all these movements as political is the wide spectrum of political domain of state as these organisations need to get permission from the state by various means. These movements can never be ‘apolitical’. Hirschkind’s (2016) position is convincing because these movements, though not be directed to capture power might have link with the other movements for sponsorship. 3 Islamist movements can be traced back from the late 18th century when Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahab (founder of Wahhabism) formulated his religio-political theory marking the base of modern political Islam or Islamism in general. His ideas, generally called Wahhabism have historical influence on other Islamists movements throughout the Muslim states despite significant differences from country to country. But present day Political Islam has direct connection with Salafist movements popularly called Salafism meaning the pious successors (Mandaville, 2014, p. 47). Though Mandaville (Ibid, p. 48) interchangeably used Wahhabism and Salafism, he argued that Salafism is broader in scope than Wahhabism where the later mainly focus on the exclusion of bidah or innovation (Ibid, p. 48) from Islamic culture and going back to the earliest Islam. In addition, Salafism urges for the establishment of Islamic ummah or society throughout the world. This Salafi ideological project has been developed by different 19th and 20th century activists of political Islam like Mohammad ibn Abdu Hu, Jamal al Din Afgani, Rashid Rida, Hasan Al Bannah, Sayeed Qutub and most recently Ayman Al Zawahiri. While Abdu Hu focused on purification of Islam based on individuals and society, Rashid Rida formulated the framework for the Islamic state based on political power which influenced Sayeed Qutub and Maulana Maududi. This Islamic state, according to Rida should be solely based on sharia but must be compatible with modern day political norms. On this point, equating Islam and sharia with modern political norms, Maududi and Qutub differed their opinion rejecting any kind of compatibility with western political norms (Mandaville, 2004, p.49). Since the beginning of Salafism, it can be grouped in three broad groups (Mandaville, 2014, p. 49); Salafist quietist who focus on individual spirituality and attainment of purification but rejects the establishment of Islamic political order or Islamic state, Salafist jihadist who want 4 to establish Islamic state by any violent means what Roy (2004) describes as neo- fundamentalists, and Salafi Islamists who want to establish Islamic state through the mainstream process of the present political structure ( One section of Muslim brotherhood for instance). In addition, Salafist reformism was grounded in another question why Muslims have failed to compete with the west (Roy, 1994, p.310). This question triggered Afghani, Rida and Bannah to search for their ideological base. In addition, because of associating their Islamic projects to anti-western strategy, Salafism became popular in Arab region. Two specific reasons played a vital role here; a feeling of threat from the colonial power and a sense of fragmentation of religious authority (Mandaville, 2014, p.51). Political Islam had to go under two kinds of Islamist movements; Islamic revivalism and Islamic reformation. In response to the westernisation and the trajectory of the Muslims, Abdul Wahab (1703-92) started revivalist movement focusing on the need to return to the primary model of Islam. His ideas have originated Salafism later on. He rejected Sufism (mystic order) stating this as bidah or innovation. His book The Book of the Divine Unity laid the foundation of the modern day Saudi Arabia kingdom in the name of Muhammad Ibn Saud (Mandaville, 2014, p. 58). According to the Wahhabis, the only solution to counter the hegemony of westerns is to go back to the original teachings of Quran, hadiths and the four caliphs. It has been noted by the theorists that Wahab was greatly influenced by Ibn Tymiah (a 13th century Muslim intellectual) to formulate the concept of going back to the early Islam and rejecting the historical compliance of Islam throughout centuries (Armajani, 2012). In response to Wahhabism, Jamal-al-Din Afghani (1839-97) started Islamic reformist movement theorising the Muslims trajectory condition as product of the western colonialization and deviation from the true teaching of Islam. Mandaville (2014, p. 59) called this movement as a response to the imperialism. Afghani, criticising the then Muslim scholars as stagnant, wanted to establish pure Islamic society by not rejecting the historicity or 5 historical civilisation like Abbasiads or umayads. He urged for the improvement of science what can be derived from the Quranic philosophy has a historical supremacy over the west (Ibid, p.59). Later on, his follower Abdu Hu accelerated this reformist movement. According to this lineage, it is not possible to establish Islamic society or state by rejecting the long historicity of Islam nor by rejecting the modern-day phenomenon; either political or scientific. Findings: Islamism in Two Nation State Islamist organisations have been best flourished in countries like Egypt, Pakistan, Tunesia where they lack political freedom, democratic institutions and coupled with military rulers. Islamist movements or organisation like Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt and jamat-i- Islami in Pakistan took the advantage of this situation to fill the political and cultural space (Taj Hashmi, 2015). In the modern day political juncture, they have equipped themselves in the modern political process. Though their main project is to unite Islamic ummah as much as possible, they operate their organizational work in national boundaries (Roy, 2004, p. 59). Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt Premised on the Salafist ideological projects, Hasan Al Bannah (1906-1948) founded Ikhwanul Muslemeen or Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in 1928. Over the course of time, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has become the most influential modern Islamic political organization (Pew Research Forum, 2010). This group promotes both personal and social reforms based on Islamic teachings. Starting from a resistance organization, it quickly became politicised with a view to establishing sharia based Islamic state with the principle of ‘Islam is the solution’ (Pew Research Forum, 2010). Rejecting the western ideas, Bannah 6 argued that the solution of the Muslims in the modern days lies in returning to the original teachings of Islam.
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