DOCSLIB.ORG

The Revival of Impeachment As a Partisan Political Weapon Richard K

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Revival of Impeachment As a Partisan Political Weapon Richard K Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly Volume 34 Article 1 Number 2 Winter 2007 1-1-2007 The Revival of Impeachment as a Partisan Political Weapon Richard K. Neumann Jr. Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/ hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly Part of the Constitutional Law Commons Recommended Citation Richard K. Neumann Jr., The Revival of Impeachment as a Partisan Political Weapon, 34 Hastings Const. L.Q. 161 (2007). Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol34/iss2/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Revival of Impeachment as a Partisan Political Weapon by RICHARD K. NEUMANN JR Contents 1. Introduction II. The Adoption and Meaning of Constitutional Provisions on Impeachment III. The Evolution of Impeachment Practice A. The First Two Impeachments: Blount and Pickering B. The Chase Impeachment, Its Context, and Its Aftermath C. Between Chase and Johnson D. Johnson E. The Era of Nonpartisanship and Bipartisanship 1. Bellknap to Hoover 2. 1937 3. Ritter 4. Judicial Impeachments After Ritter 5. Nixon and Agnew F. The Revival of Impeachment As a Partisan Political Weapon 1. The Fortas and Douglas Investigations: The Beginning of the Struggle for the Supreme Court 2. Clinton IV. The Future of Partisan Impeachments and Threats of Impeachment A. Thomas B. Evidentiary Burdens in the House and Senate C. The Effect of Party Insecurity on the Partisan Use of Impeachment V. Conclusion Professor of Law, Hofstra Law School. I am grateful for the valuable and kind help of librarians Connie Lenz and Jennifer Wagner as well as the careful work of research assistants Elizabeth Brehm, Rachel Cherny, Marissa Goodman, and Janet Shin. [161] HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 34:2 I. Introduction Impeachment-the procedure through which the House of Representatives accuses and then prosecutes a federal official in the Senate with the aim of removing him or her from office-has historically had either of two purposes. One has been to oust in a nonpartisan or bipartisan manner a corrupt official who abuses power and thereby damages the country. The other has been to inflict, for partisan reasons, a political blow on an official whose conduct the impeaching Representatives simply dislike. Because the second purpose is much less acceptable, the impeaching Representatives attempt to disguise their purpose even when voting on strictly party lines. Together, these two purposes represent the dual personality of impeachment. Beginning soon after the formation of the federal government, impeachment was used as a partisan political weapon. After the failed impeachment of President Andrew Johnson in 1868, a long period of largely nonpartisanship and bipartisanship in impeachments ensued.1 But since 1968, some elements in the Republican Party have been willing to use impeachment as a partisan weapon; to inflict political damage on their opponents and as part of a campaign to control the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts. For example, in 1969, Republican President Richard Nixon's Administration built a case against Justice Abe Fortas that it would have submitted to the House of Representatives for impeachment if Fortas had not made that unnecessary by resigning. Then, in 1970, Nixon's Administration built an impeachment case against Justice William 0. Douglas. Gerald Ford, then House Republican Minority Leader, introduced an impeachment resolution on the floor of the House. But House Democrats outmaneuvered Ford by creating a committee to investigate the charges, which found no grounds for impeachment.3 Abundant historical evidence demonstrates that the Nixon Administration's purpose in each instance was to create a Supreme Court vacancy for Nixon 4 to fill. Those events were seen at the time as aberrations peculiar to the Nixon Administration. But in 1997, House Republican Majority Whip Tom DeLay began threatening to impeach judges who decided cases 1. See infra text accompanying notes 497-705. 2. See infra text accompanying notes 732-781. 3. See infra text accompanying notes 811-846. 4. See infra text accompanying notes 707-718, 740, 750-758, 823-826. Winter 2007] IMPEACHMENT AS A PARTISAN POLITICAL WEAPON 163 contrary to his beliefs. "I advocate impeaching judges who consistently ignore their constitutional role, violate their oath of office and breach the separation of powers," wrote DeLay in the New York Times. "The framers provided the tool of impeachment to keep the power of the judiciary in check.".5 "The judges need to be intimidated," DeLay said a few months later; "[t]hey need to uphold the Constitution;" if they don't, "we're going to go after them in a big way."6 In 1998, House Republicans impeached President Bill Clinton. This was the second time that a president, and the first time that an elected president, had been impeached. In the trial that followed, the House impeachment managers failed to persuade even a simple majority of the Senate to convict, much less the two-thirds required by the Constitution.' In 2005, former House Speaker Newt Gingrich wrote that "the Ninth Circuit judges who found the motto 'one nation under God' unconstitutional could be considered unfit to serve and be impeached."8 Republican Representative Tom Feeney, a co-sponsor of a House resolution that would denounce judges who cite foreign law in interpreting U.S. law, said that a judge who persisted in citing foreign sources may be subject to the "ultimate remedy" of impeachment.9 Later in 2005, after Congressional Republicans enacted legislation intended to cause federal courts to order the reinsertion of Terri Schiavo's feeding tube, some Republicans threatened to impeach the judges who declined to do so. DeLay, who had become House Majority Leader, cautioned that "[t]he time will come for the men responsible for this to answer for their behavior." DeLay went on to complain of what he called "an arrogant and out of control judiciary that thumbs its nose at Congress and the president."10 Senator Tom Colburn's chief of staff told a meeting of Jerry Falwell and other activists, "I'm in favor of mass impeachment if 5. Tom DeLay, Letter to the Editor, Impeachment Is a Valid Answer to a Judiciary Run Amok, N.Y. TIMES, April 6, 1997, at A18. 6. Joan Biskupic, Hill Republicans Target "Judicial Activism, " Conservatives Block Nominees, Threaten Impeachment and Term Limits, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1997, at Al. 7. See infra text accompanying notes 849-997. 8. NEWT GINGRICH, WINNING THE FUTURE: A 21ST CENTURY CONTRACT WITH AMERICA 78 (2005) (referring to Newdow v. United States Cong., 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004)). 9. Linda Greenhouse, Rehnquist Resumes His Callfor JudicialIndependence, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2005, at A10. 10. Id.; see also Jonathan Ringel, 11th Circuit's Birch Keeps Them Guessing, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Apr. 11, 2005 (discussing how Judge Birch was "the subject of impeachment calls from angry lawmakers"). HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 34:2 that's what it takes."" Similarly, DeLay talked of Congress removing judges who lacked "good behavior."12 Still later in 2005, some Republicans began to threaten to impeach Justice Anthony Kennedy.13 At the time, Republicans had become increasingly nervous that Kennedy, like Justices Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, John P. Stevens, Sandra Day O'Connor, and David Souter before him, 14 was evolving from the right wing toward the center or further. This evolution had been evidenced by his opinions for the Court holding unconstitutional the imposition of the death penalty on a defendant who committed the crime while under the age of eighteen,15 the criminalization of gay or lesbian sex,16 the prohibition of local governments from enacting ordinances protecting gays and lesbians from discrimination,17 and the incorporation of prayer into a public school graduation,18 as well as his concurrence in decisions holding the execution of a mentally ill murderer to be unconstitutional 9 and reaffirming a constitutional right to abortion.2 This might seem like the talk of Jacobins. But the Republican use of impeachment-actual impeachment against Clinton in 1998-1999, threatened impeachment to create Supreme Court vacancies in the Nixon Administration, and threatened impeachment to intimidate judges more recently-is well supported by precedent in American history. Historically, there have been four great confrontations between or among branches of the federal government: (1) the struggle between the Federalist-dominated judiciary on one hand, and the Jefferson 11. Ruth Marcus, Booting the Bench: There's New Ferocity in Talk of Firing Activist Judges, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 2005, at A19; see also Nina J Easton, Rift Emerges in GOP after Schiavo Case, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 9, 2005, at Ai. 12. Jason DeParle, In Battle to Pick Next Justice, Right Says Avoid a Kennedy, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2005, at AI. 13. Ann Althouse, Innocence Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2005, at A25 (noting that Kennedy "endured calls for his impeachment" because he cited foreign law); DeParle, supra note 12 ("[S]ome notable conservatives are calling for his impeachment."); Jesse J. Holland, DeLay Criticizes Justice Kennedy, 'Activist' Republican Judges, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 21, 2005, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1113987908498; Dana Milbank, And the Verdict on Justice Kennedy Is: Guilty, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2005, at A3; Marcus, supra note 11 ("What started as 'Impeach Earl Warren' ... has now become 'Impeach Tony Kennedy'...."). 14. See Jon D. Hanson & Adam Benforado, The Drifters: Why the Supreme Court Makes Justices More Liberal', BOSTON REv., Jan.-Feb.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • IMPEACHMENT AS a POLITICAL WEAPON THESIS Presented to The
    371l MoA1Y IMPEACHMENT AS A POLITICAL WEAPON THESIS Presented to the Graduate Council of the North Texas State University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS By Sally Jean Bumpas Collins, B. A. Denton, Texas December, 1977 Collins, Sally J, B., Impeachment as a Political Weapon. Master of Arts (History), December, 1977, 135 pp., appendices, bibliography, 168 titles, This study is concerned with the problem of determining the nature of impeachable offenses through an analysis of the English theory of impeachment, colonial impeachment practice, debates in the constitutional convention and the state rati- fying conventions, The Federalist Papers and debates in the first Congress, In addition, the precedents established in American cases of impeachment particularly in the trials of Judge John Pickering, Justice Samuel Chase and President Andrew Johnson are examined. Materials for the study included secondary sources, con- gressional records, memoirs, contemporary accounts, government documents, newspapers and trial records, The thesis concludes that impeachable of fenses include non-indictable behavior and exclude misconduct outside official duties and recommends some alternative method of removal for federal judges. TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF IMPEACHMENT ,, . ! e ! I 9I1I 1 ITI THE IMPEACHMENT ISSUE IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY I I I I I I I I 12 III. THE PICKERING TRIAL . 32 IV. THE CHASE TRIAL ... ... 0 . .0. .. 51 V. EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSION 77 .... 0 0 -APPENDICES0.---
    [Show full text]
  • The Role of Politics in Districting the Federal Circuit System
    PUSHING BOUNDARIES: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN DISTRICTING THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT SYSTEM Philip S. Bonforte† I. Introduction ........................................................................... 30 II. Background ............................................................................ 31 A. Judiciary Act of 1789 ......................................................... 31 B. The Midnight Judges Act ................................................... 33 C. Judiciary Act of 1802 ......................................................... 34 D. Judiciary Act of 1807 ....................................................... 344 E. Judiciary Act of 1837 ....................................................... 355 F. Tenth Circuit Act ................................................................ 37 G. Judicial Circuits Act ........................................................... 39 H. Tenth Circuit Act of 1929 .................................................. 40 I. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980 ...................................................... 42 J. The Ninth Circuit Dilemma ................................................ 44 III. The Role of Politics in Circuit Districting ............................. 47 A. The Presence of Politics ..................................................... 48 B. Political Correctness .......................................................... 50 IV. Conclusion ............................................................................. 52 † The author is a judicial clerk
    [Show full text]
  • Original Sin and Judicial Independence: Providing Accountability for Justices
    William and Mary Law Review VOLUME 50 NO. 4, 2009 ORIGINAL SIN AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: PROVIDING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR JUSTICES PAUL D. CARRINGTON & ROGER C. CRAMTON * TABLE OF CONTENTS I. A DEFINING CHALLENGE ............................ 1106 A. The Founding Vision ............................ 1109 1. The Federalists’ “Ark of Safety” .................. 1115 B. Removing a Disabled Judge: The Pickering Case ..... 1128 C. The Impeachment of Justice Chase: Are Justices Different? ........................... 1141 1. How To Remove A Justice .................... 1144 CONCLUSION ....................................... 1152 * Paul D. Carrington, Professor of Law, Duke University; Roger C. Cramton, Stevens Professor of Law Emeritus, Cornell University. Thanks to James Boyle, Henry Monaghan, Randall Roth, and Sanford Levinson for their helpful comments and to Michael Schobel for his research assistance. Thanks also to those attending the conference on The Citizen Lawyer presented at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law at the College of William and Mary, to whom this Essay was presented on February 8, 2008, and to the Duke Law faculty workshop. 1105 1106 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1105 I. A DEFINING CHALLENGE The independence of the judiciary is an enduring and defining objective of the legal profession. We lawyers, of all citizens, have the greatest stake in shielding judges from intimidation or reward. And that task of protecting judicial independence stands today at the very top of the agenda of the American legal profession. 1 The integrity of law and legal institutions requires more than just the protection of judges. It is equally dependent on the willingness and ability of judges to maintain virtuous disinterest in their work. 2 Some might explain their occasional failings as manifesta- tions of the original sin inherited from Adam; 3 whatever their source, the proclivities of judges to indulge or celebrate themselves are perpetual temptations and judicial self-restraint is a perpetual challenge.
    [Show full text]
  • Gov. Andrew G. Curtin & the Union's Civil
    Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports 2012 For the Hope of Humanity: Gov. Andrew G. Curtin & the Union's Civil War Jared Frederick West Virginia University Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd Recommended Citation Frederick, Jared, "For the Hope of Humanity: Gov. Andrew G. Curtin & the Union's Civil War" (2012). Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports. 4854. https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd/4854 This Thesis is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by the The Research Repository @ WVU with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Thesis in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you must obtain permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/ or on the work itself. This Thesis has been accepted for inclusion in WVU Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports collection by an authorized administrator of The Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. “For the Hope of Humanity: Gov. Andrew G. Curtin & the Union’s Civil War” Jared Frederick Thesis submitted to the Eberly College of Arts and Sciences at West Virginia University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History Aaron Sheehan-Dean, Ph.D., Chair Brian P. Luskey, Ph.D. Kenneth Fones-Wolf, Ph.D. Department of History Morgantown, West Virginia 20125 Keywords: History, American Civil War, Pennsylvania, Politics, Liberalism Copyright 20125Jared Frederick ABSTRACT “For the Hope of Humanity: Gov.
    [Show full text]
  • FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2018: Election Results for the U.S. Senate and The
    FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2018 Election Results for the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives Federal Election Commission Washington, D.C. October 2019 Commissioners Ellen L. Weintraub, Chair Caroline C. Hunter, Vice Chair Steven T. Walther (Vacant) (Vacant) (Vacant) Statutory Officers Alec Palmer, Staff Director Lisa J. Stevenson, Acting General Counsel Christopher Skinner, Inspector General Compiled by: Federal Election Commission Public Disclosure and Media Relations Division Office of Communications 1050 First Street, N.E. Washington, D.C. 20463 800/424-9530 202/694-1120 Editors: Eileen J. Leamon, Deputy Assistant Staff Director for Disclosure Jason Bucelato, Senior Public Affairs Specialist Map Design: James Landon Jones, Multimedia Specialist TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Preface 1 Explanatory Notes 2 I. 2018 Election Results: Tables and Maps A. Summary Tables Table: 2018 General Election Votes Cast for U.S. Senate and House 5 Table: 2018 General Election Votes Cast by Party 6 Table: 2018 Primary and General Election Votes Cast for U.S. Congress 7 Table: 2018 Votes Cast for the U.S. Senate by Party 8 Table: 2018 Votes Cast for the U.S. House of Representatives by Party 9 B. Maps United States Congress Map: 2018 U.S. Senate Campaigns 11 Map: 2018 U.S. Senate Victors by Party 12 Map: 2018 U.S. Senate Victors by Popular Vote 13 Map: U.S. Senate Breakdown by Party after the 2018 General Election 14 Map: U.S. House Delegations by Party after the 2018 General Election 15 Map: U.S. House Delegations: States in Which All 2018 Incumbents Sought and Won Re-Election 16 II.
    [Show full text]
  • CHAIRMEN of SENATE STANDING COMMITTEES [Table 5-3] 1789–Present
    CHAIRMEN OF SENATE STANDING COMMITTEES [Table 5-3] 1789–present INTRODUCTION The following is a list of chairmen of all standing Senate committees, as well as the chairmen of select and joint committees that were precursors to Senate committees. (Other special and select committees of the twentieth century appear in Table 5-4.) Current standing committees are highlighted in yellow. The names of chairmen were taken from the Congressional Directory from 1816–1991. Four standing committees were founded before 1816. They were the Joint Committee on ENROLLED BILLS (established 1789), the joint Committee on the LIBRARY (established 1806), the Committee to AUDIT AND CONTROL THE CONTINGENT EXPENSES OF THE SENATE (established 1807), and the Committee on ENGROSSED BILLS (established 1810). The names of the chairmen of these committees for the years before 1816 were taken from the Annals of Congress. This list also enumerates the dates of establishment and termination of each committee. These dates were taken from Walter Stubbs, Congressional Committees, 1789–1982: A Checklist (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985). There were eleven committees for which the dates of existence listed in Congressional Committees, 1789–1982 did not match the dates the committees were listed in the Congressional Directory. The committees are: ENGROSSED BILLS, ENROLLED BILLS, EXAMINE THE SEVERAL BRANCHES OF THE CIVIL SERVICE, Joint Committee on the LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, LIBRARY, PENSIONS, PUBLIC BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS, RETRENCHMENT, REVOLUTIONARY CLAIMS, ROADS AND CANALS, and the Select Committee to Revise the RULES of the Senate. For these committees, the dates are listed according to Congressional Committees, 1789– 1982, with a note next to the dates detailing the discrepancy.
    [Show full text]
  • Impeachment and Removal
    Impeachment and Removal Jared P. Cole Legislative Attorney Todd Garvey Legislative Attorney October 29, 2015 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R44260 Impeachment and Removal Summary The impeachment process provides a mechanism for removal of the President, Vice President, and other “civil Officers of the United States” found to have engaged in “treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.” The Constitution places the responsibility and authority to determine whether to impeach an individual in the hands of the House of Representatives. Should a simple majority of the House approve articles of impeachment specifying the grounds upon which the impeachment is based, the matter is then presented to the Senate, to which the Constitution provides the sole power to try an impeachment. A conviction on any one of the articles of impeachment requires the support of a two-thirds majority of the Senators present. Should a conviction occur, the Senate retains limited authority to determine the appropriate punishment. Under the Constitution, the penalty for conviction on an impeachable offense is limited to either removal from office, or removal and prohibition against holding any future offices of “honor, Trust or Profit under the United States.” Although removal from office would appear to flow automatically from conviction on an article of impeachment, a separate vote is necessary should the Senate deem it appropriate to disqualify the individual convicted from holding future federal offices of public trust. Approval of such a measure requires only the support of a simple majority. Key Takeaways of This Report The Constitution gives Congress the authority to impeach and remove the President, Vice President, and other federal “civil officers” upon a determination that such officers have engaged in treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.
    [Show full text]
  • Lco~[), Nrev~ Lham~Sfn~[E ]977 SUPREME COURT of NEW HAMPSHIRE Appoi Nted
    If you have issues viewing or accessing this file contact us at NCJRS.gov. 6~N ~~~~'L~©DUCu~©u~ U(Q ll~HE ~£~"~rr»~~h\~lE (ot1l~u g~ U\]~V~ li"~A[~rr~s.~~Du 8 1.\ COU\!lCO~[), NrEV~ lHAM~Sfn~[E ]977 SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE Appoi nted_ Frank R. Kenison, Chief Justice Apri 1 29, 1952 Edward J. Lampron, Senior Justice October 5, 1949 William A. Grimes, Associate Justice December 12, 1966 Maurice P. Bois, Associate Justice October 5, 1976 Charles G. Douglas, III, Associate Justice January 1, 1977 George S. Pappagianis Clerk of Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions li:IDdSlWi&iImlm"'_IIIII'I..a_IIIHI_sm:r.!!!IIIl!!!!__ g~_~= _________ t.':"':iIr_. ____________ .~ • • FE~l 2 ~: 1978 J\UBttst,1977 £AU • "1 be1.J..e.ve. tha..:t oWl. c.oWtt hM pWl-Oue.d a. -6te.a.dy c.OWl-Oe. tfvtoughoL1;t the. ye.aJlA, tha..:t U ha.6 pll.ogll.u-6e.d . a.nd a.ppUe.d the. pJUnuplu 06 OUll. law-6 -Ln a. ma.nne.ll. c.o Y!.-6-L-6te.r"t wUh the. pubUc. iMe.Il.Ut a.nd that aU the. jud-LuaJty w-L.U c..oJ1-ti.nue. to be, a. -6a.6e.guaJtd to the. .V,b eJr.;t,[u, 1l.e..6 po MibiJ!ft[u a.nd d-Lg nUy we. c.heJLU h. " Honorable Frank R. Kenison, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of New Hampshire, liThe State of the Judiciary,1I 3 MAR 77 House Record, page 501.
    [Show full text]
  • Senate Trials and Factional Disputes: Impeachment As a Madisonian Device
    TURLEY TO PRINTER 11/30/99 3:15 PM Duke Law Journal VOLUME 49 OCTOBER 1999 NUMBER 1 SENATE TRIALS AND FACTIONAL DISPUTES: IMPEACHMENT AS A MADISONIAN DEVICE JONATHAN TURLEY† ABSTRACT In this Article, Professor Turley addresses the use of impeachment, specifically the Senate trial, as a method of resolving factional disputes about an impeached official’s legitimacy to remain in office. While the Madisonian democracy was designed to regulate factional pressures, academics and legislators often discuss impeachments as relatively static events focused solely on removal. Alternatively, impeachment is sometimes viewed as an extreme countermajoritarian measure used to “reverse” or “nullify” the popular election of a President. This Article advances a more dynamic view of the Senate trial as a Madisonian device to resolve factional disputes. This Article first discusses the history of impeachment and demon- strates that it is largely a history of factional or partisan disputes over legitimacy. The Article then explores how impeachment was used historically as a check on the authority of the Crown and tended to be used most heavily during periods of political instability. English and colonial impeachments proved to be highly destabilizing in the ab- sence of an integrated political system. The postcolonial impeachment process was modified to convert it from a tool of factional dissension to a vehicle of factional resolution. This use of Senate trials as a Madisonian device allows for the public consideration of the full rec- † J.B. and Maurice C. Shapiro Professor of Public Interest Law at George Washington University. For Benjamin John Turley, who was born during the research and writing of this Article.
    [Show full text]
  • History of the U.S. Attorneys
    Bicentennial Celebration of the United States Attorneys 1789 - 1989 "The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor– indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one." QUOTED FROM STATEMENT OF MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND, BERGER V. UNITED STATES, 295 U. S. 88 (1935) Note: The information in this document was compiled from historical records maintained by the Offices of the United States Attorneys and by the Department of Justice. Every effort has been made to prepare accurate information. In some instances, this document mentions officials without the “United States Attorney” title, who nevertheless served under federal appointment to enforce the laws of the United States in federal territories prior to statehood and the creation of a federal judicial district. INTRODUCTION In this, the Bicentennial Year of the United States Constitution, the people of America find cause to celebrate the principles formulated at the inception of the nation Alexis de Tocqueville called, “The Great Experiment.” The experiment has worked, and the survival of the Constitution is proof of that.
    [Show full text]
  • Trial Memorandum of President Donald J. Trump
    IN PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE UNITED STATES SENATE TRIAL MEMORANDUM OF PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP Jay Alan Sekulow Pat A. Cipollone Stuart Roth Counsel to the President Andrew Ekonomou Patrick F. Philbin Jordan Sekulow Michael M. Purpura Mark Goldfeder Devin A. DeBacker Benjamin Sisney Trent J. Benishek Eric J. Hamilton Counsel to President Donald J. Trump Office of White House Counsel January 20, 2020 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................ 1 STANDARDS............................................................................................................................... 13 A. The Senate Must Decide All Questions of Law and Fact. .................................... 13 B. An Impeachable Offense Requires a Violation of Established Law that Inflicts Sufficiently Egregious Harm on the Government that It Threatens to Subvert the Constitution. .................................................................. 13 1. Text and Drafting History of the Impeachment Clause ............................ 14 2. The President’s Unique Role in Our Constitutional Structure .................. 17 3. Practice Under the Impeachment Clause .................................................. 18 C. The Senate Cannot Convict Unless It Finds that the House Managers Have Proved an Impeachable Offense Beyond a Reasonable Doubt. .................. 20 D. The Senate May Not Consider Allegations Not Charged in the Articles of Impeachment. ..................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • No. in the SUPREME COURT of the UNITED STATES DONATE
    No. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES DONATE GRAHAM,Petitioner, -vs- PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent. On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The Appellate Court Of Illinois PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI JAMES E. CHADD State Appellate Defender PATRICIA MYSZA Deputy Defender Counsel of Record SHAWN O'TOOLE Deputy State Appellate Defender Office of the State Appellate Defender First Judicial District 203 N. LaSalle St., 24th Floor Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 814-5472 [email protected] COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER Of counsel: Jonathan Krieger Assistant Appellate Defender QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW After United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811 (10th Cir. 2000), a growing number of courts have held that a defendant's right to be confronted by accusers can be forfeited based on conspiracy liability. Under this line of cases, a defendant can lose the confrontation right without any personal knowledge of, or participation in, the wrongful witness procurement. In Giles u. California, however, this Court held that a defendant forfeits the confrontation right only by engaging in "conduct designed to prevent a witness from testifying." 554 U.S. 353, 365 (2008)(emphasis omitted). Since Giles, courts have split over the continued viability of conspiracy-based forfeiture. The question presented is: Whether the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception to the Confrontation Clause encompasses acts of wrongful witness procurement done by alleged co-conspirators, without the intent or participation of the defendant. TABLE OF CONTENTS Question Presented for Review ........................................... i Table of Authorities .................................................. iii Opinions Below. ...................................................... 1 Jurisdiction.......................................................... 1 Constitutional Provision Involved. ....................................... 2 Statement of the Case ................................................
    [Show full text]