Original Sin and Judicial Independence: Providing Accountability for Justices
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
The Role of Politics in Districting the Federal Circuit System
PUSHING BOUNDARIES: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN DISTRICTING THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT SYSTEM Philip S. Bonforte† I. Introduction ........................................................................... 30 II. Background ............................................................................ 31 A. Judiciary Act of 1789 ......................................................... 31 B. The Midnight Judges Act ................................................... 33 C. Judiciary Act of 1802 ......................................................... 34 D. Judiciary Act of 1807 ....................................................... 344 E. Judiciary Act of 1837 ....................................................... 355 F. Tenth Circuit Act ................................................................ 37 G. Judicial Circuits Act ........................................................... 39 H. Tenth Circuit Act of 1929 .................................................. 40 I. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980 ...................................................... 42 J. The Ninth Circuit Dilemma ................................................ 44 III. The Role of Politics in Circuit Districting ............................. 47 A. The Presence of Politics ..................................................... 48 B. Political Correctness .......................................................... 50 IV. Conclusion ............................................................................. 52 † The author is a judicial clerk -
No. in the SUPREME COURT of the UNITED STATES DONATE
No. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES DONATE GRAHAM,Petitioner, -vs- PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent. On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The Appellate Court Of Illinois PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI JAMES E. CHADD State Appellate Defender PATRICIA MYSZA Deputy Defender Counsel of Record SHAWN O'TOOLE Deputy State Appellate Defender Office of the State Appellate Defender First Judicial District 203 N. LaSalle St., 24th Floor Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 814-5472 [email protected] COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER Of counsel: Jonathan Krieger Assistant Appellate Defender QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW After United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811 (10th Cir. 2000), a growing number of courts have held that a defendant's right to be confronted by accusers can be forfeited based on conspiracy liability. Under this line of cases, a defendant can lose the confrontation right without any personal knowledge of, or participation in, the wrongful witness procurement. In Giles u. California, however, this Court held that a defendant forfeits the confrontation right only by engaging in "conduct designed to prevent a witness from testifying." 554 U.S. 353, 365 (2008)(emphasis omitted). Since Giles, courts have split over the continued viability of conspiracy-based forfeiture. The question presented is: Whether the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception to the Confrontation Clause encompasses acts of wrongful witness procurement done by alleged co-conspirators, without the intent or participation of the defendant. TABLE OF CONTENTS Question Presented for Review ........................................... i Table of Authorities .................................................. iii Opinions Below. ...................................................... 1 Jurisdiction.......................................................... 1 Constitutional Provision Involved. ....................................... 2 Statement of the Case ................................................ -
Serving the Syllogism Machine: Reflections on Whether Brandenburg Is Now (Or Ever Was) Good Law
SERVING THE SYLLOGISM MACHINE: REFLECTIONS ON WHETHER BRANDENBURG IS NOW (OR EVER WAS) GOOD LAW Burt Neuborne∗ I. INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS THE SOURCE OF THE SUPREME COURT’S POWER TO DECIDE BRANDENBURG? ...................................................... 1 II. MARBURY V. MADISON: A CONSTITUTIONAL FARCE IN THREE ACTS .... 5 A. Prelude to a Farce ........................................................................ 5 B. Building the Set: A Large Patronage Trough ............................. 12 C. Enter the Players ......................................................................... 15 1. Act I: The Disappearing Supreme Court Term ................... 19 2. Act II: How Not to Find Facts ............................................. 21 A Short Musical Interlude .................................................... 26 3. Act III: Find the Missing Court ........................................... 26 D. Requiem for an Epilogue ............................................................. 28 III. THE DIRTY LITTLE SECRET ................................................................. 30 IV. JOHN MARSHALL’S MIRACULOUS SYLLOGISM MACHINE .................. 32 V. ERROR DEFLECTION: A LEFT-HANDED REPAIR MANUAL FOR THE BROKEN MACHINE .............................................................................. 41 A. Screening for Bad Motive............................................................ 47 B. Deflecting Error on Justification or Consequence ..................... 48 VI. THE LEFT-HANDED REPAIR MANUAL IN OPERATION: ERROR- DEFLECTION -
President Thomas Jefferson V. Chief Justice John Marshall by Amanda
A Thesis Entitled Struggle to Define the Power of the Court: President Thomas Jefferson v. Chief Justice John Marshall By Amanda Dennison Submitted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for The Master of Arts in History ________________________ Advisor: Diane Britton ________________________ Graduate School The University of Toledo August 2005 Copyright © 2005 This document is copyrighted material. Under copyright law, no parts of this document may be reproduced without the expressed permission of the author. Acknowledgments Finishing this step of my academic career would not have been possible without the support from my mentors, family, and friends. My professors at the University of Toledo have supported me over the past three years and I thank them for their inspiration. I especially thank Professors Alfred Cave, Diane Britton, Ronald Lora, and Charles Glaab for reading my work, making corrections, and serving as advisors on my thesis committee. I am eternally grateful to the University of Toledo History Department for their financial and moral support. When I came to the University of Toledo, I would not have survived my first graduate seminar, let alone long enough to finish this project without the experience from my undergraduate career at Southwestern Oklahoma State University. I thank Professors Laura Endicott and John Hayden for their constant support, reading drafts, and offering suggestions and Professors Roger Bromert and David Hertzel for encouraging me via email and on my visits back to Southwestern. Ya’ll are the best. I have a wonderful support system from my family and friends, especially my parents and brother. Thank you Mom and Dad for your encouragement and love. -
History of the New Hampshire Federal Courts
HISTORY OF THE NEW HAMPSHIRE FEDERAL COURTS Prepared by the Clerk’s Office of the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire - 1991 1 HISTORY OF THE NEW HAMPSHIRE FEDERAL COURTS TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE & ACKNOWLEDGMENT .......................................................................................... 5 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 7 THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT ................................................................................ 11 Time Line for the Circuit Court and Related Courts ................................................................ 19 JUDGES OF THE CIRCUIT COURT ......................................................................................... 20 John Lowell ............................................................................................................................... 20 Benjamin Bourne ...................................................................................................................... 21 Jeremiah Smith.......................................................................................................................... 21 George Foster Shepley .............................................................................................................. 22 John Lowell ............................................................................................................................... 23 Francis Cabot Lowell ............................................................................................................... -
Remarks of the Chief Justice William H
Louisiana Law Review Volume 54 | Number 5 May 1994 The American Constitutional Experience: Remarks of the Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist Repository Citation William H. Rehnquist, The American Constitutional Experience: Remarks of the Chief Justice, 54 La. L. Rev. (1994) Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol54/iss5/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The American Constitutional Experience: Remarks of the Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist* It is with great pleasure that I have the opportunity to address you, the Louisiana law classes of 1994 and 1995, this afternoon. During your time in law school, you have been immersed--or at least you are supposed to be immersed-in the decisions of various courts in different areas of the law. Louisiana law students, because Louisiana still follows the civil law system in so many respects, get a unique perspective on the law because you learn both the civil law system and, I trust, to some extent the common law system prevailing in other jurisdictions. But the courts in this country-whether in Louisiana or in common law states-differ in one notable respect from courts in most other countries. They have the power of judicial review: the authority to declare a legislative act invalid if they find it contrary to the Constitution. This is one of the unique contributions of the framers of our Constitution to the art or science of jurisprudence, and although it has been copied by other countries since the Second World War, it does not turn out to work quite the way ours does in most of them. -
The Senate Has No Constitutional Obligation to Consider Nominees
File: Adler_Macro1_Approved.docx Created on: 10/22/16 8:10:00 PM Last Printed: 10/22/16 8:10:00 PM 2016] 15 THE SENATE HAS NO CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATION TO CONSIDER NOMINEES Jonathan H. Adler* INTRODUCTION Justice Antonin Scalia’s tragic and unexpected death sent shockwaves through the American legal community.1 Few justices to sit on the Supreme Court have had as great an impact.2 Justice Scalia’s death also reignited the judicial confirmation wars. Conflict over judicial nominations had been smoldering,3 but burst into flames once it became clear that President Obama would have the opportunity to nominate Justice Scalia’s successor and, just prior to a presidential election, dramatically alter the ideological and doctri- nal balance on the Court.4 * Johan Verheij Memorial Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Business Law & Regu- lation, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. The author thanks Michael Ramsey and Alan Meese for helpful comments and Shannon Meyer for research assistance. Any remaining errors, omissions or inanities are solely the fault of the author. 1 See Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia Dies at 79, WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-justice-antonin-scalia-dies-at-79/2016 /02/13/effe8184-a62f-11e3-a5fa-55f0c77bf39c_story.html; Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/ antonin-scalia-death.html?_r=0; see also Richard Wolf, At Supreme Court, Justice Antonin Scalia's Im- pact Still Felt, USA TODAY (May 9, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2016/05/ 09/supreme-court-antonin-scalia-death-cases-decisions/83892680/. -
The Other Supreme Court
GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW THE OTHER SUPREME COURT Ross E. Davies 06-34 Forthcoming, Journal of Supreme Court History 2006 GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY LAW AND ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER SERIES This paper can be downloaded without charge from the Social Science Research Network at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=920928 The Other Supreme Court Ross E. Davies† “The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court.” —U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added) Despite the Constitution’s “one supreme Court” language, the Supreme Court came in two flavors for 37 years. From 1802 to 1838, the members of the Court gathered in Washington every winter for a conventional en banc February Term,1 but then in the summer a sin- gle Justice would return to the nation’s capital to sit alone as a rump Supreme Court for a short August Term. This odd one-Justice rump Court does not fit the long-standing and widely-accepted understanding that the words “one supreme Court” mean “one [indivisible] supreme Court”—a single en banc body consisting of all of its available and qualified members to con- duct its business. The framers of the Constitution thought that was what they said when they chose those words, as the records of the † Associate Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law; Editor-in- Chief, the Green Bag. This essay is based on one part of a longer article in volume 90 of the Minnesota Law Review. Thanks to the editors of the Law Review, especially Deborah Broderson and Aaron Chapin, many of whose improvements to the longer article appear in the essay printed here, and to Vikram Amar, Michelle Boardman, Ofemi Cadmus, Lloyd Cohen, Mike Davies, Susan Davies, Steven Duffield, Robert Ellis, Patricia Evans, Andrew Finch, Curtis Gannon, Gregory Jacob, Bruce Johnsen, Bruce Kobayashi, Eugene Kontorovich, Montgomery Kosma, Michael Krauss, Craig Lerner, Nelson Lund, Ira Brad Matetsky, Stephen McAllister, Suzanna Sherry, Ilya Somin, Amy Steacy, Mark Tushnet, participants in a Robert A. -
Charting a Path for Federal Judiciary Reform
Revisiting and Confronting the Federal Judiciary Capacity “Crisis”: Charting a Path for Federal Judiciary Reform Peter S. Menell* and Ryan Vacca** The modern federal judiciary was established well over a century ago by the Judiciary Act of 1891. Over the next seventy years, the structure and core functioning of the judiciary largely remained unchanged apart from gradual increases in judicial slots. By the mid- 1960s, jurists, scholars, practitioners, and policy-makers had voiced grave concerns about the capacity of the federal system to function effectively in the face of ever-increasing caseloads. Heeding calls for reform, in 1972 Congress charged a commission chaired by Senator Roman Hruska to study the functioning of the federal courts and recommend reforms. After extensive study, the Hruska Commission concluded that “[n]o part of the federal judicial system has borne the brunt of . increased demands [to protect individual rights and basic liberties and resolve difficult issues affecting the financial structure and commercial life of the nation] more than the courts of appeals.”1 The Commission called attention to the Supreme Court’s capacity constraints and the risks to the body of national law posed by the growing number of circuit conflicts. DOI: https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38BK16Q3Q. Copyright © 2020 Peter S. Menell and Ryan Vacca. * Koret Professor of Law and Director, Berkeley Center for Law & Technology, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law. ** Professor of Law, University of New Hampshire School of Law. We thank the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts and the Federal Judicial Center for providing data on the federal judiciary and to Su Li for exceptional research assistance in formatting, synthesizing, and analyzing the data. -
Charles Lindbergh, Caryl Chessman, and the Exception Proving the (Potentially Waning) Rule of Broad Prosecutorial Discretion
ISSUE 20:1 SPRING 2015 Charles Lindbergh, Caryl Chessman, and the Exception Proving the (Potentially Waning) Rule of Broad Prosecutorial Discretion Wesley M. Oliver* Perhaps ever since legislatures started defining crimes, they have given prosecutors a variety of ways to prosecute the same conduct. Courts have, almost without exception, deferred to legislatures’ broad definitions of crime. Kidnapping statutes are the exception. The high profile execution of Caryl Chessman in 1960 for kidnapping prompted considerable scholarly criticism and prompted courts nationwide to impose limiting constructions on kidnapping statutes. Recently, scholars have called for a curb in prosecutorial discretion generally, attributing the explosion in the prison population to broad criminal codes, mandatory minimums, and sentencing guidelines that provide prosecutors leverage in plea negotiations. In the last two terms, the United States Supreme Court appears to have taken on this concern, limiting the scope of federal criminal statutes, twice in cases involving criminal doctrines that are part of most state criminal codes, and once in a case expressly recognized by many of the parties as an example of overcriminalization. The Supreme Court has rarely considered “ordinary” criminal law doctrines, typically interpreting complex or jurisdictional aspects of federal criminal statutes. And neither the Supreme Court, nor any appellate court in non-kidnapping cases, has used overcriminalization as a basis for limiting the scope of a criminal statute. Academics have long criticized the growing prison population, often attributing the phenomenon to increasing prosecutorial discretion, a product of overcriminalization. The Supreme Court’s recent cases suggest that America’s mass incarceration epidemic may be able to * Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Scholarship, Duquesne University. -
Western Legal History
WESTERN LEGAL HISTORY THE JOURNAL OF THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT HISTORICAL SOCIETY COMMEMORATING THE CENTENNIAL OF THE JAMES R. BROWNING UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 1905-2005 VOLUME 18, NUMBERS 1 & 2 2005 Western Legal History is published semiannually, in spring and fall, by the Ninth Judicial Circuit Historical Society, 125 S. Grand Avenue, Pasadena, California 91105, (626) 795-0266/fax (626) 229-7476. The journal explores, analyzes, and presents the history of law, the legal profession, and the courts- particularly the federal courts-in Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands. Western Legal History is sent to members of the NJCHS as well as members of affiliated legal historical societies in the Ninth Circuit. Membership is open to all. Membership dues (individuals and institutions): Patron, $1,000 or more; Steward, $750-$999; Sponsor, $500-$749; Grantor, $250-$499; Sustaining, $100- $249; Advocate, $50-$99; Subscribing (nonmembers of the bench and bar, lawyers in practice fewer than five years, libraries, and academic institutions), $25-$49. Membership dues (law firms and corporations): Founder, $3,000 or more; Patron, $1,000-$2,999; Steward, $750-$999; Sponsor, $500-$749; Grantor, $250-$499. For information regarding membership, back issues of Western Legal History, and other society publications and programs, please write or telephone the editor. POSTMASTER: Please send change of address to: Editor Western Legal History 125 S. Grand Avenue Pasadena, California 91105 Western Legal History disclaims responsibility for statements made by authors and for accuracy of endnotes. Copyright 02005, Ninth Judicial Circuit Historical Society ISSN 0896-2189 The Editorial Board welcomes unsolicited manuscripts, books for review, and recommendations for the journal. -
"To Say What the Law Is:" John Marshall and His Influence on the Origins of Judicial Review in America
W&M ScholarWorks Undergraduate Honors Theses Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects 5-2010 "To Say What the Law is:" John Marshall and His Influence on the Origins of Judicial Review in America Jennifer L. Souers College of William and Mary Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/honorstheses Part of the History Commons Recommended Citation Souers, Jennifer L., ""To Say What the Law is:" John Marshall and His Influence on the Origins of Judicial Review in America" (2010). Undergraduate Honors Theses. Paper 732. https://scholarworks.wm.edu/honorstheses/732 This Honors Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Undergraduate Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact [email protected]. “T O SAY WHAT THE LAW IS :” JOHN MARSHALL AND HIS INFLUENCE ON THE ORIGINS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AMERICA A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the Requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts with Honors in History from the College of William and Mary in Virginia, By Jennifer L. Souers Committee Members: Dr. James Whittenburg, Director Christine Nemacheck Carol Sheriff Williamsburg, VA April 2010 “T O SAY WHAT THE LAW IS :” JOHN MARSHALL AND HIS INFLUENCE ON THE ORIGINS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AMERICA CHAPTER ONE: Introduction John Marshall should be considered the “Father of the Judiciary” in the same manner that George Washington is hailed as the “Father of the Nation” and James Madison as the “Father of the Constitution.” Few men in American history have had as great an influence on the Courts as he.