China's Near Seas Combat Capabilities

China’s Near Seas Combat Capabilities Peter Dutton, Andrew S. Erickson, and Ryan Martinson, Editors CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE Newport, Rhode Island www.usnwc.edu/Research---Gaming/China-Maritime-Studies-Institute.aspx Naval War College The China Maritime Studies are extended research projects Newport, Rhode Island that the editor, the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies, and the Center for Naval Warfare Studies President of the Naval War College consider of particular China Maritime Study No. 11 interest to policy makers, scholars, and analysts. February 2014 Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studies President, Naval War College may be addressed to the director of the China Maritime Rear Admiral Walter E. Carter, Jr., U.S. Navy Studies Institute, www.usnwc.edu/Research---Gaming/ Provost China-Maritime-Studies-Institute.aspx. To request ad- Amb. Mary Ann Peters ditional copies or subscription consideration, please direct Dean of Naval Warfare Studies inquiries to the President, Code 32A, Naval War College, Robert C. Rubel 686 Cushing Road, Newport, Rhode Island 02841-1207, Director of China Maritime Studies Institute or contact the Press staff at the telephone, fax, or e-mail and editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies series addresses given. Peter Dutton Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Act Naval War College Press of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States. This document may be freely reproduced for academic or other Director: Dr. Carnes Lord Managing Editor: Pelham G. Boyer noncommercial use; however, it is requested that reproduc- tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies series Telephone: 401.841.2236 and that the Press editorial office be informed. To obtain Fax: 401.841.3579 permission to reproduce this publication for commercial DSN exchange: 841 purposes, contact the Press editorial office. E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.usnwc.edu/press ISSN 1943-0817 www.twitter.com/NavalWarCollege ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7 Printed in the United States of America Contents CHAPTER ONE Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft: Beyond Sea Denial .............1 by John Patch CHAPTER TWO Underwater TELs and China’s Antisubmarine Warfare: Evolving Strength and a Calculated Weakness .......................17 by William S. Murray CHAPTER THREE China’s Second Artillery Force: Capabilities and Missions for the Near Seas ................................................................31 by Ron Christman CHAPTER FOUR Aerospace Power and China’s Counterstrike Doctrine in the Near Seas ............................................................................... 49 by Daniel J. Kostecka CHAPTER FIVE Chinese Air Superiority in the Near Seas .................................... 61 by David Shlapak CHAPTER SIX Land- and Sea-Based C4ISR Infrastructure in China’s Near Seas ...............................................................75 by Eric D. Pedersen CHAPTER SEVEN Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR: Integrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over the Near Seas................................87 by Andrew S. Erickson CHAPTER EIGHT China’s Surface Fleet Trajectory: Implications for the U.S. Navy ................................................................... 119 by Timothy A. Walton and Bryan McGrath Abbreviations and Definitions ............................................................................... 132 About the Contributors ........................................................................................ 136 CHAPTER ONE Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft Beyond Sea Denial John Patch he capstone U.S. Defense Department study on the future operational environ- Tment declares, “China’s rise represents the most significant single event on the international horizon since the collapse of the Cold War.”1 Understanding and assessing changes in China’s traditionally defensive naval strategy, doctrine, and force structure are of obvious importance to the U.S. Navy (USN) and other Pacific navies concerned with the possible security implications of that rise. This chapter examines the development of the Chinese navy’s Houbei (Type 022) fast-attack-craft force and its roles and missions in China’s near seas and discusses implications for the U.S. Navy and other navies in the region. The author argues that this force, when integrated with People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) units and task groups in joint operations, provides an offensive sea- control capability beyond simple coastal defense (coastal defense here being a limited form of sea denial). Indeed, linked fast attack craft operating collectively may present a significant potential offensive threat to American capital ships and strike groups well beyond the littorals.2 Origins of the Houbei Fast Attack Craft PLAN doctrine outlined the purpose of the fast-attack-craft force as early as 1950. Bei- jing sought a modern, lightly armed offshore coastal-defense element to place alongside the key PLAN forces, naval aviation and submarines.3 These fast-attack-craft units con- sisted of relatively fast (thirty-plus knots), single-mission hulls, including subchasers and torpedo boats (later, guided-missile boats) that operated in speedboat zhidui (“flotil- las”).4 Early fast attack craft were adequate to the coastal-defense missions of countering Nationalist Chinese “invasions” and later, Soviet and American amphibious threats over home waters;5 they were available in large numbers and could be rapidly deployed along interior lines. They were, however, very limited in endurance and range.6 Nonetheless, because PLAN resource limitations precluded the development of large combatants be- fore the 1980s, the occasional maritime clashes that did occur involved fast attack craft— including the sinking of several adversary fast attack craft and small combatants. 2 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES In the 1980s the PLAN commander, Adm. Liu Huaqing, played an important role in changing the service’s mission (and mind-set) from coastal defense to offshore defense—or “near-seas active defense”—with a commensurate change in fast-attack-craft roles and missions. Naturally, this doctrinal shift called for a different force to cover a much larger area, a force relying less on fast attack craft for coastal defense and requir- ing more offshore-patrol vessels for longer-duration patrols in the three near seas. Fast attack craft still had a significant support role for amphibious operations against Taiwan, but other near-seas missions, like protection of sea lines of communication and patrol of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), demanded a new force of multimission vessels with improved blue-water seakeeping and endurance. During this period, accordingly, PLAN fast attack craft, numbering some two hundred by 1990, obsolesced as demand decreased.7 As the PLAN cast its gaze beyond the EEZ, however, the need for a modern, offensive fast attack craft became apparent. Offshore-patrol vessels persisted, and in greater numbers than fast attack craft (they continue their missions to the present), but they could not serve as fast attack craft in the modern sense. The Houbei class answered that requirement. Sources on PLAN requirements for a new fast attack craft are either unavailable or protected, but it seems clear from early acquisition activity that the need for a modern fast attack craft had become pressing by around 1998. For example, China sought to acquire Molniya-class fast attack craft from Russia in the early 2000s, though the sale never reached fruition.8 Houbei hulls began appearing in 2004. The Houbei represented a marked change from previous-generation fast attack craft and offshore-patrol vessels. It is not just a replacement for the Chinese versions of the Osa and Komar coastal-defense fast attack craft; it represents a capability shift decidedly in the offensive direction, a shift relevant to the “active defense” aspect of near-seas operations. ONI analysts emphasize Houbei’s “better sea keeping, speed, and mission flex- ibility” in comparison to the older missile boats.9 It is certainly not simply an offshore- patrol vessel replacement, as the Type 037 variants are still relatively capable and thus not in dire need of replacement; in any case, the Houbeis do not have the offshore-patrol vessels’ long range or endurance. While still viable for other missions, the older Houjian, Houxin, Haiqing, and Haijiu classes cannot serve as modern fast attack craft: they are too slow, most are not data-link capable, and none have long-range antiship missiles. The PLAN designed the recently re- vealed Type 056 corvette to replace the Houjian—with an escort and air-defense mission for the farther reaches of the near seas—a development supporting the assertion that the Houbei is not a follow-on offshore-patrol type.10 For now, the more than sixty “combat operational” Houbeis constitute the sole modern PLAN fast-attack-craft class.11 CHINA’S NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 3 Houbei within a Changing Naval Strategy There is no question that the PLAN is evolving to meet expanding regional missions and that the Houbei class will play an important role. What is less clear is how China is evolving its strategy, doctrine, and operational concepts to meet new near- and far-seas requirements.12 The PLAN is transforming its force structure to make it more appropri- ate for offensive operations beyond the traditional littoral tether. Gaps persist in the body of literature with respect to this transformation, but it is possible to assess the part that fast attack

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