China's Evolving Surface Fleet
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China’s Evolving Surface Fleet Peter A. Dutton and Ryan D. Martinson, Editors CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE Newport, Rhode Island www.usnwc.edu/Research---Gaming/China-Maritime-Studies-Institute.aspx Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Dutton, Peter, editor. | Martinson, Ryan D., editor. Title: China’s evolving surface fleet / Peter A. Dutton and Ryan D. Martinson, editors. Description: Newport, Rhode Island : Naval War College Press, 2017. | Series: China maritime studies, ISSN 1943-0817 ; no. 14 Identifiers: LCCN 2017030967 | ISBN 9781935352457 (perfect bound booklet) Subjects: LCSH: China. Zhongguo ren min jie fang jun. Hai jun. | Sea-power—China. | Navies—China. Classification: LCC VA633 .C554 2017 | DDC 359.8/30951—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017030967 Naval War College The China Maritime Studies are extended research projects Newport, Rhode Island that the editor, the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies, and the Center for Naval Warfare Studies President of the Naval War College consider of particular China Maritime Study No. 14 interest to policy makers, scholars, and analysts. July 2017 Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studies President, Naval War College may be addressed to the director of the China Maritime Rear Admiral Jeffrey A. Harley, U.S. Navy Studies Institute, www.usnwc.edu/Research---Gaming/ Provost China-Maritime-Studies-Institute.aspx. To request ad- Dr. Lewis M. Duncan ditional copies or subscription consideration, please direct Dean of Naval Warfare Studies inquiries to the President, Code 32A, Naval War College, Thomas J. Culora 686 Cushing Road, Newport, Rhode Island 02841-1207, Director of China Maritime Studies Institute and or contact the Press staff at the telephone, fax, or e-mail editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies addresses given. Peter A. Dutton Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Act Naval War College Press of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States. This document may be freely reproduced for academic or other Director: Dr. Carnes Lord Managing Editor: Robert C. Ayer noncommercial use; however, it is requested that reproduc- tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies series Telephone: 401.841.2236 and that the Press editorial office be informed. To obtain Fax: 401.841.1071 permission to reproduce this publication for commercial DSN exchange: 841 purposes, contact the Press editorial office. E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.usnwc.edu/press ISSN 1943-0817 www.twitter.com/NavalWarCollege ISBN 978-1-935352-45-7 Printed in the United States of America Contents CHAPTER ONE The PLA Navy’s Yin and Yang: China’s Advancing Amphibious Force and Missile Craft ......................................1 by Dennis J. Blasko CHAPTER TWO What Do China’s Surface Fleet Developments Suggest about Its Maritime Strategy?................................................17 by Bernard D. Cole CHAPTER THREE A Japanese Perspective on China’s Evolving Surface Fleet .......31 by Yoji Koda CHAPTER FOUR Why Is the Surface Fleet Gaining Importance? Insights from PLA Doctrinal Writings ..............................................43 by Nan Li CHAPTER FIVE The Modern PLA Navy Destroyer Force: Impressive Progress in Achieving a “Far-Seas” Capability .......................55 by Michael McDevitt CHAPTER SIX China’s Evolving Surface Fleet: Its Possible Roles and Missions in the Indian Ocean Region and Its Impact on Regional Security and Stability ........................................67 by Sureesh Mehta CHAPTER SEVEN An Assessment of Chinese Aircraft Carrier Aviation ..............81 by Robert C. Rubel CHAPTER EIGHT China’s Auxiliary Fleet: Supporting a Blue-Water Navy in the Far Seas? ..........................................................93 by Alexandre Sheldon-Duplaix CHAPTER NINE Sustaining the Surface Force: Developments in PLAN Logistics and Maintenance ................................................ 111 by Dale C. Rielage About the Contributors ......................................................................................... 129 About the Editors ................................................................................................. 131 The opinions expressed in this publication are the perspectives of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its components or the views of the government of the People’s Republic of China or any of its components. CHAPTER ONE The PLA Navy’s Yin and Yang China’s Advancing Amphibious Force and Missile Craft Dennis J. Blasko From a military perspective, the best way to avoid war is to prepare for it. GEN. MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, CHAIRMAN OF THE U.S. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF he missile fast-attack craft and amphibious fleets of the People’s Liberation Army T(PLA) Navy (PLAN) have undergone significant modernization over the past fifteen years. The capabilities of both categories of vessels have improved even if their actual numbers have not increased dramatically. Examined from the perspective of PLA doctrine and training, the missions of these forces represent the PLAN’s past, present, and future. Taken together, these two categories of ships and boats enhance China’s deterrence pos- ture, help defend its coastal waters, warn Taiwan of the dangers of further moves toward independence, add to China’s long-range sealift capacity, and assist in the PLA’s abil- ity to conduct nontraditional security tasks. In the newer ships entering the inventory, we see both capabilities to conduct the PLA’s traditional mission of defense of China’s 18,000-kilometer coastline and 6,500 islands and hints of the missions of the future. These two fleets represent the yin and yang of the PLAN: its enduring “offshore opera- tions” missions and its future “blue-water” or “far-seas” tasks. The Missile-Craft Fleet China’s naval missile-craft force consists of a variety of small vessels, each displac- ing about five hundred tons or less. They usually are called daodan kuaiting (导弹快 艇), daodanting, or just kuaiting. These terms are translated variously as “patrol boat,” “patrol craft,” “missile fast-attack craft,” “fast-attack craft,” “missile escort boat,” “missile speedboat,” “missile boat,” or “fast boat.” Some vessels of this size are called huweiting (护 卫艇), sometimes imprecisely translated as “corvette.”1 This paper focuses on fast, small vessels equipped with antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs), and uses the abbreviation FAC (for “fast-attack craft”) to refer to the various types of missile speedboats in the PLAN. 2 china maritime studies In addition to FACs armed with ASCMs, The Military Balance 2013 lists three types of coastal-patrol craft and one type of patrol boat in the PLAN that are not equipped with missiles and perform antisubmarine or other missions. These will not be discussed in this treatment.2 The first missile FACs in the PLAN, the Type 021 Huangfeng and Type 024 Houku classes, were based on Soviet designs (the Osa/Komar class). Because of their small size and lack of seaworthiness, these early FACs were employed relatively close to shore. They took advantage of their speed, but were limited in the length of time they could stay at sea and by adverse weather. Two versions of a more modern FAC (based on the Type 037 submarine chaser), the Type 037II Houjian class and Type 037IG Houxin class (often called corvettes, but displacing only slightly more than five hundred tons), were introduced in the early 1990s. About a decade later the stealthy, 220-ton Type 022 Houbei-class catamaran entered the force.3 The Military Balance 1996/97 estimated there were “about 185” missile craft in the PLAN. These numbers included “some 100” Type 021 Huangfeng-class, “about 75” Type 024 Houku-class, nine Type 037IG Houxin-class, and one “Huang-class [sic]” FAC.4 In the subsequent fifteen years, nearly all those craft were retired and replaced by a smaller number of more-modern, more–technologically advanced, and more-capable vessels. Current estimates of the size of the missile FAC fleet vary among sources. The Pentagon reports a total of “roughly” eighty-five “coastal-patrol (missile)” craft. It counts sixty Type 022s, but does not specify the other types of FAC in service. It also states that the new Type 056 Jiangdao-class corvettes will “augment” the Type 022s in the fleet.5 The new Type 056 corvettes provide the PLAN the capability to patrol China’s littoral waters for several days or weeks, while the Type 022s are optimized for fast attack at high speeds for shorter periods. The Military Balance 2013 lists four types of FAC in the inventory, totaling over one hundred vessels; however, its count of sixty-five Type 022s is higher than the Pentagon’s and its figures do not account for the likely retirement of the older Type 021 from the active inventory.6 Table 1. FACs in the PLAN Type Number Missile Type 022 Houbei 65+ (60 reported by U.S. Depart- two quad YJ-83 launchers ment of Defense) Type 021 Huangfeng 11 (likely no longer in the fl eet) two twin HY-2 launchers Type 037II Houjian 6 two triple YJ-8 launchers Type 037IG Houxin 20 two twin YJ-8 launchers china’s evolving surface fleet 3 With about eighty-six vessels, the PLAN FAC fleet has a higher percentage of modern boats (Type 022) in operation (about 70 percent) than the percentage of modern equip- ment in most other units and services. In 2011, the Pentagon reported that, as of 2010, only about 26 percent of the PLAN surface fleet was considered “modern,” compared with about 56 percent of the submarine force, 25 percent of the air forces, and 40 percent of the air-defense forces.7 The percentages of modern systems in the PLA have increased in recent years as newer equipment is commissioned and older weapons are retired, but the FAC force is better off than most units, and its equipment is better than most sectors’, in the PLA. Throughout the PLA, advanced systems must operate in conjunction with legacy platforms, logistics must support both old and new, and doctrine and tactical techniques must be developed that incorporate all existing capabilities and units.