The London Gazette of TUESDAY, I3th MARCH, 1951

J^umb. 39173 1381

THIRD SUPPLEMENT TO The London Gazette OF TUESDAY, i3th MARCH, 1951

Registered as a Newspaper

MONDAY, 19 MARCH, 1951 AIR OPERATIONS IN SOUTH EAST ASIA 16TH NOVEMBER, 1943 TO 31ST MAY, 1944. NOTE.—A set of maps for this despatch is on separate sale at Is. Od. net. This set of maps also covers the operations described in the other Air and Army despatches of the Burma campaign from 16th November, 1943 to 12th September, 1945. The following despatch was submitted to the replaced the Inspectorate-General of the I.A.F. Secretary of State for Air on 23rd November, and to which was bequeathed the name Air 1944, by AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR Headquarters, India. R. E. C. PEIRSE, K.C.B., D.S.O., A.F.C., Allied Air Commander-in-Chief, South East Asia. 4. To ensure the integrated operational con- trol of Units in Bengal and Assam, a new PART ONE Headquarters was set up under Major-General INTRODUCTORY G. E. Stratemeyer, U.S.A.A.F., designated Eastern Air Command and located initially at 1. As a result of the formation on 16th Delhi. This formation, which had previously November, 1943, of South East Asia Command, existed under the title Headquarters, I assumed operational control of all Air Forces U.S.A.A.F., India-Burma Sector, China-Burma- in the South East Asia theatre, with authority India Theatre, had administered and controlled to employ them in conformity with the policy the 10th U.S.A.A.F. and provided in addition of the Supreme Allied Commander, Admiral base facilities for the 14th U.S.A.A.F. The new The Lord Louis Mountbatten, G.C.V.O., C.B., Headquarters consisted basically of the Opera- D.S.O., A.D.C. Thus I had at my disposal tions Section of the old organisation with the what had constituted R.A.F. India Command, addition of an R.A.F. element. This Com- .and those American units in this theatre which mand, and all those comprising the 10th comprised the 10th U.S.A.A.F. It was my which had formerly come under Bengal Com- task to ensure that these forces operated as a mand and all those comprising the 10th coherent body and that the best use was made U.S.A.A.F. in the same area. These forces were of the potentialities of each. subdivided into a Tactical Air Force under Air 2. In addition it was my continued responsi- Marshal Sir John Baldwin, and a Strategic bility to develop India as a base for future Air Force under Brigadier General Howard C. air operations, as a supply centre, and as a Davidson, U.S.A.A.F. I was authorised to training area for R.A.F. and I.A.F. personnel. effect such re-grouping of operational units that Such activities absorb a considerable propor- I considered necessary to achieve maximum tion of ithe energies of the Command, and con- operational efficiency, and as a result R.A.F. stitute a task of which the importance and and U.S,A.A.F. transport units were merged results are not immediately apparent. I have on 15th December into one organisation which therefore devoted Part Four of this Despatch was given the title of Troop Carrier Command. to the progress that has been made in this This new formation was commanded by direction. Brigadier General D. Old, U.S.A.A.F. Simi- 3. Responsibility for operations on the larly R.A.F. and American photographic North West Frontier and for the Indian Air reconnaissance units were incorporated into Force was relinquished to the formation which one command which assumed the title of 1382 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 Photographic Reconnaissance Force. Wing 10 overcome the wide dispersal of my avail- Commander S. G. Wise, R.A.F., was appointed able fighter strength, it was necessary to main- Air Commander from the date of formation. tain at the highest pitch of efficiency the early 5. In exercising operational control of these warning system. forces, the integrity of U.S. Groups and R.A.F. 10. I planned to employ She strategic Wings was retained and administrative control bomber force against targets in the following and responsibility remained with the respective order of priority : enemy occupied airfields and American and British Commanders. The installations, shipping, railways, oil installations Chiefs of StafZ agreed to the integration with in Burma and suitable objectives in Bangkok. the qualification that in view of American com- The course which the battle took, however, mitments to China, it might become necessary made a readjustment of these priorities neces- to transfer units from the 10th to the 14th sary and a considerable proportion of the total U.S.A.A.F. bomber effort was directed to tactical targets 6. The chain of command and the conduct in support of the Army and later, to carry of operations by the merged forces almost with- supplies to the garrison at Imphal. Another out exception worked well, and mutual con- task which assumed increasing importance cessions and adjustments were made by each during the period was the evacuation of element. In ancillary services, examples of co- casualties. Much had to be done to build up operation were most notable in the sphere of a successful organisation which could deal with maintenance, signals and flying control. Major the transhipment of sick and wounded from General G. E. Straitemeyer has said in his re- battle areas and casualty clearing stations to port on operations during this period—"The better equipped hospitals in the rear. various obstacles which might be expected to arise as a result of combining U.S.A.A.F. and THE FORCES AVAILABLE. R.A.F. units have been overcome as a result of 11. To accomplish these tasks there was a integration of staffs at Headquarters, Eastern total of forty-eight R.A.F. and seventeen Air Command, Strategic Air Force, Third U.S.A.A.F. squadrons deployed for operations. Tactical Air Force, Troop Carrier Command By. May these totals had increased to sixty-four and Photographic Reconnaissance Force. Such and twenty-eight respectively. a revolutionary change in staff organisation 12. The disposition of tactical units in might well have produced many difficulties and Bengal and Assam was designed to provide misunderstandings, but such has not been the defence and support over the three main areas case, and we have undoubtedly derived mutual of land operations; in the Arakan, along the benefit, not only on the staff side, but in the line from Tiddim to Homalin, and the Ledo tactical operating of air forces". With these Sector in Northern Burma; they were under and other evidences of the working of inte- the control of 224 Group, 221 Group and the grated forces I have dealt in detail in the U.S.A.A.F. Northern Air Sector Force respec- appropriate sections of the narrative. tively. Strategic units continued to be stationed further to the west since the marshy areas of THE TASKS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED. the Sunderbunds and the poor lines of com- 7. The tasks which lay before the combined munication in that area made the construction Ah- Forces were: — of airfields east of the Brahmaputra up to (a) To conduct a strategic air offensive in heavy bomber standards a matter of extreme conformity with the general plan to destroy difficulty which neither the labour, transport enemy air forces and installations, selected nor supply position would allow me to under- rail, road and river communications, and take except as a relatively long term plan. depots and maintenance facilities. (b) To ensure the air defence of the U.S. THE SITUATION IN NOVEMBER. Air Transport Command airfields in North- 13. Facing the enemy from India there was East India and to provide for the defence a more modern, more powerful, and numeri- against air attack of Calcutta and adjacent cally stronger air force than had hitherto been industrial areas. available in this theatre. Moreover, during (c) To provide support for the operations the monsoon much had been achieved to give of Fourteenth Army. the units comprising this force greater striking (d) To provide support for the Chinese- power. Communications, although overstrained American forces under command of General were now better geared to carry war supplies J. W. Stilwell which were operating from than at any time since the outbreak of hostili- bases in the Ledo area. ties. Advanced landing grounds which had (e) To support the operations of Long been constructed afforded short-range aircraft Range Penetration forces, and a greater radius of action, both offensive and (/) To conduct photographic recon- defensive, during the dry weather that was to naissance and survey. come and the warning system was now able to 8. The prosecution of the first of these tasks give ample notice of the approach of hostile was not only the best method of maintaining a aircraft. favourable air situation, which was my prin- 14. The enemy for his part disposed of a cipal charge, but would also force the enemy force of approximately 250 aircraft concen- on the defensive and thus provide the best pro- trated in the airfield groups at Heho, Anisakan, tection for the air route to China, for the Rangoon and Chiengmai with the remainder at Calcutta area and for sea communications in lay-back bases in Siam and the Netherlands the northern Bay of Bengal. East Indies. His ground forces faced ours 9. Offensive fighter operations were to be along a front of 700 miles. In Arakan he held undertaken to the greatest possible extent and the line from Maungdaw to Buthidaung and it was proposed to use long range fighters in was opposed by XV Corps, thence north-west particular in the offensive against enemy air- across the inhospitable Chin Hills to Kalemyo fields and air installations. Moreover, in order and northwards up the Kabaw Valley where SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 1383> IV Corps was deployed. Further north still miles, defence in depth could not be so uni- he was confronted by two Chinese Divisions formly effective and that in the rear areas based on Ledo, and beyond this we held posi- which included Calcutta, he would probably tions as far as the River Salween with a small be met with Hurricanes. On 5th December he force based at Fort Hertz. The enemy's bases sent a mixed force of approximately sixty and lines of communication stretched for 900 bombers and fighters in two waves which suc- miles from Bangkok to Myitkyina, over the ceeded in bombing Calcutta for the loss of 2 whole length of which it was possible to attack destroyed, 1 probably destroyed, and 4 dam- liim. aged, while (the three and a half Hurricane 15. The security of sea communications squadrons (the half-being night fighters) suffered meant that General Reconnaissance aircraft had five destroyed and six damaged. That the enemy to cover an area ranging from South Africa to put • his maximum effort into the attack is Sumatra,. The patrol of this vast expanse of evidenced by the fact that the second wave, sea contributed a problem that could only be included Naval aircraft. met by the careful husbanding and disposition 20. During January the Spitfire squadrons' of the small forces available. gained valuable experience in air fighting and tactics that was to stand them in good stead in the greater battles to come. The enemy 16. The account of a campaign covering such continued to send fighter sweeps over the a wide area and diversity of activities does not Arakan, but Spitfires were able to inflict admit of chronological treatment. I have there- casualties upon them in the ratio of eight to fore dealt separately with each strand of the one. By this time two squadrons of Spitfire pattern of operations, commencing with the VIIIs (Nos. 81 and 152) had arrived from primary task, the maintenance of air superiority, Middle East, and I now had at my disposal and placing air transport operations next in in the forward areas of Bengal four squadrons view of the importance they were to assume. of Spitfires and nine of Hurricanes for fighter operations; the stage was thus set for the opening of the battle in Arakan on the 4th PART TWO February. Anticipating our own ground offen- OPERATIONS sive by four days the enemy launched an attack with the object of annihilating the 5th and 7th I.—THE MAINTENANCE OF AIR SUPERIORITY Indian Divisions and pressing on to capture 17. The advent of Spitfires in Bengal early Chittagong. This ambitious plan was attended in November had already begun an era of by the most impressive measure of air support successful interceptions in which the enemy afforded by him in this theatre, sweeps by for- discovered for the first time in this theatre mations of fifty plus aircraft being reported the efficacy of modern fighter aircraft backed daily. The objects of the J.A.F. appear to have by a well developed system of warning and been firstly to intercept our aircraft engaged control. on close support, secondly to increase the 18. The first squadrons (Nos. 615 and -607 morale of his own troops and thirdly to give A.A.F.) were based on Chittagong in order some measure of ground support by attacks to protect and cover that vital port and to on our positions and forward bases. As the cover the Arakan front which was to be the battle developed, one other task assumed over- scene of the first major battles of the cam- riding priority for the enemy air forces. The paign. Within the month the Spitfires destroyed 7th Indian Division, cut off from its supply four enemy photographic reconnaissance air- bases, was being supplied wholly by air. It craft of the Dinah type whose excellent per- was of vital importance to the enemy that our formance had hitherto allowed them to range supply-dropping aircraft should not succeed in with impunity over our forward bases at a this task, but the air superiority which we had height and speed which Hurricanes could not established, the provision of standing patrols. equal. The enemy reacted by sending out —particularly in the Kaladan Valley where,, fighter sweeps to test the new arrivals and owing to the intervening hills, no radar cover whittle down our Spitfire strength in order that below 10,000 feet was available—and resort to he could once again range over the Arakan supply dropping by night enabled transport, suffering only the minor casualties that Hurri- aircraft to maintain the beleaguered forces for canes could inflict. In both these objects he the loss of only one Dakota (C.47) to enem\ was unsuccessful, and by the end of December fighters. had lost twenty-two aircraft, probably lost seven 21. The tactics which were employed to gain- and had suffered damage to twenty-six against this dominance over the Arakan battle front our loss of thirteen. The greatest success scored centred around the three forward squadrons in these raids was by No. 136 Squadron who, equipped with Spitfire Vs and a few Spitfire on the last day of the year, scored 12 destroyed, VIIIs. Hurricanes were used for airfield cover 3 probably destroyed, and 8 damaged against a when Spitfires were re-fuelling and re-arming,, mixed force of bombers and fighters which and for standing patrols over possible target were attempting to attack light Naval forces areas during hostile raids in case of a missed off the Arakan coast. As a result of this vic- interception. The enemy countered by intro- tory the Secretary of State for Air signalled ducing the Tojo, whose performance exceeded his congratulations and commented that the that of the Oscar, adopting the defensive circle newly arrived Spitfires had come into good and splitting into small groups when the circle hands. was broken. This brought them a relative 19. The one occasion the enemy could claim measure of success inasmuch as their losses as a success at this time was a bold strike decreased whilst those of the Spitfires gradually aimed at Calcutta with the double object of increased. damaging port installations and demoralising 22. The advantages of the Spitfire VIII in the city. He divined that over a front of 700 this battle were not immediately apparent, for (11543) A2 1384 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 the enemy continued to operate at his best operate under 224 Group. Thus, it was pos- performance height, that is 10,000 feet. No. sible to employ Lightnings (P.38) and Mus- .136 Squadron, who re-equipped with these tangs (P.51) to supplement the work of the aircraft in February, could not effectively em- Spitfires which were still in short supply, and ploy their high overtaking speed against an had to be husbanded for purely defensive work. enemy who exploited the manoeuvrability of The serious contraction of the warning system his aircraft to the full. At first attacks were around Imphal could now be partly offset by delivered at too high a speed with a resultant sending the American long range fighters to falling off in marksmanship. intercept the enemy on his return to the Central 23. When the battle switched to the Chind- Irrawaddy strips. win front in the second week in March and it 26. The first success of the policy of intru- became clear that the main Japanese ground sion fell to No. 1 Air Commando Force, which effort was to be aimed at Imphal and the rail- surprised a large concentration of aircraft on way to the north, 243 Wing and eight squad- the Shwebo group of airfields on 8th March, rons were moved into the area from 224 Group. and destroyed 46 of them. Three days later, Spitfires did not immediately repeat their suc- the Lightnings (P.38) squadron scored 15 cesses of the Arakan campaign for the follow- against the enemy at Heho. The primitive ing reasons. Firstly, although the three Ground nature of the Japanese warning system in the Control Interception Stations were excellent area augured well for the successful continu- and brought off fine interceptions against ance of the operations. Pilots became increas- Dinahs (No. 81 Squadron scored their first ingly familiar with the details of those airfields successes in this theatre by destroying two in which were within range, and photographs and four days at. the beginning of March), the models aided quick identification of dispersal rugged nature of the terrain produced techni- areas and anti-aircraft posts. In early strikes cal difficulties in the way of echoes which left of this nature the enemy were not airborne many blank spots in the radar coverage. and awaiting attack, and it was possible to •Secondly, the substitution of Indian Mobile make more than one run over the target, the Wireless Observer Companies for R.A.F. Wire- first run being utilised to locate aircraft in their less Units resulted in a lower standard of re- dispersal pens. porting. Thirdly, squadrons which had already 27. In May, an improvement in the enemy's lost a number of experienced pilots in action warning system became evident, since often were now losing many more as operational fighters were airborne and awaiting the attack. tours were completed. Moreover, the sudden However, losses remained low, since No. 459 influx of personnel, both Army and R.A.F. Squadron discovered that if they maintained could not be met with a similar growth of trans- an indicated airspeed of 300 m.p.h. and refused port, accommodation and communications. to enter into combat with the slower and more Finally, as the Japanese advanced, more and manoeuvrable Oscars and Tojos, they were more of our early warning system was over- still able to deliver their attacks at aircraft run, and the Army Corps Commander decided on the ground, perhaps fire one burst at any that he could not employ troops on local pro- fighter which attempted to intercept and make tection of airfields and the warning net. Squad- their withdrawal without loss. The prospect don personnel became exhausted through dis- of combat during the intrusion therefore proved turbed rest, and guard duties by night com- no deterrent. In this manner No. 459 Squad- bined with operations by day. Certain ron destroyed 121 enemy aircraft on the •squadrons were therefore withdrawn from the ground or in the air in March, April and May. Imphal Valley whilst others were flown out The enemy was forced in consequence to dis- •every night. continue the use of the Shwebo group of air- 24. Once again the problem of protecting fields and even Heho and Meiktila became transport aircraft operating so near to Japanese practically untenable. By the end of May, bases asserted itself. Deteriorating weather the J.A.F. had been forced into the humiliat- •and absence of warning made it increasingly ing position of providing such support as then: •difficult to ensure interception, but that our army, 600 miles away in the northern moun- •superiority was never lost is shown by the fact tains, could receive from the comparative that between the opening of the battle and the safety of airfields around Rangoon. end of May, thirty-one enemy aircraft were 28. To sum up, the extent of Allied destroyed, twenty probably destroyed and sixty- superiority in the air throughout the period six damaged in air combat over the Manipur can be seen by a comparison of the effort and area, for the loss of seventeen. Of this num- losses of the opposing forces. The enemy scale ber, three were destroyed by No. 176 (Beau- of effort amounted to 2,700 sorties sighted or fighter) Squadron operating at night from plotted, or less than three per cent, of the advanced airfields near Imphal. Allied effort. To achieve this, the J.A.F. lost 25. Meanwhile the accretion to the Com- 402 aircraft destroyed in the air or on the mand of long-range American fighter aircraft ground, or some 14 per cent, of their effort, enabled tactics to be developed which were while the comparable total for British and to have most damaging results for the Japanese American forces amounted to 230 or less than Air Force. Already Mustangs (P.51) had one-third per cent, of the effort. The air proved their worth, notably in a combined superiority maintained over the period needs •victory with Kittyhawks (P.40) against an no further emphasis. 'enemy formation in the Digboi area on 27th March, claiming 26 destroyed and 4 probably ****** destroyed, for the loss of two. The Army re- n.—AIR TRANSPORT OPERATIONS ported finding twenty-two crashed enemy air- 29. Throughout the period under review • craft in the area after the interception. At the number of transport squadrons under my :the same time, No. 459 (U.S.) Squadron, command steadily increased, though their (.equipped with Lightnings (P.38) began to growth was by no means out of proportion SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 1385 to the continually increasing importance of Daletme and began its advance southwards, their task in the operational areas. Indeed, being dependent throughout for its mainten- it is not too much to say that their services ance upon air supply. From 7th January, were instrumental in preserving the existence 1944, onwards, this became a commitment of of the Fourteenth Army as a striking force on No. 62 Squadron R.A.F. At the same time the Burma frontier. Operations on the Eastern U.S.A.A.F. aircraft came to the help of No. front made calls upon them at an ever in- 31 Squadron in building up a large reserve creasing rate, so that despite reinforcement, of supplies at Tiddim, while further north, transport squadrons worked at a high rate of Nos. 1 and 2 Troop Carrier Squadrons effort from the moment they became opera- U.S.A.A.F. in addition to maintaining the air tional. In consequence, crews underwent a warning centres screening the Assam Valley, period of considerable strain, for not only began to supply on a much larger scale the does supply dropping in this theatre involve two Chinese Divisions advancing south-east intricate low flying over the dropping zone from Ledo down the Hukawng Valley. They for as much as an hour in a hot aircraft in- also gave help to the Kachin levies waging terior, but the crews were normally responsible guerrilla warfare in the Fort Hertz district, as for the arduous work of unloading 6,000 to well as to the Gurkha garrison of Fort Hertz 7,000 Ibs. of freight. itself. Development of Troop Carrier Command. The Arakan Battle—February, 1944. 30. In November, the only R.A.F. transport 32. When the Japanese offensive in the squadron operating was No. 31, an experienced Arakan opened on 4th February, the needs of and pioneer unit, but the 1st and 2nd Troop the 14th Army for air supply greatly expanded! Carrier Squadrons U.S.A.A.F. had begun to with only a few days' warning. The land work over the northern sector of the front communications of 7th Indian Division were and there were other squadrons both British soon cut and those of 5th Indian Division in and American, either in training or on their danger, and it was only by supply dropping way. Unified operational control of these that the encircled forces could be expected forces was effected by the institution in to stand their ground and turn a potential December of Troop Carrier Command, Eastern catastrophe into a decisive victory. Japanese Air Command, under Brigadier General W. D. preparations for an offensive had been ob- Old, U.S.A.A.F., administrative control re- served, however, and the possibility of en- maining hi the usual British or American circlement envisaged, so that when supply by channels.. Headquarters was established air was called for on 8th February, there was at Comilla on 2nd January, 1944, in close no delay. proximity to the Headquarters of Fourteenth Army and of the Third Tactical Air Force, as 33. On the first day some of our transport well as to main Army supply bases. Sub- aircraft encountered an enemy fighter sweep sequent operations illustrated the dependence and one was shot down. Such was our air of air transport operations upon the tactical superiority that throughout the Arakan opera- air situation, and in order to combine final tions this was the only loss sustained by trans- responsibility for the former with the exercise port aircraft from enemy fighters, although of our air superiority—as well as to integrate many aircraft were damaged by fire from the air transport with army policy—Troop Carrier ground. Later, as a measure of protection, Command was placed under the control of much of the supply dropping was done by the Air Commander, Third Tactical Air Force, night with but little falling off in efficiency. from 1st May. Subsequently Troop Carrier The operation while it lasted was of such Command was dissolved as from 4th June, unexpected magnitude that I was compelled by when its component squadrons numbered to request the loan of a number of Commandos 8-—4 R.A.F. and 4 U.S.A.A.F. Moreover, in (C.46) from the India-China Wing of the U.S. February the Air Transport Command had Air Transport Command. These aircraft were loaned to me twenty-two Commandos (C.46) promptly and unstintingly supplied. The to meet the emergency in the Arakan, and critical period from the 8th February to 6th when it became necessary to return these in March inclusive involved the delivery of 2,010 April, five U.S.A.A.F. Troop Carrier squad- short tons of supplies of all kinds, including rons and the larger part of 216 Squadron rations, animals, ammunition and P.O.L.* R.A.F. were detached to work with my Com- With such large scale help, ground forces were mand from M.A.A.F. Upon their return to able to break out of their encirclement and the Mediterranean theatre in June, aircraft and inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy—signifi- crews from the Strategic Air Force were cant in that it pointed the way towards the attached to the Third Tactical Air Force to fill neutralisation of the long familiar Japanese the gap until the first of the U.S.A.A.F. Com- offensive tactics. By the end of the month, air bat Cargo Groups became operational. supply to the Arakan, though it still continued, During its short but eventful life of little over was no longer of an emergency nature. six months, Troop Carrier Command had thus Operation " Thursday ". increased more than four-fold in size, and even more in significance. 34. The major offensive action planned and carried out by 14th Army before the onset 31. The routine supply dropping missions of of the monsoon, was a penetration of enemy- No. 31 Squadron over the Chin Hills and occupied territory by columns of Special Force Arakan were being continued at the time of under Major General O. C. Wingate. Its the formation of South East Asia Command. purpose was to disrupt enemy communications The first additional need was that of 81 (West and thereby aid the recapture of northern African) Division which already in December Burma and create a favourable situation for received supplies landed for it at Chiringa the 14th Army to exploit. The operation as by U.S.A.A.F. It then moved eastwards over the mountains to the Kaladan Valley at * Petrol, Oil, Lubricants. 1386 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 foully planned involved the large scale use 37. By D plus 6 day there had been flown of transport aircraft to fly in and supply the in 9,052 personnel, 175 ponies, 1,183 mules and brigades, and the energetic employment of 509,083 pounds of stores. close support aircraft to make up the mobile 38. The element of surprise which had columns' denciencies in artillery. The First accompanied the entry of these forces and Air Commando Unit under Colonel Cochran, which had been aided by diversionary bomb- U.S.A.A.F., had been specially created and ing around Bhamo and Indaw was maintained sent to this theatre to till these needs, and throughout. Even when the enemy divined acted as a task force in support of General our intentions, our air superiority was instru- Wingate. I have dealt with the activities of mental in rendering his attacks ineffectual. It this force separately. was not until llth March and 13th March 35. The long range penetration brigade that the enemy attacked the two landing which was making its way across the Chindwin grounds which had been first extemporised— overland towards Katha received its first air- by which time one had already been evacuated borne supplies on 10th February, and its main- and a detachment of Spitfires of No. 81 Squad- tenance thereafter became a continuous com- ron had been installed on the other. Other mitment. The remaining two brigades were landing strips were contrived as the occasion landed on two strips improvised in the jungle arose, though for the most part the thirty during the nights of 5th/6th and 10th/llth columns of the division were supplied by drop- March, and a fourth and fifth brigade were ping. Much of the effectiveness of this air flown into another landing ground during the supply depended upon the standard of training nights of 24th/25th March and 5th/6th April. of the Dakota crews. The dropping zones The successful accomplishment of the air side were continually being changed as the columns of this operation was shared directly by the moved from place to place. Delivery normally Pirst Air Commando Unit and by the British took place by night and there was often no and American Transport squadrons which other guide than navigational skill supple- \participated, although the whole operation was mented by pre-arranged light signals which be- tonly made possible by the high degree of came visible only when the aircraft arrived in air superiority gained by the tactical air forces the vicinity of the dropping zone. Danger from in the preceding months. ground fire whilst dropping was a frequent and 36. The initial fly-in was the work of gliders accepted risk. This was no less true of occa- which carried an American airfield engineer sions on which Dakotas were able to utilise a company whose task it was to receive Dakotas landing ground, for enemy detachments were (C.47) on the following night, and also a suffi- often in the neighbourhood. The strip opened cient number of combat troops with equipment in the later stages of the operation at Hopin to defend the locality meanwhile. Although was evacuated because of small arms fire this preparatory operation was a complete through which our aircraft had unavoidably success, it was twice in danger of being com- to pass before landing. promised. The first occasion was when at the last moment it was discovered by photographic 39. Before the advent of the rains made the reconnaissance that one of the jungle clearings use of fairweather landing grounds impossible, earmarked for use and called " Piccadilly " had one Brigade (No. 16) was flown back to its been deliberately obstructed by the enemy. base in India. The others subsequently joined The commanders on the spot decided to con- the Chinese-American forces advancing upon tinue with the operation and divert the aircraft Myitkyina under General J. W. Stilwell, and intended for " Piccadilly " to the other landing participated in the operations around Myit- zone—" Broadway ". Secondly, the towing of kyina, to whose success their columns, sup- gliders in pairs proved impracticable under the plied entirely by air, had contributed. difficult flying conditions encountered; tow First Air Commando Unit. ropes snapped and a number of gliders failed to reach their destination. Moreover there 40. This unit came to my command with existed in the clearing a number of undulations the specific duty of assisting the fly-in of not visible on air photographs, so that even Special Force, the initial maintenance of its on making the best of landings the earlier columns and the evacuation of casualties. gliders frequently crashed, and each wrecked These functions were extended to include direct glider became a source of danger for its support of the ground forces and sustained successors. Worse confusion and damage was attacks on installations and communications avoided by the airfield control improvised by to hinder the eventual mobilisation of the Lt.-Col. Allison of the U.S.A.A.F. who was enemy against these forces. The Bomber- able to stop the arrival of additional gliders. Fighter component was engaged from the 3rd Despite these difficulties, by the next night the February onwards in attacks on railways and American airborne engineer unit and British airfields and, as soon as the* fly-in had been troops had levelled "Broadway" sufficiently accomplished, in direct support when called for Dakotas (C.47) to land. The Air Com- for by the columns. In these tasks the mander 3rd T.A.F. commented particularly on Mustangs (P.51) flew 1,482 sorties and the the quality of the airfield control and the Mitchells (B.25) 422. Their claims against excellent flying discipline that were features enemy aircraft destroyed on the ground and of the operation, which enabled the strip to in the air amounted to ninety. The glider be used almost to saturation by a constant component of the force carried out fourteen stream of transport aircraft in the short hours separate operations involving the release of of darkness available. His report remarks as 99 gliders which took into Burma a variety of follows : " Nobody has seen a transport opera- equipment ranging from bulldozers to river- tion until he has . . . watched Dakotas coming craft. in and taking off in opposite directions on a 41. An important part was played in the single strip all night long at the rate of one operation by the hundred light communication landing or one take-off every three minutes". aircraft which the Air Commando possessed. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 1387 These aircraft (L.ls and L.5s) could land of five squadrons and a detachment of No. 216 more or less at will even in bad country to Squadron, R.A.F. These six squadrons were convey messages and supplies of small bulk, all operating on the Burma Front by the second to carry commanders from one unit to another, week in April. In addition, I was permitted evacuate casualties and perform a host of to retain for a further period the Commandos miscellaneous services without the risks (C.46) temporarily withdrawn from the India- attendant upon wireless silence or employing China Wing of the Air Transport Command heavy aircraft. I consider their widespread for supply dropping in Arakan. use in future comparable operations essential. 48. The needs of our forces in the Manipur 42. The record of the small force of selected area were many and pressing. No. 50 Para- personnel with first-class equipment, which chute Brigade was flown from the Punjab 10 constituted the Air Commando, was naturally reinforce the garrison at Imphal, and a little good, but that record cannot be advanced in later No. 5 Indian Division was moved by air support of extending the principle of Air Com- complete from the Arakan in 758 sorties. mando Units. Such a principle gives rise to Between 10th/15th April, an infantry brigade the. danger of tying down fighter and bomber was flown from Amarda Road, south-west of aircraft permanently and exclusively to one Calcutta to Jorhat in Assam. 99 Commando particular Army formation with the consequent (C.46) and 189 Dakota (C.47) sorties lifted risks of duplication and lack of flexibility. 3,056 all ranks, 937,000 pounds of stores and 43. Such units have a place as spearheads the following equipment: 50 motor-cycles, for airborne and air transit operations, but 40 jeeps, 31 jeep trailers, 16 25-pounders and as soon as normal supply can begin, fighter eight 3.7 howitzers. An Army Air Support cover and air support, as requisite, should be Control unit was taken by air from Poona to provided by the tactical air forces as a whole Jorhat for service with 33 Corps. The move- under the direction of the appropriate air force ment by air of the servicing echelons of tactical Commander. squadrons became a matter of routine. In regard to the maintenance of our troops, the most varied articles were delivered to the forces momentarily engulfed within the flood of The Siege of Imphal. Japanese infiltration. At Kohima, for instance, 44. Concurrent with the heavy claims on owing to the enemy seizure of the wells, it was Troop Carrier Command from Special Force necessary to drop drinking water as well as and General Stilwell's forces arose an emer- routine supplies and medical necessities. gency that surpassed in importance all other Three hundred and seventy tons of bitumenised transport operations, and on whose successful hessian were delivered by air at Tulihal to solution by air supply depended the fate of make the airfield there all-weather. On the Imphal and the continuance of support to return journeys all transport aircraft brought China. out with them casualties or troops not needed 45. On the 7/8th March the enemy crossed for active combat. the Chindwin in force with the three-fold object 49. The 79 aircraft borrowed from the of occupying Indian soil, capturing our main Middle East were due to be returned at the base at Imphal, and cutting the Bengal-Assam beginning of May. If this arrangement had railway which fed the airfields from which been adhered to the consequences might well supplies were flown to China. have been disastrous. General Stilwell's forces 46. Before the end of March, the enemy had would have been forced to withdraw to their cut the Tiddim-Imphal and Imphal-Kohima Ledo base, the Imphal Plain would have roads, occupied Tiddim and part of Kohima become untenable, the air route to China and swept round to the Bishenpur area west threatened, the morale of the Fourteenth Army of Imphal. From the air point of view, the troops encircled in the Imphal Plain would over-running of our warning system and the have been considerably affected and the all- loss of advanced landing grounds on the peri- weather airfields and warning system in the meter of the Imphal plain were a serious Surma and Brahmaputra Valleys would have inconvenience. The encirclement of the IV been lost. Moreover, the major victory the Corps divisions at Imphal, however, had enemy might have won would have had serious immediate and heavy repercussions upon the repercussions in India. transport situation, since I was forthwith con- 50. I was compelled to represent that these fronted with unprecedented demands for the vital aircraft must stay until the reinforcements large scale delivery of reinforcements and envisaged by the Chiefs of Staff arrived and supplies, not merely to the beleaguered forces became operational. Agreement was obtained, in the Imphal Plain, but also to the garrisons and I instructed the Air Commander, Eastern holding out at Kohima and elsewhere. These Air Command, to employ aircraft of the demands were met, though not without con- Strategic Air Force in a transport role should siderable strain upon an already hard-worked there be any gap between the departure of the force. M.A.A.F. squadrons and the new reinforce- 47. It was clear that the needs of our ground ments becoming fully operational. forces could not long be satisfied by the 51. On 15th April my commitment for air existing number of transport aircraft under my supply to the besieged garrison at Imphal was command. Thus, when the threat of a established at the figure of over 400 short tons Japanese offensive westwards from the per day—which even then entailed the occu- Chindwin had become apparent, although pants going on short rations. The fulfilment before it actually materialised, I made strong of this contract depended upon a modicum of representations for further reinforcements of fair weather and upon the speedy loading of transport aircraft. As a result I received on aircraft at Army supply bases. Neither of loan from M.A.A.F. the services of the 64th these conditions was entirely fulfilled, and it Troop Carrier Group, U.S.A.A.F., consisting was only by reorganisation of the ground 1388 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 elements of the air supply system and the un- pan, mule and ambulance, and perhaps rail, stinted efforts of the U.S.A.A.F. and RA.F. to the nearest base hospital. Moreover, a pro- transport squadrons available that the target portion of the casualties evacuated were from figure was reached and surpassed in June. the columns of Special Force fighting in enemy But by the end of May it was clear that the occupied territory. The 2,126 casualties evacu- enemy's disregard of air transport as a major ated from the division by the end of May factor in the battle was to render his ambitious would have been a total loss had they not been and costly offensive a failure. flown out by air. The Advance from Ledo. 54. Although evacuation of casualties by air was no new phenomenon in this theatre of war, 52. Throughout the whole period the supply nevertheless it first assumed considerable pro- of the Chinese-American forces operating from portions during the Arakan battle in February Ledo under General Stilwell had been pro- and reached its peak during the struggle for ceeding. These troops were advancing down Imphal in April. Transport aircraft, when the Hukawng and Mogaung Valleys and they landed to deliver supplies frequently re- thereby gradually bringing the opening of an ceived casualties for the return journey. When, overland route to China nearer realisation. however, supplies were dropped, the interven- Each advance took them further from their tion of light aircraft was necessary for the bases, and consequently their calls for air journey from a small advanced landing ground supply were increasing, necessitating up to to a strip further back where a Dakota might 100 sorties per day. Landing grounds were land. But since neither heavy nor light aircraft constructed wherever possible along the path could be spared throughout this period speci- of the advance, and light aircraft were fically for the evacuation of casualties, the employed with good effect. The Dakota removal of sick and wounded remained an (C.47), however, remained as the greatest single " ad hoc " matter arranged on a basis of ex- factor in maintaining the advance. In April pediency and improvisation. R.A.F. medical the entire 50th Chinese Division, numbering personnel at airfields were insufficient to deal almost eight thousand men, was flown from with the load of casualties which, due to opera- Sookerating to Maingkwan, while by then all tional exigencies, might be entrusted to them the combat troops in North Burma, both with little or no warning by a flight of trans- American and Chinese, had become dependent port Dakotas. And so, although the care of upon air supply. In May, a fast moving all wounded at airfields was officially an R.A.F. column of American troops, known as Galahad responsibility, nevertheless help in this matter Force and supported entirely by air, made a was gladly accepted from the Army. considerable detour and caught the enemy unawares, seizing the main airfield at CONCLUSION. Myitkyina on 17th May. All units of Troop 55. Thus ak transport played a decisive part Carrier Command in the north had been in the three great battles of the period. By standing by to carry in those forces which the end of May the reconquest of portions of General Stilwell believed adequate to defeat northern Burma was hi sight, and the garrison the expected enemy counter attack. Brigadier- of Imphal was still an offensive force. The General Old was waiting at Shinbuiyang to events related above make a reiteration of the conduct the initial glider operation in which importance of transport aircraft unnecessary. troops and engineering equipment were to be In connection with the operations, however, conveyed, and himself towed the first glider certain lessons were learned which I would into Myitkyina. Transport aircraft followed emphasize. First, it is essential that Army the gliders almost at once. In the course of Commanders should not be allowed to regard thirty-six hours of intensive operations by both air transport as an auxiliary arm upon which day and night, during which ground fire was they can call without reference to the appro- continually encountered, and one enemy air priate Air Force Commander. Secondly, the attack was successful in shooting down a Army must be impressed with the necessity for Dakota (C.47) and destroying others on the the quick turn-round of aircraft; during in- ground, there were landed a complete Chinese tensive operations loads must be ready for the Regiment, six light anti-tank batteries, twelve aircraft as they land. Too often crews wasted Bofor guns and crews, one airborne engineer valuable hours waiting at an Army Supply company and a Chinese mortar company. Base because their freight had not been Many loads of ammunition, food and stores assembled ready for loading. Thirdly, when the were also conveyed. Before the end of the Army are the main customers of air transport month further troops, in numbers equivalent to forces, the fullest day-to-day liaison and dis- a division, had been taken by air to Myitkyina, cussion of problems must be combined with and the first stage of the reconquest of Burma clear statements as far hi advance as possible and the reopening of the Burma Road was of what they require in the way of air trans- completed. port, and for what purpose, in order that Evacuation of Casualties. priorities may be allotted. 53. It would be incomplete to close this 56. It is to be noted that the inadequacy account of the operations of transport aircraft of the Army ground organisation for supply by under my command without some mention of air operations became recognised by the Army a further aspect of their work. During the first as and when these operations became large- five months of 1944 the aircraft of Troop Car- scale undertakings. Steps were taken to im- rier Command flew no less than twenty-three prove the ground organisation in the light of thousand sick and wounded back to safety. It the experience gained during the operations. may safely be said that but for the provision of The first step was to provide Indian Ah- Sup- air transport the greater proportion of these ply companies at supply loading airfields. A would have had little hope of survival. The further important development was to create alternative was many days' journey by sam- Army staff organisations both to control the SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 1389 activities of the Army elements on the air- a single operation. It has not been repaired fields, and to organise the flow of Army sup- since this attack. plies both from base to airfield and from air- 61. The overall strategy of rendering each field to aircraft. These developments did not, part of the railway system ineffective was ex- however, reach completion during the period emplified in the spirited low-level attack on the covered by this despatch. Burma-Siam railway by American Liberators (B.24), the series of attacks on marshalling yards at Bangkok and Moulmein, and the III.—STRATEGIC AIR FORCE mining of the ferry crossings at Martaban and 57. Operations by heavy and medium bom- Mokpalin. At shorter range, the railway from bers sought to accomplish the following tasks: Rangoon to Myitkyina was subject to con- (i) Denial and destruction of the enemy's tinuous attacks, with the result that throughout lines of communication. its length there was always one bridge or more (ii) Destruction of airfields and other mili- out of action. Amongst these bridges which tary installations. were put out of action were the Mu River, (iii) Destruction of industrial and stores Myittha, Meza, Kyungon, Zawchaung, Budalin, areas. Songon, Natmauk, Tantabin, Swa, Tangon, Ye-u, Sinthe, Pyu, Bawgyo, Pyawbwe, 58. In addition to these, the Strategic Air Myingatha, Natkyigon, Daga and Myothit Force was often called upon to furnish direct Whenever intelligence indicated that enemy support to ground forces and to provide air- troops or supplies were moving in quantity, craft and crews for transport operations. sweeps were undertaken along the stretches of 59. For the transhipment of sea-borne sup- track approaching the battle fronts. plies to Burma, there were available to the enemy the ports of Rangoon, Moulmein, Tavoy 62. Attacks on road facilities and communi- and Mergui; the three latter are all connected cations .began in earnest in April 1944, when by rail or road to Rangoon. In addition to the threat to the Imphal Plain assumed serious these, the enemy could use the port of Bangkok proportions. One enemy division moving north and two lesser ports in the Gulf of Siam, Koh from the Tiddim area had, as its main line Sichang and Sattahib, both with adequate com- of supply, the motor road leading from Ye-u. munications to Bangkok. From here the vital Two other divisions attacking from the east Burma-Siam railway, which was completed across the Chindwin were largely dependent about the beginning of the period under re- upon the road from Wuntho. Mitchells (B.25) view, could transport supplies to Moulmein, and Wellingtons began on the 18th April an thence across the Salween by ferry to almost daily assault upon these vital arteries Martaban, rail again to the Sittang River where and the supplies moving along them. While the bridge was down, once again a ferry, and the former carried out low-level daylight so to all points of use by rail. Among the sweeps, the latter took up the role of intruders measures designed to deny these facilities to by night, replacing Beaufighters which Third the enemy was the laying of a total of 89 mines Tactical Air Force considered could not be in the harbours of Rangoon, Moulmein, Tavoy usefully or economically employed on moon- and Mergui, and, further afield, at Bangkok less nights. The sum of these attacks, other and the Gulf of Siam ports. Though the num- aspects of which I have described elsewhere in ber of mines laid was not large, the results this Despatch, contributed greatly to the con- exceeded expectations. Moreover, it must be stant shortage and slow transit of men and remembered that the effort involved was con- supplies which dogged the enemy throughout siderable, sometimes necessitating flights of his offensive. 2,300 miles. The enemy's lack of efficient 63. The effort by strategic bombers to minesweeping equipment caused much delay neutralise the Japanese Air Force was directed in the clearance of harbours, and intelligence primarily to the destruction of airfield instal- reports show that considerable dislocation and lations and supplies. At the beginning of damage was caused to shipping. February a large-scale operation by night was 60. Attacks against rail communications undertaken against the Heho group of air- accounted for almost 25 per cent, of all opera- fields in conjunction with Beaufighters, who tions. Destruction of the larger installations were to follow up the attack at dawn. From was allotted to the heavy bombers, with parti- the Strategic Air Force point of view, the cular emphasis on Rangoon, Bangkok and operation was highly successful, photographs Mandalay. Wellingtons operating by night revealing many bomb patterns in vulnerable were directed mainly against railway centres. areas. The Beaufighter attacks were ham- The Mitchells' (B.25) performance and charac- pered, however, by early morning mist. teristics made them particularly suitable for 64. Of industrial targets, oil installations railway sweeps and the destruction of bridges. were one of the primary objectives. A con- In this connection, the spiked bombs that came centrated bombing programme was carried out into use in March proved invaluable and were against facilities at Yenangyaung in which used to tear up stretches of the permanent way American daylight bombers demonstrated their at intervals over many miles of track. Bridges accuracy to such an extent that twice Beau- of strategic importance were attacked con- fighters operating in the area the following tinuously and attacks were repeated each time night reported large fires still burning. In the enemy completed repair work. An ex- late 1943 this plant was producing 600 barrels cellent example of this was the Sittang Bridge of crude oil daily, from which were extracted at Mokpalin. Destroyed during the evacua- 5,000 gallons of petrol. By May, 1944, the tion from Burma, the bridge was repaired after daily processed yield had been reduced to long and arduous work by the enemy. The 1,680 gallons. Installations at Chauk, Lanywa, progress of the work was carefully followed and Thilawa were dealt with in a like fashion. by reconnaissance, and as soon as it was com- Attacks against other industrial areas were pleted the bridge was wrecked once more hi reserved for the few large towns where targets 1390 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 of a reasonable size presented themselves, The fact that we possessed and held air notably Rangoon, Moulmein, Bassein, Insein superiority enabled full advantage to be taken and Prome. The Aircraft Factory and Arsenal of these opportunities, and throughout the big at Bangkok received many hits from the 106 battles—first in Arakan and then in Manipur tons of bombs aimed at it. When considering and around Myitkyina—ground support the relative lightness of the attack, allowance reached dimensions which absorbed a large must be made for the distance involved, which part of the total effort. is equivalent to a return flight from London to 69. The successful provision of direct sup- Tunis. port to our armies in this theatre is faced by 65. While I had not originally planned to two great difficulties. The first of these is the use strategic bombers in close support of nature of the terrain over which the fighting ground troops, the Commanders on all three was taking place. Much of it is close, densely sectors of the front requested their help and wooded, or covered with thick undergrowth, were accorded it. I have dealt with these so that the recognition of targets presents a operations in more detail in the section de- problem to even the most experienced crews. voted to Army Support, where it will be seen The second is the nature and characteristics that the greater proportion were in direct of the enemy as a fighter on the ground. Three support of IV Corps in front of Imphal. things distinguish him: his tenacity and Wellingtons were initially employed on this stamina, which enable him to take great task by daylight, with fighter escort, since the punishment from the air and still retain his Mitchells (B.25) could more usefully be fighting spirit; his skill in camouflaging his employed on sweeps along the various positions and dumps, which makes it very Lines of Communication. Subsequently, when difficult to locate them from the air or the Wellington crews had to be withdrawn for air ground ; and his beaver-like propensity for dig- supply duties, the Liberators (B.24) were used ging himself into the ground by excavations in a similar daylight role. This method of that range from a number of shallow fox- employment of strategic bombers was all the holes to hold one or two men to an elaborate more acceptable to me since monsoon condi- system of bunkers unharmed by all but direct tions made night bombing wellnigh impossible. hits from heavy bombs. By virtue indeed of The frequency of these attacks increased, and the nature of each, the terrain and the enemy by the end of May No. 231 Group alone had are strikingly suited to each other. been able to achieve the creditable total of 70. The difficult nature of the terrain and 646 short tons of bombs dropped on Army the enemy's complementary skill in camou- Support targets. flage were overcome, to a great extent, by 66. The above duties of Strategic Air Force the intimate knowledge that aircrews came to involved the dropping, from January onwards, have of the country over which they were of 6,741 short tons of bombs, of which R.A.F. operating. Another aid to target recognition and U.S.A.A.F. dropped almost equal propor- was the use of artillery or mortar smoke shells. tions. The distribution of this effort was as The enemy, however, on several occasions put follows: down diversionary smoke to mislead our air- Per craft. One remedy to this ruse is the employ- cent. ment of coloured smoke which has recently Military installations, dumps, etc. 54.7 arrived in the theatre. Railroad communications ... 22.6 71. The enemy's capacity for absorbing Airfields and landing grounds ... 10.2 punishment from the air without losing his Bridges 5.5 will to continue fighting was countered by the Shipping 3.5 application to his positions of a fire-power Jettisoned 3.5 or a bomb-load of such a magnitude as would 67. The Strategic Air Force carried out one seem in a European theatre to be out of all more duty during the period, the reinforce- proportion to the objects it was hoped to ment with crews and aircraft of the transport achieve, having regard to the forces available. squadrons maintaining the life-line to forces 72. Such a concentration of bombs over cut off on the Imphal Plain. On 19th May any area held by the enemy also helped in forty Wellington crews were attached to Troop finding an answer to the gift of the enemy Carrier Command to help the over-worked for camouflage and to the fact that the terrain crews there, and five aircraft and crews were lends itself to concealment. An area was detailed to carry 250-lb. bombs to the tactical often found to contain more bunkers than squadrons operating at high pressure in the even the most careful and thorough recon- Imphal Plain. Despite bad weather, 544 naissance had disclosed. If these attacks were bombs were delivered by 31st May. In the confined to pinpoint bombing of those bunkers same period, No. 490 U.S. (Mitchell) Squadron whose existence was known, then when the delivered 380 tons of ammunition to the forces bombing ceased and ground troops followed defending Imphal. The offensive power which up, other enemy positions were found un- these loads represented contributed to the touched by the bombardment. For instance, eventual breaking of the Japanese offensive at Kyaukchaw, attacked on 17th January by and enabled the normal transport aircraft to heavy bombers, it was thought even after concentrate on delivering jother supplies of bombing had taken place that there were only which the Army was in urgent need. three bunkers, whereas there were actually eight. Only complete saturation of an area can ensure a chance of all bunkers being hit IV.—SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCES or the troops in them being at least held 68. Operations on land were renewed and down. maintained on a large scale during this period, 73. The problem presented by the strength so that there were greatly increased oppor- and depth of many of the enemy's bunker tunities for giving support to our land forces. positions was never properly solved. The SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 1391 bombs carried by light bombers and fighter- Japanese in Lynch position (near lengnoupal) bombers did little damage unless they made reported by forward troops to be most success- direct hits, and the use of medium and heavy ful. Bunkers were seen to be blown in and bombers for the task was of necessity re- bodies flying about". This was the work of stricted. Moreover, when heavy attacks were twelve aircraft of No. 42 Squadron. carried out with the help of the Strategic Air 77. A more intangible result of direct sup- Force no really decisive success was achieved, port was the effect that it had on the morale and as yet the Army has not been able to of our troops. It was the opinion, for instance, make an effective assault in conjunction with of the Commander of the garrison at Kphima these attacks. What advantage medium and in April, that the audible and visible evidence .heavy bombers have in the weight of their of the arrival of air support on the two critical blow is offset *by -their greater margin 'of days, the 15th and 18th April, put new heart bombing error, which makes it necessary to into his men towards the end of the siege. allow a safety margin and so forces troops The obverse side of the picture is given by to start their assault at a greater distance from prisoners of war who bore complete witness lo their objective than is the case with light the effectiveness of our bombing and machine bombers and fighter-bombers. A good ex- gunning. ample of the difficulty of co-operation between ***** heavy bombers and ground forces is given in the operation at Razabil, which is described 78. In November and December, squadrons later. Of such attacks, the Air Commander, gave the limited scale of support called for Third Tactical Air Force, noted in his report by Fourteenth Army, which was then occupied for this period: " The Army have not yet in regrouping for forthcoming operations. been able to carry out an effective assault 79. In the 4 Corps area the enemy advanced in conjunction with these attacks. . . . How- into the Chin Hills and occupied the line Fort ever, the accession of Mitchells in a forward White—Falam—Haka. They were held south location and under Third Tactical Air Force of Tiddim, and both sides spent the rest of the is expected to be a very considerable help in year consolidating their positions. During this enabling us to put an adequate and timely phase Nos. 45'and 110 Vengeance Squadrons weight of attack on ... strongpoints ". did good work in direct support and in 74. Another way in which such bombing destroying supply dumps particularly around assisted ground forces was in disclosing the the area of Milestone 52 on the Tiddim— enemy's positions by clearing thick under- Kalemyo road. growth from around them. This tactic was of 80. During the same period in the Arakan, great assistance to our artillery and tanks, but 15 Corps was also regrouping in preparation was inclined to be a double-edged weapon in for an advance, and many attacks were made the opinion of the infantry, since not only on enemy positions in order to inflict casualties was the enemy exposed to view, but thek own and disperse enemy troops. Among the targets line of advance was also stripped of cover successfully attacked were the Headquarters so that they were forced to attack either at of the Japanese 55th Division at Rathedaung. night or by a flanking movement. 81. In January the rate of effort increased 75. The technique of air attack was deter- to support the several intended thrusts forward. mined by the nature of the terrain in which 4 Corps took the offensive during this month, the target lay. Where thick jungle made and on the 25th occupied Kyaukchaw in the approach necessary at a height sufficient to Atwin Yomas, an enemy fortress that blocked locate the target by reference to its surround- their line of advance from Tamu to Yuwa on ings, then dive or shallow-dive-bombing was the Chindwin. From the air point of view used. When the location of targets, as for this was the most interesting operation of the instance on the lines of communication, was month, since the first ground assault was pre- not so difficult, then low-level attacks could ceded by an air attack in which aircraft of be carried out. Dive-bombers therefore and both the Strategic and Tactical Air Forces took fighter-bombers were used principally against part. Eighteen U.S. Liberators (B.24) and nine pin-points and specified areas, the ground Mitchells (B.25) escorted by R.A.F. fighters, attack fighters against concentrations of troops dropped thirty-five tons of bombs including and supply dumps immediately to the rear. depth-charges; twenty-four Vengeances and twelve Hurricanes dropped eighteen tons. The 76. The results of attacks made in ground bombing was accurate and the whole area of support could not always be observed from jungle and undergrowth was covered. On the the air, but an analysis of the reports of Army other hand there were no direct hits on bunker units that followed up the attacks or watched them as they took place, testifies to their positions, and the near misses did little damage effectiveness in terms of men and animals killed to personnel or to positions. The attack took and positions weakened, if not destroyed. place at 16.30 hours in the afternoon, but the Although great destruction of life was not Army did not advance until 08.30 hours the necessarily the primary object of these attacks next morning, by which time the effect of the and was not always achieved, the Army was bombing had mainly worn off. The unintended unanimous in its belief that the air support result of the operation, therefore, was that the given helped it to advance when the initiative Army's advance was made more difficult by was ours and to hold out and later counter- the lack of cover where blast had laid the attack when the enemy were attacking. Army undergrowth flat. formations repeatedly expressed their thanks 82. Meanwhile in Arakan, 15 Corps had to the air force units that had helped them, begun to move forward shortly before and further tribute to the effectiveness of this Christmas towards the line Indin—Kyauktaw. support is to be found in many reports. One At the beginning of January, Maungdaw was of these may be quoted as being typical of taken and the approach towards the Maung- many others: " 10th May air strike on daw—Buthidaung road was continued till the 1392 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 end of the month. The major part of the ployment or attack. Air Commander, Third available direct support effort was now being Tactical Air Force, commenting on operations expended on this front, and our advances at in this area, says " It is interesting to note that Buthidaung and Maungdaw were both pre- in 15 Corps support was allied with artillery ceded by intensive dive-bombing of enemy rather more than infantry H.Q. This was con- strongpoints. More than once the two sidered by the Corps to be more satisfactory Vengeance squadrons, Nos. 82 and 8 I.A.F., in that gunners are more used to thinking in mounted nearly fifty sorties between them in a terms of supporting fire. ..." day. In the Arakan too this month, the 86. In the first few days of March the enemy Strategic Air Force took part in direct support launched an offensive across the Chindwin on bombing to clear a salient in anticipation of the 4 Corps front. This was not unexpected. the general advance. The target was a position During February he had shown increased near Razabil, another enemy fortress, three activity on the east bank of the river, and miles east of Maungdaw. The attack was attacks had been made by Vengeances and carried out by sixteen American Liberators fighter-bombers on enemy storage areas along (B.24) and ten Mitchells (B.25), with an escort the river as far north as the Uyu river and of R.A.F. Spitfires and Hurricanes, preceded upon small vessels and concentrations of rafts by twenty-four R.A.F. and I.A.F. Vengeances on the Chindwin. The battle in Arakan had which indicated the target. The majority of precluded any large reinforcement of the the bombs fell in the area, one 2,000-lb. bomb Imphal Plain, although during the preparations obliterating the top of a small hill containing for operation " Thursday " it became evident enemy positions, but again there was an that the enemy's preparations threatened appreciable time lag before the Army moved Imphal and the Assam railway. It was indeed to the assault, and the enemy appeared to have a question which only events would resolve, suffered no appreciable or lasting damage from whether the fly-in or the enemy's offensive the bombardment. The area of attack was would start first. As it happened, although the 1,000 by 600 yards and the bomb load 145,250 first enemy units crossed the Chindwin on the pounds. The target area was too large for the night of the 7/8th March, the fly-in was begun weight of the bombardment, and it is clear on the 5/6th, in sufficient time to release im- that, to be really effective, future attacks will portant air resources for dealing with the new have to be more concentrated. situation. Had the reverse been the case, the 83. Early in February, the enemy, anticipat- demands of defence and counter-attack against ing our intended offensive by four days, him- the enemy's thrust and of support for the fly-in self attacked in the Arakan. His plan was to could not both have been fully met. The brunt separate 5 and 7 Indian Divisions, cut off their of air support was now switched from the 15 overland communications, and then destroy Corps to the 4 Corps front. them in detail. 224 Group, therefore, instead 87. The Army's intention was, in the event of assisting this offensive, found itself involved of Long Range Penetration Brigades creating in a very grim defensive battle. The enemy's a favourable situation, to push forces across the move to outflank 7 Indian Division reached Chindwin. To give air support to these forces as far as Taung Bazaar, harried the whole airfields had been developed in forward areas, time by the two Vengeance squadrons. including one as far forward as Tamu. Now, Although there was some difficulty in finding however, instead of fighting in support of an targets in the battle areas, every opportunity offensive, direct support squadrons again found . was taken to attack reported concentrations, themselves taking part in a defensive battle, bunkers and lines of communication. Over and Tamu itself was overrun. 600 Vengeance and 800 Hurricane sorties were directed to this end during the month. 88. Having crossed the Chindwin the enemy pushed onwards towards Imphal by the Tamu 84. At the height of the battle, additional and Tiddim roads, and towards Kohima weight was lent to the support given the ground through the Somra hill tracts and from Homa- troops by the employment of Wellingtons, lin via Ukhrul. Air support to meet the threat carrying 4,000-lb. bombs, from Nos. 99 and was provided to the maximum from the re- 215 Squadrons in a .tactical role. Targets in- sources available, the two Vengeance squad- cluded enemy headquarters at Godusara and rons already on this front being joined by No. Rathedaung, and enemy-held villages were 82 Squadron from the Arakan and, towards the reported completely devastated. In addition end of the month, by No. 7 I.A.F. Squadron. one operation with R.A.F. fighter escort was There was also at this time a welcome increase carried out, with excellent results, by nine in the number of Hurricane squadrons Mitchells (B.25) of No. 490 U.S. Squadron equipped to carry bombs. No. 42 Squadron against the entrances to the tunnels on the had been so equipped since January, No. 34 Maungdaw-Buthidaung road. since the end of February; now, at the end of 85. By the 4th March the battle in Arakan March, No. 60 and No. 113 Squadrons, too, had been brought to a successful conclusion. began to carry out bombing operations. There is little doubt that our overall air 89. In April Kohima was seriously supremacy was largely responsible for this, threatened as well as Imphal, and support was since it enabled transport aircraft to drop food consequently divided between 4 and 33 Corps, and ammunition to 7 Indian Division, which although till May the greater part of the effort could not otherwise have maintained the fight, was centred around Imphal. .The four Hurri- the Strategic Air Force to lend its weight cane fighter-bomber squadrons flew over 2,200 against tactical targets, and the close-support sorties, the majority of which were in the squadrons to break up many attacks, to main- Churachandpur area,. on the Imphal-Tiddim tain a constant harassing of the enemy's line road, against the road block set up at Kangla- of communication, and to pin him down in his tongbi on the Imphal-Kohima road, against bunkers while our own troops moved in de- concentrations of enemy troops attempting to SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 1393 open the Tamu-Palel road westwards, and with such a high standard of camouflage and against 31 Division which was operating concealment who, when on the offensive, moves against Kohima. The four Vengeance squad- in small groups with little impedimenta. No rons flew over 2,000 sorties during this month. army can maintain its standard of camouflage Their bombing was extremely accurate, and in retreat, however, and as this despatch is in addition to direct support tasks they being written, the air forces in this theatre are attacked enemy dumps and camps. On the proving again what has been and is being 5th April No. 82 Squadron carried out its demonstrated in every other theatre of war, last operations on this front and then rejoined that an enemy experiencing overwhelming pres- No. 224 Group. Over 750 sorties were flown sure from advancing ground forces provides by Hurricanes in offensive sorties against fleet- the best targets for air attack. The experience ing targets and troop positions. gained by Army Commanders, who have come to realise the limitations and possibilities of air 90. In May, direct support operations centred support during the period of trial, is now pay- around Kohima, where the town itself and the ing full dividends, the results of which should Aradura Spur to the south were eventually form an impressive achievement during the cleared of the enemy after intensive attacks monsoon operations now beginning. by Vengeances and Hurricane fighter-bombers against bunker positions and slit trenches. To 94. During these six and a half months the the south of Imphal, where the enemy made American squadrons of the Northern Air Sec- several attacks on the Tiddim road from the tor Force had, as their primary task, the main- west and also on Bishenpur, fighter-bombers tenance of the air superiority necessary to and ground-attack fighters attacked concentra- guarantee the safety of the air route to China tions of enemy troops and vehicles. Further and of the bases of the Air Transport Com- south on the Tiddim road, Moirang was also mand. They were also, however, responsible attacked by fighter-bombers and Vengeances. for giving air support to General StilwelTs During this month Vengeances flew over 1,000 Chinese-American Forces in their advance sorties on the 4 and 33 Corps fronts and Hurri- down the Ledo Road, which culminated in the cane fighter-bombers 1,693. assaults on Kamaing, Mogaung, and Myitkyina. 91. In this battle the Strategic Air Force 95. By February the ground forces had suc- again assisted with its heavier striking power. cessfully advanced as far as Maingkwan in In May the Wellingtons of Nos. 99 and 215 the Hukawng Valley, and the Mustangs and Squadrons flew 125 sorties against tactical tar- Kittyhawks comprising the force had given gets, American Liberators (B.24) 12, and valuable support in the form of attacks against Mitchells (B. 25) 106. Apart from one attack camps, concentrations of troops, M.T. and on the Mintha-Tamu road, the whole of this stores, both in the valley and along the road effort was made against targets on the Imphal- from Kamaing to Mogaung. The work of Tiddim road, especially in the neighbourhood ground attack squadrons in sweeps along the of milestones 120 and 87, two points of great flanks of the road was reported by prisoners tactical importance in preventing enemy rein- of war as particularly effective. Liberators forcements from coming up the road. Attacks (B.24) and Mitchells (B.25) were also used in against enemy strongholds included one against attacks on this sector of the front, dropping the village of Ningthoukhong, which was accu- 155 tons of bombs on Kamaing, 93 on rately bombed by forty-eight Wellingtons and Mogaung and 40 on Myitkyina. This support Mitchells (B.25) on the 9th May. Once again, continued when the Hukawng Valley had been however, the enemy withstood the effects of left behind, and by the end of the period the bombardment and was able to repulse the covered by this despatch Mogaung was being subsequent assault by ground troops. invested by ground forces and the main strip at Myitkyina, taken on 17th May, was in the 92. The enemy's efforts to deploy in the hands of the N.A.S.F., forming a potential Imphal Plain during the month were decisively advanced all-weather base. defeated by the Hurricanes and Vengeances which attacked at extremely short intervals any concentrations in the foothills reported by V.—ATTACKS ON COMMUNICATIONS ground troops through the Army Air Support Control operating at a high standard of effi- 96. The comparative lack in Burma of large ciency. By the end of the month, Fourteenth static targets suitable for heavy bombers has Army were going over to .the offensive and it been offset by the extreme vulnerability of the was possible to predict that the threat to Japanese lines of communication. No. 27 Imphal had been averted. Constant attacks Squadron, R.A.F., has been operating on Beau- on the tracks through the jungle which served fighters against these communications since as his Lines of Communication had prevented January, 1943, and No. 177 Squadron, R.A.F., the enemy bringing his full potential strength similarly equipped, from September of the up to the perimeter of the plain, and the effec- same year. As a result of their persistent and tiveness of air attack in thick jungle had im- ubiquitous attacks, both by day and by night, pressed on him the futility of advancing over the enemy has been driven to remove the main open country without overwhelming forces. weight of his transport from road to river and The attacker was becoming the attacked; the from river to rail. His major movements have period of attrition and defence was over, and been restricted to the hours of darkness, and the squadrons supporting 4 and 33 Corps could for protection during daylight he has been com- pelled to resort to an ingenious and complex look forward to the prize for which all air system Qf camouflage coupled with the estab- forces hope—the annihilation of an enemy in lishment of an extensive network of gun posts retreat. as a supplement to his more orthodox anti- 93. Positive results in the form of men aircraft defences. The Taungup Pass road, killed, storage areas devastated, and transport the shipping on the Irrawaddy, the Ye-u and destroyed are hard to achieve against an enemy Myitkyina railway lines, as examples, have long 1394 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 afforded daily targets for Beaufighters and, 100. Although not primarily intended for latterly, Lightnings (P.38) and Mustangs (P.51). attack on rivercraft, the 40 mm. cannon, with In November, 1943, there occurred an event of which the Hurricane IIDs of No. 20 Squadron prime importance as regards the supply were fitted, did great damage to hundreds of problem of the enemy troops in Burma—the assorted craft with which the enemy supplied opening of the Burma-Siam railway. This did his forces dispersed among the waterways of not diminish the importance of the routes of the Arakan coast. This squadron began to Northern and Western Burma, but it did bring operate in December, 1943, using A.P. shells. into strategical prominence their relationship to In February, H.E. ammunition became avail- these routes from the south and east. New able and the rate of destruction increased. objectives such as the railway junction at Craft when holed could no longer be beached, Thanbyuzayat, the ferry termini at Moulmein but disintegrated in the water, with the inevit- and Martaban, the bridge over the Sittang able instead of occasional loss of their cargo. river at Mokpalin and in general the railway When, finally, aircraft with additional internal system north, south and east of the all- tankage arrived, the effective radius of attack important junction at Pegu became of cardinal was extended south of Akyab, and the rate of significance. destruction, reached a peak which seriously 97. The armament of the Beaufighters of hindered the reinforcement and supply of all Nos. 27 and 177 Squadrons, consisting of four Japanese forces occupying the coastal region 20 mm. cannon and six machine guns, proved from Cheduba Island northwards to the front very suitable weapons for attacking the river- line, a distance of roughly 150 miles. craft, motor transport, rolling stock and loco- 101. The damage and hindrance that the motives on these routes. They first reached enemy suffered from these widespread attacks Moulmein on 27th February; thereafter they are hard to assess, but one criterion of their regularly attacked targets as far south and east effectiveness was the energy with which the as the Burma-Siam railway itself, and the Japanese attempted to defend their communi- terminus of the main Siamese railway to cations. The statistics show that in 1,276 effec- Bangkok at Chiengmai. tive sorties by R.A.F. long-range fighter air- 98. In January, 1944, a third squadron of craft, 35 were destroyed by enemy action or Beaufighters (No. 211) began to operate under did not return from operations, and 29 were my command using rocket projectiles (R.Ps.). seriously damaged by enemy fire, but no The enemy had by this time instituted a system statistical summary can adequately record all of pens and shelters to protect his locomotives, the damage and delay that the enemy suffered. and although a target thus protected was For example, it was estimated that in April immune from cannon and machine-gun fire, reinforcements travelling from Bangkok to it was often vulnerable to R.P. attacks. Another Manipur took six weeks to reach their development rendered the advent of rocket destination. projectiles even more timely. The opening of the Burma-Siam railway now allowed the ****** Japanese to bring replacement engines into VI.—GENERAL RECONNAISSANCE Burma by this quick and easy route. Accord- Control and Planning. ingly, the emphasis of attack was moved to 102. The vast areas of ocean for which air- the more permanent installations on Burmese craft in this Command were responsible in and Siamese railway systems, since the destruc- November precluded the density of patrol that tion or damaging of locomotives was not now was desirable. Moreover, it was difficult to so serious to him. In attacks on stations, water- maintain a sufficiently close liaison with those towers, curved portions of the track which formations responsible for the security of sea could not easily be replaced, and bridges, the communications in neighbouring areas. In rocket projectile proved a valuable supplement December, however, a new directive from the to existing weapons. Chiefs of Staff enabled a more clear-cut policy 99. The delay fuse which was all that was to be introduced and better defined the system available with which to arm R.P.s was soon of control and responsibility. The boundaries found to be unsuitable for attacks on bridges, of the Naval C.-in-C.'s Command were ex- and their destruction was left more and more tended to include Aden. This facilitated co- to bomb-carrying aircraft of both the Strategic operation with coastal aircraft there, which and Tactical Air Forces. I have dealt in more were, in the interests of consistency, to come detail with this aspect of strategic bombers' under my command. I thus became respon- work in the section devoted to their activities. sible for all flying boats, G.R. landplane and In attacks by tactical aircraft the long range of coastal striking force units allotted for opera- Mustangs (P.51) and Lightnings (P.38) was ex- tions in the Indian Ocean, the Mozambique ploited to the full. The Shweli suspension Channel, the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Oman bridge for example had often been attacked and the Bay of Bengal. Day-to-day opera- by bombers but its position rendered bombing tional and administrative control remained from any height difficult. Fighter-bomber with the A.O.C. in whose command the air- attack was not possible until the long-range craft were located. Broad control was nor- Mustangs (P.SlBs) of No. 1 Air Commando mally to be exercised through A.O.C. 222 Unit arrived. Immediately after their arrival Group, who was to work in close liaison with the bridge was destroyed by them in April and the appropriate Naval authorities and South its emergency replacement a fortnight later. African Air authorities. Thus A.O.C. 222 Other attacks on communications by Mustangs Group had a dual responsibility, combining (P.51) and Lightnings (P.38) included many with the command of his own Group the against the vital Mandalay-Myitkyina railway organisation and direction of all G.R. opera- particularly on the section between Shwebo tions in the Indian Ocean. To aid him in this and Wuntho which fed both the divisions latter task a .new body was formed—Indian attacking Imphal and the forces opposing Ocean G.R. Operations, or "IOGROPS"— Special Force. with a Deputy A.O.C. and separate staff. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 1395 103. In order to make the best use of the and was particularly, mentioned in the telegram relatively few aircraft available to patrol these of congratulation from C.-in-C. Eastern Fleet. areas, a new policy was introduced with the The sinking of this tanker was the only one object of making G.R. forces as mobile as of the month in either 222 or 225 Group areas. possible and to concentrate in areas where 112. December opened with considerable submarines were known or suspected to be. In activity and movement of G.R. aircraft in addition, the generous allotment of air escort order to protect large shipping movements in to convoys in areas where no threat existed the Bay of Bengal. To relieve the congestion was reduced to the minimum, and flying hours on the Bengal communications system, were thereby conserved for concentrated action Fourteenth Army were to be reinforced from where necessary. east coast ports, and extensive patrols were 104. C.-in-C. Eastern Fleet is in complete provided to cover the entire eastern approaches agreement with this policy and co-operates to to the Bay of Bengal. This involved a large- the fullest extent. scale and rapid movement of forces over dis- 105. The concentrations of aircraft needed tances varying from 1,000 to 1,400 miles to to implement the policy and carry out inten- concentrate suitable aircraft in strategic posi- sive patrols when necessary demand consider- tions. able shuttling of aircraft between bases. These 113. Round-the-clock patrols began at first movements are used to good effect by routeing light on the 6th and finished at midday on the the aircraft over shipping lanes so that they 9th as the ships reached Chittagong. The re- may carry out traffic patrols while in transit. deployment between Groups, and the conduct 106. One of the first tasks carried out by of the operation were notable for the high "IOGROPS" was an investigation of the state of efficiency and serviceability main- practical application of the system used in the tained. During the operation there was only Atlantic, by which air cover is given to ship- one sighting of a submarine, thought to be a ping in accordance with the degree of risk Japanese of the " I" class. Unfortunately the and the value of the convoy. By the standards Catalina was not positioned for an immediate of this procedure—known as "Stipple"—the attack and further searches failed to locate the wastage in flying hours during May was enemy again. Two enemy aircraft were sighted assessed as follows: over the Bay of Bengal but were not allowed to Per come within range of the surface vessels. cent. 114. On the 23rd December the enemy tor- (a) Aden area pedoed the s.s. Peshawar in convoy off the 17 .south-east coast of India. The attack was (6) East Africa 59 made in perfect weather at midday and while (c) 225 Group 55 a Catalina was escorting. This was the first (d) 222 Group 2* example of such an attack while escort was 107. Negotiations are now proceeding with provided. Continuous day and night cover C.-in-C. Eastern Fleet to introduce the proce- and a hunt to exhaustion was instituted, but dure, modified to suit local conditions, in this apart from a report from the same convoy on Command. the 25th, which caused an extension of the 108. Finally, all operations by Indian Ocean air cover, no other sightings were made. General Reconnaissance aircraft are in pro- 115. On the 27th, H.M.I.S. BERAR (escort cess of coming under the control of five Naval vessel) carried put a submarine attack near Air Operations Rooms at Bombay, the south-west tip of India without any known Vizagapatam, Kilendini, Aden and Colombo. result. A Catalina of 225 Group witnessed The resultant cohesion over the areas con- the attacks, and the detailed report and photo- trolled, and closer liaison with the Navy of graphs taken by the aircraft's crew were of which these N.A.O.R.S will permit, promise great value in assessing the results. Further well for future control of coastal aircraft in south-west, on the same day, a merchant vessel this theatre. was torpedoed, and to counter the threat to the many convoys in these waters, Catalinas were moved from Ceylon to Kelai, and Addu Operations. Atoll was reinforced. 109. A decrease in enemy submarine activity 116. Since commitments in 222 Group were hi November "permitted a reduction in air heavy, especially in affording air cover to units escorts and a subsequent saving in aircraft of the .growing Eastern Fleet, Beauforts were hours. used to escort coastal convoys, and long-range 110. The lull was utilised to carry out a aircraft reserved for the forward island bases more intensive training programme as a neces- and the Australia-Colombo convoys. sary initiation for No. 203 Wellington Squad- 117. During this month No. 354 Liberator ron, newly arrived at Santa Cruz; and as a (B.24) Squadron took over the G.R. patrols refresher for the other squadrons already previously flown by Wellington medium- operational but in need of training to fit them bomber squadrons, and extended them to for their more versatile work in the revised cover the N.E. Bay of Bengal, and the Arakan policy of mobility and aggression then being coastal areas. No sightings of enemy surface introduced. Otherwise, traffic patrols and or underwater forces were made during these shipping escorts were the main features of G.R. patrols, but this did not detract from their activity. value as negative reconnaissance. Several 111. Survivors of a tanker torpedoed in the small craft off the Arakan coast were attacked Seychelles area were located and rescued as and sunk with bombs and gunfire. a result of continuous sorties flown from the 118. The early part of January was con- 28th January to 30th January. One Catalina spicuous for the dearth of enemy activity in crew flew for forty-two hours on the 29th-30th southern and eastern waters, in spite of the 1396 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 increased number of convoy sailings and move- of the Japanese Fleet to Singapore. Plans ments of naval forces. One U-boat was known were laid for the assembly and despatch of to be in the Maldives area, and on the 16th air striking forces including all heavy bomber another made an attack off Pondicherry, sink- squadrons should the occasion arise. Bases ing one vessel. A Catalina assisted in the in Southern India and Ceylon were prepared rescue work, but the offensive anti-submarine and stocked for the possible advent of large search which was immediately instituted forces from Bengal, and No. 200 (Liberator proved fruitless. What was probably the G.R.) Squadron from West Africa and No. 47 same submarine was sighted and attacked by (Torpedo) Beaufighter Squadron from the a Catalina of No. 240 Squadron returning from Mediterranean arrived as reinforcements. No. a convoy escort on the 22nd. Probable 27 (Coastal Fighter) Beaufighter Squadron was damage was done in spite of the difficult con- detached from Bengal to work with No. 47 ditions of light and angle of attack, and a Squadron at Madras. The threat did not hunt to exhaustion was immediately initiated materialise but the organisation built up has using Catalinas of both 225 and 222 Groups. been retained in skeleton form. The enemy was not destroyed, although depth- 126. March witnessed a peak of activity charges were dropped on a possible sighting, which began on the first of the month with a and no further attacks were made on convoys hunt to exhaustion following the sinking of a in the area. merchant vessel twenty-five miles south-west 119. 225 Group aircraft continued to search of Galle. In the forty-fourth hour of the for the submarine until after dawn on the search a Catalina sighted and attacked a sur- 25th, but the 222 Group detachment returned faced submarine by moonlight. The enemy to Ceylon to provide cover for units of Eastern U-tboat was not seen after the attack, and Fleet. Beauforts carried out anti-submarine although it was probably damaged the search sweeps in front of Trincomalee harbour, while was continued for two more days. the Catalinas escorted the arriving ships to 127. Further enemy attacks resulted in two port. sinkings in the Arabian Sea, four in more 120. In spite of defensive air patrols, one southerly waters, and one of a troopship in independently routed merchant vessel was the northern Bay of Bengal, an area hitherto sunk in the Maldives area, but aircraft again almost completely immune from submarine located survivors and guided a cruiser to the attacks. There were regrettable delays in re- spot. porting the sinking, and thus the assembling 121. Considering the great amount of ship- of forces to search for the submarine, but the ping activity, the month witnessed compara- limited number of aircraft available to 173 tively few attacks. It is probable, however, Wing which controlled the area, eked out by that enemy submarines were being employed Beaufighters from 224 Group, carried out a on reconnaissance, particularly of the growing modified search until the arrival of reinforce- concentration of naval forces. There is no ments. The flying effort and quick turn round doubt that the provision of patrols and escorts of the few aircraft available, however, was of the greatest density possible with the forces particularly creditable, one Liberator of No. available was responsible for denying to these 354 Squadron being airborne again forty-seven enemy reconnaissance submarines much useful minutes after landing. information. 128. No. 230 (Sunderland) Squadron arrived in the Command during March, but it did not 122. In February the number of enemy sub- begin to operate fully until later, since lack marines estimated to be in the Indian Ocean of spares kept its serviceability low. rose to ten, and patrol activity was intensified to meet the threat. It became necessary to 129. In April the number of submarines augment air cover for the threatened areas operating in the Indian Ocean fell to an esti- around Ceylon with Catalinas and Wellingtons mated two. One was believed to be in the from 225 Group. Sinkings were heavy during Maldives area and the other to be operating the month, but one submarine was destroyed on the trade routes between Freemantle and by escort vessels with the co-operation of the Colombo, out of range of aircraft operating covering aircraft, and another, after it had from the Maldives. Beaufort aircraft were sunk H.M.T. KHEDIVE ISMAIL, by H.M. thus employed on coastal convoy escort, and destroyers who were guarding the troopship in long-range aircraft were held at Ceylon in such a strength that no air escort was deemed readiness for a threat further afield. No ships necessary. were sunk in the waters around India during the month, and the gradual change-over from 123. The sinkings necessitated many rescue the defensive to the offensive was symbolised operations by aircraft, and the survivors of in this month by the successful escort pro- three ships were located and covered while vided to Eastern Fleet in their strike with surface craft were guided to them. The out- carrier-borne aircraft against Sabang in North- standing rescue was that of survivors of a ship West Sumatra. torpedoed fourteen days earlier 800 miles from 130. In May, Eastern Fleet was again the mainland. covered during its journey to and from Soura- 124. The other major operation of the baya. During the month, it became possible month, which absorbed a considerable number to discontinue the Arakan coast patrols. No of aircraft hours, was the cover given to a sightings of any importance had been made slow-moving floating dock from Bombay to in the six months that the patrols had been Trincomalee—cover which would probably not carried out, and the continued absence of a have been afforded had the "Stipple" pro- threat in this area now allowed of a diversion cedure been in force. of these aircraft to more positive work. 125. Towards the end of February there 131. The loss of Liberators (B.24) engaged arose a potential threat to the east coast of on photographic reconnaissance of the India from the move of a considerable portion Andamans, Nicobars and North Sumatra led SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 1397

to the investigation of enemy radar by two meet a long-felt need for accurate and up-to- specially equipped Liberators allotted to my date maps of Burma. By the end of May, not Command. Twenty-six sorties were flown only immediate battle areas had been sur- from Ceylon to the Andaman Islands, Car veyed, but also approximately 57 per cent, of Nicobar, Simalur, and Northern Sumatra. Con- the whole of the country. The remainder of clusive evidence was obtained on these flights the effort was absorbed in assessing the extent that the enemy employ in this theatre beam- to which communication facilities were being swept radar of the type found on Attu and used and the damage inflicted upon them. The Guadalcanal. At the end of April the air- record number of eighty airfields were covered craft were transferred from Ceylon to Bengal in one day, as was the greater part of the in order to operate along the Burma coastline Burma railway system, allowing of an accurate and in the Bangkok area, but the results of aircraft count and a reliable estimate of the their investigations have not been sufficiently engines and rolling-stock in the country. An- conclusive to be included in this despatch. other valuable result of the large-scale airfield 132. Searches carried out by coastal aircraft cover was the issue of target mosaics to long- during the period assisted in the location and range fighter squadrons, which proved of great rescue of a total of 535 survivors from tor- assistance, especially when airfields were pedoed vessels in the waters around India. attacked. 133. The results of coastal activity are 137. Meanwhile, the American P.R. seldom tangible, and an account of the work squadron equipped with Lightnings (F.5) was of forces engaged on this work must of neces- still working independently. This often re- sity draw attention to those occasions when the sulted in duplication of effort, and closer co- enemy's positive attacks overcame the efforts of ordination was clearly desirable. Thus on the negative reconnaissance. Such attacks in the 1st February, Photographic Reconnaissance area patrolled by India and Ceylon-based air- Force was formed, incorporating No. 171 Wing craft did not and could not meet with sufficient Headquarters. This month and March were reaction to provide a continual deterrent to the notable for many sorties to obtain airfield in- enemy's intrusions, nor was the rate of destruc- formation and to assess the damage to com- tion of submarines high enough to prove a munications by aircraft of Third Tactical Air serious obstacle to him, since the maximum Force and No. 1 Air Commando Force. forces available in India and Ceylon during Survey work was also carried out, together the period consisted of ten long-range and with regular flights to the Andamans and the three medium-range squadrons. vast area bounded by a line joining Kenrung, Sittang, Mergui and Koh Si Chang Island ****** (South-East of Bangkok). VII.—PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE 138. Small country-craft were now being 134. In November it was the intention that increasingly used by the enemy, and the water- No. 681 and 684 P.R. Squadrons should ways of the Arakan and Central Burma were eventually come under the control of Strategic also frequently photographed to assess the Air Force. To this end No. 171 Wing, which density of traffic and staging points. On had originally been formed as a Tactical Re- 27th March the longest flight yet, of 1,860 connaissance Wing, was moved from Southern miles, was achieved by a Mosquito of No. 684 India to take over administrative and opera- Squadron when a large stretch of .the Bangkok- tional control. The 9th P.R. Squadron, Singapore railway was covered. U.S.A.A.F., was still under the control of 139. In April a substantial increase in the 10th U.S. Army Air Force. number of Army requests entailed numerous 135. No really long-range reconnaissance sorties over the battle and reinforcement areas. had been carried out by this time, since No. A Mosquito improved upon the record flight 684 Squadron had only recently received of the previous month by photographing many Mosquitoes, and there had not been time to stretches of railway in the Malay Peninsula, explore the potentialities of this aircraft under flying 2,172 miles to do so. tropical conditions. The radius of P.R. cover on the 1st December, excluding the Andaman 140. The advent of the monsoon affected Islands, was only 680 miles. On 15th photographic reconnaissance work perhaps December the first cover of Bangkok was more than any. In May, instead of concentrat- obtained and provided much valuable informa- ing on the programmes laid down, it became tion regarding Japanese dispositions and their a question of finding areas where the weather use of lay-back airfields. Although Bangkok was best and photographing the highest is now a routine target, the sortie was at priority targets in them. that time an outstanding achievement, since the 141. The outstanding achievement of the range of the Mosquito in this climate was still month was the photography of islands in the undetermined. Great Nicobar group. The flight was intended 136. At this time the main role of the two to discover if it were possible to reach these squadrons was to provide airfield cover for islands, but on arrival there was sufficient fuel aircraft counts, to photograph communications remaining to take photographs before return- and areas indicated by the Army, and to cover ing. Short-range squadrons during May potential target areas for attacks in Burma. obtained routine cover wherever possible and Twice weekly sorties were flown to Port Blair were also instructed to bring back as full a in the Andamans to secure information on the weather report as possible, which proved valu- enemy's anti-shipping activities. In January able in planning the next day's sorties. Only one of the few Mitchells (B.25) belonging to three of the twenty-three sorties flown on No. 684 Squadron photographed Mergui on survey photography were wholly successful. An the Tenasserim Coast for the first time, involv- idea of the achievement in the field of survey ing a journey of 1,600 miles. Survey photo- photography before the bad weather is shown graphy was also begun during the month to by the following figures, which represent the (11548) B 1398 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951

photographing of an area three times the size cult for identification. The same is true of of England in four and a half months : dropping zones for supply-dropping aircraft. Net area covered ... 152,000 square miles Crews and staff officers from the European (approx.) theatre of operations state that the dropping Made up of: points given here would be considered im- 6 in. cover ... 134,000 square miles possible there. Thus, complete familiarity with 12 in. cover ... 18,000 square miles the area over which they have to operate has In addition: been found essential for crews engaged in 12 in. cover of ground or transport support work. areas photo- 146. I have discussed the complexities of graphed on close support in Burma in the section dealing a smaller with that type of operation. Certain con- scale ... 38,000 square miles clusions follow that are worthy of note. First, 142. The foregoing account will give an in- unless used in overwhelming strength, the heavy dication of the great advance in the regu- bomber is no more the answer against an larity and extent of the cover obtained. entrenched enemy than has been found in other Targets as far away as Rangoon, Bassein and theatres. Secondly, if air bombardment on a Lashio came to be regarded as routine even heavy scale is used, the infantry must follow by Lightnings (F.5) and Spitfire aircraft, while the attack immediately in order that the limited the ranges achieved by Mosquitoes were little effect on the enemy is not lost before the attack less than phenomenal. A high standard of goes in. Thirdly, specialised trials are neces- photography and technical work was sary to determine the best types of bombs maintained. for use against jungle targets. These are now being carried out in this Command. Finally, the fighter-bomber and the dive- PART THREE bomber, with their extreme accuracy, proved excellent aircraft in close support in difficult SURVEY OF RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED terrain. The Hurricane, for example, could 143. Although territorial gams in the cam- be employed against targets in valleys hemmed paign until the end of May were small, the in by cloud, conditions that demanded high ground won back from the enemy hi Northern manoeuvrability if the target was to be Burma marked the first step towards the re- reached at all. Comparable aircraft of higher opening of overland communications with performance and with the ability to carry a China. The advance of the Chinese-American greater weight of bombs should prove an even forces, and the disruption of enemy communi- more decisive weaoon. cations by Special Force which aided it, 147. In combating the Japanese Air Force, would have been impossible without the air the lack of long-range fighters was acutely superiority which had been gained, allowing felt until Mustangs (P.51) and Lightnings (P.38) the free use of transport support aircraft and of the U.S.A.A.F. became available. Once our of fighters and bombers in close support. The ah- superiority was established in the forward same is true of both the less positive achieve- areas the enemy utilised bases too far away ments of the campaign, the breaking of two for normal-range aircraft to reach them. I large-scale enemy offensives—one aimed at have recounted later how it was that pres- Chittagong and the other at Imphal. Of the surised long-range tanks were not yet ready attack on Imphal, C.-in-C. 11 Army Group for the Spitfires, which could not therefore be stated: "There is absolutely no doubt that used in the rdle of long-range counter air had we not had air supply we should have offensive. In this theatre, where distances are lost the Imphal Plain, and the position on so great and the enemy so widely dispersed, the eastern frontier of India would have been long-range fighters are essential both for escort very grave ". He might with equal truth have and offensive operations. said "Had we not had air superiority". 148. Finally, it has been proved in this 144. The campaign established that the em- theatre as in others that air power is co-equal ployment of air transport in this theatre is with land power, and that Army and Air Com- capable of indefinite expansion, and yields manders should work from a Joint Head- dividends that could not be gained by any quarters if they are effectively to implement other agency. Moreover, there is scope for a the principles of command required by a com- wider range of transport aircraft than obtains bined Army/Air Plan. It is according to this in Europe, where thick jungle and high moun- broad principle, which has been agreed with tain barriers do not impede swift communica- the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief 11 tion. Light aircraft which can land in a space Army Group and approved by the Supreme too small for Dakotas are able to carry out Allied Commander, that future air operations a multitude of tasks for commanders, and, by in South-East Asia will be conducted. eliminating the feeling of isolation brought on when fighting so far from established bases, have a beneficial effect on the morale of the PART FOUR forces engaged. EXPANSION AND DEVELOPMENT 145. Close support of ground troops in such terrain has proved the value of accurate bomb I.—ORGANISATION, REINFORCEMENTS and gun attacks in a locality where pin-points AND BASES are few and targets difficult to identify, re- 149. The remoteness of this theatre of war quiring a thorough knowledge of the sector. from centres of control at home, together with Such knowledge is clearly of special signi- the obligation of developing so economically ficance in this theatre. Air liaison officers when backward a country as India as a supply base, briefing crews can give targets that would has inevitably led to the assumption by my often be refused in other theatres as too diffi- Headquarters Staff of functions which rightly SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 1399 belong to an Air Ministry, a Ministry of Air- development has been of existing airfields. craft Production, a Ministry of Labour, a Five airfields west of Calcutta have been Ministry of Economic Warfare, and perhaps developed for the U.SA.A.F. as bases for even a Board of Trade. Estimated at its V.H.B. aircraft. The need for pressing for- lowest, Air Command, South-East Asia, exer- ward our offensive and air transport operations cises the powers at least of Deputies to such has been responsible for the expansion of a bodies. number of airfields in the Fourteenth Army 150. The formation of South-East Asia area east of the Brahmaputra. In Ceylon, Command resulted in extensive developments work has begun on the development of two in organisation, and a whole hierarchy of new airfields at Kankesanturai and Negombo Headquarters has been called into being. for heavy aircraft, while, for special operations, Headquarters, Supreme Allied Commander, runway extension and strengthening of taxi- South-East Asia, moved from Delhi to Kandy tracks has been undertaken at China Bay. in March, 1944. It was not possible to move Work is being started on a plan for reinforce- my Headquarters to Kandy at this tune, as ment route development. In this field of the expansion and development of my Com- development effective use has been made of mand necessitated maintaining the closest bitumenised hessian—" bithess "—for both run- contact with G.H.Q. India, and so it was ways and apron hardstandings. The service- necessary to form an Advanced Headquarters, ability of this experimental material under A.C.S.E.A., consisting of a Planning and monsoon conditions is being closely observed. Liaison Staff, to accompany H.Q. S.A.C.S.E.A. 153. The procedure of implementing works in its move to Kandy. Air Headquarters, projects was altered slightly in January, 1944, India, was set up as an autonomous unit to though the difficulties and delays remained as control operations on the North-West Frontier before. In the Fourteenth Army area, priorities and assume responsibility for the LA.F., awarded to the R.A.F. services have been liable directly responsible under its own A.O.C. to to alteration by Army commanders without C.-in-C. India. Eastern Air Command was any reference being made to the Air Com- established to co-ordinate air operations on the mander concerned, and without any apprecia- Burmese frontier. Its Headquarters moved on tion of the effect of such alterations on the 15th April to Calcutta in order to maintain future of the air offensive. Labour and closer touch with its subordinate units—the material has been diverted and moved without Strategic Air Force, Third Tactical Air Force, giving any notification to the R.A.F. authori- Troop Carrier Command and Photographic ties concerned; frequently the first intimation Reconnaissance Force. Thus administrative that they receive of such action is the complete control of American units also gravitated to cessation of work upon some R.A.F. project. Calcutta, since this remained the responsibility 154. The expansion of establishments con- of Major-General G. E. Stratemeyer in his nected with the formation of new Headquarters other capacity, that of Commanding-General units and the preparation of cadres for the of the U.S.A.A.F. in the India-Burma Sector of reception of future reinforcements has aggra- the China-Bunna-India Theatre. vated the manpower shortage. The overall 151. In December, 1943, three new R.A.F. Command deficiency of effective strength Groups were formed—Nos. 229 (Transport) against current establishments has throughout Group, 230 (Maintenance) and 231 (Bomber). the period been approximately 12 per cent.; Within the period covered by this despatch but although this deficiency may not appear eleven R.A.F. and I.A.F. squadrons were unduly in excess of the global R.A.F. shortage, added to my command either by formation or nevertheless there has been very severe lack on transfer from another theatre. In addition, of personnel in individual trades. Since re- a second flight has been added to Nos. 681 and inforcements in the period reached this Com- 684 P.R. Squadrons, whilst at the height of mand in only negligible quantity, various, the defence of Imphal, No. 216 Transport alternative sources of supply to meet the Squadron was operating under my command deficiencies have been tried. An extensive on detachment from the Mediterranean. A scheme has been inaugurated for remustering further eight squadrons were held in back areas British other ranks from lower trade groups for re-equipment, and seven others changed into the more severely deficient higher trade their battle role. The conversion programme groups, but this, besides merely transferring has been mainly bound up with the further the shortage from one trade to another, has infusion of Mosquitoes and Spitfires into the also meant a loss to effective strength of the Command, while Thunderbolts are also airmen undergoing conversion training. The arriving, and plans to re-equip the Hurricane recruitment of Indians both as officers and men squadrons with them have been formulated. to fill the vacancies has also offered some The flow of aircraft in support of this solution, but this has continued only at a modernization has been steady, though the diminished rate and it has been very difficult R.A.F. in South-East Asia remains, as far as to find suitable officer candidates. Further, aircraft types are concerned, at least a year some months must elapse even after the period behind other theatres. Parallel to this ex- of formal training before such reinforcements pansion and re-equipment has been the can be counted on as fully effective. The rationalisation of the areas for which Groups question of substitution by women has also in India are responsible to correspond with the been given special attention. The W.A.A.F. boundaries of Army Commands. mission from the Air Ministry led by Air Chief 152. The large programme of airfield Commandant Dame Trefusis J. Forbes arrived development has been continued, with the in February. As a result of her investigations ultimate purpose of providing accommodation discussions have been begun w.ith the Govern- for the approved number of squadrons included ment of India. Meanwhile W.A.C. (I) recruit- in my long-term target. Save for certain new ing for the Air Forces in India has been at a sites in the forward areas and in Ceylon, all standstill. It may be added that with the. 1400 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 advent of the decentralised system of establish- the fundamental and ineradicable shortcomings ment control introduced at the end of 1943 of the transport system. Even if a damaged manning has been placed on an entirely new aircraft can be taken to the nearest railway, basis. Personnel are now demanded against the journey thence to a repair depot generally ceiling establishment figures as fixed by the causes so much further damage that a machine Asian Establishments Committee after con- that was capable of repair is fit only for write- sultation with my Headquarters. off when it reaches its destination. One remedy, which is having encouraging results, was the formation of an Airborne Salvage Section in November 1943 to fly to the scene of a crash II.—MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR in a specially fitted transport aircraft which 155. I referred in my last despatch to the can carry spares, tools and engines. On reach- uphill task confronting the maintenance ing the site, patch repairs are effected and the organisation hi this Command. Without actual damaged aircraft nursed to the nearest depot. knowledge of the conditions, however, many The Airborne Salvage Section was given one of of the inherent difficulties cannot be fully the first Dakotas it salvaged, and in that air- appreciated and deserve further emphasis. craft mainplanes of large aircraft and com- 156. The low standard of industrialisation in plete Spitfires have been carried. Up to date, India throws a heavy burden on the shoulders the Section has salvaged eighteen aircraft; the of Service maintenance personnel, who receive possibility of forming further similar sections none of the assistance from contractors' work- is under consideration. ing parties that is available at home establish- 161. An example of the shortage of man- ments. Even when it is possible to sub-con- power to meet emergencies arose in April when tract work to civilian firms, the quality of the transport operations necessitated the maximum products leaves much to be desired. Secondly, output of Dakotas both from major inspections the vast distances involved call for a wide dis- and repair. By diverting all available re- persal of existing stocks and make A.O.G. sources, the time taken on the floor was pro- procedure extremely slow. Thirdly, there is gressively reduced until it became half of what a case for stating that it is not sufficiently it had been at the end of 1943. This rapid realised that more manpower is needed per unit turnover was only achieved, however, by con- of output than in other theatres of war where centrating maintenance personnel on Dakotas spares are more readily available, the sickness at every stage of their travel, with a conse- rate lower, and base repair not rendered so quent reduction of work on other types. The difficult by the distances between depots and output of Dakotas from repair rose from two the operational areas, with the inevitable de- in December to ten in April and eleven in May. terioration of damaged aircraft in transit. It The later figures would have been higher still is in the light of these and similar difficulties but for the complete lack of certain spares in that the work of maintenance and repair should this Command which had to be demanded from be considered. America. 157. Expansion during the period was 162. Attempts to produce locally jettison directed mainly to preparations for dealing tanks exemplify the difficulties and delays ex- eventually with the load of 156 squadrons en- perienced in indigenous production. The tanks visaged under the Long Term Target for the were requested in October/November 1943 to Command. Additional civilian capacity has implement the long-range fighter policy. The been mobilised; one unit—No. 2 Command most suitable firm for their manufacture was Maintenance Unit Trichinopoly—is in process chosen, but found that it could not work to of being doubled in size, and three new the required limits laid down in the standard C-M.U.s have been formed. No. 322 M.U. at Vickers' drawings, and more generous toler- Cawnpore is now in operation, constituting the ances had to be permitted. In spite of this, largest service base repair depot in India. When one difficulty after another arose, and metal it reaches full capacity it will be able to deal tanks are still not available for issue. I have with major repairs to about 55 large aircraft already indicated the urgency with which they and with the overhaul of nearly 500 engines per were needed in the Third Tactical Air Force. month. As an alternative, a plywood tank was 158. A comprehensive organisation has been developed and successfully flight tested in built for holding reserve aircraft at Aircraft December 1943. There were, however, the Storage Units and Reserve Aircraft Pools so inevitable delays in getting it into production, disposed as to cover the whole of India in and they were not actually available for opera- three zones. The A.S.U.s hold a two-months' tional use until May. reserve, while the R.A.P.s hold a fortnight's 163. Simple types of equipment more suited reserve of aircraft ready for immediate issue. to the manufacturing resources of the country This organisation has contributed in no small have been produced to the fullest extent, and measure to the high rate of serviceability in British production thereby relieved of a con- squadrons, since it is generally possible to re- siderable burden. The monthly output of place aircraft within twenty-four hours. supply-dropping parachutes increased from 159. Lack of storage accommodation for hold- 35,000 to 144,000, and it is anticipated that ing main stocks has been due to poor progress this figure will be increased to 250,000 by the in the erection of new buildings planned long end of the year. since, and is a most serious problem at the 164. Very close liaison has been maintained present time, when approximately 30,000 cases with the U.S. Air Service Command. There of R.A.F. stores have had to be stored in the is a free and complete exchange of technical open. information and liaison officers are established 160. Often in this Command an aircraft at both Headquarters. At the time when the which has crashed or force-landed away from Dakota position was acute, the Air Service an airfield has to be written off because of Command released to the R.A.F. one-third of SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 1401

their total stocks of Dakota spares in the Group and Wing Headquarters will in future country. be self-contained and fully mobile as regards 165. Despite the increased operational effort, signals requirements. The formation of No. 5 the serviceability of squadrons has been well Base Signals Unit provided the cadre for maintained. To some extent the higher wastage operational training under field conditions. of aircraft has had to be met from reserve Personnel thrown up by the substitution of stocks, whilst the number of airframes and Wireless Observer Units by Indian Mobile engines under or awaiting repair has increased. Wireless Observer Companies were among the It is not certain that this back-log will be first to use these training facilities. It has thus fully eliminated during the monsoon, because been possible to establish No. 4 Group Control of shortage of personnel in the various trades Centre and 104 Mobile Air Reporting Unit and the inherent shortcomings of an organisa- which will replace the existing organisation in tion of rapid growth working with inadequate the Tactical Air Force of Group Operations local resources. Rooms, Filter Rooms, etc. The installation of Radar units in barges has been used to good effect already. In November, the most advanced units were those along the Cox's III.—SIGNALS, COMMUNICATIONS AND RADAR Bazaar—Ramu Road and the terrain in front 166. One of the major problems of the Com- of these was unsuitable for more extended mand has always been the provision of efficient siting. As soon as the Army had advanced to communication facilities over long distances. Maungdaw, an Air Ministry Experimental Trunk telephone and telegraph systems give Station (A.M.E.S.) was anchored off St. Martin's poor and unreliable service, nor can any ap- Island. This station, together with a G.C.I. preciable improvement be expected until the and Mobile Radar Unit (M.R.U.) sited at Indian Posts and Telegraphs Department is re- Maungdaw, provided most useful cover and inforced by Military signals units. Meanwhile assisted in successful interceptions off the the construction of long-distance overhead Arakan coast. G.C.I, sets have also been in- carrier systems is proceeding, although the stalled in a jeep, amphibious jeep and an maintenance problems that will arise when they amphibious DUKW. are complete cannot be solved without addi- 169. There has been an overall increase of tions to personnel. The six Air Formation 30 per cent, in navigational aids since Novem- Signals units within the Command have worked ber. The installation of static H.F. D/F* sta- well in view of their deficiency of seven Officers tions is practically completed and the delivery and 270 British Other Ranks on the 1943 of V.H.F. D/Ff equipment permitted a start target. Indeed, shortage of personnel has been to be made on its erection at all airfields along the greatest single limiting factor in the ex- the main transport and reinforcement routes pansion of signals facilities. The situation was within India. An up-to-date map is issued further aggravated by the need to supply to quarterly giving details of all aids to naviga- Special Force 185 Wireless Operators and tion, and the combining of R.A.F. and Mechanics and eight Officers. These personnel U.S.A.A.F. facilities has been of great value. are still with the Division. 170. Details of the airborne investigations of 167. The formation of Eastern Air Command enemy Radar have been given in Part Two of resulted in a high degree of co-operation and this Despatch. exchange of technical information between American and British forces, particularly in the 171. Signals traffic saw a large increase with sphere of radar. Two G.C.I, stations were the creation of Advanced Headquarters, Air sited to cover American bases in the Brahma- Command, South East Asia, in Ceylon, and of putra Valley and another was sited at Shin- Eastern Air Command, Strategic Air Force, buiyang in May to provide early warning for No. 230 and 231 Groups in Bengal. Cypher the Chinese-American forces advancing down traffic increased from 11£ to 15£ million groups the Hukawng Valley. Further British and per month, and a High Speed Automatic W/T American Light Warning sets were also de- channel was installed to handle the increased ployed in the area. Another G.C.I, set has traffic between Delhi and Colombo arising from been modified in order that it may be carried the move of the Supreme Allied Commander's by air and made available to U.S. forces. New Headquarters to Ceylon. To offset the increase American Light Warning sets have been tested rendered inevitable by the creation of many jointly by R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. officers. new Headquarters, an airgram service has been Moreover, with the prospect of Loran stations started within the Command. That such a for the use of A.T.C. aircraft proceeding to and step was necessary is an apt comment on the from China being installed, the operational use vast distances over which messages have to of this device by the R.A.F. in the Command travel in this theatre. has come nearer to realisation. Information on Radio Counter Measures has been provided IV.—FLYING CONTROL to XXth Bomber Command and to other 172. Although the value of Flying Control American units. Finally, all American units facilities has always been recognised in the in this theatre have adopted the R.A.F. call- Command, development has been hampered by sign procedure. the continued shortage of trained personnel and 168. All signals planning for future opera- necessary equipment. An efficient Flying Con- tions has been undertaken with mobility as the trol organisation has become more and more keynote. Specialist signals vehicles have been essential in this theatre where bad weather, a produced within the Command and are lack of land-line communications, and widely designed to meet needs peculiar to this .theatre. dispersed landing grounds make diversion a Moreover, static establishments in operational * H.F. D/F—High Frequency Direction Finding. units in the Third Tactical Air Force have been t V.H.F. D/F—Very High Frequency Direction replaced by mobile units with the result that Finding. (11548) C 1402 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951

complicated task. Moreover, air transport more than twenty miles from their Wing Arma- operations into the Lnphal Valley could have ment Officer are from 1.5 to 2.5 times those on been intensified but for the low standard of squadrons less than twenty miles from the proficiency among the inexperienced controllers wing. In spite of the fact that there are on the few airfields available. Within these established posts for only ten squadron Arma- limitations, however, much has been done, and ment Officers in the Command, which are its value is evidenced by the fact that at the naturally allotted to the bomber squadrons, only two airfields in 221 Group which could and that there are many establishment vacan- be provided with proper flying control, there cies which have not been filled because of the were in February no avoidable accidents serious shortage of armament officers, .303 gun among the four squadrons accommodated failures have fallen from 0.11 to 0.08 and there. 20 mm. from 2.07 to 1.48 per thousand rounds. 173. In November there were only thirty Bomb failures have similarly fallen from 0.47 trained British Flying Control Officers in the to 0.25 per hundred bombs. The measures Command. This small body was reinforced by which contributed to this improvement were a forty resting aircrew and thirty I.A.F. officers. decentralisation of the training and mainten- There were forty main airfields along the re- ance branches, a better system of check on inforcement routes and in Ceylon, with no air- failures, and careful distribution of available field controllers, no trained airmen and very manpower. To aid in this distribution a certain little equipment, among which these personnel dilution of I.A.F. personnel has been accepted. were distributed. These have proved suitable and efficient trades- men at certain tasks and have enabled the 174. In anticipation of the arrival of trained following dilution to be effected: controllers from England, plans were made to institute a full Flying Control organisation in per cent, the operational areas and along the reinforce- (i) I.A.F. Squadrons ... 100 ment routes by February. Unfortunately the (ii) M.U.S 50 flow from U.K. was stopped in January and (iii) Other non-operational the plan could not be implemented. The units 25 urgent needs of operational airfields had to be (iv) Operational R.A.F. Squad- met by stripping other areas below the safety rons 25 margin and diluting their establishment with (provided British Other too high a proportion of I.A.F. officers. At the Ranks are substituted end of May deficiencies on current establish- when available.) ments amounted to 150 officers and 100 airfield 179. A number of new weapons have arrived controllers. in the Command and come into use, operation- 175. One of the most encouraging features ally, during the period. Hurricane LTD aircraft of the development is the progress made to- armed with 40 mm. cannon first operated in wards complete integration with the U.S.A.A.F. No. 20 Squadron in December, 1943. The Liaison has been pursued since September initial A.P. ammunition was supplemented in 1943, and in March of this year a joint con- February by H.E. which has proved very effec- ference proposed the setting up of one system tive against rivercraft. R.P. has been used by of Air Traffic Control throughout the Com- No. 211 Squadron since January. It was at mand. A committee was set up to examine the first employed against bridge targets, but the technical problems involved and make recom- delay fuse was found to be unsatisfactory for mendations. These included a Joint Flying this type of attack and no proper facilities Control Board which will meet at intervals and, were available for modifying it. In view of it is hoped, maintain the unanimity achieved this, R.P. attacks have been directed against by the initial committee. Application was rolling stock, transport convoys, oil installa- made to U.S.A.A.F. H.Q. to send to the Com- tions, factories and rivercraft with good effect. mand officers trained in the joint system now 500 Ib. M.C. bombs came into use early in the working in U.K. new year, and in addition to the supply to 176. I therefore anticipate that a unified Bengal, stocks have been built up at selected system of Flying Control will soon be operat- stations hi Southern India and Ceylon should ing throughout the Command, and that every action become necessary against a Japanese crew will receive standard briefing and stan- Naval Task Force. 2,000 Ib. A.P. bombs have dard aids on all flights. been distributed for the same purpose. 180. A 4,000 Ib. bomb was dropped on Burma for the first time in November, 1943, V.—ARMAMENT against railway targets at Sagaing; its employ- 177. The slow receipt and dissemination of ment since then has been extended both by up-to-date information on armament matters, day and night. Among American weapons as indeed in all technical branches, has hin- which have been introduced since November dered the work of making the best use of are parachute fragmentation bombs, 300 Ib. weapons and developing the striking power of spike bombs for use against railway lines, the the Command. New publications take two noses being of indigenous manufacture, and months to arrive and an even longer period to the rocket-gun employed in the same manner reprint and distribute. One remedy has been as the R.A.F. rocket-projectile. an extensive use of the microgram service to 181. Close liaison between British and hasten the process of keeping technical per- American Armament Staffs resulted in much sonnel informed on all current developments. inter-change of information and resources. 178. Operational failures have been reduced American aircraft used R.A.F. flares and the in spite of the fact that fighter squadrons do R.A.F. used American mines, incendiaries and not possess Armament Officers. It has been drift lights. found that the stoppage rates on squadrons SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 1403 VI.—TRAINING the aircraft which came under No. 229 Group's 182. The re-orientation of the training control from 46 per 10,000 in December, 1943, organisation early in the period allocated to 13 in May, 1944. responsibility on a geographical basis, and No. 188. The number of aircraft available for 227 Group was no longer regarded primarily internal services continued to be small in com- as the training group. From January onwards, parison with requirements and the distances in- each group supervised and administered train- volved. Since it was necessary to earmark ing within its own area. nearly all Dakotas for the replacement of 183. Much of the available resources have wastages in squadrons operating at pressure on been absorbed by the need to convert crews the Eastern frontier, the formation of another to the latest types of aircraft, since reinforce- transport squadron (the sixth) had to be con- ments arriving in the Command have not been tinually postponed, and the conversion of No. familiarised with these types, and many exist- 353 Squadron from Hudsons to Dakotas de- ing squadrons are re-equipping. The change- layed. This squadron,

to the defence of its stations within the limit Naval Air Operations Rooms, keeping constant of available resources. watch, are responsible for initiating such 192. By December, 1943, R.A.F. Regiment operations. personnel had been organised into units with 196. Officers responsible to their respective independent establishments. It was possible to A.Os.C. for the efficient arrangement of Air form only five field squadrons, the remaining Sea Rescue and for keeping squadrons in- personnel being organised into A.A. flights formed of any new developments in methods armed with light machine-guns, since there of search and ancillary equipment have been were not enough officers nor the requisite established in Commands and Groups as equipment to allow larger units to be formed. follows: — These units functioned with considerable Eastern Air Command—One Squadron efficiency and, in addition, station personnel Leader. instructors drawn from the Regiment trained Third T.A.F.—One Flight Lieutenant. in defence a large percentage of all personnel No. 225 Group—One Squadron Leader; in threatened areas. One Flight Lieutenant. 193. By January, 1944, Army garrisons west No. 222 Group—One Squadron Leader. of the Brahmaputra had been withdrawn, but 197. Twelve Warwicks have now after some no static garrisons had been provided for the delay arrived in India and are undergoing more vulnerable stations in either the 4 or 15 major overhaul at Karachi, Allahabad and Jes- Corps areas. The local defence of these sore. Seven Sea Otters are being off-loaded stations depended entirely upon the few R.A.F. at Karachi and crews have been detailed to Regiment Units and the station personnel. take a conversion course as soon as the air- Despite repeated representations, the reduction craft become serviceable. When they are of the Regiment to nearly half its initial ready for operational flying, these aircraft will strength was insisted upon by Air Ministry, join No. 292 Squadron, the Headquarters of and in February action to remuster personnel which will be at Jessore. to other trades was initiated. The results were seen when in April the Air Commander, Third 198. Meanwhile searches have been carried Tactical Air Force, was obliged to withdraw a out by the four Walruses already in the Com- number of operational squadrons from the mand, and by operational aircraft, which, when- Imphal Valley. I had no alternative but to ever possible, carry the Lindholme Dinghy direct that further reduction of the Regiment, Gear. Experiments are being made to fit this already down to 3,434 all ranks, should be gear to Liberators. suspended. My Command Defence Officer was 199. Little progress has been made in the sent to England in May to explain the circum- formation of A.S.R. marine craft and Units. stances and to request, not only that the This is chiefly due to the slow rate at which suspension of the Regiment reduction should launches have been delivered. By July, 1943, be confirmed, but that a force adequate for there were nine in the Command. Between the task of defending airfields and ancillary this date and January 1944 no more arrived, stations in the battle areas should be provided. and as a consequence no additional units could 194. I append a comment by the Air Com- be formed. With the improvement, however, mander, Third Tactical Air Force, upon the in the shipping position, four launches have Regiment units under his control: — recently arrived from the United Kingdom and four from the U.S.A. There has also been "Units of the R.A.F. Regiment have notification of another seventeen being shipped proved themselves of the greatest value in to this Command. this campaign, of which the insecurity of air- fields and warning establishments in forward 200. Air Sea Rescue Units have been formed areas has been a feature. When Radar or are now in the process of forming at the Stations were established at St. Martin's following places: Chittagong, Maiakhal Island and later in the Maungdaw area, the Island, Calcutta, Dhamra River, Vizagapatam, unusual situation existed of Radar Stations Madras, Cochin, Bombay, Karachi, China Bay, being actually well in advance of the front Colombo, Galle, Kayts (Jaffna), Jiwani and line and within range of the enemy's guns Jask (Iraq). The craft, however, allocated and night patrols. It says much for the to most of these units have not yet arrived in R.A.F. Regiment personnel that the Radar the Command, or are still being fitted out and crews enjoyed undisturbed conditions in so are not yet operational. which to carry on their work under such 201. The maintenance of these craft has been trying conditions. It has proved to be quite a difficult problem owing to the limited supply unsound to rely on the Army maintaining of spares and special tools, to the great dis- troops for local defence in times of crisis tances between operational areas and the over- when the land situation deteriorates. This is haul workshops, and to the lack of transport the time when they are really needed by us, that prevails. The problem has been met by but this is the time when they are invariably using naval facilities where possible for ship- withdrawn to take part in the land battle ". ping and engine overhauls and by locating rescue craft by types, so that they are within as easy reach as possible of the workshops cap- IX.—AIR SEA RESCUE able of doing the overhaul of their respective 195. The Air Sea Rescue organisation in this types of engines. Command has been based on that of the United 202. Thirty-seven aircraft in all were Kingdom, with the necessary adaptations for searched for. The number of aircrew personnel local conditions and the scale of equipment that in these aircraft was 168, of which 102 were is available. The responsibility for operations saved. An American amphibious Catalina, has been delegated to the A.Os.C. of Groups, based on Calcutta, was responsible for two to whom in turn th§ Group Controllers of ocean landings and the saving of twenty-one SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 1405

aircrew, both R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F., in the sance Force Headquarters at Bally Seaplane Bay of Bengal. Base, Calcutta, where British and American 203. The demand made upon the marine staffs work together and have achieved a high craft has on the whole been light, except in the degree of co-ordination. Chittagong area where some lone sorties have been made off enemy-controlled coasts, and where an advanced rendezvous position off XII.—MEDICAL : WELFARE Katabdia Island was manned day and night for 210. The health of the Command as a whole several months. This position has now been shows only a slight improvement compared with superseded by an advanced base established on the analogous period for the preceding year. Maiakhal Island. The sickness rate for malaria and dysentery, although lower than that for 1943, has since February maintained the seasonal rise; that for X.—BALLOONS venereal disease alone has steadily declined. 204. Balloons were flown subject to weather The rate of invaliding in the Command has conditions at six sites : at Calcutta for the pro- risen gradually. In 1943 the incidence was tection of the docks and Howrah Bridge; at 1.44 per thousand, whilst in 1944 the rate has Jamshedpur, defending the vital iron and steel increased steadily from 2.00 in January to 2.50 works; at Colombo and Trincomalee to pro- per thousand in May ; these figures are doubt- tect harbour installations and naval anchor- less connected with the increasing Average ages ; at Chittagong to protect dock facilities length of the sojourn spent by personnel in and the Janali Hat Bridge; and, since 12th the Command. Malaria has continued to be May, at Kharagpur airfield to protect the Very the most important single cause of lost service Heavy Bomber base established there. days through sickness, and measures have been 205. There were no impacts with balloon actively taken in hand further to combat it. A cables by enemy aircraft, but two by Allied Deputy P.M.O. (Malariology) has been aircraft. During the enemy attack on Calcutta appointed to re-organise the plan for malaria in December, many bombs were dropped in control and to give the necessary technical the area occupied by No. 978 Squadron, kill- directions. Action has been initiated to raise, ing two and wounding ten other ranks. Some by propaganda and instruction, the standard equipment was destroyed and buildings of personal anti-malaria discipline, and plans damaged, but the efficiency of the unit was have been prepared for forming anti-malaria unimpaired. units. A further step has been the experi- mental spraying from aircraft of areas where 206. Indianisation of Balloon Squadrons malaria-carrying mosquitoes are known to has continued and by the beginning of May breed, and a flight of No. 134 Squadron has there were 1,246 I.A F. other ranks compared been detailed for this purpose. with 971 B.O.R.s. There are now no surplus R.A.F. Balloon Operators in the Command, 211. It is hoped to increase the liaison with and all those rendered redundant by the the Army and -the U.S.A.A.F., which has Indianisation are being absorbed into other hitherto not been as close as desirable. Arrangements are being made to increase trades. When the process is carried further it hospital accommodation to meet the potential should be possible to release another 400 to 450 needs of the eighty-five squadrons accepted as British airmen. the short-term target. Work is now proceeding on the conversion of the buildings of La XI.—PHOTOGRAPHY Martiniere School, Calcutta, to serve as the 500-bedded General Hospital, the first R.A.F. 207. Photographic reconnaissance and sur- Hospital in the Command, for whose opening vey commitments in India have produced a sanction was given in April. When open, .the high quality of photographs, and the speed of existence of this hospital should not only reproduction has been good considering the obviate to a very large extent the present many technical difficulties involved. The con- necessity for sending R.A.F. casualties in the struction of mobile photographic processing forward areas to army hospitals, with all the vehicles is progressing, and a plan to construct consequent administrative difficulties, but two self-sufficient photographic units each com- should also put the four R.A.F. Mobile Field prising eleven vehicles will be begun in the Hospitals hi a much stronger position with re- near future. gard to the supply of stores and equipment. 208. Experiments in night photographic re- They have been frequently overcrowded, and connaissance by Ceylon-based Liberators of on occasion it has been found that essential 160 Squadron are proving satisfactory. equipment for which they had vainly been Cameras and storage for 28 flashes have been asking was nevertheless being made available installed in aircraft, together with the means to neighbouring Army hospitals. of releasing the flashes at variable intervals 212. At the beginning of the year a repre- to obtain line-overlaps. Other trials have sentative of the R.A.F. Physiological Labora- proved the practicability of obtaining stereo tory, Farnborough, toured the Command and pairs at night using two F.24 cameras installed investigated flying conditions, including such in tandem. Plans to use carrier-borne aircraft matters as oxygen needs, flying clothes, flying for long-range reconnaissance have been im- rations and length of operational tour. A plemented to the extent of installing and test- report on his visit has since been received ing equipment in Hellcat aircraft. Experiments and action is being taken where necessary. now wait upon the provision of American and British cameras. WELFARE 209. R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. processing and 213. The provision of amenities for airmen interpretation in Eastern Air Command have has continued to be a pressing and difficult been integrated at Photographic Reconnais- problem. The greater proportion of R.A.F. 1406 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951

personnel live in scattered communities on the in towns. I cannot see any alteration in this eastern marches of India, housed in bamboo proportion until travelling facilities on Indian huts or tents,.often widely dispersed in small railways vastly improve, and proceeding to groups of less than a hundred, and generally distant leave centres becomes less of an ordeal. at least a day's journey from the nearest centre The unhealthy nature of most large Indian of what to them represents civilisation, and towns makes this improvement even more perhaps even from the nearest R.A.F. unit. desirable. To ameliorate as far as possible the drab and 217. Assistance has been given by my Wel- lonely life inevitable under these circumstances, fare Staff to 915 airmen in need of advice or 170 gramophones and 363 wireless sets have undergoing avoidable hardship, in addition to been made available during the period and the many cases handled by the welfare officers distributed at special rates to units. It is the in subordinate formations. The provision of aim ultimately to provide a wireless set for amenities has continued with grants from the every hundred men. Special arrangements Amenities, Comforts and Entertainments for have also been made for the distribution of the Forces Fund, while the Royal Air Force books and the supply of sports gear. Cor- Welfare Grant has been received from 1st April respondence courses which have been made onwards. To deal with the growing scope of accessible for airmen at a specially low fee welfare duties, six selected airmen have been have been meeting a heavy demand. Six commissioned in the A. & S.D. (Welfare) mobile cinemas have been set up in Bengal Branch and five welfare officers with the rank to which the average attendance is 15,000 of Squadron Leader have arrived from the weekly, and touring concert parties have visited United Kingdom. many units. 214. No single factor has conduced more XIII.—INDIAN OBSERVER CORPS to ill-feeling between the airman and the people 218. In November, 1943, the Indian Observer of the country in which he is living than the Corps consisted of three control units, six uncontrolled operation of the laws of supply mobile companies in Bengal, static units in four and demand at a time when so many men main areas, Calcutta, Chittagong, Vizagapatam whose standards of self-respect and personal and Madras, and fourteen other mobile com- cleanliness are high were arriving, and stocks panies under training. These together with of tooth-paste, shoe polish and razor blades Care & Maintenance companies and training were short. The rise in the price of such centres made up a total strength of 10,851 per- essential goods was aggravated by the fact that sonnel. In December it was decided to break there is in India no N.A.A.F.I. to cater for down the static organisation and certain Care the essential needs of the serviceman, the Gov- and Maintenance formations, and form from ernment of India preferring to retain the con- them seven additional mobile companies. By tractor system. Thus the only possible obstacle May, 1944, the number of control units had to the exploitation of the airman by bazaar increased to four, and that of operational store-keepers has been a progressively more mobile companies to seventeen with ten others rigid supervision of local canteen contractors. The problem has been made easier during under training or in process of formation. the last few months by the provision from 219. During the battle in Arakan, four com- abroad of large stocks of essential articles panies were involved, and re-deployment of a which are disseminated through service number of posts was necessary. Such posts as channels and sold at controlled prices hi can- were forced to retire succeeded in destroying teens. The problem is now one of distribution their equipment before retreating. Similarly, rather than supply and in general it may be when the enemy advanced towards Imphal, said that the airman can buy essential com- nearly 50 posts had to be evacuated or re- modities at fair prices in his canteen—though deployed. The posts east and south of Imphal not yet at all times or in all units. naturally lost much equipment, but a high, per- 215. Without the services of N.A.A.F.I., the centage was saved and all abandoned equip- provision of entertainment parties from ment was denied to the enemy. Casualties, too, England proved impossible for a long period. were light in view of the little or no warning The Government of India have finally been provided, consisting of some six missing and prevailed upon to allow E.N.S.A. parties to six others wounded. perform in this country, and G.H.Q., India, 220. Experience gained during the period led has partly defrayed the cost from excess at the end of April to the substitution of canteen profits. Mobile Control Units for the Base and Forward 216. Other advances which may be men- Control Units, with resultant closer supervision tioned include the improved scales of accom- and greater flexibility. Ultimately there will be modation and furnishings which have been seven of these to control the seventeen com- sanctioned for Hill Depots, and the development panies, and each of the latter will control of airmen's clubs. The number of beds avail- fifteen observer posts. able for personnel on leave has practically R. E. C. PEIRSE, doubled during the past year, and Hill Depots have been made as informal as possible with Air Chief Marshal, no parades at all and a minimum of restric- Allied Air Commander-in-Chief. tions. In spite of this, approximately 70 per 23rd November, 1944. cent, of airmen still prefer to spend their leave Air Command, South East Asia. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 1407

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