, I

(j (. .1 u!) \J _l'·,· ~ABLE OF CONTENTS

A. INT~ODUCTION

1 . Rcvie1-1 u f in;1'tents 2. T11,pl·:::r:cn ta ti on of Requirements

b., Re.so luUoI~ of Conflicts

c <· Consider a t,iorJ rif Avc:.ilable Research J, Considerat icn of Past Di.fficultie:3

et Aircraft CcckFits

Accide~i/Incia2nt Re2ord

6 Conclusions

C .. CREd COMP.LEHZ!~T

l.. Review of 11.eq1.iirements ;::i, Views of the Industry

a. Ma~uf2cturers

~~ Air Carriers c. 1·'!.:.:Uu.:·:J.l Avi at.ion Agency cL. .Pilot Organization e., Flisht Eng:inc:er Organization

h. Conclusions .D. cnn·.r DUTIE.S 1. Review of ~equirements 2. Views of the Industry a. Manufacturers b .. Air Carriers c. FBricral Aviation Agency d, Military e, Flight Engi.near On.;..n] za ti on f. Pilot Organization 000002 Evalua 1:.ion Conclusions I l.

e.. Fi..-:..

J.\.FI?ENDI CES

II. TJ, S. J.._i-:: C:::.2'.'rie~ l~:.r..:i.Je'."'_t.s f'::.r 1J 1~riod cfo.:,.;:-::1v .July =...> ~964 - 'L-;_:rbcjet Aircr:;.ft

J.11' r.·;.:;:: ~·=-:·:~-= B·::a_-l.:'..::::"~'.:':":. ~Tr: s -:~:; te1--,lis:-~:::d by BAC-ll.~. n:.:;. 9 E\r~.:il·;,s.T ~.or, Com~tr~:.t-_:.se- ::i.s p:cs.:_::,s~1ted by ..L;n~ pj_j_ot Org~r.. iz:-.. -.·. .ior;

IV. Limi t:a·:::i..c:".::: f::i::.· T:·-cr:.1.::;por r:: Ai:t-::::.a.f~ Op.:::::-·:;.-:-.~~::.·":; w:i rh 1.;.r:..> '.!V:"':L!."1 crew ~L: p~~0:etJ.t:::l ty ~~1E: Fligl1t E11ginc('=Y O:t;ar,j_zg.-,l..Jn

v. P1'01;c).: c:.·~~ Re'.":l e:'-.. r l.965 ·,

II

00000;~ 000004 ·I. . I

dealing

: -, (' :.: : '. ()'. ;_

background .is that ::; f ?. pilot, Tr~c.· term nrnec:hani c oriented" wi.J.l refer to ·..

ari. imlivid'Jal whose predo;;·l.ir 1 ar~t h;i.ckgrour.d i5 thr-Lt of a. mecharn.c,;: ev1;::1_-,

though he ;na.y poSSE:'.::2 app.l:lce..bls certificates both 2.S pilot ?.r1d .m0cf:.a~-1 J.c. For the purpos:ssoi thi:; n:?port. the de±::initic·ns cor•.tc:.i:ied b. Ps.:t Lo

of the Civil Air RsE;"Jlatio:·:s w'Lll apply~

11!~~~Q_rev:__i·>;r1b~,e :. A flight crew ·::E.,:r1t.. 2r i 2 a. c:rew rnernber assigr:ed to dU ty on a:r. airplane as a ,;_)ib t cH' f.ligb. t erJf{.i.r:.C?F.:r, '

000005 2 A fl.. ~g•.~t i=,;"'J.g.i.:::c::er is an j;;1di':rid'--'..2.l tc,J.dir.g a vc.}.:id :·1.ig'.·n, eng·ineer ceri~ ..~.tica-se :~s::·..:e•:..:. by thE::; Adr:i.ir~.ist:~at:-jr ?..r:.d wl".us~.:. pri1TJJ.ry a.ssignE:d de.tty· duri::g fl.::...ght is tci 2.ssist th-:' pilub3 ir:: t!-1_e mecha:--.:5_cal op<:!·a Lio~: n!: ar. a.i cplane.

t-l.r:-:c i.2 the t.in;e :f.rCJm U·_rJ ILCLt:'.!. L. cht:: :1i:c·pla.ne fi.r:.::t rr,oves ucdet:· it.2 011.r::. vo1.1cr for t~e fJLJ.rpose of flight ~i.:1~.:LL it c:~1w;s to l'C~St 2.':. tf~e .'."'.E:Xt f'O.in+. C.il ~: 2.r.d.i!lg (block--tc~ tJ~_c,c\.: ti.rr.e) "' l~

rrie1. 1~ ci

so1'1e of 1 ~hi; clt.J.l"ll' t.cr:::.r.:: 1.• :'.. .r...:s of t~·le pres~;r~1- coc:.kpi.t can no lo'lgcr be ident.i ..

f.iod) a.r:o 1.. :,c r)l'l ;:;.. r:.?. l behi:'.ld their ·con+:.r.ibc.t,-~on3 t.·.a.:;: been

and mi.lJ t::ixy

0 0 (ju u(; ') .. ) - ' 1a. No a:: .::::.:·r'~1:..·.: :"'.J.i.~ ~pc:"''3.·:r~ ~;"· 0.·i11~~.;..;:'.; w:~~:\- 1cs::: 1'.'i.:.i.t- t'.-.<':: rr.ir.iJrtLlffl :i.:.c~··.!. 2.r 1~~'·i .::pi:·-::~:Jr-::cJ ::'.r. i.!:.':'· :::·.]nrr:.rtl-:'.:•c:::E. cr;,rt-;f~:~'.·.;te for the \'JI,r.. 0f q:r·J:s'::~c,:, 1

1 11 Ar: a.. irff.8 .... ::c\~·:i!.".ts -, 'iCi.. J. .:..~ f·~:(~~'- (;;:· !"lr:eo:r· ·~-·2·rt·~'."i:~c.t =~ ~::.aL. '.c r8·.1uj red v· .:-.:..-:!. l '.3.1 l f: LY.t:C· :::· crt·. 1 f ::;.3, 'J•d f .. JY' r,,c,r•: t~,_-:::" ::,G. c:co

t-s: rr~u ·,. ip:.;d er .s. '2. l L. ,,. ..::. i er:;:~· 1• : '.. i::.: :~ u:~c:: :: or ':,,.-.i rr: th.. s.:--,

JO. 000 F' 1-1 :· c~ ·~ m:c>.x i !i1\:,'T1 :.· e.r ;:.:~ ~-::·:a f_ (=d t '.J.l-:0c f :' '\-rej G~'. '· :.1~·.. 2 r f-;; t:·~r:! Ad..::~~r:j·:.;tc:1,t.··...:r i'.:J.cJ~: 1·.;·l::.i 7-1-:2 dr:'.:~g~r: ~/ t.'.-:::- ?.~::-T~lc:.,-:-.tc-: :.;·:•"d or ~J;e. t.:r1:;u c.f c,v/·JL:cu' >:.. ::.,.::.'." ;,~_'.? tr.J :c''. 1 ::1.1~r:: 1:;;

1 1 .-: t hf._: s~~' ,~ u (,J pi-~ r -.:. '.: :_.. ',.) ~c I_) [ t.,~ :, .; :J,,~ :-1~·'1 (.; Y-: .,

aru co:::-::idereci

1 muctint:;.:;, :.1. t whicl~ tl-tCJ u~qH'U3~:J t~n:::ir opi·;,i0r.~ ;,: : 1u cocr;p-.• t, 1 F.Li1j1L CL'C\.l p3.t'S~clpaLlort ~i.n i,fle dt:;sic:--· (1,' ~J. nr:;w C()Clq:,-: t ·~:= t. u·o ~gh the; ail' carriurs ,., the S ·· 7 CoJrii:;.'~ Llee·: c..nd ur.ion :-·eprr.::se:;c".tati Vt~~; . n n n n ·'1 0 UUVU( Aircra.Jt Dr_js.ig<'· _, ,.;;~:::._i.::;··, 1.:::: pt:J,'l.ished by ~h1.:: U ,. 0. Ai;- .Fo!'Ce. ?or e2.ch r..sw ail:cra.ft being t11i-i.c t'.1.2 Air Fxce Ge~::.g:".2.tes c.. Prograr·: JJ·_rec.tor~ who acts

~J.s 1 :.a.l.l.y.. t.r,c r1la.n.1..:.:" e.c t1:.rer deterrri-'.. c.es 1-:;y .1 nf ~ n1tJ.l d.:sc.ussioPs wi.th

pro·spec st~re '..:_'Jyt--:;r;=: the derna:... d .fo:.- t.".e r)ropcsc=d 1~.:;:31gn. Ea.:rly in

No m-J.~oi· ccr;JLct.. ::: re.lat..-Lng t:::>.the ~0ckp.it desige1 oL' tod-;,.y's ,js-r.

trar:.sport:;; r,cerc; rep0.rted to t!"le St:;,d:y Te2.r110 ~,fter ci.n a..irct··3..ft has

jeop~rdize safety~ In sume in.stances

ar.:. ai.r r.€:.rr::er cr.. ooses to Fretrcfit}1 t.h~ :3•. ircraft, after :it be·::ci.rnes part

1 0 .ser.1.e.~ o.( r::rx 1pr·Jrr'.1'. B': ri"Sl.'.l t:i:.1.g frcJY, .f:"'Jse1a.ge guometry:, cr(W corn.plern.ents 1,

a.nd sre,,,r d.1;.t... ief ~ The SV.:dy Te?..rn L;u.r~d r:J deta.::ted pl&.n :::f cockp.i.t. con~

f:Lgura.t.lori tai::r::C. exc1u..si·1ely 0:1 crew d1.:.tie::: a.nd cruw wo:rkl.oa.d,,

.. s -. 000008 figurat~or:: tl:::.." 1'-t-1,d pr0110d h.. ~gl·.ly ?::.1:1~C.:i.ctory W?I'e j·et-=11.r.i;>d where pos:.ib1e. E.xi.r 1 ·rn"', depa.rt·... n~; :rc;'"1 pro'·c.r: ''oy·cept:- vv:re n.trd.ded so that

S"PW :·i::~ch.r ..~.'Jue > dP·.·~lopec ._ ... ,Y-')'.:gr·. y;::-r:.r: of 0xper:ence3 could be I mai r:.La.i ~.ed ,

e Q I~-~-9~:~~~~~~~~~: Sect:o'-.. 6C') ::.;:· ·~'":<:> frc.dr:.rj.l i1··:.9.i·:c;~ f;:;+ c:: 1(;58 ernpow<:>r<: •.. he

Ad:n.lf.1!:'"1-T8.':.0r r1~· •l:p fc·d~·n.~ j\v:;,'.~') .. Agnr~·y lo .:~S'JC typn cert.ificatet:

for 2..""! re r 3...C+· q

I~ -·g OOOOUf) The statute authorizes and directs the FAA to set mininu.m st.sndards and regulat,:i_c:.,ns governing the issuance of type C·srtifica.tes, and requires the agency t<"' raake a finding th24:i ?ach aircraft co;,1p2.:l.t3s with

the regulations before a type -:ertificate is:ssued, In

authorized to prescribe "terms, conditions) ancl .li..'.11itations as &.::.·2

required in the interest cf safety. fl

Reg\1la tions re1a ting to the certification of jet t:can:3r :-i:1"ts ,~1'.'e con­

tained in Part l.ib of the Civil Air Regulations~ C8rtain of these n?gu.­ lati~ons are phrased in general terms as broad safety criteria> such as the ba3ic requirern8nts of speed control. . Other regula tior1s are more definitive and therefore more restrictive. In reg:.:i.rd t<:i cockpit configura tionJ the F'.AA has published. rules

rel::!.t.l.ng to f~pc,e:i.fi.c flight instrll.11ents !'equ.:ired and the maimer cf arra.ngement on the panel. Ther,:; are aJ;;o reguJ.. Htions dealing: with tl:e £1.ap 0etua.:,or and landing geac actuator contrD1s. The E'AA do.:::c. Hot

at teinpt to diet.ate every .~::::~t cf cockpit de.sign dm·i'rg develcpmt):n t arid type certification.

· Cert.:if:l.cation of t.oday 1 s jet transport involved 2. lengthy program of coordination between t11e i-.:::gulatory agency and the industry« rfhis I occ.urred during the development and initial manufacture of tile aj.rcraft. FAA approval of the ~ockpit configuration in todayi s jet transport I developed in the following 01"der: (1) The manufacturer applied fo::- a. type certificate approx"­ I rnately three or four years in advance of the anticii;.atc::d coinpletion date of the first aircraft. Shortly a.i'ter the appli­ cation. 1v.s.s madE;, the manufacturer and r'AA represent,atives r:t!::)i: in Preliminary TJ9e Certification Boards to discuss design .1.nd to

inspect the mock~.1.p prepared by the manufacturer. Test. programs I and methods of derno,:s+,rat.ing compliance with Ci'Til Ah· Regulations were discussed during t.h8se early meetings. I (2) Liaison between FAA and the manufacturer was maintained dur:i.ng the design phase. From time to ·time the FAA made I specific engineering inspe~tions of the partially completed cockpits and, when sufficient progress had been made, Preflight I ·Type Certification Doards met to determine Type Inspection Authorizations prior to the fir~t test flight.

- 7 - I 0 vvun" rl ..1 t o· (.3) During the f1:Lght test program,, :'epresen+,ati7es of the I manufacturer and the FAA participated ir1 Interim l'ype CertL:'ica- r,ion Boai'd meetings to dis0uss regul2 t,ory compl-1.an.c':;. Throughout tbE: flight test program FAA test pilots we:-e contin\.ially 12valuat- I ing the cockpit. configurai:.ion.

(L) Some four or five years and many thousands of ~')nglneering I

man-hours later, U-1e Final Type Certification Boar j 1-:-~et to :review the entire prograni from the ·rime of appl].cation through I all preliminary and interim activities up to and including flight and reliabilit~r tests. Following tl1e resolution of 811 I outstanding items to the satisfactio~ of the FAA, the type certificate was issued. I Section Jlh of the Federal Aviation Ac".:. of 1958 a1..:.th1Jr.L-:.P.s ~.he Ac'....rn]:r:.i.strato:;:> to delE:gatc certain of his pm:ers and du.:..i.e.s to pt·ivate perscns. Part ll3J of t.l1e regu1atic:::1s contains the procedur<:,3 1-'or I

cie::~:Lt;na t:Lng pri·.;·5te persons to exarni.ne ·' in.spe:::t; and ms t ah'cr<1ft.

Tf:.J,;:-; if3 generall:,r referred. ·:. o BEi the adesig.".lei:: i:-1rcgran:. 11 Desi gnatr:;d Engineering Representatives perfcrmed varief.JUS tests and. evaJ:u.atior...r:> di.ffing the t;y i:Je certification of the jet transports. I In discussions with representatives throughc·ut the industry, the Study Team found no instance where the FAA had improperly cert.ific:Pted I the cockpit configuration of today's jet transports. J. Variations of Turbojet Aircraft Cod':pits a. Size I 'I'be size of the current turbojet cockpits is practically t,fii;:: same as that of the military KC-13.5. In the B-707 this stemmed from I LvJci pcincipal factors: First_., the same en5ineer designed both the 1\C-·1j:) and the B·-707 ,~ Eiecond) the tooling was already e2tablished. I One of.' the reas'.Jns th:Ls same basic size was used in the CV·-880 and the DC·-8 was the air carriers 1 request for standardization where I possible. b. Layou!: Certain portions of the cor\.:pi t are laid out identically :i_n all I air carrier aircraft, in compliance with the Civil Air Regu1atio:is (see paragraph 2a. supra) . Howevc::r, there is much variation from carrier to carrier regarding placement of items n1.1t specifically con­ trolled by :r·egu.lation. For instance, some carriers positioned all I radio equipr1ent controls on the aft portion of the center pedestal_, wberf;as othE·rs placed them on the outboard fuselc-ige panel. 0QOQ1 l I. -8- LL, ~~=-2~J ~1k.:icJ.,_:::n,.:,/In~ident rte...:or~

.::r:dices I eil1ci. II tc, this re~)ort ccnt:::in a list of aircraft ac :i. ..

- L' i.~wol '.ri11b turbojet ai.rcraft. '!. ciJ.rb;.:;jet air carrier accidents failr:;d

720 > ::ind cockt~its. The objectives of cockpit standard·:.-

ability uf £1i7,ht creHs res~...:.l.ted j_n cockpi.t desi.g;"

III ::;:-';d. IV),

d~si;n of the curreDt L.lITbojet aircraft is the

rr:sul.t ol.' eve lu t~.. :::m based on prove:::-1 l-:nm·1ledge and e.z:perienc ~) toe

u. The 80 ,000-pound rlJle preventt?d industry-wide evr luot,i,::,n of

D ~110-rnan cockpit during t.he des:i.. g:n. of current je-u transpo~:.s" c. There is no feasible Hay for t.hf3 cockpir_, desi5n of pr·esently

ce::'.'tif'ic a ted jet transp ort.s to be adapated to 8 t:·JC'-r~1on

wi~hout com0lute modification thrc~gh redesigD .

•, ',:I - 000012 ·::.·.

regulatior:s .. Before Apr'il lL:;i l?L.~_, t~.::i :.:·~ig!~~ .... -:,rew JT1.1i-:.::.J11nn wa.s E::·tah··

1 lj.shed as that nUJ'1r·r'ff of perf:o:-. .r:. re::p.c:~':=ffy ·'"cir sa.:f; opi=-r2.+,,j_o.,.._ d Y"."::-:g !}3.Y

quirements basi::d c:'. th0 ::;;:~f 2ty of ::-:.~~

ooou l ;i - l r~ • Boa:td decided tha ti sirnila.'.'· requirements 1·.rere not nscE:::::sary f o~c scheiuleci.

don£stic operat:Lcns and that) with the na-;.i.ga.tioric..~ c:.:.ds c..nG ccimr.unic a­

tlons facilities avaiiable, the pilot did not re0i:~~ additio~al pr~f ~s­

si.onal h~lp i.r; the:::e areas. It vras no+ .. J i h=..t i11tr ;:; .. :·..:c.d.Gn 1:.f adva:.. c::;d

navj_gatioEal ec;_uipr!.ent nducsd thG rh::ce:.::;s5_'ty .:t'c.c a. ~~"s:ri6at:: 1: c,n r:JW~cs that previotJ.sly 2ec;uired cir:e.

The So a.rd ccncl.uded further that thf~ rr.ul ti.r.lic :. --:.c cf Lis t.:cu::-.sr_ :,c. "::..ic r.

lirn:'~ t e d t :n. e :s 2bility tc focui his atten~i0n GL a~l ci the ~ritical

instrument COEdi tj_cnc q The Board belieVE.:.'i that a ;:1~6ht snzi:n.ee2:~ W?..E

requi~~ect on ai.rc:raL:. o.f the sj_ze and cor:ipJ..exi -:::.:r of tr.>S .JougJ_a.2 DC ~6 2.~:id

Boeing 377; a.r1d t.hc.: under certRin opera-:-, ing ~c. ndi -:,jc.ns; such as "-:>.ZtE:::r.di::ci

o\rerwater flights ..i even a DC~L rn i..ght requ2.re a .flish: er:gin:-jer. The Board t.r-_ere.f ore ¥.;ended the oper3. ting reg-_:tl:=.tic:ns .?.f-'f;li;::: a.tl'::' to "

both i.nternationc.l and domestic operatior:3 to requ:_r.. -=: a flit:h'., en.g:3.!:r::::er c­

all ai1~craf: cer0iiica ted for more than cJ J 000 peii.;;.::-.J.~ ff,axi.,1,:.;1:1 ta.r:eof;: weight (B-377, L-OL9_, and DC-6) anti on all other .9.:::..r·2.~:3.ft cert.if.i.s~t~·d fo:.:·· more th.9.n 3J:,OOO pc:unds rr.az.irnum takeoff 1-:e:i.gl-'...t (JlC-1;.} 2.f 1,h-'.:: Aclr:·,:..n:i.s· ... r.s.tc,,:'

f ::nJ:Jd th~n~ des.it::n cf the=~ a:!.1·c:·:J.f t or the :.;ype of o;:.:ca.tio;~. ::-(=:qu2.:-cd.. ..:::'li.;)'. -:,

e':lgineer personnel for the suf e opera ti.on of the- c..:?_r-::ra.:~t. Tl'-:i.s ce.:;_~; :ii-:~ -

ment has remained in the regulations subs·::,antially u.:.changec.t s.ir..ce ;_-_, 1:!2.s originally p,eomu:Lgated.

On April 27 > 196Li:i the F12der::i.l Avj,aL:.. on 1~gf.rnc:,r > 11r.:ic:}·1 ·na:::; b:~r.::!'.

responsible for safety :cegulations sine':: the Federal ;.vii:ii:,ion .·,(; ~ _,.f l'.;158 .. w.ent into e::'.f cct, iss-;ied No ti co of f roposed RJl·:: I.:::i.k:i.r:i:; U.! -::::1. H.i ::.

notice pror:o.ses c.:,o eliminate the rni:indatory requirt::'ic-::t, fr)!'' 3 . .fli ~'!-

gineer on aircraft above Go ,OOO pounds cc.rt.ifj_catr::: J :J'ter J J.tr1acj _)

However J it will still be incumb1:mt on u-_e FiL-\ to ·Je-:er;;:i·1(; tr:c; ,·:i~~l:c,1X'. crew requi:--err.ent durir,.g the tY}Je certif.l.Lation of -cl·r.: aircraft, e'.:::ro .i1:

tlic: SOJOOO-pcund r~1lr~ i::;; f.d.i.1:iinutr.:J. Sec _,.1.or.:. ,720 of P~i.rl, l~b .. 1 f t:·;1 ..

- n - - ~ . r - - ,-, • J the appropl'~ 2. !- e c:: ;»:~,· :·,·:·; 1-;(::;'

2, V:iew:::. of th'"" T.-~-:_i·; ~r r .. _..,...__,_,_.._..._=.,_.,_.---.. ____,,,...,, ... ~- ... ~.-.-...... ___...._...... ;;,,.

opera.tio.r ~

qu8.stiored c, :'

indicatect

necessary h'J t :, :..Jpo-, si:.ronf~ irsis Lenee by a f oreigr~ (;1J ::tunt:::r; Gi J.

redesign the cocKp:i t for a two" pv:i.r opera tio~.•

b. Air Carr~e~s

The opera,tirY.s 1.::f tr.e rnoder'"' tl.lrho.!~~t trar:spon 1·.·"J_U-·. a :our-rn.ar: crev1 resulted from a rc:·:oh:t.ion ad·.1pr,nd hy a p::lor 'J;·"°!o"' 2.nd .i:-1:::::1uck-d

in the airlinr.:: co):;.,r2.ct:: 1.

rr·esence of thrr:;e p::.1ot~: -:.- tk:.c [l~ t- CI'':;h' o~~ ::;,·~c'.: ~irpJ2.:-.es, For

tho38 opera tors wl·.o h3.d e:::: t acl:i ::;b::cl a. po1 icy ~!u t t:-1e flicJ·, t 01-:[;.i ne(; r::

should be pilot O['ie~ Lccl ., Urn adopt::.. or~ of Lh is n:-201 ~l U on hacJ no of i oc G

on crow cornplemcLL For t,hose 1-Ji~') l': ::.d mccharLJ ~ ~1J r: o:: tcd flight er..g.:: :ree~·s; elirriinatcd ll1e fourth crew meir·ber and satisfied the unfon r8c.fuirerr:ent for tnree pilots on the flight cisck. Prac ticaJ.ly a11 air carr·ien; have r.D-r.v elinLino.ted the fourth rnan.

-~lJ carrit:i~s :Ln terviewr.:::d f ouci t:.~.c 80, OUO-pc1u.~10. n.J.1G ot,~ ec ·:_.icra.tl1~,

'l.'h,;y caiJ the crew ~umplm;1e~t shcnld be~ bas":U on cockpit 1,.Jc.'' 1 ~l__;a_J cJ..i:J comr~lez... ity. One carrier f·~lt tha:.:, i:.L(-; fiO,U00-·1::-·J1md rule mighl .J.Jv8:~·,_·.l /

::.11JJ.u 1~nc(:: }J.Coe;rsssi v.r..~ cockpit dc::::;igr.; in thci. t i I_. das11pcri::J inr:;::t1-:-.. ..i 1n:: i,o simpiify and automate tte coskpit.

:·hne o±:· the carriers believc:ci tLa.t re;ciproca:ti.ng-cngine: ;:[j_::~n·aJ 1·,

EO;; GOO-pound r·Jaximtur1 to.Y..eof f 1irei1Sh t.

;,Ics t carr lt:.:l'S o.grecd tho. t thE: cu.!.~rr::nt 3- 2 :d L~~r:.mgi..~1e tur·~ 'Jje t

tran.::;p1Jrt

to this opir:ioE vJEi.s c.;,.~f;.'..'Sssod by a fcr~;ign car·ri.er· tha.i. cuLS i.ni::::rcrJ r_,he

1 1:,hird m.::i.n suq~lus, In y:r0curing its DC-f3 ai.rpl<,n.es 1 :it plo.m1r::d i, ...; operati::; with a. t1-w-man cr'eVJ. Accordingly, the coekpi.t configi..;r2.tior·.

was .::·1.::desi6nc~ 1J to p0r;rd t. all con~i.~ols .:i ins trur:ents) s·t1H r;h•;s;, '=: ~ ':'

1 w:i th thu L:ZC cp ticn cf one s-:,1i tell and the el cc trica.1 ci .\~ ::::ui.t. bL::ai·~c; r , _9

00a. ts. Their cl:.:.e:f ob,jcc t,i 'r13 l1as to perm:i.t the airc1·0.f t tr:> be! Jp•:.r .:-. r,:;d. safely by oce p1:.!r:Jon from either seat. Tbis propo:·3ed opera.:ticr' was ri.o':, put into pra.c tice owing to lack of approval by the appropn.ate govern­ mental auth01;_i tieG.

c. Federal l~ ::ia tior~-~:;~z

FAA pe::r0r; nne1 r··;:.; pons::.blo fo'!:' the cer Lificci.tion oJ ':,:,r·a.n=·r.)c.rt a.~ r·~

cro.f t t~w op.Lnion that minimnm cn~w should be ba:c,ecl on c0d:p.i L complc:d. ty d.nd wod:luad ra tber than weight, The agency ha:_: propo;;cd 3uch a rule (page llJ supra). In th::.ir e:vC:J.11.;.::i, t::i.unJ

of a pro por;rc::d two-n:an cocKpi t, the philosophy aclv:Jctl '.~Gd wc.'J.ld rGc.1u.irc:

that ei the:r pilot be abl\:; to 01:;er,:ice the a.l.1'cJ·1Lt saf.'ly fron h.i 2

- 13 - UOOUlG thes~ pe~~ workl0ad period~.

T~---~,l ':; p.~ 2.C-) "':_ 0 ~·g ~ ·r~ 1 r2 .. ~ .~ 0 ... (-:~"~' :>? r ~d :,~ =- .: : r '.~.:~ W'=I ~· J.(l ::: ~,.d red~~:: :. -~ ().... .: : ,e~-, ~

this p.ilot c:·e-.a.':.izs.t :.o~" (~Zp~r-:;~::.(~d t':e v~i·::w ~r.c.~:. c·ori1.r,:1~.8X.~~,y ;:/ t-1-:.e

Ur.i ted States a: r t:ra.i..:.. 1.:· c.o ... u·o"l .c:yste::n re'JFires a ~r.'.l'ec~·

e,, E_'.l:i.gh t ~'lg:..ri~;:::_QE~~~!~~: O.>:i.e f lizh t:--e~;.gi.r eer orgs.:-:::...22. :io:; ird.'..c:.s. sed tr'.a t a. th::.rd crewman

was used or_ :::omr~ p:.-op~'~ lr::r'-dr:i.vr=-::-:. a::_.rc~·?. .:: ..... before ~1.<~optior Jf d•P

80 :,OOO~·pound rule. were to.:

(1) Mor_:. to1· ·trA sy.::~(~m? c.pc!"2.t.io"' :i-;.c1 '..ld:.:r:.g powi=irpla.~.. t::.

(2) AdjT:«' ':tee \'·<:?.r."..0:1.2 :=.y2.4:eP:::: c:.r.d puwer ~y- r,~:.c· ~.irpla:.8 .for

the most eco--.on::ica.1 t.ypc. D.~ .fl.ig<-~t. rer<:.i.:: those systems in .flight, and supervise and r::aKe .cer;;;i.irs :.:;n the srour.d subsE::quent to the flight.

The .f]_.ight engineers recorn1:~ended that the b()_,000-pulin:i rule be retaineci, and that transport aircraft uf less . th,an 60) 001) pounds be

re;;qu:L.re,i to carry a thr 1 ~e-man creH unless thi:::y conforrr~e,l -::,o certatr criteria.. The engj_neer..3 proposed criteria cc ...i.sisting of items e5sen t.i?..~J_y concerned with reduction of creu workload a.~-:d. :simpli fie:~. -

ti.on of cpera. tion. These i ter~1.::: are listed m Appendix IV. ':Iit:-. respect to the CaravelleJ tLe .flight e:igin.eers stated that

peaY. wo.rdoads du.ring takeoff a:nd landing j~Jstif'y the req1.1irernent for

T,ic).n of t.he .::.:..:·c1J.71s+:iances sL1rro~:tt1.dir.;s .its 2.doptio::i.• vfay Ha.s t~:a.t particu~ lar weight.. 5·~~ected? Indeed, why 1:.1as weight picb:.~d as the cr2. terio::i.? 'Th 0 post Wor·ld '.!=...~ II era. was a tine of grea.t change o.n.d developrner::.t in a ..ir transpor ta.ti.:.::., and the L.. --engj_ne traEsport.s bee a.me fr.e basic e:::p;.ip.::1e:1 L ::,f the majsr ai~ carriers. The operational problems related tc tte spocJfic aircraft u1 ·..:.se at the ti~1e; Le.:i the DC-4} DC~6 3 L-0Lt9~ and B-·377. Cor.-· sider:.l tion cf she operating requirements of those a.ircr2.ft res~d t.ed in a. det0rmiL..J. -::.i(,,:-, t~ca t. the DC·#·u did not re·::it~irr:' a .f1:i.ght engineer 8J'-d tl:.at t~:e other t.::-11'0.c ::.il'craft did. TracU.tionally, weight 'r.as been u::;ed a.s a. cr.i i:eLLor iE :he classifica. tion of a..~ .. ~'craft. Even today t.he ... reig~·~ ~ of

air.:r.::ift. Tne DC-·~. was certifj cated for approximately 70;iOOC po1mds and the other th::-ee aircraft were certificated for takecff at weights i.n excess of 80)000 po;.llJds. Therefore_, that weight was selected bt3cause .it repri:;~~ented a simple

Q11r preserit jet -;:,ransports are all certificated fo1· weig.hts at least twc or three r,j_mes greater than Go, CDO pounds. Thr2 Study Team found no in:i..ar1ce whe!'e the FAA issue::d exeriptions from t~ie u0,000-pcund rule in c ertif ica tir.5 the present jet transports. This L'ac t. must be vit.:wed a.ga:~n3 t,

the b:1Gkg·cow1..:i oi' the; tr<..u1si Lion from p1•opeller tc jut aircr.J.f ~,. Tho.r.'e wo.c; 000018 much higher ::p;;=;ed:.-.

those events ~~~·

wei.ght.

3."

o.f mini1;i',,;_11 ~'1.-'.. g ht.. :· r ~::1." ,

D , CREl{I[ DUT2:SS

1. Review 0~1ent~ Federal Jl3ia t.: o·~ R.0~:c.:l2.:.. c'-:,:: ;"r::T1;2.re ~::.::'~-.. ::.:.::r carr~ er to prep::.:>:e a.r:.rl.

crew members to a.c.::.ompl.isl-: f~'.1,_,·_r cL·

degree of safety~ OOUOlfl Duty as0isnments and res_r::onsibiliti8s outlinc:d .in this .rnanua.l are

cci.rrier 1s philoscphies, type cf opr::r;i,t:ion, a.nd operat,ior~al t:;xperi1~nce.

The.se proc13dures ar;o.e subject c,O revie1·.r and approval by the FAA.. None of the infcrma t.icr1 contained in t:.his .manual Iaa;y be contrary to regulat:lons 1 c.ipE:-ratinc; sp~cifications.~ or c.he operating certificate of the nir ca.rrier. A.pprG'Jal must be obtained .frur1 tLe FAA f·or :my crew d"i...lty assignments car.-· tai.neci i.r.. tl:is nHLUal. if sucb a.s:sig:;.Lrrients conflict with proced1:Lres esta.r­ l.i she'..! .i.~1 the FAA-·approved .Airplane Fl2.ght lfanual published by the ina;·~uf ac turer,

Crow fl_;.r:.c ti.ons arc; formila. ted du:::'icg c :J~k1_1.it planr_i.r:g a:c.a a.re veri..f.i cd

' est0.bJ.ish rsal.ist:i.c: crew ~t1J.J.y <".ssigrur1ento Sir.plificB.t-ion, 2.1.it.omatJ.on.1 iail·-safe n:dundancy..1 and irr;prcved rel:..a.bilii.,y of.· syste:n.:; &.~:.cl compor.ents reJu:::e pilot worklca.d rJ.nd tecome do.m.i::.ant factors: evrmtua.lly dlc ta t.i r1.r,; i.l~e opera. tioL0.1 1: row d1i t,y fnnc tions, Hegulatio.n:::; require con:.rc ls to bi:: of standard arrc;w.ge:n1Sr:t a.."1d appr:::ar­ a.nce, and so l.ocated as to 1Y~ s&.fely anJ eonvenie::J.tly oper·.'.3.tc~d w:i th nat·ural rnot:Lons_, unrestr:i.ctcd by coc~pj t s+.:,ructu.reo · If cre~·I •,;ork.load rec_1l.ires a flit:l-it •,;n3ineer·-' 2. fllgh t· .. eEgi:11.::er station ::.t: prov:i..ded .:i :=.:c l.:.iC-3.ted and

arranged that flight cre:w mernte.rs can r.. erform t:,heir .L~.r~c t.io::s ef'fi.cteY).tly

is establ:i511ed by the Fi\_A 1 ba3eJ on individual crew meml~er "IJOrklo,,...:.d con­

sidering contro 1 a.cces~:;ibili. ty a.nd eas8 of opera. t:ion. The mar:'Jfa.c turer)

in demons tr a ting compHance _, pi~epares a l.:i.st co1reririg e:veTy item in the

cockpit ;.1 a.nd dE:sign3. tes the crew member responsible for the opera ti on of each item.. During cockpit evaluations it must be detcrmi·1ed tha.t tlv:;se controls c2.n be 01Jur·ai,eJ a.s rsqui.r:EJd,

In Uie past, inf u1·mal t.,a::.k a.nalys1.:-:::. have been ;·,w:!.e t;~1 indi.v..:.d•1als

conn~c ted wi lh '3ar Ly desi.[i;n pha.ses, based 0~1 exp12rie·nce o Trxiay_, th(~ entire indu::;try is oxplor .i.nt; a more .form&.l human engineering tazk a:..-:o.ly:;_l.s _, utilizing both expcrirnental and proven scieM,ific rr:ethocis.

- l'l .. 000020 '',. [','.",'.'

1'

- ::. ,,. ~- ·,.... ~ . ··-'·- ' .. ~ ' t-). mm:i tor::,".g

and. mix-:. 1J.r'.: .:-:."

reduces tot~1 tte p 1):'.3t t:2.J. ~:y of .::_"',i:orrec: t e.rrterge.:..~y ac:+ ::o"ls 2.r•d the

This aircraf • is co~cur~e~ The assi~~m2~t o~ ere~ dJ~~G3 jn ~he nili~ary ve~~ior w~ll provide the

sion, the ~1aViQ:at.Lor ~ ~;)x·~.ic 1 ::s 'dill ~: 1_' i'.C'rrjd fo:~',.l.~rd .for ~.~or:.. rol hy tr1e pilots. 0 0 0 0 ~21 C8.ti\)n~: of the

pilot-or~~ented indivi.Ju~.:i.ls.:i if rrcper'lJ trained.1 could. perfo1Yl -che

:;;:.;:10_1_:c~c..':...l, anc:. ~ne opE::ra:L.iona.J r~i.J_ss::.on-" Lr-::,; flight test., rrrii.itar=··_..

J.ncl/:__. 1.· C1.:L1· carrj_er, ..:i.u. tu:: a tic sys tc;:·''.S .s.rid orx: ca tion.:::.l C':.ntrol s in:r) 1.1 c:i L:/

func

(:-'.'.) In.. Ir:ost ca~3es the pilot in cor,unc,md of a J.a.rge ci.v.il 2:::..rcra.:ft report a. relucta.nce to authorize mecham_cs or flight engiLeers to a.i,te:r1pt very much in the 1va.y of co.erecting malfunctions while in .flight.

(J) The:ce is sorr:e risk that further r11alfu.nc-t.fons )I oho rt circa.it::.' ;i etc,,

rr.a.J res-J.l t when a mechan5_..,_ or fb.ght engineer uses tools in an ar,~a wh0r·e complh:ated circuitry or mechar.isms of va.::·:ious EysLe:r:is a.rr:, in clcise p!.'oxir:1.i ty to ea.ch other, b. Air Carriers The rnaj orit.y of air ca:..~:ci€TS reported tha '.:, t.he manu.fa.c"turer

ini t..i.J.lly assiins crew duties~ These assignmP-nts rrmst be. approved by 000022 - 19 - ca.rr.iers oeL.~ :Lni ti.al

and handled coF1pa.:,y radio cornmunicat:or.s Whe~ t~~se air carriers reverted to a t1::ree-ma., fl ir;~ t c:r·e1,r complemer;.t) du t.i es o.f the f'o1Jrth man were rea::isigr.ed.. A:ir traffic corrurr~u11icat.io;.s were taker, ewer by the pilots and most ca1~ric:rs ass.ig_,"'!ed conpany c.:J.rnmU.r'i.cat.ions to the

flight ene;ineer., Generall~/,, the air carrier philosophies of crew performance f-3.ll into two catei,:;OY'il:S. ~)qe croup bel.ie're::> that :he crew should operate as a unit with each assigr.1nent. spelled c:'.Jt in detailed Hstandard opera­

tintS procedures. 11 Ii~ th 1 s cs.~:P. e::.i.:::·:: ·2r··'"\·r f.lember ~.s expected to accomplish his assi~r.··;j l;:;;~~-: 1.1 it'r.01.;~ •]c.;t_.:r:Lled direct:ion from the

- 2J - captain, The captain, huwever, is responsible for rr,cni tor.Lng the entire operation and the proper functioning of the crew. The cth'.:;;I' group believes that the captain has complete respons:_oility fo:- the

detailed direction cf the :2rew and that no c:cew r:-:emb-=r shoulci. p~rfurrn

any function v1i th0ut ::i direct Grder .t;rcm the capL..ain.

In all instances, U1e primary fnnct.ioris of flig[-~t are assigm:J to

the two pilots. The flight engineer is assigned fu~ctions not n3ces­

sary to primary flight control and do not require co:1tin 1J.(~d :-iilot monitoring. Host carriers indicated that the variou: fllght .:;egments are divided on a 50-50- basis between the captain sn~ the first officer. The pilot not handling the controls generally 2cc(lmp-:..ishe:s air traffic communications and navigation ,"1ssistanc8. All fligh:, crew members maint2in a i-rntch for other air traffic,, The air c:i1·::.·iers generally

r:5r2ed 1t.Jj_t,[1 'th'3 F;:..nrJ. .i.'actur·::.Ts t:1at in-fl:i.gd rr.aintF;.;-,,mce and r2p:dr i::: imp::·ast.ical 0.:1.d possioly unsafe.

Syst8niS cu~1p:l.•:;xity h:::s similarly elimfriaced rrwrq of the gr0uI1d

r:· ·~inter,ancG du.t,i:::.s .f ormerl;y assigned "to tne flig[J. t e.ngi!',~er, One

carrier, l101,iever, reported that it, relies heei·lil~':; or... the flight, engineer to eliminate maintenance delays. .Pe is

generation of turbojet aircraft, together with ina~cessi.bilHy and complexity of their sys terns_, has resulted in preflignt responsib:} lit;>r assignment to grounrl maintenance by most carriers, c. Feder2l Aviation Agency ------.___ .__.i:;;...____ _

The nur~beI!- of mechanical f ..mctions formerly performed by the flight engineer has been reduced in jet transpo:-ts. Tho numbe:i.' of d.uplic ate controlu and the at tend ant respc.msibili tie:s the ref or have I Leen reduced. In FAA 1 s opinion, the need for a flight engineer to have a mechanical background is far less important now than H was

I several years ago when he wss required to perform many e11gin~ control I functions in addition to monitoring ari maintenance. I I - 21 - During World War II and the late 19L.0 1 s airplanes had reached whc=lt I was then considered the z.enith in complexity. FM officials recalled that the feeling throughout industry 1rns that a third ;;re11 i':er;,bcr '•las

:.:eeded to monitor ~he multitude of engir:s j_nstrumei;:..s; to ::: t.::£' L and ... stop engines, preflight the aircraft, etc. They said the ::-:i_rlines werG aware that an accurat:...~, comprehensive repcrt on an engine mal­ function would save them money. Someone capable cf rr.unitorir,g the engine ·it.Snition analyzer could report minor m3lfunctions, thereby preventing major malfunctior.s.

FJ\A .Jffici.als expressed the opinion that imp1'oved equi.p:"H~;nt and proccdurEs have reduced crew workload. One problem that still eYists is th2t )f rc:dio communicat.iont> in t,he terminal areas. ,4t present,

fr·cqi..~,;n :. :;hanges i:1 radio freque11ci 1 ~s are requir 1.;d in ~,erm:~n:::..i. arc::.1s

)·ih•::·. t ;e r.·i:.i.ot.5' :::tt~nt)_on s'nouJ.d be directed to fl/ing tl1e ;;irplar.2

3 tirj •J. 1S8r 1.r-'L.r::.g tr-a ff ir::. (o;~siderable eff crt, is r,ow bt:i:1~; J.'... r·,::ch!u

'f!1e FAA does not permit flight engineer;:: to pe1·form ,;.1.·:.::'..md. r;,;-1inte-·

r:J)1C ~ unless they are specifically approved, possess an" A (:': '"'~ co::!'~i.ficate c:n.d so designated by name in the carrier 1 s maintenance rr.w:u·:_._. 1'[;·:~ I c 1rriers have been informed that pilots or flight 8n,;incc-rs so qu8Uf'ied c:.nd. designated may conduct or supervi- 2 correction of nwi11tenanrx~ I

pr<-• ~:~duru, d. l'i.5 li t,;Jry I ThG duL:ic:.; rissic1cd to t,he military flight enr,ineer (dcs:i.,£nated

part in that he is rr:;sµor1s.i ble for all mainten~rnce Cir;.(i refu~c:-.J:i.11.; d1 ... r·i:;._;

his assignment to an aircraft and; when a loadmaster .Ls r.h:.iL 'J "~~ilablc, I for tbe eorrt.:ct loading of the aircraft to conform to wei[Sht, arid b.:;lt:Jr,ce liwiLations. His in·-flight duties, however, are essentially compor.·able to those of the civilian flight engineer. Military transport crews are not usually assigned as a tmt t to fly together. The military emphasis, therefore, is placed n the s tandardiza ti on of individual crew duty assignmerits and tr a in.Lnt; Go assure safety in operations. I

e. Flight I~nginee."' OrganLrn t.io12 One flight engineer group reported that the present regu~~.at~.ons I :Jre 11 silent.. 11 with respect to the specific duties to be pcrf'ormi}rl h;y

- 22 - 000025 I the .flight er,gineer; that the capta.:;,.n 3 first officer·' disp,1 tcher: a.nd navigator duties are specified in the regulntiu11s.1 but. th.'3.t the fUght

engineer du ti.es are lsft to the d8te2rri.nation of the air c.~~r:~iers; conscquum.1yJ duty assignments dJ.ff er among the,. various c.ssriers. This group t"'.-1in.ks tLe. FAA, b;/ regulation) 2hould as3j_gn :::pecific duties to 1:..he third crew member. Th.i::.-3 r;rganizati.on further inciic::J.te;d that about 90 percent cf all

.crew duL.ies cr:mstst of monitoring U-1r-; ir:strwnentaticn; how2'r.::r, the

f'li t crcgi:neer does a conside:1 ab2.E: mnount of in-fLLgL.t troubleshoottr:g

to p.i.npc1.int 2.r..d/ or correct difi'ict:'.1_ .... -2s experie~:.ced during fligh to The grCivl-:. sta te.::i that there had bel=:r. a. number (Ji :.:is t::J.ri.c:es where

in-flight ~.Tc'.iblr:::sh:Jeiting was .f ea.eible.; pr-.imaril.y in -She autorr~. .s.ti c-,

c.:.~paL.ili. ty .. .f. Pilot On:rani sa tion --...----... ~------One JJilot organization reporte:d that the duties cf the fl.ight eng.ir.ef..'r ha:1c r:::Nc l•rcd fron f'.JCl-and-·engir..8 marragement a::.d maiLt8'"'.a.n-::c

lia.Lseir;. tr) ac +, • .... i +..y n~qutr.ing p ~loting ability ..

Thr; p-L lot-.:.:: SUPf,Dl~ ted their views with the proposition thc:. t each.

member of r~h~: c.ockr--i t must be aware of the pro bl.ems of fl.igh t. As ar:

(C:f0:c-:::ed to a :3i tuatioY: wherein on.e mecharLic-or~snted

£1::..gh t erigineer sh 1..: t off all engine puwer ·when the pilr) t re::p1~s ted

"tak~off fhvv:r:n Hhile atterr.pting a. 11 go-arour..do 11 Anothe.c ex.':3.!;jple .i'r~­

vol vea upc.:r'J. tiun :i.r:. hea'r.J ter·1r:inal traffic.. 'Whtl F.: the Li:::-::. L ·:>fficer· 1-ras wa tchirJ.g tra.ff i c:,, the captain flying the aircraft also di.: ected his o.tter: +:.ion out.side the cockpit to observe other traffic... During th.is tirn·.; a pilot-qualified flight engir:.eer notic""Jd that. the 2.irspeed

w;is beco:rr:.~.ng cl3.ngero11sly low and broug..l-i. t this mo. t te!" to the captain 1 s at ten ti 1m, This example was reported by the pilot group a::.: tnr:

:nanner- .in whlch ::i. _rJilot-ur ientr.:d second officer is bett.er c&.pable to ass.ist the ere!\'/ in major t.ermi.r:-:>l areas. J, Evaluatlun

Todo..yr s varinion.'3 ·.-Ji.t,hin th2 ind~1st.::y are f'::.1..; and. esse:;t.ioi.ll:r re.late

to du ti.os ')f the Lhi rd crew member. 00002() . 23 - fanctio~al mcck~pfo

duty re:i.u .. ~ re-rrP:-.~- s.

practice::. c., In 8.i.r r;arr~_PY' ope:-at~~O':~s, .~ligh~. 8.Cg.l..:-/2er d'.1t.y ::i.:=:::.:.gr.rr.!?r.~s C'{;."~ be

accornpli:::t:ed c:u:.cJ 2.Tc. tt?i~-:g p2i.Lr01ed :H.!:'ely l:y bof-1:-:. pilot..· !j,"d !'l'.'·2ha:·ti.c-

E, CRE1r QUALIFICATIONS

1. Revie~~Re~E:_~.!~ The q1.ial.ificaticn ar.cd t.ra.E::;ng req'Ji.remer.:ts r.ave teco~'Tle more s ::ri ngent owir.g to equipment soph.i s t"i::a. t::ior:- ~ ~ -:;_::re2.sec tra.ff'ic;; grea;t er speed:i ard

contir1uous efforts roi:,n,rd 1ower l an.:ii..ng :-;:.~l.ill'i'Jn<~ o

Flight crew qu2.l.L~·~ca.tiu;· 'i:lO ~; ·-..:'g rer:.... .:re:ne.::ts a.re regulat.::d by the Federal .h.viatior Ager..cy" Regc1E·

ai.rline transport rat..ing 2.:·J s.pr:''~r~1.::; r'\.11 0000~7 second-in-cor::.! '.·3.nd pilot.s r~,u::.t. h-')ld a C0!11.I:'·erci.al p.1-lot cer-'.:ifir:.2.te a.rd

progra..rn ~uS.f i1.;ient- to ir.'..sure that each flight 2.rew meLber i:.; ad':<;1.1 a tely traJ_ned to feLfo:crn. the duties to which he is as:.3~.~rn~d.. E:i.c'r. carrier is

properly qualj_f.ie:d int: Ll'lJctors. A s1J.Cfici.E:r..t riJ1r~itsr of che~t: 2j .;:-irr,E:_,_1'" are req1J.ired to con duet. fli[!:h t checks.,

the~ F26 E.r 2.l

r:.'.;;

pc;.rticuls.r cri HL ich L1::: .i ::~ to serve.

dernon::_;Lrate:; Li0 2.bil.i Ly :.o pilot and na.vigatf: airp:!..arJ;:.:; Jln-;.!T"!

After u~lf.:' -i_n.i. ~.i.:i.l ,3iz.-rrionth piJ.ot prof:i.ciency cher;l'.c) an 8.pproVE(;_ C•:li.!'cf; c:::

t.rain.i.r.g .ir1 al: a.ircraft simulatcr m~w be sub.sti.h:t,,eci a+:. ;-~lt.erna~:.t:' Eix~

cl.se ~he du t .Les and respons.ibili ties of pilo '::.~·5. :~-r:.ornrr~::md. d-1J.r .ing a. sch eG_l..:..led

fl:i.gr.t Lc~.uee:n te:·:rinah·. ovc::r a rcutn to 1.·it.icl, ~.e is i;o£;:1ally a.;:;(.:,igr~·~d. Ptli:Jts-in·,~Of'Jrtar~d a.rl:" 8.lso requi.red i~0 demonssr2.t0 ade.. ~u.1te krteWJF:dg·~ ot· a particular route prior to Gervice as pilo L·-:L.:.-c;ommand on th.:j,t r·o11te.,

Seconu-in-corr1mar:d pilots ViJ.st satisi'acto!".il~y demonsk3.4:e ab.Ll..:.ty to pilot and navigate the airplanes flown by them. Thereafter a p.i] ot pt'O·-:

f.iciency check :Ls req1J ired each J.c: )nonths. Sa t.i3fa.c to:1:-y ccir1ple. tion uf a"1 approved cour·se of trahri.ng .Ln an airplane=:: t:uJnulat.or may be: sd~su tut.(iri o,t

alterne.te 12--month j_rLtervals. All air carrier pilo-Ss ;11ust deinr;.:wtrat.:; capability Lo f1y by instruments each six mo;-1 t.hs" The i:..hird crew member utilized by some air cal'rie rs be.fc.re vlcrlri. Wac. II was a mechani8 whose primary respon.sib:Ll.i ty was ground maintenaricu. ThL'J mechanic also assisted the flight c.rew in the evalua.tiun of in-f1i.ght 000028 - 25 - eI.fecti''le valid , . :? ; ~-.

(a~ A~ le~~: 3 year~ ~f d~v0rsJi1Ad pr~ct:c1l exper~e~ce ~~ a·!J~~r''i.Jr ?._•d cS,lrCr.::.f ';'-€,-~;'<; !fl(,l•'t':':r,?,.-r'C ( ..:_t \,_,.Y.;.-J.(i';_ 3.t ~.f.'C2.2t 1 -:;rear ;:.:~-:: :>-. ~'::::t.1~-::.2.;r:.:.".'g ,.1..'..~ l'?'g:""<;· a.. :rcr2.::•_ w·. tf-, '~·"!.g:~·-;es ;·:ned ci.t h·;;::it o.<:. F)CJ.J h:rsop·:-ii.rc:.r e;c,,c-l1..1 or ~· .. r~ e:;_".l~v;:.,_;,<::..-t~ .·,..-: 1~'-:~·1:.,ir11:; pr.Ywo:::red 2.. ircra.ft') ;;.v.d 2.: ·122.:'. ~: 1 'c·_:r~ cf f1:g~:. rr=-;L·!...'.;'€-'.; .~! : .. L'.g:~~t

0 .f",,~· 1 ~Y r)r ::-"r'_·,rr-; r:~ ..-- g.~ ... lf.::= r:J.tecJ 2.t eng.,.r:eer er the. r-:,:;1J.: 't~d;;:-~ p::1 1 c~> '~ lea5t at 8GC hJr~ep~~er powered 3. i r'.Tc.f':.,

( L) Gr c.du J. t,:i o:·.. f :·r:m ;:, t 1 ::" :-·. o: +_ :C;. 2 · :f P':'.Y' ;: p~~('."..~ ~,.1 i zec! 2.c:: rc't8.r. ~- .i c ..:d tra.i"i.l.:-:·g CO'Jr:r~ ~-"' r--2.::..~«1>:•. ··: .•. ~lg .S;:r'.·:ra.f't. a,;·;j r-,,1:·c~-.-:.ti t:: ... f;.l:'f."~i (:Jf wh:~ch 8.l 101'.:t. 6 ::::alr::-:dri.r .7.:-·:·t 1 ·~2Yen:! i;"'- r.;:i.:c.i:::.. i:•.: ...... ~ T~· 1 !1Ue•-:.r-s:ine a;ircra~·t with er:g::.ne2 n.t,ed .:i.t: lea.::.: at 8C1n i--.or2epowPr c~ach. 1 or the eq1.;iv::J.lent in t\1;1:::.:.te~powered 8.::r~raft-) .. ;3_""d 1.t J.i::a~:.t S hc.urs of fli.ght tra.lr...:~g .L:.. Fl.~ght~ e~1gjr:eer du~ .. if';S 0rr. ;;1,:; rcr9.ft 'rri th four 01" more engi.'1"'j~, r::iJ.i:;d a.t lea.st a't Scc1 ~tc-rsepnHP.r ~·:j,cL 1 or th0 equi.vt!J er.t power j •· 1: ~:....-bir;E>p:iwered a.1 re r2. f't,, (c) A dr:·c;ree in a.ero:':-.'.! 1.. :c.:i.1) elr:r:::risa.l .. or nect.:Hl.l~d.1 eni:s::..:1eer~ ing from a re2cE~izeJ colluge~ ur17crsity~ or e~gine0ri~g school; aL leF1.s1 () c"J.le;1d3.r !'iOr''.l.iiS nf p1>t~:\.ic0.l uxp(~r~en 1 '.8 .ir) Jrta..i.:.La.ir~ir:g mul t.1 cr.g:'.. nc r-J. i rcr.1 ft ;.. r i '. ·~ r.ct~ r:J. t.nd ::i,t le:3.s t a.t (;>1]'.} hc1rsep 01er ea.ch_ or l~1C' 0-:p1iv.:-d·..:·L :~: ·Jrbin,c'.·powr.:n~d :.:dr(';rc.ti't; ::.ncl at least 5 ho1Jrs of fbght '.. rai:· ..rv ~n fl::r'.hl cv;e;'i:ieer d11t1.e-:: "JL air:::ra..ft 1 wit-h four or mc•re :·:c0 : r'-~ 1 .c·d 'J,\. lr:-a.:::t s,t 8(0 hcrs(~power eacr:j or the eqc;:i.va.li;-·r,'. y:o'1J.-~~· ·~:·t·.~;c~·pcwe~'.·"~d s.:rcraft.

• ?~; - ( d) At le&s t 200 hours of £1.i.ght tine 3.s piL: t :i.n commcuvi .• aircraft with four or more engines rated at least at Boo horse­ ::;.1u.1·(!l' each .1 or the eq1il v

·.ic.ien te:;d .ir:di.'Ji dual may apply for a .flight. enB:i.ncer' s cer cificate.

In a.ddi tic•!l 1 8.n a.pplica!1t is requi.red to pa.ss a w::i tten e.i: ..:...r;,i:uEd.J .':Jr·; r)D the fclloH:ing su.b.ject.3:

"(a) I'.he: p-c0v.LsLJns of the Civil Ail~ .tlegulatior;_s appl.icahle to

(d) l•;:.ithi.::~r:at:l.cc.~.1 c·J:r•P'J1,at.~crn of ~::ng:i.ne op:;:c:it:i.or:: 3.11Cl f~x;:

CGrtSi ;rr1pt.i Otl: ( e) Ba.sic meteoroJ.ogy vrl th .cespec t to engine cper'a.tions;

(.f) Airc.:'.':..{fLloading and center of gravity computation..~;;

( ,;_) Ge:1H:: cal a.'.c..cr;raft mairLtcnnnee and opera ting prcced~ire:s; a.:r:d.

c~~) p.:.~oced1ire3 .. ti

The applicant riuct 2..l.so pass a prac tice?,l f.oX.aJai.na.tio:'l J_n th.r:~ du t:i:c: ...: ")~

::;ynthetic LrJ.iner..,

FJ..i.t:f; t, r::LrJlntY:'~l'::j .i.n air carr:.1.;;r s01··,1.i.v: mi12t sat2.s:L::,ctGr.U.~/ c·::,rn1,1l-:.:" t,r:; the initial train:ing requirements outlined in CAR 40. 284J which ii n\...J.::iJ13 Urn follow.Lng: "(a) The appropriate provisions of the air carrier operations specj_fications and appror~riate 'provisions of the regulat] ons of this .sulJchapter wit:b particular emphasis on the operation ari.d dispatching rules and airplane opera, ting limi ta t:i.orn); ( b) Dispatch proc<:;')durcs and. r.tppropr.i.ate contents oi tho:: Ji1.J.0.ua ls;

( c) Tho du ti ,');J and responsibilities of crew members;

( d) The type of' a.irp1~ne to he flown;, induding a s Ludy of Lhe airplane) engines, al1 m3.jor components and s;:rstems ~ perJor;~tance l:ilr~itations, standJ.rd arid cr.:ergm1.cy onerating proced·u.n:;~3;i and appropriate contents of t,ho approved Airplane Flib1·it Manual~;

- 2'l - 000030 i; ~LU I :_:.

nef.(U ~2. L ·~ o'·::: t.r3.i'..lirg

of a quali.:.:·_ 0 d : ;

to b8 ~P~~~~~~~+cd ~~ - :.. ·::? r .~-:--'-" ~ : -:::· :: J 6 .... Irl(•:':.t;'-'c pc;r: ~-c. l~(· i-'. J'.::.?"". .~. ~· fligt+ e~~~~PPr ~- G,:.rp 2 =· .,-:p. C.~. ":·T~t.::.~ ~.. 1r~·; .~-: ' 1J ·::;c, T '.! ~; C. r ;!.. -.:_ t }--1.c r~; zed rep:-85~~~- t. ~. ~,.-~."fl'"8 ·,__··!" r .'r <.:~ A6:-r .. ~_.::·:~~K;D ·, e.::g.~:-,e·::x ;c.d d"?t.e.:.r:-:2...:-~ecl t:'.-.:i.t 1~.i: .fa.rr1ib;'.!" w_:_J.•, ?.Jl ,.,,r:;:~_r+:: (;';~-Y'f3.'."_ ... , :'.r.!cr:1i·J::_or~ c:.rd r·pr::;it. 1 ,-2.. ~:.rc- 1 csdur8:: -; P2..-?,t t 'J ~)-, ~~~r-;;·~ ·-:E r:,._'_.~ p~.a.::-'.'? l-" wt-1.:_:~1 e ._,.:: t_'J l''?

1 1 1 d.S :.:ri.f;: eu rrr' .d : = ;-, O!npc: ~ :. :-~. p ~.. r.::t ':-'.. :.- ·= ~ p~ ct +,Q .~· .. :--·}~_ .i.~ rp 1 P. ~~ (? ll T~·~ .. :.. ~ ~ ~:.'::: ::- k sl:~ll ~-~·~.r:l·:d(· :. :-~·~c. .-.~~ ~-~ ~~1 .. !G>.: ~ P!~0v:·.d.i::>d_, Th9.~, ~ :--. ti-~.1~ c :t:=l .... {*\:~ ?, flight- C';'·.g'2..n.r~er ,,,-~10 h::L'· ':Jr"e'-" prPV.~O'Jfly '~~J?.l.:f.:.ed ;n t'.:r:· t T_O"" ::.,~ r~, plan

T, ~ (' -- T..i ·'"""~: a recitatio:"'_ r_•.f. b2,::::·_, rc~g~::!.at::iry re'~.1~.:.reme:rJ_::::- .• F"~.rt'.-.e2:·.-' the c!t~+.~r-:-:- r1f

flight eLgi':'".!.c'_:r::: 1:~·::.gI'-.r::d to e2,:~!J typ.:: jet trancport. op':;r2.t.1;d 1:-y e':.-:::1.;, ajr

'l'he FAJ~ has es t::ibl~sh:::.d :,;., tifl.l gh 1J Ope rs. i:..i.o '.le· Eva2.·~J2.t:':.ci.:·L Boa.rd 11 f0i~ ee.cn type of jet tri'l:~pcr+: to pr:.:•v2Jc, J<:d·1~try·-·W:i.de g~1i.de:lirPs .for ~;:r;e: · cont8r.t: of these manuals ..

0000 ~~t a. Marrc. ..facturers

'D:c r:a.:~nfacture::-'s we1e :i.r. agreement that either .:~ n:ecLani.c= oriente:i c.:.:-· pi.l•Jt-orient:.;d flight engin·~er is capa~;J.e, :.:if perf.c.rrrLi!.-~g ... tLe E.~t;ht~engi.neer Ju:.ies ,_~qually well and witl1 E:L'}_ui·valE;::tt. saf2!y_,

prov.i.J.·:-d ;_-,_<:'; iE properly trained 2.:'."1d propsrly moti_'.rated •

.:-:. ,3, re;::.11.lt cf t!::e pilo t>~gr·:.mp :ceso 11.;.t_ .... rer~~.i.i.::·:Lng ·c.h:::'3e }'Jllr_, t.-

q;...:d..l~f j ed crew members 0.:1 a.11 +,'J.rooje:t aire;raft;; a.ll :::::.hed:.:.JtSd

carr.::·:::r::: c!perc.tj_:Qg jet eqtnprri.er..t are undergoing tra~rnLtio·:... to p.i::!..o~·­

~;1.JaL~.iE.i fligbr engi. 1.:sersn Different .rr,ethods 1Jf. acccirr1pli.st-·.. i::-:.g tr.j3

tra~:~: t:L:.ir:. hav0 hser~ enploy-ed by va:::-'iou.s a.irl.lnes. Ea.c}1 2.J:rl:Lr.:.t:;:;

engi::.·.:.>ers. Most. ca.rr::..srs have established qualif.ica ti·-:::1s :·or .~Lew::.y

;:;y~es :r~c~uir:..ng a ccr1une:.:·c.ial pi.lot certiX:5..r::atr.; w.i.th a:c im, t.rJ.ment, rating,, These carriers then t.::'ain the:: Eew p.ilot,s tc b::

fl ::. er:.gJ neers. One probl.ef.1 in the trans:i tion .from £1::.gh t -~~·~g:i.r..::.t·r

nv~c't:.:J.T1.ic-uLi..er!ted_, ic- the. maximum age at whic.h the individua.Js re.:ri:;j_.!; adap• able t,o such trar... s:i tiono

Th..<:> :i.lr carriers e.xpres.sing a preference for pilot- orie~1ted

i'lir;:• t engi.:~eer.s repor Led adequa t8 performance of the flight·r i::cgirL8er d'J.t:i·::is and the additional benefits of operational 9-nd in.capa.citatio:.i.

bac}~jp, T~'tet>e ca.rrir;r::, also firmly believe the flight~.engi:r1eer

:.=; tr1.:ion p;::i)Vides an excellent trair.ing pla tforrn for progre;:33J.on t.c

co_F.ilot 2.r_d cap ~ai.~Q

Those aJ_r carriers that do not provide company-owned rna.i~·,t.ena,'1.ce

facilities ~hroughout their sy~tems reported that they pref~r

·- 29 - capta.i_.:-,_, ::i.:c; +-: havirg cr_'.p:...:.. ..

enginePr prov~d,:-d te ::.s prr.p:;~ly rrntt-Jat.ed.1 traJ.:'."<:'clJ .:wci q~L1.'~:.L~.ed. 1 Operations ~'eqairif'.g grou.ncl main~,e.:::ar..ce a~ c.i7~. t ..ies ry i,:i,8 .i'ligh t' crew'°

reqyire 2. special. rna.ir:ter..2.:--.e:e qJJal:ficatioYJ.•

d. Mi~~ tary Military transpo1~t cpel'ati.ons C'Jrrently reo_uir.i:-:g ;::;, tt~ird .Gi.gh t. crew member have re~a.~ ne-Jd th,r: ::crew c:."'..ief 11 '.'"~O~'.~.sp-t.o The d1Jti.'.:'.:: of this. individual irvol ve e"!'(l1;~~d rno.::r:t.i=>r:3.r~.ce 2..'.~.d rur.n:.::..:'8 rnocr;an_:i_r,

qual.ificatior..s. e. F li~h t Er..13ir..s~Q2::£i~~~!~~D

')f\ ro thP .f]

D."1d t, Thf:y ::oa..i ci tr.a+_ rr,r.:r•:; sa.J::ety .is provided by the !llf"l'hP.n.1 C -0r.i e;_::-,cl fl.Lghi. C'."\:;i:"'eer' S detailed 'mdersta.nding of the a.i cl' r2.i.' t. :·;y::_: t ,~r.~" wh.l '.:°f-i e...-:•c.:.b} F~ h.i.rr: to a.·;ccrnp.L.~:;h ii:.~f'li,gh t repairs.

d:'...::c rr-?p.:i..r:r:-.ies b grntu:d rr:a.int8rance p'rsonr.·el. provi.des a higher degree

r" ~~L~::~Q2:f2I.:.2:~!.:!:.'.~:E: Tr«:J r.::.1 -~ o<:-. C:'f.:C:..r:.i.z :-.. ti·::;·,: :-1.e:;;_r:_,...i rc.fr,r:'i:-:d to :::rew imcs.pac.i tatJ.on and

1 Ji.J l-.hcYi 1:;·r1 rr:ai:~y rpi ~.~.nr:.E> b.r1.vP bee~1 express,::::d t1-.rongh the years with rE"spect. tci thP re1a:-i 1 1c~ S:3.l"'t:I n ..f.' rJpf'":.r'3.t.i.o:"2.E '.1!-.:i.1.:'.z.2..":.tg 3. pilot-·oriented vs. a ffiPchqrJ.c~·od e: t eJ !:L.f~h t eng.·i. 1 ~jeer; c_u.r 5 tlJ.dy cLid Y".0t. d.i.sctose aJT'f differ~

1 ence :i.r.. t.h 0 r>?.lati.7e safety oi .:J~.e.:.:.r per.:or.ma.nce c'.f .7-n~E1 ight f1ight­ engir.eer cl'JtiJ::f J pr:::.·.r.i.ded ea.er.. 'l.ndi·ridual is pr0perl;-{ t.cairi.ed.

A rev~ F;'r' o!: t 1.J1-0oj i:,t, ;:i,cc.idents did r1ot revea1 a~w probable cause directly a+trj.bur~d to i~adequate crew ~uallfl~aliu~sn

J.i..., r.or:c1U'.: ~or.;, 0rierta.t.~o,: 1 nJ l:"ie tl; .. rd crew me1r,b•~rJ w~~ethc·r p1 !.<.li:. or mecha.n.ii..;, has not cornprorrt1.:::f'd the ~"'.:i. .fe perfo:1rt,?.r:cf'. i:.i.~ as;::igr.ed !u7'::: t,i_o~~s:; provided that the cr0w mF>mr'er ~s hlly- qualif.ied a:r_d crew d.iscipl.:.r.e .is ma.1.ntainedo

... 31 .. U" '"'',, AIR CA?..RIER ACCIDEirrS ArJALYZED FiJI\ PFR.I0D JANUA_qy l; 1959 - 0EPTSK3ER. 10.1 1963 TURBOJET AIR '.2RAFT

id.rc.ra.f t,

The inattEnticn of t~~ tc· the progr•::ss cf the flight> cLll'ing the absenc~ 0f the Captain from the ~•c:l-::;_-.::j_-;:,_, fcl~Lcvving the i1:voJ.'JJ:tcn·y d.:':.sengagen~i::rrc of the au topi lc·t . Contributing ~ac~crs; (1) Autopilot c1-.l·sengage r,;arning light in th1:; diJri posi~io~. (2) ~a2h tri~ switch in th1· ., of.[! 1 posi tiorL.

Boeing 707 Pilot fa_ 1c::::d T~o rn.c:dntain fly:ing S"f.'•C:E-d d'..:ring a r:·.rc"engir:e mJ.n:iir,t.un contrcl speed mc:i.~1e 1 _1ve:··

E·:.. "=: l ~~Ld: Lg d r,!_d - :r.lct fj~~ ~ -r:,,i en r~

7/12/)9 'T(J; iai lur.:-:; of tr;s forw::ord i:!'.'uct:: t.sa:'' c.f the lef-: 2-2r-.ding gc::ar.

(l) A hard land1ng, wnich r0s~l~~d i~ &: high bcl.:1c 2 .J c e:1J.sE~c.1 by llr.pr up'.::'.°' leindir:g fl2reo 1Jt techniq1JP., ( 2 i F'a2.h1.ri::- cf t hs Captai '": t.c r_:zr.:- cu:::·..::: 3dsquatF.:: s·. .::pc-r'risi on ovc;r the Y.::.::E ": (;ff1cer,

0/1)/59 ':h:: c!..~ew: s f2-.:_ 11_tri:: to n=:r:.•Jgnizr:~ and correct the developreent of exc8~sive ye;,1 whj.ch r;a11sc:d 2n i.mint-ent~:..onal rolling m3n~uver a~ bn al~Jtule tos low i:.(; pt:: r:"ll t ccmpl·~~t;:~ :re.:cryvc;ry,

11/26/59 Bor3.Lng ~(07 Lrnproper flight sirpervi s:i on and planning by carrier's dispatcher office.

2/7/60 Boein8 707 ( J.) Improperly executed HS approar:::h , ( 2) lnadeq'.Jate super-vision by \..he Gapt.;·in,

000035 S/9/60 Boeing 70'7 J\ poc-rlj' c l:d·.~cted :~r~str:.1~'1'~?-!1~ Gpprua2b neces~~itat. r~~ a g\]-2!"0 1 ~Ed h;t-:::·~ ~\:c:s ini ti.; t.ed .:'('\ ..!..ate a ~-:d ~I'l1;~" r.:·~ .:: ~---1_:): 8_":e.:i._1 t~ ed

5/12/60 ·i.':_:~., C"'i.11e l18e iJ: :,1 i ~:tr~·~ f '.)>?.::>:~~::.cl: t':~; th2"c· ·~.op c.i:' i'3 ~c:~"·;;:~·:ra-·::;:.~ 1 :: =-~·~~r-::·:~:.c:·1 eind ~ ZOL.e 1-;f "'/e:ct.~'~dl 1~r:_nd ~

5/21.i/60 Douglas DC~8

6/11.i/60 Douglas DC-8 Inabi~ j of tr1e pi.lJt to ma:.ntain dire c ~J~ x~a 1 ccntrol ca:Jsed ty f a.ilu:ce of the No. L reverse mecha~i~~.

6/19/60 Boeing 707 Insdvertent act~a~iG~ of ~b~ stabilizer :::rin sv1i":~ch. tc the fi.:11 n

7/3/(~::; DougLrn DC-8 1 g~ ~~~~;_-:r.~~~ ~: 2~;~!~'.~~;) to cc:rv:ply wi t.h ·3 eat ~·eJ t 3 ~ §/L ~1nd t {~e c Ci~c\·~_z:. ?.tt enda;rts to insL

'0/25/60 Boeing 707 Failure of t.hL~ nose g::ar t ·:) 2.xi~eri.d f ,Ji' reason.:;: 1J.ndetermined,

12/4/60 Boeing 720 (1) Inflight tu:b:1lence" (~2) Inadeqi.rnte p::-··~c;-:i;.rtion p;·iCJl- t•) enter-· ing an a:--ea o:pcssible. t-..rrb::le?::,ce.

12/16/60 Douglas DC-8 United Pl::..ght 826 pToceed2d bsyc:'.ld :::J,s clearance 1i'7:-'d and the ccnf.i;;e5 0f the airspace allocated to the .fEg(1c by J\:i.r « Traffic Contro~ " Contributing I actor: The high ratf:: •Jf speed of the United DC-8 ns it :-;)pl'C)ached the Pre:3t,on Lnter­ section; coup1ed with the cbangs of clearance which reduced the en route distance along Victo.:' 123 by approxi~ mately 11 miles.

1/9/61. Boeing '"07 Inflight engine fi"!'.'e eaused by Mater-ial failure of the No. 1 fuel mc.nifold ,,

1/28/61 Boeing 707 A loss of control for an undetermined reason,

2/15/61 Boeing 707 (1) Failu.::·e cf tbe in,j•:.1·ed persons to ccmply wi.th the ::fasten seat beltll reque~n.. ~ 2) rr~ ..f'J.ight turbulence.

APPENDIX I - P ap;e 2 oooo~~G Dat.<2 Aircraft,

:2/2)/61 Boeing 720 Pilot rds j'Jdged d1L·~i v:.s the approdch resul:ing i:-i a hard 2..:::nding snort of the r-.:nHay,

3/26/61 Boeing 107 Pj.~l-YL misj11dsGd fl2r2:i1..i.\ :.E1d ±'3.i_l·:~(i tc maintsi~ ads·q_i.:.a~.e ,:.;i ·::peed (est:.l-1:.ing ir, a hari J.ar:.C1.i::-~g Eh 1:1 t :;f th.s rm:.'·J3y,,

')/17 /61 Convair 880 I-~alft:~:.2tion :·f -j:0 ·11J.::. 2 ,:;,r,gj_r,-;:: .start.er syst.e 1 .tor 211 t.:::ld.st""'~~.) nc;d r::ason"

G'/""' .Lb, , /'' /.)~ Cor.vair 880 LJialf:.:1·1c1:.icr.;. o:·· ·:J:e e:·r~rf;t: ncy ::id.1:~ oi tl.-:-..i::- frJt:.e ge2r a-:ergt:r.:y 1::rv::nc.io:r1 val~'?. c=iused by· ei::, ~~.:-~".:. ui i:::~e:1anc•? ::o:! rj.ng pack:.ng,

7 /11/61 Douglas Dc ... 8 n:.e e:s;;n1'.: tr ~c tl~rus t -.. ;hie\:) du;··.:. ng a h,y-dra'.::..~_ic· E:?Ti8rgecsy) :-es~:}_~·.sd fl'' lh~ 1~-:-. '.\jd::J s-~.l·::::::t,e·.i. f ,~.:,n:.~·j.'c~1~.ir:~ f a:t·~.:-_'' W<'J3 ·~ 1.·;c fail·.::_:: 1.- "-i'if.c f i.r·.:,,i, Off i c.:i:::r_, t :.1 _... ~c}Li.t 1)1' t.t·.:: ·u-; r ~:c r ~;-\,.~. :: .. :::. ~~-:

1 i.ndi :: 21, o~( l.i F;l:-.: :-3 \;·:~ ("-:-:-_ -

?/24/61 Doug1Gs DC~8 Inflight engine fire :a~s~d by ~~terial faj_l-,;r·e Df '.:.t:.e No ;~ ::opi;H?.C: l:.Jra':': 1':d ~ o:i...nL of the f-:.rnl r11ard.i old -::1:.:s ·t,,~r .

7/';.'9/61 Boeing 70'( (1) l.~properl.y .3xec;_r::sd epp::ca.:~.:·: artd 1 1 level (;ff by tbe fir:::, :. ff i.cE c and imp'rcper :r:t::c:)ve;:y fl'c~·1 tt-~c: :.-f.~ ~nltaxF_, bo1mced lar:.dj.ng by tr~~ Gnpt.a:.n .. (2) l:nadeq1_;_a~--e su.ppr,-::s.~c:-:.1 hy 1;ne Captain.

e/u/61 Boeing 720B ( 1) Inf1..ight t 11rb1~ ~-·.=::.:: e , ')) Tr ·r+~ -r ,.; ~ .~-.l ''."T ( C::. .1...;,drd eq1ld1,tj-, \jcJ'\)L_:_,,.. C} r-=la...,iv·3 to ti;rtule1yi::: ..

9/16/61 Douglas DC-8 (1) Cnwanted s:·1:ymetr:.cal reverse t:l-:.rust resulting from maJ.fm::c t,-::_on of the .i'Tos., .3 and 4 reverse!'S cau.se•i by the d.et.12riorated condition of tt.e 1i0 11 ring se.::il i.n. the

Nos" 3 and 4 reve:.:: se c:jector val.ves o

Boeing 'r ?OB 1'he Cap t.3in 1s decisi':!1 +,o 1and in variable v~eatr:er conhtions precluding ad•.;quate orientation !'ela t::. Vb to location along the ·t~Jnway.

10/11/61 ·Boeing 720 Imprc:.pc:: aecuri ty of thi:· c owl.ir!g at tacrur.ents folloi·Jing maj_nt~:-1ance inspection.,

APPENDH I 000037 ...... -- -- -·-- -

Te.rnpo:r ary d~fcr~_':":ation ci: . h<- " ::,:) st,r~i-: Boeing 707 10/20/6: packii.:; i·ings ;:<::r:titL;~~ ::o di'::2':-:..::irge cf hydraulic :·1·.::-.:;.ci en -:_.\(.;:- ·,-' ci'7 . : ;::~'.P asse:"'1bli ss -

J30e.Lng 720E Gil s~arvat~on Jf t~e

-~~~~" ci·~~~~-~;; ;~~ stt~~ii'~-~.~·~r: c ~I~~~- ~:·r:~.~~~~-~:~~d -:;·ear r.·1t and t:~e fJVEr::-c~=- ::::d::..?'1f:' 3~1d 5:mt·seq_Llent di:: 1 nt2 gr at ior:, nf the ~- >; -p: r=;- :: ..... r'."' t crl,-_nE~ c::e-cti:ir:,

(1) Faib.:::'e of H:.e pi.lc.:·3 of sach aircraft <- £::'. J o __l l •)/r c/' to mainta:l.!1 s1:fficient -_,.-:;,_::rna1 :·efe1'0rw0 to the ot.her 1 s aircraft. 2nd alter co-:J1se to

0 assure avoidance of r£a:: -::.·) 11: ;iun,

Pi.lot :'."nisjudgPd diftanC'e ar.d ·cndi=:.rshot i/26/e2 Boeing 720B d·uring 1anc:::.ng,

Engine fail1.ir::; cau:::ed t7 ~::.tc ::at:..g-,1r;:-~ ?/l/62 Boeing 720 f,siJi.:.re of tt'.~·";E -t.h.:;.;:'cl '."tat_;E· U·:"'p:~e%OT' b1ades,

(1) J:1dgment ::f th·2 Car:·;_.·:;-;,.r. ir: ~r_.it,i_..s·.':r.g landing ·,.md<:!r the ex~~s-::J.r.:.g n.:r:.-t1ay and surface:; vJind cocditic~':.~~, ( 2) Excessj_ve speed at ~- ::-·'.:Chd::;;.m and imp:::'oper minh:n.i.n1 dis tar:ce st nppj_ng te chni 1ue . (3) Unfavorat1.e brak2_ng r:..mw ..::;r cond.:.tions.

Boeing 707/123B Rudder cont.:tc:!_ syst0:~1 !TialfJ..:nc;:ion prc:di;cing 3/1/62 yaw, .side sllp and ·.:c·ll le::idi,;'.g to .s los:s of contr::>l ·fro!11 wr~:.ct r"?.cove-::y wa.::: n,-)t, effective.

Douglas DC-8 An irrlproperly executed gc--ar.:r_..:-1a r esu1ting 4/7/62 in an undetect,ed descer:.t and !'GsuE,ant wheels up to-;lchdowL er: the r 1;_nway.,

Boeing 707-321 (1) Pilot misjld.ged di:-.:tance a:1d undershot 1-i/27/62 during landing. ( 2) Inadequate supervision by cbe Captain.

Boeing 707-124 Disintegrating force of a dynamite 5/22/62 explosion which occu:rrad to the :eight ruar lavatory, resulting in destruction of the aircraft,

6/.iLj62 Douglas DC-8 (1) Failill'i?. of the crew to Dnticipate turtu1ence and turn on the nrasten seat belt'1 ~Jign.

000038 APPEtIDIX I - Poge 4 Date Aircraft Prcb!3ble cause

6/1)/62 Boeing 707-121 Failure of the pi.lots cf both c:irc;naft to observe tl:e otber au·c;raft in T1iI'.:2 to avoid the necessity of an extreme c:::~llisio:n-ev.ssive J..sne11

8/20/62 Boeing 720 Pilot mis judged ~iat.ance and 11r:.de:rsr::)t d"-r:i.ng landing.,

9/11/62 Caravelle ?ailure of the ri.ght, n

9/n/62 Boeing 720 Pi.let mis j11dged leve1

9/2J/62 Boeing 720 Faib.n: 0£· V-;e Captab -to ":.ab.:: ti!flely t"'.l.rb 1..;.ler1ce fl:.ght pre cc:ot.i on.3::-y mec:t3i.1I'8S 2..:~ an a:::·ea r)f rsporied v.u-~·AJ.'=:1ce .

1 .1.1/l j/(~:2 ;.: c:'...d~;Et 51:,:i, ::_}_ i..lY d~~.r ~! ·7,::.,~ ~:} §'.'"·c_~ r [I , (:'biG ac;::'...d.2;;.-i:-.. cccr• .::T:-c· .:...:-1 a '~·:~ 1 :>:.gn e: 0unl.r7 .s~·:d t;ii·8 Boa rr.l ~- :· ai.!a l ":,J,g ~.1·~1.:., i sst:dLC (; ·;f a 2.-eport ~? t;(·;r_:. r~ ::~~n·1~r y i:--nOlVed ;:.-.. ef on~ p 1J't'.•J ...!.;:,f::i._[lg CJ 1 rr_:,por•T_,,)

1/1/63 Conv2ir eeo IrifEgl:lt f a.iLnj rJf the nc2e ::-:wl tE:·n3ir:,11. 2-at.ch"

l/14/63 Douglas DC-8 (1) ~·laterial fai~urE. of t.hs lc::::t lar"--'1.ir:g gear str"Jt cylir~der du:ri.ng lar.di :-1g .. (2) .Inadec;_'.:;.8"7:E 0Vf;Yf;a'~l ar.d r)'rr::::"hcnl inspe:tion of the landing gea~ &ZS8~Lly.

l./22/63 D'·'Jglas DC ~S Fail~re of th~ pilots ta SP8 t~~ other!a si.rcrait in :..ime to a','-:-,.id .:rn e/asi·18 maneuver,

J/2S/6J :Soeinl:£ 707 I.nfligt:t t 11.r.b1Jlsr,':r::- d ;__:- i.cg ras.:agr; r .::hlfoen cl.uud b:JD.dups ,

5/27/63 Caravelle In.flight turbulence, 6/23/63 Douglas DC-8 Clear=air turbu12nce., F a.Uu.:"e of the pilots to initiate ti:rne1y penetrat.frm p:cocedul'es in an area of f orcca.s t clear~· a:!.r t1rrbulr:mce,

6/28/63 Boeing 707B Tnfligbt turbulcn::·e. F8i.l'Jrc:: of .!~1o;ne passengers 1:,0 corriply w::. tt1 thi:~ Cf'f3W f 3 i:r,...i :,1·ucticins,

oooo~n APPENDIX I - Page S Date Aircrar l. 2/13/63 Boeing 707-321 Aircraft encountered turbulence with inadeq·..ia te C)ppo:rtuJ1~ ty to complete t1J2~bulence preparatio::t prnced·rrss under .the exL:ni1:.g c:. rc.11r.:s+ anct->~

8/21/63 Douglas DC-8 Pi.lots fa -.'..le:d to a~ S'c:I E '.:.~·~e J..andi ng gFar i;,;as ex.tended pr:.·~.y- t.8 L'.3ndbi.ngo L1a,120:_,.::ite s~1pervisi.cn 1J.f. fl:_g~:~ by U:.e Captain,

9/10/63 Boeing 707/_:31 Pilots o~ N7 05PA ~~sjudged clearan~e distance ch-:.ring t axj . C:'wo eiircr aft involved.)

000040 APPENDIX I ·· Page 6 2/7/S;.

2/26/59 ::-:-:,:_:.bL~~· .':er:ar::tt:.cn cf t\~;'"' ~:~~: ~l(:>2s .::f .:c--_:::;elJge ski!i during h~:i gb speed leVt2: flight -

L/26/59 Eoe:=..ng

7/ll.d59 Tn-f:jght seµara~icn ~ t~0 rigct o·,.. ~:. C: :;rd fer fldr~ l~l ... 1r:_r:g ~2n,i.:.::.r ai:p~··~a::h ..

7/24/59 Boeing 7CJ7 In-f .2..igl:t. cepara t.icr.. of & por'.:.ior. c: left ·.·1~1:.g fillet d~..:r .ing svep left o:-.ui~n a: r:.~ gr~ indic2ted a::'~rspeea.

8/26/59 Boeing 707 ln-~-l2-ght 5'sparatior1 ci tbe rigl:: o-.:t. boa:!'d. fo:-sflap irr.ir:edic:itely foaowJ.11e; rota~ion d'Jing takeoff ..

I' 9I 2/55t Convai.:-- 580 Gear fai.!:-irg~ sera~~a-t:ed d·w-ing .355 k~wt ext.:::~:.s i ·Jn .

11/7/59 Left nose w'.-~eel :::E-pc;ratt:d fro~t the r..q:;;c: wheel assembly d.1..::-ing J.anchng

11/21/59: .Aire~· aft pitc:hed up:..iard f c•llm;ing act.uati.on 0.f -:.he a'..:.top1 lot p1.tct. c.ontrolle.r to a cl.L"T1.b attitude.

1/5/60 DC-8 Fou:c' rear tires deflc;ted duri ":!!;:". period of pract~ce. take-offs and la~ciings.

1/11/60 Boeing 707 In~flight separa~i0n cf the 10ft wing durr.p :: hut.e and at t.2 ...:lE!1g door,

1/11/60 Boeing 7D7 Aircnft pitched violcni:.ly up'.;·aro into a steep nose·-up at_,t-::.i.t'Jd8 dur:ng iinal approach .for land: r:.g ..

3/19/60 Boeing 707 In-flight separation of t.br; f:-eon door" APPENDIX II - Pat_:;e l 000041 Date Aircraft 3/30/60 l~ft rear Main t~res ~e~e def:3ted d ·.rr~ng landi!'.g £0 J_-::..01;:_ r:.; _ f: yd~'B ·;lie cy::-tr:':'.'"!. ~;~a1Ju.r:c~ io::"

)4/16/60 Boeing 707 S/5/6o Boeing 707 f 1)r-:."i.cn .:,f engi::e ::-·01·.~:=-~g ~,:.·:. r:~,~ l e!·tgint: st.·p2:--med :.r-. ,.::..:'..sh~ 2r_d

S/29/60 Convair 280 No , L. ~r"g1 TIP pod :. :. :--~, k r ·~!-:•,: ay d ~~:..;:-"ing la.r.di :'lg

6/19/60 Boeing 7CJ7 In-fI:igh~~. sepc;ration Jf Uif: l<::i't dump chi.Ate,

1 6/20/60 Boeing 707 Airc:ra.f· • :. truck pc-:.·wJ"'...i!1E- d1;,.r·ing lc:Jnding 1~ppr )ach,

7/1L/6o B•)eing No::" _'. .:1nd L i:~ngi ~:-~e ~:ids ::t::"udc the rJ.nway d'..:.ring la~d::r:!.g.

10/2/60 Boeing l\i7 ~1.:_ ... .ci::.gr1 1: fire i~cs. :·. ;:.,;::.d Li ·~:.gines during cl.i:ri.b to aJ.·:.:,i • 1.:.r::e.

10/26/60 DC-8 Prec.a·'..ltL·mary 1ar..d ~.r:.g f 012.c'",,Jing an in·~flight fG.ili.:re of t~~ t.ydrauLc system"

11/11/60 Boeing 707 12/2/60' Boeing 707 Routine :nspeckor~ d:::-::_!lg +....-c.:rn aro1md r8•real0d da:rrtage to t~.e f"..'..se1age .skin around the ::.c3e ~ect::.0,·1"

12/17/60 Boeing 707 A:.rcr aft -reered 0~ f r1r:.way dur ir~g landing and str.;.c k s:J.cM': anlc

Following take-cf.: ee:~·J experieor.ced 2/2/61 Bo~ing 707 fire warning,, investigation rEvealP-d fire da:nnge Ho. 3 engi:1e"

2/8/61 Boeing 707 Ancraft veered to lefi:::. during '!Jake=<:·ff run and st1• 1Jck snowban...!.c

3/J/61 Boeing 707- Nose gear wheel s:n1Jbbe!:"' brake f.:3iled tvnen landing gear was 1.owered

3/7/61 Boeing 707 Fire No. 2 engine iY:."":lediately following take-off.

3/13/61 Boeing 720 Aircraft nosed up suddenly when ,::roto­ pilot was engaged.

000042 Date Aircraft - J/16/61 Boeing 707 In-flight electrical fire in lavatory. J/18/t:.1 DC-8 In-flight eleGtricaJ_ fire in cock~i~ i'ollow:hg t.:.~:..:. -off·' J/21/61 Boeing 707 Left dump clmte SfYtJrrated frorr: a:Lrcraf t :i.n~fligb.t, 3/26/61 Boeing 707 Tubing to se~t le~ in cabin area failed in·-flight ,,

J/28/61 DC-·6 Hydraulic press 1.1re wr:s lost durir:g taxi to unloading :::·riz .'[-'. J/3fJ/61 Convair 880 Fire in No .. 2 e~tginc:: following t0~1chdown. 4/18/61 DC-8 :F';:mlty rheostat trc;nsformer c aus

00004.] 'Iypi:: of kc~dr:;n>:....._ Date Aircraft __ ,..,_,___,.,... ___ ,,.,_,,.,.,. ___ 6/17/61 Eoeing 707 Shortly ;;fter t2~:>::: -o~·:·· ~lo, 2 er;.6lne fire ~arning light ca~0 s~- Fire was E::cinfT.:.j.:::·:ed d: .Landir.€,

6/21/61 DC-8 Loss of hydraultc fL~:d C::" hyd:-aulJ.r.: p·.ur,p st·H:1~-t Gar l•:::c k ":·f:al.

6/21/61 nc .. -8 T.sh;-.. Jff was a·:.c1:'ted (1.-._,e ~~-, ;~.. :.::lf-.JJ.'H.:tic.n- 2.ng airspeed.

6/2?/61 Boeing ?')'{" Following a fuel LLO'·: m.:::i".L.Lnct:ia.n Nc1. 2 engine·' engine Ha.s ::l: tit dc:~·m in•fligh c.

7/2/61 DC-8 In-flight hydra:;lic failuYe

7/r:./6"'1 ,I .L Convair eeo 7/10/61 Boeing

7/12/61 1JC-8 A:r c .raf"'... veer·~~d cf J' :'.,ffr,1D;:/ d. •zirig land.-:.ng f oll.c11.iing an in-i':~ig~; ' .. :· <":-3il1..:.r-c.:· of hydr.:.u::Lc syste;;-1.

7/12/61 DC··S In-flight hydr au2.i (', :~:a l±'ur.~ ti c-r:..

7/16/61 Boeing 707 Ai:.."craft struck by 1.igh~~nb~· ·:. f: b ght.

7/20/61 Boeing 707 In ~flight. brbulencf~

7/28/61 Convair 880 Hydraulic sys~e~ malfunc+~cn.

7/29/61 DC-8 Aircraft, ran off i::nd of runvrq du_r:i ng landing ..

7/29/61' DC-6

8/1/61 Boeing 720 In~flight fire.

) . 3/3/61 Boeing 707 Hijacked - tires c.sflated t.:y g·cin fi:::·e to prevent take ··oi:f,

8/l~/61 DC-8 In-f.light fire No., J engine" 8/8/61 Boeing 707 Fire in No. 1 engine - engine was shut down.

8/16/61 DC-8 Hydraulic system malfunction during flight.

00004'1 Date ------.Aircraft 2/16/61 Boeing 707 Hydrc:ralic syst.ern ma li U!"'~s ti on"

8/19/6J nr, _.:, H~rdr~nJ.ic Y!nlfunr,tion during fli.f~ht, 8/2G/61 Corwair 880 Touched down sn.ort CJf rJ.mJ::.y, \; 9/10/61 Boetng 720 '\lfin?oard ri~ht front E1'e d·dlated ·.bring landing.

Hydr'aulic malfunction d"Jring flight .. '.J /17 /61 DC-6 Hydraulic malfmJ.ction dllring flight, ')/17/61 DC-.(: Hydraulic malfunction during fligr/:... :;/Yi/fl,. LC _l DC-·3

9/27/61 DC--3 'l'ou.chdmm sbcr't cf r·u:;frrny during lending,

·:i /J0/61 B(~.:-~ir..s 720

JU/J/6=1.. )j.~)r:: :_ _:-· .. E -(07

10/1/61 JJr_:--;:!.:

Fire in :\ro , L~ e r:gi ne . Da;r:2 ge to ~JJ;1 . 1111~]. \) - Bot::ing 707 cowl end wing,,

10/17/61 DC-3 Hydraulic m.:;1function during flight,, 10/20/61 Bo•::ing 707 Hydraulic f11Jid d.:.,s cha:rgf~d from tbf.: low~r area of the righ~ main landing gBar oleo. Fire in the area of No. 7 and e whe•J ls '

10/29/61 Bc.o;ing 720 Jn-·flight fire,

11/l..i/61 Boeing 720 Tire deflcited during tal<:eoff. n/n/61 DC-8 No. 4 engine mGlf~uctijn aft8r take· of i' .

11/29/61 Convair 880 Ran off runway during landing. '. 12/2/61 Bceing 707 In-· flight failure inbeard attachment, of fore flap,

12/lJ/61 Boeing 720 Ground collision between aircraft, 12/16/61 DC-8 Anti-icing malfuncticn aft8r takeoff.

12/27/61 DC·-8 R.ight. landing gear malfunctlnn dur··ing extension. 000045 Date -----Aircraft 1/2/62 Convai!' LSC l/?_/62 Boei.n~ 72c

~L/8/62 DC-·13

Le:: wi r:g ::= t.~'-.:'..:)\ .c;::c,'.;..:-.C. e'11;i_Lp::nsnt 1/9/62 IH.>8 d·:.:r~.r~~ :a:c_

Tires dsfla:Ed tl;1r~ng landing. 1/11/62 DG .. .S Aborted take~of f ~nen ~eft rear outboard Bc.eing 707 i/1S/62 :.::.. r'3 d,::,flat.ed

Starter veh~clp rol~ed 1nto aircraft. 1/16/62 Convair Ei°r'

1/2G/62 DC-.fj Skidded .--,.:.: ~-.. n:.~ 0;3=,r !:! ;.:;-::..ng or:1)!'t8d Conv.::i::x 1/22/62 takF::u.f ·'.'.

1/26/62 Eoei.;16

Boeing 7C'7 :'::. n~ Ne·' ' r~r:g~ ::~e d1_;_;:"2.r:g r8VET'3:i.r1g on 1/27/62 laEd::.ng.

Boeing 7Ci7 ln·fEgh.t :'a: l.....::'.'.:'e o[ st.-in .fro;-1 1/29/62 hc:rizor:-+_.al st,a':li li zer .

~n 4 ±:Egt·;t. f211'8re -c8·tt Nr;. J engine 1/29/62 Boeing 7Cf( : ·Ti r:ng.

l/Jl/62 Boeing 720 A~rc~8fS ~as taxied c~f taxiway. 2/5/62 · f:ic,e:I ng 720 In-.f Hght bydrauL.c malfLmc ti on.

r; 7;~0 '· /7 ;r-r;...,...... _ Boeir:g 2/9/62 Boeing 7!J7

'),_ /2·1-'-/ /60 c_ Boeing 720

Boeing 707 Right nain t"iI·es deflated dm·ing 2/214/62 landin1!, - tb::-l;,st reversers failed t..:> opi::rate,

Boeing 707 Aircraft ~etCT·ned to point of takeoff 2/25/62 when left o~tboard spJiler 0xtended.

2/25/62 Boeing 720 N~. 3 Hngine shut down in flight due tic> v1 brar..i:_c,n:.

00004f> Date Aircrof:_

~.ight gear cuter r.ylinder failed ~i 1 1r ~~ng t :_ixi ..

2/28/62 Cor._"'/J.ir .~(~() ,,,~;. 2 c:s1·1-ling separated during landing

2/2<~/62 DC- I'oudv::: 1J. dowr" short of ruri•..:ay cl;uing -~8.!'";d i i:g.

Boe :~ng T~7 Ir:-f light turh;.l ence.

Aborted ta}-.eoff run following unusuc..l ·ri bratior:..

3/l(_';/t2 1;0. 4 E:ng1ne 1Jod strucl'~ runway duri:1g

~-I

~:~:~.er£~~(~r.c:/ ·~(::.nding fc.J~}J . ... ~ :·~ r:- r~ ',:; c~:T) i ~.:, ~

Lc.r~dbl en i'oBmecl ru.r.w2.:.r :,.,ri tj·~ ::-1csr:: gr::~1r .ret:ractsd~

L&nding gear truck f&iled .

.AcJCJrt<.::d tPJ.:.E::of'f f'cllc'tling '.'ire ·110.rning G~: ~To. li en.~,ine.

De ....~~ ?!0. 1+ engine· flamed out durir,~: lar:cLing.

i:/1l,/G2 He,:::_ 3 and 1,. engine r;c:id:~ strnck r1;·.r,•:1a.y u·1r icg l..s~rid i1-1g,

) .. /I (i/(/.;' Sta.tic durin~~ cle:3cent-. •I J / ~ c.. Boeing 7~?'J discharge

Li /?0 /1 ~,;~ :Jo:.~,, 3 .~r:d L cng"l.Le J.1'.:.c~_s strL~c:Y: ru!-:.~d:1:/ 1 d·Hing lar.ding.

4/30/G2 Hard lr.Lnding.

~·/ 1l1/62 DC-8 Fire No~ 2 ene;ine during tak~off'.

Doe i ng 707 Fire in C lavatory while t;l.arbng ene;inrc.:s.

l )/l')')/(,r~ C.....J ,_,(,_ DC-EJ Encountered hail and tircbu l.ence !:it: 2(_;,, GOO feet.

~/Jl/62 Boeing 720 Risht fillet flap failed to retract following takecff.

APPEl"n)IX II ·- Page 7 00004? )ate Hrcra.f t ·--~- S/l.J,./62 DC·~S S/S/62 Convair 9'?i'.J Firt:: in lJG. L eng"i..ne cr-1 t.aksoff, 6/17 /62 Boeing 707 6/24/62 Convair 990 S:-noke ~L.~1. co ckp:i.t. 6/29/62 Boeing 720 Pr8cau~ionary land~ng - loEs of ~ydra 1 J.lic p:'"t:2::'u'2.

7/1/62 Boeing 7C7 Nc1, LL i::-:-1girlr:: ~-:,n1lcde.d follo't1ir1g ~.:,akr:

7/5/62 Boeing 707 Left main gea:o f a~lsd d·.1r::_ng taxi, ?/11/62 DC·-8 Hard landir..g .. 7/23/62 Bceing 7?0

7/2h/62 b 1,...;r:~1ng 7?0 e;J/62 BC:e:i r,g 7r:•7 8/12/62 DC-8 .Airr.!:'af+. wa:; lclnd.;:,d, c,r; airpe:rt 10 miles east of inteno.r~d 2.lrpori,,

8/14/62 Boei!1g 7?0 In ·flight tydra:~2-ic malfonction, 8/19/62 Boeing 720 Prr-:ca 11tionary landing - Ho, 1 e!1gjne :rn.aliunct::...cn,

8/27/62 Boeing 720 In-flight engine reverssl. 9/6/62 Boei.ng 707 Right !'1ain gf:ar b"Jngee asssrribly 9/12/62 DC·~8 ;nalf~.mction,

..~ 11/J/62 B0.'i1.; 707 Veered c1ff p;m:ay du.ring landi.ng, 11/11/62 Boeing 720 No. 4 c~wling damaged in flight. 11/17/62 Boe:rng 720 Nose wheel dam.aged d'J_ring aborted takeoff.

11/18/62 Boeing 720 Loading ramp collapsod and struck wing~ 12/1/62 Boeing ?20 PrecautirJn2ry lar,d'ing - fire warning No 2 cng:ine

12/J/62 DC-8 n J:J :yE'! •-:ind of w:t runway onto overrun, 12/5/62 Convair 880 Unable +,o trim aircraft, in flight. 000048 uaL>e 11..Ll v.L a.Lu

12/7/62 Boeing 720 Grou'.ld collision between aircraft,

12/10/62 Boeing 720 Aborted takeoff run following bird ingestior~ ..

12/~~6/62 Convair 990 Tires dmnag,:-;cl d. 1J.ring lar1ding, " 12/29/62 DC~S Right gear malfunct::'Lon after· tcikeoJf) resulting in precauticmary landing.

1/4/63 Boe:Lng 707 Nose gear door fell oft during takeoff , 1/14/63 Boeing 720 In-flight loss of ai.r conditioning dor):r,

~/J0/6J Convair eso Ge~ff malf1mction while t.axij_ng ..

2/15/6.3 Boeing 707 Seat ~aught fire en roi.1te,

'! /~:o/6 3 Con-J.sir 9)0

4 gPBC ')].,...._ /'J'\/f.._t_.. 1-',,., "<, B.::,0:irJg 72U Hec.2p of ·cin.; on ifo, 6 .:.~, r()a~.n i: [H;le ~)ff ..

1 : • /1~/C J c .:.r1'./ Si i.:.'

J/L/6J Boi::dng 707 Struck approach ligh~a dering IIS. 3/10/63 Boeing 707 In~-flight, t.urbulence .. -j/2J/6J Boeing 720 Engine fin;: Ho, J enginG after f i.r =t power reduction.

J/27/63 Convciir 990 .Asymmetry of tlaps di...:.:'ing de.scenL L/4/6J Boeing '{20 !Jo. L er.gine pod struck g::.'7o"t:nd d~~"'.Lng landing.

L/H~/63 Boeing 707 In--flight t'Jrb~1lence,

L Ir f7 i/~:> F0,J -. Bue int; 720 In-flight; n.r"3 Nu, 2 •3ngim~ .,

4/26/63 Cor~.vaic 880 Takeoff aborted after tire. f a:Ll11Yes on nose gear. 5/1/63 Convair 880 Fire warn1ng No. Li engine on takeoff. 5/6/63 DC-8 Bird strike during descent. 5/1Li/6J DC-U In-·flight turbulence. 5/18/63 DC-8 Struck j8Gp during t

6/18/63 DC~·8 6/19/63 Boeing {2C)

6/2!..J./63 DC~r3 7/8/63 Joei.ng 707 7/12/63 Convc;ir 8C18

7/12/63 Boeing 720 Lo ..;s )f ~'· .'. :::i t.lJCle f'Yp':'rienct::d d 1~:rir;g tU!'b•.J.ence,

7/15/63 BoeinE; 7n7

7/25/63 Boeing 707 Veered off r~.mway after re1 rer:;e thrust.

7/2r:./63 Boeing 720 No. 3 fire warning en route,

7/26/6.3 Boeing 7 ~"J

PjR/'-~ 1 ..J ·.>; O_, Convair 9)0 1:-f't :nai.n g'::'2'' d or:.:r pa:· .:, l~{ ·:,p~'nc:"d ·in f:U.ght ..

9/l/63 Boetnr; 7:J7

( 9/4/63 DC-8 Collided w~th truck while ~az~ing, 9/5/63 DC-8 9/10/63 Boeing720 Smoke in cabin en route.

9 /Jli/6.3 DC-8 L.re u1 Ho. 3 engine aJ te::~ lancl.lng,

9/15/63 Boeing 720 Hard landrng.

9/18/63 DC-8 'Tires bln1.·n1 during landing.

9/28/63 Convair 880 No, 1 eng:..ne pod struck runway during J.ar .. cU ng, .. 9/23/63 Boeing 707 Collided with loader during departure taxi.

A- 9/29/63 DC-8 Lost hydranlic fluid in fl.tght"

10/l~/63 Boeing 707 Cowling came off duTing takeoff.

10/20/63 Boeing 720 fire shut down on No,, 2 engine during taxi,

10/26/63 Convair 990 Loss of hydraulic fluid and i=::lectric 7 tr ."".,

10/27/63 Boeing Fn f:: .L--:. cabin during taxi for taker)ff

0000~)0 Date ----i~J.rcrar!:, 11/4/63 DC-.. 8 11/S/63 Boeing 720 Fire No. 3 t:ngine after takeoff, 11/6/6-J Bceing 707 11/7/63 Boeing 70? lhncr elect.:-ical g~lley .:J..re ir1 flj_ght ..

11/7 /63 DC-·8 Fire hJa:e.ning lJo. l e.i:gins dw:ing f Eg1·:~ ...

l l../21/63 DC 8 No. J engj_ne mal.f1mcti0n durtng ta.kec.f:

Bc10ing 720 Explosion i ,-~ No. ·'+ t:!1gine dl ro11te •

i.2./ J0/63 Bo13ing 720

DC-8

1 failure:. oC Jef t la:'lding g7-;;r rl ·.:..~'"i.r.t, i.· /10/c.:. Dc~.ing 707 ~:Jl1 rnL ,,

E(, 1::· 1 r15 71j7

E~:•:-~ Lg

Ir.JTLgbt t·:;:bulencs, 1hi/f4.i--/,, •..J Bcr;_ir:.g 707

l /12/64 DC-e l/U/6L Cr_;nva ir eso Vibration .i.n tail d~~in.g fEgh t" l/1-8/6h DC-E3 l/JS/64 Ev!di.ng 707 l/lb/6L p,:::,..:.·ing 720 lnflight turbulence,

i./c'CJ/61~ Boeing 707 Fire warning 113 engi!1e .tn fb gbt,

Fir-;;; in engine. du.rin~: cli.Jnb" l/"'). '-{_. /f.1_,.~ DC-8 //h 2/J/64 Boeing 70'7 Struck power unit d!..:.ring start, ;. 2/li/61.i, Boeing 707 Turbulence on approach for land.i.ng., 2'/11/64 Boeing 707 Hydra:tlic leeik and control malfunction dtiring flight,

2/13/6h DC-8 Cnmpressor failure 113 engine du.ring cliJTib. 2/15/64 Boeing 707 Bird strike duri.ng fligl1';, ·' 2/17/64 D(>8 Fire warning #3 engine during n i.ght ., 3/5/64 Boeing 707 Fire in lavatory during flightO OO () 51 7 Stabilizer jam"'ll.ed c:n takeoff - 3/6/SL1 Boeing 70 3/7/64 Boeir:g 7?0 !f.3 compressor f ailc·cl -.n flig'."'~t., 3/9 164 Boe:i.r:g 7?0B

_,·~to J.., I /6L ! ·Boeirig 72DB 3/11/6h DC-8 .Split flao " no fldp 1 andi::~~. 3/14/64 Boeir.g 707 .J/2o/6L. Boeing 727 ThrEE tires deflated d1.rr1ng -,.;:ikeoff. Fire warning #h e1:gLr.e di..r·~_r.g -takeoff. 3/2h/64 Boeing 7l'.O 4/1/6L. DC-8 No. ~i eng~ ne ::n.alf1..:..;.:ctior: af:er ·take ciff. 4/h/61~ Boeing 720 1412/6h Boe:i:ig 707 h/30/6!.i Boeing 727 5/5/64 DC··2 S/12/6L. Convair 99C1 Rapid decorrlp:ression. HuddE:r control rnalfr:nc t.i.·Jn ::n f lighL 5/25/6L~ Boeing 720 )/27/64 Boeing 720 Fire warning #4 e.ngi.ne Er:: :·cru.te, 5/30/64 Boeing 727 No" 3 engJ.ne rnalf:1nction d.:=ing takeoff, 6/9/64 Boeing 707 laxi collision with ano~~er aircraft during departure.

6/10/64 Convair 880 Taxi collision w~~th anotJ1e-::- aircraft during departure.

6/18/64 Boeing 720 Tires failed durbg taxi. 6/26/64 DC-8 . Touched down short of runway during landing.

7/1/64 Boeing 727 Left flap came off during landing ,

000052 APPENDIX II - Page 12 AS PF.ESENTED BY THE PILO'r ORGANIZA.1.rION

( 1) Ab:._rnlutely no req_uired in-flight pa·per work in cockpit• With onl.y two c.:.~ew memhe:rs only one set of eyes can be outside of c0ckpi t at all t1mes due to other pilot monitoring instruments. • fJ (ei.) Other means a.re presently available for recording pertinent nperational data.

( b) l·~ ,) PAA requirement exists fer log btJok ent.rif -i excerJt r,o wri.te u~ discrepancies, which· can be donP, at end oi' flight,

,~~ .1 No con~-:an/ J:·o.dio contd.ct:::; excerJt in cme:rw~ncy or a.t pilots' disc:te-Lic1rL

(:J..) '~J1~2se i:~alls of~~e1;1 ·~!ome at a tim.e \!hen ei.rery avaj.. lable r!Je sb.r):.1},el r.ie 011~;i:: icie of co·~:kl'Ji t for tr1;.ff :.c..

( '1) ·~'hese call.s compct:tnd the communicat.i.omi workload w:i.thm~1.t cc.. <'i.t:ri·­ ·._:,...: Ling to the safety of the flight.

( 3) A. properly funcHoning auto-pilot a,nd approach coupler must· be a no~go item.

(a) Auto-pLLots that function properly would free man~ time for t::r.J.fftc and instrument scanning.

(b) Auto·-pilot would help reduce the fatigue factor of a two-man crew.

(4) Hon.-essential ATC position reports and radio contacts must be eliminated.

(u) With trans-pond.e1·s and radar-following, a major portion of posi tj on reports are unnecessary.

(°'o) Position reports require one pilot to take time for 'checking of fl:i..ght plan, charts and bis using the radio instead of monituring; the fUght.

( 5) Dog h::g airways should be eliminated.

(a) 'l'r:e resetting of.' numbers into cockpit navigational .equipment and t.!~e use of charts to obtain th~se numbers take eyes a.way from flight monitoring.

(b) En :route clea,rances over other than dire~t routes shou.ld not be used except tor apeoitio trattic 1epar&tion.

000053 ( 6) Simplified- strip navigation charts must be developed.

(a) :.·.1e '-L~t; o:::: ·twc o:c more char-.:;s on flight,s cf less ~h2.:-1 2c..: ::.ile;3, ... \Jr a:.cample, ~.s anothe:i.4 dietra.c-1;ing influence on fligh-.: e::.;.G. traffic monitoring.

(o) ~;·,_1r this type operation, the use of a single chart t'or t;ach route ·:·.~gment is a munt. \ (7) On-dut/ and flJ.f!)lt time must be ·reduced (especially a.fter midn.i.Ght).

(a) rj.\ro crew mem·cers,, who are reaching a point of fattgue d1 .... e -co long duty houxs) wi 11 not be adequa.-ce to monitor both traffic and fUt;ht, especially in high density areas.

(li) The gTeater number of approaches and departures 'Wi1:h -che ~;:;,2.ll, short range jet~; will increase the -workloac1 and result in mc/r e f;;i.tigue to itf; flight crew,

(8) ?er:fo·1.ma.nce ;fa.ta rrn.::.st be q_uj_ckly and accurately readable and ir: sir:-.:;_;lif:i.~c. fC)l'Ill.J

(a) rrhe ui:ie and. fonrw.t of the present charts ar~d/or graph.s · reqU:.1'ed too much time and they are subject to misinterpretation.

(b) With only two crew members, the charts as presently used prevent adequate monitoring of flight instruments and traffic..

( 9) Adequate training for handling of emergencies.

~(a) Procedures trainers sn0uld be used extenGively.

(b) With only two pilots all emergencies should be handled 1rithout h~ving to refer to manuals, etc.

(c) Ground school instruction should take.this into consideration.

(d) Cabin attendants must be adequately trained and capable of rumdli:ng all emergen~ies in the cabin area.

(10) Cockpit layout and' systems design must be such that all in-Hight emergency procedures can be completed by either pilot without leartng· bis seat.

APPEND.I.A. III - . Pag). 2 00005tl " .• :,:; :'.~ ..st :;,-: i11·:JVdcd. to t:,ive the I-:.J.._ot positive anti ins"'..:.ar::.fi1~c!C.\.i~~ ··,· .. ~·r.i1~:'.': cf L;ss 07'. th.ru.st :m. a..'1 eq;:i.r.e.

I S. . hi th e'.:"lgi.ncs mounted ~.n -;:;he :f\rnelee;e neB..l- -.~he center.l:i,;-.<.~ o:' tiie air:plan~, lcs b of thrust :.s net i.mrr.ed.iately. U..J.);ia1·em, to tl:.e pi lot since he e:A.'})eriences little or no yawing '"..:i th the lo!:R oi' ~luuat on one engine.

l•hYi.: fications; additions or dele ~.ions may be n:adv to t.rL~ foregcir.g ,:: l even poin:s as ID3.Y be requi:r-?cl e...':. a ::result of expc.rie:·i\'.e a.no. l.J:r--wlf"!dge gained during the aevelopmen t and s-i..i])Sc

000055 .... ~ ------·-~---~·~-----J11l~-~~};.\_,.,~-·~ ··--·-·-· -----~· l1S PRE~:;El,l'rBD BY '11:12 F'LIGHT ENGrnEER ORGA1UZ/'.'l1IO:; l ; rj i1 t cont r o Is.------·----.. · ------·---·

1' ·1 ic.nol control c.ibout 1ongitudin:::i!, rol 1 and '/oV/ <'li\cS \,~Ji t:11 :~x• for simple:: trim control" No standby systi.;;rns required .

... i ~.~·:ti on and Communications. : of components I imited to 11 on.· Off 1: ~witching, chann~?·I ~e1~ ...... - j audio gain cont(ol. No manual tuni119 required,

,·i ,·; i n 9 Cle a r • .1.:J b't '.:.incile handle movement. St;1ndby ~Jy.str:~m operc-it.ed , ... , ,,! .., . han~1L=:: or sviitch movement without necessity of le.;:ivin:-J ~;c~::Jt.

' :1 p ~. c"J I ie,1 / 0 r 5 r:10 I I er s . iJnd1n~1 :J~:z.1r contro\ l imitatior1.s above .

.• 1· )IJl. i1. System,. ~ c1i·,(· (,Jt I (H1, cont 10 ·1 01 monitor I n9 of hyd rau I i c i·~:::;u i r2d.

J \_ f •. :-; '/ :.; t Ctn,.., ... ·11 c;>::::ri]L!c•n1; cont(ol CH' monitoring of pne1Ht'l.;Jtic s:.·~·)tcrn ''· I.ii.. (1..~ql1 l 1· 1;;d.,

,- rl . './·.I • >..,) •

·,i:· Cc:nditiuoin-;; System.

1.: 1 •;r, .. ic:-i .:ind control of air conditio1:ing ::.hould be I iffi! Lt.2d t;: '. 1:. ~ :. i ~) :-1 of t e rn p e r a t u re • No f u r t he r mo n i t o r i n g or o .. ::in u r..d up ..::. , ..:.i 1 1 u , 1-.. , ~ b::; rc:qu 1 (ed.

·· \ .: i n g · and ant i - i c i n g s y s t ems • c.~f de-icing and anti-icing systems should be;; li1·1iitv.J to 1 '..;:1, Off" switch or hand.le manipulatiun, 1v1onitorin9 :.. 11u111,! 1:::quired ... ,:..:r-Plants :· .. i rt~ rang..:: of po'1.1er output from f'J1 !. fon1.;ard i..o f1;l 1 1·E:\.1.::rc-,.:.;

inc1udin'J start and cutoff .1 should C.e ccintrol lt:d by ::: ,;,.J:·.1 · '1· _,:; Lwo levers per powerplant.

; 1 r' ,, 1 I • ; . :...; 5 t i n s t r urn en t a t i 0 n • '. ::,, !>:.·1 .:~e: r:hrust rnonato1ping of each pmver-plant sh,-;Ldd rJ!d pns 5 it} 1 .;:; · .,, ·~<.:.re.nee to not more than one i nstruroent.

,. ·,··l. Pressurization System ~·~r.~ manual operation, control or monitoring of ~he pr.::;s~:.>urizution system should be required for aircraft certificated to fly above 25000 1 p.a. ·

APPENDIX IV - Page 2 000057 > D. C '·

PHOPOSED------REVIE.'W OF 'HiE JET rrnAIJSPOF'.'I1------COCJ\FIT

'"'i

.) . !. '.··: '.·::d'.C

. !.·

._ .... \F

;

000058 :Si.::::-2::.u cf Sr-..fcty

-----?~-:?o;:,: 1. To cQ::'.3. 1 .:c··~ ;;.. ::::-c,·iew of: coct:?tt. o~a. fli::,nt c.:::c': ·.'.':.::~.::;::.. -:.::-.'5. c•J::1'ir-:• r:~t.ic:::1 o~· cc·:;~:·.:C!~c:..2..l j:.:t airc::-":ii't; tl:8 di"'t:l.. cio~~ of d~~:t:t·~.-:, ~~.~-~:~ ~;::::;c~.:.:ibi2-~..... :i,:: :.:.:·:-::-;.,:; 8.ir er::-.;;:;; r:.:10. ·t;b.2 r8c_;_uisi te ciualifica~~i.onc o:· ·::·::-- ·:.-::: ~·cc::"s.

2. To c·.;tci--:Y.in~ ~;:1c~he:::- the e:::.g:i.n2crin6 :pbilc:::;c::_·fr:.:; u:'::'..~.:L::-::·: i ~-: C.'2si::;·.~:- -~ c::;~~:]it3 C..:~i fl~.,:::,fl't 0.c:8l:S Of C':/~ercial ,jet airc:."'D-1't_; c::-:.J t:~·3 :;.:::::J .. ~cc."~l-:· cj.. -.r:Ll c1i!' rcc~~] .. [;1,t:.c~s .-; c:ie~u.::::.tely p:rovide :t'or op-C:Lr::~::: sc-~0<:~,- r.::::;-~_:ro~:~.:,_:;:-,J~cJ. ·~c:~:::::.i tio;.:s :I.r: 1~}:ich ·~~:~0 cr2... ,rs of Jet aircro.ft r:·,1st e::..r::':t cJ:C t:-1c:.:~ 01:e!'"::~~:!.c:: <( .

.:;, • :'.:'.:::.:.::o·c::.::::; li terc..t;.~re c..nd. information on. the rc::!..c.i;io::::;~:i.".; ::cJ-:~;e-.;::. cc-:~-:::.::... :. c:.~;;:i.. ~ 8r.~:.:.~~--~'.)r:.::s c:-~~ :-it;.. :-:--~:n engineering as rele.teCt t0 ;]c·G :-:.. :~:..'~:.--2-~~.,~ e:-:~~s ·.-:'~~ .. ~.

l.;.. ~.::~1,:-. 2i:--::3. ui:;cr2i."t m2.nufcctu.rers, ~ircraft ·;:e3~,::~rc:i o:."c:'_::iz~.tio:::: .:.:_ c... ..:,:-1~~·-~~ o;-.;: ..... :,~~.r.:·.. ~s -:r:Ll.l tc ce-~v2.sse1 t.o ascert<:.tn he-.. ., '~cc~:::1i~~ (~~zl~_-.!1 r~q_t:.:~_1~'··:· ---·· C::t~::.~~~:.::.:.: .:.~1~1. ·:jr:_':'.:j"fo:::-::-.~d i::to cocl::p:i.t C(:'~1fi.cu::::-c;::;:L~,;:;.

) • r. .. :i.:;:.::t crc-:i ~:~;.~~Y c:!.-Z~ic;::.-:2nts for both nor:::.cl :-.!..."'l~l r:::,:::-c.~::~:r ccn'.::_::/~:L':":-_:: 1:-:.".:_:!.. ·02 !''?.V:.~·i;C:~l.

6. 1'C..1· c~:r::-ier jet aircrz.ft accident rec'Jrds id.ll 1;e r·::.::J.:r-::·.:::.1. to

7. ':-::.~ '.3 ·~a.lcJ.. ~~ ~;-.2-ll 'be C.i viderl into three work ~1 • 1 ~:·c.:~~::.3,, 2.::J.. flic;f.!t c::e;r qutlifica.tions.

:-:'3J;.uf c,cture::-s 1 Design Requirements b. Gove::.-ri_-:ent ?:equireme:::its ( i ) F /J_t.,. ( 318) (ii) Milite.ry (MATS) c. C:i::.-rc.tcr 1 n :Requirements cl. :?J.iz;ht Cre·..; neg_uirements

2. Inyle:10nt~tion of Requirements

a. Coc!'c5.i!l2.t:ton between interested graJ.yc b. ReG.olution of Conflicts

APPENDIX V - Page 2 OOOUb:f - 2 .•

c. G-::~3idr:;r,:·:iicn cf A":u::.~,.'Jb:s ~~ :-:- -... , .... · 1 :~.. C0::3:~\ic~rc:.io:1 cf p,~'J~(. :s:_r.:.:.·~.. ~ ~- ·~.:_, .. - ~ I~~ Cc~t~~~c~~io~

.'-'· L~.;,·:Jt~t (i) Cc;it:::'ols • ( :_::_) Ir:~3t·r,; ..--.C!nts ~~.ii) s.:.r~:t(;::~~J c., c:~~ .. ·.: Cc~~~~_,:_·:::.1c1:t

I c: ,J ·, ,., L.• ;J~,-~.~l.~.ff~,· !\cc:JlC!:-/J/I~cidcnt., ?_~:;~y I:;.\· ~J :.~r ..J::··~ nt

C _:-~::--:~ ..JJ:"':..; ?.·JCf.ljJ·c:-.'::~ ..:8 Gr:-;~Jt:::.:::~r:::c~r, :::. 1 :·~~~:.:_~r:'t:;::-~.nts (f..:\.': .~.r:( ;_ ~ C::'c::: !~c C!' ;i:~ :::-::2n~:-r=

:1. :~~: ~~:;~:,j~c C?·J~~tor8 ·~). ~Lsr:.~::ut.~~~·:--_.:l OF~~n t~!'3

'··

G.-.. 1 ~):.. a t,c~~.; RC!r~~xi~:::::--.0nt:J 'c.. C~0 1 r?!.'::---::e;y~ ::t~:q·J~--~~C!r.:,::; (5 .. \~\--~~\=:) c • .?l:::..;~~1 t C:nc·~·: R.cq_ :J.i!"'':'!:-';_;n t.~3

~. Dc~cctic Operatcr3 , 'ti. I1:tern::it.icr..al Op::r:::tc~1 s J. i~c'.ric:~·I of Accident/focidcnt R·~c0rd :or (,>.:[.1:.:icGtic:-:.::; :rJ.V\J 1. v0r~ 1Jnt

APPENDlX V - Page 3 0000.60 ~ l). Oi t:;,.3 3~cc;.~ of Sc:~et~r. J\ct'T1ini.strcjti-re and ctht:!r r 1..;~,_~.:.r·:~-:~ :;~J.p~·ort ~er·.·ic'_ .. ~ '.:ill cu ;_Jrc-.-.:..J::;d c-:: 7,hc B·J!'cau of Safety .:ind the Ci·.-::..~ 1~·~::·e;::.:J1;tiss Bo;;r:i.

9. Ti~e p~·o;j~?c~ ,.;ill be conducted in thrc'3 p:12so3:

?:!.ASE

I Bcick[;rour.d S'J.r-re;y 3nd liter2tt:.re 20 Lci:'-.. search, including review of accident/ ;.o '.lee'.:. inciC.c:::.t :ceco:::-ds ~ reg-u.}f.tions cf FAA lO Cicic-::::. .3::.d ~.;,;·,~s

II 7ield ;isits

':Cea;;i 1 - Douglas .Aircraft Co. (LAX) Convair Division o: General Dyn.<.i:rJ.cs (SAN) 75 H/D Tech. FAA ·.:8stern r.egion (LAX) ;.i ~i/D J~d..--: Contin:m~0al. Airlines (LJ.X) l) E/D Cle:. .-icc::!.. T::-.:;~s ':!orld ,.~irlines (HKC) ~;h,C'.JO ;~L:.c:-.foan J.irJ.ines (TUL)

Te2~ 2 - Ihe Eo8ing Co. (SEA) l: ::.i ~ cd .Air. Lines ( SfO) 1 ;n~~:.d .Hr Lines (mD) A]:.P.~ ( c:rr) ; n:rn (DCJ\) Ft;,L~ ( r;::c) 30 Vi/D Clerical I:LI A'1aly~;is a:c1

S"ci:Jr'lemental ResO'\:::::-ces

Additicneilly t.he intermittent services of other go-..rer:'.JT?.9nta1 ager.cies, r:0::i-· ;,;ovCJrrT.lent.Jl ro.=;.:;a=ch organizations, aircraft manufa:t"..l.Tcrs, airline opera to:"'' ~md other 2::-;:ihc.:ble parties will be required on a partici?ant ar.rl/ or obserY<3::­ b.;;sis. P.ai-:lYJ.r3e.":".ents for out-of-pocket expenses in conn~ction wi.th these serv::i.ces ~d:l oe ZT:acie to the extent possible. Thus, additional non-salary CXtJenses nay be required. C01'1PLETION·------DATE r 10. It is esti.n:ated that two months will be required to complete the project.

000061 APPENDIX V - Page 4