A Procedural Analysis of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courts Kate
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POORBAUGH.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/22/2015 10:26 AM SECURITY PROTOCOL: A PROCEDURAL ANALYSIS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURTS KATE POORBAUGH* This Note examines proposed changes to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court following the NSA leaks by Edward Snowden. Specifically, it analyzes proposed procedural changes to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that attempt to provide a clear legal standard and effective oversight to ensure that intelligence activity does not undermine the democratic system or civil liberties. This Note argues that a public advocate should be added to FISC proceedings to represent the public’s privacy and civil liberty interests and allow FISC final orders granting surveillance to be appealed to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review by a public ad- vocate. In addition, this Note recommends that changes be made to the FISCR so that it may handle a larger caseload and become a more permanent entity with full-time judges. TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 1364 II. BACKGROUND ................................................................................ 1365 A. The History of the Electronic Surveillance Law in the United States: Pre-FISA .......................................................... 1366 B. Requirements of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act . 1369 1. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court .......................... 1370 2. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review ......... 1372 C. FISA Amendments .................................................................. 1373 1. USA PATRIOT Act .......................................................... 1373 2. Protect America Act .......................................................... 1375 3. FISA Amendments Act of 2008 ........................................ 1375 4. Patriot Sunsets Extension Act ........................................... 1376 D. FISA Today .............................................................................. 1377 III. ANALYSIS ........................................................................................ 1379 A. Balancing Civil Liberties with National Security Concerns . 1380 B. Potential Solutions to Amend FISA and Protect Civil Liberties .................................................................................... 1381 * J.D. Candidate, 2015, University of Illinois College of Law. B.S. Accountancy, 2012, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign. I would like to thank the editors, members, and staff of the University of Illinois Law Review for their valuable edits and diligence. 1363 POORBAUGH.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/22/2015 10:26 AM 1364 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2015 1. Public Advocate ................................................................. 1381 a. Adversarial Process .................................................... 1382 b. Logistics of a Public Advocate Solution .................. 1384 2. En Banc Review ................................................................. 1386 3. FISC Judge Selection ......................................................... 1388 4. Appellate Process .............................................................. 1389 IV. RECOMMENDATION ....................................................................... 1391 A. Public Advocate ....................................................................... 1391 B. En Banc Review ....................................................................... 1393 C. FISC Judge Selection ............................................................... 1393 D. Appellate Process ..................................................................... 1394 V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 1395 I. INTRODUCTION Tension between the conflicting demands of security and liberty is not a novel concept, and it has sparked many debates throughout our na- tion’s history.1 Today, however, the use of powerful new technologies has heightened this concern. 2 During the first six months of 2013, Google re- ceived 25,879 legal requests for users’ data “from governments around the world,” a number that has tripled since 2009.3 Of these requests, 10,918 came from the U.S. government alone.4 Other Internet compa- nies, such as Facebook and Microsoft, have reported similar numbers.5 These statistics reveal the “government’s steadily growing appetite for more data from more users” and thus less privacy for individuals.6 This issue came to the forefront of U.S. policy makers’ concerns in June 2013 when Edward Snowden leaked confidential information shed- ding light on the true depths of U.S. surveillance and eavesdropping pro- grams.7 The leaks caused panic among some U.S. citizens, who feared 1. Clayton Northouse, Providing Security and Protecting Liberty, in PROTECTING WHAT MATTERS: TECHNOLOGY, SECURITY, AND LIBERTY SINCE 9/11, at 8 (Clayton Northouse ed., 2006). 2. Id. 3. Michael Liedtke, One Chart that Reveals Everything Google Can Say About FISA Requests, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 23, 2014, 6:56 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/14/google-fisa requests_n_4275584.html. 4. Id. 5. Declan McCullagh, Facebook, Microsoft Release NSA Stats to Reassure Users, CNET (June 14, 2013, 7:20 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57589461-38/facebook-microsoft-release-nsa- stats-to-reassure-users/#!. 6. Liedtke, supra note 3 (quoting Leslie Harris, President of the Center for Democracy & Technology). 7. See Mark Hosenball, NSA Chief: Snowden Leaked up to 200,000 Secret Documents, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 23, 2014, 6:56 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/14/nsa-snowden- documents_n_4276708.html. POORBAUGH.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/22/2015 10:26 AM No. 3] SECURITY PROTOCOL 1365 that their privacy had been compromised.8 These concerns have spurred “the first serious re-examination of government spying” since the 1970s.9 Several proposed amendments to the current surveillance regime have been suggested, ranging from terminating the government’s ability to store metadata to creating more oversight of the National Security Agency (“NSA”).10 Applying the Church Committee’s insight that “the system of checks and balances—created in our Constitution to limit abuse of Governmental power—was seldom applied to the Intelligence Community,”11 this Note focuses on the proposed procedural changes to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”). Specifically, this Note examines proposed changes to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”), because “clear legal standards and effec- tive oversight are necessary to ensure” that “intelligence activity does not itself undermine the democratic system it is intended to protect.”12 Procedural changes must be made to FISA in order to adequately protect civil liberties. Part II of this Note provides a history of the sur- veillance laws in the United States and examines the current application of FISA. Part III analyzes the benefits and concerns of several different proposed FISA amendments. Considering this analysis, Part IV recom- mends how FISA should be amended to adequately balance civil liberties with national security concerns. This Note proposes two changes be im- plemented to the FISC. First, this Note suggests that a public advocate be introduced to make FISC proceedings more adversarial, instead of the current ex parte, in camera review. Second, this Note suggests revising the definition of a “final judgment” under the FISA to create an im- proved appellate process. II. BACKGROUND When exploring proposed amendments to FISA, it is important to consider the history leading to its enactment and the act’s original goals. “In the long run, if we are to cope with present and future crises, we must think deeply about how our historical experience bears on a changing world.”13 FISA represents just one of the government’s several attempts to balance the long-term struggle between national security and individ- ual liberty that has influenced surveillance law in the United States.14 8. McCullagh, supra note 5. 9. Bruce Ackerman, Surveillance and the FISA Court, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2013, http://articles. latimes.com/2013/sep/24/opinion/la-oe-ackerman-fisa-reform-20130924. 10. THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES, LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD 25, 34 (2013) [hereinafter PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP REPORT]. 11. Id. at 59 (quoting Church Committee Report from April 26, 1976) (internal quotation marks omitted). 12. Id. 13. Daniel Farber, Chapter 1: Introduction, in SECURITY V. LIBERTY: CONFLICTS BETWEEN CIVIL LIBERTIES AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 1 (Daniel Farber ed., 2008). 14. Robert A. Dawson, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Shifting the Balance: The D.C. Cir- cuit and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1380, 1382 (1993). POORBAUGH.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/22/2015 10:26 AM 1366 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2015 A. The History of the Electronic Surveillance Law in the United States: Pre-FISA Before FISA, the electronic surveillance law in the United States provided for vast government scrutiny and little protection of civil liber- ties. In 1791, the Bill of Rights was ratified to the U.S. Constitution, in- cluding the Fourth Amendment: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa- pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,