DEFINING REALITY AFTER SNOWDEN: a Mixed Methods Study to Global Surveillance Discourses Across Societal Sectors

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DEFINING REALITY AFTER SNOWDEN: a Mixed Methods Study to Global Surveillance Discourses Across Societal Sectors Master Thesis DEFINING REALITY AFTER SNOWDEN: A mixed methods study to global surveillance discourses across societal sectors Leon Jansen Erasmus University Rotterdam 27-06-2014 DEFINING REALITY AFTER SNOWDEN: A mixed methods study to global surveillance discourses across societal sectors by Leon Jansen Student number: 321106 Supervisor: Lela Mosemghvdlishvili, MSc. Second Reader: Marc Verboord, PhD Master Media Studies Media & Business Erasmus School of History, Culture & Communication Erasmus University Rotterdam Master Thesis June 2014 ii Abstract Design: This study features a comprehensive design, both conceptually as well as methodological, in order to uncover surveillance discourses in different sectors throughout society after the groundbreaking disclosures on global mass surveillance. These disclosures were fundamentally aided by the whistleblowing activities of Edward Snowden. Through a triangular conceptual design, this study investigated the discourses used by the corporate sector, government, and citizen groups. Methodology: This study featured a very comprehensive methodological design using digital research methods (DRM), quantitative and qualitative content analysis, and in-depth discourse analysis. Accordingly, while moving forward through the research process, the data captured with the different methodologies allowed for an increasingly rich understanding of how surveillance is understood in different societal sectors. The network analysis (DRM) capitalized on the linking structure of the internet and collected big data in bulks, whereas the content analysis identified themes and differences among societal sectors, and finally, the discourse analysis was instrumental in finding out what discourses were prominently used by what sectors. Because the methods build on each other, results gained increased validity through triangulation. Findings: The corporate sector, government sector, and citizen group sector draw on fundamentally different discourses, that sometimes draw on each other through interdiscursivity, and sometimes are engaged in discursive struggle. Most notably, the triangular sectors fail to acknowledge the fundamental role of the corporate sector in facilitating current mass surveillance. This failure has fundamental ideological consequences. Relevance: The relatively recent mass surveillance disclosures made possible by Edward Snowden, leave a substantial gap for identifying surveillance discourses after his leaking. In addition, the innovative triangular design adds to a knowledge gap by contrasting the discourses used by different societal sector in a framework. In addition, the societal relevance is evidenced by the large societal interest in the topic as well as public recognition for the relevance of the issue. Surveillance discourse fundamentally influences the way we perceive reality. Suggestions: As discourses are contingent they change over time. As a result, a longitudinal study to surveillance discourses could be conducted in order to observe how discourses change over time. In addition, a study could be conducted to surveillance discourses prior to the leaking of Edward Snowden, and potentially compare the results with the discourses after leaking. Finally, surveillance discourses could be compared across different geographical regions. Keywords: Surveillance Studies; Discourse Theory; Edward Snowden; Mass Surveillance; Mixed Methods. iii Acknowledgments First of all, I would like to especially thank my supervisor Ms. Lela Mosemghvdlishvili for her inspiring guidance, her vital contributions to the creative process, her flexibility and kindness, and her enthusiasm. In contrast to advocating a strict professor-student hierarchy, she instead encouraged a more egalitarian collaboration, which made me truly feel like I had ownership over the project. This helped me find necessary motivation to complete the research and writing process in a personally satisfactory fashion, and in addition it allows me to now feel the intrinsic gratification of having produced a piece of scientific work that may be a contribution to the field of surveillance studies – a field I have become passionate about over the last six months. Also I find it appropriate to especially thank my father Francis, my mother Sonja, and my twin and best friend Remy for their encouragement; as well as their ability to endure my occasional complete social isolation while working hard in order to meet deadlines. In addition, I would like to thank my other family members, friends, fellow students, and fellow thesis writers for encouraging me during stressful moments. You know who you are! Finally, I would like to thank you, the reader, for your time and your interest in reading my thesis. - Leon Jansen June 26, 2014 iv Table of Contents Abstract ................................................................................................................................................. iii Acknowledgments ................................................................................................................................. iv Table of Contents................................................................................................................................... v Chapter 1: Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1 1.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 1 1.2 Triangular Framework ................................................................................................................... 2 1.3 Relevance ...................................................................................................................................... 5 Chapter 2: Theoretical Background .................................................................................................... 7 2.1 Surveillance Studies ...................................................................................................................... 7 2.2 Discourse Analysis ...................................................................................................................... 15 2.3 Research Questions ..................................................................................................................... 18 Chapter 3: Methodology ..................................................................................................................... 19 3.1 Digital Research Methods (DRM) ............................................................................................... 20 3.2 Content Analysis ......................................................................................................................... 24 3.3 Discourse Analysis ...................................................................................................................... 28 Chapter 4: Findings & Discussion ..................................................................................................... 32 4.1 Network Analysis Findings ......................................................................................................... 32 4.2 Content Analysis Findings .......................................................................................................... 37 4.3 Discourse Analysis Findings ....................................................................................................... 46 4.4 Discussion: Corporations ............................................................................................................ 49 4.5 Discussion: Government ............................................................................................................. 51 4.6 Discussion: Citizen groups .......................................................................................................... 55 4.7 General Discussion ...................................................................................................................... 57 4.8 Reflexivity ................................................................................................................................... 59 v Chapter 5: Conclusions ....................................................................................................................... 60 5.1 Conclusions ................................................................................................................................. 60 5.2 Theoretical Implications .............................................................................................................. 62 5.3 Practical Implications .................................................................................................................. 62 5.4 Limitations................................................................................................................................... 63 5.5 Future Research ........................................................................................................................... 63 References ............................................................................................................................................ 65 Appendices ........................................................................................................................................... 73 Appendix A: Corporate Sector Codebook ........................................................................................
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