Implicações Da Vigilância Das Informações E Comunicações Conduzidas Pelas Agências De Inteligência Na Democracia

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Implicações Da Vigilância Das Informações E Comunicações Conduzidas Pelas Agências De Inteligência Na Democracia FACULDADE MERIDIONAL - IMED PROGRAMA DE PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO STRICTO SENSU EM DIREITO – PPGD CURSO DE MESTRADO EM DIREITO IMPLICAÇÕES DA VIGILÂNCIA DAS INFORMAÇÕES E COMUNICAÇÕES CONDUZIDAS PELAS AGÊNCIAS DE INTELIGÊNCIA NA DEMOCRACIA CASSIANO CALEGARI PASSO FUNDO 22 DE SETEMBRO DE 2015 COMPLEXO DE ENSINO SUPERIOR MERIDIONAL - IMED PROGRAMA DE PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO STRICTO SENSU EM DIREITO – PPGD CURSO DE MESTRADO EM DIREITO IMPLICAÇÕES DA VIGILÂNCIA DAS INFORMAÇÕES E COMUNICAÇÕES CONDUZIDAS PELAS AGÊNCIAS DE INTELIGÊNCIA NA DEMOCRACIA CASSIANO CALEGARI Dissertação submetida ao Curso de Mestrado em Direito do Complexo de Ensino Superior Meridional – IMED, como requisito parcial à obtenção do Título de Mestre em Direito. Orientadora: Professora Doutora Salete Oro Boff PASSO FUNDO 22 DE SETEMBRO DE 2015 ii iii iv I would rather be without a state than without a voice. -Edward Snowden v minha orientadora, por manter meus pés no chão, À incentivar e acreditar nas minhas ideias. À minha família, por suportar a minha busca pela excelência acadêmica. À minha namorada, por ter me apoiado, ajudado e sobrevivido à elaboração deste trabalho. Aos meus professores e professoras, por terem me tornado uma pessoa melhor. Aos meus colegas, por terem tornado estes últimos dois anos inesquecíveis. Ao meu colega Eduardo Medina, por sempre me lembrar que as coisas poderiam estar piores. vi RESUMO O presente estudo destina-se a averiguar as implicações que a vigilância das comunicações e informações mundiais realizada pelas agências de inteligência possui sobre a democracia, inserindo-se na linha de pesquisa Fundamentos Normativos da Democracia e da Sustentabilidade do programa de Mestrado em Direito da Faculdade Meridional - IMED. São abordados mecanismos matemáticos de contra-vigilância e mecanismos jurídicos que possibilitem uma proteção teórica das comunicações. Considera-se que esta vigilância em massa possui influências negativas para os regimes democráticos prejudicando os institutos de liberdade de expressão e articulação política que possibilitam a democracia contemporânea. Conclui-se que, embora existam prejuízos para as liberdades individuais e transformações em alguns institutos da democracia, a vigilância conduzida pelas agências de inteligência não representa um dano significativo ao regime democrático, mas um instituto que se construiu dentro da democracia visando vantagens diplomáticas e comerciais. Ainda, conclui-se possível a implementação de mecanismos suficientes para elidir esta vigilância através da regulamentação dos setores que lidam com armazenamento e transmissão de dados. Para tanto são utilizados os métodos hipotético dedutivo e o monográfico e a técnica de pesquisa bibliográfica em fontes primárias e secundárias. Palavras-chave: democracia; criptografia; vigilância; direito; informações e comunicações. vii ABSTRACT This study is aims to determine the implications of the surveillance of communications and global information held by intelligence agencies on democracy, inserting into the research line Fundamentos Normativos da Democracia e da Sustentabilidade of the Master’s in Law program of Faculdade Meridional - IMED. Mathematical mechanisms of counter-surveillance and legal mechanisms that allow a theoretical protection of communications are addressed. It is considered that this mass surveillance has negative impacts on democratic regimes, undermining the institutions of freedom of expression and political organization that enable the contemporary democracy. It is concluded that, although there are losses for individual freedoms and transformation in some institutes of democracy, the surveillance conducted by intelligence agencies does not represent a significant harm for democracy, but an institute that was constructed within the democracy, aimed at diplomatic and commercial advantages. Still, we conclude that it’s possible to implement sufficient mechanisms to avoid this surveillance through regulation of sectors that deal with data storage and transmission. The chosen method is hypothetical deductive and monographic and the research technique is bibliographic. Key-words: democracy; cryptography; surveillance; law; information and communications. SUMÁRIO LISTA DE ABREVIATURAS E SIGLAS 2 LISTA DE TABELAS 4 LISTA DE ILUSTRAÇÕES 5 INTRODUÇÃO 6 1 PERSPECTIVAS E ESPERANÇAS: UM ESTUDO SOBRE DEMOCRACIA 9 1.1 DEMOCRACIA NA ANTIGUIDADE: GRÉCIA E ROMA 11 1.2 DEMOCRACIA ILUMINISTA E MODERNA: INGLATERRA, ESTADOS UNIDOS E FRANÇA 18 1.3 DEMOCRACIA MODERNA 31 1.4 DEMOCRACIA NO SÉCULO XXI: ORIENTE MÉDIO 38 2 VIGILÂNCIA CONTEMPORÂNEA: INTERCEPTAÇÃO MASSIVA DE DADOS 54 2.1 TEORIA DA INFORMAÇÃO: UMA BREVE CONTEXTUALIZAÇÃO 54 2.2 VIGILÂNCIA: UM ESTUDO HISTÓRICO DA VIGILÂNCIA SOBRE AS INFORMAÇÕES E COMUNICAÇÕES. 65 2.3 NSA, GCHQ E A VIGILÂNCIA EM MASSA SOBRE AS COMUNICAÇÕES 75 2.4 CONTRA-VIGILÂNCIA: PRIVACIDADE ATRAVÉS DA MATEMÁTICA 90 3 VIGILÂNCIA E DEMOCRACIA: LIÇÕES E TEMORES 103 3.1 EFEITO DA VIGILÂNCIA DAS COMUNICAÇÕES SOBRE AS PESSOAS 103 3.2 POLÍTICA EM UM MUNDO INFORMACIONAL: UMA ANÁLISE DO IMPACTO DA VIGILÂNCIA SOBRE A DEMOCRACIA 111 3.3 GARANTINDO A PRIVACIDADE: MATEMATICAMENTE 118 3.4 REGULAMENTAÇÃO CONTRA A VIGILÂNCIA EM MASSA 127 CONCLUSÃO 135 REFERÊNCIAS 138 ANEXOS 150 2 LISTA DE ABREVIATURAS E SIGLAS AC Autoridade Certificadora AES Advanced Encryption Standard AOL America Online ASCII American Standard Code for Information Interchange AT&T American Telephone and Telegraph Bit Binary digit BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit Byte Binary Term CCTV Closed-cirtuit Television CEO Chief of Executive Office CIA Central Intelligence Agency CNE Computer Network Exploitation CPI Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito DES Data Encryption Standard DoD Department of Defense EFF Electronic Frontiers Foundation EUA Estados Unidos da América FISA Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act FVEY Five Eyes GCHQ Government Communication Headquarters HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure IBM International Business Machines ICANN Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers IDH Índice de Desenvolvimento Humano ISC Security Committee of Parliment ISP Internet Service Provider ITI Instituto Nacional de Tecnologia da Informação MAC Message Authentication Code MD5 Message-Digest algorithm 5 NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 3 NSA National Security Agency ONU Organização das Nações Unidas OTAN Organização do Tratado do Atlântico Norte SHA Secure Hash Algorithm SPQR Senatus Populusque Romanus SSO Special Sources Operations TAO Tailored Access Operation TOR The Onion Routing UE União Europeia XKS X-KEYSCORE 4 LISTA DE TABELAS Tabela 1 – Representação de codificação binária em grupos de 5 caracteres. 92 5 LISTA DE ILUSTRAÇÕES Ilustração 1 – Exemplo de comunicação criptografada com um interlocutor não autorizado. 97 Ilustração 2 – Comunicação entre duas partes utilizando criptografia de chaves públicas. 99 6 INTRODUÇÃO A vigilância tem sido um tema recorrente na ficção, em especial com os escritos de George Orwell. Profecias de Estados de vigilância tirânicos ganharam espaço na literatura do século XX com os regimes totalitaristas e o temor da vigilância estatal invasiva. Entretanto, os temores de Orwell nunca se concretizaram por meio das televisões e câmeras de vigilância por impossibilidades de ordem prática. Este cenário se transformou com a evolução das tecnologias de informação e comunicações, principalmente com a transmissão digital de dados. Os últimos cinco anos abalaram o balanço de poder entre as Nações de uma forma tão significativa quanto o desenvolvimento de armas nucleares nas décadas de 40 e 50. Através dos documentos revelados por Edward Snowden em 2013, foi possível vislumbrar a execução de um projeto de vigilância onipresente de dados e comunicações pela aliança de inteligência Five Eyes em nível mundial. A presente pesquisa pretende elucidar as influências da espionagem das informações e comunicações sobre a democracia, com o objetivo de se propor formas de proteção teórica das comunicações e dados nacionais. Estudos sobre cibersegurança são tratados como prioritários pela Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU) desde 2011, pela Organização do Tratado do Atlântico Norte (OTAN) e pela União Europeia (UE) através da Digital Agenda for Europe. Com a avaliação das consequências dos atos que vem sendo conduzidos pelas agências de inteligência, revelados por Snowden em 2013 para a estrutura política democrática, será possível compreender as alterações que a tecnologia vem causando nos regimes democráticos e, do mesmo modo, permitirá desenvolver instrumentos visando assegurar a integridade das relações políticas que fundamentam a democracia. Desta forma, o estudo da segurança das informações e comunicações no território nacional constitui uma prioridade para garantir a democracia e a soberania do Estado frente às novas tecnologias de vigilância, propondo técnicas que garantam a segurança teórica das comunicações, sem resultar em retrocesso tecnológico a equipamentos analógicos. O atual modelo administrativo brasileiro 7 depende das informações e comunicações por meio da internet ou linhas de telefone para garantir o funcionamento do Poder Público, sendo toda a coordenação pública realizada através de comunicações eletrônicas. Não constitui uma alternativa viável retroceder a métodos postais para a transmissão de dados sob pena de agregar um grau de morosidade exponencialmente maior à máquina pública. Assim, a segurança das informações e comunicações constitui a única alternativa para garantir a inviolabilidade
Recommended publications
  • The Right to Privacy and the Future of Mass Surveillance’
    ‘The Right to Privacy and the Future of Mass Surveillance’ ABSTRACT This article considers the feasibility of the adoption by the Council of Europe Member States of a multilateral binding treaty, called the Intelligence Codex (the Codex), aimed at regulating the working methods of state intelligence agencies. The Codex is the result of deep concerns about mass surveillance practices conducted by the United States’ National Security Agency (NSA) and the United Kingdom Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). The article explores the reasons for such a treaty. To that end, it identifies the discriminatory nature of the United States’ and the United Kingdom’s domestic legislation, pursuant to which foreign cyber surveillance programmes are operated, which reinforces the need to broaden the scope of extraterritorial application of the human rights treaties. Furthermore, it demonstrates that the US and UK foreign mass surveillance se practices interferes with the right to privacy of communications and cannot be justified under Article 17 ICCPR and Article 8 ECHR. As mass surveillance seems set to continue unabated, the article supports the calls from the Council of Europe to ban cyber espionage and mass untargeted cyber surveillance. The response to the proposal of a legally binding Intelligence Codexhard law solution to mass surveillance problem from the 47 Council of Europe governments has been so far muted, however a soft law option may be a viable way forward. Key Words: privacy, cyber surveillance, non-discrimination, Intelligence Codex, soft law. Introduction Peacetime espionage is by no means a new phenomenon in international relations.1 It has always been a prevalent method of gathering intelligence from afar, including through electronic means.2 However, foreign cyber surveillance on the scale revealed by Edward Snowden performed by the United States National Security Agency (NSA), the United Kingdom Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and their Five Eyes partners3 1 Geoffrey B.
    [Show full text]
  • R E P O R T Select Committee on Intelligence United
    1 114TH CONGRESS " ! REPORT 1st Session SENATE 114–8 R E P O R T OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE UNITED STATES SENATE COVERING THE PERIOD JANUARY 3, 2013 TO JANUARY 5, 2015 MARCH 31, 2015.—Ordered to be printed Filed under authority of the order of the Senate of March 27 (legislative day, March 26) 2015 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 49–010 WASHINGTON : 2015 VerDate Sep 11 2014 06:43 Apr 01, 2015 Jkt 049010 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 4012 Sfmt 4012 E:\HR\OC\SR008.XXX SR008 SSpencer on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with REPORTS E:\Seals\Congress.#13 SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE RICHARD BURR, North Carolina, Chairman DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Vice Chairman JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho RON WYDEN, Oregon DANIEL COATS, Indiana BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland MARCO RUBIO, Florida MARK R. WARNER, Virginia SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico ROY BLUNT, Missouri ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii TOM COTTON, Arkansas MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio Member HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio Member JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio Member JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio Member CHRIS JOYNER, JACK LIVINGSTON, Staff Directors DAVID GRANNIS, Minority Staff Director DESIREE T. SAYLE, Chief Clerk During the period covered by this report, the composition of the Select Committee on Intel- ligence was as follows: DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia, Vice Chairman JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia RICHARD BURR, North Carolina RON WYDEN, Oregon JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland DANIEL COATS, Indiana MARK UDALL, Colorado MARCO RUBIO, Florida MARK R.
    [Show full text]
  • SURVEILLE NSA Paper Based on D2.8 Clean JA V5
    FP7 – SEC- 2011-284725 SURVEILLE Surveillance: Ethical issues, legal limitations, and efficiency Collaborative Project This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no. 284725 SURVEILLE Paper on Mass Surveillance by the National Security Agency (NSA) of the United States of America Extract from SURVEILLE Deliverable D2.8: Update of D2.7 on the basis of input of other partners. Assessment of surveillance technologies and techniques applied in a terrorism prevention scenario. Due date of deliverable: 31.07.2014 Actual submission date: 29.05.2014 Start date of project: 1.2.2012 Duration: 39 months SURVEILLE WorK PacKage number and lead: WP02 Prof. Tom Sorell Author: Michelle Cayford (TU Delft) SURVEILLE: Project co-funded by the European Commission within the Seventh Framework Programme Dissemination Level PU Public X PP Restricted to other programme participants (including the Commission Services) RE Restricted to a group specified by the consortium (including the Commission Services) CO Confidential, only for members of the consortium (including the Commission Services) Commission Services) Executive summary • SURVEILLE deliverable D2.8 continues the approach pioneered in SURVEILLE deliverable D2.6 for combining technical, legal and ethical assessments for the use of surveillance technology in realistic serious crime scenarios. The new scenario considered is terrorism prevention by means of Internet monitoring, emulating what is known about signals intelligence agencies’ methods of electronic mass surveillance. The technologies featured and assessed are: the use of a cable splitter off a fiber optic backbone; the use of ‘Phantom Viewer’ software; the use of social networking analysis and the use of ‘Finspy’ equipment installed on targeted computers.
    [Show full text]
  • The National Security Agency: Missions, Authorities, Oversight and Partnerships
    9 August 2013 National Security Agency The National Security Agency: Missions, Authorities, Oversight and Partnerships ³7KDW¶VZK\LQWKH\HDUVWRFRPHZHZLOOKDYHWRNHHSZRUNLQJKDUGWRVWULNHWKHDSSURSULDWH balance between our need for security and preserving those freedoms that make us who we are. That means reviewing the authorities of law enforcement, so we can intercept new types of communication, but also build in privacy protections to prevent abuse´ --President Obama, May 23, 2013 In his May 2013 address at the National Defense University, the President made clear that we, as a Government, need to review the surveillance authorities used by our law enforcement and intelligence community professionals so that we can collect information needed to keep us safe and ensure that we are undertaking the right kinds of privacy protections to prevent abuse. In the wake of recent unauthorized disclosures about some of our key intelligence collection programs, President Obama has directed that as much information as possible be made public, while mindful of the need to protect sources, methods and national security. Acting under that guidance, the Administration has provided enhanced transparency on, and engaged in robust public discussion about, key intelligence collection programs undertaken by the National Security Agency (NSA). This is important not only to foster the kind of debate the President has called for, but to correct inaccuracies that have appeared in the media and elsewhere. This document is a step in that process, and is aimed at providing a VXFFLQFWGHVFULSWLRQRI16$¶V mission, authorities, oversight and partnerships. Prologue After the al-4D¶LGDDWWDFNVRQWKH:RUOG7UDGH&HQWHUDQGWKH3HQWDJRQWKH&RPPLVVLRQ found that the U.S. Government had failed to identify and connect the many ³dots´ of information that would have uncovered the planning and preparation for those attacks.
    [Show full text]
  • Information Awareness Office
    Article Talk Read Edit View history Search Wikipedia Wiki Loves Monuments: Photograph a monument, help Wikipedia and win! Learn more Main page Contents Featured content Information Awareness Office Current events From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Random article Donate to Wikipedia The Information Awareness Wikipedia store Office (IAO) was established by the Interaction United States Defense Advanced Help Research Projects Agency About Wikipedia (DARPA) in January 2002 to bring Community portal together several DARPA projects Recent changes focused on applying surveillance Contact page and information technology to track Tools and monitor terrorists and other What links here asymmetric threats to U.S. national Related changes security by achieving "Total Upload file Information Awareness" Special pages (TIA).[4][5][6] Permanent link [1][2] Page information This was achieved by creating Information Awareness Office seal (motto: lat. scientia est potentia – knowledge is Wikidata item enormous computer databases to power[3]) Cite this page gather and store the personal information of everyone in the Print/export Part of a series on United States, including personal e- Create a book Global surveillance Download as PDF mails, social networks, credit card Printable version records, phone calls, medical records, and numerous other sources, without Languages any requirement for a search Català warrant.[7] This information was then Disclosures Deutsch Origins · Pre-2013 · 2013–present · Reactions analyzed to look for suspicious Français Systems activities, connections between Italiano XKeyscore · PRISM · ECHELON · Carnivore · [8] Suomi individuals, and "threats". Dishfire · Stone Ghost · Tempora · Frenchelon Svenska Additionally, the program included · Fairview · MYSTIC · DCSN · Edit links funding for biometric surveillance Boundless Informant · Bullrun · Pinwale · Stingray · SORM · RAMPART-A technologies that could identify and Agencies track individuals using surveillance NSA · BND · CNI · ASIO · DGSE · Five Eyes · [8] cameras, and other methods.
    [Show full text]
  • SSO Corporate Portfolio Overview
    SSO Corporate Portfolio Overview Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52 Dated: 20070108 Declassify On: 20361201 What is SSO's Corporate Portfolio? What data can we collect? Where do I go for more help? Agenda 2 What is SSO's Corporate Portfolio? What is SSO Corporate access collection? (TS//SI//NF) Access and collection of telecommunications on cable, switch network, and/or routers made possible by the partnerships involving NSA and commercial telecommunications companies. 3 Brief discussion of global telecommunications infrastructure. How access points in the US can collect on communications from "bad guy" countries (least cost routing, etc.) 4 Unique Aspects Access to massive amounts of data Controlled by variety of legal authorities Most accesses are controlled by partner Tasking delays (TS//SI//NF) Key Points: 1) SSO provides more than 80% of collection for NSA. SSO's Corporate Portfolio represents a large portion of this collection. 2) Because of the partners and access points, the Corporate Portfolio is governed by several different legal authorities (Transit, FAA, FISA, E012333), some of which are extremely time-intensive. 3) Because of partner relations and legal authorities, SSO Corporate sites are often controlled by the partner, who filters the communications before sending to NSA. 4) Because we go through partners and do not typically have direct access to the systems, it can take some time for OCTAVE/UTT/Cadence tasking to be updated at site (anywhere from weekly for some BLARNEY accesses to a few hours for STORMBREW). 5 Explanation of how we can collect on a call between (hypothetically) Iran and Brazil using Transit Authority.
    [Show full text]
  • The Two Faces of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
    Indiana Law Journal Volume 91 Issue 4 Article 4 Summer 2016 The Two Faces of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Emily Berman University of Houston Law Center, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, National Security Law Commons, Privacy Law Commons, and the Rule of Law Commons Recommended Citation Berman, Emily (2016) "The Two Faces of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 91 : Iss. 4 , Article 4. Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol91/iss4/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Two Faces of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court EMILY BERMAN* When former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden leaked a massive trove of information about secret intelligence-collection programs implemented under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in the summer of 2013, U.S. surveillance activities were thrust to the forefront of public debate. This debate included the question of whether and how to reform the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISA Court”), the statutorily created secret court that reviews government applications to conduct surveillance in the United States. This discussion, however, has underemphasized a critical feature of the way the FISA Court works. As this Article will show, since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (“9/11”), the FISA Court has been playing not only its traditional role of “gatekeeper,” but also the additional—and entirely different—role of “rule maker.” This is the first scholarly examination of this dichotomy and its implications for reform.
    [Show full text]
  • FISA and NSA Legislation Introduced In
    FISA and NSA Legislation Introduced in the 113th Congress (Revised 03/14/14) American Library Association Washington Office Date Bill Number Official Title Short Title Sponsor 6/17/2013 H.R. 2399 To prevent the mass collection of records of innocent Americans Limiting Internet and Blanket Electronic Conyers [MI-13] under section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of Review of Telecommunications and Email 1978, as amended by section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, and to Act provide for greater accountability and transparency in the implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. 6/19/2013 H.R. 2440 To require the Attorney General to disclose each decision, order, or FISA Court in the Sunshine Act of 2013 Jackson Lee [TX-18] opinion of a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that includes significant legal interpretation of section 501 or 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 unless such disclosure is not in the national security interest of the United States and for other purposes. 6/20/2013 H.R. 2475 To require the Attorney General to disclose each decision, order, or Ending Secret Law Act Schiff [CA-28] opinion of a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that includes significant legal interpretation of section 501 or 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 unless such disclosure is not in the national security interest of the United States and for other purposes. 6/28/2013 H.R. 2586 To amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to FISA Court Accountability Act Cohen [TN-9] provide for the designation of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court judges by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the minority leader of the House of Representatives, the majority and minority leaders of the Senate, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and for other purposes.
    [Show full text]
  • By Gil Carlson
    No longer is there a separation between Earthly technology, other worldly technology, science fiction stories of our past, hopes and aspirations of the future, our dimension and dimensions that were once inaccessible, dreams and nightmares… for it is now all the same! By Gil Carlson (C) Copyright 2016 Gil Carlson Wicked Wolf Press Email: [email protected] To discover the rest of the books in this Blue Planet Project Series: www.blue-planet-project.com/ -1- Air Hopper Robot Grasshopper…7 Aqua Sciences Water from Atmospheric Moisture…8 Avatar Program…9 Biometrics-At-A-Distance…9 Chembot Squishy SquishBot Robots…10 Cormorant Submarine/Sea Launched MPUAV…11 Cortical Modem…12 Cyborg Insect Comm System Planned by DARPA…13 Cyborg Insects with Nuclear-Powered Transponders…14 EATR - Energetically Autonomous Tactical Robot…15 EXACTO Smart Bullet from DARPA…16 Excalibur Program…17 Force Application and Launch (FALCON)…17 Fast Lightweight Autonomy Drones…18 Fast Lightweight Autonomous (FLA) indoor drone…19 Gandalf Project…20 Gremlin Swarm Bots…21 Handheld Fusion Reactors…22 Harnessing Infrastructure for Building Reconnaissance (HIBR) project…24 HELLADS: Lightweight Laser Cannon…25 ICARUS Project…26 InfoChemistry and Self-Folding Origami…27 Iron Curtain Active Protection System…28 ISIS Integrated Is Structure…29 Katana Mono-Wing Rotorcraft Nano Air Vehicle…30 LANdroid WiFi Robots…31 Lava Missiles…32 Legged Squad Support System Monster BigDog Robot…32 LS3 Robot Pack Animal…34 Luke’s Binoculars - A Cognitive Technology Threat Warning…34 Materials
    [Show full text]
  • SSO FAIRVIEW Overview
    TOP SECRET//SI/OC//NOFORN SSO FAIRVIEW Overview TOP SECRET//SI/OC//NOFORN TOP SECRET//SI/OC//NOFORN AGENDA • (U) FAIRVIEW DEFINED • (U) OPERATIONAL AUTHORITIES/CAPABILITIES • (U) STATS: WHO IS USING DATA WE COLLECTED • (U) FAIRVIEW WAY AHEAD AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR YOU • (U) QUESTIONS TOP SECRET//SI/OC//NOFORN TOP SECRET//SI/OC//NOFORN International Cables (TS//SI//NF) (TS//SI//NF) TOP SECRET//SI/OC//NOFORN Brief discussion of global telecommunications infrastructure. How access points in the US can collect on communications from “bad guy” countries (least cost routing, etc.) TOP SECRET//SI/OC//NOFORN WHERE SSO IS ACCESSING YOUR TARGET (TS//SI//NF) SSO TARGET UNILATERAL PROGRAMS CABLE MAIL, VOIP, TAP CLOUD SERVICES CORP PARTNER RAM-A RAM-I/X RAM-T RAM-M DGO SSO WINDSTOP BLARNEY SSO CORP MYSTIC AND PRISM FAIRVIEW STORMBREW OAKSTAR TOPI PINWALE XKEYSCORE TURMOIL (TS//SI//NF) TOP SECRET//SI/OC//NOFORN TOP SECRET//SI/OC//NOFORN FAIRVIEW DEFINED • (TS//SI//NF) Large SSO Program involves NSA and Corporate Partner (Transit, FAA and FISA) • (TS//SI//REL FVEY) Cooperative effort associated witH mid- point collection (cable, switch, router) • (TS//SI//NF) THe partner operates in tHe U.S., but Has access to information tHat transits tHe nation and tHrougH its corporate relationships provide unique accesses to otHer telecoms and ISPs (TS//SI//NF) 5 (TS//SI//NF) TOP SECRET//SI/OC//NOFORN TOP SECRET//SI/OC//NOFORN Unique Aspects (C) Access to massive amounts of data (C) Controlled by variety of legal authorities (C) Most accesses are controlled by partner (C) Tasking delays TOP SECRET//SI/OC//NOFORN (TS//SI//NF) Key Points: 1) SSO provides more than 80% of collection for NSA.
    [Show full text]
  • Prepublication Review in the Intelligence Community
    TILL DEATH DO US PART: PREPUBLICATION REVIEW IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY Kevin Casey* As a condition of access to classified information, most employees of the U.S. intelligence community are required to sign nondisclosure agreements that mandate lifetime prepublication review. In essence, these agreements require employees to submit any works that discuss their experiences working in the intelligence community---whether writ- ten or oral, fiction or nonfiction---to their respective agencies and receive approval before seeking publication. Though these agreements constitute an exercise of prior restraint, the Supreme Court has held them constitu- tional. This Note does not argue fororagainsttheconstitutionality of prepublication review; instead, it explores how prepublication review is actually practiced by agencies and concludes that thecurrentsystem, which lacks executive-branch-wide guidance, grants too much discretion to individual agencies. It compares the policies of individual agencies with the experiences of actual authors who have clashed with prepublication-review boards to argue that agencies conduct review in a manner that is inconsistent at best, and downright biased and discriminatory at worst. The level of secrecy shrouding intelligence agencies and the concomitant dearth of publicly available information about their activi- ties make it difcult to evaluate their performance and, by extension, the performance of our electedofcials in overseeing such activities. In such circumstances, memoirs and other forms of expression
    [Show full text]
  • Mass Surveillance Part 1 - Risks and Opportunities Raised by the Current Generation of Network Services and Applications
    Science and Technology Options Assessment (STOA) Mass Surveillance Part 1 - Risks and opportunities raised by the current generation of network services and applications ANNEX EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service Scientific Foresight (STOA) Unit PE 527.409 EN Mass Surveillance What are the risks for the citizens and the opportunities for the European Information Society? What are the possible mitigation strategies? Part 1 - Risks and opportunities raised by the current generation of network services and applications Annex IP/G/STOA/FWC-2013-1 - LOT 9 – Safety and security technologies December 2014 STOA - Science and Technology Options Assessment The STOA project “Mass Surveillance – Risks, Opportunities and Mitigation Strategies Part 1” was carried out by TECNALIA Research and Investigation. AUTHORS Arkaitz Gamino Garcia Concepción Cortes Velasco Eider Iturbe Zamalloa Erkuden Rios Velasco Iñaki Eguía Elejabarrieta Javier Herrera Lotero José Javier Larrañeta Ibañez Stefan Schuster (Editor) STOA RESEARCH ADMINISTRATOR Peter Ide-Kostic Scientific Foresight Unit Directorate for Impact Assessment and European Added Value Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research Services European Parliament, Rue Wiertz 60, B-1047 Brussels E-mail: [email protected] LINGUISTIC VERSION Original: EN ABOUT THE PUBLISHER To contact STOA or to subscribe to its newsletter please write to: [email protected] This document is available on the Internet at: http://www.ep.europa.eu/stoa/ Manuscript completed in November, 2014 Brussels, © European Union, 2014 DISCLAIMER The content of this document is the sole responsibility of the author and any opinions expressed therein do not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament. It is addressed to the Members and staff of the EP for their parliamentary work.
    [Show full text]