Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups

United Nations System Staff College (2015) Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0)

Under the following terms: Attribution - You must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests the licensor endorses you or your use. Non Commercial - You may not use the material for commercial purposes. No additional restrictions - You may not apply legal terms or technological mea- sures that legally restrict others from doing anything the license permits.

For further enquiries: United Nations System Staff College Viale Maestri del Lavoro 10 10127 Turin, Italy www.unssc.org

Tel. +39 011 65 35 911

1 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups Table of contents

ACRONYMS p. 03

FOREWORD p. 05 Jafar Javan and Almut Wieland-Karimi

PART I UN response capacity to emerging threats in peace operations contexts

CHAPTER 1 p. 09 State of play and new trends Svenja Korth

CHAPTER 2 p. 11 “Unconventional threats”: Past and future work at Headquarters Kristiana Powell and Michèle Griffin

PART II Political, criminal, terrorist? Multiple and concurrent agendas of new non-state armed groups

CHAPTER 3 p. 17 Violent mobilisation of youth gangs by political parties Véronique Dudouet

CHAPTER 4 p. 29 Transnational organized crime in Guinea-Bissau: Perspectives, challenges and the way forward Marco Carmignani Table of contents 2

PART III Hostile groups and unconventional threats: sub-regional perspectives

CHAPTER 5 p. 37 Non-state armed groups in South Sudan, Somalia and Central African Republic Hilde Frafjord Johnson

CHAPTER 6 p. 43 The case of Boko Haram in Nigeria Ahmed Rufai Abubakar

CHAPTER 7 p. 53 The Islamic State: Origins, evolution and implications for the United Nations Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou

CHAPTER 8 p. 59 Armed groups in Mali and implications for the UN Stabilization Mission Arthur Boutellis

PART IV Conclusions and areas for further work

CHAPTER 9 p. 73 Fit for purpose: Equipping the United Nations to better understand non-state armed groups Fabio Oliva

AUTHORS p. 87 3 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups Acronyms

AFISMA African-led International Support Mission to Mali AQI Al Qaeda in Iraq AQIM Al-Qaida of the Islamic Maghreb CAG Compliant Armed Groups (Mali) CMFPR Coordination des Mouvements et Forces Patriotiques de Résistance CVE Countering Violence Extremism DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration DPA Department of Political Affairs (UN) DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN) ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States FAO Food and Agriculture Organization (UN) FTF Foreign Terrorist Fighters HCUA Haut Conseil pour l'Unité de l'Azawa IDP Internally Displaced Persons IED Improvised Explosive Device INGO International Non-Governmental Organization ISI Islamic State in Iraq ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant ISIS Islamic State in Iraq and Syria JMNTF Joint Multinational Task Force (Nigeria) MAA Mouvement Arabe de l’Azawad MDSF Malian Defense and Security Forces MFDC Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance MINUSMA UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti MNLA Mouvement National pour la Libération de l'Azawad Acronyms. 4

MUJAO Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa NGO Non-Governmental Organization OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs SPLA Sudan People's Liberation Army SPM Special Political Mission SSR Security Sector Reform TAG Terrorist Armed Groups (Mali) TCCs Troop Contributing Countries TCU Transnational Crime Unit (Guinea-Bissau) UNCT United Nations Country Team UNDAF United Nations Development Assistance Framework UNIOGBIS United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau UNMISS United Nations Mission in South Sudan UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime WACI West Africa Coast Initiative UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNFPA United Nations Population Fund UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UNOCA United Nations Office for Central Africa UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime UNOWA United Nations Office for West Africa UNSSC United Nations System Staff College ZIF Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze

Based in Turin, Italy, the United Nations System Staff College (UNSSC) is the primary provider of interagency training and learning within the UN system. Its main objective is to promote and support UN collaboration and increased operational effectiveness of the system as a whole.

The College conducts a variety of learning and training activities, in Turin as well as at the regional and country level. The main thematic areas are UN Leadership, Human Rights and Development, UN Coherence, Knowledge Management, Peace and Security.

Based in Berlin, the Centre for International Peace Operations (ZIF), through its training programme, pursues two objectives: to screen and assess candidates for ZIF’s pool of German civilian professionals for deployment to international peace operations, and to provide field- oriented preparation for personnel in such operations.

ZIF offers basic peacekeeping, specialization and election observation courses. All courses focus on the practical preparation for work in a peace operation, based on mission experience and lessons learned. 7 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups FOREWORD Jafar Javan and Almut Wieland-Karimi

In the last decade, maintaining peace and about the structures, motives and social

security has become further complicated morphology of these new actors. It is more

by increasing violence. Violence is no and more apparent that armed groups’

longer perpetrated exclusively by national strategic options are often contingent on

armies and armed oppositions but also the internal dynamics and the way power

by an increasingly assertive and brutal is allocated within them. Unless we

range of hybrid actors, such as youth understand these dynamics and become

gangs, criminal organizations, pirates and equipped to respond accordingly, we cannot

transnational networks. They are operating make significant steps towards successful

in countries such as Afghanistan, Brazil, strategies to address this new phenomenon.

Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea- In many cases, the United Nations’ Bissau, Myanmar, Honduras, El Salvador, engagement with these new types of non- Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Syria, state armed groups is being developed on and sometimes even affect entire regions an ad hoc basis, or is driven by mandates such as the Sahel. The violence resulting and operational priorities. For instance, from these situations exceeds many on- resources have been developed by going civil wars. humanitarian actors, but the focus is still

Understanding this new generation of non- too narrow and is not linked to the wider

state armed groups presents novel analytical compact of international responses in

and practical challenges for the United crisis areas. Likewise, many other United

Nations, as these groups differ substantially Nations entities and peace operations have

from the traditional ones active in civil neglected to engage non-state armed actors

conflicts. For instance, there are groups in a strategic way, or have not developed

like the gangs in El Salvador and Honduras sufficient institutional capacity to support

which are connected to the community, and dialogue efforts.

there are members of drug cartels in Mexico We believe that the emergence of hybrid who use submarines and airplanes and are armed groups that are different from at war with both state institutions and the the ones the international community local communities. has been dealing with since the end of

The main problem is that we know little the Cold War has enormous policy and Foreword. 8 programmatic implications – particularly of the Secretary General (DSRSG) Dialogue for peace operations engaging in issues in December 2014 – jointly organized by such as Disarmament, Demobilization the UNSSC and the Center for International and Reintegration of former combatants, Peace Operations (ZIF). During the seminar, protection of civilians, mediation and high-level UN peace operations leaders, preventive diplomacy, humanitarian particularly the DSRSGs, exchanged views assistance, and crime prevention. and discussed approaches with practitioners

and academics on this new generation of In 2014 the United Nations System Staff non-state armed groups. This publication College (UNSSC) undertook a scoping highlights some cross-cutting themes and exercise to examine existing resources issues that warrant further discussion within related to the issue of non-state armed the international community. groups and make an inventory of the stakeholders working in this field. The report We would like to thank the German Federal has provided the basis for initiating a broader Foreign Office and the contributors to

UN inter-agency learning initiative, led by this volume for sharing their ideas and the UNSSC, which attempts to broaden the experiences. We hope that this work may analytical capacity of UN personnel in order inspire a wide and more fruitful debate to cope with such hybrid armed groups. on the future of UN peace operations and

Based on this initiative and on the findings possibly initiate more consistent efforts to of the scoping report, these topics informed build the capacity of the UN system to deal the annual Deputy Special Representatives with these emerging actors.

Dr. Jafar Javan Dr. Almut Wieland-Karimi Director, Director, United Nations System Staff College Center for International Peace Operations

Sources: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2013. Intentional homicide data and Geneva Declaration (2011) Global Burden of Armed Violence. Brian McQuinn and Fabio Oliva. 2014. Analyzing and Engaging Non-State Armed Groups in the Field. Preliminary Scoping Report. Turin: United Nations System Staff College. Abdulkader H. Sinno. 2011. “Armed groups’ organizational structure and their strategic options” International Review of the Red Cross. Vol. 93, No. 882 (June 2011), p. 312

PART I UN response capacity to emerging threats in peace operations contexts 11 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups CHAPTER 1 New generation armed groups: State of play and new trends Svenja Korth Overview

During the 1980s and 1990s, United new operational directions, such as robust Nations (UN) agencies and peace peacekeeping, use of unmanned aerial operations adapted to a shift in armed vehicles, counter-terrorism, stabilization and violence from wars between states to armed muscular protection of civilians. This is the conflict within states, but these trends are result of changes on the ground and diverse ones of the past. Today, shifts in the patterns challenges faced by the United Nations in of violence combine with organized crime to the field. While there are not always trade- impact state fragility. These are just some of offs between new and traditional forms of the elements which call for a new approach engagement, if strategic intersections are and enhanced understanding of the unique identified, as is the case in Mali, the two nature of non-state armed groups. approaches can be complementary. Much will be learned from the developments In addition, over the past 20 years, new on the ground in Mali about how to move issues (e.g. protecting and promoting the United Nations towards using a more human rights; disarmament, demobilization dynamic approach. and reintegration; protecting civilians; mediation and preventive diplomacy; While the new, less conventional approaches humanitarian assistance, crime prevention, signal an evolution in peacekeeping and small arms proliferation, addressing youth peacebuilding doctrine, the United Nations at risk and providing electoral support) have faces an entirely new set of dilemmas and become integral parts of peace operation trade-offs. Some of these go back to the mandates. Given that the United Nations is foundations and core principles on which increasingly operating in a rapidly changing the UN was founded. For example, there environment, its responses can no longer be are national governments which impose “business as usual”. legislation that restrict “material support” to non-state armed groups, yet it is becoming increasingly evident that engaging with Emerging issues in the peace such groups is politically and practically operations landscape necessary. The dilemma is whether the United Nations has sufficient funds, In recent times, we have seen an expansion new tools and the capacity (i.e. qualified of areas in UN engagements and a departure personnel and appropriate equipment) to from the “traditional” areas of work towards New generation armed groups: State of play and new trends 12 transform itself on the ground to deal with understanding the impact of transnational asymmetric threats (e.g. counter-terrorism) criminal networks and illicit trade syndicates and with non-state armed groups and their on the stability and survival of states like interests. Further, do we truly know enough Guinea-Bissau. Deterring and targeting about such groups in order to politically the spoilers and fighting drug trafficking engage with them? Do we fully comprehend require new tools and adequate training as what issues drive groups such as the Islamic well as peacekeeping partnerships, such as State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or Boko the Economic Community of West African Haram? Do we truly understand the values States (ECOWAS) in West Africa. that make young women and men follow the This publication collects some relevant call to join groups such as these? The range examples and country cases showing the of unanswered questions is endless, yet the extent to which the nature of non-state emerging trends demand urgent action. armed groups is beginning to shape the Addressing unconventional armed groups United Nation’s operating assumptions and that stretch over the territory of two or more response. countries provides an additional challenge for many peace operations, which are primarily compounded by mandates defined within national borders. Advocating for regional involvement by engaging and strengthening regional actors and organizations, however, does not automatically result in a viable and preferable regional solution. Current developments in the Central African Republic show the complexity of such issues.

In some cases, the expectations and impact of UN engagement have differed quite dramatically between local, national and international contexts. This gap will likely widen in the future. Ungoverned spaces, transnational crime and disenfranchised Muslim youth are issues that transcend borders, as seen in West and Central Africa and the Middle East.

Another increasingly challenging concern for UN peace operations relates to 13 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups CHAPTER 2 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups: A perspective from Headquarters Kristiana Powell and Michèle Griffin Introduction

There is a keen awareness in UN this issue, but very few have adequate Headquarters that our effectiveness in (if any) capacity. the field is increasingly dependent on our 2. Most civil wars have a proxy element and understanding of and ability to deal with are transnational in nature (involving, new types of non-state armed groups. for example, criminal networks, arms This chapter provides a preliminary flows, ideological narratives and refugee Headquarters perspective on this issue. It outflows). However, our responses tend begins by offering basic assumptions about to be country-specific. changes to the security landscape and the geopolitical climate, including dynamics 3. The growing presence of violent within the United Nations. It then provides extremism complicates our an illustrative, but not comprehensive, peacemaking efforts. We are not talking overview of how the issue of non-state only about violent Islamic extremists – armed groups is coming up in our work, although they are, of course, a major particularly at Headquarters. It closes with concern – but also about gangs and a number of questions for further policy criminal groups whose motives are as discussion. likely to be economic or ideological as political.

Basic assumptions: The presence of these groups and broader the security landscape dynamics make conflicts much less conducive to political settlement and can

The nature of conflict is changing faster pose serious threats to us and the people than the United Nations or the international we are mandated to protect. Indeed, in community as a whole is adapting. Research today’s security landscape, our tools and suggests that conflicts are becoming more ways of doing business are at risk of being intractable and less conducive to traditional overtaken. political settlements. This may be due to three main reasons:

1. Organized crime is emerging as a major stress factor. Several UN peace operations are mandated to address Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups: A perspective from Headquarters 14

Basic assumptions: received a great deal of attention from the geopolitical climate Member States. It was a defining issue during the 69th session of the General The geopolitical climate and its influence on Assembly, where many Member States dynamics within the United Nations impact commented that while terrorism itself is not our capacities to respond to these threats. new, today’s terrorism is characterized by This convergence of crime, cross-border increased brutality, is regionally networked, conflict and extremism would test our policy is driven by territorial aspirations and is responses at the best of times, but these generally not amenable to traditional tools are more like the worst of times. Three like mediation or good offices. The “new” main challenges complicate our work. First, elements of this old threat call into question we are arguably facing more crises today the ability of the United Nations to respond that at any time since the end of the Cold appropriately. War, from seemingly intractable conflicts in Africa, the Middle East and Europe to The Security Council has also been very the unprecedented outbreak of Ebola in engaged on this issue, particularly recently. West Africa, to name but a few. Secondly, There were Security Council debates and divisions within the Security Council have outcome resolutions or statements in rendered it unable to address a number August, September and November 2014. of pressing situations and have struck at These have focused on international the core of the Council’s credibility. Finally, cooperation to address foreign terrorist the Council has been willing, at times, to fighters and financing for terrorism. Another mandate us robustly, arguably without debate in December 2014, under the sufficient consideration of basic principles, Chadian presidency, considered the links whether there is a ‘peace to keep’ or internal between terrorism and cross-border crime.

inconsistencies in our mandate. These discussions build on previous resolutions or agreements. However, there are also some innovations. For example, Overview of what is Security Council Resolution 2178, adopted happening at Headquarters unanimously in September, recognizes that foreign terrorist fighters are a manifestation There has been a great deal of thinking at of violent extremism. It calls on Member Headquarters and in the field around the States to introduce more Countering UN’s response to armed groups. This issue Violence Extremism (CVE) measures, which comes up in a number of different spheres of are broad and address the root causes of work, such as counter-terrorism, mediation terrorism. This is the first time the Council and the future of peacekeeping operations has recognized CVE as a Chapter VII and special political missions. obligation. For its part, the United Nations The issue of counter-terrorism has recently has been requested to provide capacity- 15 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups

building assistance in this area. to places where there is little or no peace to keep. This is pushing our thinking on how we At a time when the Council is divided on define the outer limits of UN peacekeeping. so many critical issues, counter-terrorism Our peacekeeping operations in the appears to be generating strong support Democratic Republic of the Congo, where among Council members. The broader we are conducting offensive operations via membership is also very engaged in this the Force Intervention Brigade, and in Mali, issue. The General Assembly’s 2006 which is operating in an asymmetric threat counter-terrorism strategy was renewed environment alongside an ongoing, parallel for the fourth time in June 2014. During counter-terrorism operation, are emblematic this most recent renewal period, particular in this regard. emphasis was placed on addressing the conditions conducive to terrorism. Critically, For Special Political Missions, our discourse the strategy identifies respect for the rule is framed, at least in part, around how we of law, human rights and good governance can operate in insecure environments like as key factors in fighting terror. In response Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya or Somalia. Our to this growing interest by Member States, work is becoming increasingly dangerous. the United Nations’ counter-terrorism The attack in Mogadishu in December was architecture is very focused on this issue. only the most recent reminder. We face the dilemma of trying to do effective political There is a risk, however, that despite work – which is at the core of our mandates commitments to focus on the root causes of – while hemmed in behind T-walls, razor terrorism and the human rights dimensions wire and sandbags. of counter-terrorism, the “Foreign Terrorist The High-Level Independent Panel on Fighters” (FTF) issue will continue to Peace Operations, announced by the dominate the agenda of key Member States Secretary-General in June 2014, will grapple while the well-being of millions of people with a number of these issues, including living under the control of extremist groups how things have changed in the 15 years will receive insufficient attention. Moreover, since the release in 2000 of the “Report of bilaterally, counter-terrorism is still largely the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping” a military enterprise, often undermining (the “Brahimi report”). The panel will cover human rights. The challenge, of course, is both peacekeeping operations and special to ensure protection of human rights while political missions and will consider if these countering terrorism. tools are still fit for purpose in today’s

The issue of new non-state armed groups environment. Its report will be released in also features prominently in discussions the spring of 2015 and will serve as the of the future of peacekeeping operations basis for a Secretary-General’s report to and special political missions. There is be submitted to Member States during the recognition that peacekeepers are deploying 70th session of the General Assembly. Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups: A perspective from Headquarters 16

Finally, we are doing a great deal of thinking We may be asked to play a more direct on the dilemmas that a new generation role. The Organization of American States of non-state armed groups pose for our negotiated a controversial “gang truce” in mediation work and how to resolve these. El Salvador in 2012 and has suggested that There is a range of new actors entering the the UN Secretariat needs to reflect on the mediation sphere. Indeed, there are more suitability of mediation as an instrument actors involved in facilitating a negotiation to help overcome unconventional violence process, but there is also – in many cases – (such as that of gangs), provided they are a proliferation of actors around the table or amenable to licit, non-violent opportunities. seeking a place at the table. We will have to do some deep self-reflection on what this means for the United Nations The UN “Guidance for Effective Mediation” and what we are best positioned to do. does not place restrictions on who we can talk to. We classify these actors by their value to the process, not by whether they Questions for future policy work are listed or indicted. This is by design and allows us to do what is most appropriate for In short, there are a number of initiatives each situation in accordance with relevant underway to address or help us think legal limitations. This leaves grey areas and through the impact of new non-state armed requires political dexterity and creativity in groups on our work. There is a need to move approach, but it helps protect the mediation forward with our policy work, deepen our space and gives us the flexibility required to understanding of these threats and sharpen adapt to new challenges. our tools to ensure an appropriate response. In doing so, the following policy questions For example, the mediation landscape could be considered: is becoming increasingly complicated by the fragmentation of groups. There 1. What are the new, emerging or is not always a clear centre of gravity or changing challenges to peace and leadership structure. In Syria, for example, security facing UN field presences?

fighters move from group to group, alliances 2. If these are actors or groups, how constantly change and the power balance amenable are these entities to can be quite fluid. In addition, we do not alternative (i.e. non-violent, licit) currently mediate with groups that we opportunities? label as exclusively “criminal”, including 3. What more could or should the United gangs, but we know that we must at least Nations be doing to address or respond understand how they operate and what to these threats? There is an emerging leverage or influence they have over other consensus that we need new tools, but actors – including States – if we want to what might these look like? identify incentives for an agreement or help reach a ripeness point.

PART II Political, criminal, terrorist? Multiple and concurrent agendas of new non-state armed groups 19 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups CHAPTER 3 Violent mobilization of youth gangs by political parties Véronique Dudouet 1 Introduction

The peace and conflict research community youth gangs involved in social violence. It has finally come to realize the challenges aims to review the interplay between their posed by actors of organized violence who economic, social and political dimensions, lie beyond the traditional scope of direct and especially the complex relations and parties to international or intra-state armed mutual influence gang members entertain conflicts. Studies such as the Global Burden with political actors/parties. Given its target of Armed Violence (Geneva Declaration audience, this chapter primarily addresses 2011) raise awareness about the growing post-war contexts since these are most threat posed by interpersonal or criminal relevant to UN peace operation missions. violence, estimating that “non-conflict” However, considering the scarce empirical violence generated eight times as many evidence on this phenomenon, some fatalities as all armed conflicts did between policy implications also derive from past 2004 and 2009. In turn, mediators and and ongoing approaches to urban youth peacebuilders – who traditionally focused violence in ‘non-conflict scenarios’. The their attention on non-state armed groups first two sections analyse the urban violence upholding political agendas (i.e. claims phenomenon and its politicization. The last to state power) well-suited to negotiation two sections address the wide range of existing peacebuilding, development and processes – are increasingly acknowledging security responses by local, national and the pragmatic need to engage with a wider international actors, fleshing out some key range of violent actors in order to enhance recommendations for UN peacekeeping or peace process sustainability2. Indeed, peacebuilding missions. so-called criminal or ‘hybrid’ actors (from paramilitaries and militias to organized crime networks, vigilante groups, street gangs and pirates) present a mounting 1. This is based on an extensive review of the existing literature, as well as the author’s previous work on challenge to international security and non-state armed groups and political transitions (e.g. Dudouet 2014, Dudouet et al. 2012). Many thanks to exhibit significant ‘spoiling capacity’ capable Matteo Dressler and Lauren Schorr for their assistance with background research. of destabilizing political agreements and post-war peacebuilding efforts. 2. For instance, the report from the 2013 Oslo Forum High-level Mediation Retreat was entitled “Innovative approaches to mediating conflict” and has a section on This chapter focuses on one sub-category “Negotiating with criminal groups”. www.osloforum.org/sites/default/files/Oslo-Forum- of non-conventional armed actors: urban Meeting-Report-2013.pdf Violent mobilization of youth gangs by political parties 20

Violent urban youth: The term ‘civic conflict’ has also developed An emerging form of to distinguish urban violence from sovereign armed conflict (international) and civil (intra-state) violence. Civil conflicts are stimulated by the state’s Already a decade ago, astute minds failure to provide security, welfare, growth documented that “urban violence has and institutionalized methods for nonviolent reached unprecedented levels in many contestation over civic issues (Beal, cities of the South, and is increasingly Goodfellow and Rodgers 2013). In this seen as one of the most portentous threats sense, civic conflicts are said to be largely to development on a local, national and reactive, in contrast to proactive strategies international scale” (Winton 2004: 165). mobilized for state takeover. Urban youth Experts are conceptualizing cities as the violence should also be treated as distinct primary site of tomorrow’s warfare, noting from criminal networks and organized that violence in urban spaces has begun to crime – even though these categories often “resemble classic armed conflict situations” overlap. The reason for clear delineation is (Moser and McIllwaine 2014: 333). Urban that street gangs partake in trafficking and violence might be classified into several sub- the brutal violence associated with such types, including political (e.g. urban guerrilla activities to a lesser extent. In fact, their warfare), institutional (e.g. extrajudicial mobilization is often the result of (structural killings by police), economic (e.g. or institutional) violence rather than its cause kidnappings by organized crime networks), (Winton 2004). Labelling gang structures as interpersonal (e.g. sexual violence) and criminal enterprises defined by individual social (e.g. petty theft or communal riots by pathologies is unhelpful as it tends to invite gangs) (adapted from Moser and McIllwaine overly repressive state responses. Instead, 2014). This paper zeroes in on the last, with this chapter considers urban youth violence ‘gangs’ defined as “voluntary associations as a socio-political phenomenon calling for of peers, together for common interests, comprehensive political solutions. leadership and internal organization that act collectively in order to achieve some goals, even illegal activities and the control of the The political dimension of territory, equipment or business” (Miller social violence 1992: 21). Related phenomena which also involve violent urban youth and which might Socially violent actors (in this case, urban be of direct relevance for UN peacekeeping youth gangs) are far from ‘apolitical’. This and political missions include soccer fan section examines the political dimension clubs (e.g. Kosovo), youth wings of political of their origins, motivation, nature, effects parties (e.g. Burundi, Nepal) and, to some and, especially, functions as ‘proxy’ political extent, youth-led militias (e.g. Nuer ‘white actors controlled and/or instrumentalized by army’ in South Sudan). power contenders. 21 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups

Impact of macro-political conflicts on gang of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) mobilization and migration of war victims to cities One cannot grasp the urban youth accelerated by post-war governments violence phenomenon without adopting failing to implement structural reform a comprehensive approach that analyses in rural areas. This leads to large its trigger, proximate and root/structural concentrations of youth who become factors. Given this paper’s focus on contexts particularly vulnerable to groups relevant for UN peace operation missions, involved in illicit activities or violent it is particularly important to consider the behaviour; and characteristics of war-affected or post- 6. formation of informal networks by war contexts conducive to street gang demobilized child soldiers (e.g. emergence. Such features include: Sierra Leone) or ‘disqualified’ minor

1. persisting social exclusion resulting combatants (e.g. Nepal), seeking from imperfect peace accords that avenues to recycle their war-time focus solely on the political inclusion of skills as a source of livelihood and/or a ‘new elite’. In such contexts, youths maintain their links to former armed are the most vulnerable to gang or structures (Kukeler and Peters 2011). militia conscription because they often Socio-political functions of youth gangs hail from the most marginalized social Street gangs perform at least three types of groups; roles that might be described as political: 2. combined state fragility and economic 1. Internally, many gangs develop into under-development caused by the organized collectives with command legacy of protracted intra-state conflict. and control structures in which leaders This results in a lack of institutional enjoy some degree of legitimate capacity to offer sustainable livelihoods authority over their members (Dudouet and a subsequent search for alternative 2014). economic opportunities by the young and disenfranchised; 2. Within their social environment, youth gang members tend to acquire de facto 3. destruction of social fabric and family power positions and (largely coercive) support structures over the course of authority, especially in places where ethno-political violence, which leads they take on the role of providing young people to look for substitutive services and enforcing rights ordinarily collective identities; attributed to state actors. In slums or generally deprived areas where 4. higher tolerance for violent conflict the state is perceived to be absent, behaviour in post-war societies; ineffectual and/or repressive, gangs 5. abrupt urbanization due to dispersion may provide alternative and legitimate Violent mobilization of youth gangs by political parties 22

governance and protection for their (5) overt political contention (e.g. protests) neighbourhoods or communities as a means of party mobilization or rival (Rodgers and Muggah 2009). party destabilization, typically around elections. Many youth gangs, militias or 3. Gang members may also become political parties’ youth wings engaging in politicized through their actions, deviant violent activities emerge in response developing a conscious social or to the instrumentalization of regular security ideological agenda as they translate forces by the party or ethnic group in power, their socio-economic precariousness leading opposition parties to develop their into political riots, demonstrations, own protection, self-defence and law and upheavals and other forms of order mechanisms. Three examples are contestation (Philipps 2013). cited below:

However, a recurrent phenomenon has been • In Haiti, President Aristide, who ruled noted across cases as diverse as El Salvador, the country between 1994 and 2004, Haiti, Sierra Leone and South Africa: was known for having formed his own namely, gangs’ progressive depoliticization armed gangs (the Chimères) which at paralleling the adoption of more brutally times operated in concert with the police violent and profit-oriented activities (such as and carried out protection rackets. drug trafficking). His overthrow by an armed rebellion

Mutual relations with the formal political created a state of lawlessness which arena: Youth as political proxies was filled by these gangs, who became the de facto leaders in the slums of the Apart from their intrinsic political functions capital, Port-au-Prince. They developed and attributes, many youth gangs also an interdependent relationship with entertain direct relations with political members of the political and business parties (or armed opposition groups) in elite, who manipulated them while post-war contexts or acute social conflicts. providing them with arms, funding and Existing empirical evidence from Burundi, protection from arrest (Kemp, Shaw Guinea Conakry, Haiti, Kenya, Mindanao/ and Boutellis 2013). Philippines, Nepal, Nigeria, Timor Leste and Zimbabwe reveals that party support, • Timor Leste is also said to be vulnerable control or instrumentalization of street gangs to extortion and trafficking involving often serves at least five complementary local gangs organized around kinship purposes: (1) self-protection and control ties, martial arts groups or patronage over areas of influence; (2) exhibition of party networks and used by political parties strength; (3) financial gain (e.g. through for personal security and as agents smuggling, organized crime or forced provocateurs (TLAVA 2009). donations and taxation); (4) covert criminal activity (e.g. to eliminate opponents); and 23 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups

• In Nepal, several parties have Policy responses: Evolution established youth wings/forces which towards a comprehensive they have used to provide ‘muscle approach to gang violence power’ and financial gain to their leaders, including the Maoist party’s How does this analytical shift in Youth Communist League. Following understanding contemporary conflict allegations of violent proxyism against patterns impact violence-related policy and these youths and their party backers, external intervention? A consensus has relative failures on the part of political emerged recognizing the limits to isolated actors to rein in their youth forces criminal justice and law enforcement “provides a sobering example of the approaches. In Central America, ‘mano- difficulties in controlling such a force dura’ or iron-fist tactics demonstrated how once it has been created” (Carter such policies can lead to increased violence Center 2011). and the dispersion of violence to other, Philipps (2013) notes an interesting paradox: less-policed areas (Cockayne 2011). While gangs’ perceived mobilization in opposition researchers reflect at length on the pros to the politically powerful “not only coexists and cons of various options for engaging with their instrumentalization; it provides with armed actors in conflict settings the very basis for it”. Besides instigating (including transitional justice; Disarmament, violence and unrest by appealing directly Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR); to disenfranchised youths’ frustration Security Sector Reform (SSR); and political and anger, political parties might employ incentives), no real debate has started on other means to entice or recruit gangs for what role these tools may play in handling personal political gain. Economic rewards other types of organized armed actors. are obvious incentives, in addition to political For its part, the United Nations has enticements (e.g. promises of future posts progressively mandated peace operations in the bureaucratic apparatus, the army or to address organized crime and its the police), ideological persuasion (e.g. by associated challenges, but little operational alluding to common narratives or appealing understanding exists regarding the specifics to simplistic agendas around free education, of urban youth gangs. free medical care, jobs for all, etc.) and

kinship ties/appeals to a common past (e.g. Addressing the triggers, proximate and remobilization of former child soldiers by root causes behind social conflict requires rebel movements-turned political parties). a comprehensive approach to intervention along multiple dimensions: multi-sector (from security and rule of law to development, governance and peacebuilding), multi- actor (combined efforts by civil society, states and international agencies) and Violent mobilization of youth gangs by political parties 24 multi-directional (integrating bottom-up lacks cooperative learning across these community-led intervention with top- different intervention pillars; down law enforcement). Time-wise, short- • a lack of an explicit mandate to address term quick impact interventions require urban youth violence within most peace integration with longer-term approaches operation missions; aimed at improving institutional capacities, developing alternative socio-economic • a reluctance by host countries to allow incentives and transforming cultural norms international interference into internal around violence and patronage. Most matters of so-called criminal violence importantly, policy responses to urban – especially in instances where state social violence must address multiple agents maintain illicit relations with stakeholders simultaneously: gang leaders youth gangs and are therefore part of and members; surrounding communities; the problem rather than the solution; and local and national institutions, including • the difficulty for UN missions to support political actors connected (or complicit) with actor-targeted and/or community-led gang violence. The table below summarizes initiatives, given their state-focused approaches used to prevent or reduce gang mandates; violence by various Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), development state • the challenge to draw local support agencies (such as USAID, DFID or GIZ), and and buy-in from the public and private UN entities (such as UNDP, UN Habitat, sector for ‘soft-power’ engagement UNICEF, ILO and, in some rare cases such (e.g. dialogue and incentives) with as MINUSTAH, UN peace operations). gang members, as it may be seen as rewarding perpetrators of violence; While the need for a coherent UN agenda on youth and violent conflict has long • the impact of the ‘war on terror’ on been acknowledged (e.g. UNDP 2006), criminalizing contact with armed a number of political, organizational and groups, which has been extended in practical challenges prevent UN agencies some instances to non-conventional and missions from adopting such a violent actors (e.g. some El Salvador comprehensive approach. These include: gangs are on the United States’ terrorist • a lack of expertise and analytical listing system); and understanding of the multi-level factors • incompatibilities between short-term conducive to urban violence and of its mission mandates and the long-term differentiated manifestations; vision required for a comprehensive • a compartmented approach to approach to social/urban violence. peacebuilding, security/rule of law, governance and development which 25 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups

GANG-FOCUSED COMMUNITY-FOCUSED STATE/INSTITUTION-FOCUSED INTERVENTION INTERVENTION INTERVENTION Violence deterrence and Crime reduction through State authority extension into control through arrest community policing deprived urban areas and punishment Restorative justice Institutional capacity-building for justice /police reform in Community-led Small order to build legitimate, Arms and Light weapons LAW AND ORDER accountable and effective law ALW control enforcement institutions (SECURITY/JUSTICE) Local authority capacity- building geared towards addressing urban insecurity and creating a culture of prevention, e.g. UN-HABITAT Safer Cities Programme Dialogue and mediation Support to community Support for national (e.g. with/between gang mediators and local media) discussion fora to leaders to facilitate ‘bridge-builders’ (e.g. promote a more nuanced truce agreements and social workers, former understanding of youth gangs behavioural shifts gang members, church, as a deep-rooted societal/ VIOLENCE teachers, etc.) structural phenomenon e.g. Gang truce in San REDUCTION Salvador (El Salvador) in Social capital, trust and THROUGH DIALOGUE 2012; peace agreement cohesion rebuilding AND MEDIATION by rival leaders in Bel Air through multi- (Haiti) stakeholder community dialogues (involving NGOs, business leaders, religious institutions, academics, etc.) Constructive engagement Capacity-building for Promotion of robust anti- with former gang leaders youth empowerment and corruption measures turned politicians effective participation to encourage their in local decision- Good governance support POLITICAL shift from coercive to making fora in deprived through aid conditionality consensual authority; neighbourhoods INCENTIVIZATION ‘Naming and shaming’ AND GOVERNANCE Collective transformation politicians involved in youth APPROACHES of gang structures into gang patronage practices positive civil society actors benefiting their communities, e.g. SER PAZ in Ecuador Collective or individual Community violence Support local authorities reinsertion support by reduction programmes: to ensure that sufficient facilitating re-education Provide alternatives to resources, commitment and and integration into the street crime (vocational supervision are provided to job market training, psychological gang reinsertion programmes support, and economic e.g. Viva Rio NGO opportunities) for youth Support for national policies in Haiti, Pailig at risk developing short- and long- Foundation in Mindanao term livelihood options for (Philippines) Community infrastructure marginalized youth SOCIO-ECONOMIC rehabilitation Youth-focused DDR e.g. UNDP Kosovo and Timor REHABILITATION programmes e.g. MINUSTAH; UNDP Leste AND DEVELOPMENT El Salvador Ex-prisoner rehabilitation Support effective service and socio-economic Community-based delivery in deprived reintegration approach to DDR neighbourhoods

e.g. MINUSTAH in Haiti Engagement with the private sector to cooperate with gang reinsertion programmes by creating employment opportunities Violent mobilization of youth gangs by political parties 26

Policy recommendations combine peacebuilding, development, governance, policing and criminal Given its growing role in contemporary justice expertise on the subject. This conflict-affected and post-war contexts, might also include hiring specialists (e.g. urban youth violence is becoming anthropologists or political economists) increasingly relevant for UN missions. at the Headquarters or mission level in The sustained insecurity caused by ‘civic order to fully comprehend the drivers of conflicts’ represents a direct challenge for violence and intervention options. Such international peace operations as it hinders comprehensive fact-finding should also their operability and the very development, include sound analysis of: the specific security and justice that the United Nations local context; the community’s capacity seeks to build. These emerging patterns of to support and accompany external violence in urban spaces should thus be intervention; the complex relationships taken seriously, both in pre-deployment which non-conventional violent actors analysis and field intervention. maintain with state/government structures; and, in situations of armed Analysis conflict, the opportunities for integrating • Urban social violence will become such actors into broader peace accords less of an impediment to peace if UN or national dialogues. staff acquire a better understanding • Sound analysis would also help of the nature and motivations of youth international actors avoid the gangs, the environments in which they imposition of simplistic labels (such emerge, the social, economic and as ‘criminal entities’) to qualify highly political networks they are embedded heterogeneous groups and individuals. in, their social roles and legitimacy and Such designations “deny the reality of the underlying factors which enable life on the ground and the extent to them to develop and operate. Prior which social actors can also form part of to any intervention on the ground, the societal fabric” and might ultimately it is also important to analyse which internal and societal features of such impede conflict-resolution prospects groups might potentially be utilized (Cockayne and Lupel 2011). Mission for purposes of dialogue and eventual staff should become better aware of the socio-political reintegration, and to specificities and the similarities between detect early signs of violence fatigue various types of violent actors operating or internal discontent which might on the ground (e.g. gangs, militias, serve as entry-points for engagement. political party youth wings, vigilante Mission planners should engage in joint groups, organized crime networks and analysis and intelligence sharing across political or extremist armed groups) various UN departments in order to and the nature of the boundaries and 27 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups

operational relations between these • While the reinsertion of gang members distinct social phenomena. and ‘youths at risk’ cannot occur if the environment is too adverse, state- • Assessments of the problem at stake building and societal transformation and the factors that seem to be driving can also be blocked by gangs’ ‘spoilers’ it should be accompanied by a clear violence. Therefore, actor-focused vision of the desired outcomes (such initiatives should be linked up with as a reduction in violence, changes broader efforts to strengthen institutional in behaviour or attitudes or structural capacity for security enhancement reform) and the range of appropriate and good governance. The United responses. Nations should also take advantage Intervention of privileged bilateral relations with • In contexts where political conflicts respective governments to incentivize or post-war politics are strongly the criminalization of corruption and interlinked with acute social violence, patronage practices, in order to prevent UN mission mandates should adapt or mitigate the instrumentalization conventional peacebuilding tools to of urban gangs for political ends and integrate and address both dimensions. resource mobilization. For instance, SSR assistance should • If the epicentre of contemporary encompass capacity-building for violence takes place in urban spaces community policing or restorative and deprived neighbourhoods, justice approaches in urban areas local communities should be key affected by gang violence. DDR intervention targets. Violence reduction support should also be designed in a programmes are most likely to be comprehensive manner, combining effective and sustainable if rooted individual, collective and community- in the context in which they will based approaches to weapon collection be implemented; therefore, they programmes and socio-economic should be designed and carried out rehabilitation for young offenders. in partnership with local authorities Mediation and dialogue programmes and community leaders (especially should also be adapted to deal with in areas affected by weak institutions non-conventional violent actors (such and public service delivery). Missions’ as youth gang leaders and members) staff should identify civil society bridge- because direct engagement might builders such as religious institutions or offer valuable insights to DDR teams local NGOs with direct access to gang about the prospects of offering socio- leaders and marginalized youth, and economic incentives for individual and jointly identify appropriate (‘hard’ and collective disengagement from violence. ‘soft’ power) responses to tackle both Violent mobilization of youth gangs by political parties 28

illicit activities and their underlying (e.g. repression vs. incentives). In factors. They should also identify and contexts where there are ongoing engage with informal or traditional conflict resolution efforts, mediation (e.g. kinship) structures that can be teams should also be advised to harnessed to support reintegration support the inclusion of relevant peace projects. By providing balanced and accord provisions which might help coordinated assistance to young UN monitoring missions hold parties to offenders and youths at risk, civil account (e.g. relative to the dismantling society organizations, political parties of youth party wings and paramilitary and local authorities, UN missions structures, or the transparent use and their national counterparts will of political party funds). Finally, UN be more likely to strengthen national missions should take advantage of consensus for comprehensive soft- their multi-national composition to power engagement on urban violence hire professionals and peacekeeping and enhance public/government trust troops with the right mix of linguistic in the process. and context-sensitive expertise who can adopt a more informed approach • Inclusive approaches to social violence to tackling societal phenomena such as prevention and reduction call for inter- urban youth violence. agency collaboration and partnership efforts in support of effective • The failure to address the problem of peacebuilding. This includes working urban social violence at an early stage with other UN agencies (such as UNDP (particularly in post-war contexts) can or UNICEF) and actors outside of the make it more difficult to transform/ UN system (e.g. regional organizations, rehabilitate actors and patronage state agencies or International NGOs) networks later on. Moreover, social which can offer longer-term support violence mitigation and transformation and differentiated responses. These should be defined as a long-term, even include socio-economic projects multi-generational, process. UN peace addressing youth unemployment and operation missions need to adapt interventions aimed at improving civic project-bound timeframes to sustained engagement and political participation. engagement needs in order to make an In addition, DDR staff should liaise and effective and sustainable contribution coordinate with international agencies to peace and security in fragile urban in charge of legal, policing or military spaces. intervention to eradicate ‘crime’ in order to harmonize their approaches and the timing of interventions, and to avoid sending contradictory messages 29 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups

References Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development. 2011. Global Burden of Beal, J., T. Goodfellow & D. Rodgers. 2013. Armed Violence, Report. Online at: www. ‘Cities and conflict in fragile states in the genevadeclaration.org/measurability/global- developing world’, Urban Studies Journal, burden-of-armed-violence/global-burden- 50(15), pp. 3065–3083. of-armed-violence-2011.html

Carter Center. 2011. Political party youth Kemp, Walter, Mark Shaw & Arthur Boutellis. wings in Nepal. Report, February 28. 2013. The Elephant in the Room: How Can Online at: www.cartercenter.org/resources/ Peace Operations Deal with Organized pdfs/news/peace_publications/democracy/ Crime? New York: International Peace nepal-political-party-youth-wings-022811- Institute. en.pdf Kukeler, Josja & Krijn Peters. 2011. “The Cockayne, James. 2011. State fragility, Boys Are Coming to Town”: Youth, Armed organised crime and peacebuilding: Conflict and Urban Violence in Developing towards a more strategic approach. NOREF Countries, in: International Journal of Report, September 2011. Online at: www. Conflict and Violence, 5, 2, 277-291. peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/ Miller, W.B. 1992. Crime by Youth Gangs original/application/2af427c8039ed02db6f and Groups in the United States, OJJDP, d29fab1144aa8.pdf Washington. Cockayne, James & Adam Lupel (eds.). Moser, Caroline O. N. & Cathy McIlwaine. 2011. Peace Operations and Organized 2014. New frontiers in twenty-first century Crime: Enemies or Allies? Abingdon: urban conflict and violence, in: Environment Routledge. & Urbanization, 26, 2, 331-344. Dudouet, Véronique. 2014. “Transformation Philipps, Joschka. 2013. Ambivalent Rage. of coercive actors”, in Accord issue Youth Gangs’ Inner-City Protests in Conakry, 25, Legitimacy and Peace Processes: Guinea. Paris: Editions L’Harmattan. From Coercion to Consent. Conciliation Resources, pp. 91-94. Rodgers, Dennis & Muggah, Robert. 2009. Gangs as Non-State Armed Groups: The Dudouet, Véronique, Hans J. Giessmann Central American Case, in: Contemporary & Katrin Planta. 2012. Post-war Security Security Policy, 30, 2, 301-317. Transitions: Participatory Peacebuilding after Asymmetric Conflicts. London: TLAVA. 2009. Groups, Gangs and Armed Routledge. Violence in Timor-Leste. Online at: www. timor-leste-violence.org/pdfs/Timor-Leste- Violence-IB2-ENGLISH.pdf Violent mobilization of youth gangs by political parties 30

UNDP. 2006. Youth and Violent Conflict: Society and Development in Crisis, UNDP: New York. Online at: www.undp.org/cpr/ whats_new/UNDP_Youth_PN.pdf.

Winton, Ailsa. 2004. Urban violence: A guide to the literature, in: Environment & Urbanization, 16, 2, 165-184. 31 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups CHAPTER 4 Transnational organized crime in Guinea-Bissau: Perspectives, challenges and the way forward Marco Carmigniani Introduction

Transnational organized crime, most The presence of non-state armed groups in notably drug trafficking, is not singular to the land border with Senegal adds another Guinea-Bissau, nor should it be viewed factor to this complex situation. in isolation. Yet, more ink has been spent This chapter is structured in four sections, publicizing the effects of its sprouting in starting with an overview of the known that small West African nation rather than dimensions of transnational organized crime on the circumstances that brought it about. involving Guinea-Bissau, with a particular Certainly, criminal activities in any country focus on illicit drug trafficking. The second undermine good governance and security, section presents the challenges faced by with negative impacts on socio-economic the Bissau-Guinean State in its fight against development, human rights and the rule that type of crime. The third section reviews of law. Still, for Guinea-Bissau, it is the some of the ongoing initiatives undertaken by transnational nature and ramifications of the national authorities, especially the ones criminal activities in and through the country receiving support from the United Nations. that draw most attention as a security threat The final section presents recommendations to West Africa and to some parts of Europe and priorities on the way forward. and North America.

The vulnerability of Guinea-Bissau to The status organized crime stems first from its of transnational organized location in the geographical route used by traffickers to bring illegal drugs from crime in Guinea-Bissau producers to consumers. Furthermore, the In the early 2000s, the European market fragile structures of the Bissau-Guinean for cocaine gradually expanded while State, are still unable to fully monitor the the North American market started to country’s porous borders at land and sea slow down. In this expansion, West Africa (there are over 80 islands, of which only a became a major transit route for illicit drugs fourth are inhabited)1 which are seen as a produced in South America and headed to path of lesser resistance by international criminals. That fragility also is apparent in the operational capacity of law enforcement 1. Peter Mendy and Richard Lobban, Jr. (Eds.), agencies to gather and act on information. Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau. Lanham: The Scarecrow Prs, 2013 Transnational organized crime in Guinea-Bissau: Perspectives, challenges and the way forward 32

European cities.2 In the sub-region, Guinea- Challenges in the fight Bissau, Guinea (Conakry), Senegal and against transnational The Gambia were particularly targeted as organized crime a northern transit hub for the illegal drug market of Southern Europe.3 Evidence of Guinea-Bissau currently faces two major drug shipments arriving in non-commercial challenges in the fight against transnational airstrips in Guinea-Bissau remain anecdotal, organized crime: (1) the limited ability of along with reported stand-offs between the national law enforcement agencies to gather police, military forces and foreign traffickers. intelligence related to organized criminal The chain of custody of confiscated drugs groups involved in drug trafficking, money became long and blurred, with seized laundering, extortion and other related illicit shipments eventually disappearing.4 activities; and (2) the lack of operational capacities to act on the information gathered The geographical location of Guinea-Bissau and effectively control entry and exit points – almost at the midpoint between major ports along national borders. An additional and and airfields in Europe and South America interrelated challenge is the presence of – makes the country highly attractive to non-state armed groups along the northern traffickers. The largely uninhabited islands border with Senegal. of the Bijagós archipelago also offer a propitious stage for undetected illicit Limited information gathering and exchange activities. Poverty, coupled with the fragility National law enforcement agencies lack of the State, make some people, including accurate information about the operation of poorly paid public servants (whether or not organized criminal groups in Guinea-Bissau, in uniform), targets of corruptive practices. as well as how they might be connected across West Africa and elsewhere. Although In the last five years, according to the records there are reasonable suspicions that the of national law enforcement agencies, police illicit drug trafficking business is connected operations in the country seized more than to other crimes such as human trafficking, 32kg of cocaine and 67kg of marijuana, money laundering and extortion, the exact most at the Bissau international airport. relationships between the groups behind Cocaine was mostly transported in capsules those activities remain unknown. ingested by individuals who had embarked from South America. To date, national law enforcement agencies have not recorded cases of interception at other land or sea 2. Stephen K. Van Riper, Tackling Africa’s First Narco- borders, which makes it difficult to assess State: Guinea-Bissau in West Africa, PKSOI Paper, September 2014. the amount actually trafficked. Most of 3. Markus Schultze-Kraft, Getting real about an illicit the suspects detained were nationals who ‘external stressor’: Transnational cocaine trafficking through West Africa, Evidence Report 72, Institute of were thought to attract less scrutiny when Development Studies, June 2014. 4. UNODC, Status of the drugs trafficking in West returning from abroad to their own country. Africa/Guinea Bissau. 33 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups

There are four police agencies in Guinea- framework of the West Africa Coast Initiative Bissau with responsibilities for combating (WACI) and supported by the United Nations organized crime, including illicit drug Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), in trafficking: the Public Order Police, the close partnership with the United Nations National Guard, the Judiciary Police and Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea- Interpol. Although the number of police Bissau (UNIOGBIS). Despite benefiting from relative to the national population is above external technical support and capacity- average, the quality of the training, the building initiatives, the TCU faces the same certification standards and the operational critical limitations as the Judiciary Police. capacity of those agencies do not always The TCU is equipped with only eight officers, meet the requirements for effective and its Chief reports that in five out of the enforcement of the rule of law. latest ten of the TCU’s cases, suspects were released almost immediately after detention. The degree to which national law Moreover, the focus of the TCU is primarily on enforcement agencies are capable of drug trafficking, which excludes addressing coordinating effective responses to the cases of money laundering, illegal arms complex operations of the networks trafficking or human trafficking.5 Since the involved in organized crime, including drug networks behind those illicit activities are trafficking, in Guinea-Bissau and West Africa believed to be interrelated,6 the focus on remains very limited. As a result, strategies a single activity hinders the prospects of a and operations to counter the expansion of holistic and effective response to the causes illegal activities in Guinea-Bissau are not as and consequences of illicit drug trafficking. integrated as they could be. Similarly, the National Guard is largely unable Inadequate operational capacity to effectively assert its authority over illegal Among the four police agencies, the land crossings or monitor the sea borders Judiciary Police holds investigative authority of Guinea-Bissau given its limited logistical for major crimes, including organized crime and technical capacities and infrastructure. and drug trafficking. The Judiciary Police For instance, during an assessment carried has 181 officers who are mostly based in the out by UNIOGBIS in September 2014 in city of Bissau. Hence, operations related to close collaboration with local authorities, drug trafficking are mostly concentrated at seven National Guard officials were found the Bissau international airport, with hardly to be monitoring 174 km of borders by foot any attention paid to the islands and the patrol.7 regions, especially the most remote ones.

The Judiciary Police hosts a specialized 5. Interview with the Chief of the Transnational Crime group tasked with combating international Unit, Bissau, 27 November 2014. 6. Schultze-Kraft, Getting real about an illicit ‘external organized crime, the Transnational stressor’. 7. UNIOGBIS, with National Guard Command Staff, Crime Unit (TCU), established under the Assessment Field Mission, 16 June-3 July 2014. Transnational organized crime in Guinea-Bissau: Perspectives, challenges and the way forward 34

The potential destabilizing role of non-state which calls for “vigorous action from all armed groups ECOWAS Member States to combat drug There are reports that members of the trafficking and organized crime”.9 WACI Movement of Democratic Forces in the aims at enhancing the capacity of national Casamance (MFDC) are illegally operating and regional law enforcement agencies in in the regions of Cacheu and Oio in the the areas of drug interdiction, forensics, northern area that borders with Senegal. intelligence, money-laundering, criminal The MFDC started in 1982 as a separatist justice and border management. movement in southern Senegal and has Within the framework of WACI, on 3 since been in dispute with Dakar over December 2010, the Ministers of Justice, territorial issues. Over the years, various Interior and Finance signed a Memorandum cease-fires have been reached between of Understanding with UNODC and the MFDC and the Senegalese military, only UNIOGBIS on the establishment of the to be repeatedly broken. Guinea-Bissau TCU in the Judiciary Police, which acts as and Senegal have since jointly planned a primary in-country point of contact in the initiatives to counter the power of the MFDC, fight against transnational organized crime, which included extrajudicial arrests and drug trafficking and cross-border matters. the exchange of members of MFDC and the militants of the Liberation Front for the UNIOGBIS, UNODC and other international National Independence of Guinea (FLING).8 organizations are also providing support to national authorities through vetting and The recent activities of the MFDC within certifying police and military personnel; the borders of Guinea-Bissau include offering capacity-building initiatives through cattle rustling from local communities, daily mentoring and advising; delivering establishment of illegal check points and specialized trainings and workshops; and attempts to control the movement of Bissau- developing standard operating procedures Guinean citizens in their own country, and national strategies and action plans. including an incident involving a convoy of the Minister of Internal Administration on 23 November 2014.

What is being done?

A number of initiatives guide the fight against transnational organized crime 8. Vincent Foucher, Wade’s Senegal and its relations in Guinea-Bissau, including the 2008 with Guinea-Bissau: Brother, patron or regional ECOWAS Political Declaration, the 2008- hegemon? Occasional Paper nº 132, South African Foreign Policy and African Drivers Programme, 2011 ECOWAS Regional Action Plan and January 2013. 9. UNODC, Status of the drug trafficking in West Africa/ the 2010 WACI Freetown Commitment, Guinea-Bissau. 35 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups

Priorities on the way forward partnership here seems to be in the interest of all concerned stakeholders, within the The newly elected Government of Guinea- region and beyond – for each border has two Bissau has been proactive in addressing sides, and for each illegal drug transaction, organized crime, despite the limited means there is a seller and a buyer. currently available. Members of Parliament are beginning to raise their voices more loudly on what was previously treated as a taboo subject. On 27 October 2014, the Popular National Assembly issued a declaration asserting its willingness to adopt and adapt existing legislation (e.g. for the confiscation of illegally obtained assets) to stamp out this illegal activity. A new Prosecutor-General and a new Head of the Judiciary Police were appointed in the first 100 days of the new Government. Those initiatives illustrate the willingness of the Bissau-Guinean institutions to address transnational organized crime .

Still, successfully addressing transnational organized crime in Guinea-Bissau will require the development of a centralized interagency communication system that can gather the necessary information and coordinate responses by law enforcement operatives. Once properly vetted, law enforcement operatives require advanced and specialized training in investigative techniques. They would also require equipment to properly monitor land and sea borders.

Ranked 177 (out of 187 countries surveyed) in the 2014 Human Development Index, Guinea-Bissau cannot do it all alone. To combat transnational organized crime, the Government stresses that it needs partners more than it needs donors. And indeed,

PART III Hostile groups and unconventional threats: sub-regional perspectives 39 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups CHAPTER 5 Non-state actors in the most fragile states: South Sudan, Somalia and Central African Republic Hilde Frafjord Johnson

Introduction elite group to attack civilians. This implies that the state has no monopoly on the use This chapter addresses the non-state armed of violence. When there is no one to protect actors in South Sudan, but also expands the communities and individuals, they must perspectives and includes cases like the fend for themselves. Central African Republic (CAR) and Somalia, Security is everyone’s most basic need – at the most fragile states. This discussion will times even more so than water and food. analyse matters of security and protection of One can manage without food and water for civilians in the absence of the state, as well a few days, and most communities in Africa as the implications for local dynamics and have coping mechanisms to handle such for the United Nations. situations. But it is much worse to feel totally The state may exist in name, but in reality vulnerable without being able to defend these countries do not have what we yourself, your family or your community. normally define as “the State” – functional If you can be subject to attacks, violence, state institutions and structures. Even loss of property, rapes or the abduction or if the entities exist, they may be largely random murder of your wife and children, dysfunctional or extremely weak – or we may you have to do something. be talking about a ‘phantom state’ (which in Security is often underestimated as the 2007 was the title of an ICG report on CAR). prime driver of the actions of individuals Despite declaring its independence on 9 and communities. Those whom we usually July 2011, South Sudan is a country virtually regard as non-state actors generally are without a functional state in the normal not people who are deviously pursuing sense of the word. In such countries, as in an agenda against the state or their own the case of CAR, the state will not protect communities; they are resorting to the the people from violence. In Somalia, the means they have to protect themselves and near absence of the state is well-known. their families. In these countries, the state’s security services and forces will either not be there Basic organizing entity: or will not be able or willing to protect the ethnicity people and their property. In some cases, in fact, the state security forces may be the In the absence of institutions of the state, ones being used by a particular ethnic or ethnicity remains the most important Non-state actors in the most fragile states: South Sudan, Somalia and Central African Republic 40

organizing entity in Africa and many other Although some claim to have religious places in the world. affiliations and ideological motives, in Somalia this is usually opportunistic. • Ethnicity becomes the only ‘institution’ Clan identity is the organizing principle you can trust; blood is thicker than of almost everything, including everything else. In security situations, protection. You bet on the horse that is this is critical: you are less likely to be likely to carry the day (or the moment), killed by your kin. until things change again. You change • Ethnicity – if well organized – is the only positions. But the fundamentals guarantee for your protection. Rather continue to be clan identity. than trying to build a neutral entity that cannot be trusted anyway, it is seen as • In South Sudan, there has been a better to improve the organization of different type of ethnic mobilization, ethnically-based security. and community security and militias have been used as more reliable • Ethnicity is a sustainable entity over protectors than the state. The next time. While armies and police may be section offers more detail about their dependent on the whims of leaders and characteristics. the unpredictability of events, ethnicity remains; it will always be with you and can always be relied upon – in the view The case of South Sudan of many kin. more specifically

This implies that non-state actors that In South Sudan, inter-communal violence develop security based on ethnicity – armed is prevalent, and the culture of cattle- youth, armed militias or even warlords, as in raiding among pastoralist cattle herders South Sudan, Somalia and, to some degree, has permeated into something else. Large- CAR (although in CAR religion has also scale armed youth with modern uniforms, been used as a mobilizing tool) – are more weapons and means of communication reliable to many people: organize like armies with command • In CAR, the Séléka and Anti-Balaka structures. This has led to columns of forces were organized to defend 6-8,000 armed youth perpetrating attacks different communities in order to fill in cycles of violence. the security vacuum following a virtual During the latest crisis and civil war in collapse of the state. While religion 2013/2014, they cooperated with more seems to play a role, the rebels also organized forces in numbers of more than have their separate regional identities. 20,000. They are all mobilized on an ethnic • In Somalia, clan-based militias and basis, primarily through the age class system. warlords have operated as the primary This led to the establishment in 1991 of the guarantors of security for decades. so-called White Army of the Nuer and the 41 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups

Galweng – a similar Dinka movement, which because inter-communal violence was no longer functions. These major ethnically based on decades of grievances and an mobilized armies of armed youth are often absence of state protection. There was seen as an affront to the state. no ideology, no political agenda and not much to negotiate; instead, it was about In addition, there are a plethora of militias repairing relations and reparation- and or warlords, also largely ethnically-based reconciliation processes that were very and often mobilized on the basis of complex. These processes take a very grievances. Many such groups prevailed long time. after independence, although there have been frequent efforts towards reconciliation • Protection of civilians: This was and reintegration to reduce the numbers extremely challenging because the operating outside the structure of the state. resources did not in any way match the needs facing the threats in this kind A critical dilemma for both categories of of hostile environment. The United non-state actors, i.e. armed youth mobilized Nations therefore lost credibility both along ethnic lines and militias, is that they with the people and the non-state protect their own community in a way that actors. U nless there is a willingness inadvertently affects others. This implies to put many more resources behind that civilians end up suffering, either a mission, this is likely to happen through direct attacks, displacement or elsewhere, too. other indirect threats. While this is not a zero sum game, it is often very likely that the • Enabling state protection through protection of one community will lead to the mandated support to state security suffering of the other. forces: Police and the rule of law are solutions that are far too complex It is also for this reason that the state’s role and long-term to be relied upon for as a neutral protector is so important, if vulnerable civilians. The United Nations indeed it can be made to function in this Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) did way. This is also why the United Nations and not have the mandate to do defense its forces can be very important if they are reform, although it was badly needed. provided with the mandate, the resources At the same time, the role of the and the capacity to act to protect civilians. police in the protection of civilians was What are the implications for the United limited. Basically, the United Nations Nations of these major threats among non- was not in a position to adequately state actors? push for the state security forces and services to significantly improve their Pre-crisis (2011-2013): own protection of civilians. • Political: Peace negotiations were conducted, but were very difficult Non-state actors in the most fragile states: South Sudan, Somalia and Central African Republic 42

During the crisis (after 15 December 2013): United Nations were also killed on two The Government’s armed forces cracked occasions. and were divided along ethnic lines, with a • UN helicopters were shot at multiple Dinka-dominated SPLA government force times, and shot down by both sides, and a non-state armed rebellion (consisting one was shot down by accident – by of opposition forces of defected SPLA and a state actor, the SPLA in 2012, and White Army of Nuer origin): another in 2014 by intention (after • Political: The United Nations had threatening) by the non-state actor. no role, but IGAD (The regional • UN staff were arrested and taken organization for the Horn of Africa) hostage – although not for long – and negotiates with both state and non- later released. state actors. While these are issues specific to South • Posture of the United Nations: Sudan and UNMISS, there are some The mission’s impartial stance was broader implications to consider. challenged because the United Nations had been seen as taking sides against the non-state actors in favour of the government in MONUSCO (the Peacekeeping Mission in the DRC), Mali and other countries when there was a crisis.

• Protection of civilians: This was impossible through engagement in battle because there was neither a mandate nor resources. As a fall-back solution, the United Nations opened the gates of its bases to more than 100,000 civilians seeking protection from the violence.

Among the implications, the foremost was the hostility towards the United Nations from both sides:

• UN bases were attacked by non-state actors – armed youth aligned with the opposition or with the government. Civilians seeking shelter with the 43 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups

Broader implications for operations.

the United Nations • Since the more extremist Somali elements are operating in Kenya – a Whatever happens in peace talks on South neighbouring country to South Sudan Sudan, the country will remain without – these groups are not far away from a functional state for a long time, as will South Sudan, Sudan or CAR. CAR is CAR and Somalia – although the cases are also not that far from Cameroon, the different. What does this imply? current hide-out for Boko Haram.

During the UNSSC-ZIF seminar in Berlin In other words, there may be a ‘belt’ of there were speakers discussing Nigeria, security vacuums across the African Mali and the spread of extremist groups continent which can be utilized by extremist across the Sahel. These are very different forces, and where the Eastern coastal-based situations with very dissimilar non-state extremists may meet the Sahel-based ones. actors. However, there are many common factors behind the decisions of communities What does this mean for and individuals to resort to violence to the United Nations? protect themselves, their families and their communities in a security vacuum. Breeding Five issues deserve further investigation and grounds for such movements develop when deliberation:

there is the sense that the state is not able 1. A regional perspective is critical across to protect its citizens. countries. A national focus does not work when facing these challenges. • Although there are different cases,

the same issues often apply: When 2. At the same time, our focus must be there is a weak state, the absence of local. We need to keep our ears to the security and protection permits more ground, and in particular among youth. extreme movements to operate in local People operate locally, are betrayed areas. Communities allow them to be locally (by their national leaders) and there, because it is better to have some are recruited locally. We need to know security than to have none. what’s going on where things happen – on the ground, in the field. • CAR and South Sudan are less prone to become breeding grounds for the same 3. Local people’s main issue – their ideologically-based extremist groups as protection – must be of the highest recruitment is more difficult for a variety priority to the army, police, rule of of reasons. However, there is always a law institutions, the United Nations risk that countries without functional and the international community, and state institutions may be used as hide- we are not doing this well. Otherwise, outs or launching pads for extremist people will resort to non-state actors for Non-state actors in the most fragile states: South Sudan, Somalia and Central African Republic 44

protection, whether they arm their own community youth or ethnicity-based groups or permit extremist groups to operate in their territory. This work has a national basis, but must be done across borders.

4. We need to focus on incentives and disincentives for joining armed non- state actors: What are the drivers? How can the incentives be changed? And in the case of extremist groups, how can disincentives be effectively applied?

5. The United Nations is best positioned as a political actor to talk to all parties in a conflict, whatever their background, position or ideological stand. It is different for countries/Member States who can choose whom to relate to in their bilateral relations. The United Nations, on the other hand, is a global organization, and has a special role to play. If the United Nations is not seen as the interlocutor that can relate to all, then the world community and all unprotected people around the world will be the losers. 45 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups CHAPTER 6 The Case of Boko Haram in Nigeria Ahmed Rufai Abubakar

Introduction Boko Haram had actually been carrying out terrorist activities since 2010, first On the night of 14–15 April 2014, about against police and military formations and 270 female students were abducted from personnel mainly in the states of Adamawa, a government secondary school in Chibok Borno and Yobe. These activities gradually town in Borno State, Nigeria. The Jama’atu grew in scope and intensity, and were Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-jihad (People eventually carried out against soft targets Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s as well (e.g. schools, churches, mosques, Teachings and Struggle), popularly known as markets/shopping centres, motor parks, “Boko Haram”, claimed responsibility. The petrol stations). Thousands of civilians have international community expressed outrage, been killed, while thousands others have which quickly developed into a sense of suffered injuries, displacement and loss of urgency to take coordinated and effective businesses and property as victims of direct action to stop the terrorist group. A summit Boko Haram attacks or of Government of the Heads of State of the Governments of responses against the insurgents. It is Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria pertinent to note that Boko Haram had was quickly convened in Paris on 17 May, carried out a suicide bomb attack against the where a number of regional initiatives against UN building in Abuja on 26 August 2011, the terrorist groups were agreed upon. Many killing 21 and wounding 60. This came less countries and organizations undertook to than two months after the group carried out support Nigeria’s efforts to address the an attack inside the police headquarters in insurgency. The UN Secretary-General Abuja, targeting the Inspector-General of designated his Special Representative Police. for West Africa to serve as his High-Level Representative for Nigeria. In Nigeria, the Five years into its insurgency, far from abduction led to calls for a more drastic being defeated or weakened, Boko Haram response by the Government, not only to seems to have grown stronger and become secure the safe release of the abducted school better organized, resourced and supplied. girls, but to generally address the scourge in a Eight months after the mass abduction of more comprehensive way. Consequently, the 15 April, the Chibok girls are still in Boko Nigerian Government intensified its response, Haram’s custody and more girls and women in addition to the state of emergency that have been abducted by the group, which had been imposed on the three states of now controls territories in the three most- Adamawa, Bormo and Yobe since May 2013. affected states. The Case of Boko Haram in Nigeria 46

Who are Boko Haram insurgents? What is some of whom were unsuspecting – and their social background and what are their an increasing number of disciples from objectives? Do they have an organizational disenfranchised youths, including from structure? How do they recruit and conduct neighbouring Chad, Cameroon and Niger, their operations? This chapter will attempt the group quickly grew in size and spread to answer these questions within its limited into Yobe, Bauchi and even far away Niger scope. states. Authorities generally left the group alone until its rebellious character began to manifest, leading to sporadic clashes with Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna law enforcement agents. Lidda’awati Wal-jihad (Boko Haram) Guiding principles In the early 2000s, a group of radical youths The group’s known guiding principles in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State, include: denounced the clerical leadership of the Islamic establishment for being morally • All power is for Allah, and democratic and politically corrupt. Inspired by the hijra governance conflicts with Islam. (Mohammed’s flight from Mecca to Medina), • The group is a saved sect and is they left the city to set up a “true” Islamic carrying out the duty of reviving the society based on a strict interpretation of spirit of struggle (jihad) in Nigeria. sharia law in Kanama, a small village in Yobe State near the border with Niger. In • Western education schools were December 2003, the group, which by then established to serve missionary and had been given the attention-grabbing name colonial ideals and interests: Girls and “Nigerian Taliban” by the press, clashed boys are mixed in classes, and concepts with the police following a dispute with local and theories such as Darwin’s theory fishermen. A heavy-handed crackdown by of biological evolution conflict with security forces ensued, during which most the tenets of Islam. Because of this, of the group members (estimated to be Western schools should be forbidden around 60 at the time) were killed.1 and not attended. Hence the attribute of “Boko Haram”.3 Sometime in 2004, a handful of remnants of the “Nigerian Taliban” reemerged in Maiduguri, now under the leadership of 1. Thorough background on this phase of the insurgency, known among observers as the Kanama Mohammed Yusuf, a charismatic young period, can be found in Perouse de Montclos, Marc- Antoine (2014). Boko Haram: Islamism, politics, man. A mosque named after the influential security and the state in Nigeria. African Studies Wahhabi scholar Ibn Taimiyyah2 served as Centre. Leiden 2. Walker, Andrew (2012). What is Boko Haram? the headquarters of the group. Spurred by United States Institute of Peace. 3. The name means “Western” or “non-Islamic” donations from local and foreign donors – education is a sin. 47 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups

• Government employment (civil or the same mosque in Maiduguri. Every year military service) is forbidden under during the month of Ramadan, Sheikh Adam current dispensation. travelled from Kano all the way to Maiduguri where he interpreted Qur’an in a mosque Meanwhile, a number of sources spoke owned by a well-known businessman and of an association between the group and philanthropist to avid Hausa-speaking a democratically elected Governor in disciples. Mohamed Yusuf, who resided in Borno State, obviously for mutual benefits: the capital city, preached in both Kanuri and the Governor achieves political aims4 in Hausa languages. The two split, reportedly return for financial support he extends to around 2002-2004, over issues related to the group. It was reported that Mohamed the guiding principles and objectives of the Yusuf, the group’s founder, enjoyed political group. The assassination of Sheikh Adam protection and largess from the Government was, in retrospect, seen as the first act of due to this relationship. religious/political violence by the group.

The group continued its confrontation with Objectives authorities while expanding its base. Yusuf Other than the above-mentioned guiding released several videos where he condemned principles, the only known founding Western education and lambasted the objective of the group is the establishment political class in Nigeria. In July 2009, the lid of an Islamic state headed by an “Imam”. on the simmering tensions blew off as Boko How this was going to be achieved was not Haram members clashed with local police described in their writing and preaching. in Maiduguri for refusing to wear helmets as However, Mohamed Yusuf was regarded they drove their motorbikes to a funeral of as the Imam and received allegiance from one of their comrades. A number of Boko young disciples. Moreover, members of the Haram members were injured in the fracas, group were also increasingly disregarding and about six consequently died. state laws, while also taking the law into Mohamed Yusuf wrote an open letter to the their own hands. federal Government, giving it an ultimatum In April 2007, Sheik Ja’afar Mahmoud of 40 days to resolve the crisis or threatening Adam, a popular cleric who had criticized that the country would face “jihad the group’s interpretation of the Qur’an, was operations”. If there was any response to killed by gunmen in his mosque in Kano, this letter, or any form of dialogue between and all fingers pointed to Boko Haram. The late Adam, a graduate of Madinah University in Saudi Arabia and a Wahhabi reformist, was at some point a teacher of Mohamed Yusuf and had commended Yusuf for his 4. Harnischfeger, Johannes (2014). Boko Haram and its Muslim critics: Observations from Yobe State. brilliance. Also both of them preached in African Studies Centre. Leiden. The Case of Boko Haram in Nigeria 48 the group and the local authorities, the • freeing their detained comrades from records were not readily available and, in detention centres; and any case, because of the restrictive scope • making Nigeria ungovernable. of this paper, we are unable to present a detailed study of what happened, including As with many non-state armed groups, it is efforts made by authorities. However, what clear that Boko Haram had multiple agendas followed were attacks against police stations and objectives that evolved according to and personnel in Maiduguri and a number circumstances. It is pertinent to note that of towns and villages in northeastern the movement found inspiration not only Nigeria. Security forces deployed to the in ideology, but also in the social rebellion Borno State capital subsequently retaliated against what they rightly or wrongly saw as and reportedly embarked on a bloody injustice and oppression. This is a founding campaign, rounding up and executing narrative seen in many other Islamist hundreds of suspected Boko Haram terrorist organizations. For instance, in the members. On 28 July, Government troops frequent videos the movement releases, attacked Yusuf’s home where his disciples Shekau is filmed against a backdrop of the barricaded themselves, and on 30 July same “Rayat al-uqab” black banner flag he was captured and subsequently killed with the Arabic inscription used by ISIL. in what has since been understood to be an extrajudicial execution carried out in a Social background police station. and context

Fifty or so disciples, including Abubakar The advent of Islam in northern Nigeria Shekau, the Vice-Chairman, reportedly dates back to the ninth century (1000 escaped and fled Nigeria, only to regroup AD), hundreds of years before colonialism over the next year in AQIM-administered reached the region in the nineteenth century. training camps in Mauritania and other parts The religious landscape was calm and quiet of the Sahel. The group reemerged in June for almost 800 years until the emergence 2010, announcing its link with Al-Qaeda of two reformers in the eighteenth century: and a new set of objectives, including: Sheik Usman dan Fodio, in the areas that • revenge for the extrajudicial killing of today are referred to as the northwest, north their spiritual leader in particular, and central and part of the northeast of the for what was believed to be a heavy country; and Mohamed Amin El Kanemi, in and indiscriminate reprisal against the the remaining parts of the northeast and the group. Their targets include defense territories beyond the present-day borders and security personnel and Christians into Chad. The practice, then, of mixing as well as Muslims who refuse to Islamic rites and paganism on the one adhere to their principles; hand and the repressive culture of the local 49 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups

authorities on the other hand inspired dan 2. Salafism/Wahhabism: Many African Fodio in particular to start social and political scholars – including Bakary Sambe, a reform based on the Sunni Maliki School researcher at the Center of the Study of Islam. However, way into the colonial of Religions, University Gaston Berger period and shortly after independence, in Saint-Louis and coordinator of the religious landscape became one of the Observatory of Radicalisms and continuous mutation, characterized by a Religious Conflicts in Africa – have multiplicity of tendencies, two of which were argued that Salafists and Wahhabis invariably predominant: believe that they are the only correct interpreters of the Qur’an and consider 1. The “Boko Haram” syndrome: Western moderate Muslims to be infidels. They education was not only seen as therefore seek to convert all Muslims and synonymous with colonialism and to ensure that their own fundamentalist Christianity, but also as supplanting version of Islam prevails. In any case, Islamic/Arabic schools and creating a Nigerian students in the middle-eastern new elite. Those who went to western countries were exposed to this reality schools became the new set of leaders, and to the growing sectarian divides while those who refused to go or to send in the Middle East and beyond among their wards saw themselves increasingly Sunni, Sufi, Shi’a, etc. Related events marginalized and impoverished. While were broadcast live so that everyone the Islamic school system continued, could see them and become inspired. those who emerged from those schools The 1979 Iranian revolution completed were not admitted into Nigerian the picture. universities, no matter how brilliant they were, because they did not have Again, it is pertinent to quickly mention the two main requirements: credit in that it is beyond the scope of this paper English and mathematics. In the mid- to present a detailed study of how the 1970s, some universities in the north combination of religious and colonial history made provisions for admitting such and practices in northern Nigeria and the students for specially designed courses reformist tendencies and sectarian divides of studies – mainly Arabic and Hausa in the Islamic world helped to shape languages, as well as Islamic studies the social background of Boko Haram’s and sharia law. Many of these students leaders. However, this simplistic exposé ended up getting scholarships to study should provide enough insights to allow an in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Sudan understanding of the historical context and where reformist ideas and activities background that define the thinking and (e.g. Salafism/Wahhabism) had already indeed the personalities of the Boko Haram taken root. insurgents. Mr. Yusuf himself was said to be a school dropout. He went to “Boko” The Case of Boko Haram in Nigeria 50 western school. At one time he joined people died, including Maitatsine himself. Ibraheem Yakub El Zakzaky to found the His followers, labeled as “the fanatics” Islamic Movement of Nigeria (a Shia group). by the press, dispersed and staged other He left and joined the Izala group and uprisings in Bulunkutu (near Maiduguri), trained under Sheikh Jaafar Adam before Kabuga in Kano, and Yola in the following forming his own movement. years which were all brutally suppressed by security forces with casualties running into Other relevant social factors include: poverty; the thousands. In Nigeria, violence over youth unemployment; environmental religious and sectarian lines, especially in degradation; population explosion; lack connection with elections, can break out on of government presence; political actors a regular basis.6 using youth as thugs for self-protection and political gain; political discourse over power rotation between the North and South; and Organizational structure the amnesty programme for the Niger Delta Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-jihad Militant groups (this was added by former (People Committed to the Propagation of President Obasanjo). The northeastern the Prophet’s Teachings and Struggle) is region is the poorest part of Nigeria, where the name of the group, which never refers 71.5 percent of the population lives in to itself as Boko Haram. Surprisingly little absolute poverty and more than half are is known about the group’s structure and malnourished. This provides the conditions internal dynamics. Its strategic goals are not conducive to radicalization of youth and very well-defined and seem to be evolving. their recruitment for terrorist activities.5 While the group at times makes references Boko Haram, however, is not the first of to other hardline groups such as Al-Shabab, its kind in northern Nigeria. The region Al-Qaeda and ISIL, Boko Haram is not has had an extended history of ethno- believed to have any formal operational religious violence since independence. In cooperation with global Islamic jihad. the 1980s, a violent Islamist sect called It is believed to have a cell-like structure Maitatsine grew out of the slums of Kano. governed by a 30-person Shura Council, Its leader, Muhammadu Marwa, declared where each member is responsible for a himself a prophet and attracted a huge geographical area with operatives, under following by preaching against affluent the leadership of Shekau. There are likely Muslims and Western materialism and four main factions within Boko Haram actively recruiting and arming young boys. Anyone seen with a bicycle, watch, radio or excessive amount of money was considered an “infidel”. In December 1980, security 5. Figures based on UNICEF’s 2014 assessments. 6. Further backgroud to the Maitatsine uprising can be forces led an extremely bloody clampdown found in Isichei, E. (1987). The Maitatsine Risings in Nigeria 1980-85: A revolt of the disinherited. Journal of of the sect in Kano, during which 4,177 Religion in Africa. Vol. 17, pp. 194-208. 51 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups

that operate independently of each other.7 mission to Cameroon interviewed locals This structure might explain the lack of who claimed that new recruits were lured consistency in the group’s attacks, which with the sum of 300,000 Naira (US$1,600), follow no clear tactical logic as could be a motorbike and an AK-47 rifle to join the expected of a group with a centralized insurgency. decision-making structure/mechanism. From its hit-and-runs on police and security The hierarchy of Boko Haram is dominated forces, financed by bank robberies and by Kanuri people, an ethnic group that occasional kidnappings, Boko Haram has straddles across borders in Nigeria, Niger, shifted tactics to the deliberate targeting of Cameroon and Chad. As a diaspora, Kanuris civilians as well as schools, churches and also live in large numbers in CAR, Saudi mosques. After the Chibok kidnappings, Arabia and Sudan. There are questions they began to seize and hold territory. In about a possible hidden agenda to redefine July 2014, the group captured its first borders and re-establish the Kanem Bornu settlement when it overran and seized the Empire, which at its height encompassed an town of Damboa in Borno. The capture area covering northeastern Nigeria, eastern of the town of some 20,000 inhabitants, Niger, northern Cameroon and much of which is home to army and police barracks, Chad. marked the start of a blitzing campaign of territorial conquests as Boko Haram took control of a dozen or more local government Recruitment and methodology areas in Borno State during August. This culminated with the capture of Bama, the Since the kidnapping of the Chibok second-largest city in the state, located only school girls, Boko Haram appears to have some 100 kilometers from Maiduguri. After embarked on a near systematic campaign a weeklong battle in the city of Konduga, of abductions and forcible conscription of the military pushed Boko Haram back from teenage boys and girls, taken during raids the state capital. However, as of November, of villages in the northeast and reportedly Boko Haram is believed to be in control of indoctrinated in radical Qur’an schools. at least 18 local government areas, roughly Some served as child soldiers who are comprising a territory the size of Belgium. allegedly used to obtain intelligence, In August, Boko Haram leader Shekau conduct recognizance and serve as lookouts announced that the city of Gwoza had been before being sent to the frontlines during Boko Haram’s raids of military infrastructure or civilian settlements, where they often form the “first wave” of the attack. However, 7. Walker, Andrew (2012). What is Boko Haram? nited there are also indications that Boko Haram States Institute of Peace. 8. The United Nations Office of West Africa (UNOWA) is increasingly offering monetary incentives. and the United Nations Office for Central Africa 8 (UNOCA) are Special Political Missions led by the A recent UNOWA-UNOCA assessment Department of Political Affairs (DPA) The Case of Boko Haram in Nigeria 52 placed under an Islamic caliphate and that Extreme North province in Cameroon. Niger sharia law would be enforced. Witness and Chad are also directly affected. The dispositions coming from Mubi, a key city Paris Summit of 17 May 2014 decided on in Adamawa State seized and renamed in a number of initiatives and measures at a late October, describe brutal enforcement of regional level. These include: Islamic law, including hand-decapitations, • Real-time intelligence-sharing: lashings and executions that could suggest Intelligence Fusion Units has been that Boko Haram is increasingly instituting established with the support of partners; governance systems in its captured areas. • Operationalization of the Joint The use of suicide bombs and improvised Multinational Task Force (JMNTF): explosive devices began with attacks in Almost all Member Countries are Abuja in the summer of 2011. The number deployed; of these kinds of attacks, which have almost exclusively been carried out in northern • Establishment of the headquarters of Nigeria, reached a peak in 2012 and again the JMNTF: this has not yet been done; in 2014. Boko Haram has also used young • Counter-terrorism strategy: This has girls as suicide bombers. In the Ramadan been developed but not yet adopted for month in July 2014, female suicide implementation. bombers, all under 16 years old, carried out four successful attacks on universities and fuel stations in Kano. The decision to send Response by the United Nations young girls to the front lines is believed to The UN response to the Boko Haram threat have been taken by Hafsat Mako, a widow has taken different and complementary of a Boko Haram commander, who was forms: arrested in late July 2014.9 1. Following the Chibok kidnapping, the Secretary-General appointed a The regional High-Level Representative to Nigeria: dimension/response High-Level Consultations; member As the insurgency continues to grow in of the Paris Summit Follow up strength, the spill-over to neighbouring meetings; UNOWA participated in the countries is becoming more evident. Since development of a CTS; August 2014, Boko Haram has intensified its cross-border raids into Cameroon and has been engaged in fierce firefights and exchanges of rockets and artillery with its army, especially around the Fotokol, which 9. Zenn, Jacob; Pearson, Elizabeth (2014). Women, Gender and the Evolving Tactics of Boko Haram. lies strategically at the opening of the vast Journal of Terrorism Research. University of St. Andrews. 53 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups

2. The High Commissioner for Human and the United Nations Development Rights visited in March 2014 and the Programme) also meets regularly to Deputy Secretary-General visited in assess the situation and provides August 2014. technical support to the Senior Action group. Furthermore, the Counter- 3. An Integrated Support Package was Terrorism Implementation Task Force developed by the United Nations plans to provide support to the Nigerian Country Team (UNCT) Abuja, and the Government’s soft approach strategy Strategic Response Plan and the United and build human rights capacity for the Nations Development Assistance security forces. Framework (UNDAF) 2014-2017 have

been adapted to reflect the conflict and 8. A Rights Up Front Assessment Mission humanitarian context. was deployed to Nigeria from 24-28

4. The Resident Coordinator was November 2014, and a light team will appointed to double as the be deployed to support. Humanitarian Coordinator, and a Peace and Development Advisor and Challenges faced by the a Senior Human Rights Officer have United Nations been recruited.

5. Several agencies have strengthened The challenges faced by the United Nations their presence, and the Office for the in its response include: Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs • inadequate capacities on the ground, (OCHA) will establish a full-fledged including staffing and funding. This office in early 2015. The UNCT has a is being addressed through the contingency plan on the humanitarian deployment of a light team and more consequences of potential election- funding; related violence. • the absence of effective coordination of 6. The Government of Nigeria was humanitarian services in the affected reluctant to give its consent for UN areas. Only a small percentage of agencies/other aid organizations to people in need of humanitarian bring needed assistance and support assistance have access to support; in the northeast. • the need to effect a change in the 7. At Headquarters, a Senior Action Group attitude of security forces regarding chaired by Deputy Secretary-General respect for human rights; and meets regularly and gives guidance on the UN response. An Inter-Agency • a lack of UN presence at all in the Task Force on Nigeria (co-chaired areas under the control of Boko Haram, by the Department of Political Affairs because of insecurity. The Case of Boko Haram in Nigeria 54

Conclusion support and care they may require. Their parents cry their hearts out every day. Like most armed insurgencies, Boko Haram 2. Young women and girls as young as has not emerged from a vacuum, and neither ten years old are being indoctrinated was it the first insurgent group in Nigeria. and used as suicide bombers in public The factors that led to the emergence of places such as markets and schools. Boko Haram and other such groups before It is believed that many of them have it are deeply rooted in past and present already become victims of the conflict, and need to be deeply understood and having lost one or both parents in it. addressed comprehensively. Therefore, a multi-dimensional approach is required 3. Women activists have joined together to permanently resolve the crisis. Nigeria and formed the “Bring Back Our is believed to have the material capacity Girls Movement”, following the mass but requires technical assistance, and this abduction of the Chibok school girls. is where the United Nations can make a Since April 2014, they came out every day difference. The Organization has taken the in Abuja to advocate for the safe release right approach in this regard. of all abductees, but also to organize material and psycho-social support for Finally, this contribution will not end without their families and for the escapees. They mentioning how women in particular feature contribute substantively in the national in the Boko Haram insurgency and the debate on the comprehensive approach efforts to address it. It is generally said that needed to fight violent extremism and in all conflicts, women and children are the terrorism as well as its consequences. In most affected and victimized, even though doing so, these women not only sacrificed they may have little to do with the root or the comfort of their home and their superficial causes of the conflicts. The Boko professional obligations, but exposed Haram conflict is no exception: themselves to threats and hazards. 1. Women and girls are frequently All of these groups of women and girls kidnapped in large numbers, such as deserve, in different ways, to be rescued in the abduction of the Chibok school and/or supported. girls. Except for the few who were able to escape, none of the abductees had been released at the time of this writing, and more are still being kidnapped. Most worrisome is that except for the disturbing hint given by the leaders of the group about the fate that awaited the abductees, nobody knows where they are, nor can anyone provide the 55 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups CHAPTER 7 The Islamic State: Origins, evolution and implications for the United Nations Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou

Introduction – a group to which the Islamic State is related but also qualitatively distinct from in Over the past year, the group now commonly important ways. known as the Islamic State (al Dawla al Islamiya) has taken centre stage in matters A complex genealogy of international security. With impressive swiftness, this seemingly-new yet decade- The Islamic State was born five times. old organization has steadily moved from (1) a domestic concern in Iraq, from where In the late 1990s, ‘Arab Afghan’ Abu Musab it sprung; to (2) a regional threat in the al Zarqawi (Ahmed Fadil Nazzal al Khalayla) Levant and, more widely, in the Middle East returned to his home country of Jordan and North Africa; to (3) a global issue. The after having spent most of that decade in group’s actions have raised a number of Afghanistan. In mid-1999, he established questions related to its nature, its evolution a radical Islamist group named Jama’at — recent and forecastable — and the al Tawhid wal Jihad (the Group of Unity consequences of this manifestation. and Jihad). The organization remained underground until the United States’ This chapter provides an overview of the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, at which historical background of the Islamic State time it became the first group to actively and highlights the nature of the challenges lead insurgency operations against US and it is raising, particularly for the United UK troops, as well as the United Nations. Nations. It argues that this group is at once Al Zarqawi, who had moved to Iraq in May the embodiment of latter-day transnational 2002, gained an international profile and non-state armed groups’ dynamics and, became of operational interest to Osama per se, an innovation by such groups’ Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda after the attacks evolved standards. Accordingly, efforts he conducted that year on the Jordanian at re-conceptualizing the nature of the embassy in Baghdad on 7 August and organization and devising strategies towards on the United Nations compound on 19 it are needed. This is all the more so because August. so far, policy mapping of the Islamic State has been generally pursued along the After making contacts with Al Qaeda’s familiar lines of what was previously done number two, Ayman al Dhawahiri, and throughout the 2000s to counter Al Qaeda in the context of the group’s mid-2000s The Islamic State: Origins, evolution and implications for the United Nations 56 franchising strategy,1 Al Zarqawi announced (also known as Abu Du’a), ISI remained the on 17 October 2004 that his Jama’at al dominant radical Sunni extremist group in Tawhid wal Jihad was folding itself into Iraq for six and a half years. Then, on 9 April Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda and becoming 2013, ISI was expanded under the name Tandhim Al Qaeda fi Bilad al Rafidayn of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (the Organization of Al Qaeda in the Land (al Dawla al Islamiya fil Iraq wal Shaam, of the Two Rivers, known as Al Qaeda in ISIL or ISIS for the Islamic State in Iraq and Iraq, or AQI). This second incarnation of Syria). Finally, on 29 June 2014, Abu Bakr what would ultimately be the Islamic State al Baghdadi, who had remained at the helm was important but short-lived, as AQI was of the different incarnations of the groups fundamentally associated with al Zarqawi’s since May 2010, announced the creation high-profile and staccato attacks in Iraq in of the Islamic State as the Islamic Caliphate 2004-2005. Featured in a 5 February 2003 with himself as the new Caliph under the United Nations Security Council briefing name Ibrahim. during which US Secretary of State Colin Understanding the above complex tapestry Powell presented him as a leading emergent is important, as the genealogy of ISIS holds threat, al Zarqawi also distinguished himself the key to its current multifacetedness from Al Qaeda by introducing two key and points to different potential policy elements which would remain important in approaches. Is the Islamic State primarily this context in the coming years, namely his an Iraqi story? Or an Iraqi story evolved intra-Islam factionalist attacks on the Shia into a Syrian one? Or, as the Zarqawi-Bin and his brutality (encapsulated notably by Laden original association would indicate, the videotaped beheading of US citizen a project which always harboured a global Nicholas Berg on 7 May 2004). dimension? In point of fact, the Islamic State Al Zarqawi was killed by a US air raid on is all of the above. 7 June 2006, and with his disappearance In hindsight, what emerges is the picture the link to the global project of Al Qaeda of an entity passively present in Iraq before started to decline. Indeed, four months the US invasion in 2003 which seized the later, on 15 October, the Islamic State in Iraq opportunity to unleash its operations. It (ISI) was created, overtaking AQI. (Earlier, on January 15, an umbrella organization to which AQI had adhered – Majliss al 1. In the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks and in the context of the Global War on Terror, Al Shura al Mujahideen, the Council of the Qaeda accelerated its global strategy and spawned six off-shoots: Tandhim al Qaeda fi Bilad al Rafidayn or Combatants – had been briefly set up.) Led Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), Tandhim al Qaeda fil Jazira al Arabiya or Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), successively by Abu Hamza al Muhajir (also Tandhim Al Qaeda fil Maghrib al Islami or Al Qaeda in known as Abu Ayuub al Masri), Abu Omar the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Qaedat al Jihad fi Oroba or Al Qaeda in Europe, Tandhim al Qaeda fi Misr or Al al Baghdadi (Hamid Daoud Mohammed Qaeda in Egypt and Qaedat al Jihad fil Khorasan or Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Only the first three – AQI, AQAP Khalil al Zawi) and Abu Bakr al Baghdadi and AQIM – would become full-fledged independent franchises. 57 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups

then temporarily folded itself into Al Qaeda, of the past, and that the future of radical then joined a nationwide Iraqi insurgency Islam laid in the hands of the Islamic State’s platform and then seized the opportunity of ‘Caliph’ Abu Bakr al Baghdadi and not Bin the Syria conflict to reactivate its operations Laden’s successor, Ayman al Dhawahiri. and move on to claim a regional and, Post-globalization transnational non-state ultimately, international leadership of radical armed groups feature such competitiveness Islamism. in their approach, as they have to constantly up the ante to distinguish themselves from An ambitious trajectory other groups. Al Qaeda had introduced this reinvention of the terrorism2 matrix, and Therefore, the evolution of the Islamic subsequent groups sought to emulate it. State is importantly a combination of (1) Yet no group has been able to emerge as an independently-moving battle plan, now able to pursue Al Qaeda’s plan and indeed focused on Iraq, now centred on Syria; and potentially transcend it until the Islamic State (2) an adaptation to domestic and regional developed an ambitious new narrative in contingencies. In this inherent duality and 2012-2014. The sequence of emancipation flexibility lies one of the strengths of the is revealing and takes us to where the group Islamic State: its forward-looking versatility. stands at this juncture. This is what allows it to present its struggle By mid-to-late 2010, ISI was at a strategic continuously under the perception of dead-end. Since January 2007, the United urgency: the immediate need to resist the States, with the collaboration of a number US invasion in 2003-2006, the necessity to of Iraqi tribes from the Al Anbar province, oppose Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki had been pushing against the group in the and his Shiite militias in 2006-2011 and context of a new military strategy known the imperative to go to battle against Syrian as ‘The Surge’, limiting its ability to deploy President Bashar al Assad and his Alawite throughout Iraq. Similarly, rifts had been troops since 2012. growing with Al Qaeda, and ISI, led by Abu The ability to stay the course and reinvent Bakr al Baghdadi, was feeling the need to itself is what makes the Islamic State potent. rework its strategy. Three unexpected events Consequently, the Islamic State ‘brand’ has allowed it to successfully do precisely that: ensured a certain depth in relation to its (1) the Arab Spring which started in January social and religious milieu. Most importantly, 2011; (2) the death of Bin Laden in May; and it has avoided the perception that it was, at (3) the Syrian civil war from June onwards. any given time, ‘finished’. In fact, quite the

opposite: in the most recent phase, it has 2. See Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, been ambitious enough to decree that its “Al Qaeda and the Reinvention of Terrorism: Social Sciences and the Challenge of Post-Globalisation ‘mother organization’, Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda, Transnational Political Violence”, in Jussi M. Hanhimäki and Bernhard Blumenau, eds., An International History was, for all intents and purposes, a thing of Terrorism, New York: Routledge, 2013, pp. 230-244. The Islamic State: Origins, evolution and implications for the United Nations 58

Seeing the rebirth opportunity offered by Al Dhawahiri’s statements were indicative of this coincidence of events, al Baghdadi, Al Qaeda’s weakness and ISIS/ISIL’s rising in September 2011, set in motion a plan power. Again realizing the potential move aimed at positioning his group at the centre to make, al Baghdadi chose to ignore the of these changes. The first component injunctions and moved to accelerate his concerned the revamping of ISI’s soldiery group’s plan. In December 2013/January in Iraq. Al Baghdadi oversaw a number 2014, he entered the most ambitious of prison breaks to free the most ruthless phase so far in the group’s history. ISIS/ISIL operators whom he appointed, alongside initiated a two-step plan meant to position it middle-aged former Iraqi army officers (in within the next six months (before Ramadan its heyday up until the early 2000s, the of 2014) as the leading insurgency force Iraqi Republican Guard was a feared and in both Iraq and Syria. ISIS/ISIL battled well-organized corps), as his lieutenants to a coalition of eight small- and mid-sized increase the group’s lethality. Gulf-sponsored Islamist groups in the area around Aleppo, Syria known as Jaysh al Subsequently, in January 2012, al Baghdadi Mujahidin (the Army of the Fighters). It dispatched representatives to Syria to meet managed to defeat it as well as the Supreme with the newly-formed Jabhat al Nosra (the Military Command of the Free Syrian Army Victory Front) – a Syrian radical Islamist (Jaish Souriya al Hor, FSA) and established group opposed to Assad – to discuss control, albeit in a fragile way, of key sectors operational collaboration across the Iraqi- in northeastern Syria, in particular the Syrian border. On 9 April 2013, al Baghdadi city of Raqqa. Subsequently, most Syrian announced that his group was becoming cities straddling the border with Iraq were the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant/Syria captured by ISIS/ISIL: Tal Hamis, Shaddadi, (al Dawla al Islamiya fil Iraq wal Shaam) Markada, Suwar, Hraiji, Abu Hammam, with Jabhat al Nosra integrated into it. The Hajjin and Bukkamal. move was denied by Jabhat al Nosra whose On the strength of this show of force, ISIS/ leader, Abu Mohamed al Jolani (previously ISIL turned back to Iraq where it seized close to the Al Qaeda-supporting Lebanese control of Iraq’s second biggest city, Mosul, group, Junud al Shaam, the Soldiers of the on 10 June 2014. Over the next months, and Levant) declared the next day that Jabhat while positioning a force of 3,000 or so men al Nosra had not joined ISIL/ISIS and that in Raqqa as the centrepiece of its presence it remained faithful to Al Qaeda. The break in Syria, the group moved on to seize in with Al Qaeda became formal and public parallel the Iraqi cities of Siniyah, Sharqat, when at two occasions, on 23 May and Saadiya, Anah, Rawah, Habbaniya, Tal Afar, 7 November, Al Qaeda’s current leader, Falluja, Mahmoudiya, Traybil, Tikrit, Abu Ayman al Dhawahiri, announced that these Ghraib, Sinjar, Yarmouq and Al Qadisiya. moves by ISI had not been authorized and condemned them. 59 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups

Innovations and responses foreign Islamist radicals from some 80 countries around the world who have To mark the success of his group at the travelled, at times with their families, acme of this advance, ISIS/ISIL spokesman to the cities the group controls in Syria Abou Mohammed al Adnani announced on and Iraq; 29 June 2014 that the group was now the Islamic State and that his leader, Abu Bakr • built up a solid economic basis al Baghdadi, was the Caliph of the Muslim based on oil sales from fields under Umma (community of Muslim believers) its control (notably the oil fields near around the world as Caliph Ibrahim. the Iraqi city of Kirkuk seized on 17 June), providing large-scale financial Over the past months, the Islamic State revenues (estimates are US$1 million has moved to cement this unprecedented per month) that allow it to provide show of force by a non-state armed group. salaries to thousands of militants; and Specifically, the Islamic State has: • invested in media-savvy electronic • displaced Al Qaeda,3 both within communication with state-of-the-art Islamist radical circles and vis-à- videos regularly released to impress vis its state enemies, regionally and foes and friends alike. internationally; Battling an international coalition on two • secured the formal support of several fronts, displaying a flag, holding vast leading radical Islamist groups in the territory over two countries, fielding close Middle East and North Africa, Sub- to 30,000 men and planning to release its Saharan Africa and Asia: Jama’at al currency, as announced on 13 November, Tawhid wal Jihad fi Gharb Ifriqiya (the the Islamic State, in a short period of time, Movement for Unification and Jihad in has positioned itself as the most powerful West Africa, MUJAO) on 11 July 2014; transnational non-state armed group, Boko Haram in Nigeria on 13 July; relegating the global threat of Al Qaeda to Ansar al Sharia (the Partisans of the second place. Sharia) in Derna, Libya on 31 October; Ansar Beit al Maqdis (the Partisans Such actions call today for an updated of the Holy House) in Egypt on 10 understanding of what this ambition means November; and JundAllah (Soldiers of for external actors, notably the United God) in Pakistan on 17 November; Nations. The following dimensions are key in the pursuit of such an exercise: • generated new groups being set up in its name, such as Junud al Khilafa (the Soldier of the Caliphate) in Algeria in September 2014; 3. On this issue, see Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, ISIS and the Deceptive Rebooting of Al Qaeda, Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Policy, • attracted approximately 15,000 August 2014. The Islamic State: Origins, evolution and implications for the United Nations 60

• The Islamic State is both a territorial group and a transnational one. Accordingly, engagement with it has to simultaneously consider contiguity and evanescence.

• The Islamic State has a dominant leader, but it is also spread over a large territory where local leaders/middle managers hold significant power. This is buttressed by the fact that the group is increasingly welcoming allegiances to it, which means accommodation of a measure of decentralized power.

• Engagement with the Islamic State can be engineered through focus on Iraq or focus on Syria, but not without considering both centres concurrently. This implies calibrating responses to different political situations and different social landscapes.

• The Islamic State has demonstrated a high level of violence and extremist rhetoric, significantly curtailing any realistic options for non-military engagement. Yet, the global use of force did not defeat Al Qaeda over the past decade; it was ultimately overtaken precisely by internal competition and not counter-terrorism measures. This indicates that creative thinking is required in the face of this most unconventional and fast-changing group. 61 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups CHAPTER 8 Armed groups in Mali and implications for the UN stabilization mission Arthur Boutellis

Introduction on the Council – threatening to withdraw its peacekeepers. Niger, which lost nine On 10 November 2014, the UN Security soldiers in a 2 October ambush,2 and the Council held an informal interactive dialogue Government of Mali itself are pushing to session on the UN Multidimensional make MINUSMA’s mandate “more robust” Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali and to set up a “force intervention brigade”, (MINUSMA). The mission has increasingly along the lines of the brigade of the UN been the target of asymmetrical terrorist mission in the Democratic Republic of the attacks which have left more than 30 Congo, to combat terrorist groups and drug- peacekeepers dead and 100 wounded since traffickers.3 the summer. While this may be, in part, Both the UN “brainstorming” and the 5 because MINUSMA has become the largest November meeting of Ministers of Foreign force in northern Mali while Jihadist groups Affairs and Defense of MINUSMA TCCs are reorganizing in the broader Sahel, it in Niamey, however, concluded that the has raised a number of questions in Mali, mission’s mandate – which authorizes the sub-region and New York regarding the peacekeepers under Chapter VII to “use all relevance and adequacy of MINUSMA’s necessary means” to protect civilians and mandate and capabilities in such a context. to “deter threats and take active steps to

UN Under-Secretary-General for prevent the return of armed elements” – is Peacekeeping Hervé Ladsous, when briefing sufficiently robust.

the UN Security Council on 8 October, However, the broader question of whether stated that MINUSMA is no longer operating the UN peacekeeping tool is appropriate in a peacekeeping environment, and the and can be effective in carrying out a following day, MINUSMA Force Commander General Jean Bosco Kazura told the Council

that “MINUSMA is in a terrorist-fighting 1. See http://www.whatsinblue.org/2014/10/briefing- and-consultations-on-the-security-situation-and- situation without an anti-terrorist mandate political-process-in-mali.php 2. This ambush carried out by assailants on motorbikes or adequate training, equipment, logistics or marked a change in the terrorist modus operandi, as intelligence to deal with such a situation”.1 previous attacks had been rocket and mortar attacks on MINUSMA camps (mostly off target) and improvised African Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) explosive devices (IEDs) against patrols. 3. See http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20141008-mali-onu- also raised the alarm, with Chad – which lost minusma-envisage-renforcer-mandat/ and speech of Mali Foreign Minister to the UN Security Council on 6 the most troops overall and is also currently January 2015 (S/PV.7355) Armed groups in Mali and implications for the UN stabilization mission 62 stabilization mandate in such a context Touré’s policy of “demilitarization”, alliances remains unanswered, as the High-Level with local elites in northern Mali and the Panel on Peace Operations started its work instrumental use of ethnic militias in pursuit and is due to report in April 2015. This of narrow political agendas. chapter provides an analysis of the complex The Tuareg MNLA occupation of northern and evolving nature of armed groups in Mali was, however, short-lived. The militarily northern Mali as well as the implications and financially superior Al-Qaida of the for MINUSMA specifically and for UN Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its offshoot, peace operations more broadly. It looks at the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West the tools which are available (within and Africa (MUJAO), quickly drove MNLA outside the United Nations) to allow the elements out, taking control of Timbuktu Organization to better carry out its mandate and Gao respectively, while another Islamist in such a high-threat environment, which Tuareg group, Ansar Dine, controlled Kidal. new military and civilian capacities are still Negotiations that had begun between the required and how these can be best utilized interim Malian Government and the MNLA to design and implement mission-wide and Ansar Dine came to an end when stabilization strategies that are not blind to the Islamist groups started moving south complex terrorist and criminal sub-regional towards the capital Bamako, triggering the dynamics. January 2013 French military intervention.

The initial international response to the The 2012 Mali crisis and 2012 Mali crisis had been a military one, the French military with the planned African-led International intervention Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) overtaken by events on the ground and the The 2012 crisis in Mali started with a Tuareg decisive French military intervention on 11 rebellion of the (Mouvement National pour la January 2013, which killed a few hundred Libération de l’Azawad – MNLA)4 in January Jihadists in the first days. After some initial 2012 (the fourth since independence in confusion about whether the objective of the 1960). This was bolstered by the return intervention was simply to prepare for the of soldiers with heavy weaponry from AFISMA deployment, French forces quickly Qaddafi’s legions who occupied a large reconquered the northern towns of Gao, part of northern Mali and declared the Timbuktu and then Kidal with support from independence of this territory (which it calls Azawad). This, in turn, triggered the March 4. The MNLA is a primarily ethnic Tuareg secular 2012 coup d’état by frustrated army officers separatist group which originated in October 2011 from in Bamako, consecrating the collapse of a the fusion between the (pacific) Mouvement National de l’Azawad (MNA) and the armed Mouvement Malian State that had been weakened by Touareg du Nord Mali (MTNM). Bilal Ag Acherif is its political leader, and Mohamed Ag Najem (a former corruption, President Amadou Toumani Colonel in Qaddafi’s Libyan legions) is its military chief. 63 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups

Chadian AFISMA troops.5 They faced little presidential and parliamentary elections resistance as armed groups largely vanished on its whole territory in July 2014. Ibrahim into the rough terrains of northern Mali’s Boubacar Keita was elected president “Adrar des Ifoghas” and southern Libya. with a solid margin, and two former rebel leaders (Mohamed Ag Intalla and Ahmada With the end of major combat operations, Ag Bibi of the HCUA) became members of France supported the idea of the deployment parliament for the Kidal region after Bamako of a UN mission in Mali as an exit strategy lifted arrest warrants against them.11 But for its forces and a way to “multilateralize” while the Ouagadougou agreement clearly its intervention. Despite questions over called for the new legitimately-elected whether there was yet a peace to keep after the end of major French combat operations,

key permanent Security Council members 5. For a detailed account, see http://www.crisisgroup. org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/mali/201-mali- supported the idea of a UN mission on securiser-dialoguer-et-reformer-en-profondeur-english. pdf the basis that such an arrangement would 6. AMISOM is the African Union Mission In Somalia provide greater oversight than an AMISOM- while UNSOMA is the United Nations Political Office for Somalia. See http://theglobalobservatory.org/2013/03/ UNSOA-type partnership the Africa-led malis-peacekeeping-mission-full-fledged-behemoth- or-have-lessons-been-learned/ 6 peace enforcement mission AFISMA. This 7. Which were given a four-month grace period until 31 October 2013 to meet UN standards for equipment decision to deploy a UN peacekeeping and capability, with support from the AFISMA Trust mission to stabilize Mali would soon be Fund. 8. The Haut Conseil pour l’Unité de l’Azawad (HCUA) called into question by the challenges the was created in May 2013 out of a splinter group of Ansar Dine, the Mouvement Islamique de l’Azawad (MIA) mission would face on the ground. itself created in January 2013. It is primarily composed of Tuareg Ifoghas (dominant Tuareg “noblesse”) and led by the Amenokal (traditional Tuareg leader) Intallah Ag Attaher, and his sons Alghabass and Mohamed. It MINUSMA: is based in the Kidal region and has a strong Islamic agenda. Mission impossible? 9. The Mouvement Arabe de l’Azawad (MAA) started out in April 2012 in Timbuktu from residual elements of an Arab militia (backed by president Amadou Toumani MINUSMA was authorized in April 2013. Touré and led by Colonel Ould Meydou) from the first months of the rebellion. It aims to protect Arab – legal It incorporated most of AFISMA’s 6,000 and illegal – commercial interests and communities. African troops7 and took over on 1 July, MAA helped AQIM enter into Timbuktu out of preference over Tuareg MNLA, but later distanced itself following the signing of the Ouagadougou from the jihadists. In June 2012, it chose Ahmed Ould Sidi Mohamed as its leader. In 2013, the MAA split into interim peace agreement of 18 June 2013 two branches, one loyal to Ahmed Ould Sidi Mohamed sometimes called “MAA-Bamako” due to its proximity between two rebel groups of northern to the Government, and another MAA branch led by Ould Sidatti sometimes called “MAA-Ouagadougou” Mali (MNLA and HCUA8) and the interim due to its alliance with the MNLA and HCUA, whose Government in Bamako. Two other groups – leadership was based in Ouagadougou for some time. 10.The mainly-Songhai self-defense militia MAA9 and CMFPR10 –, which had not taken Coordination des Mouvements et Forces Patriotiques de Resistance (CMFPR) emerged due to the absence part in the MNLA-led rebellion and are of state authority during the 1990s rebellions in northern Mali as a group called ”Ganda Koy” and most considered to be closer to the Government, recently they were reactivated alongside other smaller also adhered to the agreement. self-defense groups of sedentary populations of the Gao and Timbuktu regions. 11. See http://m.naharnet.com/stories/en/103740- This made it possible for Mali to hold mali-rulers-lift-arrest-warrants-against-tuareg-chiefs Armed groups in Mali and implications for the UN stabilization mission 64

Government to initiate negotiations towards hours (and more than 30 casualties on a comprehensive and final peace agreement their side), and sought refuge at MINUSMA no later than 60 days after its installation, camps in Kidal and other cities in northern such talks never started, and the follow-up Mali.12 mechanisms of the agreement – Comité Despite the brokering of a ceasefire on 23 de Suivi and Comité Technique Mixte de May, the assault on Kidal radically changed Sécurité, presided over by the MINUSMA the situation and rapport de force - on the head of mission and Force Commander ground. The armed movements of MNLA, respectively – stopped meeting by October HCUA and ally MAA-Ould Sidatti were now because of a lack of political will on both in control of more than half of the Malian sides. territory from which the government MDSF This made the implementation of MINUSMA had fled. These groups started setting up mandated tasks “to support national political a parallel administration in these regions, dialogue and reconciliation” and “to support including local security committees. This the re-establishment of State authority” very led to much questioning within MINUSMA difficult – some would argue, paradoxical. on how to now work in these areas and The Government of Mali wanted the United engage with armed movements – de facto Nations to focus its support on the return authorities – without legitimizing them. of the Malian Defense and Security Forces The mission was often caught between (MDSF) and of State administration to communities criticizing the United Nations northern Mali. But MINUSMA’s attempts to for doing too little, movements suspecting re-launch the political dialogue by facilitating the mission to be partial to the Government workshops in February-March 2014 to build (a government wary of the United Nations on the momentum created by a visit of the legitimizing these groups) and terrorist Security Council met with little success. and criminal groups with little interest in stability that were reorganizing themselves With a lack of progress on the political front, and starting to target UN peacekeepers tensions continued to rise and culminated who were now on the front lines after the with a 17 May 2014 visit by Prime Minister departure of MSDF and the progressive Moussa Mara to Kidal. This led to some downsizing of French forces.13 clashes between the MDSF and armed groups and the killing of six civil servants at the Governorate. Both sides blamed each other for having initiated the fighting, and the Government called it a “declaration of 12. Report of the UN Secretary-General on MINUSMA, S/2014/403, 9 June 2014 war”. Four days later on 21 May, the MDSF 13. MINUSMA, Serval and MSDF have carried out launched an assault on Kidal using heavy coordinated patrols in northern Mali. However, the Government of Mali had always refused to set up joint weapons against MNLA, HCUA and affiliated patrols including armed movement elements, despite the fact that these were envisaged in the Ouagadougou armed groups. MDSF retreated after a few Interim Agreement as a confidence-building measure. 65 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups

Terrorism: MAA-Ahmed Ould Sidi Mohamed21 branch, A threat to everyone but and continue trading and trafficking. This not everyone’s fight illustrates the blurring of lines between so-called “Compliant Armed Groups” MINUSMA is not mandated to engage in (CAGs), “Terrorist Armed Groups” (TAGs) explicit counterterrorism tasks, despite: and criminal groups. There is competition (1) the initial embedding of small French among these groups over influence and Liaison and Support Detachments within control of trade and trafficking routes and many MINUSMA units to ensure operational fluidity in their leadership and in Malian coordination and coherence between the fighters (versus international jihadists), as forces; (2) the fact that “French troops many have moved from one group to the [can] intervene in support of elements other based on opportunities. of MINUSMA when under imminent and serious threat“14; and the occasional

French-MSDF-MINUSMA coordinated 14. Resolution 2100 (2012), paragraph 18 operations15. Security Council members 15. See http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/ article/2013/10/24/une-operation-militaire-de- understood that Serval was essentially a grande-ampleur-en-cours-au-mali_3502505_3212. html & http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ parallel counterterrorism force with its own ARTJAWEB20130916155823/ 16. AQIM was created in January 2007 out of the objectives to deal with other groups who Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) – and its predecessor Armed Islamic Group had neither signed nor adhered to the (GIA) which fought against the secular Algerian Ouagadougou agreement, namely AQIM16 government – after it pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda. It is led by Emir Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud (aka: and MUJAO/Al Murabitun.17 It was replaced Abdelmalek Droukdel) and organized into several zones and katibas with four katibas in the Sahel. It aims by Barkhane in July 2014, maintaining to create an Islamic state across North Africa, has used trafficking, kidnapping-for-ransom and taxing to fund some 1,000 French troops in Mali out of a its terrorist activities. 17. MUJAO is a jihadist militant group that broke off from total of 3,000 operating in the sub-region. AQIM in October 2011, reportedly due to disagreement over kidnapping revenue distribution and the dominant Another group, Ansar Dine,18 has been position of Algerians in the leadership. Unlike AQIM, the majority of MUJAO’s members are Malian (Tilemsi largely dormant, as most of its prominent Arabs, Fulani and Songhai) active in the Gao region where they have carried out rocket and IED attacks. In members have since moved over to the August 2013, MUJAO Ahmed al Tilemsi merged with Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s al Muwaqi’un bil-Dima group to more respectable HCUA, with the notable create “Al Murabitun”, and claimed responsibility for exception of Iyad Ag Ghali. He reappeared the attacks on the French uranium mine in Arlit, and army barracks in Agadez, Niger. in a July 2014 video, threatening both 18. Ansar al-Din is a militant Salafi Tuareg group which played a crucial role in the jihadist takeover of France and MINUSMA19 and claimed a northern Mali. Iyad Ag Ghali, a former rebel leader of the 1990s Tuareg rebellions, created the group after recent 29 December 2014 rocket attack he was denied the leadership of the MNLA in the 2012 20 rebellion. Its alliance with AQIM boosted Ansar Dine on a MINUSMA camp in northern Mali. with both weaponry and combatants. Many prominent Tilemsi Arab members 19. See http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20140808-iyad-ag- ghali-le-leader-ansar-dine-recherche-soutiens/ and financers of the MUJAO (put on the 20. See http://www.jeuneafrique.com/actu/20141229T 195415Z20141229T195343Z/ Al Qaeda sanctions list in December 2012) 21. The case of Yoro Ould Daha is emblematic, see http://depechesdumali.com/1818-yoro-ould-daha-l- have also since joined the more acceptable armee-francaise-m-a-propose-de-rejoindre-le-mnla.html Armed groups in Mali and implications for the UN stabilization mission 66

Figure 1: Simplified typology of Mali armed groups

Compliant (Represented in the ongoing Algiers inter-Malian negotiations)

MNLA

CPA

MAAs CMFPRs

HCUA

Political / Criminal Ideological

Ansar Dine

MUJAO

Al Murabitun

AQIM

Terrorist 67 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups

This reality has sometimes encouraged it will carry out Quick Impact Projects and broad generalizations whereby all these Community Violence Reduction projects to groups are labeled as “bandits” or improve the acceptance of the mission and “terrorists”, which is not helpful either. prevent further recruitments by CAGs and That said, the November 2013 kidnapping TAGs. and killing of two journalists of Radio But collectively these efforts to modernize France Internationale in Kidal, regular the mission’s capabilities do not constitute planting of mines and IEDs and rocket a counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency and mortar attacks on MINUSMA camps doctrine. Better protection alone could lead across northern Mali, suggest some level of to an escalation, with terrorists using more complicity between mainstream elements advanced techniques, carrying out complex of CAGs and the local population. This, attacks on UN facilities and employing larger however, could also result from the fear of or more sophisticated explosive devices, retaliation by better-equipped jihadists, with including explosively formed projectiles, no possibility for MINUSMA to protect those against UN armored vehicles. Terrorists who choose to collaborate. Notably, MNLA may also opt for “softer” UN civilian targets. members who supported the French troops The use of remote-controlled and magnetic in driving out the jihadist groups have been IEDs and instances of both vehicle-borne the target of abductions and assassinations. and suicide-bomber suicide attacks, which The MNLA is also the only group that has had not been seen in this region before, also publicly denounced acts of terrorism against illustrate the growing sophistication of these MINUSMA, MSDF and civilian populations. terrorist groups. The only “high-capability”

As a peacekeeping mission, MINUSMA contribution MINUSMA has for now (from remains acutely vulnerable to such the Netherlands, combining highly mobile asymmetric threats, and has neither the Special Forces with Apache and Chinook mandate nor the capabilities to fight back. helicopters as well as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles has a limited range outside of Gao. Troops it inherited from AFISMA lack the

specialized training and equipment for MINUSMA also still lacks a good adequate force protection, let alone more understanding of the evolving threat. On offensive measures. MINUSMA is now in the the intelligence front, the NATO-type All process of reviewing its Rules of Engagement Sources Information Fusion Unit brought and Mission Concept in light of the threats, unprecedented analytical capabilities to the and created an additional “military sector” mission. However, with limited intelligence for northern Mali in December 2014 in collection capabilities feeding into it (i.e. order to improve the mission’s response. It without placing sensors to conduct remote also started building “bunkers” in its camps, surveillance or gathering signals intelligence deploying force protection units and training and with few trained military intelligence and equipping its troops against IEDs, and officers/“human sensors” in the mission Armed groups in Mali and implications for the UN stabilization mission 68 at field level to build human intelligence the MAA-Ahmed, CMFPR and the Coalition networks), its contribution has so far too du people pour l’Azawad (CPA), created on often been similar to that of other parts of 18 March as an MNLA dissidence, signed a the mission (JMAC, UNDSS, U222) and platform on 14 June. too seldom timely and tactical. In order As negotiations progress, armed groups for MINUSMA to get ahead of and disrupt have fragmented and alliances have shifted the terrorist planning and operational as the various groups and their leaders cycle, a concurrent higher-tempo cycle of position themselves ahead of the conclusion intelligence-led operations would have to of a possible agreement. Since the beginning be created, which would be unprecedented of the Algiers talks, part of the CMFPR allied for a peacekeeping operation. Formal with the Coordination (as “CMFPR2”); part information sharing with the French (and of the CPA returned to the MNLA; and a the Americans) operating in the Sahel is also new group called GATIA23 announced its challenging in part because of confidentiality formation in August 2014 and joined the issues and a lack of protocols and standard platform following the first clashes between operating procedures. platform groups and Coordination groups in the Gao region. GATIA openly supports the The Algiers negotiations: Government and what some have labelled Light at the end as a proxy militia under the direct orders of the tunnel? of Malian General Elhadj Ag Gamou. The Government of Mali denied any links to Much hope for an improvement in the these groups which it describes as “vigilante security situation in northern Mali lies with groups … formed by the communities the Algerian-led international mediation of concerned in order to protect their land”.24 the inter-Malian peace talks initiated in the While the international mediation25 has aftermath of the assault on Kidal in May so far not recognized any of these “new 2014. Algeria, which played a key role in groups”, the presence of two platforms of mediating Malian crises since the 1990s, armed groups and the Government of Mali had started “exploratory discussions” in January 2014 in an attempt to bring together the various CAGs in a coherent platform 22. JMAC is the Joint Mission Analysis Center; UNDSS is the United Nations Department of Safety and ahead of a negotiation with the Government Security, while the U2 is a reconnaissance aircraft. of Mali. These efforts did not succeed, and 23. GATIA stands for Groupe d’Autodéfense Touareg Imghad et Alliés and is primarily composed of ethnic the various CAGs entered the negotiations Tuareg Imghad (considered vassals under the traditional Tuareg hierarchy) from the Gao region. and signed the 24 July 2014 roadmap as two 24. Speech of Mali Foreign Minister to the UN Security Council on 6 January 2015 (S/PV.7355) separate CAG platforms: the MNLA, HCUA 25. Algeria serves as lead mediator and the UN, the and MAA-Sidatti signed as the Coordination African Union (AU), ECOWAS, the European Union (EU), the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), of Azawad Movements (an alliance which Mauritania, Niger and Chad are co-mediators. This is different than past negotiations in Mali which were had existed since November 2013), and carried out by Algeria alone. 69 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups

as a third party remains a major challenge. the continued instrumentalization of certain groups and militias against each other So while the signing of a peace agreement in northern Mali. In this context, it seems would represent an important step towards reasonable for MINUSMA – which will likely the stabilization of the country through a continue to be one of the key security actors political and security agreement dealing in northern Mali for some time – to hope for with some of the (governance) root causes the best but plan for the worst. of the conflict and allowing the progressive redeployment of the administration on the whole territory, it will not solve all the Conclusions and problems. Indeed, while it would help “draw recommendations the line” between CAGs and TAGs and The terrorist threat in Mali and elsewhere is enroll CAGs into the fight against terrorism not about to go away. And while there are alongside the MSDF, those not present in strong arguments for not deploying large, Algiers will continue to be spoilers. Further, static and vulnerable UN peacekeeping those represented but who would not be missions to such theatres (and instead taken into account in a final agreement preferring a lighter footprint, with a parallel could also become spoilers. non-UN rapid-response force doing the TAGs could also very well enroll some of the fighting), the United Nations must also younger more radical (and/or opportunistic) adapt its ways of doing business if it is to members of the CAGs represented continue deploying stabilization missions in in Algiers, particularly if no attractive high-threat environments. alternative is provided to them through Member States have increasingly military integration and socio-economic recognized that terrorism and transnational reinsertion, or if a final status settlement organized crime have become both a direct fails to satisfy the nationalist or religious threat to UN peacekeepers and civilian demands of a young and more ideologically staff and a strategic threat to the successful motivated base. This will be all the more implementation of the mission’s mandate, challenging in that integration/enrollment particularly in terms of protection of into the Malian army is not often seen as civilians, but also in the reestablishment of an attractive option for many combatants in state authority and governance in general. light of the lucrative criminal economy and However, they have so far given little trafficking opportunities prevailing in parts guidance and means to UN missions for of northern Mali. Naturally, a collapse of the dealing with such threats and implementing negotiation process would also negatively stabilization mandates.26 impact security. But if an agreement is signed but not in good faith, and there is

no political will on either side to implement 26. See http://theglobalobservatory.org/2014/12/ united-nations-peacekeeping-peacebuilding- such an agreement, this could also lead to stabilization/ Armed groups in Mali and implications for the UN stabilization mission 70

First of all, peacekeeping missions need and rehabilitation and reintegration to develop a better understanding and programmes for (national) terrorists and accurate profiles of CAGs and TAGs, their early peacebuilding approaches aimed at political, criminal and ideological interests addressing the root causes of terrorism and and motives, and the threats they represent, transnational organized crime through non- as well as the dynamics of radicalization, military/law enforcement approaches.28 resilience and self-defense strategies Also, while peacekeeping may not be applied by different elements within at-risk able to address the long-term sources of communities. This takes time and should disillusionment and frustration caused by not be a one-off assessment done by a underdevelopment, poor governance and UN headquarters team (at the onset of the the political economy that have allowed mission and before each mandate renewal) terrorism and organized crime to flourish, it but rather a cross-cutting conflict analysis cannot ignore the problem altogether either. done by the mission itself on a regular basis. It should develop new early peacebuilding This requires that missions be equipped with tools to help “nip the problem in the bud” as better military intelligence collection and part of a defined and time-bound mission- analysis capabilities, but also with different wide strategy, because it is often difficult kinds of civilian skills (e.g. anthropologists). to mobilize and sustain the economic transformation required to counter criminal MINUSMA must adapt to these new threats agendas. (in terms of force protection analysis) in order to carry out its mandate, however, Mission planning should also be adapted as the mission’s true added value may lie a result of these considerations. A phased elsewhere. Multidimensional stabilization approach might start by first deploying missions in such a context should begin a light footprint and more mobile high- formulating and implementing a coherent capacity military contingents (able to and comprehensive military and non- take civilian staff who are social science military response to this menace, much experts along with them) to get a better like missions are now required to develop understanding of the context, before mission-wide strategies for the protection “tailoring” a larger peacekeeping mission. of civilians. Such mission-wide strategies could combine the above-mentioned need for self-protection with the strategic use of traditional peacekeeping tools such as 27. See for instance http://www.hdcentre. org/41577F16-C5DD-4EE7-A405-6DE96C68942E/ mediation, DDR and CVR programmes, but FinalDownload/DownloadId-4A8E4E090C6C63908 27 FE5763AA7CAE4B9/41577F16-C5DD-4EE7-A405- in innovative ways. 6DE96C68942E/uploads/tx_news/Strengthening- mediation-to-deal-with-criminal-agendas.pdf Peacekeeping in the future could also 28. See http://www.ipinst.org/publication/policy- papers/detail/401-the-elephant-in-the-room-how-can- include non-traditional tools such peace-operations-deal-with-organized-crime.html 29. See http://www.ipinst.org/media/pdf/publications/ as deradicalization, disengagement ipi_e_pub_driving_the_system_apart.pdf 71 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups

A system-wide planning standing capacity as MINUSMA in this type of environment could help the United Nations rise above creates a historic and time-bound sterile departmental turfs battles and come opportunity to alter some, but not all, of up with more creative solutions.29 More the negative dynamics that are at the generally, the United Nations needs to finally root causes of the crisis in the first place. move away from the current numbers- Adopting the correct balance of capabilities based approach to a capability-driven force and postures, both political and military, vis- generation approach used by NATO or the à-vis this shifting spectrum of armed actors European Union, for instance.30 Similarly, is challenging. However, the aim should the current trend of building “super-camps” be to create a new, improved status quo and adopting a “bunkerized” response to through a deliberate and nuanced mission threats risks being counterproductive in the concept by the time the mission departs. long run.

Another major obstacle to UN peacekeeping is the fact that it is geographically limited to the borders of a country, such as MINUSMA in Mali, while terrorism and organized crime are transnational and CAGs and TAGs operate across borders in the Sahel region. MINUSMA has been sharing information with UNOWA (Sahel Strategy), UNODC and UNDSS offices in neighbouring countries, but this has been done on an ad hoc basis. The development of regional and cross-border programming is critical to any longer-term success; otherwise we are always ‘leaving the back door open’. The United Nations should instead explore ways to more systematically share information and collaborate with a UN Panel of Experts 31 (on Libya particularly) and with non- 30. See http://www.ipinst.org/media/pdf/publications/ UN forces (France and the United States) ipi_rpt_rethinking_force-Gen.pdf 31. UNSC Resolution 2117 (2013) for example, required operating in the sub-region, EUCAP Sahel32 Peace Operations, Sanctions Committees, Panels of Experts and Member States to share information on and, whenever feasible, with national illicit arms and ammunition trafficking networks, which fuels many of the conflicts across the southern belt of counterparts within the framework of the the Sahel, from Somalia to Mali. However, even within HRDDP,33 who will ultimately be in charge the UN system, no mechanism or platforms exist to systematically share such information. once the peacekeeping mission withdraws. 32. EUCAP Sahel is a European Union civilian capacity building mission. 33. UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on UN Deploying a peacekeeping operation such support to non-UN security forces (HRDDP).

PART IV Conclusions and areas for future work 75 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups CHAPTER 9 Fit for purpose: Equipping the United Nations to better understand non-state armed groups Fabio Oliva1

Falling walls an unprecedented global threat to peace and security, to make this new equation manifest. The current jihad waged by ISIL Another wall has come down. has, in fact, elements of both intrastate Back in 1989, the fall of the Berlin Wall and interstate armed conflict. While ISIL is exposed political scientists to a new type leading a brutal sectarian civil war within of armed conflict, one that was no longer Iraq and Syria, its leader, the self-declared fought between states but was being waged caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, defines the within states. In 2001, Al-Qaeda’s terrorist radical movement as a full-fledged “state”. campaign on US territory signalled the Central America has also made its dissolution of another analytical barrier, comeback into the United Nations Security with the terrorist aggression presenting the Council agenda. In one of its most recent casus belli for the War on Terror, a direct resolutions, the Security Council mandated confrontation between legitimate states and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in a non-state armed organization. Now, 25 Haiti (MINUSTAH) to support the Haitian years after the end of the Cold War, a new Government in its efforts to tackle gang dimension has resulted in the war scenarios violence and organized crime (United that analysts, military strategists, politicians Nations 2014a). The case of Haiti reflects and journalists need to consider, i.e. a a recent shift in the patterns of violence hybrid armed conflict waged at multiple which indicates that in the last five years, levels, between states and within states, 90 percent of violent deaths in the world simultaneously. took place outside situations conventionally To tell the truth, this third wall had already understood as armed conflict or terrorism fallen in 2006 when Hezbollah, a US- (Geneva Declaration 2011:5). For instance, designated terrorist organization with a in 2011 the death toll in Somalia was 3,131, commanding state-like presence in southern nearly half of the violent deaths recorded in Lebanon (Abdul-Hussain 2009), confronted Tanzania – 6,071 (UNODC 2013). – and nearly overcame – Israel during 34 days of intense conflict. However, it took the 1. The views expressed in this article are those of the advent of ISIL, with its rapid territorial gains, author and do not represent the views of the United Nations, in general, and the United Nations System a superseding propaganda apparatus and Staff College, in particular. Fit for purpose: Equipping the United Nations to better understand non-state armed groups 76

Until 2012, El Salvador had experienced the What we know so far highest homicide rate in the world. Although a shaky truce between the two largest gangs Before suggesting how to address this initially reduced homicide rates by half, the emerging phenomenon, let us first explore negative impact on human security posed how these unconventional insurgents by these non-conventional armed groups is managed to become the prevailing challenge to global peace and security. New generation reaching unprecedented proportions, while non-state armed groups have demonstrated the legitimacy of the central state is collapsing an extraordinary ability to learn from the due to the fact that such organizations strengths, weaknesses, achievements and create their own parallel systems of power. failures of their predecessors and from The situation in Mali is also quite revealing the past interventions and responses of of the dilemma that the international the international community. A discussion community and individual governments are is presented below of some general facing. The resurgence of the long-standing considerations highlighting elements of Tuareg rebellion and the proliferation of discontinuity between traditional armed Al-Qaeda-linked insurgents following the groups and unconventional armed 2012 coup d’état have produced a crowded organizations. conflict landscape, one that is characterized by armed groups that possess multiple and • Peace talks? No, thanks. Unconventional armed groups do not conceive of peace interrelated agendas. as a possible end-state. A settlement Overall, there is a broad consensus among can only go to the detriment of their scholars that a new generation of non-state reputation as hardliners. The moment armed groups has seized momentum and, they are open to negotiations, another in an increasing number of places, small, group is likely to outbid them politically tactical, dispersed and interconnected violent and militarily. In addition, a settlement outfits often have an edge on regular armies will by no means achieve their goals, (Mohamedou 2005; Blin 2011; Briscoe which are best pursued outside the 2013; et al.). As we have argued elsewhere, realm of constitutional politics and the “evolving hybridity of these organizations rule of law. Not only is a soft landing blurs simple distinctions between politically into politics unappealing, but it is not oriented insurgents and organized crime or even considered as an ultimate option. gangs” (McQuinn and Oliva 2014:1), with These groups do not seek to become political forces that can compete in the the consequence of making sound policy electoral arena as their interests are decisions much harder than before. political but not in the Westminsterian sense. 77 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups

• No quarter. Traditional armed of military operations, which were groups operated in a context where concentrated in the most remote international humanitarian law and regions of a country, mainly the international criminal law demarcated rural areas, where the government’s the boundaries of military engagement. presence was more dispersed and the Despite some armed groups only local population was more porous to erratically abiding by those legal rebels’ propaganda. The recent thread frameworks, many of their leaders were of complex insurgences that have eventually brought to justice. The new stirred the Middle East as well as the generation of armed groups is ruthless. growing phenomenon of youth gangs Their use of force is indiscriminate and, in Central America point to a partial in some cases, it has been brought departure from this dynamic. Military to unprecedented levels of brutality. encounters, governance deliberations Some of the most radical organizations and economic transactions happen have been outshined by new extremist more frequently in urban settings than organizations for the extent of violence in the periphery of a country or in so- they employ. For instance, Al-Qaeda called “ungoverned spaces”. In El is increasingly being regarded as a Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala, “moderate” terrorist organization in the maras rule over large swaths of the comparison with ISIL. The disregard capitals and other major towns. ISIL’s of legal obligations in the conduct insurgency has strategically targeted of war goes hand in hand with the towns and cities of Iraq and Syria, while spectacularization of violence. The the revolutionary brigades that toppled broadcasting of graphic images and Gaddafi, and are now the main factor explicit videos of hostage executions of insecurity in Libya, have been a feeds into the high-tech propaganda primarily urban product. machinery that is employed to shock • Shadow states. While formally international public opinion, acquiesce representing “non-state entities”, local populations and recruit new these new armed organizations have combatants from Muslim and non- a symbiotic connection with the state Muslim countries alike. structures. They thrive in situations • Urban attire. There was a time when of state fragility or collapse, and their cities represented governmental safe members have strong ties with the havens, the bulwark of state authority state apparatus, as they may have and, consequently, the ultimate been even part of it in the past. As objective of armed rebellions. This argued in some recent research, the impacted substantially on military provision of goods and services by non- strategies and the actual conduct state armed groups can be regarded as Fit for purpose: Equipping the United Nations to better understand non-state armed groups 78

“complementary governance”, which oil bunkers (Asuni 2009). Central in some instances occurs with the America’s youth gangs are the by- implicit consent of governments (Idler product of three main factors: the failure and Forest 2015). to fully reintegrate former combatants of the 1980s guerrilla movements; the • Multiple identities, concurrent agendas. expulsion and repatriation of Central The most striking novelty of American citizens involved in criminal contemporary armed groups is the activities in the United States, who hybridity and fluidity that characterize imported the cult of street gangs from their origins and mutations as cities like Los Angeles and started to opposed to the overall linearity of live on the profits generated from drug traditional armed groups’ evolution. trafficking; and the disenfranchisement Typically, the genesis of a traditional of large parts of the population who failed guerrilla organization would follow a to secure any peace dividends. The standard pattern (i.e. underground so-called ‘first law’ of systems thinking preparation, violent propaganda, reads that “today’s problems come organizational growth, guerrilla from yesterday’s solutions” (Senge offensive, mobilization of masses and 1990). The emergence of the Taliban – if successful – takeover). Embedded and Al-Qaeda has been often explained in this established sequence would as the unintended consequence of US also be the supremacy of the political military and financial support to anti- agenda over the military and economic Soviet resistance groups in Afghanistan dimensions of the armed struggle. during the 1980s. Similarly, as eloquently Such a linear progression clashes with explained in this volume by Mohammad- the volatility that characterizes the Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, ISIL trajectories of unconventional armed “was born five times”. The group is an groups. In the case of the Sahel region, amalgam of different Islamist streams for instance, non-state armed groups (locally-grown jihadists and Al-Qaeda present a highly ideological (jihadist) franchises) and former army officers political agenda, adopt guerrilla tactics of Saddam Hussein. The latter have in their military operations and sustain found in the radical movement an themselves by managing cross-border opportunity to put an end to the decade- illicit trades. The rise of the Movement long political exile they had been forced for the Emancipation of the Niger into by the “De-Baathification of Iraqi Delta (MEND) has been attributed to Society”, a policy initiated in 2003 by the the convergence of diverse streams US-led Administration of the Coalition of affiliations and networks, among Provisional Authority and then continued which are university confraternities, by the successor Shia-dominated Iraqi street gangs, drug traffickers and illegal governments. 79 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups

These condensed considerations are gather accurate information to produce instructive of the radical departure of strategic analysis and, in numerous cases, contemporary non-state armed groups has reinforced divisions, stereotypes and from their predecessors. As explained in negative perceptions. the next section, the complexity of this new Physical barricades, barbed wire and phenomenon has not been fully realized, compounds have gone hand in hand with and responses being put forward are only other legal barriers. Following the War on attempting to tackle its symptoms. This Terror, several armed groups have been shortcoming is indicative of the fact that labelled as ‘terrorist organizations’ by the international community, including the Member States, thereby curbing all sorts United Nations, is not yet duly equipped of official contacts with those groups and to understand and catch up with the rapid hampering potential mediation efforts. pace of mutations these groups undergo in Dealing with illegal or proscribed groups has the field. become nearly impossible, and attempts at drawing clear defining lines for engagement What does not work with such actors have shown their limitations since, as mentioned before, several non- The multiplicity of organizational facets state armed organizations have multiple and identities that coexist within the new agendas that only a nuanced analysis could generation of non-state armed groups has help explore and understand. As a result, completely overthrown the boundaries peacemaking efforts that are being pursued of engagement and redesigned the in places like Mali are forced to navigate operating scenarios of UN field operations. very narrow corridors of frail and short-lived The patterns of armed violence and the legitimacy that is granted to certain armed organizational structure of its perpetrators groups based on their ostensible compliance have evolved much faster than the capacity with superseded legal benchmarks. to understand and react to these new Traditional mediation tools also risk challenges. missing important undercurrents, such as transnational crime and radicalization, that The response by the UN system has permeate the dynamics of contemporary been inward-looking and reactive, mainly armed groups. focused on insulating its own assets and maintaining a ‘business as usual’ stance. When more assertive solutions have been The ‘bunkerization’ of the UN presence pursued, the United Nations and the in field locations may have been effective international community have perpetuated in limiting casualties and violent attacks a silo mentality. Robust responses have against its own staff and premises. However, typically leaned on counter-insurgency it has negatively affected the capacity strategies, rule of law interventions and to reach out to the affected population, DDR programmes, which have been put in Fit for purpose: Equipping the United Nations to better understand non-state armed groups 80

place in isolation one from another, while be explored to counter-balance military and often targeting the same audience. Current intelligence strategies (The Guardian 2014). approaches are also tainted by preconceived ideas and narratives about armed groups Developing and the conviction in predetermined fit-for-purpose linear cause-effect patterns concerning the motivations of non-state armed actors UN personnel

for pursuing their goals through violent The comprehensive discussion on the post- means. Attempting to explain otherwise 2015 agenda has put great emphasis on the incomprehensible decisions and actions by need to reconfigure the UN system to make ISIL, a reporter of The New Yorker recently it “fit for purpose” and capable of responding wrote that the radical movement “doesn’t to emerging global challenges. Goal 16 of the behave according to recognizable cost- proposed Sustainable Development Goals benefit analyses” (Packer 2015). (SDGs) – which have been formulated to replace the Millennium Development Goals Instead, there is a great need to redefine (MDGs) – calls on UN Member States to and upgrade our understanding and tools “promote peaceful and inclusive societies for for diagnosis. Current responses suffer from sustainable development” (United Nations an inherent difficulty to overcome traditional 2014b). Among the declared targets, there classifications that present more limitations are explicit references to reducing “all forms than opportunities for positive engagement. of violence and related death rates” (target Fresh thinking is required to come up with 16.1) and strengthening “relevant national new solutions while adapting available institutions (…) for preventing violence and mediation tools to contexts such as Central combating terrorism and crime” (target America. In El Salvador in 2012, a truce 16.11). Although perfectible and not yet between the two largest rival gangs abruptly ratified, these targets call for improved results reduced homicide rates by 40 percent. and more effective strategies in tackling By the end of 2013, the truce started to unconventional armed groups, which – as collapse and in 2014, El Salvador returned mentioned earlier – are responsible for the to pre-2012 murder rates, de facto closing vast majority of violent fatalities worldwide. the window of opportunity created by the gangs’ agreement. It is worth remembering As Ina Lepel nicely put it, we should start here that the UN Guidance for Effective by “understanding the phenomenon rather Mediation states that any effective mediator than trying to fix it”.2 To do so, efforts should be able “talk with all actors relevant should be made to strengthen the analytical to resolving the conflict” (United Nations 2012:§26). As recently argued, new 2. Inaugural session, 2015 Dialogue Series, December approaches and processes for starting 2014, Berlin. Ina Lepel is the Deputy Director-General for the United Nations and Global Issues at the German dialogue with proscribed groups need to Federal Foreign Office 81 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups

capacity of the UN system so that field staff Tackling those issues is part of an ongoing in particular can learn how to track and effort to reform the United Nations and understand the convergence of multiple goes beyond the scope of this contribution. historical and socio-political legacies Nonetheless, in the past years, those UN and their impact on the genealogy and entities that have the largest presence in performance of armed groups. field duty stations – and are therefore more exposed to the threat of unconventional In an attempt to offer some elements for non-state armed groups – have made reflection, we have mapped out existing some interesting headway towards better analytical resources and capacities that are understanding the local context in which worth exploring and possibly expanding in they operate. DPKO has conducted a study order to create a cadre of UN staff that is fit aiming at “Understanding and Integrating for purpose. Local Perceptions in Multi-Dimensional UN Peacekeeping” which provides a solid Leverage points starting point for increasing and deepening and existing resources the interaction and engagement with local stakeholders (UN DPKO 2013). The study A stronger United Nations can be built maintains that taking into account local around variable but integrated knowledge views and opinions noticeably reinforces networks. Although significant progress inclusivity and public confidence in the has been made in the area of knowledge UN role. Another key finding of the inquiry management (KM), the United Nations is reveals that integrating local perceptions still far from being a well-versed learning adds value in terms of improved situational organization. Several UN departments, awareness and more accurate analysis agencies, funds and programmes have of the context. UNDP has gone further in equipped themselves with strategies to incorporating local dynamics in its work manage knowledge more effectively,3 but by facilitating the establishment of so- the actual exchange of knowledge is fairly called “peace infrastructures” and, in limited compared with the huge amount some cases, strengthening existing ones. of information being produced across In a 2013 brief, peace infrastructures are the system, which remains scattered and disorganized. There are several reasons behind the modest volume of knowledge 3. In the past years all major UN entities, including the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the Department being shared, and in-house research on of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Food the subject suggests that institutional, and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations bureaucratic and cultural factors have Population Fund (UNFPA), the United Nations High prevented the Organization from reaching Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), have formally its learning potential (United Nations 2006 adopted KM in the form of a strategy, a learning system or a portal or have made explicit reference to KM in and 2007). their strategic plans. Fit for purpose: Equipping the United Nations to better understand non-state armed groups 82

defined as a “network of interdependent in identifying leverage points to better systems, resources, values and skills held capture the nature of armed groups, while by government, civil society and community preserving their physical safety and respect institutions that promote dialogue and for the legal and ethical standards to which consultation; prevent conflict; and enable humanitarian workers adhere. peaceful mediation when violence occurs in a society” (UNDP 2013:1). Integrating different A similar and complementary approach analytical systems could be taken to isolating “violence infrastructures”, those aggregative Every year the UN system conducts processes and institutions that exist in every hundreds of assessments, surveys, society and can channel structural violence. investigations, studies and reviews. A We have, in fact, very limited knowledge on comprehensive study on the United Nations the nature of networks and local alliances argues that the changes that have resulted that facilitate involvement in organized from such a wide compendium of research, armed resistance activities. We also ignore statistical data and inquiries have been one the importance of religious practices and of the most underrated achievements of local rituals in forging group cohesion and the United Nations since its creation (Jolly allegiance within armed movements. As 2009). Naturally, each discipline has its seen earlier when looking at the genesis of own methodology which is tailored to the contemporary armed groups, there are often purpose of the analysis and the process for undercurrents and storylines which remain performing it. As we operate in a globalized latent or run below the radar for some and interconnected world, understandably time, but then suddenly meet the enabling some of these analyses cover similar topics, conditions to unfold and produce lethal perhaps from a different perspective, but do organizations. Those dynamics are often not necessarily “talk to each other”. Again, shrouded – and therefore difficult to capture this has to do with the modus operandi of the – but they reveal a great deal of information UN system and is the result of the complex that can help sharpen our knowledge on organigram and governance structures that armed groups. define each UN entity, its scope of work and mandate. Evidently, the catchword of any Humanitarian agencies are also critical to organizational reform – integration – would advancing our analytical capacity on the also be quite appropriate here, but we are subject because of their proximity to the not suggesting the collapse of all approaches frontlines and their operational mandates. to produce a sort of “One UN” methodology. Humanitarian staff deal with armed outfits on a daily basis, having to secure access to Nonetheless, the method of analysis populations in need during emergencies. we select should be a derivative of the Their full involvement should be secured very issue we plan to investigate and its 83 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups

fundamental nature. The challenge posed should therefore incorporate the dynamics by unconventional armed groups is multi- of a conflict – its transformation, recurrent faceted: It is a military phenomenon with trends and relevant discontinuities and its evident political connotations. But clearly regional and transnational dimensions – these groups appeal to other important basically connecting the dots and capturing rubrics to entice their prospective sometimes small but significant changes constituencies, such as status, camaraderie, in the conflict equation. The appraisal of vengeance and redemption among others. conflict dynamics also looks horizontally at

In order to navigate the complexity presented the mutual influences and spill-overs among by the organizations that are under scrutiny, different crises. For instance, there is a fine we suggest here a possible redefinition of the line that connects ongoing insurgencies investigation processes and some concrete led by Boko Haram in Nigeria, Burkina ideas about the integration of different Faso and Niger, ISIL in Syria and Iraq, Al- analytical systems. We first showcase Qaeda franchises in Mali and parts of the 4 existing analytical frameworks that are Sahel region, the Islamist militias in Libya, worth incorporating to better understand the Séléka rebel coalition in Central African armed groups; we then present two valuable Republic, and Al-Shabaab in Somalia. approaches – or mindsets – that could be Similarly, one cannot fully understand the used to integrate the different models. street gang problem in El Salvador without connecting it with the broader regional Analytical frameworks dynamics unfolding in other Central The first change of paradigm that is American countries. required to recognize issues characterized by high complexity and frequent fluidity is Political economy analysis has also to urge UN staff to go beyond a descriptive developed into a fundamental resource to understanding of the context in which discretely observe conflict situations that we they operate and develop an analytical normally examine predominantly through understanding of it. In this regard, the political lenses. Tracking money flows traditional conflict analysis framework offers and illicit traffic routes and understanding a safe starting point for “asking the right informal rewards and incentive structures in questions”. Basic conflict analysis conveys specific contexts can reveal fresh streams a general overview of the context, with useful of information and push our analysis to insights into existing problems and the role of consider alternative and additional enablers main stakeholders, including their concerns of violence. Initially developed by the World and interests. This segment can, however, Bank to monitor the patterns of economic be considered only a partial or ‘static’ distribution in developing countries in order assessment as it does not account for the to understand the conditions necessary evolution of the conflict, its actors and issues at stake. A full analytical understanding 4. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) also known as Al-Qaeda in the Sahel (AQIS) Fit for purpose: Equipping the United Nations to better understand non-state armed groups 84

for successful aid policy, political economy started therefore to look at recruitment analysis has been progressively adopted in strategies, rebel governance, economic other disciplines (e.g. conflict resolution) to incentives underlying group formation, the assess the economic dimensions of armed role of rituals and memory in forging group insurgencies and, more recently, situations cohesion and a whole range of new inquiries of unconventional violence like ones looking at the micro-elements of armed perpetrated by street bands or prison gangs organizations. This analytical framework (Glaister 2010 and Skarbek 2014). Political presents a great opportunity for increasing economy analysis provides an opportunity the understanding of unconventional armed to advance the common knowledge and groups by providing useful insights into their understanding of the hybrid armed groups social morphology. that operate in so called ‘ungoverned spaces’, Analytical approaches (mindsets) those areas characterized by a flimsy state In terms of analytical approaches, systems authority and persistent insurgencies. At thinking provides perhaps the most useful the same time, understanding the value mindset to tackle such a complex and fluid of economic assets leads to that ‘mirror phenomenon. Systems thinking is a holistic analysis’ that is capable of explaining the analytical method that looks at the interaction symbiotic relationship sometimes emerging among the different parts of a complex between non-state armed organizations and system – unconventional armed groups in state institutions and representatives. our case. It attempts to trace the evolution

As we argued elsewhere (McQuinn and of systems over time and their performance Oliva 2014), until recently most studies within the context of larger systems. This on causes of civil war focused on the role approach differs from traditional analysis, and performance of the state to explain the which isolates the individual parts of a outbreak of armed resistance and did not system in order to study them separately. factor in elements pertaining to the armed Systems thinking appears successful in groups themselves. With contributions addressing problems that involve complex from disciplines like anthropology and issues, which depend on past occurrences and on the actions of forces theoretically psychology, a new line of research was then external to the system under scrutiny. This introduced, which investigates the so-called approach is particularly helpful in solving “micro-foundations of civil war”. This new problems that are recurring, “those who perspective was driven by the recognition have been made worse by past attempts to that “rebel groups are sophisticated, self- fix them”, issues where “an action affects or sustaining multinational entities that survive is affected by the surrounding environment” under extreme pressure and in countries and “whose solutions are not obvious” where organizations of comparable size and (Aronson 2008:1). organizational capacity are rare” (McQuinn and Oliva 2014:10). Micro-level analysis 85 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups

A complementary approach that shows potential paper suggested that these competencies for addressing systemic issues is what biologist be complemented with systemic approaches Edward O. Wilson referred to as “consilience”, and cross-fertilization of different knowledge the confluence and synthesis of knowledge in order to find the right solutions. from different specialized fields (Wilson 1998). The advent of the new forms of structural The assortment of knowledge is, in fact, likely to violence presented in this chapter sanctions produce unexpected and innovative solutions the demise of traditional conflict resolution, through sudden change of paradigms. and with it, the end of the supremacy of political settlements as an instrument to solve A light at the end armed conflicts. This does not necessarily of the tunnel? mean that politics is superseded or should To build peace one has to understand war. be given less emphasis. But analytical Current conflicts are radically different and efforts should be bolstered in order to equip more complex than ever before. Non-war UN cadres and field personnel to recognize violence exceeds by far the violence taking the importance of other elements of place in situations of armed struggle. Yet, contemporary armed insurgencies, such as the bulk of current analytical, political and their political economy, the role of rituals in military capacities is still geared towards group cohesion, the dynamic evolution they confronting traditional conflicts. This chapter endure and the potential alterations they has suggested a radical redistribution of produce. These are all fundamental assets capacities and a recalibration of approaches of contemporary armed groups, but, as to better understand and deal with explained earlier, the United Nations and its contemporary armed groups. personnel can tap into a broad spectrum of analytical methods and learning resources The United Nations, along with the to face complex issues that involve seeing international community, is lagging behind the “big picture” and not just the single in many regards and should be working parts of it. systematically to upgrade existing knowledge management practices and learning processes. Nonetheless, concurrent efforts References should be made to preserve successful Abdul-Hussain, Hussain. 2009. “Hezbollah: practices (while encouraging innovations) A State within the State”. Current Trends in and existing leverage points that UN staff Islamist Ideology Volume 8: 68-81. have at their disposal, such as knowledge Aronson, Daniel. 2008. “Overview of of local perceptions, presence of peace Systems Thinking”. Thinking Page website infrastructures and trusted interactions www. thinking.net (accessed 15 January with some armed outfits. Mapping and 2015).

landscaping are two key skills that analysts in Asuni, Judith B. 2009. “Understanding the the UN system especially need to have. The Armed Groups of the Niger Delta”. Working Fit for purpose: Equipping the United Nations to better understand non-state armed groups 86

Paper, Council on Foreign Relations. Organization. New York: Doubleday/ Currency. Blin, Arnaud. 2011. “Armed groups and intra-state conflicts: the dawn of a new Skarbek, David. 2014. The Social Order era?” International Review of the Red Cross of the Underworld: How Prison Gangs 93(882): 287-310. Govern the American Penal System. Oxford Briscoe, Ivan. 2013. “Non-conventional University Press. Armed Violence and Non-state Actors: United Nations. 2014a. “Security Council Challenges for Mediation and Humanitarian Resolution 2180”. S/RES/2180 (14 October Action”. The Norwegian Peacebuilding 2014). Resource Centre. United Nations. 2014b. “Report of the Open Geneva Declaration. 2011. Global Burden of Working Group of the General Assembly on Armed Violence, 2011. Lethal Encounters. Sustainable Development Goals”. A/68/970 Geneva, Geneva Declaration Secretariat. (12 August 2014). Glaister, Leslie. 2010. “Confronting the Don: United Nations. 2012. “Guidance for The Political Economy of Gang Violence in Effective Mediation: Annex to the report of Jamaica”. An Occasional Paper of the Small the Secretary-General on strengthening the Arms Survey. Geneva. role of mediation in the peaceful settlement Jolly, Richard et al. 2009. UN Ideas that of disputes, conflict prevention and Changed the World. Indiana University Press. resolution”. A/66/811 (25 June 2012).

Idler, Annette and Forest, James J. F. 2015. United Nations. 2007. “Knowledge “Behavioral Patterns among (Violent) Non- Management in the United Nations System”. State Actors: A Study of Complementary Joint Inspection Unit, Geneva. Governance”. Stability: International Journal United Nations. 2006. “Report of the Office of Security & Development 4(1): 1-19. of Internal Oversight Services on the thematic McQuinn, Brian and Oliva, Fabio. 2014. evaluation of knowledge management Analyzing and Engaging Non-State Armed networks in the pursuit of the goals of the Groups in the Field. Preliminary Scoping Millennium Declaration” Economic and Report. Turin: United Nations System Staff Social Council. E/AC.51/2006/2 (26 March College. 2006).

Mohamedou, Mohammad-Mahmoud O. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping 2005. “Non-Linearity of Engagement: Operations. 2013. “Understanding and Transnational Armed Groups, International Integrating Local Perceptions in Multi- Law, and the Conflict between Al Qaeda and Dimensional UN Peacekeeping”. New York: the United States”. Harvard Program on United Nations. Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research. United Nations Development Programme. Packer, George. 2015. “Why ISIS Murdered 2013. “Issue Brief: Infrastructure for Kenji Goto”. The New Yorker 2 February Peace”. New York, February 2013. 2015. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Powell, Jonathan. 2014. “How to Talk to 2013. Global Study on Homicide, Vienna: Terrorists”. The Guardian 7 October 2014. United Nations.

Senge, Peter M. 1990. The Fifth Discipline: Wilson, Edward O. 1998. Consilience: The The Art and Practice of the Learning Unity of Knowledge. New York: Knopf. 87 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups Authors Ahmed Rufai Abubakar and peacebuilding. He is fluent, in English, French, Arabic and Hausa. Ahmed Rufai Abubakar joined the Nigerian Foreign Service in 1993 and held several Almut Wieland-Karimi international assignments in West Africa and the Maghreb region until 2006 when he Almut Wieland-Karimi has been Director of joined the African Union Mission in Sudan the Center for International Peace Operations as Head of the Political Affairs Department. (ZIF) since 2009. ZIF was founded in He was subsequently Acting Head of Office 2002 by the German government and of the Joint Support and Coordination parliament to strengthen civilian capacities Mechanism (JSCM) (April 2008–2009), in for international peace operations. The Addis Ababa, where he liaised between the Center’s core mandate is to recruit and Department of Peacekeeping Operations train civilian personnel and to provide of the United Nations Secretariat and analysis and advice on peacekeeping and the Department of Peace and Security peacebuilding issues. ZIF works closely with of the African Union Commission for the the German Federal Foreign Office and is deployment and operations of the United responsible in particular for Germany’s Nations /African Union Hybrid Operation civilian contributions to UN, EU and OSCE in Darfur (UNAMID). From Dec. 2010 until missions. Previously, Almut Wieland-Karimi June 2011 he was Acting Chief of Staff, AU- worked for the Friedrich Ebert Foundation UN Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST) (FES), lastly as country director for the US in the context of the Darfur Peace Process and Canada, and set up the FES country in Doha, Qatar. He subsequently became office in Kabul/Afghanistan from 2002 Acting Director, Political Affairs Division to 2005. She holds a Master’s degree in (PAD) at the African Union-United Nations Oriental Studies from Bonn University and Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), a doctorate in the same. until June 2013. Mr. Abubakar is currently ¬serving as Director, Political Affairs, in Arthur Boutellis the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) where he coordinates preventive Arthur Boutellis is both a practitioner and diplomacy activities including mediation in a researcher. He currently works with support of the good offices provided by the MINUSMA as Deputy DDR, and supports Special Representative of the UN Secretary- the Mali peace negotiations in Algiers General for West Africa, for whom he as part of MINUSMA Mediation Team. deputizes. His current functions also include He is also a non-resident adviser at the convener of Regional Working Group of Goal International Peace Institute (IPI) in New 2 (Security) of the United Nations Integrated York, where he worked from 2011 to 2013 Strategy for the Sahel. Mr. Abubakar’s (See http://www.ipinst.org/about/people/62- background and expertise lies in conflict detail.html). Prior to IPI, Arthur has worked prevention, governance, conflict resolution with the United Nations Missions in Authors. 88

Burundi (BINUB), Chad, and the Central Hilde Frafjord Johnson African Republic (MINURCAT) and Haiti Hilde Frafjord Johnson has close to 20 (MINUSTAH), as well as think tanks, years of high-level leadership experience academia and NGOs. His work has primarily in international positions. Most recently, focused on post-conflict reconstruction, she completed her three year tenure as peacekeeping and peacebuilding, Special Representative of the Secretary- mediation and peace processes, as well as General (SRSG) in South Sudan. Prior to DDR, security sector reform, and the rule of this, she was Deputy Executive Director of law. He holds a master’s degree in public UNICEF (2007-2011), where she was in affairs from the Woodrow Wilson School at charge of the organisation’s humanitarian Princeton University and is a graduate of the operations, crisis response and security Institut d’Etudes Politiques. He is bilingual issues, as well as resource mobilization in French and English, as well as fluent in and external communications. As Minister Spanish. for International Development of Norway for almost seven years (during 1997- Fabio Oliva 2005) Hilde F. Johnson was in charge of development policies and programmes, as Fabio Oliva joined the UNSSC Peace well as humanitarian response. During her and Security Team in 2008. His current ministerial tenure, she was a key player portfolio covers conflict analysis, prevention in brokering the Comprehensive Peace of electoral violence, and analysis of Agreement (CPA) for Sudan in 2005. With a unconventional non-state armed groups. particular engagement also in Afghanistan, He has supported UN peace operations and Timor Leste, the Great Lakes, and the country teams in Afghanistan, Guinea, Iraq, Sudans, Ms. Johnson has advocated for Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Mauritania, Somalia, a reforms in the international response Sudan (Darfur) and Uganda. Prior to the to crisis and post conflict settings. In this UN, he has worked in the Philippines context she was also Senior Advisor to the (Mindanao) conducting consultations President of the African Development Bank, aimed at the political transformation of developing its Fragile States policy. Hilde F. Islamic armed groups, and in Nepal Johnson was elected Member of Parliament managing a training programme for political from 1992-2001. She has her post-graduate party cadres. In 2006 he has participated degree in Social Anthropology and speaks as election observer in the OSCE mission to English, Swahili and French fluently. Bosnia and Herzegovina. He holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the Graduate Jafar Javan Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva with a dissertation on post- Jafar Javan is the Director of the United conflict elections. In 2007 he was Visiting Nations System Staff College. Mr. Javan Scholar at the School of International and brings over 25 years of experience, having Public Affairs (SIPA) of Columbia University worked in the United Nations system in in New York and Visiting Fellow at the Royal various regions, notably Africa, Asia and the University of Phnom Penh in Cambodia. Pacific, Europe and the Commonwealth of 89 Understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups

Independent States. During his tenure in the Before joining the UN, Kristiana worked as a system, his professional responsibilities have researcher with The North-South Institute in focused on policy development, education, Ottawa, Canada and as a senior researcher/ training and employment, community project manager with the Centre d’Alerte et development and social participation. Prior de Prévention des Conflits in Bujumbura, to his latest appointment, Mr. Javan was the Burundi. Deputy Director and Head of Programmes at UNSSC since April 2008. He has served from Marco Carmignani 2006 to 2008 as Director of Policy Support Marco Carmignani of Brazil is the and Programme Development with the Deputy Special Representative of the United Nations Development Programme’s Secretary-General with the United Nations (UNDP) Regional Centre for Europe and the Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea- Commonwealth of Independent States in Bissau (UNIOGBIS). With more than two Bratislava. He was Chief of the Subregional decades of service with the United Nations, Resource Facility with UNDP Bratislava Mr. Carmignani’s experience traverses the between 2003 and 2005, and Policy Liaison political, legal and administrative fields. Adviser with the Bureau for Development For the past seven years, he served in Policy at UNDP Washington, D.C., from peacekeeping and political missions in the 2000 to 2003. Mr. Javan holds a doctorate Middle East as Senior Advisor and Chief in psychology, with a specialization in of Staff. Prior to that, he held a number human resources development, from North of senior positions at the UN Secretariat Carolina State University, a master’s degree in New York and in Africa, including with in international relations and a Bachelor the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB). Mr. of Arts in international affairs from the Carmignani holds a Juris Doctor degree American University in Washington, D.C. from Rutgers University School of Law (U.S) Kristiana Powell and a M.S. in Computer Science from the University of Miami (U.S.). He received a Kristiana Powell is a Political Affairs Officer Bachelor’s degree in engineering from the in the Policy and Mediation Division in the Aeronautic Institute of Technology (Brazil). UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) where she helps to shape the Department’s Michèle Griffin position on a number of policy priorities, including conflict prevention, the post- Michèle Griffin is Director of Policy and 2015 sustainable development agenda, the Planning in the Secretary-General’s office Responsibility to Protect/atrocity prevention, (EOSG) at the United Nations. Previous and unconventional threats, among other assignments include ten years in the thematic areas. Prior to joining DPA, she Department of Political Affairs (DPA), where served in the Security Sector Reform she launched the Mediation Support Unit, Unit in the Department of Peacekeeping and several years in UNDP, contributing to Operations where she was deployed to the the establishment of the Bureau for Crisis Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Prevention and Recovery. She has been an Haiti, and Ethiopia for extended periods. adjunct Professor at Columbia University Authors. 90 and has published and lectured widely on Paz (Spain). Ms. Korth holds a Master’s UN matters over the years. Degree in Applied Anthropology (focus on International Development) from The Mohammad-Mahmoud American University, Washington, DC and Ould Mohamedou a B.A. in Swahili and Anthropology from The School of Oriental and African Studies, Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou University of London, UK. is Deputy-Director and Academic Dean of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy Véronique Dudouet and Adjunct Professor in the International History department of the Graduate Institute Véronique Dudouet is senior researcher of International and Development Studies and programme director at the Berghof in Geneva. He is also Visiting Professor at Foundation (Berlin), where she manages the doctoral school at Sciences Po Paris. collaborative research and capacity-building Previously, he was Associate Director of projects on non-state armed groups, the Harvard University Programme on negotiations, post-war governance and civil Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research. resistance. She also carries out consultancy He is the author of Understanding Al Qaeda projects for various civil society organisations – Changing War and Global Politics (2011), and international agencies (e.g. UNDP, Contre-Croisade – Le 11 Septembre et le European Parliament, EU Commission), Retournement du Monde (2011), and Iraq and serves as Academic Advisor of the and the Second Gulf War – State-Building International Center on Nonviolent Conflict and Regime Security (2002), as well as in Washington. She holds a PhD in Conflict several articles on transnational terrorism Resolution from Bradford University (UK). and political transition. Véronique currently edits the Berghof Transitions series, and has authored Svenja Korth numerous publications in the field of conflict transformation, including two edited books: Svenja Korth works at the United Nations Post-war Security Transitions: Participatory System Staff College. She started her career Peacebuilding after Asymmetric Conflicts with UNDP in 1989 and has worked in (Routledge 2012), and Civil Resistance and Namibia, Equatorial Guinea, Suriname and Conflict Transformation: Transitions from Nicaragua. In 1998 she joined the UN System Armed to Nonviolent Struggle (Routledge Staff College in Turin. Ms. Korth manages 2014). the Peace and Security Team, which supports capacity building efforts within the UN System in thematic areas related to peace and security. She has published several articles, including “Alerta temprana y Medidas Preventivas: La experiencia de un proyecto de las Naciones Unidas” in Papeles de Cuestiones Internacionales (2003), Centro de Investigaciones para la

Printed in May 2015 Graphic project by Macisto

United Nations System Sta College Viale Maestri del Lavoro 10 10127 Turin, Italy www.unssc.org