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The Inferior Fleet – a Risk Taken

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The Inferior Fleet – a Risk Taken Bulletin of ”Carol I” National Defence University 10.12753/2284-9378-20-65 THE INFERIOR FLEET – A RISK TAKEN Capt. (Navy) Valentin-Marian TOMA, PhD Candidate* In the present article I set out to make an analysis of the concepts of current fleet and also of the inferior fleet in action, which have in common the quantitative and qualitative inferiority of forces and means. In naval conflicts the superior fleets quantitatively and qualitatively benefit from a considerable advantage in relation to the enemy. This advantage of the superior naval force, in most cases, leads to a rapid neutralization of the enemy naval forces, to the achievement of the freedom of navigation in the area of operations and to the fulfillment of the operative and strategic objectives. However, there is the possibility that an inferior naval force will avoid a decisive battle and the naval tactical actions it performs will greatly influence the conduct of events at sea. The novelty of this article is highlighted by the comparative analysis of the examples presented, which highlights the differences between the two concepts, so that the idea that an inferior fleet can act on the enemy’s means of communication, can delay its actions for a short time, but without consistent support from the air force or allied forces, the inferior fleet will eventually lose the initiative and be defeated. Equipping ships of an inferior fleet with modern detection technique will qualitatively reduce the differences in a naval confrontation. The analysis of the naval confrontations shows that many naval battles and battles took place near the shore, from which we deduce the particularly important role that the air and ground forces have in supporting the naval forces. Keywords: inferior fleet; current fleet; inferior fleet in action; naval tactical actions. In this article I set out to analyze two concepts We have found that each state with access to the that encompass doctrinal and action issues, which sea or the ocean has had to develop its naval power are related to the expression of maritime power, over time in order to protect its own merchant the concept of fleet in existence and the concept of ships, defend its own coastline against aggression inferior fleet in action. Both concepts are specific from the sea or to conquer new territories. The size to an inferior fleet, because I believe that, although of the fleets and the capabilities developed differ they are developed by naval powers with limited according to the maritime interests of each nation. possibilities of expression, there are significant Usually, nations with a developed economy have differences between the two concepts. The novelty managed to consolidate their naval power so that of this approach consists in the fact that, following their maritime interests are protected in different a comparative analysis regarding the modus parts of the globe. operandi of some fleets and doctrinal provisions in The assertion of a nation as a naval power different schools of thought, those differences will involves a lot of investment in ships, combat be identified. equipment, port facilities, training bases, shipyards, For this approach, we considered as a research naval education, and participation in national or hypothesis that the application of the concept of international naval exercises or naval operations in inferior fleet by a nation with access to the sea is alliances or coalitions. suitable only for a short period of transformation of In many cases, nations with access to the sea or naval power and adaptation to new security threats the ocean, for economic reasons in particular, do not in the region. To validate the research hypothesis, develop naval power at the pace of technological I proposed two directions of research, in which I evolution. Establishing the architecture of the fleets want to make a delimitation of the two concepts is based on the maritime space to be defended and and identify the implications for the expression of the situation of the security environment in the maritime power by applying the two concepts by region. As a rule, these fleets are quantitatively and states with maritime interests. often inferior in quality to the dominant nations’ in the region. An inferior fleet does not have many options * Romanian Naval Forces for expression and therefore must find solutions, e-mail: [email protected] following in-depth analyses of the situation in the December, 2020 41 Bulletin of ”Carol I” National Defence University region and potential enemies, in order to fulfill the Means of expressing the concept of existing fleet missions entrusted to it. In order to analyze the concept of the existing It is obvious that an inferior fleet is a risk in a fleet, we chose two relevant examples for the mode naval confrontation, but through the possibilities of of action of some naval powers during a conflict. maneuver, fire and technological equipment it can The first example is the mode of action of avoid a decisive battle and can decisively influence the Argentine naval forces during the Falkland the course of action of the naval enemy. War. The conflict between Argentina and Great In the follow-up of the article I will present some Britain took place between April 2 and June 14, particularities of the concepts of fleet in existence 1982, a conflict that erupted following the invasion and inferior fleet in action and I will highlight the of the English Falkland Islands by the Argentine differences between these two concepts. armed forces. The Argentine fleet participated in the conflict through a naval force composed Conceptual delimitations of 1 aircraft carrier, 1 cruiser, 6 destroyers, 2 The concept of the existing fleet is very close classic submarines, 1 amphibious transport ship, to the concept of the inferior fleet in action with 5 patrol ships, 3 corvettes, 10 auxiliary ships and a common root, namely the inferiority of the 15 merchant ships. On the other hand, the British quantities of forces and means available in relation Intervention Force participated with 5 nuclear to the enemy. submarines, 2 aircraft carriers, 10 T-21 frigates, It is very unlikely that an inferior fleet will 4 T-22 frigates, 4 Leander frigates, 7 destroyers, gain and maintain control of the sea, but the naval 2 assault ships, 3 patrol ships, 2 hospital ships, tactical actions it can perform can pose a danger to 4 dredgers, 40 auxiliary vessels and 10 landing the enemy, cause the enemy to stop on an alignment craft. and lose his initiative for the time being. An inferior In the face of such a naval force, the Argentine fleet needs to continuously improve its capabilities navy tried a surprise attack. The attack failed, and in order to be able to react promptly in the event of the Argentine Destroyer General Belgrano was a naval or air threat. sunk. It was decided to withdraw the Argentine The concept of the existing fleet and the concept ships in the territorial waters, from where they tried sporadically, without success, to break the of inferior fleet in action are usually developed by naval blockade formed by the British. small naval powers in confrontations with large Thus Argentina did not risk the loss of warships naval powers. Most of the confrontations took in direct confrontations, but applying this strategy place near the coast, where the inferior naval power was not able to help Argentine forces already benefited from the advantage of the configuration landed on the Falkland Islands. Adopting this of the coast, the depths and the fire cover of its own passive attitude, the concept of the existing fleet actions. was applied, probably also in view of the very large Depending on the chosen strategy, an inferior quantitative and technological differences between fleet can be actively involved in combat actions the two opposing naval forces. specific to guerrilla warfare (strike and flee), thus The second example is the mode of action applying the concept of inferior fleet in action. of the Yugoslav naval forces during Operation The concept of an existing fleet is applied by a Allied Force. Operation Allied Force was NATO’s naval power by keeping naval forces in a safe place, response to the implementation of UN Security protected from the enemy actions until the end of Council resolution no. 1199 of 23 September 1998 the conflict or until a time when the conditions amid Serbian military action against Albanians in for engaging in combat are met after receiving the Kosovo region. reinforcements so that it would be able to execute On March 24, 1999, NATO forces attacked naval tactical actions against the enemy. Yugoslavia. Operation Allied Force ran from March Below I will present some relevant examples 24 to June 11 and included the use of 1,000 aircraft of how the concepts of existing fleet and inferior from Italian bases and aircraft carriers deployed in fleet in action have been applied in various naval the Adriatic Sea. The operation also involved the confrontations. launch of Tomahawks from ships and submarines. 42 December, 2020 Bulletin of ”Carol I” National Defence University The naval forces participating in the Allied Force Means of expressing the concept of inferior fleet had the mission to monitor the air and naval space In most naval confrontations between the of Yugoslavia in the first phase and later the launch belligerent forces there were differences in the of the Tomahawk cruise missiles to hit targets on amount of forces and means available. In most the territory of Yugoslavia. cases one of the parties was inferior in number of NATO forces deployed in the Adriatic Sea were ships or technologically. The role of a fleet, even if impressive.
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