Spanish Terrorism in Theory and Practice
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Spanish Terrorism in Theory and Practice The Cases of ETA and TL Alexander B. Ward University Honors in International Studies Senior Honors Thesis, SIS-498-002H Advised by Professor Carolyn Gallaher Fall 2011 1 ABSTRACT Most studies about the development and continuation of terrorism tend to focus on groups in the third world. Further, the general consensus of these studies is that three variables – political economics, identity politics, and public opinion – are the most valid rationales for understanding the usage of terror. This thesis, however, by mostly looking at secondary sources but also by quoting members of each group, will look at two terrorist organizations in Spain, Euskadia ta Askatasuna (ETA) and Terra Lliure (TL), in terms of how these three variables affected their rise, development, and continuation. To be sure, both of these groups mostly operated in Spain when the country was in the first world, already making this thesis different from the literature on terrorism. Ultimately, this thesis concludes that identity politics appears to be the most convincing argument for why terrorism either continues (for ETA) or has ceased (TL), but also concludes that the political economic situation was important for each groups’ development and that public opinion did not matter much for the continuation of terrorist tactics. Thus, this thesis adds to the gaps in the literature in two ways: 1) by simultaneously surveying two groups not in the first world that operated at the same time and in the same country, and 2) by taking on the main assumptions of terrorism scholars in order to show which variable is most important in the study of terror. 2 INTRODUCTION The 1992 Summer Olympic Games in Barcelona, Spain were only one year away. The Spanish authorities made no secret that they were afraid one of Spain’s most prominent terrorist groups – Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) or Terra Lliure (TL) – were planning to disrupt the Games in any capacity. On May 31, 1991, those fears were realized. A city by the name of Vic, only about thirty miles north of Barcelona, Catalonia’s capital, was the site of a bomb blast which occurred in a Civil Guard barrack.1 ETA took immediate responsibility for the attack.2 With the Games not too far away, the last thing the authorities wanted was to turn Spain into a police-state in order to ensure security. With its bomb the ETA accomplished two things: 1) it continued its struggle for independence of the Basque Country, and 2) inconvenienced Spain’s Olympic Planning Committee into adding more security.3 The ETA’s willingness to bomb Vic also left open the possibility that it could conduct another attack in the near future or during the Games. Making it harder for the authorities was that the region of Catalonia, where the Games were being held, was also home to TL, a terrorist movement seeking Catalonia’s independence from Spain. Indeed, Olympic security was “enjoying little success,”4 and the prospect of another group (in addition to ETA) that threatened the Games made their jobs all that much harder. What some security guards did not know was that around 150 of their colleagues were TL operatives who had gotten jobs as security guards in order to sabotage the Games.5 And, though TL infiltrators did not kill anyone they caused many logistical problems that facilitated ETA 1 Policinski 1991, 12C. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Finkelstein and Koch 1991, C2. 5 Ibid. 3 planting a second bomb in the Montjuic Stadium in Barcelona (during the games?). Luckily, a non-TL officer found the bomb and got the necessary people to defuse it. Nevertheless, the combination of ETA’s deadly plans and TL’s sabotage made the Olympics hard to handle. Yet, as Spanish authorities well know, both of these groups have been causing trouble on the peninsula since the mid-1950s.6 --- --- --- The roots of the ETA and TL can be found in the 1930s when General Francisco Franco organized a successful military coup and installed a fascist political system. Franco, a devout Catholic who was angry with his Republican Government not promoting the religion, wanted to take over the country to return Spain back to God. His actions would spark a civil war in the country that would mercilessly rage for four years as the prelude to World War II. Out of the Spanish conflict grew two terrorist organizations – Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) and Terra Lliure (TL) – that claim to be the legitimate representatives of the two regions in the war that got the brunt of Franco’s fury: the Basque Country and Catalonia. While in distinct regions, both groups’ messages were similar and clear: their particular regions should be independent from Spain. Both groups stemmed from separate independence movements; indeed, Franco’s suppression of each territory began distinct pushes for a break from Spanish authority. Today, both the Basque Country and Catalonia are autonomous regions within the framework of Spanish politics (both having achieved this status in the Constitution of 1978 that reestablished a democratic government after the war). Thus, neither ETA nor TL succeeded in their goals. 6 Ibid. 4 However, despite their similarities, these two groups took different paths. TL stopped their operations in the mid-1990s and only killed one person, whereas ETA continues to operate today and has achieved a total death count of around 800 people. What is interesting here is that they are two groups with ethno-nationalist tendencies, that want independence, in the same country, at the same time, with similar economic and demographic backgrounds, and yet one group survived and one still kills today (despite having called a ceasefire). Thus, this thesis attempts to answer why TL is no longer active while ETA continues to operate. My research suggests that greater rates of regional-language knowledge in Catalonia (Catalan) are higher than the regional language knowledge of the Basque Country (Euskera). This is important because both groups were, or are, fighting for the promotion of their regional language; thus, where the language rate is low, more violence is expected. Further, with higher levels of language comprehension in Catalonia, there is less social fragmentation, therefore no longer requiring the need of a social adhesive, which TL tried to be. In the Basque Country, meanwhile, ETA still survives – barely – because Basque is minimally understood in the region. This thesis differs from other studies on terrorism in Spain which argue that economics is what drives both the support for terrorism and terrorism itself (see, for example, Medrano 1995). Indeed, economics is a major component since it is undeniable that economic success in both areas attracted immigrants that did not speak the regional language, leading to a nationalist movement.7 Nationalism alone, though, could not keep support for terrorism – and the terrorists knew this. In fact, both groups used nationalistic fervor and assuaged the public to place that radicalization into the regional language, thus easily defining a Basque or a Catalonian versus a Spaniard. In other words, nationalism planted the seeds for the independence movement; but the 7 Medrano 1995. 5 desire to have a place to speak the regional language without interference from the Spanish state – thus, the desire for independence – stemmed from the will of the regions to have control over their own languages. In addition to surveying the past and present of Spanish terrorism, both groups will be used as a case study to offer a comparative look at terrorism. Indeed, studies on terrorism normally focus on just one group. The rare studies that focus on more than one terrorist organization tend to focus on groups that are in the developing world. After the events of September 11, 2001, for example, the jihadist terrorist movements have been the focus of most research. This thesis, then, looks at two groups that formed because of the same factor – immigration into their respective territories – but continued to operate well into Spain’s status as a first-world country. Yet, what the region of Catalonia did – institutionalize the learning of language, the same one TL championed – is what led to its demise, whereas ETA’s championing of the Basque language allows it to continue operating. In this sense, this thesis can offer a lot in terms of what a state can do to end terrorism within its borders and also see terrorism inspired not by something religious, but rather by something linguistic. The remainder of the thesis is divided into the following distinct sections. Section I will be a literature review on the most relevant scholarship on terrorism. The fact that this thesis is unique in that it covers both groups in Spain means that there is not much written on the subject and thus receives very little attention in this section. However, I will show in this thesis where the scholarship is at this point. Most of the immense scholarship on this issue debates how economics, identity politics, and nationalism affect the genesis and the continuation of terrorism; therefore, these areas will be reviewed. 6 Section II covers how I conducted my study of TL and ETA. Section III will cover the history of both terrorist groups in Spain with special attention paid to how each group formed, operated, related to the public, made its claim to legitimacy, and then died out (for TL) or weakened (for ETA). Section IV will focus on my first variable—the political economy of the regions—to show how the nationalist movements formed. This would be enough to start the movements, but not enough to keep them alive. Section IV will show that identity politics – that is, identifying with one’s language – is what gave the terrorists’ legitimacy and why both groups received support for their actions.