Submarine Taniwha - Design Report
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Navy Columbia-Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress Updated September 14, 2021 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R41129 Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program Summary The Navy’s Columbia (SSBN-826) class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) program is a program to design and build a class of 12 new SSBNs to replace the Navy’s current force of 14 aging Ohio-class SSBNs. Since 2013, the Navy has consistently identified the Columbia-class program as the Navy’s top priority program. The Navy procured the first Columbia-class boat in FY2021 and wants to procure the second boat in the class in FY2024. The Navy’s proposed FY2022 budget requests $3,003.0 (i.e., $3.0 billion) in procurement funding for the first Columbia-class boat and $1,644.0 million (i.e., about $1.6 billion) in advance procurement (AP) funding for the second boat, for a combined FY2022 procurement and AP funding request of $4,647.0 million (i.e., about $4.6 billion). The Navy’s FY2022 budget submission estimates the procurement cost of the first Columbia- class boat at $15,030.5 million (i.e., about $15.0 billion) in then-year dollars, including $6,557.6 million (i.e., about $6.60 billion) in costs for plans, meaning (essentially) the detail design/nonrecurring engineering (DD/NRE) costs for the Columbia class. (It is a long-standing Navy budgetary practice to incorporate the DD/NRE costs for a new class of ship into the total procurement cost of the first ship in the class.) Excluding costs for plans, the estimated hands-on construction cost of the first ship is $8,473.0 million (i.e., about $8.5 billion). -
Gao-20-257T, Navy Maintenance
United States Government Accountability Office Testimony Before the Subcommittees on Seapower and Readiness and Management Support, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. ET Wednesday, December 4, 2019 NAVY MAINTENANCE Persistent and Substantial Ship and Submarine Maintenance Delays Hinder Efforts to Rebuild Readiness Statement of Diana C. Maurer Director Defense Capabilities and Management GAO-20-257T December 4, 2019 NAVY MAINTENANCE Persistent and Substantial Ship and Submarine Maintenance Delays Hinder Efforts to Rebuild Readiness Highlights of GAO-20-257T, a testimony before the Subcommittees on Seapower and Readiness and Management Support, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found The 2018 National Defense Strategy The Navy continues to face persistent and substantial maintenance delays that emphasizes that restoring and retaining affect the majority of its maintenance efforts and hinder its attempts to restore readiness is critical to success in the readiness. From fiscal year 2014 to the end of fiscal year 2019, Navy ships have emerging security environment. The spent over 33,700 more days in maintenance than expected. The Navy was Navy is working to rebuild its readiness unable to complete scheduled ship maintenance on time for about 75 percent of while also growing and modernizing its the maintenance periods conducted during fiscal years 2014 through 2019, with aging fleet of ships. A critical component more than half of the delays in fiscal year 2019 exceeding 90 days. When of rebuilding Navy readiness is maintenance is not completed on time, fewer ships are available for training or implementing sustainable operational operations, which can hinder readiness. -
Appendix A. Navy Activity Descriptions
Atlantic Fleet Training and Testing Draft EIS/OEIS June 2017 APPENDIX A Navy Activity Descriptions Appendix A Navy Activity Descriptions Atlantic Fleet Training and Testing Draft EIS/OEIS June 2017 This page intentionally left blank. Appendix A Navy Activity Descriptions Atlantic Fleet Training and Testing Draft EIS/OEIS June 2017 Draft Environmental Impact Statement/Overseas Environmental Impact Statement Atlantic Fleet Training and Testing TABLE OF CONTENTS A. NAVY ACTIVITY DESCRIPTIONS ................................................................................................ A-1 A.1 Description of Sonar, Munitions, Targets, and Other Systems Employed in Atlantic Fleet Training and Testing Events .................................................................. A-1 A.1.1 Sonar Systems and Other Acoustic Sources ......................................................... A-1 A.1.2 Munitions .............................................................................................................. A-7 A.1.3 Targets ................................................................................................................ A-11 A.1.4 Defensive Countermeasures ............................................................................... A-13 A.1.5 Mine Warfare Systems ........................................................................................ A-13 A.1.6 Military Expended Materials ............................................................................... A-16 A.2 Training Activities .................................................................................................. -
Bill's Cave Diving Lexicon
Bill’s Cave Diving Lexicon 120 Rule: Noticing from the Navy NDL table that, for certain depths, depth + bottom time = 120 so that the NDL can be determined by subtracting the depth from 120. 200 DIN: Thread depth in a DIN valve and associated pressure (200 BAR) that can be handled. This size (7 threads) allows for a DIN to yoke conversion. 300 DIN: Thread depth in a DIN valve that provides the most secure (9 threads) connection and can withstand 300 BAR pressure. 5 nines pure: 99.999% pure, as in a gas. 50-50: Gas mix of 50% oxygen and 50% nitrogen used for decompression gas. 6351-T6 Aluminum Alloy: Alloy that has had problems with tank ruptures. Absolute Pressure: Total pressure being exerted on a diver At sea level Absolute pressure is 1 ATA and it increases by 1 ATA for each 33fsw (34ffw). ADDD (Air, Duration, Depth, Distance): Limits for dive termination acronym minimum Air volume/pressure, maximum Duration of dive, maximum Depth of dive, and maximum Distance of penetration. ADV (Automatic Deflation Valve, and Automatic Diluent Valve ): Device on a buoyancy compensator that allows for rapid air purging, and device on a rebreather that dilutes the breathing mix. AGE (Arterial Gas Embolism): A lung expansion injury. A condition in which gas bubbles enter the arterial system and cause damage by blocking blood flow to vital organs, most commonly the brain. This is generally caused by air passing through the walls of the alveoli into the bloodstream. Air: A gas mixture of Oxygen (21%), Nitrogen (78%), and other gasses (1%, Helium, Argon, etc.). -
Diving Accident / Incident Report Form
DIVING ACCIDENT / INCIDENT REPORT FORM NOTE: FAU Scientific Divers shall use this form to report diving related accidents, injuries, and incidents including; near-drowning, decompression sickness, gas embolism, lung overexpansion, or injuries that require hospitalization as well as any incidents that compromised diver safety or might result in later hospitalization, therapy, or litigation. FAU Dive Logs for all dives related to the accident / incident must also be submitted with this report. Contact the FAU Dive Safety Officer at 561-297-3129 with questions about whether or not to report an incident. GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE ACCIDENT/ INCIDENT VICTIM DIVER NAME: DATE & TIME OF INCIDENT: DIVE LOCATION: DIVING CERTIFICATION LEVEL: CERTIFICATION DEPTH: Scientific Diver Diver-In-Training Temporary Diver CURRENT MEDICATIONS: CURRENT HEALTH PROBLEMS: If the diver is not anFAU-certified diver, complete this section. FAU-certified divers skip to the next section. AGE: SEX: (M/F) DIVER’S AGENCY OR ORGANIZATION: AGENCY OR ORGANIZATION DSO NAME & TELEPHONE #: # YEARS DIVING: TOTAL # DIVES: # DIVES LAST 6 MONTHS: PREVIOUS DIVE INCIDENTS & DATES: DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT / INCIDENT: Please describe accident / incident in detail. Include ANY factor which you believe may have contributed to, or minimized the accident / incident. If more than one accident / incident occurred please fill out a separate form. Use extra paper if necessary. What could have been done to prevent this accident / incident? Did the accident / incident cause harm: Diver’s qualification: (may circle >1) Yes No Not known Diving student …… DS Open water ……...OW Advanced diver…….AD Divemaster ……...DM Specify : Dive instructor ….. DI Untrained …… .. UT Professional ……... PD Technical diver…...TD Not known ……. -
Supervised Dive
EFFECTIVE 1 March 2009 MINIMUM COURSE CONTENT FOR Supervised Diver Certifi cation As Approved By ©2009, Recreational Scuba Training Council, Inc. (RSTC) Recreational Scuba Training Council, Inc. RSTC Coordinator P.O. Box 11083 Jacksonville, FL 32239 USA Recreational Scuba Training Council (RSTC) Minimum Course Content for Supervised Diver Certifi cation 1. Scope and Purpose This standard provides minimum course content requirements for instruction leading to super- vised diver certifi cation in recreational diving with scuba (self-contained underwater breathing appa- ratus). The intent of the standard is to prepare a non diver to the point that he can enjoy scuba diving in open water under controlled conditions—that is, under the supervision of a diving professional (instructor or certifi ed assistant – see defi nitions) and to a limited depth. These requirements do not defi ne full, autonomous certifi cation and should not be confused with Open Water Scuba Certifi cation. (See Recreational Scuba Training Council Minimum Course Content for Open Water Scuba Certifi ca- tion.) The Supervised Diver Certifi cation Standards are a subset of the Open Water Scuba Certifi cation standards. Moreover, as part of the supervised diver course content, supervised divers are informed of the limitations of the certifi cation and urged to continue their training to obtain open water diver certifi - cation. Within the scope of supervised diver training, the requirements of this standard are meant to be com- prehensive, but general in nature. That is, the standard presents all the subject areas essential for su- pervised diver certifi cation, but it does not give a detailed listing of the skills and information encom- passed by each area. -
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress September 16, 2021 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov RL32665 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress Summary The current and planned size and composition of the Navy, the annual rate of Navy ship procurement, the prospective affordability of the Navy’s shipbuilding plans, and the capacity of the U.S. shipbuilding industry to execute the Navy’s shipbuilding plans have been oversight matters for the congressional defense committees for many years. In December 2016, the Navy released a force-structure goal that calls for achieving and maintaining a fleet of 355 ships of certain types and numbers. The 355-ship goal was made U.S. policy by Section 1025 of the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2810/P.L. 115- 91 of December 12, 2017). The Navy and the Department of Defense (DOD) have been working since 2019 to develop a successor for the 355-ship force-level goal. The new goal is expected to introduce a new, more distributed fleet architecture featuring a smaller proportion of larger ships, a larger proportion of smaller ships, and a new third tier of large unmanned vehicles (UVs). On June 17, 2021, the Navy released a long-range Navy shipbuilding document that presents the Biden Administration’s emerging successor to the 355-ship force-level goal. The document calls for a Navy with a more distributed fleet architecture, including 321 to 372 manned ships and 77 to 140 large UVs. A September 2021 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report estimates that the fleet envisioned in the document would cost an average of between $25.3 billion and $32.7 billion per year in constant FY2021 dollars to procure. -
The Cost of the Navy's New Frigate
OCTOBER 2020 The Cost of the Navy’s New Frigate On April 30, 2020, the Navy awarded Fincantieri Several factors support the Navy’s estimate: Marinette Marine a contract to build the Navy’s new sur- face combatant, a guided missile frigate long designated • The FFG(X) is based on a design that has been in as FFG(X).1 The contract guarantees that Fincantieri will production for many years. build the lead ship (the first ship designed for a class) and gives the Navy options to build as many as nine addi- • Little if any new technology is being developed for it. tional ships. In this report, the Congressional Budget Office examines the potential costs if the Navy exercises • The contractor is an experienced builder of small all of those options. surface combatants. • CBO estimates the cost of the 10 FFG(X) ships • An independent estimate within the Department of would be $12.3 billion in 2020 (inflation-adjusted) Defense (DoD) was lower than the Navy’s estimate. dollars, about $1.2 billion per ship, on the basis of its own weight-based cost model. That amount is Other factors suggest the Navy’s estimate is too low: 40 percent more than the Navy’s estimate. • The costs of all surface combatants since 1970, as • The Navy estimates that the 10 ships would measured per thousand tons, were higher. cost $8.7 billion in 2020 dollars, an average of $870 million per ship. • Historically the Navy has almost always underestimated the cost of the lead ship, and a more • If the Navy’s estimate turns out to be accurate, expensive lead ship generally results in higher costs the FFG(X) would be the least expensive surface for the follow-on ships. -
The Submarine and the Washington Conference Of
477 THE SUBMARINE AND THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE OF 1921 Lawrence H. Douglas Following the First World War, the tation of this group, simply stated, was tide of public opinion was overwhelm that second best in naval strength meant ingly against the submarine as a weapon last. A policy of naval superiority was of war. The excesses of the German necessary, they felt, for "history consis U-boat had stunned the sensibilities of tently shows that war between no two the world but had, nonetheless, pre peoples or nations can be unthink sented new ideas and possibilities of this able.,,1 A second group, the Naval weapon to the various naval powers of Advisory Committee (Admirals Pratt the time. The momentum of these new and Coontz and Assistant Secretary of ideas proved so strong that by the the Navy Theodore Roosevelt, Jr.) also opening of the first major international submitted recommendations concerning disarmament conference of the 20th the limitation of naval armaments. century, practical uses of the submarine From the outset their deliberations were had all but smothered the moral indig guided by a concern that had become nation of 1918. more and more apparent-the threat Several months prior to the opening posed to the security and interests of of the conference, the General Board of this country by Japan. This concern was the American Navy was given the task evidenced in an attempt to gain basic of developing guidelines and recommen understandings with Britain. dations to be used by the State Depart The submarine received its share of ment in determining the American attention in the deliberations of these proposals to be presented. -
Psdiver Monthly Issue 83
PSDiver Monthly Issue 83 Air Buys Time discussion group and let’s talk about it. Use what works for you and be open minded to suggestions and possible I have been asked by a number of subscribers to write changes. There will never be a one size fits all solution. about equipment configurations. I am always hesitant Your goal should be to search and experiment until you about writing about specific equipment or specific brands are able to find what works for you. or models. It is not that I do not have personal favorites; it is BECAUSE I have personal favorites that I have been Pony bottle and Pony Mount reluctant. To my way of thinking, if we dive FFM and a Pony and do It is has always been my opinion that equipment for a NOT use a gas switch block, we need the pony to have a dive team is based on particular need, budget and thumbnail SPG and a second stage regulator attached. availability. A small member team with an annual 20k Divers should also have a separate mask available to use budget is going to be better outfitted than a 20 member with the standard scuba second stage. Consider this team with a 2K annual budget. configuration for a minute. The diver is on SCUBA with a full face mask. The diver would likely have a This month I offer an editorial about pony console package with a SPG and either a bottles. What I present here is not intended computer or an analog depth gauge with a to be an “end all” to the topic nor is it maximum depth indicator. -
Wreck Diver Specialty Course Instructor Guide
Instructor Wreck Diver Guide Wreck Diver Specialty Course Instructor Guide Product No. 70232 (Rev. 4/07) Version 2.0 Instructor Guide Wreck Diver PADI Wreck Diver Specialty Course Instructor Guide © PADI 2007 Portions of the Appendix of this guide may be reproduced by PADI Members for use in PADI-sanctioned training, but not for resale or personal gain. No other reproduction is allowed without the express written permission of PADI. Published and distributed by PADI 30151 Tomas Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688-2125 USA Printed in U.S.A. Product No. 70232 (04/07) Version 2.0 2 Specialty Course Instructor Guide Instructor Wreck Diver Guide Table of Contents Introduction How to Use this Guide .......................................................................................5 Course Philosophy and Goals .............................................................................5 Course Flow Options .........................................................................................6 Program Options ................................................................................................7 Section One: Course Standards Standards at a Glance .........................................................................................8 Instructor Prerequisites .......................................................................................9 Student Diver Prerequisites ...............................................................................9 Supervision and Ratios .......................................................................................9 -
The Law of Submarine Warfare Today
Jacobson 205 Chapter VIII The Law of Submarine Warfare Today by Jon L. Jacobson* Introduction he roles of military submarines have evolved throughout the twentieth T century. In wartime, these roles have included coastal defense, harassment of enemy fleets, and, especially in World War II, hunting and destroying the seaborne commerce that supported the enemy's war efforts. Today, two principal roles for u.s. submarines, at least in any future war with the Soviet Union, are probably as anti-submarine weapons (attack submarines) and as strategic weapons platforms (ballistic missile submarines). Other missions, however, could include coastal defense, attacks on the enemy's surface fleet, projection of force ashore, and commerce warfare.1 The laws of war have never been comfortable with the submarine's unique combination of stealth and vulnerability. As will be explained below, it is this peculiar mix of strength and weakness that can be blamed as the root cause of the legal dilemma, particularly as it relates to the submarine's role as a commerce raider. The legal responses to this twentieth-century weapons platform have ranged from early proposals for its abolition to justification of its use under the rules of reprisal to tolerance of it as an effective war machine with characteristics that regrettably require some adjustments in the traditional laws of war. The U.s. Navy's new Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations (NWP 9) includes references to the laws of naval warfare that specifically address the submarine weapons system and also rules that apply, or can apply, to submarines and their roles in wartime.