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Project Summary Contact Expert Group – Project Summary Project Title UK7 Dismantling of two Oscar 1 Class nuclear submarines General Information Start Date: 2003-11-21 End Date: 2004-12-31 Status: Completed Cost: 11 424 000 GBP Project Summary Russia constructed some 250 nuclear submarines; of which about 90 are Strategic type (Housing ballistic missiles) and the remainder were General Purpose (GP) type carrying torpedoes and/or cruise missiles. Since its signature of the START agreement, Russia has accepted an obligation to progressively reduce its submarine fleet, and this intention has been reinforced by the decline in funding for the Russian navy since Perestroika, which has both accelerated the withdrawal of submarines from active service, and inhibited work on defuelling and dismantling these submarines. The Strategic submarines issue has been the subject of a bilateral agreement with the US (under its Co- Operative Threat Reduction Programme) that agreed to fund the dismantling of about 30 such submarines. However, there has hitherto been no corresponding aid programme to fund the dismantling of GP submarines. Although of somewhat lower military significance, these are of high safety and environmental significance, since they are in many cases older than the Strategic submarines, and have in many cases deteriorated to the point where they can no longer be relied on to remain afloat. Although most of these older GP submarines have been withdrawn from service, many have not yet been defuelled, and the prospect of their sinking with their nuclear fuel still on board has been a matter of rising concern to Russia and its neighbours. The underlying objectives of this project are: - To undertake dismantling of two General Purpose nuclear submarines in NW Russia nominated by MINATOM and agreed by the UK DTI. - To establish contracts for and monitoring of the decommissioning of early generation GP nuclear submarines, ensuring they are completed to time and cost. - To maintain liaison with other international donors engaged in similar programmes - To investigate the sustainability of future decommissioning/dismantling programme for GP submarines at the shipyards in NW Russia. - To address components of the submarine dismantling lifecycle that requires support to improve on issues of safety, security and the environment. The project includes some inprovements of the infrastructure which is being used for the dismantling activities, and development of necessary project-related documentation. Progress and Results The project was successfully completed at the end of 2004. Two Oskar1-class nuclear submarines have been completely dismantled at the Zwezdochka and Sevmash shipyards. Solid RW have been was loaded into the 3-compartment units that have been left after dismantlement. Scrap, cable, non-salvageable waste and hazardous waste were processed. Two 3-compartment units have been formed for floating interim storage. Technical Areas ▸ Dismantlement of nuclear submarines and ships Regions/Sites ▸ North West Russia ▸ Murmansk Region Facilities ▸ Zvezdochka shipyard ▸ Sevmash shipyard Framework Agreement ▸ UK-Russia Supplementary Agreement Supporting Countries ▸ United Kingdom Funding Organisations ▸ Department of Trade and Industry Participating Organisations ▸ Keel Marine Ltd. ▸ Storvik & Co AS ▸ Zvezdochka shipyard ▸ Sevmash Leading Organisations ▸ Nuvia Ltd. Project Leaders ▸ Wells, David ▸ .
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