Boko Haram – Terrorists Or Pioneers For The Redefinition Of The Public Space In Formatted: Font: Bold Africa Hippolyt Pul Catholic Relief Services-- Abstract The Boko Haram phenomenon surpasses the Biafra secession civil war; multiple military coup d’états; militia uprisings in the Niger Delta; and the numerous interethnic and communal conflicts in threatening the integrity of the State. Based on the review of theories of insurgencies, religious fundamentalism, as well as the literature on Boko Haram, this paper argues that the Boko Haram crisis is not a localized conflict triggered by issues of relative poverty and marginalization; neither is its evolution from a pacifist local organization to a violent one with international connections (Johnson, 2011) an isolated development. The belief of its founders’ in justice, in accordance with Islam, may have influenced the birth of Boko Haram, but it is not religion that is fueling the current crisis. On the contrary the continued presentation of the Boko Haram insurgency as a Christian-Muslim war is not only unhelpful; it distorts the issues and obscures the need for the post-colonial state in Africa to be more attentive and responsive to the demands for the voice of faith in the public sphere. To that extent, Boko Haram may be emerging as model not only for the reinsertion of faith in the public domain, but also the archetype for marginalized groups to reclaim their voices in the public sphere. Insidiously, continued use of the labels of horizontal inequalities and religious framing of the conflict only provide the cloak for powerful political forces to stealthily infiltrate the public sphere as they battle for footholds in the State system. This increasing use of religion as an instrument of politics is redefining the State as a sacro- secularist entity where faith and morality, not just Machiavellian realism, will guide politics, public policies, and governance. Africa’s civil wars may have just taken on a new face – religion, as trends in Kenya, Tanzania, Mali, the Central Africa Republic, and elsewhere indicate. Key words: Boko Haram, religion, public sphere, faith-based organizations 1 Introduction Since 2009, Nigeria has come under siege from an insurgent group commonly known as Boko Haram. Founded in “…2002 as a peaceful Islamic splinter group” (Herskovits 2012) the group calls itself “Jama'atul Alhul Sunnah Lidda'wati wal jihad, [which means people committed to the propagation of the prophet's teachings and jihad"] (Johnson 2011). Nonetheless, the group has come to be known as Boko Haram, interpreted to mean “Western education is sinful” or forbidden (Johnson 2011; Chothia 2011). Kukah (2012), however differs in his interpretation of the term “boko”, which he argues has given cause for the misrepresentation of the intent and philosophy of the Salifiya group that has come to be known “…inappropriately as Boko Haram” (Kukah 2012, p.7). The term “boko”, according Kukah (2012), means “fake” in the Hausa language, and can be found used in terminologies such as “amaria boko”, which means “fake bride” – a term used to describe a bride-to-be before the Islamic marriage ceremony is conducted. Following from this, Kukah argues that the initial revolt of the Salifiya group was against the fakeness of the educated people in Nigeria who were not living in accordance with the tenets of justice and care for the people, as Islam’s faith and concern for the common good requires them to. Kukah (2012, p.7) posits that Boko Haram’s initial nonviolent struggle was against “…the endemic corruption in the police and other security agencies, the judiciary, civil service and almost the entire apparatus of government” which were seen as the instruments of exploitation of the country’s resources for private gains rather than the common good. In brief, Boko Haram had nothing to do directly with opposition to western education. Instead, “Boko Haram regards the Nigerian state as being run by non-believers, even when the country had a Muslim president” (Chothia, 2011). Its relation to western education was inferential and limited only to the extent that those running the affairs of state are educated in accordance with the western system. The agenda of the Salifya group was, therefore, more political than religious and the presumed fight for the institution of Sharia Law was in the hope that its application would create a better space for holding such crooks in public office (western educated or not) to account more than civil law has been able to do. In other words, the group saw Sharia law as a means to promoting a just society, not an end in itself. How then did the group come to be associated with western education, which the popular interpretation of its name indicates is an abomination? The association of Boko Haram’s ideology to education, Kukah explains, was due to the group’s observation that all those who plundered the state for private gain at the expense of the public or common good were educated under the western educational system. The group therefore argued that since this western education has failed to produce men and women of integrity who rule justly for the common good, but has produced crooks who exploit the poor, that education must be fake. As Stroehlein (2012, p.1) puts it “…they are not against Western technology and technical learning, but they lament the perceived deterioration of morals unleashed by Western influence”. In other words, it is not western education per se, but the failure of the education system to produce good and honest citizens in public life that the Salifya group condemned. The religious connection of Boko Haram’s initial struggle, as Kukah points out, lies in the theological foundations of Islam which emphasizes justice. Chothia notes that Boko Haram’s “…followers are said to be influenced by the Koranic phrase which says: "Anyone who is not governed by what Allah has revealed is among the transgressors"’ (Chothia, 2011). Kukah (2012) further holds that just as Christianity is a religion concerned about love, Islam is a religion focused on justice. Hence Boko Haram’s original focus was a struggle for justice, very much as Christian liberation theologians of Latin America in the 1970s did. 2 Accordingly, the group’s initial orientation as a nonviolent movement attracted a considerable following, as it provided an alternative source of solace for the marginalized poor in society who were disillusioned by the inability of the state to create conditions that enabled them to meet their basic needs (Herskovits, 2012; Niworu, 2013; Idris, 2013; ). These poor were further appalled by the flagrant opulence displayed by the rich few who happened to be the educated in power and in business with access to resources of the state which they plundered. In other words, ““Boko Haram” is an ideology providing inspiration to some Nigerians living in grinding poverty under a set of rulers who concern themselves not with running the country but simply with stealing the country’s oil wealth” (Stroehlein 2012, p.2). Boko Haram did not set out to use violent means to achieve its political aims. Its recourse to violence was triggered by the televised killing of its leader in 2009 by the State security agencies. Since then, hundreds of people have died at the hands of the group through a campaign of terror. Additionally, the frequency, scale, and targets of its attacks have changed significantly. Between September 2010 and December 2011, the group claimed responsibility for at least eight (8) major attacks in locations beyond its initial theatre of operation in the north eastern corner of Nigeria. The attacks claimed victims in cities such as Kano, Jos, Yobe, and even Abuja (BBC 2011). Quoting Human Rights Watch, Reuters, reports that since 2009 Boko Haram “has killed at least 935 people” including more than 250 in the first weeks of 2012. This excludes the more than 800 killed during the group’s engagement with the security forces of Nigeria in 2009. For 2011 alone, while the Associated Press estimates that Boko Haram has been “…responsible for at least 504 killings in 2011 alone” (Al Jazeera 2011). Reuters (2011) estimates that “550 people were killed in 115 separate attacks by Boko Haram…” for the same period. As with the frequency and scale of attacks, the targets of the group’s attacks have also shifted significantly since 2011from random targeting of state actors and establishments to selective targeting of people and institutions. In August 2011 for instance, a suicide car bomber attacked the U.N. headquarters in Abuja, killing 24 people. Although the attack on the UN is said to be because the UN is “…a forum for “all global evil”, it was also designed to “send a message to the U.S. President and ‘other infidels’” (Kuori 2011). Since August 2011, however, the attention of the group has increasingly focused on Christian churches and businesses (Krause 2011). For instance, in its December 2011 attacks “….about 30 Christian shops were burnt in the nearby city of Potiskum late on Sunday” (Al Jazeera 2011) same day as the attacks on the churches. The changes in scale and targets of Boko Haram’s activities raise questions about a wider agenda that goes beyond its initial recourse to violence as a way to avenge the death of its leader. Kukah, however, adds that in addition to avenging the death of their leader, the attacks on the police were designed to build up its military might to enable it stand up to the reprisals of the state. Hence the group resorted to “ransacking Police stations to acquire arms” (Kukah 2012, p.7). Obviously, Boko Haram had a mission change at some point in its evolution.