Boko Haram – Terrorists Or Pioneers For The Redefinition Of The Public Space In Formatted: Font: Bold Africa

Hippolyt Pul Catholic Relief Services--

Abstract

The phenomenon surpasses the secession civil war; multiple military coup d’états; militia uprisings in the Niger Delta; and the numerous interethnic and communal conflicts in threatening the integrity of the State. Based on the review of theories of insurgencies, religious fundamentalism, as well as the literature on Boko Haram, this paper argues that the Boko Haram crisis is not a localized conflict triggered by issues of relative poverty and marginalization; neither is its evolution from a pacifist local organization to a violent one with international connections (Johnson, 2011) an isolated development. The belief of its founders’ in justice, in accordance with Islam, may have influenced the birth of Boko Haram, but it is not religion that is fueling the current crisis. On the contrary the continued presentation of the as a Christian-Muslim war is not only unhelpful; it distorts the issues and obscures the need for the post-colonial state in Africa to be more attentive and responsive to the demands for the voice of faith in the public sphere. To that extent, Boko Haram may be emerging as model not only for the reinsertion of faith in the public domain, but also the archetype for marginalized groups to reclaim their voices in the public sphere. Insidiously, continued use of the labels of horizontal inequalities and religious framing of the conflict only provide the cloak for powerful political forces to stealthily infiltrate the public sphere as they battle for footholds in the State system. This increasing use of religion as an instrument of politics is redefining the State as a sacro- secularist entity where faith and morality, not just Machiavellian realism, will guide politics, public policies, and governance. Africa’s civil wars may have just taken on a new face – religion, as trends in Kenya, Tanzania, Mali, the Central Africa Republic, and elsewhere indicate.

Key words: Boko Haram, religion, public sphere, faith-based organizations

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Introduction

Since 2009, has come under siege from an insurgent group commonly known as Boko Haram. Founded in “…2002 as a peaceful Islamic splinter group” (Herskovits 2012) the group calls itself “Jama'atul Alhul Sunnah Lidda'wati wal jihad, [which means people committed to the propagation of the prophet's teachings and jihad"] (Johnson 2011). Nonetheless, the group has come to be known as Boko Haram, interpreted to mean “Western education is sinful” or forbidden (Johnson 2011; Chothia 2011). Kukah (2012), however differs in his interpretation of the term “boko”, which he argues has given cause for the misrepresentation of the intent and philosophy of the Salifiya group that has come to be known “…inappropriately as Boko Haram” (Kukah 2012, p.7). The term “boko”, according Kukah (2012), means “fake” in the Hausa language, and can be found used in terminologies such as “amaria boko”, which means “fake bride” – a term used to describe a bride-to-be before the Islamic marriage ceremony is conducted. Following from this, Kukah argues that the initial revolt of the Salifiya group was against the fakeness of the educated people in Nigeria who were not living in accordance with the tenets of justice and care for the people, as Islam’s faith and concern for the common good requires them to. Kukah (2012, p.7) posits that Boko Haram’s initial nonviolent struggle was against “…the endemic corruption in the police and other security agencies, the judiciary, civil service and almost the entire apparatus of government” which were seen as the instruments of exploitation of the country’s resources for private gains rather than the common good. In brief, Boko Haram had nothing to do directly with opposition to western education. Instead, “Boko Haram regards the Nigerian state as being run by non-believers, even when the country had a Muslim president” (Chothia, 2011). Its relation to western education was inferential and limited only to the extent that those running the affairs of state are educated in accordance with the western system. The agenda of the Salifya group was, therefore, more political than religious and the presumed fight for the institution of Sharia Law was in the hope that its application would create a better space for holding such crooks in public office (western educated or not) to account more than civil law has been able to do. In other words, the group saw Sharia law as a means to promoting a just society, not an end in itself. How then did the group come to be associated with western education, which the popular interpretation of its name indicates is an abomination? The association of Boko Haram’s ideology to education, Kukah explains, was due to the group’s observation that all those who plundered the state for private gain at the expense of the public or common good were educated under the western educational system. The group therefore argued that since this western education has failed to produce men and women of integrity who rule justly for the common good, but has produced crooks who exploit the poor, that education must be fake. As Stroehlein (2012, p.1) puts it “…they are not against Western technology and technical learning, but they lament the perceived deterioration of morals unleashed by Western influence”. In other words, it is not western education per se, but the failure of the education system to produce good and honest citizens in public life that the Salifya group condemned. The religious connection of Boko Haram’s initial struggle, as Kukah points out, lies in the theological foundations of Islam which emphasizes justice. Chothia notes that Boko Haram’s “…followers are said to be influenced by the Koranic phrase which says: "Anyone who is not governed by what Allah has revealed is among the transgressors"’ (Chothia, 2011). Kukah (2012) further holds that just as Christianity is a religion concerned about love, Islam is a religion focused on justice. Hence Boko Haram’s original focus was a struggle for justice, very much as Christian liberation theologians of Latin America in the 1970s did.

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Accordingly, the group’s initial orientation as a nonviolent movement attracted a considerable following, as it provided an alternative source of solace for the marginalized poor in society who were disillusioned by the inability of the state to create conditions that enabled them to meet their basic needs (Herskovits, 2012; Niworu, 2013; Idris, 2013; ). These poor were further appalled by the flagrant opulence displayed by the rich few who happened to be the educated in power and in business with access to resources of the state which they plundered. In other words, ““Boko Haram” is an ideology providing inspiration to some Nigerians living in grinding poverty under a set of rulers who concern themselves not with running the country but simply with stealing the country’s oil wealth” (Stroehlein 2012, p.2). Boko Haram did not set out to use violent means to achieve its political aims. Its recourse to violence was triggered by the televised killing of its leader in 2009 by the State security agencies. Since then, hundreds of people have died at the hands of the group through a campaign of terror. Additionally, the frequency, scale, and targets of its attacks have changed significantly. Between September 2010 and December 2011, the group claimed responsibility for at least eight (8) major attacks in locations beyond its initial theatre of operation in the north eastern corner of Nigeria. The attacks claimed victims in cities such as , Jos, Yobe, and even Abuja (BBC 2011). Quoting Human Rights Watch, Reuters, reports that since 2009 Boko Haram “has killed at least 935 people” including more than 250 in the first weeks of 2012. This excludes the more than 800 killed during the group’s engagement with the security forces of Nigeria in 2009. For 2011 alone, while the Associated Press estimates that Boko Haram has been “…responsible for at least 504 killings in 2011 alone” (Al Jazeera 2011). Reuters (2011) estimates that “550 people were killed in 115 separate attacks by Boko Haram…” for the same period. As with the frequency and scale of attacks, the targets of the group’s attacks have also shifted significantly since 2011from random targeting of state actors and establishments to selective targeting of people and institutions. In August 2011 for instance, a suicide car bomber attacked the U.N. headquarters in Abuja, killing 24 people. Although the attack on the UN is said to be because the UN is “…a forum for “all global evil”, it was also designed to “send a message to the U.S. President and ‘other infidels’” (Kuori 2011). Since August 2011, however, the attention of the group has increasingly focused on Christian churches and businesses (Krause 2011). For instance, in its December 2011 attacks “….about 30 Christian shops were burnt in the nearby city of Potiskum late on Sunday” (Al Jazeera 2011) same day as the attacks on the churches. The changes in scale and targets of Boko Haram’s activities raise questions about a wider agenda that goes beyond its initial recourse to violence as a way to avenge the death of its leader. Kukah, however, adds that in addition to avenging the death of their leader, the attacks on the police were designed to build up its military might to enable it stand up to the reprisals of the state. Hence the group resorted to “ransacking Police stations to acquire arms” (Kukah 2012, p.7). Obviously, Boko Haram had a mission change at some point in its evolution. However, Kukah’s assertion leaves several questions unanswered: If the reason why Boko Haram turned violent was to avenge the death of its leader in accordance with the Islamic principles of justice, why would the group procure arms after it had avenged the death of its leader? Why does the vengeance against its leader’s death never seem to be ending? Why has it failed to return to its nonviolent modus operandi? Why is it taking on a much wider war with the State of Nigeria? Why did it widen its ring of activities to include attacks on the United Nations Headquarters in Abuja? Why has it increasingly turned its attention to Christian churches, and their secular establishments such as businesses? Did Boko Haram have a larger, but hidden agenda from the onset? Or, are there other forces that see in it an instrument for achieving objectives other than the group’s initial struggle for social and economic justice?

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Inadequacy Of Current Theoretical Frames For Understanding Boko Haram:

Conventional theories on the proliferation of conflicts in the post-cold war era have proffered that the nature of war has changed from inter-state to intra-state (Levy 2007). The preponderance of these wars in post-colonial Africa has spun a plethora of theories from the perspective of different academic disciplines. Political scientists argue that the rise of insurgencies is because of the failure of the postcolonial state to create inclusive spaces for their diverse constituent groups lumped together by arbitrary colonial boundaries. Exclusion from political participation, they argue, is what has unleashed “loose coalitions of different groups fighting for their own purposes” (Levy 2007, p. 19). According to this view, after African states fought to obtain their independence, it has become necessary for “…segments of some of these states [to] now fight …to make sure that their destiny is in their own hands” (Zartman 2001, p. 219). In other words, “the use of violence is purposeful and intended to advance the actor’s political objectives [even when such violence includes the use of] guerrilla war [fare] and terrorism, long the ‘weapons of the weak’” (Levy 2007, p. 19-20). But when insurgent groups such as Boko Haram can defy or even match the power of the state and remain operational despite the deployment of full state power against them, can they truly be described as the weak trying to lay claims in the state through the use of violence? Ayoob (2007, p. 97) argues that the proliferation of armed conflicts in Africa is due to the resistance by “recalcitrant elements [or groups] within the population” to the imposition of state power and control over them. This, Ayoob considers to be an inescapable part of the state making process in post-colonial countries. He also argues that, although such conflicts are largely intrastate in nature, the issues generating them have international dimensions, even though they are rooted in domestic contexts. But if conflicts are the birth pangs of post- colonial nation-building, why hasn’t that been the case for colonized countries in other parts of the world? Why would the burden fall on visibly religious groups such as Boko Haram to do the fighting? From the economic perspective, relative deprivation theorists attribute the rise in intra state conflicts to economic factors, arguing that countries that derive a large percentage of their GDP from raw material exports “…are radically more at risk of conflict” (Collier 2007, p. 200) than more industrialized ones. To be more precise, Collier argues that countries that derive 26% of their GDP from the export of raw materials are 23% more at risk of conflict. Essentially, the economic theories of insurgencies and intra-state wars argue that poverty breeds discontent and war. Stewart and Brown (2007) add that a vicious cycle in which poverty and violence are mutually causative exists in such situations, as “…poverty begets conflict and conflict begets poverty” (p. 219). However, they specify that “it is not absolute poverty but relative poverty” (p. 228) that instigates violent reactions, since relative poverty is symptomatic of the existence of horizontal inequalities deriving from inequitable access to and control over political power, economic resources, and social services, among others. While recognizing that there are intervening factors such as culture and politics in the perpetuation of the vicious cycle of poverty and war in developing countries, Gleditsch (2007) nonetheless subscribes to the relative deprivation theory and argues that “moving [fighting groups] from poverty to wealth is probably the most effective means to improve all forms of human security” (p. 190), good governance, peace, and development. Giving a geo-religious tilt to the relative deprivation theory, Tostevin (2011) points out that across Africa “… more heavily Muslim regions are often relatively marginalised economically and politically and that leaves plenty of ground for radicalism to sprout” (p. 1). This suggests that a combination of poverty, politics, and religion in predominantly Muslim communities triggers or accentuates a collective identity of deprivation that creates the

4 conditions for rebellion. If that is the case, then why is Nigeria the only country confronted with this politico-economic and religious conflict? Why are Moslems in other countries in the West Africa sub region such as Ghana, Cameroun, Benin, that have geographical enclaves of religiously diverse populations with marked differences in access to political and economic power not taking up arms after the example of Boko Haram? Providing some additional explanation to the poverty argument, Collier (2007) acknowledges that extra-economic factors such as history, economic opportunities, and ethnic composition are important intervening factors that attenuate the validity of economic models for explaining the upsurge of violence in relatively deprived areas. He argues that while ethnic diversity might increase safety, political and economic inequalities it has “… no discernible effect” (p. 203) on the emergence of conflicts [since] “Unequal, ethnically divided societies with few political rights …have no higher risk of violent conflict than anywhere else …indeed thanks to their ethnic diversity, they are somewhat safer” (p. 203). This is largely because the existence of grievances are not enough to instigate rebellion unless they are collectivized, channeled into a collective agenda and demands for public goods, and then turned into an operational model that sees rebellion as a form of business. Hence, he argues that it is greed, not grievance that turns horizontal inequalities into rebellions. Stewart and Brown (2007) however believe that to turn collective grievances into motives of war, the agential role of individuals who see an opportunity to maximize private gain is essential. Hence, their private motivation theory emphasizes the dimension in which the potentials for private gains from a conflict provide the motivation for individuals to join fighting forces of one group or the other. In the case of Nigeria, the Boko Haram factor, however, seems to defy a single theoretical frame for capturing why it exists and what it is fighting for. Consequently, various theories have been used to try to explain the emergence and growth of the group. In general, the relative deprivation argument is popular in explaining the Boko Haram phenomenon. Discounting the religious fundamentalist argument, for instance, Adesoji (2011) points out that the fact that “Islamic fundamentalism is mostly restricted to northern Nigeria” (p. 101) cannot be attributed wholly to the dominance of that faith tradition in the area. The prevalence of “poverty and illiteracy” (Adesoji 2011, p. 101), among other factors are major contributors. Herskovits (2012) would add “…that the root cause of violence and anger in both the north and south of Nigeria is endemic poverty and hopelessness.” Similarly, Tostevin (2011) points out that Nigeria’s “…largely Muslim north; arid, poor, less well educated, lacking in resources and facing the decline of its few industries was divided from the more prosperous and dynamic south, [which is] home to Africa’s biggest energy reserves and booming factories” (p.1). The deprivation theory gains further credence when it is pointed out that “…72 percent of people [in the north] live in poverty compared to 27 percent in the south and 35 percent in the Niger Delta” (Johnson, 2011). This regional disparity in poverty also comes within the context of a country with “… a per capita income of more than $2,700 and annual GDP growth of 7 percent” (Johnson 2011, p. 3). If poverty were the cause of the insurgency, why are specific groups and institutions such as the police, Christian groups, and the United Nations that do not control the economic resources of Nigeria being targeted by Boko Haram? What role have these played in perpetuating poverty in the areas where Boko Haram was nurtured? In response to these questions, while agreeing that poverty, unemployment, and other forms of relative deprivation have a role to play in the Boko Haram crisis, Wole Soyinka disagrees that relative poverty alone is the cause of the insurgency. On the contrary, he accuses "power-hungry politicians from the North of using indoctrinated young militants, drawn from the ranks of the poor unemployed and educated in Islamic schools" as foot soldiers in a battle over who should control the country” (Adebowale 2012). In his words:

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Those who unleashed Boko Haram on the nation are politicians. These are the ones behind Boko Haram. Unfortunately, one has to point to what section they come from, and that is the North. This minority is much focused, very powerful, very rich. They used to be in government; they've accumulated billions; they are the ones who unleashed this monster on the nation (in Adebowale 2012)

Similarly, contrary to the theory of State intrusion as the genesis of rebellion, Kukah (2012) argues that, the emergence and growth in strength of Boko Haram, as well as, the militants in the Niger Delta is rather due to the inability of the Nigerian State to assert its legitimacy and “undertake its duties to citizens that make these criminals lords [who claim] to be …righting the wrongs done to their people” (p. 7). Kukah’s argument buttresses Levy’s view that the line between war and crime is blurred “…as criminal networks play a growing role in the funding of civil wars and insurgencies” (Levy 2007, p. 19). It is for similar reasons that other writers even deny the existence of any organized group such as Boko Haram. They argue that criminal gangs have hijacked and used the name of the Salifya group to mask their criminal operations. Writing an opinion piece in the New York Times, Herskovit (2012), for instance, disputed the existence of any organized group by name Boko Haram much less one with an orchestrated agenda to take on the State of Nigeria. According to him, there is no proof that a well-organized, ideologically coherent terrorist group called Boko Haram even exists today. Evidence suggests instead that, while the original core of the group remains active, criminal gangs have adopted the name Boko Haram to claim responsibility for attacks when it suits them (Herskovit 2012). In his view, “…the news media and American policy makers are chasing an elusive and ill-defined threat [because] Boko Haram has evolved into a franchise that includes criminal groups claiming its identity” (p. 2). Herskovits sees the arguments that the group is linked to Al Qaeda as being “simplistic explanations” (p. 1) that enable the government of Nigeria to make scapegoats of Boko Haram for its “mounting security crisis” (p. 1). On his part, Gurr (2007), disagrees with both Collier and other deprivation theorists, on the one hand, and Soyinka and other political theorist on the other hand when he points out that communal identity, greed, or the struggle for power are not enough to explain why identity-based groups in the postcolonial state fight for the right either to access or to exit the state system. He attributes the increased visibility of these internal tensions manifested in the number of civil wars and communal violence to the “indirect consequence of global process of modernization” (p. 134), which he characterizes as comprising of four pillars – expansion of the modern state system, economic development, migration, and improved communication. Gurr’s point about the import of globalization on local conflicts is an important contribution to our understanding of why and how Boko Haram seems to be growing in strength within Nigeria and the consequence of this to the peace and security in Africa. It points out that in a globalized world there are no more localized conflicts. On the contrary, the tendency for localized conflicts to be sucked into larger global conflicts is real and high. This potential is particularly high when shared universal values, as contained in creeds of all transnational faiths, can be invoked as the raison d’être for the local conflicts. It is this globalizing effect of localized conflicts that calls for worries over the potential of the Boko Haram insurgency to draw not only Nigeria, but the entire West Africa, and indeed, Africa into a wider conflict that would have religion as its defining line. For, the steady but strategic extension of Boko Haram’s activities beyond the north-eastern corner of the country into other areas within and beyond Nigeria shows the group has shifted from being a “localized problem” to taking on a national, and even an international dimension. The Abuja attacks also showed the group had a wider agenda than fighting for the institution of

6 sharia law in its home state. As a spokesman for the group indicated, their aims now go far beyond their initial concerns with Western educated corrupt political and business leaders. “We are demanding an Islamic government be established in the northern states. Not this kind of democratic government, "There is not real Sharia in northern states"” (Abu Abdurahman in Fisher 2011, p. 4). The growing national and global agenda of Boko Haram becomes more evident in the ability of the group to reach deep into Nigeria’s seat of government, which has led security sources to “…believe the radical Islamist group [is] receiving training and expertise from outside Nigeria” (Fisher 2011). The groups recent connection with the rebel insurrections in Mali (Davison & Mazen, 2013; Pindiga, 2013; Raghavan, 2013), and reported affiliations with Al-Shabab in Somalia and other terrorists networks elsewhere (Daily News, 2012; Leigh, 2011) lend credence to these concerns. However, the questions that remain unanswered by Gurr’s global modernization theoretical frame are: What turns a peaceful movement into a violent one? What are the push or pull factors driving what was essentially a localized, nonviolent struggle by the Salifya group in the north of Nigeria into becoming a regional or even a continental violent menace? What forces are behind it and what are their motives?

Typology of Evolution of Faith-related Civil Society Organizations on the path of peace and violence

The growing literature on the resurgence of religion in the public sphere recognizes that this global development may not always be for pacific ends. Indeed, Miles (1996) points out that “the renewed intrusion of religion into the realm of politics, far from having a pacifying effect, has had quite the opposite result” (Miles, 1996, p. 526). While accepting the violent outcomes of the re-entry of faith into the public domain, others have, however, argued that religiously motivated violence tend to be single-issue focused and generally “…kill smaller numbers of people than full-scale wars” (Toft, Philpott, & Shah, 2011, p. 147). What is missing in this debate, however, is the failure to clearly delineate what constitutes a faith inspired political movement from a faith-based organization that turns political. Miles (1996) cautions against labeling any form of action that invokes religion as necessarily a religious act. On the contrary, a distinction must be made between what is a “para-theologian” organization and what is essentially “sacrilized politics”. According to him, “Clerics and lay leaders who, consciously or not, use religious rationale primarily to gain or maintain power [may be called] 'para-theologians'” [while] “Sacralised politics” refers to authentically religiously, spiritually, or doctrinally motivated behaviour or activity that occurs in the political arena or spills into it” (Miles, 1996, p. 526). Useful as this distinction is at isolating the intentionality of action of the two sets of institutions laying some claim to religiosity as the basis of their actions, this dyadic categorization assumes constancy in the nature, mandate, and operational procedures of the organizations. It also fails to make the distinction between those organizations which are structurally ensconced within a larger religious institutional frame on the one hand, from those organizations which merely claim inspiration, without necessarily being structurally integrated into a given religious tradition. As a result, faith-based organizations are homogenized and lumped together as a categorical subset of civil society organizations (CSOs). In reality, however, the nature, mandate, and operational identities of FBOs differ widely in substance and over time. The evolution of Boko Haram as captured above would indicate that organizations that thrust themselves into the public sphere in the name of one creed or the other are neither static in their structure and operations nor legitimately associated with the institutional religion they lay claims to. On the contrary, they may be in a

7 constant state of evolution that enable them migrate between different categorizations, depending on their operational context and the feedback they get from it. Also, distinctions must be made between Faith-based organizations (FBOs), which would belong to the category of organizations that are intentionally created by an institutionalized faith organization to champion a specified mandate and other forms of faith- related ones. The level of intentionality distinguishes FBOs from Miles’ para-theologian institution, since certainty of intent and clarity of mandate is a sine qua non in this type of organization. Falling into the category of FBOs would be, for instance institutions like Catholic Relief Services (CRS) which was intentionally created by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) to carry out its specific mission providing relief and development services overseas. A converse to the FBOs would be faith-inspired organizations, which may not be created by an institutionalized faith organization, but derive or claim their mandates from the tenets of a given creed. This category of organizations differs in the nature and degree of affiliation with institutional religion or creeds. For instance, some political parties (e.g. the Christian Democrat Party of Germany) may lay claims to getting their inspiration from a religious tradition, but are not necessarily formally associated with the institutional structure of that faith. Just as political groupings may be inspired or not by faith, so is it possible for us to have faith-based based organizations that are either politically inspired or not. We may therefore have in the same public space four possible configurations of faith related civil society organizations, namely: i) Apolitical, Non- Faith Organizations (ANFOs); ii) Politically Inspired but Non-Faith Inspired Civil Society Organizations (PINFICSOs); iii) Faith-inspired Apolitical Organizations (FIAPOs), and iv) Faith-inspired and Politically Inspired Organizations (FIPOs). Characteristics of each category are presented in Figure 1 below.

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Figure 1: Evolution of Faith-related Civil Society Organizations on the path of peace and violence

Not Politically Inspired Politically Inspired Apolitical, Non-Faith Organizations Politically Inspired but Non-Faith (ANFOs) Inspired Civil Society Organizations  Do not subscribe to any particular (PINFICSOs) religious creed or political ideology  Exist to advance a particular political  Focus on Secular Social service ideology or course delivery e.g. regular development  Usually, but not always, affiliated to community-based, national, and identifiable state level political parties international NGOs or groupings  May occasionally engage in dialogue  Actions not inspired by any particular or alliances with faith-based religions creed, even if they have organizations or political entities to affiliations with a faith traditions further specific agendas, but are clear  Examples include: to maintain their religious neutrality  Women and Youth Wings of and independence. Not Faith Inspired Not Political parties  Examples include  State or Party Sponsored CSOs -  Social issues based advocacy the GONGOs such as 31s groups e.g. FIDA, December Movement; Committee  Commercial and Trades for the Defense of the Revolution Associations (CDRs) in Ghana ; Young Patriots  Ethnic Youth Associations in Cote d’Ivoire

Faith-inspired Apolitical Organizations Faith-inspired Political Organizations (FIAPOs) (FIPOs)  Inspired by faith, but not politically  Derive their mandates from motivated identifiable faith traditions  Are usually averse to any form of  Have a manifest agenda to engage in overt political engagements and shape the public sphere, policies,  Examples include:. and programs to conform to their  Associations linked to a faith beliefs and values systems.

tradition e.g. Christian Mothers  May or may not have the blessing of Association, Catholic Youth institutionalized faith or faith Association, Muslim Youth communities from which they arise or Association, Muslim Women’s to which they claim affiliation Association, etc.  May or may not subscribe to the use

 Faith-based social service delivery of force to claim power FaithInspired agencies e.g. incorporated service  Examples include delivery agencies in education,  Faith-inspired Political Parties e.g. health, etc. – Catholic University of Christian Democratic Party in Eastern Africa Germany  Faith-inspired development agencies  Political organizations that claim (ADRA, CRS, Islamic Development legitimacy from faith communities Agencies, World Vision etc.). – Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, LRA, Shin  Faith-inspired friendship associations Fein, e.g. Lodges, Knights, etc.

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Inter Temporal Characteristics of faith and politically motivated CSOs: It is essential to note that membership of a CSO to any of these categories is not fixed; nothing stays permanent as change is not only possible, but can be constant, allowing CSOs to crisscross the lines of the categories depending on the times and circumstances. All categories of organizations in the chart may change their categorization. Such change may be permanent or temporal. In particular, Mission Change is possible and may occur due to a number of factors. Another critical change factor is the nature of the membership recruitment process. For open- source franchising organizations, all persons or organizations who belief it the cause of the parent organization are free to join either directly or by setting up their own cells. In such instances, no formal applications, negotiations, contacts, or contracts are required. Faith-inspired organizations are particularly well suited for open source recruitment, as the articulation of some shared faith ideals or values are usually enough to support the recruitment drive. When a political agenda is attached to the faith values they purport to uphold or defend, member mobilization is not only opened wider, it becomes more rapid. The universality of values inherent in the faith also creates opportunities for locational transfer of actions or displaced aggression, as it were, when an innocent third group is punished in retaliation for actions that an affiliate member of the network suffered in a different location. This proxy fighting is why fundamentalist groups such as Al Qaeda can mushroom so many cells rapidly around the world, with several of these having little or no direct contact ever with the formal leadership of the parent organization. Another mechanism for membership recruitment is the Common Cause Networking approach. Under this, organizations that have no shared faith or political foundation but believe they are fighting a common cause would form concrete or loose alliances in which they share material, intellectual, and sometimes financial resources. Such alliances also allow for trans-locational proxy actions, as would be evidenced in cases where an independent group in one country initiates action that is purported to support the cause of another group in a different location, with or without the knowledge of the perceived beneficiary affiliate. Such groups are usually bonded together by the universal appeal of a common cause. Faith is an effective binder, if it comes into play, but other emotive factors such as race or ethnicity are equally import hubs for networking. These easily arouse sympathetic engagements and support when a shared sense of persecution can be aroused. Conditions for Mission Change: Mission change occurs when an organization radically changes its objectives, targets, and operational strategies from its initial set ones. Time is an important factor underscoring mission change. For organizations seeking to leverage some influence in the public sphere, context is equally important, as change is induced by reactions from the environment e.g. government. The nature and speed of change would depend on the ability of the organization’s leadership. Hence, leadership becomes the third factor for mission change. But leadership may be homegrown or externally courted and/or imposed. Where homegrown leadership is deficient, there is a high risk of co-optation of the organizations agenda by other predatory or parasitic forces. Under such circumstances, an organization that has made a name but lacks clear direction and leadership is recruited or taken over by external actors to serve the agenda of the new masters, directly or vicariously. Cooptation may be voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary cooptation occurs when local and external organizations find mutual agreement in working together. In such cases, the organizations trade roles and responsibilities on the basis of identified mutually beneficial agenda. Involuntary cooptation occurs when a local organization unwittingly plays into the hands of more power actors with ulterior motives that may or may not coincide with or contribute to the achievement of the original objectives of the local organization. However, the local organization plays along either for protection, resources, or merely the ability to keep their names on the public radar for publicity or to keep them operational. This raises the

10 question of the agential role of individuals within and outside the organizations. Organizations create platforms of actions from which individuals act out organizational or personal scripts. A Desmond Tutu without the accolades conferred by the Anglican Church would be another person. Hence, in the case of Boko Haram, the pertinent question is – to what extent are individuals using the platforms the organization offers to prosecute their personal agendas? The Fit of Boko Haram – The Creation Of The Monster: Dyadic thought processes that make distinctions such as faith versus morality; public sphere versus private space are inherently false in the African worldview. For most African societies, religion, faith, and morality are inextricably linked and the distinction between the public and private has little accommodation. The secular and the sacred are usually inextricably intertwined in ways that make little practical distinctions in the set up and running of political communities, be it at the family, clan, lineage, village, chiefdom or kingdom levels. Lived experiences in both the public sphere and private space are indistinguishable. Faith and morality are to be lived; not merely ritually rehearsed and observed in private; you live your faith out; you live what you believe. Similarly, one cannot isolate one’s religious life from one’s political, economic, or social life. Hence, in the political organization of the community, even when separate leadership roles are assigned for the practice of politics and religion, at the functional level, the two remained intertwined, with chiefs working closely with the religious leaders, be they the priests of traditional religions, the Imams, or the Tengdana (earth priests), as in the case of Northern Ghana. Most African societies were religiously tolerant, as the practice of poly-deity monotheism was accepted. Members of the same family could worship the Supreme Being through different deities. Hence interreligious tensions in the public sphere were seldom an issue. Examples abound of peaceful coexistence of different religious groups and creeds even in the postcolonial state. For instance, from Senegal to Ghana, Christians and Moslems co- celebrate their sacred festivals convivially. In the east, especially “ in the Ethiopian highland villages that are mixed, the Orthodox will help the Muslims build their mosques and the Muslims help the Orthodox build their churches, literally [in accordance with an] old tradition going back 600 or 700 years” (Lugo, 2006, p. 3). Hence, experiences of religious hatred and extremism in Ethiopia today, as it is in other parts of the continent, is imported, more recently from disgruntled political fascists – crossover of extremists of Sudan into Ethiopia, and who in the words of a community member came:

… burning churches down in order to cause conflict. I asked, what did you do? They said, we've thrown them all out of the country. We don't want them here. We get along very well with our Orthodox friends. And the patriarch told me the same thing about the Muslims: We don't want these people causing trouble (Lugo, 2006, p. 3).

It is against this background that the interaction between the postcolonial state and politically and religiously inspired groups in Africa must be viewed. The modern state has not only failed to create the conditions for the private practice of faith, which is the barest minimum that citizens of faith require from it, it has, in some cases, tried to privatize or even banish the practice of faith as lived experience and alienate it from the public sphere. Worse still, the state has insistently pursued an agenda to invade and occupy the private sphere of faith as well. It is the secular state’s invasion of the private and communal spaces of faith, ethics, and morality that has triggered the reactions manifested in the intrusion of religious nationalism into the public sphere (Juergensmeyer 2005). It is in response to this that religiously inspired political groups now attempt “to reassert the role of traditional values and religion” (Taydas, Akbaba & Morrison 2012, p. 532) within the public sphere. The

11 reassertion of the place of faith in the public sphere effectively challenges the legitimacy of the state and its monopolistic control over political power and the use of force to compel attention and compliance of the insurgents. Ironically, faith Inspired Political Organizations (FIPOs) have gradually reinserted themselves in the state by latching onto the failures of the state. In general, they use the instruments of strategic engagements i.e. legitimizing their presence and messages through filling the development and service gaps that the state created or failed to fill. Several start with meeting basic the needs of the local communities, while harnessing their grassroots presence for direct and indirect popular mobilization. In other cases, their superior organization and grassroots penetrations, coupled with their reality-based political messages, have won them the place in the hearts of ordinary people, according them a kind of popular legitimacy (Campbell & Harwood, 2012; Rasheed & Bwala, 2013). This has been particularly the case with Islamic politico-religious organizations such as Hamas, the Moslem Brotherhood, and Boko Haram. The lessons to be learned are that when politics and religion align on one side, they constitute a potent force that can challenge the legitimacy of secularist view of the world and how it organizes its delivery of human services. Beyond the claim to higher moral legitimacy (who argues with commands from God); the emotive power that the combination of faith- inspired and politically inspired agenda unleashes is often unstoppable. You cannot reason with emotions; you either respect them or be doomed. When a promise of transcendental rewards is added to the mix, as is the case when a jihad is declared, the limits of rationality become breached, paving the way for the kinds of brutalities and suicide bombing that the world has witness since 9/11, including the brutal lethal approach that Boko Haram uses. In the context of our analysis, it is essential to note that Boko Haram is faith-inspired; set up to protest against elite corruption that made nonsense of the tenets of justice and morality that Islam preached. Hence it has a value proposition that elicits the sympathy and support from an audience beyond the precincts of its home base. Fighting against corruption and injustice is the challenge of all religions. Therefore, in principle, Boko Haram’s agenda appeals not only to the local population, but also to the wider Islamic community and members of other faith-based communities concerned with promoting social justice. Notably also, Boko Haram did not set out to be politically violent; initially it never engaged the state directly in battles; it simply protested the ills in society and challenged the rational for an education that prepares leaders for the practice of corruption that had no regards to the common good and social justice. Boko Haram never had arms; it was forced into arming itself. In brief, it was the negative state reception of and reaction to its nonviolent demands for justice that radicalized it into violent political activism. The recourse to arms was a reaction to state failure not only to accommodate its demands; but to invade its private space of worship. Police killing of its members over the wearing of safety helmets was the tipping point. But once Boko Haram picked up arms in self-defense, and successfully withstood the state, it became a valuable instrument for co-optation by external forces. This happened on several fronts. Religious cooptation was what changed the mission of Boko Haram from a social justice movement into an anti-state establishment and anti-Christian stance, which was not part of its original agenda. Obviously, ultra-fundamentalist Islamic groups found perfect home in an organization whose social justice agenda is founded around Islamic values and teachings. When politics is added to the mix, the agenda broadens out beyond the control of its leaders. Hence, Boko Haram does not target only Christians; it deals ruthlessly with Moslems it considers to be betrayers of the course of Islam. Added to this is the leadership that created opportunities for political cooptation, in which Boko Haram has been made the public face of Nigeria’s interminable north-south

12 political wrangling. In its current scope of engagements, Boko Haram is evidently fighting a proxy war on behalf of faceless northern politicians who have bones to pick with their southern counterparts or the federal government (Aliyu, 2013; Ekott, 2013; Okpi, 2013). Indeed, it is noteworthy that Boko Haram may have operated since the 1960s using the name “Shabaab Muslim Youth Organisation”, under which it was more concerned about providing social and humanitarian services. Mission and leadership changes came together when the original leader passed on leadership responsibilities to Mohammed Yusuf. Hence, “it is the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf that allegedly opened the group to political influence and popularity” (Aro, 2013, p. 2) In other words, group identities such as race, ethnicity, and religion are not, ipso facto, the raison d’être for insurgencies; they merely provide a rallying point for mobilizing fighting forces when a collective victimhood at the hands of the state can be articulated and shared. However, group grievances provide an avenue for parasitic co-optation of mobilized groups, when such groups lack a strong leadership, a focused agenda, or become vulnerable due to lack of resources to prosecute their own agenda. The Boko Haram phenomenon merely provides an excuse and a platform for northern politicians who are “using this division of North versus South the same way as they are using religion. The issue is completely political. But with toxic element of religion infused into it, it gives them the leg to ally with international terrorist bodies based on religion. Those are only too happy to be of assistance” (The News, 2012).

Conclusion

Created at independence out of amalgams of multivariate diverse population groupings, African States already had a daunting task of fusing these groups into nation states. Over the last fifty years, however, most states have successfully squandered opportunities offered by the euphoric energies of independence through political infighting among their elites that culminated in coup d’états, inter and intra ethnic violent outbursts, and even civil wars. As a result, the anticipated dividends of independence eluded the majority of the citizenry as poverty of all categories, human insecurity, and limited access to social services continue to plague them; often in the midst of the display of wealth corruptly plundered from the state. Consequently, African States have lost their political and moral legitimacy through their inability to deliver the basic human services expected of them. The Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria on the back of a proclaimed fight against injustice may have lost focus and direction through parasitic cooptation or hijacking of their agenda for political ends. It may also have been sucked into wider international conflicts for reasons of importation of the agenda of like-minded external organizations in exchange for resources such as equipment and training. Nonetheless, the ability of Boko Haram to defy the power of the Nigerian state and survive to prosecute its war sets up a model that may repeat itself in countries with enclaved religious populations that have a collective sense of marginalization and victimhood. Expressions of faith-inspired discontent by the Mombasa Republican Council in Kenya or Uamsho, the separatist radical Islamic group in Zanzibar in Tanzania, provide pointers that must be watched closely. Africa’s civil wars may be dying down, but its politicized faith-inspired wars of discontent could be the next source of destabilization on the continent. The difference, however, is that unlike regular political rebel groups, faith-inspired political organizations do not only tend to have wider spheres of persuasion; be more diffused in their structure and operations; they can be invisible and impossible to locate and control. In sum, African Governments can no longer ignore or deny the importance of religion in the public sphere. Religion will continue to be an important player in the public space,

13 albeit in different ways, as faith-inspired civil society actors take on political agendas. Accordingly, African governments ignore the place and voice of faith and morality in the public sphere at their peril. Egypt and provide proof, albeit in diametrically opposed ways. The Arab Spring, in general, and the Egyptian version in particular, may have initiated the process of de-politicizing religion and de-sacrilizing politics. The push back of Morsi and the Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt is an affirmation of the important role religion has and will continue to play in political life of nations in Africa. The exclusionist approach of the Moslem Brotherhood in accommodating religion in the public sphere is the bane of the Morsi-led government and the cause of the post-Mubarak Egyptian crisis. Conversely, Morocco has not succumbed to the infectious spread of the Arab Spring fever precisely because its current governance structure takes the place of faith in the public sphere seriously. The king of Morocco is not only a political head; he is also a religious head of the state. However, his proactive recognition of the synchrony required between faith and politics enabled him to adopt reforms that have created space to accommodate the demands and aspirations of faith-inspired political groups in that country. That accommodation has stemmed the desire for an Arab Spring in Morocco. Either way, the push back on the faith-inspired government of the Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt and the embrasure of faith-inspired political groups in Morocco both represent the beginnings of another perestroika where the voice and views of faith in the public sphere can no longer be ignored. In both cases, the push back represents an erosion of the exclusivist theocratic state systems that the Moslem Brotherhood aspires to at a time Egyptians seems to embrace more liberal and inclusive concepts of democracy, with its bandwagon of freedoms, including the freedom of choice of religion. The creation of space for faith inspired political organizations in Morocco provides a different approach that leads to the same thing – the recognition of the role of faith in the public sphere. Both represent processes that would eventually lead to St. Augustine of Hippo’s original conception of the principle of separation of church and state in which, disencumbered from the trappings of politics and power, and yet with a firm place within the state, the church, and for that matter all faiths can stand on their own pedestals to guide the state towards the kingdom of God. While Boko Haram’s mode of assertion of its voice and views in the public space has turned extremely violent, it nonetheless reflects the failure of the state to be more accommodative, attentive, and responsive to the issues it purported to have represented from its initiation. That failure means that the State of Nigeria lost the opportunity to create the needed platform for constructive engagement with the voice of faith in matters of public interest. Replication of this failure in other settings can only reproduce the Boko Haram model to perpetuate Africa’s image as the continent of interminable violent conflicts.

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