EDITORIAL STAFF M aj o r Kenneth F. G antz, Ph.D., Editor C aptain Patr ick O. M ar tin, Assistant Editor G race G. L ane, Editorial Secretary EDITORIAL BOARD C olonel Jaj vies W. Chapivian, J r ., C S Education, President C olonel George E. H enry, Deputy Commandant, AWC C olonel John C. H orton, Deputy Commandant, AC&SS C olonel Joseph Ladd, Deputy Chief, Evaluation Division L ie u t e n a n t Colonel Jac k L. B entley, A U Secretary D r . C harles M. T homas, Dept. of the Air Force Library M r . A lder M. Jenkins, Publications Section, Academic Div. ATTENTION Views expressed in this journal are those of the authors, and are not to be construed as the official opinions or policies of the Department of the Air Force or the Air University. The purpose of this journal is to stimulate healthy discussion of Air Force problems which mav ultimately result in improvement of our national security. Appropriate contributions of pertinent articles and corre- spondence which present new views, or refute or support old ones, are solicited. THE U nit ed States Air Force AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW V olume I I I W I N T E R 1949 N umber 3 PRIZE EDITORIAL 2 Why Emphasize Air Power? HENRY HARLEY ARNOLD 4 AIR WARFARE AND MORALITY 5 Maj . G en. O rvil A. A nder so n, USAF WANTED: INTELLECTUAL LEADERSHIP 15 Capt. J ohn B. Barron, U S A F REDUCTION OF MALADJUSTMENTS AT ISOLATED STATIONS 26 Col. R obert L. Snider , U S A F INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION PLANNING 36 L t . C ol. W il bur R. Car t er , USAF SCIENTIFIC TECHNIQUES FOR PROGRAM PLANNING 49 M r . M ar shal l Wood IN MY OPINION . The Balance in Our Armed Forces 66 M aj . J ohn J. D aunt, J r ., U S A F AIRMAN S READING 70 Global Mission, Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, USAF (Ret) ; Modem Arms and Free Men, Col. Grover C. Brown, USAF; The Eagle in the Egg, Capt. Raymond L. Towne, USAF; Bombing and Strategy and Strategic Air Power, Col. Ramsay D. Potts, Jr., USAF; The Rome-Berlin Axis, Prof. Hans Rothfels; Lincoln Finds a General, Maj. Kenneth F. Gantz, USAF; Briefer Comment. THE PERIODICAL PRESS 97 AIR ANTHOLOGY 106 EDITOR S NOTES 114 »»»» • «««« Pubished quarterly by the Air Unlversity, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. The prlntlng of this publlcatlon has been approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, 17 June, 1949. Students and íaculty of the Air Unlversity schools are provided free copies as textual material. Prlnted by Field Printing Plant. AU. Price. single copy, 50 cents; yearly subscrlp- tion. t2 00. Address orders to Air University Book Department, Maxwell Álr Force Base, Alabama Properly credlted quotatlons are authorlzed. PRIZE EDITORIAL WHY EMPHASIZEAIR POWER? R POWER, as a basic military means of decision, is a com- paratively new one. Armies were first conceived and used in eras before historical reference. Navies followed, although their power as a decisive weapon did not become felt until after the Middle Ages and England's rise to world power. The First World W ar saw the introduction of aerial flight to war, and World War II proved its worth as a means of obtaining a decision. The basic concept of warfare is to destroy the opponenfs will to resist. The first to achieve this destruction will be the victor. Before the advent of air power it was usually necessary to ob- tain a vital decision over the opposing armed forces, either an army or navy. The destruction or reduction to a state of im- potency of the opposing forces then allowed the victorious commander to attack the people of the opponent nation and destroy their will to resist. With the coming of air power the efFect of armed conflict can for the first time in history be felt immediately by the people, who in the last analysis can decide whether to fight or capitulate. Armies or navies, no matter how powerful, can be by-passed and rendered ineffective in a comparatively short period of time by loss of support of their countrymen who m aintain them. It is not to be construed that mass bombings of civilian popu- lations will necessarily bring decision. The factors that decide where and what shall be the target depend upon continuous study. But it is to be remembered that with air power a decisive force can be brought to bear in a minimum length of time against a prim ary target—the will of the people. The Battle of Britain, an example often used by detractors of air power, re- veals a misuse of offensive air power by the Germ ans rather than the ineffectiveness of it as a decisive weapon. Had the RAF been destroyed through the proper use of the Germ an Air Force, England would have been at the mercy of Germ any. Then the Royal Navy and Arm y would have been useless against the forthcoming attack on the will of the English people to resist. The only defense against the one force aimed directly at the factor that decides capitulation is air power. The nation with the strongest air power, both offensive and defensive, holds the requirement for victory. It is a matter of history that we have refrained from striking the first blow. Hence it is vital that we be capable of immediate and decisive reprisal. No longer can we depend upon time as an ally to prepare the return blow. It must be struck in hours. This, then, is the case for em phasis on air power. With proper support it is the weapon for achieving a decision in the minimum time. The nation that recognizes it and prepares for it will play the percentages for success if w ar should come. Robert J. Seabolt, Major USAF MacDill Air Force Base r |íbnrg jMarky JVntolít General of the Air Force SUNDAY, THE FIFTEENTH OF JANUARY, 1950, the news carne that our great wartime commander was dead. The life that had been entirely devoted to Service in the United States Air Force and to com- manding it and building it into the exercise of over- whelming power against our enemies in a world-en- circling war was fulfilled. Most Americans serve themselves. America was founded to provide them the opportunity. But some Americans have been called to serve America— to make America, and to keep America the home of msn who can live as they will. Little thinking where the lõng road would lead, young Henry Harley Arnold went away to West Point and was graduated into the Service of his country. He became one of the first few military pilots in the world, and above all the many honors and decorations of his later years he continued to esteem his Military Aviator's Badge, numbered One. In the bitter struggle for adequate American air power he joined all his energies with those of other American airmen now, with him, justly honored for their roles in the long controversy. When the Second World War carne to confirm his foresight and theirs in matters of warfare, he directed the creation and deployment of tremendous air forces and at the same time sat for American air in the councils cf war as the trusted adviser of the President of the United States. Power departs, and glory does not keep forever in the memory of men. But in the great book of Duty it can be recorded in the characters of a continuing American way of life that throughout all his days a man served his country and in her hour of need he served her well. In that book it is now so written of General Henry Harley Arnold. Air Warfare and Morality Maj o r General Orvil A. A nder so n HROUGHOUT recorded history, evolution in the nature of war has been associated with evolution in the techni- Tcal and mechanical characteristics of weapons. Over a period of some thousands of years we ha ve progressed from the stone and Club age, through the spear, bow and arrow, cross- bow, and gunpowder periods, finally to arrive at the atomic era Each major advance in weapons has been marked either by an increase in the range of the weapon or by an increase in its destructive capacity, or by both. We have gone from the war capability of the club, the capacity to bruise or kill a single individual at a range of a few feet, to the war capability of modern air weapons, the capacity to destroy whole cities or key industrial systems at ranges of thousands of miles. The frightening increase in the potential of weapons has been matched with an evolution in our social and economic structure which adds further hazard to modern existence. The simple agrarian life, with humanity living close to the soil, dispersed and largely independent, has been replaced with a complex social and economic fabric which is super-vulnerable in many criticai areas. As the power of weapons has increased, concentrations of population, industry, and transportation have developed which provide highly profitable targets for destruction by modern military weapons. Thus the evolution of our social order into a compact industrialized structure has placed us in double jeopardy: First, it has produced long-range weapons capable of great destruction. Second, it has created the targets for these weapons. This observation has a singular significance to our problems of today, when the fate of America, the fate of world civiliza- tion itself, is primarily dependent upon the strategic concepts that guide the provisions we make for our sustained security.