Thurston, A 2013 Mali: The Disintegration of a “Model African Democracy”. stability Stability, 2(1): 2, pp. 1-7, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.aq

commentary Mali: The Disintegration of a “Model African Democracy” Alex Thurston*

This commentary examines how Mali entered its current crisis, tracing the fall of the regime of President Amadou Toumani Touré and the rise of armed Islamist groups in northern Mali, as well as the events that led to an armed intervention by France. The piece then discusses some of the conceptual frameworks that could impede effective policy formation in post-conflict Mali. The piece argues that Somalia does not offer a compelling model for Mali. The commentary closes by recommending that the Malian government and its partners should prioritize addressing humanitarian and security concerns in northern Mali over staging elections.

On 17 January 2012, a separatist group ern cities. Yet as the Malian government and in northern Mali, the National Movement its partners move to reunify and rebuild the for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA), country, flawed assumptions and imported launched a rebellion against the government models risk undermining reconstruction and of President Amadou Toumani Touré. Led by sowing seeds of future conflict. Tuaregs, a politically disenfranchised ethnic Mali’s rebellion began with the MNLA’s group that had organized previous uprisings uprising against Touré, but neither the in Mali and neighboring Niger, the MNLA MNLA nor Touré remained a central player quickly scored a string of victories. Observers in it for long. Disgruntled Malian soldiers, watched to see how Touré – a former general embarrassed by their losses to the MNLA, and a supposed symbol of African democ- charged that the government had failed to racy – would respond. They wondered how properly equip and fund them. A mutiny in the country’s next president, the winner of March 2012 escalated into a successful coup elections scheduled for April 2012, would against Touré (Schneider 2012). As it turned attempt to placate the Tuaregs, as previous out, the image of Touré as a great statesman administrations had done. Instead, Mali – an image not wholly undeserved, given unraveled, with a coup in March 2012 and the that he relinquished power after leading a emergence of armed Islamists in the north. coup in 1991, and seemed willing to respect As political instability wracked the south, term limits and do so again before the March French forces intervened in January 2013 to 2012 coup – had blinded outsiders to rot in halt Islamist advances into the Mopti region. his administration. Systemic corruption and The French rapidly reconquered major north- broken promises had weakened the military, hollowed out government institutions, and left northern communities bristling with resentment (Whitehouse 2012). * Department of Religious Studies, Northwestern University, USA The mutineers-turned-putschists spoke [email protected] of retaking the north, but once in power Art. 2, page 2 of 7 Thurston: Mali: The Disintegration of a “Model African Democracy” they made no immediate move to do so. manders sketched plans for war. ECOWAS’s The MNLA, left with a freer hand, declared efforts in 2012 overcame initial skepticism independence for the north. But the osten- from Washington, DC and Paris about the sibly secular rebels soon found themselves group’s capacity to organize an interven- sidelined by a coalition of armed Islamists. tion. Plans to deploy an external force were This coalition includes the Tuareg-led Ansar ratified first by ECOWAS, then by the African al Din (Arabic for “Defenders of the Faith”), Union, and, finally, in December 2012 by the an Al Qa’ida franchise called Al Qa’ida in the United Nations Security Council. Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and an AQIM splin- In the latter half of 2012, a de facto parti- ter group called the Movement for Unity and tion of Mali held. Islamist forces conducted Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA). The MNLA had sporadic attacks, capturing Douentza from robbed and raped civilians, creating political a local garrison in September, and tak- space for Islamists to offer northern com- ing the towns of Lere and Menaka from munities a version of law and order. Islamist the MNLA in November. But at year’s end justice horrified some, including thousands clashes were limited. who fled into southern Mali and neighbor- In early January 2013, planning for an ing countries. But others were grateful for external intervention was overtaken by Islamists’ efforts to distribute aid and pun- events. Islamist fighters attacked towns in ish crime. Islamists outmaneuvered the the central region of Mopti, perhaps hop- MNLA politically and militarily. By summer ing to capture key infrastructure, like an air- 2012, the Islamist coalition controlled the port in Sevaré, which outside commanders northern provincial capitals of Gao, Kidal, hoped to use in staging their coming inter- and Timbuktu. vention. The Islamist advance evoked a swift In the capital Bamako, with soldiers in response from Mali’s former colonial ruler charge, presidential elections were cancelled. France, which retains a strong political and Facing sanctions from the regional bloc, the security role in Francophone Africa. Within Economic Community of West African States days, French planes were bombing northern (ECOWAS), coup leader Captain Amadou targets. By January 30, French and Malian Sanogo ceded official power in April 2012 to soldiers recaptured Gao, Timbuktu, and a transitional civilian administration headed Kidal. Troops from ECOWAS and Chad moved by President Dioncounda Traoré and Prime to join the French, with the idea that after Minister Cheick Modibo Diarra. But Sanogo securing the north militarily, France would continued to influence politics. Sanogo loyal- leave West African governments and Bamako ists obtained key cabinet posts (Dicko 2012). to reassert political order. Sanogo’s supporters proved willing to intimi- The battle for Mopti and the resulting date civilian leaders who displeased the Cap- French intervention underscored a key les- tain. In May, pro-Sanogo demonstrators beat son of the Malian crisis: the rapid, unpredict- Traoré so badly that he was flown to France able nature of events. Every twist of Mali’s for extended treatment. On 10–11 Decem- tragedy can be explained with the benefit of ber, soldiers arrested Diarra and forced him hindsight, from the way regime corruption to resign. weakened and angered the army to the way Outside forces strove to stabilize Bamako that the MNLA’s brutality created political politics while searching for a way to reinte- opportunity for Islamists. But the thread of grate northern Mali. As ECOWAS negotia- continuity in events in Mali in 2012–2013 has tors met with Ansar al Din representatives been the way that each new status quo frag- in Burkina Faso, attempting to convince ments and shifts, rendering figures like Diarra Ansar al Din to renounce links with AQIM powerful one month and irrelevant the next, and make peace with Bamako, ECOWAS com- and raising hopes of progress only to dash Thurston: Mali: The Disintegration of a “Model African Democracy” Art. 2, page 3 of 7 them soon after. In December, Ansar al Din 16 January, “The kind of support we would delegates in Burkina Faso signed a ceasefire give to the ECOWAS states and others in the deal with the Malian government. In early African theater [in Mali] is very, very similar January 2013, further talks were delayed, to what we have done in support of the [Afri- the ceasefire in shambles. Policymaking has can Union Mission in Somalia, or AMISOM] sometimes moved too slowly to help Mali’s effort in Somalia” (Shinkman 2013). allies in addressing the country’s crises. One problem with using Somalia as a By the end of January 2013, French and model for Mali is that the trajectory of exter- Malian advances had dealt powerful blows to nal military interventions – plural – in Soma- Islamist forces. Yet a key question remained lia bears little resemblance to the present unaddressed: Who will rule Mali both dur- and expected experience of Mali. Somalia ing and after the intervention? Eyeing a has seen occupation by its neighbor Ethio- model that supposedly succeeded in Soma- pia from 2006 to 2009, the deployment of lia – involving African peacekeepers and primarily Ugandan and Burundian soldiers Western funds – French Foreign Minister as part of AMISOM from December 2007 Laurent Fabius and other senior French offi- to the present, and an invasion by Kenyan cials have expressed their intention to head Defense Forces (KDF) in October 2011 (KDF for the exits once Mali’s territorial integrity units in Somalia officially joined AMISOM in is re-established. Even then, Western gov- July 2012). Since 2009, Ethiopian soldiers ernments will likely continue to influence have continued making periodic incursions efforts at political reconstruction in Mali. Yet into Somali territory. Unlike in Mali, where two of the main tools the Western powers outside policymakers hope African troops have in their toolkit for dealing with rebel- will maintain French gains, in Somalia Afri- lions against weak states – elections and can troops have retaken territory at different military might – seem insufficient for solving paces. Ethiopian and Kenyan troops have Mali’s problems. largely acted on their own countries’ behalf rather than as part of a unified mission. Shoot and vote It is, moreover, premature and reductive In the last decade, a number of countries to call Somalia a success. First, the Ethiopian in the greater Middle East and Africa have occupation from 2006–2009, which aimed experienced versions of a model that might to break the power of an Islamist group be called, in plain English, “shoot and vote.” called the Union of Islamic Courts, was bru- Outside policymakers assert that outfight- tal (Hassan and Lefkow 2007). This brutality ing rebel groups will create security, while appears to have driven recruits to Al Shabab, elections will produce governments with the youth militia of the Courts and a domi- the legitimacy to consolidate military gains. nant force in southern Somalia after Ethio- Outside powers have prodded destabilized pia’s withdrawal (Bruton 2009). Outside countries to hold elections in the midst of intervention, in other words, played a role in wartime or immediately after major hostili- intensifying the conflict in Somalia. ties. Throughout 2012, the US government Second, despite military gains by AMISOM favored such an approach in Mali, urging the and other actors, reconquered areas lack country to stage “national elections” as soon credible, effective governance. The central as possible. government, which has yet to fully secure Outside policymakers have touted Soma- the capital Mogadishu, has frequently been lia in particular as a model for Mali. Once distracted by its own internal struggles. the French intervention in Mali began, Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government US Assistant Secretary of State for African conducted a multi-stage political transition Affairs Johnnie Carson told journalists on in summer and fall 2012 to produce a new Art. 2, page 4 of 7 Thurston: Mali: The Disintegration of a “Model African Democracy” parliament and president. The transition prime minister to delay presidential elections fell months behind schedule. More impor- from August 2011 to August 2012 (Ahmed tantly, it left core political questions, such and Sheikh 2011). The antidemocratic deals as how the central government will share that paved the way for an ostensibly demo- power with local communities, unresolved. cratic transition call the new government’s The destabilizing effects of political confu- representativeness into question. sion have become apparent in Kismayo, a Returning to Mali, there are reasons policy- port city and former al Shabab stronghold makers want to “shoot and vote.” The political captured by the KDF in September 2012. chaos in Bamako and the military challenge In reconquered Kismayo, groups aspiring to in the north are undeniably interrelated: influence politics include the central govern- confusion about who has the legal authority ment, the Ras Kamboni militia, the Kenyan and the political power to rule the country government, the Ethiopian government, hinders efforts to organize a credible effort clans, and local politicians who support the to reintegrate the north. But “shoot and vote” idea of creating a semi-autonomous territory seems unlikely to solve Mali’s problems, called “Jubaland” (Thomas III 2013). Before especially in the long term. If Mali holds elec- invoking Somalia as a model for Mali, it is tions as soon as July 2013, how will election appropriate to ask how well Somalia’s politi- organizers enfranchise northern communi- cal class is able to resolve conflicts between ties emerging from Islamist control? Will localities and the center. As analyst Kate elections include the more than 400,000 Mrkvicka writes, “Somalia will only thrive if, Malians who have been displaced from their and when, a permanent and legitimate polit- homes, and the 300,000 more who may be ical solution can be reached, which requires displaced in the coming months (Reuters either a government capable of integrating 2013)? Could the resulting government earn all clan- and religious-based entities, or a legitimacy and exercise power without inter- government powerful enough to tamp down ference from the military or other potential future extremism. Any solution that stops spoilers? Elections could do more political short of these objectives will leave the door harm than good. Yet without political clar- open for insurgency and violence to return” ity in Bamako, military efforts to retake the (Mrkvicka 2012). north could stumble, either in the execution Third, security has not yet returned to or in the aftermath of the fight, as the center Somalia. Assassination attempts against attempts to re-establish governance. Either President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud on 12 outcome could increase the dangers of pro- September 2012 and against Prime Minister tracted conflict in the region. Abdi Farah Shirdon on 29 January 2013 have The cyclical nature of conflict in Mali fur- underscored how fragile electoral legitimacy ther challenges the idea that an election and can be in conflict zones. As Mali plans for a war will stabilize the country. The rebellion elections in July 2013, its partners should of 2012–2013 reflects grievances that went bear in mind that elections – events meant unresolved after the end of the 2006–2009 to build national unity or at least resolve rebellion, which in turn drew on grievances political contestation – can produce difficult unaddressed after a series of rebellions from questions about representation and inclusiv- 1990 to 1996 and memories of the Malian ity. Somalia’s political transition in 2012 had government’s repression of a rebellion in the its roots in antidemocratic processes – agree- early 1960s. The MNLA invoked a century of ments brokered between different factions discontent with administrations in Bamako, rather than voted on by a plebiscite, meetings whom they accuse of discriminating against of “clan elders,” (RBC Radio 2012) and a com- Tuaregs and abandoning nomads to drought promise between the outgoing president and and poverty. Some northerners may welcome Thurston: Mali: The Disintegration of a “Model African Democracy” Art. 2, page 5 of 7 the chance to vote for a new government in its brutality against civilians. Can they pro- the south, but Mali’s next government must vide credible political leadership if given a make a long-term commitment to the full second chance? economic and political integration of the The equation of Tuaregs with rebels also north if it hopes to avoid another war in five, ignores undercurrents of ethnic tension. As ten, or twenty years. communities in the north and south come Perhaps an election and an occupation to blame Tuaregs for the country’s problems, could initiate a long-term shift in relations and as current conflicts awaken memories of between Bamako and the north. But policy- earlier ethnic violence, incidents of ethnic makers often confuse elections with democ- violence have broken out in reconquered racy, and ceasefires with peace. Libya’s July areas like Timbuktu and Gao (IRIN 2013). The 2012 elections, held a mere ten months after Songhai militia Ganda Koy, which the gov- the death of ousted leader Colonel Muam- ernment has attempted to mobilize against mar Qadhafi, were greeted with optimism northern rebels, targeted Tuaregs in the and praise. Yet by the start of 2013, such 1990s, and could do so again (Tinti 2012). It optimism already seemed inflated, as militias will be a grim irony if Western policymakers, refused to disarm, assassins targeted politi- who initially categorized the northern rebel- cians, and areas like Benghazi continued to lion as ethnic, now ignore ethnicity while challenge central government control. Put concentrating on Islamism. differently, war and elections are political Another unhelpful category is local- processes that address macro-level questions ity. Keen to separate “local” from “foreign” about who will wield formal power. But the fighters, policymakers – including officials solutions to instability lie more in addressing at dialogues with Ansar al Din in Burkina micro-level political questions: Who gets a Faso – have often treated Ansar al Din as a job? Who gets a gun? Who gets a say? group with genuine local roots, while treat- ing its Islamist partners as foreign to Mali. Rigid categories obscure complexity Such categorizations ignore the seemingly Beyond the limitations of “shoot and vote,” fluid nature of membership between Ansar devising policy solutions to Mali’s crises faces al Din, AQIM, and MUJWA. When and if it another challenge: policymakers’ tendency comes time to demobilize or reintegrate to rely on simplified and unhelpful catego- Islamist fighters, rigid ideas of who is local ries for understanding the conflict. or foreign may hinder dialogue and reconcil- How we describe actors and events in iation. In sum, policymakers who put north- Mali has consequences. With the eclipse of ern Malian movements into sharply defined the MNLA by an Islamist coalition includ- categories may find that the borders blur ing Arabs, Fulani, and others, speaking of a again and again. “Tuareg rebellion” already seems antiquated. Equating northern Mali with Tuaregs, and Conclusion and recommendations Tuaregs with rebellion, is dangerous. For one Mali fell apart quickly, but it cannot be reas- thing, this equation encourages policymak- sembled quickly. Hundreds of thousands of ers to conclude that the MNLA are the “right displaced northerners cannot return home kind” of Tuaregs. Policymakers then con- overnight; some will never return to their clude that with outside support, the MNLA homes. Ethnic tensions, economic griev- could provide a workable military and politi- ances, political anger, and religious fervor cal alternative to the Islamists. This line of will not fade immediately once battlefields thinking presumes that the MNLA can speak are cleared, deals are inked, or election results for the north. But the MNLA already lost are announced. Mali needs outside help. But control of the situation once, partly due to it needs a kind of help that practices patience Art. 2, page 6 of 7 Thurston: Mali: The Disintegration of a “Model African Democracy” and engages complexity. 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How to cite this article: Thurston, A 2013 Mali: The Disintegration of a “Model African Democracy”. Stability, 2(1): 2, pp. 1-7, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.aq

Published: 22 February 2013

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