The War Report Armed Conflicts in 2018

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THE WAR REPORT ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The War Report 2018 was supervised and edited by Dr Annyssa Bellal, Strategic Adviser on IHL and Senior Research Fellow at the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights (Geneva Academy). The different sections on selected armed conflicts were written by individual authors and copy-edited by Munizha Ahmad-Cooke. The War Report 2018 also builds on past editions since 2012. The Geneva Academy would like to thank the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (DFAE) for its support to the Geneva Academy’s research on this issue.

DISCLAIMERS

This report is the work of the editor and authors. The views expressed in it do not necessarily reflect those of the Geneva Academy. The qualiﬁcation of any situation of armed violence as an armed conflict under international law should not be read such as to trigger war clauses in insurance contracts and does not in any way affect the need for due diligence by any natural or legal person in their work in any of the situations referred to. Furthermore, facts, matters or opinions contained in the report are provided by the Geneva Academy without assuming responsibility to any user of the report who may rely on its contents in whole or in part.

The designation of armed non-state actors, states or territories does not imply any judgement by the Geneva Academy regarding the legal status of such actors, states or territories, or their authorities and institutions, or the delimitation of their boundaries, or the status of any states or territories that border them.

April 2019

ISBN: 978-2-9701003-9-3

Criminal CourtinTheHagueandattheNGONoPeaceWithout JusticeinBrussels. focus onAfricanstudies.Previously,sheworkedasanintern attheInternational Human RightsandHumanitarianActionfromSciencesPo,Paris, witharegional manitarian Law andHuman Rights at the Geneva Academy. She holds a Master in ic RepublicoftheCongo.SheiscurrentlypursuinganLLM in InternationalHu- is theauthorofsectionsonCentralAfricanRepublic andtheDemocrat- Giulia Marcucci itarian lawandhumanrightsinpeacekeepingoperations. focuses ontheobligationtoinvestigateseriousviolationsofinternationalhuman- Technology InterchangeDirectoratDireDawaUniversity,Ethiopia.Hisresearch of InternationalandDevelopmentStudies.HewasaLecturerResearch Assistant at the Geneva Academy and a PhDstudentat the Graduate Institute is theauthorofsectiononconflictinEritrea–Ethiopia.HeaTeaching Tadesse Kebebew time asVisitingResearchFellowattheGenevaAcademy. Jean MonnetUniversityandSciencesPoLyon.Hewrotethesearticlesduringhis at theGraduateInstituteofInternationalandDevelopmentStudiesinGeneva, spectives, includinggender,humanrightsandterrorism.HeisaVisitingLecturer analyses thedevelopments in theconflict andpost-conflict zonesfromvarious per- Ingushetia andNorthOssetia–Alania.Hespecializesinthepost-Sovietspace and conductedfeldresearchinNorthCaucasus,primarilyChechnya,Dagestan, notably, worked in Georgia, Indonesia,Kosovo, Macedonia, Mali and Burkina Faso (Ukraine). Grazvydasisascholarandconflictmanagementpractitioner.Hehas, is theauthorofsectionsonGeorgia–Abkhazia,CrimeaandDonbassregion Grazvydas Jasutis neva AcademyandalawdegreefromtheUniversityofNaplesFedericoII. holds anLLMin International HumanitarianLawandHumanRightsfromtheGe- Associate attheInternationalCommitteeofRedCrossdelegationinParis.He Offcer attheGenevaCentreforSecurityPolicy(GCSP).Hepreviouslyworkedas is theauthorofsectiononMali. Alessandro MarioAmoroso Alessandro isSecurityandLawProgramme

INFORMATION ABOUT THE AUTHORS 5 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 6 Colombian territory. process andtheescalationofconflictwithotherarmednon-stateactorsin ing on socio-legal solutions to the main challenges posed by thereincorporation agreement reached between theColombianGovernmentand FARC-EP, work- conflict. Atpresent,sheisinvolvedintheimplementationofHavanapeace contexts intheAmericasincludingColombiannon-internationalarmed legal researchandpolicy-makingprocessesregardingavarietyofarmed-violence Human RightsLawfromtheGenevaAcademy.Since2012,shehasworkedin Europe CoordinationandInternationalCooperationDivisioninStrasbourg. security andhumanrights.SheiscurrentlyworkingasatraineeattheCouncilof in InternationalSecurityatSciencesPo,Paris,focusingontheinteractionbetween is theauthorofsectionsonSouthSudanandSyria.MarijapursuingaMaster Marija Sulce with theUnitedNationsandvariousNGOsinWashington,DCColombia. ternational lawandcivilianprotectioninLatinAmerica.Shehaspreviouslyworked Rights andHumanitarianActionatSciencesPo,Paris,whereshehasfocusedonin- is theauthorofsectiononBrazil.SheagraduatingMaster’sstudentinHuman Liliana Muscarella in conflictresolutionandholdsanLLMInternationalHumanitarianLaw is theauthorofsectiononThailand.SheaColombianlawyerspecialized Laura Baron-Mendoza

INFORMATION ABOUT THE AUTHORS 7 THE WAR REPORT THE WAR :REPORT: ARMED ARMED CONFLICTS CONFLICTS IN 2018IN 2016 88 CONTENTS 1. 4. 3. 2. 1.

C. B. A. D. A. B. A. C. B. A. E. D. SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 PART 2: KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF PART I: SUMMARY INTRODUCTION SELECTED INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS

WHEN DOES A NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT END? THE GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE OF A NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT CRITERIA FOR THE EXISTENCE OF A NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT RULES APPLICABLE IN A NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 7. 6. 5. 4. 2. 1. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT THE GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE OF AN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WHEN DOES AN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT END? SUMMARY IHL RULES GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT CRITERIA FOR THE EXISTENCE OF AN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT SUMMARY IHL RULES GOVERNING A SITUATION OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION THE ERITREA-ETHIOPIA ARMED CONFLICT WHICH ARMED CONFLICTS OCCURRED IN 2018? NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WHAT IS AN ARMED CONFLICT? 3. Ethiopia’s Refusal to WithdrawItsTroopsFromBadme The Eritrea-EthiopiaClaimsCommission (EECC) The Eritrea-EthiopiaBoundaryCommission (EEBC) The DeploymentofthePeacekeeping Operation c. b. a. The Ethiopia-EritreaWar,1998–2000 Background The PeaceProcessandtheFinalAlgiersAgreement The AlgiersAgreementofDecember2000 The AgreementonCessationofHostilities The OrganizationofAfricanUnityFrameworkAgreementanditsModalities

44 49 20 42 24 24 28 28 26 26 30 38 36 39 39 47 25 25 32 19 37 37 37 37 41 41 21 21 15 31 31

CONTENTS 9 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 10

1. 3. 2.

A. A. D. C. C. B. B. A. B. D. D. C. SELECTED NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS

HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT 4. 3. 2. 1. 3. 2. 1. 2. 1. 3. 2. 1. 4. 3. 2. 1. 2. 1. WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS KEYDEVELOPMENTS IN 2018 KEYDEVELOPMENTS IN 2018 PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ANNEXATION AND REUNIFICATION? NOT A NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT BRAZIL: HIGH LEVEL OF ARMED GANG VIOLENCE BUT THE ARMED CONFLICT BETWEEN UKRAINE AND RUSSIA IN CRIMEA: THE ARMED CONFLICT BETWEEN GEORGIA AND RUSSIA IN ABKHAZIA: THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTION WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS KEYDEVELOPMENTS IN 2018 The IntensityofViolence Drug TraffickingandtheMãoDura Crackdown underTemer The TransitiontoDrugs Favela Violence:GangOrigins Self-Defence CrimeanForces Ukrainian ArmedForces Russian ArmedForces The Eventsin2014 Crimea: HistoricalFacts Abkhaz Forces Russian ArmedForces Georgian ArmedForces The EUSix-PointAgreementanditsImplications The August2008War New Violencein1998and2001 The Georgian-AbkhazSchismintheEarly1990s The OngoingDiscussionRelatingtoPrisonersofWar(POWs) Joint DeclarationofPeaceandFriendship,9July2018 PREDOMINANCE OF IRRECONCILABLE POSITIONS

60 64 66 66 66 69 50 50 50 62 62 62 62 54 54 59 59 56 63 52 72 72 74 74 74 75 53 77 73 73 71 71 71 71

3. 2. B. A. C. D. C. C. A. B. D. D. B.

MAINACTORS HISTORY OF THE CONFLICTS 7. 6. 5. 4. 3. 2. 1. 2. 1. 2. 1. 1. KEYDEVELOPMENTS IN 2018 WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS KEYDEVELOPMENTS IN 2018 KEYDEVELOPMENTS IN 2018 IN THE EASTERN REGIONS DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: CONFLICTS VIOLENCE CONTINUES CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: SECTARIAN AND INTERCOMMUNAL HISTORY OF THE CONFLICTS PARTIES TO THE CONFLICTS WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS PARTIES TO THE CONFLICTS National People’sCoalitionfortheSovereignty ofCongo(CNPSC) Nduma DefenseofCongo(NDC–R) National CouncilforRenewalandDemocracy(CNRD–Ubwiyunge) Democratic ForcesfortheLiberationofRwanda(FDLR) Ugandan AlliedDemocraticForces–Nalu(ADF–Nalu) of Congo(MONUSCO) United NationsOrganizationStabilizationMissionintheDemocraticRepublic Armed ForcesoftheDemocraticRepublicCongo(FARDC) j. i. h. g. f. e. d. c. b. a. Non-State Parties MINUSCA The UptickinViolenceandArmyPowersUnderTemerBolsonaro Activist’s MurderHighlightsOverlookedUrbanViolence The LevelofOrganizationtheArmedActors Democratic FrontoftheCentralAfricanPeople(FDPC) National CoordinationoftheEx-Anti-Balaka Anti-Balaka LocalGroups Muslim Self-DefenceGroupsinBangui National MovementfortheLiberationofCentralAfricanRepublic(MNLC) Revolution andJustice(RJ) Return, Reclamation,Rehabilitation(3R) Union forPeaceinCentralAfrica(UPC) Movement ofCentralAfricanLiberatorsforJustice(MLCJ) The Coalition

100 80 80 80 90 90 88 88 98 98 98 89 89 89 89 89 89 99 99 96 82 82 93 93 87 87 87 87 78 78 97 97 97 81 91

CONTENTS 11 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 12 6. 5. 4. A. C. C. B. A. A. B. D. D. B.

HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT 1. 4. 3. 2. 1. 2. 1. 10. 9. 8. 7. 6. 5. 4. 3. 2. 1. 4. 3. 2. 1. KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2018 KEYDEVELOPMENTS IN 2018 PARTIES TO THE CONFLICTS THE SYRIAN ARMED CONFLICT: NEARING THE END? THE SOUTH SUDAN ARMED CONFLICT: A NEW PEACE DEAL JIHADIST AND INTERCOMMUNAL CONFLICTS MALI: THE OVERLAP AND COMBINATION OF SEPARATIST, HISTORY OF THE CONFLICTS HISTORY OF THE CONFLICTS PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS PARTIES TO THE CONFLICTS International ArmedConflicts Sexual Violence Child Soldiers Attacks onCiviliansandCivilianProperty Attacks onAidWorkers SPLA-in-opposition orSPLA-IO/RMandSPLA-IO/TD Sudan People’sLiberationArmy(SPLA) Alliance fortheSalvationofSahel(ASS) Dan NanAmbassagou Imghad TuaregSelf-DefenseGroupandAllies(GATIA) Movement fortheSalvationofAzawad(MSA) Islamic StateintheGreaterSahara(ISGS) Jama’at Nusratal-Islamwal-Muslimin(JNIM) The G5SahelJointForce(G5SJF) UN MultidimensionalIntegratedStabilizationMissioninMali(MINUSMA) French ArmedForces Malian ArmedForces(FAMa) The EndoftheTuaregRebellionAlongsideRelentlessJihadistViolence French InterventionandTheUN’sRobustPeacekeepingMission The JihadistTakeoverandPlannedRegionalOperation The TuaregRebellioninAzawadandMilitaryCoupBamako d. c. b. a. Israel VersusIranon SyrianTerritory Syrian Government Turkey US-led Coalition

104 108 106 102 102 120 102 124 126 126 126 122 122 125 125 125 123 110 114 114 114 118 118 116 118 116 119 121 121 112 112 112 113 113 113 113 117 111 8. 7. A. C. B. C. B. C. D. A. D. D.

HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT 3. 2. 1. 1. 3. 2. 1. 2. 1. 1. 2. 1. 2. KEYDEVELOPMENTS IN 2018 PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2018 PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS KEYDEVELOPMENTS IN 2018 HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT AND ZERO RECONCILIATION THE CONFLICT IN EASTERN UKRAINE (DONBASS): DIRE CONSEQUENCES ARMED THAILAND’S DEEP SOUTH: A CONTINUOUS NON-INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTION and LuhanskPeople’sRepublic Non-State ArmedGroups:TheSelf-ProclaimedDonetskPeople’sRepublic Russian ArmedForces Ukrainian ArmedForces Two CeasefireAgreements:QuoVadis? Stalled PeaceTalks b. a. Armed Non-StateActors The RoyalThaiArmedForces The StartofaLong-SimmeringInsurgencyandtheIncreaseinViolence Since 2004 Understanding theArea The International,ImpartialandIndependentMechanismofSyria Assad’s TerritorialGains The DeclineofIslamicState f. e. d. c. b. a. Non-International ArmedConflicts The PataniConsultativeCouncil(MaraPatani) The PataniMalayNationalRevolutionaryFront(BRN) YPG-YPJ Syrian DemocraticForces(SDF) Hay’at Tahriral-Sham Ahrar al-Sham Islamic State(IS) Free SyrianArmy(FSA) CONFLICT

140 144 149 150 128 128 129 129 130 130 130 154 154 145 156 143 134 138 139 136 147 132 127 127 155 135 135 153 153 137 141 131 151

CONTENTS 13 THE WAR REPORT THE WAR :REPORT: ARMED ARMED CONFLICTS CONFLICTS IN 2018IN 2016 1414 INTRODUCTION cance underinternationallaw. political science purposes, but such categorizations do not, per se, have signifi- based on,forexample,25or1,000battlefielddeathsannually canbevaluablefor armed groups(orbetweensuchthemselves).Thus,reports detailing‘wars’ the extentofclashesbetweenarmedforces,or forcesandorganized ing thethresholdintoarmedconflict;otherfactorsarealsopertinent,especially also Convention Art2,1948 onthePrevention andPunishment of theCrimeof Genocide. within thegroup; Forcibly transferring children of thegroup to another group.’ Art6,Rome Statute; see to bringabout itsphysical destruction inwholeorpart; Imposingmeasures intended to prevent births or mental harmto membersof thegroup; Deliberately inflicting onthegroup conditions of life calculated national, ethnical, racial orreligious group, assuch:Killingmembersof thegroup; Causingserious bodily 2 other inhumane acts.Art7(1)(a)–(k),Rome Statute. pregnancy, enforced sterilization, sexual violence, persecution, enforced disappearance, apartheid and cible transfer of population,imprisonment, torture, rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced of whichattack theperpetrator hasknowledge. Suchactsare murder, extermination, enslavement, for certain actsare undertaken aspart of awidespread orsystematic attack against acivilianpopulation, Rome Statute of the International CriminalCourt (Rome Statute), crimes against humanity occur where 1 constitute crimes against humanity within astatemayclaimnotonlyhundreds,buteventhousands,oflives–and lence asanarmedconflictisnotsimplyanumbersgame.Indeed,violence life maybeinanystateorterritory,thequalificationofasituationarmedvio- Further, asexplainedinmoredetaillater,howeversignificant(andtragic)lossof ing theapplicablelaw,butiscertainlynotconclusive. amount toanarmedconflictisrelevantinformationforthepurposesofdetermin- Consequently, whetherastateaffirmsthatparticularsituationdoes,ordoesnot, the existenceofanarmedconflictisobjectivetestandnotanational‘decision’. armed conflict(although,unquestionably,thesituationsmaycoincide).Moreover, a situationthreateninginternationalpeaceandsecurityisnotsynonymforan cation thataparticularsituationofarmedviolenceconstitutesanconflict; No nationalorsupranationalbodyisauthoritativeinitsdeterminationimpli- connection witharmedconflicts. tional CommitteeoftheRedCross(ICRC)hasaformalroleinprotectiononly may onlybecommittedinconnectionwithanarmedconflict.Third,theInterna- participation, seethe‘SummaryIHLRules’sectionsinPartI).Second,warcrimes forces oracivilian‘participatingdirectlyinhostilities’(forthedurationofsuch does notprohibittheintentionaluse of lethalforceagainsta member ofthearmed law of law enforcement,appliesonly in a situation of armed conflict. Notably, IHL less restrictiveinitsprohibitionsontheuseoflethalforcethanisinternational First and foremost, IHL governing the conduct of hostilities, which is markedly istence ofanarmedconflictisimportantbecauseithasfar-reachingimplications. main andprovidelegalanalysisundertheframeworkofinternationallaw.Theex- The purposeofWarReportistocollectinformationanddatainthepublicdo- under internationalhumanitarianlaw(IHL)andcriminal(ICL). that amounted to armed conflicts in accordance with the definitions recognized This workidentifies,describesanddiscussessituationsofarmedviolencein2018 Crimesagainst humanityare those crimesthat‘shock theconscience of humanity’.Underthe1998 Genocide‘means any of thefollowing actscommitted withintent to destroy, inwholeorpart, a 1 or even genocide 2 – without necessarily cross- -

INTRODUCTION 15 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 16 3 violence thatamounttoanarmedconflictunderIHL. (rulac.org), anonlinedatabasethatidentifesandclassiallsituationsofarmed junction withtheRuleofLawinArmedConflictsportalGenevaAcademy of complete overview of the history of all conflicts, the2012, 2013 and2014 editions Part IIfocusesanddetailsthesituationsofselectedarmedconflictsin2018.Fora law, certaincontroversiesandimprecisionnotwithstanding. on thebasisofexplicitcriteriathat,webelieve,bestreflectexistentinternational Part Iofthisworklistsandsummarizesthearmedconflictsthatoccurredin2018 At: http://www.rulac.org/. The WarReportarerecommended.2018mayalsobereadincon- 3

INTRODUCTION 17 THE WAR REPORT THE WAR :REPORT: ARMED ARMED CONFLICTS CONFLICTS IN 2018IN 2016 1818

SUMMARY PART I cessed 19March 2019). Press, 2010, SSRN, 2008, p132,http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2222757 (last ac Concept of Non-International Armed Conflict inInternational Humanitarian Law , CambridgeUniversity 2000, See, Cullen, e.g., fn 34. ‘The A. Threshold of Non-International Armed Conﬂict’, Cullen, inA. Criminal Court,, Finalized Draft Text of theElementsof Crimes,UNdoc PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2, 2November “international armed conﬂict” includesmilitary occupation’. Preparatory Commission for theInternational 4 tion thatalsoformspartofthelawinternationalarmedconflict. and WesternSahara).Theseoccupationsaregovernedbythelawofmilitaryoccupa- (Azerbaijan, Cyprus,Eritrea,Georgia,Lebanon,Moldova,Palestine,Syria,Ukraine In addition,belligerentoccupationscontinuedinpartsof10statesandterritories well asTurkeyandIraq. between LibyaandEgypt,IsraelSyria,Iran(onSyrianterritory)as In addition,therehavebeenaseriesofshort-livedinternationalarmedconflicts Syria andthedifferentstatesbelongingtoUnitedStates-ledcoalitioninSyria. territory of7states:betweenIndiaandPakistan,UkraineRussia,aswell Of the69conflicts,internationalarmedictshavebeentakingplacein and Yemen. Somalia, SouthSudan,Syria,Thailand,Turkey,Ukraine,WesternSahara Mali, Mexico,Moldova,Myanmar,Nigeria,Pakistan,Palestine,thePhilippines, Republic of the Congo (DRC), Egypt, Eritrea, Georgia, India, Iraq, Lebanon,Libya, istan, Azerbaijan,TheCentralAfricanRepublic,Colombia,Cyprus,theDemocratic In 2018,atleast69armedconflictsoccurredontheterritoryof30states,inAfghan- pines, Somalia,SouthSudan,Syria,Thailand,Turkey,UkraineandYemen. Egypt, India,Iraq,Libya,Mali,Mexico,Myanmar,Nigeria,Pakistan,thePhilip- territory of22states:Afghanistan,theCentralAfricanRepublic,Colombia,DRC, At leastatotalof51non-internationalarmedconflictsoccurredin2018the of EritreabyEthiopiaisdebatable,asdiscussedinthesectiononconflict (p.37) The Elements of Crimesestablished undertheInternational CriminalCourt (ICC) provide term that‘the

4 Theoccupation The -

PART 1 : SUMMARY 19 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 20 nized armedgroupsorbetweensuchwithinaState.’ States orprotractedarmedviolencebetweengovernmentalauthoritiesandorga- case: ‘[A]narmedconflictexistswheneverthereisaresorttoforcebetween Criminal TribunalfortheformerYugoslavia(ICTY)ina1995decisionTadić of thetwocategorieswasadvancedbyAppealsChamberInternational January 2014, §35, January 2014, Commissaire général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides, Fourth Chamber, Judgment, Case no C-285/12, 30 organisation of thearmed forces involved ortheduration of theconflict.’ CJEU, Aboubacar Diakité v territory concerned, aseparate assessment of the intensity of thearmed confrontations, thelevel of law; norisitnecessary to carry out,inadditionto anappraisal of thelevel of violence present inthe to becategorized as“armed conflict not of aninternational character” underinternational humanitarian armed groups oriftwo ormore armed groups confront each other. Itisnot necessary for thatconflict (CJEU) determined thataninternal armed conflict exists ‘ifaState’s armed forces confront oneormore or internal armed conflict’. Inadecision theCourt inJanuary2014, of Justice of theEuropean Union dual threat to acivilian’slife orperson by reason of indiscriminate violence insituationsof international Directive 2004/83. According to Art15(c)of theDirective, serious harmconsists of a‘serious andindivi- or, owing to suchrisk,unwilling to avail himself orherself of theprotection of thatcountry’. Art2(e),EU country of former habitualresidence, would face areal riskof suffering serious harm…andisunable, concerned, ifreturned to hisorhercountry of origin,orinthecase of astateless person, to hisorher as arefugee butinrespect of whom substantial grounds have been shown for believing thattheperson of protection underEU law, whether athird-country nationalorastateless person whodoesnot qualify 6 LOAC framework. hostilities) isbetter termed IHLwhile‘Hague’law (ontheconduct of hostilities) falls withinthebroader protection of those inthepower of aparty to conflict whoare not, or nolonger, participating directly in conflict (LOAC). Today, thisistheprevailing view, althoughithasbeen argued that‘Geneva’ law (onthe 5 not acaseof‘either-or’inanygivengeographicalsituation.Accordingly,several Furthermore, andeventhoughthisunderstandingisnotuniversallyshared,it constitute aNIAC.Thisissueisdiscussedbelow. IAC differs from – i.e. is, in general, significantly lower than – that necessary to groups withinastate.Thismeansthatthelevelofviolenceneededtotriggeran between governmentalauthoritiesandorganizedarmedgroups,orsuch force betweenstates,whileaNIACexistswhenthereisprotractedarmedviolence Thus, intheviewofICTY,anIACexistswheneverthereisaresorttoarmed national-humanitarian-law-legal-concepts (last accessed 6March 2018). 873 (March 2009), Humanitarian Law: Legal Concepts andActual Situations’, 91 International Review of theRed Cross (IRRC) ticle-170308.htm (last accessed 17March 2019); S.Vité, ‘Typology of Armed Conflicts inInternational Paper, 17March 2008, https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/armed-conflict-ar Red Cross (ICRC), How istheTerm Armed Conflict” Defined inInternational Humanitarian Law?, Opinion acdec/en/51002.htm (last accessed 17March 2019). See generally also International Committee of the Interlocutory Appeal onJurisdiction, IT-94-1, 2October 1995,§70, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/ 7 definitionof armedthe IHL/ICL conflict (last accessed 17March 2019). dex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=460406. This decision hasnoinfluence on In accordancewithIHL(alsocalledthelawofarmedconflict) 1. WHAT IS AN ARMED CONFLICT? ternational armedconflict(NIAC). two categoriesofarmedconflict:internationalict(IAC)andnon-in- ICTY, Prosecutor vDusko Tadić (aka ‘Dule’),Appeals Chamber, Decision ontheDefence Motion for Views differ asto whetherinternational humanitarian law (IHL)isasynonym for thelaw of armed The European Union(EU) also uses theterm ‘internal armed conflict’ to determine, for thepurposes https://www.icrc.org/en/international-review/article/typology-armed-conflicts-inter http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=147061&pageIn 6 Avaluableandwidelycitedgeneraldefinition 7 5 and ICL,thereare

confrms thisinterpretation,andnotesthat though, limitedtoareaswherecombatisoccurring.The2016ICRCCommentary state engaged in an armed conflict. mon Article3tothe1949GenevaConventions,applythroughoutterritoryofa a consequence,numberoffundamentalrules,includingthosesetoutinCom- IHL generallyappliesthroughouttheterritoryofstateorstatesconcerned.As the conflict in otherareasthatitcontrols.Whenanarmedconflictisprogress, each other.Warcrimesmay,however,becommittedbyamemberofpartyto ited totheareaswherepartiesconflictareconductinghostilitiesagainst In anyevent,theexistenceofanarmedconflicteithercategoryisgenerallylim- 1257F7D004BA0EC#174 (last accessed 6March 2018). icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=59F6CDFA490736C1C of the Condition of theWounded and SickinArmed Forces intheField,§460, https://ihl-databases. 10 International Law of Armed Conﬂicts, Hart,2008, pp94–96. 9 §1197.2014, 8 If understoodstrictly,theICTY’sdeﬁnitionofanIACinTadić case(‘whenever state ofwarisnotrecognizedbyonethem’. which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the Conventions ‘shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict According to Common Article 2 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, each of the four 2. INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT case. Criminal Court’s(ICC’s)TrialChamberjudgmentinMarch2014theKatanga the fragmentationofconflicttheory,hasbeensupportedbyInternational the same time and in parallel in any given state. This position, sometimes called different armed conflicts, comprising one or both categories, may be ongoing at A. CRITERIA FOR THE EXISTENCE OF AN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT See, e.g., ICC, Prosecutor vGermainKatanga, Trial ChamberII,Judgment,ICC-01/04-01/07, 7March See, e.g., Arts 35–46, 1949Geneva Convention IV. See also R.Kolb andR.Hyde, AnIntroduction to the ICRC, 2016 Commentary on Art 3 of the First Geneva Convention: Convention (I) for the Amelioration 8 Such fragmentationisevidencedinanumberofrecentarmedconflicts. plicable internationalandregionalhumanrightslaw. criminal andlawenforcementregimes,withintheboundariessetbyap- tion totheconflictgenerallyremainregulatedexclusivelybydomestic and thenon-internationalarmedconflict.Actsthathavenosuchconnec- law toaspecifcactthereforerequirescertainnexusbetweenthat and forhumanitarianlawtoapply…Theapplicabilityof conflict’ forthatacttobecommittedinthecontextofarmedconflict curring in other parts of the territories controlled by the parties to the by the ICTY, a particular act must be ‘closely related to the hostilities oc- therefore fallnecessarilyunderthehumanitarianlawregime.Asnoted State partytotheconflictdoesnotmeanthatallactswithinterritory the applicabilityofhumanitarianlawinwholeterritorya 9 Rules governing the conduct of hostilities are, 10

PART 1 : SUMMARY 21 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 22 humanitarian law.’ forces wouldsparkaninternationalarmedconflictandleadtotheapplicabilityof ists …Evenminorskirmishesbetweenthearmedforces,betheyland,airornaval reach acertainlevelofintensitybeforeitcanbesaidthatanarmedconflictex- armed conflict,thereisnorequirementthattheuseofforcebetweenParties As underlinedbytheICRCCommentaryonCommonArticle2,‘forinternational 42 toexist, ‘two conditionsmust be fulflled:(a)theoccupier is abletoexercise be exercised’.AccordingtoSylvainVité,foroccupationinthe meaningofArticle extends onlytotheterritorywheresuchauthorityhasbeen establishedandcan when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation Article 42ofthe1907HagueRegulationsreads:‘Territoryisconsideredoccupied not thepartyattackedresists’. Geneva ConventionsbetweenthetwoStates...Itisalsoofnoconcernwhetheror force byoneStateagainsttheterritoryofanothertriggersapplicability the latterstateﬁghtsback.Thus,asHans-PeterGasserexplains,‘anyuseofarmed state usesarmedforceagainsttheterritoryofanotherstate,irrespectivewhether bellum (thelawgoverninginterstateuseofforce),anIACalsoexistswheneverone IRRC 885(Spring2012). M. Zwanenburg, M.Bothe and M.Sassòli, ‘IstheLaw of Occupation Applicable to theInvasion Phase?’ 94 to the31st International Conference of theRed Cross andRed Crescent, Geneva, October 2011. See, e.g., 14 international, Schulthess, 2016. 1257F7D0036B518 (last accessed 17 March 2019). See also D. Carron, icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=BE2D518CF5DE54EAC of the Condition of theWounded andSick inArmed Forces intheField,§§236–237, https://ihl-databases. 13 International Red Cross andRed Crescent Movement, Paul Haupt, 1993, pp510–511. 12 Hague Academy of International law (RCADI), Recueil descours, vol 163, Brill/Nijhoff, 1979, p131. 11 In addition,anIACincludesanysituation between twoStatesbringstheConventionsintoeffect.’ of thearmedforcestwoStatesclashwitheachother...Anykindusearms Article 2commontotheGenevaConventionscanalwaysbeassumedwhenparts rich Schindlerobserves,‘theexistenceofanarmedconflictwithinthemeaning the armedforcebebetweentwoormorestates.Itisundoubtedlytruethat,asDiet- there isaresorttoarmedforcebetweenStates’)toonarrowinitsinsistencethat situation quitecomplex.’ and afterthephaseoutperiod–mayrenderlegalclassifcationofaparticular of somedegreeauthoritybylocalauthorities,ortheforeignforcesduring elements –suchasthecontinuationofhostilitiesand/orcontinuedexercise ICRC, ‘[n]otonlyisthedefnitionofoccupationvagueunderIHL,butotherfactual a belligerentoccupationoccursis,though,notfnallysettled.Accordingtothe 2 commontothefour1949GenevaConventions.Theprecisemomentatwhich occupies it,evenifthereisnoarmedresistanceatall.ThissetdowninArticle D. Schindler, ‘The Different Types of Armed Conﬂicts According to the Geneva Conventions and Protocols’, ICRC, 2016 Commentary onArt2of theFirst Geneva Convention: Convention (I)for theAmelioration H.-P. Gasser, ‘International Humanitarian Law: AnIntroduction’, inH.Haug(ed), Humanityfor All:The ICRC, ‘International Humanitarian Law andtheChallengesof Contemporary Armed Conflicts’, Report 13 13 14

in whichonestateinvadesanotherand L’acte déclencheur d’un conflit armé 11 ad But, consistentwithjusad

eign state is deemed to have ‘overall control’ over the actions of the ANSA. (ANSA) operatinginanotherstatewhenthatsupportissosigniﬁcantthefor- There mayalsobeanIACwhenonestatesupportsarmednon-stateactor sia hadsoughttoannexpartofUkrainianterritory(Crimea). state. Subsequently,however,thefactsongrounddemonstratedclearlythatRus- time oftheletterandcouldnotthereforebeconsideredgenuinelytorepresent Yanukovych did not effectively control the police or armed forces of Ukraine at the However, without prejudice to the legality of his removal under Ukrainian law, Mr curs. may befactualandlegalissuesconcerningwhetherwhenanoccupationoc- with respecttoNATO’smilitaryinvolvementinAfghanistan,forinstance.Butthere the latterstate’sconsent,twostatesarenotengagedinanIAC.Thisiscase Of course,whereonestateusesarmedforceontheterritoryofanotherwith pation meetswithnoarmedresistance.’ total occupationoftheterritoryaHighContractingParty,evenifsaidoccu- to CommonArticle2,‘[t]heConventionshallalsoapplyallcasesofpartialor threshold fortheapplicationof1949GenevaConventionsislower.According peoples areﬁghtingagainstcolonialdominationandalienoccupation controversially, anIACmayalsoexistwherethereisarmedconflict‘inwhich had seemingly authorized Russian military intervention in a letter dated 1 March. occupying Ukraine, given that deposed Ukrainian President, Viktor Yanukovych, chamber judgment, §§1177 etseq. their respective armies orthrough others actingontheirbehalf.’ Unofficial translation.) ICC, Katanga trial en leur nom.’ (‘An international armed conflict exists whenever armed hostilities oppose states through tilités armés opposent desÉtats àtravers leursarmées respectives ouàtravers d’autres acteurs agissant Trial Chamber further approved this position: ‘Un conflit armé international existe dès lors que des hos- The Trial Chamber expressly approved the Tadić dicta onthisissue. Inthe2014 Katanga judgment,theICC Prosecutor vThomas Lubanga Dyilo,Trial Chamber, Judgment,ICC-01/04-01/06, 14March 2012, §541. See similarlytheviews of theTrial Chamber of theICC initsjudgmentthe2012 Lubanga case: ICC, 115 etseq; ICTY, Prosecutor vBlaškić,Trial Chamber, Judgment,IT-95-14-T, 3March 2000, §§149–50. 18 un-security-council-with-appeal-by-legal-president-yanukovych/. Yanukovych’, 17 Martinovic, aka ‘Štela’ , Trial Chamber, JudgmentIT-98-34-T, 31March 2003, §217, footnotes omitted. Katanga trialchamberjudgment,§1180, citingICTY, Prosecutor vMladenNaletilic,aka ‘Tuta’and Vinko over theterritory; theoccupying power hasissued andenforced directions to thecivilianpopulation. time to make theauthorityof theoccupying power felt; atemporary administration hasbeen established the occupying power hasasufficientforce present, orthecapacity to send troops withinareasonable occupation); as occupied territory; however, sporadic local resistance, even successful, does not affect the reality of forces have surrendered, been defeated or withdrawn (in this respect, battle areas may not be considered the occupied authorities,whichmust have been rendered incapable of functioningpublicly;theenemy’s tion was occurring: theoccupying power must beinapositionto substitute itsown authorityfor thatof against andidentified anon-exhaustive list of factors to consider whendetermining whetheranoccupa- 16 15 tion hasnotbeenapprovedbythelegitimatesovereign’. effective controloveraterritorythatdoesnotbelongtoit;[and](b)itsinterven- See, e.g., L.Stangret, ‘Russia Provides UNSecurity Council withAppeal by “Legal President” Vité, ‘Typology of Armed Conflicts inInternational Humanitarian Law’, 74. See, e.g., ICTY, Prosecutor vTadić, Appeals Chamber, Judgment,IT-94-1-A, 15July1999,§§84and IntheKatanga case, theICC Trial Chambercited withapproval trialjudgmentinthecase theICTY 16 InMarch2014,theissuearoseofwhetherornotRussianFederationwas Euromaidan Press , 5 March http://euromaidanpress.com/2014/03/05/russia-provides- 2014, 15 Arguably,however,the 18 More 17

PART 1 : SUMMARY 23 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 24 same asforanIAC–thatis,muchlowerthanitisNIAC. of armed violence for such a conflict to occur is not settled,butis probably the indiscriminate, andcertainly there isnogeneral agreement asto whichweapons mightfulfilthiscriterion. between civilianandmilitary targets’. Ithas sometimes been claimed thatnoweapons are ‘inherently’ its 1996Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion,referred to ‘weapons thatare incapable of distinguishing 22 directly inhostilities. 21 University Press, 2005, §3.4.2. regulated by Common Article3.UKMinistry of Defence, The Manualof the Law of Armed Conflict, Oxford 20 vociferously whenitwas adopted. Ithasnever been applied inpractice. 19 The useofindiscriminateweapons, to takepartinhostilities.Recruitingchildrenunder15years oldisawarcrime. Children mustnotberecruitedintoarmedforcesor groupsnorallowed military advantage,areprohibited. ly orseverallywouldbe‘excessive’comparedtotheexpected ‘concreteanddirect’ injuries amongthecivilianpopulation,ordamagetoobjects,whichjoint- attacks againstlawfulmilitaryobjectivesthatmaybeexpectedtocausedeathsor damage tocivilianobjects).Inaddition,accordingtheruleofproportionality, all feasibleprecautionsinanyattacktominimizeciviliandeathsandinjuries(and conduct ofhostilities,internationallawalsorequiresthatpartiestoaconflicttake Although itisunderstoodthatciviliancasualtiesmaynotalwaysbeavoidedinthe law giventherequisiteintent(mensrea). an indiscriminateattack),andbotharewarcrimesundercustomaryinternational ing todistinguishinmilitaryoperationsbetweenciviliansandcombatants(i.e. do notdirectlyparticipateinhostilities,isaseriousviolationofIHL,astoofail- (e.g. homes,hospitalsandschools).Deliberatelytargetingcivilians,providedthey objectives andnotthecivilianpopulation,individualciviliansorobjects ‘parties toaconflict’(inotherwords,thewarringparties)targetonlymilitary The basisofthelawarmedconflictisruledistinction.Thisobliges and their1977AdditionalProtocols,representcustomarylawapplicabletoall. IAC aresetoutinthe1907HagueRegulationsand1949GenevaConventions The basicprinciplesandrulesofIHLapplicabletotheconducthostilitiesinan tentially targeteachother’sarmedforcesanywhere. parallel to any IAC, where militarily necessary, states involved in an IAC may po- NIAC (seebelow).Withoutprejudicetojusadbellum,therulesofwhichapplyin The geographical scope of an IAC is potentially far broader than is the case for a racist regimesintheexerciseoftheirrightself-determination’. C. SUMMARY IHL RULES GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT B. THE GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE OF AN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT Civiliansonlylose their‘general protection’ against hostilities if, andfor suchtimeas,they participate See Art 1(4), 1977 Additional Protocol I.The USanda number of other states opposed thisprovision Art 8(2)(a)(xx) of the Rome Statute refers to ‘inherently’ indiscriminate weapons, while the ICJ, in This isnot, though,thepositionof theUK,whichargues thatthethreshold isthesameasfor aNIAC 22 or weapons‘ofanaturetocausesuperfluous 21 20 19 Thethreshold 24 23 of peaceisreached’inthecaseanIAC. conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a generalconclusion ICTY intheTadićcasesuggestedthatIHLapplies‘frominitiationof...armed The precise duration of an international armed conflict is a difﬁcult issue. The on theoccupyingstateextraterritoriallywithregardtoterritoriesitoccupies. Hague Regulations). In addition, international human rights law (HRL) is binding or totheoccupationascloselypossibleandprovidingsecurity(Article43of tering thelocallifeofpopulationunderitscontrol,maintainingitaswaspri- mains inforce.Atthesametime,occupyingpowerisresponsibleforadminis- territories itoccupiesandlocallawthatwasapplicablepriortotheoccupationre- reached. Duringthisperiod,theoccupantdoesnotenjoysovereignrightsover is supposed to be a temporary situation, which lasts until a political agreement is international law.Theunderpinningofthelawmilitaryoccupationisthatit the 1949GenevaConventionIV,1977AdditionalProtocolIandcustomary ritory, applicablelawissetoutinthe1907HagueRegulations(Articles42–56), Subject tothediscussionabove,duringabelligerentoccupationofforeignter- status ofprisonerwar,withtheassociatedrightsandobligations. Captured combatants(primarily,membersofarmedforces)aretobeaccordedthe who arehorsdecombat,becauseofsickness,wounds,detentionoranyothercause. visions, partiestoaninternationalconflictmustrespectandprotectcombatants injury orunnecessarysuffering’,isprohibited.Inaddition,amongmanyotherpro- when anoccupationstartsanditsends.AccordingtoTristan Ferraro, hostilities. Inaddition,IHLdoesnotprovideclear-cutstandards fordetermining of armedconflictwithoutsuchanoscillationamountingtoactivecessation of be afluctuationintheregularityandextentofarmedviolenceduring asituation hostilities haveeffectivelyceasedistooexpansive.Nonetheless, therewilloften conduct ofhostilitiespertaintoactscommittedafterthepoint atwhichactive the treatment of detainees, a notion that law of armed conflict rules governing the ly extendbeyondtheactivecessationofhostilities,includingthosepertainingto erential treatment. assistance tothecivilianpopulation,womenandchildrenarebegrantedpref- E. WHEN DOES AN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT END? D. SUMMARY IHL RULES GOVERNING A SITUATION OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION

These are set out,inparticular, in1949Geneva Convention III. Tadić appeals chamber decision, §70. the existinglocalgovernmental authority,andthecontinuedabsence their abilitytoenforceauthority overtheterritoryconcernedinlieuof tion, butinreverse.Therefore,thephysicalpresenceofforeign forces, words, thecriteriashouldbesameasforbeginningof occupa- generally mirrortheonesusedtodetermineitsbeginning. Inother the criteriatobemetinorderestablishendofoccupation, should 24 While certainIHLobligationswillclear- 23 Inproviding

PART 1 : SUMMARY 25 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 26 armed violencehasbeenreached. The requirementof‘protracted armed violence’meansthata certain thresholdof armed group,orbetweensuchgroups.Theseelementsarediscussedin turn. the violencemusttake place betweenthearmedforcesandatleastoneorganized group (orbetweensuchgroupswithinastateoracrossstate’sborders);andthird, ducted bygovernmentforcesandatleastoneorganizednon-governmentalarmed tion. First,theremustbe‘protractedarmedviolence’;second,violencecon- There arethreecumulativerequirementsforaNIAC,accordingtotheTadićdefini- occurs betweentwoormoreorganizedarmedgroupsacrossaninternationalborder. foreseen bytheTadić subject tointernationalhumanitarianlaw.’ unorganized and short-lived insurrections,or terrorist activities, which are not the purpose,asaminimum,ofdistinguishinganarmedconflictfrombanditry, of aninternalormixedcharacter,thesecloselyrelatedcriteriaareusedsolelyfor 29 Humanitarian Law andtheChallengesof Contemporary Armed Conflicts’, p8. 28 27 Milošević, Trial Chamber, Decision onMotion for Judgmentof Acquittal, IT-02-54-T, §17. 16June2004, Brahimaj, Trial Chamber, Judgment,IT-04-84-T, 3April2008, §§40etseq; ICTY, Prosecutor vSlobodan and Judgment, 7 May 1997, §562; see also ICTY, the word’s meaning inordinary parlance isoneof duration, not intensity). ICTY, Prosecutor vTadić, Opinion to ‘protracted’ armed whenqualifying violence was aninsistence ontheintensity of conflict (even though 26 Law’, 94IRRC 885,2012, p156. 25 typically possess and useavarietyofweaponscontrolsignificantlogistical Organized armedgroupsarethosewithacommand-and-control structure,who and intensearmedviolence In accordancewiththedefinitioninTadić 3. NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT explicitly determinednottoamountarmedconflicts. ‘riots, isolatedandsporadicactsofviolence’otherasimilarnature,are groups within a state. Situations of ‘internal disturbances and tensions’, including occur inasituationofintensearmedviolencebetweentwoormoreorganized army, andoneormoreorganizednon-governmentalarmedgroups.ANIACwillalso A. CRITERIA FOR THE EXISTENCE OF A NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT Art1(2),1977 Additional Protocol II;see also Art8(2)(d), Rome Statute. T. Ferraro, ‘Determining theBeginning andEndof anOccupation UnderInternational Humanitarian As the ICRC has noted, violence ‘the must reach a certain level of intensity’. ICRC, ‘International In the trial judgment in Tadić appeals chamber decision, §70. occupation shouldbeconsideredtohaveended. mination ofoccupation.Ifanytheseconditionsceasestoexist,the presence, cumulatively,shouldbescrutinizedwhenassessingtheter- of thelocalgovernmentalauthority’sconsenttoforeignforces’ decision, aNIACwillalsooccurwhereintense armed violence Tadić and other cases, confirmed the ICTY that the specific meaning it gave 26 betweenthesecurityforcesofastate,especially 28 AccordingtotheICTY,‘[i]nanarmedconflict Prosecutor v Ramush Haradinaj, and Lahi Idriz Balaj, 29 case, aNIACissituationofregular 27 Althoughnotexplicitly 25 individual confrontations’. tive factorsforanarmedconflictinclude‘thenumber,durationandintensityof network, can be a party to an armed conflict. group whoseaimispurelylucrative,suchasadrugscarteloranorganizedcrime 35 Law-of-NIAC.pdf (last accessed 16March 2019). Conflict With Commentary, 2006, p3,http://stage.iihl.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Manual-on-the- 34 33 Chamber, Judgment,IT-95-13/1-T, 27 September 2007, §407 andsources cited infootnote 1592. and over aperiodof time’.See, e.g., ICTY, Prosecutor vMileMrkšić,Miroslav Radić,andVeselin Šljivančin , Trial sity criterion:seriousness ‘the of attacks andpotential increase inarmed clashes,theirspread over territory 32 31 IT-03-66-T, 30November 2005, §170. 30 case andcitedaboveof‘terroristactivities,whicharenotsubject tointernational pear tofallmoreaccuratelywithinthenotionexpressedby ICTYintheTadić the armedorsecurityforcesofastate,isnotengagedinNIAC.Suchsituationsap - body-borne IEDs(BBIEDs),butwhichdoesnotengageindirect ‘hostilities’with provised explosivedevices(IEDs),landmines,vehicle-borneIEDs(VBIEDs)or Thus, anarmedgroupthatconstructsandemplaces(ordeliverstoatarget)im- cal orreligiousagendaforittobepartyaNIAC; conflict. It is not, however,necessary that an armed group have a particular politi- the determinationoftheirstatusunderinternationallawwithrespecttoanarmed elements bystatesorotherentities;suchdesignationshavenoconsequencefor sometimes calledrebels,insurgents,terrorists,criminalgangsoranti-government other organized armed groups, such groups are ‘party’ to a NIAC. These groups are When engagedinregular and intense armed confrontations with armed forces or capacity thatgivesthemthecapabilitytoconductregularmilitaryoperations. tual combat. ‘conflict’ and ‘between’ is, The thirdcriterionispotentiallycontroversial.Inherentinthenotionofwords War Report2017withregardspecifcallytothesituationinMexico. Kosovo LiberationArmyandtheSerbforces,statedthat that anarmedconflictexistedinKosovobeforetheendofMay1998between territory ofasinglestate. Armed ConflictstatesthatNIACsare‘armedconfrontations’occurringwithinthe Vité, ‘Typology of Armed Conflicts inInternational Humanitarian Law’, 78. Incases before theICTY, theTribunal hastended to consider thenumberof clashesaspart of theinten- International Institute of Humanitarian Law, The ManualontheLaw of Non-International Armed See, e.g., ICTY, Prosecutor vFatmir Haradin Limaj, Bala,andIsakMusliu,Trial Chamber, Judgment, Haradinaj trialchamberjudgment,§49. trialchamberjudgment, §172,Limaj footnote omitted. of organisation. KLA toengageinsuchvariedoperationsisafurtherindicatorofitslevel cipality ofMitrovice/KosovkaMitrovicainthenorth...Theability Prizren andtheKosovo–Macedonianborderinsouthmuni- nian border in the west, to near Prishtina/Pristina in the east, to Prizren/ clashes withsubstantialSerbianforcesinareasfromtheKosovo–Alba- by theendofMay1998KLAunitswereconstantlyengagedinarmed 32 InitsjudgmentintheHaradinajcase,ICTYstatedthatindica- 34 35 The War Report 33 In theLimajcase,ICTYTrialChamber,infinding TheSanRemoManualontheLawofNon-International argues, a requirement that there be ac- 31 This discussion takes place in 30 therefore,anorganizedarmed The

PART 1 : SUMMARY 27 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 28 despite theexistenceofaceasefre. case ofalastingcessationarmedconfrontationswithoutrealriskresumption, that aNIACwouldendbythemerefactoneofpartiesceasestoexistorin The 2016ICRCCommentaryontheGenevaConventionsof1949alsospecifes conflict asitmayundertheclassifcationofIAC. is particularlydiffcult,sinceanindividualattackdoesnotamounttoarmed ‘cessation ofactivehostilities’inarmedconflictsanon-internationalcharacter 41 scope-application-ihl-non-international-armed-conflicts-end-part-2/ (last accessed 16March 2019). Part 2’,OpinioJuris,19February http://opiniojuris.org/2014/02/19/guest-post-bartels-temporal- 2014, 40 to (non-international) armed conflict. 39 38 of theterm. See also, e.g., Milošević trialchamberdecision, §26. to theterms modify of theProtocol withrespect to theUK,butrather to set outtheUK’s understanding ding’ of theUKasa‘reservation’, butitismore accurately termed a‘declaration’ because itdoesnot seek International Armed Conﬂict, Oxford University Press, 2012, p233.Sivakumaran refers to the‘understan- 003FB6D2?OpenDocument (last accessed 16March 2019), cited inS.Sivakumaran, The Law of Non- 37 36 an armedconflictislimitedtotheterritoryofasinglestateorthatprovisions the territoryofoneHighContractingParties’.Thiscanbe takentomeanthat Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions refers to a NIAC ‘occurring in [until] apeacefulsettlementisachieved’. ing totheTadićdecision,IHLapplies‘incaseofinternalconflicts[i.e.NIACs], More complicatedisthe determination ofwhenaNIACiseffectively over. Accord- humanitarian law’. concerted orinisolation’. stituted bythecommissionofordinarycrimesincludingactsterrorismwhether conflict” ofitselfandinitscontextdenotesasituationkindwhichisnot- 1977 AdditionalProtocolI,theUKenteredadeclarationwhereby‘theterm“armed old setfortheapplicationofIHL.’ cumstance ofthelevel“organization”and“intensity”fallingbelowthresh- by virtueofapeacesettlementbeingreached,butratherthemorefactualcir- position hasbeenadvancedbyRogierBartels:‘NIACsdonotnecessarilyendonly when eithercriterionisnolongerfulflled,aNIACcanbesaidtohaveended.This on oforganization.Establishingthesesituationsasfactisclearlychallenging,but are killedorcaptured,thegroupmay,asaconsequence,nolongerfulflcriteri- armed groupthatispartytosuchaconflictfragmentsoritsseniorcommanders NIAC mustbefrequentbutnotnecessarilydailyorevenweekly.Further,whenan C. THE GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE OF A NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT B. WHEN DOES A NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT END? ICRC, 2016 Commentary onArt3of theFirst Geneva Convention, §§489–491. Declaration of 28January1998,http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/NORM/0A9E03F0F2EE757CC1256402 These situationsare governed by theinternational law of law enforcement, including,inparticular, HRL. As noted above, in relevant treaties ‘isolated andsporadic acts of violence’ explicitly donot amount R.Bartels, ‘Temporal Scope of Application of IHL: When DoNon-International Armed Conflicts End? Tadić, §70. 36 As Sandesh Sivakumaran has noted, upon ratiﬁcation of the 37 37 40 41

38 Thisistooexpansive.Identifyingthe 39 Clashes betweenpartiestoa as amatteroflaw’. territorial base … a global non-international armed conflict does not exist, at least, to besimplyglobal.AccordingSivakumaran,anarmedconflictmust‘havea international borders,itisnotpossibleunderexistinglawforaNIAC that, today, it mayhave ‘a core territoryplusoverspill onto different territory’, those foreignstates. conflict appliestoanyhostileactbythenon-statepartyonterritoryof conflict involvesforeignstatesinterveningonbehalfofthatstate,thelawarmed NIAC existsontheterritoryofonestateagainstanon-statearmedgroup,andthat 48 47 46 ring intheterritory of one of theHighContracting Parties’ (emphasisadded). 45 44 the reference to theTaliban. peech/ Center for Scholars,Washington, 30April2012, DC, http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/04/brennans the President’s Counterterrorism Strategy’, Remarks of JohnO. Brennan, Woodrow Wilson International al-Qa’ida, theTaliban, and associated forces, in response to the 9/11 attacks.’ ‘The Ethics and Efficacy of from 2013–2017), stated: ‘As amatter of international law, theUnited States isinanarmed conflict with Advisor for HomelandSecurity andCounterterrorism (later, Director of theUSCentral Intelligence Agency 43 humanitarian-law-contemporary-conflicts (last accessed 16March 2019). University, 2003, p8,https://hhi.harvard.edu/publications/temporal-scope-application-international- Cambridge, January27–29, 2003, Program onHumanitarian Policy and Conflict Research atHarvard High-Level ExpertMeeting ontheReaffirmation andDevelopment of International Humanitarian Law, International Humanitarian Law inContemporary Conflicts, Background Paper Prepared for theInformal 42 ritories’ thataregeographicallyunconnected. sial isthequestionofwhetheranarmedconflictmayexistacross‘multipleter- sometimes (unhelpfully)termeda‘transnationalarmedconflict’.Morecontrover- It isnotcontestedherethatanarmedconflictmayexiston‘asingleterritory’, ing isgovernedbytheauthorityofaStateParty. only apply to a situationin which the territory on which an armed conflict is ongo- forces’. engaged ina‘globalarmedconflict’against‘theTaliban,al-Qaeda,andassociated of internationallaw.SomeargumentsweremadeinthepastbyUS,thatitwas This positiondoesnotmean,however,thataglobalizedNIACexistsasmatter limitation, atleastwithrespectto‘spill-over’fromoneterritoryanother. sions. Further,undercustomarylaw,thereisarguablynosuchstrictgeographical ventions, thereisverylittleterritorythatwouldnotbecoveredbythetreatyprovi- November 2016,allUnitedNationsMemberStateswerepartytotheGenevaCon- Ibid. For example, in2012 JohnBrennan, thenAssistant to theUSPresident, andDeputyNationalSecurity Indeed, thetext of Common Article3refers to ‘armed conflict not of aninternational character occur For ahelpful discussion of thisissue, see, e.g., D. Jinks,The Temporal Scope of Application of Vité, ‘Typology of Armed Conflicts inInternational Humanitarian Law’, 74. Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict, p234. Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict, p234. (last accessed 6March 2018). Later, however, theObama administration started quietlydropping 43 NosuchconflictexistsunderIHL/ICL.WhileaNIACcancertainlycross 44 48 47 42 According toonetheory,wherea Ifitisthelatter,giventhat,asof 45 or or 46 46 -

PART 1 : SUMMARY 29 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 30 are alsoboundbybothapplicabletreaty cutions, tortureandenforceddisappearances). by atleastperemptoryHRLnorms(e.g.prohibitionsonsummaryorarbitraryexe- There isalsoincreasingacceptancethatnon-statearmedgroupsarebound determining lawfuluseofforce. the applicablelaw,whileoutside such areas,HRLisarguablythelegalframework tilities arebeingactivelyconducted,thelawofarmedconflictiswidelyregardedas international humanrightsobligations.’ tors, suchastheTaliban,exercisedefactocontroloverterritory,theyareboundby international humanrightslawincreasinglyrecognizesthatwherenon-Stateac- groups, cannot formally become parties to international human rights treaties, ary 2012that‘[w]hilenon-StateactorsinAfghanistan,includingarmed For instance,theUNAssistanceMissioninAfghanistan(UNAMA)statedFebru- customary humanrightsobligations,forexamplewheretheycontrolterritory. recruited intoarmedforcesorgroups,norallowedtotakepartinhostilities. because ofsickness,wounds,detentionoranyothercause.Childrenmustnotbe Non-State Actors inAfghanistan’, 93 IRRC 881(2011). 2012, p iv. See also inthisregard, Bellal, G. Giacca A. andS.Casey-Maslen, ‘International Law andArmed 52 ius cogens –for instance, torture orenforced disappearances –can never bejustified.’ cogens) bindStates, individualsandnon-State collective entities,includingarmed groups. Acts violating sion notes that,ataminimum,humanrightsobligations constituting peremptory international law (ius the Syrian Arab Republic, UNdocA/HRC/19/69, 22February 2012, §106: ‘Inthisregard, thecommis- 51 colour, sex, language,religion orsocial origin’. other obligationsunderinternational law anddonot involve discrimination solely ontheground of race, required by theexigencies of thesituation,provided thatsuchmeasures are not inconsistent withtheir and the existence of which isofficially proclaimed’. Any derogation must be only ‘totheextent strictly and Political Rightsmay onlyoccur of publicemergency in‘time whichthreatens thelife of thenation 50 military operations’ andto implementtheProtocol. and thatthey control apart of theterritory so asto enablethemto ‘carry outsustained andconcerted and opposing‘dissident’ armed forces; thatthedissident armed forces are underaresponsible command; cation of 1977 Additional Protocol II,namely:confrontation between thearmed forces of thegovernment Geneva Conventions of 12August 1949,1987, Certain p1348. criteria are explicitly required for theappli- of non-international armed conflict’. ICRC, Commentary ontheAdditional Protocols of 8June1977 to the does not have exactly thesamefieldof application asCommon Article3,whichappliesinallsituations the article,ICRC notes thattheProtocol ‘only appliesto conflicts of acertain degree of intensity and 49 in hostilities,oranyfighterwhohaslaiddownhisarmsishorsdecombat conduct ofhostilitiesitisprohibitedtoattackanyciviliantakingnodirectpart Accordingly, basedonapplicablerulesofthelawarmedconflict,during certain circumstances,the1977AdditionalProtocolII. all otherprovisionsofthelawarmedconflictapplicabletoaNIAC,aswellas,in (by virtue of their universalapplication under customary international law) and groups. ThisalwaysincludesCommonArticle3tothe1949GenevaConventions IHL isapplicabletoallpartiestheconflict,whetherstateornon-statearmed D. RULES APPLICABLE IN A NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT See, e.g., Human RightsCouncil, Report of theIndependentInternational Commission of Inquiryon See, Afghanistan: e.g., UNAMA, AnnualReport 2011, Protection of Civilians inArmed Conflict, February Derogations from other humanrightsinaccordance withthe1966International Covenant onCivil The scope of application of 1977 Additional Protocol II is set out in Art 1. In its 1987 commentary on 50 52 andcustomaryHRL.Inareaswherehos- 51 Theymayalsobeboundbyother 49 States engagedinaNIAC

well asbetweenTurkeyandIraq. between LibyaandEgypt,IsraelSyria,Iran(on Syrianterritory)as In addition,therehavebeenaseriesofshort-livedinternational armedconflicts lands, SaudiArabia,Turkey,theUnitedArabEmiratesand UnitedKingdom). US, Belgium,Canada,Denmark,France,Germany,Italy,Jordan, Morocco,Nether- states composingtheinternationalcoalitionconductingairstrikes inSyria(the well asaseriesofinternationalarmedconflictsbetweenSyria andthedifferent arguably aparallelinternationalarmedconflictbetweenUkraine andRussia,as in linewiththeRuleofLawArmedConflictsproject(rulac.org), thatthereis In additiontotheconflictbetweenIndiaandPakistan,TheWarReport considers, The followingtablessummarizethe18IACsand51NIACsthattookplacein2018. 4. WHICH ARMED CONFLICTS OCCURRED IN 2018? until provedguiltyaccordingtolaw. sentence. Everyonechargedwithacriminaloffenceshallbepresumedinnocent conduct agenuinedefenceandtobeableappealagainstbothconviction against him/her,tounderstandthecourtproceedings,haveopportunity essential judicialguarantees.Thisincludesadefendant’srighttoknowthecharges No onemaybeconvictedorsentenced,exceptpursuanttoafairtrialaffordingall grading treatmentisprohibited.Summaryorarbitraryexecutionsare gious beliefs.Murder,torture,rape,bodilyinjuryorothercruel,humiliatingde- conflict mustbetreatedhumanelyandinaccordancewiththeirsex,age,reli- deprivation oflibertyisprohibited.Anyonedetainedbyapartytoanarmed Enforced disappearancesareprohibited.Hostagesshallnotbetaken.Arbitrary damage tocivilianobjects. and inanyeventtominimize,incidentallossofcivilianlife,injurycivilians military advantageanticipated.Allfeasibleprecautionsmustbetakentoavoid, civilian objects,oracombinationofboth,inrelationtotheconcreteanddirect prohibited iftheymaybeexpectedtocause‘excessive’harmeitherciviliansor Attacks againstlawfulmilitaryobjectives(militarypersonnelorequipment)are a warcrime. unnecessary suffering’,isprohibited.Violatinganyoftheserulesmayconstitute of indiscriminateweapons,orweapons‘ofanaturetocausesuperfluousinjury tween militaryobjectivesandciviliansand/orcivilianobjects,areprohibited.Use itary objectives.Indiscriminateattacks,namelyattacksthatdonotdistinguishbe- civilian objects.Civilianobjectsareanybuildingsorareasthatnotlawfulmil- Recruiting childrenunder15yearsoldisawarcrime.Itprohibitedtoattack A. INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018

PART 1 : SUMMARY 31 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 32 2018 between India and four different armed groups in the northeast of the country. At least51NIACsin23statesoccurred2018.Arguably,new conflicts brokeoutin the conflict(p.37) The occupationofEritreabyEthiopiaisdebatableasdiscussed inthesectionon Table 2.BelligerentOccupationsin2018 Table 1.ActiveConflictsin2018 B. NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 22 21 20 19 Conflict no Conflict no Conflict no Conflict location CAR Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanistan Western Sahara Ukraine Syria Syria Palestine Moldova Lebanon Georgia Eritrea Cyprus Azerbaijan Iraq Libya Syria Syria Syria Ukraine India andPakistan Location ofoccupation Location ofconflict

MINUSCA vtheCoalitionMINUSCA (FPRC, RPRC, MPC,Anti-Balaka,MLCJ) Afghanistan vIslamicState inAfghanistan (Khorasan branch, IS-K) Afghanistan vHaqqaniNetwork Afghanistan andtheUSAvQuetta Shura Taliban Parties to conflict Morocco Russian Federation Turkey Israel Israel Russian Federation Israel Russian Federation Ethiopia Turkey Armenia Turkey vIraq Egypt vLibya Israel vSyria Iran vIsrael International coalition vSyria Ukraine vRussia India vPakistan Occupier Parties to conflict 50 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24 23 Conflict no Conflict location Philippines Pakistan Nigeria Myanmar Mexico Mali Mali Libya Libya Iraq India India India India India Egypt DRC DRC DRC DRC DRC DRC DRC Colombia Colombia Colombia Colombia CAR

Group Philippines vvarious armedgroups, incl.AbuSayyaf Group, BIFF, Maute Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and TTPsplinter groups Pakistan vTehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP),incl.IS-K,Jamaa-ur-Ahrar, Haram Nigeria, withthesupportofBénin,Cameroon, NigerandChadvBoko and DKBA Myanmar v Mexico v Dan NanAmbassagou vtheAlliance for theSalvation oftheSahel (JNIM) andtheIslamicState intheGreater Sahara (ISGS). fense Group andAllies(GATIA) vJama’atNusrat al-Islamwal-Muslimin ment for theSalvation ofAzawad (MSA)andtheImghadTuareg Self-De- ed Stabilization Mission inMali(MINUSMA)andby militiasoftheMove- Mali, supported by France, theUnited NationsMultidimensionalIntegrat Libya (withsupportoftheUSA)vIS Libya vseveral armedgroups, includingLibya ShieldandAnsaral-Sharia Iraq vIslamicState (IS) India vNationalSocialistCouncil ofNagaland(NSCN-IM,andNSCN-K) India vPeople’s United Liberation Front (PULF) Songbijit India vNationalDemocratic Front ofBodoland(NDFB)/later NDFB- India vTheUnited Liberation Front ofAsom(ULFA/ ULFA-Independent) India vNaxalite Maoists Ansar Beital-Maqdis) Egypt vWilayat Sinai(‘State ofSinai’or‘Province ofSinai’,knownas Sovereignty ofCongo (CNPSC) DRC (withsupportofMONUSCO) vNationalPeople’s Coalition for the Democracy (CNRD–Ubwiyunge) DRC (withsupportofMONUSCO) vNationalCouncil for Renewal and DRC (withsupportofMONUSCO) v (NDC-R) DRC (withsupportofMONUSCO) vTheNdumaDefense ofCongo-Rénové DRC (withsupportofMONUSCO) vTheNdumaDefense ofCongo (NDC) of Rwanda (FDLR) DRC (withsupportofMONUSCO) vDemocratic Forces for theLiberation Patriotes pourunCongo Libre etSouverain (APCLS) DRC (withsupportofMONUSCO) vAlliedDemocratic Forces/Alliance des Colombia vEastern BlocoftheFARC-EP (dissident) Colombia vGaitanista Self-Defense Forces ofColombia (AGC) Colombia vPopular Liberation Army(EPL) Colombia vNationalLiberation Army(ELN) vseveralMINUSCA armedgroups, incl.UPC,3R,RJ MNLC FDPC Parties to conflict the Jalisco Cartel NewGeneration various ARSA AA, armedgroups, MN-DAA, TNLA, incl.KIA, Allied Democratic Forces (ADF-Nalu) -

PART 1 : SUMMARY 33 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 34 69 68 67 66 65 64 63 62 61 60 59 58 57 56 55 54 53 52 51 Conflict no Conflict location Yemen Yemen Yemen Yemen Ukraine Turkey Thailand Syria Syria Syria Syria Syria Syria Syria Sudan Sudan S. Sudan Somalia Philippines

Yemen vtheSouthernMovement Yemen, withthesupportofUSAandUAE vAQAP al-Houthi v Arabia, Sudan,UAE, USAval-Houthi Yemen, withthesupportofBahrain, Jordan, Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Ukraine vDonetskPeople’s Republic andLuhanskPeople’s Republic Turkey vKurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) Thailand vPatani Malay NationalRevolutionary Front (BRN) Turkey vYPG-YPJ Free Syrian Army vHezbollah YPG-YPJ v Syria, Russian Federation vIS Syria vAhrar al-Sham Syria vJabhatal-Sham (former al-Nusra Front) Syria, Russian Federation vFree Syrian Army Sudan vJustice andEquality Movement (JEM) Sudan vSPLM/A-North South SudanvPeople’s Liberation Army(dissident faction) v al-Shabaab Somalia, AMISOM,Burundi,Djibouti,Ethiopia,Kenya, UgandaandUSA Philippines vNewPeople’s Army(NPA) Parties to conflict IS al-Qaeda intheArabian Peninsula (AQAP)

PART 1 : SUMMARY 35 THE WAR REPORT THE WAR :REPORT: ARMED ARMED CONFLICTS CONFLICTS IN 2018IN 2016 3636 see pp32–34 above. an impact onthelegal situationof thearmed conflict concerned. For acomplete list of armed conflicts, 53 The selection of armed conflicts hasbeen madeaccording to relevant facts which,we believe, have OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2018 IN PART 2 53

Conventions (GCs)of1949,thelawoccupationapplies. of theterritory,andthus,asenunciatedunderCommonArticle2(2)toGeneva control of Eritrea in 1941. during WorldWarII,whichcausedBritishforcestoattackItalianandtake 1889 and1941,EritrearemainedanItaliancolonyuntilItalyjoinedtheAxispowers itrean ConstitutionenteredintoforceandtheFederationwasformally established. with theratifcationofFederalActbyEmperorHaileSelassieEthiopia, theEr- 1996, p42. 59 December 1950. 58 africa-13349078. 57 ryid=ad18 (last accessed 2December 2018). 56 pdf (last accessed 2December 2018). haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/PCA/Ethiopia-Eritrea%20Boundary%20Commission/Decision_13-4-2002. Between theSate of Eritrea andtheFederal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 13April2002, http://www. 55 December 2018). Scope of Jurisdiction, 15August 2001, https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/769 (last accessed 2 54 and Massawa,wasabletosettleinEritreawithoutmuchdiffculty. From thelate1880s,ItalyconsolidateditspoweraroundcoastalareaatAssab 1. Background December 2000. began inMay1998andwasformallybroughttoanendbyAgreementon12 Eritrea and Ethiopia were engaged in an international armed conflict (IAC), which Classification oftheConflict 1. THE ERITREA-ETHIOPIA ARMED CONFLICT of sovereigntyandEritreanaspirationsforindependence. mous entityfederatedwithEthiopiaasacompromisebetween Ethiopianclaims until 1952. In 1950, the United Nations resolved to establish Eritrea as an autono- front, belongs to Eritrea. (EEBC) decidedthatmostofthedisputedterritory,inparticularonwestern protected persons. On 13 April 2002, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (IHL), particularly those relating to the treatment of persons, continue to apply for A. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT ARMED CONFLICTS SELECTED INTERNATIONAL

‘Eritrea Country Profile’, BBC News, 15November 2018, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world- Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC), Decision Regarding Delimitation of the Border The details of Eritrea’s association with Ethiopia were established by the UNGA Res 390A (V), 2 Historyworld, ‘History of Eritrea’ http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?histo See Eritrea-Ethiopia ClaimsCommission (EECC), Decision no1:The Commission’s Mandate/Temporal The United NationsandtheIndependence of Eritrea, The United NationsBlueBooksSeries,vol XII, 54 However,therelevantrulesofinternationalhumanitarianlaw 55 57 Nevertheless, Ethiopia continues to occupy those parts Eritreawas then under British military administration 58 On11September1952, Tadesse Kebebew

56 Between 59

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 37 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 38 an administrativedivision.Priortotheconflict,borderwaspoorlydelimited. and becameboundary wasabolished colonial the in 1962, and unifcation 1952 citizenship. portant interstateinterestsincludingtrade,theuseofportsandquestion locked. Besides,littlewasdonetodevelopinstitutionsrequiredmanageim- The referendumof1993andtheensuingsecessionEritrealeftEthiopialand- 2. TheEthiopia-EritreaWar,1998–2000 later expandedacrossalltheboundaries. Africa brokeoutbetweenEritreaandEthiopiaaroundthetownofBadme,which border increasinglybecameanissue.InMay1998,oneofthebloodiestconflictsin economic issues,however,souredtherelationship.Theporousandundelimited erly undertaken,andeconomicsocialrelationscontinued.Initialdisputeson the establishmentofanewEritreanstate,boundarydemarcationwasnotprop- in whichEritreansvotedalmostunanimouslyfavourofindependence.Despite successor, MengistuHaileMariam, in 1991.Twoyearslater,areferendumwasheld resistance movementseventuallydefeatedtheforcesofHaileSelassie’scommunist The allianceoftheEritreanPeople’sLiberationFrontandacoalitionEthiopian Eritrean rightsundertheFederation. eration (theIndependence Bloc) andotherswhoclaimedasystematicerosion of an LiberationFront(inCairo))werestartedinexilebygroupswhoanti-fed- armed resistancegroups(theEritreanLiberationMovement(inSudan)andEritre- for theindependentstateofEritrea.Infact,itwasbeforedissolutionthat an parliament and declared Eritrea’s federal status void. Generally, theborderhad‘anunusuallytroubledhistory’. province. Federation resultedintheincorporationofEritreaintoEthiopiaasitsfourteenth 66 ca/pl_armedconflict/ethiopia-eritrea-1998-2001/ (last accessed 2December 2018). 65 piaeritrea.pdf (last accessed 2December 2018). January 2007, p2,https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Africa/bpethio 64 63 Ethiopia andEritrea: Preventing War, p2. 62 2 December 2018). 2018); Eritrean HumanRightsElectonic Archive http://www.ehrea.org/1952.php (EHREA), (last accessed sisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/ethiopia-and-eritrea-preventing-war (last accessed 2December Ethiopia andEritrea: Preventing War, Africa Report no101, 22December 2005, p2, https://www.cri 61 14 December 142013, http://awate.com/eritrea-the-federal-arrangement-farce/. Eritrea Federation, 15African Issues , 15;Y. Ghebrehiwet, ‘Eritrea: The Federal Arrangement Farce’, Awate com/place/Eritrea (last accessed 2December 2018); S.Haile,‘The OriginsandDemise of theEthiopia- 60 decision, the EthiopianparliamentandEritreanAssemblywhichunanimouslypassed However, 10yearslaterin1962,theFederationwasabrogated.Forsome,it See The United NationsandtheIndependence of Eritrea International, pp13,42; CrisisGroup, See The United NationsandtheIndependence of Eritrea, p13. Project Ploughshares, ‘Ethiopia-Eritrea (1998–2001)’, updated February 2002, This occurrence was described by some asthe Ethiopian‘annexation’ of Eritrea. See, e.g., CrisisGroup, Healy andPlaut,EthiopiaEritrea , p3. S.Healy andM.Plaut,EthiopiaEritrea: Allergic to Persuasion, ChathamHouse, Africa Programme, See J. Markakis Last, ‘Eritrea’, andG. C. last updated 29November 2018, https://www.britannica. 60 62 whileforothersitwasEmperorHaileSelassiewhodissolvedtheEritre- Thedissolutionisclaimedtohavetriggereda32-yeararmedstruggle 64 FollowingthereassertionofEthiopiansovereigntyoverEritreain 63

61 66 The dissolution of the

http://ploughshares. 65 ,

in violationofArticle2(4)theUNCharter. started thewarbyforcefullyoccupyingborderareas–somecontested,othersnot opia ClaimsCommission(EECC)confrmedthat,inMayandJune1998,Eritrea ralled intoafull-fledgedwararoundbordervillageofBadme.TheEritrea-Ethi- being aspointless‘twobaldmenfghtingoveracomb’. large-scale IACalongtheircommonfrontier,whichwasdescribedbymanyas Between May1998and2000,thetwocountrieswereinvolvedinadevastating pian residents,despiteitsclaimsthatithadnooffcialexpulsionpolicy. hearing orappeal.Eritreaexpelledand/orrepatriatedanestimated70,000Ethio- origin whomEthiopiaforciblyexpelledonnationalsecuritygroundswithoutany nizations, other war victims included an estimated 75,000 Ethiopians of Eritrean in trenchesalongthecontestedborder, the twocountriesresumedwitheachdeployinghundredsofthousandstroops and theelderly. displaced atleast1.2millionpeople,70percentofwhomwerewomen,children Secretary-General’s (UNSG)reportestimatesthattheEritreanandEthiopianwar armaments onbothsides. 74 December 2018). https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/68-ethiopia-and-eritrea-war-or-peace.pdf (last accessed 2 73 72 71 shifts-throughout-strategic-zone (last accessed 2December 2018). and International Studies, 25July2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/eritrea-ethiopia-peace-seismic- 70 69 border disputes by theuse of force could not beconsidered lawful self-defence. ruled thatsince there hadbeen noarmed attack against Eritrea, itsattack onEthiopiaandthesettling of 68 67 accordance withtheprinciplesenshrinedinCharterof OAU;therejection of thepresentcrisisandanyotherdisputethroughpeacefullegalmeansin sented aFrameworkAgreementbasedonthefollowingprinciples:resolution At theAlgierssummitinJuly1999,OrganizationofAfricanUnity(OAU) a. TheOrganizationofAfricanUnityFrameworkAgreementanditsModalities 3. ThePeaceProcessandtheFinalAlgiersAgreement countries. all informalchannelsofcommunicationbetweenthepoliticalelitestwo times relationsdeterioratedintoopenconfrontationandclashes,whichruptured Gradually, therelationshipbetweenEritreaandEthiopiabecametense,at civilians isestimatedtobearound70,000. given indifferentreportsvary,thetotalnumberofdeathsbothsoldiersand CrisisGroup, EthiopiaandEritrea: Preventing War, p2. CrisisGroup, EthiopiaandEritrea: War orPeace?, Africa Report no68,24 September 2003, p5, UNSC, Report UNSC, of theSecretary-General onEthiopia and Eritrea, UNdocS/2000/643, 30June2000, §11. Project Ploughshares, ‘Ethiopia-Eritrea (1998–2001)’. Ibid,p2. C. Pineau, C. ‘Eritrea-Ethiopia Peace: SeismicShiftsThroughout aStrategic Zone’, Center for Strategic Project Ploughshares, ‘Ethiopia-Eritrea (1998–2001)’. EECC, Partial Award, 67 In1998,relationsworsenedunexpectedlyandborderskirmishesspi- 74 Jus Ad Bellum 70

Ethiopia’s Claims 1–8, 19 December 2005, §16. The EECC rightly 69 backedbyheavyartilleryfrommassive 72 Asperreportsofinternationalorga- 68 InFebruary1999,fghtingbetween 71 Thoughthefgures 73 TheUN pre-

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 39 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 40 tions, ofsubstantivepeacetalks,undertheauspicesOAU, onthebasisof ian populationsofbothcountries. the newoutbreakofviolencehadserioushumanitarianimplicationsforcivil- passed aresolutionexpressingconcernovertherenewedfghtingandnotedthat as Ethiopialaunchedanotheroffensive.Then,theUNSecurityCouncil(UNSC) Despite allthediplomaticefforts,on12May2000,fghtingeruptedagain by theOAU,UNandUS. but EthiopiaexpressedconcernregardingtheTechnicalArrangementsprepared parties acceptedtheFrameworkAgreementandModalitiesofImplementation work AgreementontheSettlementofDisputebetweenEthiopiaand Eritrea. was alsoemphasizedintheModalitiesforImplementationofOAUFrame- 82 81 80 cessed 2December 2018). 31 August 1999,§8,http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/technical-arrangements-31-08-1999.pdf (last ac 79 background (last accessed 2December 2018). 78 Summit inAlgiersonWednesday, 14July1999. Dispute between EthiopiaandEritrea, endorsed by the35thOAU Heads of State andGovernment 77 76 framework-11-98.htm (last accessed 2December 2018). Dispute between Eritrea andEthiopia,8November 81998,http://www.dehai.org/conflict/oau/oau- 75 tion anddelimitationoftheentirecommonborderbetweentwocountries. ries theyoccupiedafter6May1998.TheAgreementalsocalledforthedemilitariza- In addition,bothcountrieswererequiredtoredeploytheirforcesoutsidetheterrito- pertinent colonialtreatiesandapplicableinternationallaw. by theOAUsummitinCairo1964,andtheirbeingdeterminedonbasisof borders existingatindependence,asstatedinResolution AHG/Res16(1) adopted of theuseforceasameansimposingsolutionstodisputes;andrespectfor and delimitationoftheentirecommonborderbetweentwocountries. military observerstoverifytheenvisagedredeploymentsanddemilitarization areas fromwhichthetwosidesweretoredeploy,deploymentof,interalia, also calledfortheestablishmentofaneutralcommissiontodetermineprecise countries. aimed atpreventingthesupplyofweaponsorarms-relatedassistancetotwo the OAUFrameworkAgreementanditsModalities. and fnalizedthedocumentTechnicalArrangementsforImplementationof Mr AnthonyLake,representativeofthePresidentUnitedStates,reviewed cial EnvoyofthethenChairmanOAU,AmbassadorMohamedSahnounand After furtherconsultationswiththepartiesconcerned,MrAhmedOuyahia,Spe- Preamble, UNSCRes 1297, 12May 2000, §8. See Modalitiesfor theImplementation of theOAU Framework Agreement ontheSettlementof the OAU HighLevel Delegation Proposals for aFramework Agreement for aPeaceful Settlementof the United NationsMission inEthiopiaandEritrea (UNMEE),‘Background’, https://unmee.unmissions.org/ Ibid,paras 3,5. Technical Arrangements for theImplementation of theOAU Framework Agreement anditsModalities, UNSCRes 1298,17May 2000, §6(a). CrisisGroup, EthiopiaandEritrea: War orPeace?, p4. 82 Italsodemandedtheearliestpossiblereconvening,withoutprecondi- 80

81 On17May2000,theUNSCimposedmeasures 78 TheTechnicalArrangements 75 79 76 Both This 77

- of the two countries met for a second time in Algiers and signed a comprehensive Following theceasefreandinitialUNMEEdeployment,representatives c. TheAlgiersAgreementofDecember2000 ment) on12December2000. ment paved the way for the signing of the Algiers Peace Agreement (Algiers Agree- authorized thedeploymentof4,200troopsforUNMEE.Ingeneral,thisagree- Ethiopia on18June2000. The effortsculminatedinthesigningofaceasefreagreementbetweenEritreaand rity zone’. pected toberedeployed,creatingazoneofseparationcalledthe‘temporarysecu- distance of25kilometresfrompositionstowhichtheEthiopianforceswereex- forces totheirpositionsbefore6May1998.Eritreawasmaintainitsata The agreementobligedthepartiestoimmediatelyceasehostilitiesandredeploy ing operationsubjecttofutureauthorization. observers andthenecessaryciviliansupportstaffinanticipationofapeacekeep- the UNMission in Ethiopiaand Eritrea (UNMEE),consisting of up to 100military ‘Ethiopia andEritreahavebeenveryfaithfultotheirceasefre’. Special RepresentativeoftheUNSG,toldInternationalCrisisGroupin2005, 90 89 88 87 86 of Hostilities), pp86–88. of EthiopiaandtheGovernment of theState of Eritrea, Algiers,18June2000 (Agreement onCessation 85 84 83 which humanitarianaidwasflowing,necessitatingurgentdiplomaticmeasures. bombing portsandairports,disruptingsupplylines,includingthosethrough Ethiopia’s massiveoffensivebrokeEritrea’sdefensivelineinnumerousplaces, b. TheAgreementonCessationofHostilities far, whichwouldconcludeapeacefuldefnitivesettlementoftheconflict. Framework AgreementanditsModalitiestheworkconductedbyOAUso sanctions againsttheoffendingparty. installations andequipment. plies, asrequired,through their territoriesandpromisedto respect its members, guaranteed freemovementandaccessforthepeacekeepingmissionitssup- peacekeeping operationtoassistintheimplementationofagreement.They The partiesalsocalledupontheUN,incooperationwithOAU,toestablisha Ibid,§14(a). Ibid, §4. Ibid,§4. Agreement onCessation of Hostilities between theGovernment of theFederal Democratic Republic Cited inCrisis Group, EthiopiaandEritrea: Preventing War, p1. Agreement onCessation of Hostilities, §1. Ibid,§12. CrisisGroup, EthiopiaandEritrea: War orPeace? , p4. UNSCRes 1312,31July2000. 86 Theagreementspecifedthatviolationsoftheceaserecouldtrigger 85

89 On31June2000,theUNSCdecidedtoestablish 87 AsAmbassadorLegwailaJosephLegwaila, 90 On15September2000,theUNSC 88

83 84

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 41 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 42 a commissiontoaddressanissueassensitiveviolationsofIHL. lationships alreadybrokendownwereabletoreachanagreementonsettingup was amodelofitskind,wherepartiesinvolvedinanarmedconflictandtheirre- anticipation of a peacekeeping operation subject to future authorization. consisting ofupto100militaryobserversandnecessaryciviliansupportstaffin Welcoming thereportofUNSG,UNSCdecidedtoestablishUNMEE other personsdetainedinconnectionwiththeconflict. the taskofsupervisingreleaseandrepatriationprisonerswar(POWs) tion of and compliance with the GCs, was entrusted by the Algiers Agreement with The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which promotes the applica- 3, thispartoftheagreementwasnotoperationalized). an independentcommissiontodeterminetherootcauseofconflict(Article Commission toaddresswarreparationsandcompensationclaims(Article5) 99 98 97 96 95 94 93 on maps,whiledemarcation isthephysical identification of theborder ontheground. 92 Democratic Republic of Ethiopia(Algiers Agreement), Algiers,12December 2000, pp 94–99. 91 peace agreementon12December2000. the UNSCauthorizeddeploymentofupto4,300troops. sion formechanismstodelimitanddemarcatetheborder, Building ontheOAUFrameworkAgreement,AlgiersAgreementmadeprovi- Thus, itformallyendedthewarbetweentwocountries. selves. Eachpartyshallrefrainfromthethreatoruseofforceagainstother.’ that ‘[t]hepartiesshallpermanentlyterminatemilitaryhostilitiesbetweenthem- be fnalandbinding. both partiesalsoagreedthatthedecisionondelimitationanddemarcationwould to ensure observanceof the security commitments agreed to by the two parties. ties, theredeploymentofEthiopianforcesandtemporarysecurityzone, deployment ofaUNpeacekeepingmissiontomonitorthecessationhostili- Under theCessationofHostilitiesAgreement,EritreaandEthiopiarequested 4. TheDeploymentofthePeacekeepingOperation of EthiopianandEritreanforcestheirpositionsonceredeployed andthetem- cluded, interalia,themonitoringofcessationhostilities, theredeployment As outlinedunderUNSCResolution1320(2000),themandates oftheUNMEEin- Agreement between the Government of theState of Eritrea and the Government of theFederal Agreement onCessation of Hostilities, §3. CrisisGroup, EthiopiaandEritrea: War orPeace?, p6. Art4(15),AlgiersAgreement. Art 4, Algiers Agreement. Art4, Delimitation refers to theprocess of establishing the course of theborder UNSCRes 1312,§1. UNSCRes 1320, 15September 2000, §2. Art2(2),ibid. Healy andPlaut,EthiopiaEritrea, p2. 95

91 Article1oftheAlgiersAgreementstates 96 93

TheAlgiersAgreement 92 99 providedforaClaims

94 Interestingly, 98 Later, 97

been completed’. sion shallterminatewhenthedelimitation-demarcationprocessofborderhas contemplated in the Algiers Agreement, i.e. ‘the mandate of the Peacekeeping Mis- perform itscoremandate. drawal ofsupport,whicheventuallyledtountenablerestrictionsonitsability operational abilitywasgraduallyhamstrungduetotheexplicitandimplicitwith- Although bothcountriesdidnotformallywithdrawtheirconsent,theUNMEE’s 107 December 2018). www.securitycouncilreport.org/update-report/lookup_c_glkwlemtisg_b_4284791.php (last accessed 2 the UNSG,see Security Council Report, ‘Update Report No. 8:Ethiopia-Eritrea’, 28June2008, https:// 106 105 org/report/57575/horn-africa-un-relocates-expelled-staff-eritrea-ethiopia. 104 103 Healy and Plaut,EthiopiaandEritrea, p5. Affairs, 2009, p5,https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/137322/19_2009.pdf (last accessed 2December 2018); 102 101 100 tary activities’. restraint andrefrainfromanythreatoruseofforce…toavoidprovocativemili- mandate in2008.TheResolutionalsocalledonbothcountries‘toshowmaximum the UNMEE, UNSC unanimouslyadopted Resolution 1827andterminatedits On accountofthecripplingoperationalandadministrativerestrictionsimposedon logistical support for the Field Offces. included demininginkeyareastosupportdemarcation,andadministrative in theexpeditiousandorderlyimplementationofitsdelimitationdecision, UNSC decided to adjustthemandateof the UNMEE in order to assisttheEEBC porary securityzone.SubsequenttothedecisionofEEBCinApril2002, in December2005. UNMEE stafffromtheUSA,CanadaandEurope,includingRussianFederation, Agreement andcooperatefullywiththeEEBC. ties toassumetheirresponsibilities,fulflcommitmentsundertheAlgiers from acomprehensivesolutiontotheconflictandborderissue’. the missionandperceptionofUN,butalsotoconflict, byshiftingthefocus other instrumentsdeemedcentraltothepeaceprocessweredetrimentalnotonly the ‘UNMEE’slackofapoliticalcomponent…anditsstructuraldetachmentfrom on allitshelicopterflightswithinEritreanairspace. restrictions imposed ontheUNMEEby the Eritrean authorities, includinga ban fully accept, without preconditions, the decision of the EEBC and the increasing including thestalematein the demarcationprocesscausedby Ethiopia’s refusal to uation intheUNMEEareaasaresultof‘anaccumulationunresolvedissues’, 3 January2006,therewasaseriousdeteriorationofthesecurityandpoliticalsit- See, e.g., UNSCRes 1466,14March 2003. UNSC, Report UNSC, of theSecretary-General onEthiopiaandEritrea, UNdocS/2006/1, 3January2006, §2. See SandeLie,UNMEE . UNSCRes 1827, 30July2008, §1. See J. H. SandeLie,UNMEE:Deterioration andTermination, Norwegian Institute of International Agreement onCessation of Hostilities, §5.Itwas also against therecommendations proposed by ‘UNRelocates Expelled Staff from Eritrea to Ethiopia,IRIN,15December 2005, http://www.irinnews. UNSCRes 1430, 14August 2002, §1. 105 TheterminationoftheUNMEEmandatewascontrarytowhat 106 104 TheUNMEEdidnotmeetitsfnalgoalandastudyrevealedthat 102 AsclearlypointedoutinthereportofUNSGon 100 The subsequent resolution urged the par- 101

103 Eritreaalsoexpelled180 107

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 43 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 44 in fullwithoutanyprecondition. always maintainedthattheEEBC’srulingisfnalandbindinghastobeimplemented Eritrea acceptedthedecision.InvokinglanguageofAlgiersAgreement,has rial reconfgurations and a varietyof contradictory maps. es andtheborderremainsmurky.Also,therewasconfusionovernomenclature,territo- The borderareabetweenEritreaandEthiopiahadoverlappingcompetinginfluenc- ty’, is nogenerallyagreedmapoftheareadepictingplacenameswithanydegreereliabili- treaty byacceptingRiver‘Meeteb’ https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17433871. 117 blog/23781 (last accessed 2December 2018). Eritrean Territories IncludingtheTown of Badme’,11 April2017, http://www.shabait.com/category 116 Int’l L. &Dis.Res., 2017, 268–271. Boundary Setting:Why theEritrea/Ethiopia BoundaryConflict Remains Unresolvable’, 24 Willamette J. 115 114 largely Ethiopian,butthevillageof Badmewas insideEritrea); Healy andPlaut,EthiopiaEritrea, p3. 113 112 111 110 109 108 Eritrea. victory. TheEEBCsoonclarifeditsdecisionbyafrmingthatBadmebelongsto along whichtheborderwouldrun),ledtoconfusionasbothsidesclaimed either initstextoraccompanyingmaps(theyonlygavethecoordinatesofline point townofBadmewasinitiallynotmanifest,astherulingfailedtoindicateit delivered itsdelimitationdecisionon13April2002.Yet,thelocationofflash- After examiningthemeritsofterritorialclaimsbothcountries,EEBC treaties (1900, 1902 and 1908) and ‘applicable international law’, but not ed todelimitanddemarcatethecolonialtreatyborderbasedonpertinent was oneofthecorecomponentsAlgiersAgreement.TheEEBCmandat- The establishmentofaneutralboundarycommissioncomposedfvemembers 5. TheEritrea-EthiopiaBoundaryCommission(EEBC) et bono(onthebasisofjusticeandequity). tional communitytoenforcetheAlgiersAgreementanditsruling on theboundaries. instead ofRiver‘Maiteb’,raisedsomequestionsaboutitstreatyinterpretation. mined, aswelltheterritorialintegrityandsovereigntyofotherparty’. the EEBCshallbefinalandbinding.Eachpartyrespectbordersodeter- Agreement stipulatedthat‘thedelimitationanddemarcationdeterminationsof in ResolutionAHG/Res.16(1)adoptedbytheOAUCairo1964.Notably, sis fordeterminingbordersisconsistentwitharegionalcustomarylawenshrined 111 EEBC, Decision EEBC, Regarding Delimitation of theBorder, §4.63. See, e.g., M,Plaut,‘Are EthiopiaandEritrea Heading Backto War?’, BBCMarch News, 21 2012, CrisisGroup, EthiopiaandEritrea: War orPeace?, p6(thearea known astheBadmePlainswas See, e.g., L.Anebo, ‘The Fallacy of Virtual Demarcation asaPrimarySchemeof International Land EEBC, Decision EEBC, Regarding Delimitation of theBorder, §2.7. See, e.g., Eritrea Ministry of Information, ‘EthiopiaMust Unconditionally Withdraw from Sovereign EEBC, Decision EEBC, Regarding Delimitation of theBorder, §5.42. CrisisGroup, EthiopiaandEritrea: War orPeace?, p2. Art 4.2, AlgiersAgreement, Art4.2, 12December 2000. Art4.15, AlgiersAgreement (emphasisadded). noneoftheboundariesweredemarcatednor,tovaryingdegrees,fullydelimited. 113 ThemannerinwhichtheEEBCsetasideexplicittextof1902 116 Ithasaccordinglyrepeatedlycalledontheinterna- 114 asapointofreferenceforborderdelimitation 108 Theuseofcolonialtreatiesastheba- 110 As noted by the EEBC, ‘[t]here As noted by theEEBC, ‘[t]here ex aequo 109

115 117 112

of theboundaryinajustandlegalmannersoastoensurelastingpeace justice’. Itrequested‘analternativemechanismtodemarcatethecontestedparts ble decisionsonBadmeandpartsoftheCentralSector’as‘ablatantmiscarriage Meles Zenawai,totheUNSGreferredEEBC’s‘illegal,unjustandirresponsi- the UNSCon19September2003.TheletterfromEthiopianPrimeMinister, Third, EthiopiasuspendeditscooperationwiththeEEBCandappealedinsteadto that Ethiopia’srequestwasinadmissibleandnofurtheractiontaken uponit. Decision asrenderedon13April2002.Re-argumentofthecaseisnotpermitted’,and dure neitherallowsubstantiveamendmentnoraffectthebindingqualityof The EEBCrepliedthat‘theprovisionsofArticles28and29theRulesProce- concessions atthedemarcationstage. sion, andstartedalabyrinthinediplomaticbrinkmanshiptoseeifitcouldextract launching asubsequentlegalandpoliticalcampaigntoreverseoralterthedeci- would berefnedduringdemarcation’ derstanding thatthe EEBC explainingthatithadonlyacceptedthe Second, on24January2003,Ethiopiasubmitteda141-pagedocumenttothe 125 Ethiopia BoundaryCommission, UNdocS/2003/257, §3,6March 2003. 124 123 com/web/sendAttach/799 (last accessed 2December 2018). Federal Democratic Republic of EthiopiaSubmitted on13May 2002, 24 June2002, http://pcacases. p4, 122 Book PublishingandRightsCo, p584. 2014, 121 accessed 2December 2018). Interpretation, Correction andConsultation, 13May 2002, http://www.aigaforum.com/ethio1.pdf 120 119 “in principle”andinpractice remains asignificant obstacle to peace’. 118 areas. on the need for further deliberation before withdrawing troops from the disputed decision ‘inprinciple’.However,itbacktrackedfromitscommitmentandinsisted Yet, Ethiopiadeniedtohonourtheawardandaftersometimeonlyaccepted move, arguingthatsuchaclaimwasinconsistentwiththeAlgiersAgreement. amounted toanattemptreopenthesubstanceofAprilDecision’. Commission emphasizedthatin‘anumberofsignifcantrespects,thecomments but wentbeyonditspowerasitcouldnotdecidemattersexaequoetbono. should bevariedsoastotakebetteraccountofhumanandphysicalgeography’, Commission, the‘mainthrustofEthiopiancomments[was]thatboundary ments wouldberequiredduringthedemarcationphase. tion, CorrectionandConsultation,claimingthaterrorshadbeenmadeadjust- CrisisGroup, EthiopiaandEritrea: Preventing War gapbetween acceptance, p14:‘the of theDecision CrisisGroup, EthiopiaandEritrea: War orPeace?, pp1, 6. See A. Welde See A. Giorgis, Eritrea ataCrossroads: ANarrative of Triumph, Betrayal andHope,Strategic Cited inWelde Giorgis, Eritrea ataCrossroads, p588. Ibid,§4. EEBC, Decision EEBC, Regarding the‘Request for Interpretation, Correction andConsultation’ Submitted by Annex I,Report of theSecretary-General onEthiopia andEritrea, EighthReport of theEritrea- The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia,Eritrea/Ethiopia BoundaryArbitration: Request for 118 Ethiopiashowedequivocationovera‘fnalandbinding’delimitationby ‘straight-line segmentbetweenPoints6and9(Badmeline) 119 so astoputBadmeinsideEthiopia. First,itsubmittedaRequestforInterpreta- Commission’s Decisionontheun- 120 Eritreaobjectedtothe 124 125 Forthe

123 The (last 122 121

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 45 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 46 and itdoesnotimplythatweareintroducingaprecondition’. Ethiopia alsomaintainedthatthis‘doesnotmeangoingbacktothedrawingboard, marcation couldproceedinallsectors. cooperate promptlyandinfullwiththeEEBCitsfeldofcerssothatde- Algiers Agreementswillleadtosustainablepeace’,andcalleduponEthiopia during thedemarcationstage,setstageforastalemate. and objectioninparticulartothetransferofBadme,aswellEritrea’sobstinacy In general,Ethiopia’sfailuretocooperate,contrarytheAlgiersAgreement, the promotionofsustainablepeaceandbrotherlytiesbetweentwopeoples. implementing theBoundaryCommission’sdecisioninamannerconsistentwith al’, which,interalia,calledforanimmediatestartofadialoguewithviewto Finally, on25November2004,Ethiopiacameupwitha‘fve-pointpeacepropos- region’. requires theparties to cooperate withtheEEBC. 135 134 Ethiopia-Nov-27-2006.pdf (last accessed 2December 2018). Affairs of Ethiopia,UNdocS/2007/33, Enclosure, http://dehai.org/demarcation-watch/eebc/EEBC-Letter- 133 132 131 S/2005/690, 1November 2005. Mission of Ethiopiato theUnited Nationsaddressed to thePresident of theSecurity Council, Undoc 130 Ethiopia andEritrea, UNdocS/2004/973, 16December §14. 2004, 129 EEBC-Oct-7-2003-letter.pdf (last accessed 2December 2018). the Secretary-General, UNdocS/2003/1186, Appendix 1, http://dehai.org/demarcation-watch/articles/ 128 127 F9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Somalia%20S2010%20225.pdf 2003, UNdocS/2010/225, Attachment 2,https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFC 126 the bordercompletelyandpromptly,withoutpreconditions. marcation bytakingthenecessarystepstoenableCommissiondemarcate numerous resolutionsdemandingthatEthiopiabegintheimplementationofde- al support.’ quoted Eritrea’sviewonit:‘apublicrelationsexercisedesignedtogaininternation- Crisis Groupobservedthattherewasno‘newsubstance’insuchaproposal,and of theEEBCenshrinedinAlgiersAgreement. to progresswereblocked,theEEBC,aftergivingnoticepartiesaboutitsin- 2002, tofndwaysofchangingit.’ the Commission’sDelimitationDecisionsandhasbeenseeking,eversinceApril ident oftheEEBC,pointedoutthat‘Ethiopiaisdissatisfedwithsubstance a repudiationofEthiopia’srepeatedacceptancetheCommission’sdecision. Crisis Group, EthiopiaandEritrea: Preventing War, p6. Letter dated 27 November 2006 from thePresident of theCommission to theMinister of Foreign Letter of EthiopianPrimeMinister MelesZenawi to UNSecretary General Kofi Annan,19September CrisisGroup, EthiopiaandEritrea: Preventing War, p1. Note thatArt4(14)of theAlgiersAgreement UNSCRes 1507, 12September 2003. Healy andPlaut,EthiopiaEritrea, p5. See, e.g., UNSC Resolution 1586,14March 2005. Letter dated 7October 2003 from thePresident of theEritrea-Ethiopia BoundaryCommission to See Annex to theLetter Dated 31October 2005 From theChargé d’affaires a.i.of thePermanent The text of thefive-point proposal Progress isincluded inUNSC, Report of theSecretary-General on 126 The UNSC, however,indicated that ‘only the fullimplementationof 131 The‘reasonable-soundingplan’brushedasidetheexclusivemandate 133 ItisworthmentioningthattheUNSCpassed 127 TheEEBCdescribedEthiopia’sletteras 132 SirElihuLauterpacht,thePres- (last accessed 2December 2018). 135 134 130

When allavenues TheInternational 128 129

and binding er alsosuggestedthat‘justandreasonableadjustments’bemadetotheEEBC’sfnal calling ita‘legalfction’. itrea acceptedthevirtualdemarcation,Ethiopia,foritspart,rejecteddecision of Ethiopia and Eritrea to the UN and said it had fulflled its mandate. sent mapsindicatingthedemarcatedboundarypointstoPermanentMissions and theimpactofhostilitiesoncivilianstheirproperty. relating totheconductofmilitaryoperations,treatmentPOWsandcivilians additional mandate. decision, butstatedthatitwasunabletocorrectthemunlessthepartiesgavean boundary, theEEBCalso admitted thattherewereindeedsomeanomalies in its Apart fromthereluctanceofpartiestocooperateondemarcation 144 Claims Commission, Oxford University Press, 2013, p398. 143 Humanitarian Law, 2003, 435. 142 141 http://www.irinnews.org/q-and/2004/01/05/interview-un-special-envoy-designate-lloyd-axworthy 140 139 Africa, 29June2008, §31. PSC/HSG/2(CXXXVIII), ButEritrea accepted it,see §30. 138 October 2008, §4. 137 136 ed claims. Traditionally, claimscommissionsarerarelyusedforthedispositionofwar-relat- 6. TheEritrea-EthiopiaClaimsCommission(EECC) the Commissionwouldberegardedasfulflled. scribed onthemapswouldautomaticallystandasdemarcatedandmandateof proceeded withvirtualboundarydemarcation,andruledthatthede- tention tousing‘moderntechniquesofimageprocessingandterrainmodelling’, rights andIHL,appearstofavourgreatermeansofaccountability. violations of the GCs or international law. of onepartyagainsttheGovernmentotherparty’arisingfromwar,or loss, damageorinjurybyoneGovernmentagainsttheotherandnationals… Commission withamandateto‘decidethroughbindingarbitrationallclaimsfor Agreement of 2000, in an extraordinary move, included the creation of a Claims as ‘something that hastobeworkedat’and‘needs developed’. Special EnvoytoEritreaandEthiopia,whocharacterizedthedecisionofEEBC by Lloyd Axworthy,formerCanadianMinisterofForeignAffairsandUN Cited inWelde Giorgis , Eritrea ataCrossroads, pp597–598. Twenty-Seventh Report of theEritrea-Ethiopia BoundaryCommission, UNdocS/2008/630, 3 African UnionPeace andSecurity Council, Report of theCommission onConflict Situationsin EEBC, Observations EEBC, of theEritrea-Ethiopia BoundaryCommission, March 21 2003, §4. Statement EEBC, by theCommission, 27 November 2006, §22. S.D. Murphy, W. Kidaneand T. R.Snider, LitigatingWar: Mass CivilInjuryandtheEritrea-Ethiopia G.H.Aldrich,‘The Work of theEritrea-Ethiopia ClaimsCommission’, 6Yearbook of International Art5,AlgiersAgreement. A. Al-Hilweh, ‘Interview A. withUNSpecial Envoy-Designate Lloyd Axworthy, 142 Nevertheless,contemporarypolitics,withtheprominenceofhuman delimitation decisionindemarcatingtheborder. 139 Meanwhile,thediffcultiesindecisionwerealsonoted 138

144 In 2001, both countries 136 On30November2007,theEEBC 141 , 5 January 2004, IRIN, 5January2004, 140 143 JendayiFraz- TheAlgiers 137 fled claims While Er- .

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 47 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 48 lations thatallviolationsshallresultinresponsibilityandaccountability. tions ofviolationsIHL. at thesametimeexoneratepartiestoanarmedconflictfromunwarrantedaccusa- of the facts and impartial arbitration can showupwide-spreadrespectofIHL’and both partiestotheconflict.Itsetagoodprecedentthat‘thirdpartyestablishment Importantly, theEECCbroughttolightthatIHLrulesweremostlyrespectedby signifcant numbersofvictims, only addressedactswhichwerefrequentorpervasiveandconsequentlyaffected proceedings, needtobetakenintoconsiderationforthefuture. to increasetheirsenseofownership,aswellimprovedmediacoveragethe conduct isbeingjudged,andallowingaffectedpeopletoparticipateintheprocess icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule149 for Violations of International Humanitarian Law, ICRC Customary IHLDatabase, https://ihl-databases. the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8June1977 (API);Rule 149:Responsibility 149 EECC also covers ‘allclaimsfor loss, damageor injury…related to thearmed conflict’. 148 Ethiopia’s Claim2,Partial Awards’, 2,2005, 471. 99AJIL PartialEthiopia’s Claim4, Awards: Central Front (Eritrea v. Ethiopia)’,Eritrea’s 6,7, Claims2,4, 8and22/ 2009; R. Weeramantry, ‘International Decisions: Prisoner of War (Eritrea v. Ethiopia),Eritrea’s Claim17/ and GabriellaVenturini (eds), The 1998–2000 War Between Eritrea andEthiopia,T. Asser M.C. Press, ‘International Humanitarian Law andtheTreatment of Protected Persons’, deGuttry, inA. H.G.Post (eds), Protected Persons inInternational Humanitarian deGuttry, Law’, inA. H.G.Post andG.Venturini 147 https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/71/ (last accessed 2December 2018). 146 145 ‘light ontheconductofwarthanhadpreviouslybeenavailable’. The decisionsoftheEECCdealtwithhighlycontroversialmattersandthrewmore 153 152 Persons inInternational Humanitarian Law’, pp341–342. 151 Commission Towards theTreatment of Protected Persons inInternational Humanitarian Law’, p347. the Treatment of Protected Persons’, pp313–316; Sassoli, ‘The Approach of theEritrea-Ethiopia Claims 150 International Humanitarian Law’, p347. Approach of theEritrea-Ethiopia ClaimsCommission Towards theTreatment of Protected Persons in as principledandpragmaticinitsapproachinterpretingapplyingIHL. commendable effort. the economicconstraintsofpartiesinassessingtheirliabilityisapracticaland each sideofthenationalsother. localities, theseizureanddestructionofprivatepropertytreatmentby civilian internees,thelegalityofmeansandmethodswarfareusedinvarious included thelawfulnessofinitialresorttoforce,treatmentPOWsand has alsobeencriticizedbysomeauthors. Sassoli, ‘The Approach of theEritrea-Ethiopia ClaimsCommission Towards theTreatment of Protected Murphy etal,LitigatingWar , p401. Sanna,‘International Humanitarian Law andtheTreatment of Protected Persons’, pp317–319. M. Sassoli, ‘The Approach of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission Towards the Treatment of Healy andPlaut,EthiopiaEritrea, p7. See Weeramantry, ‘International Decisions’, 472; Sanna,‘International Humanitarian Law and See EECC, Partial Award, Prisoners of War –Eritrea’s Claim17, 1July2003, §56.The mandate of the See Art91, Protocol Additional to theGeneva Conventions of 12August 1949,andrelating to All the rulings by the EECC can be found on the website of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, The 1998–2000 War Between Eritrea andEthiopia,T. Asser M.C. Press, 2009, p350;S.Sanna, 152 Locatingsuchcommissionsclosertothecountrieswhose 151 Thefactthat the EECChadconsideredissuessuchas 148 butthisapproachisatvariancewithIHLstipu- (last accessed 2December 2018). See also Sassoli, ‘The 146 150 TheworkoftheEECChasbeenlauded

153

145 Theissues 149 This 147 It It territory. comes underthecontrolofenemypowerpreviouslycontrollingthat rules onoccupiedterritoriesapplywhenever,duringanarmedconflict,aterritory the territorywhenconflictbrokeoutoraninvasiontookplace. state whoseforcesestablishedeffectivecontrolwasnottherightfulsovereignof the testofwhetherornotitisundermilitaryoccupation.Whatmattersthat occupied territoryiscontestedoritsstatusuncleardoesnothaveanimpacton resistance assuch(Article2(2)commontotheGCs).Inaddition,factthat Law’, 94International Review of theRed Cross 885,2012, 155. 158 EECC, Partial Award, Central Front paras –Ethiopia’sClaim 2,28April2004, 28and29. to theBoundary Commission, was occupied for thepurposes of IHLifithadbeen invaded duringthewar’, 157 156 of War onLand,18October 1907. See also U.S.Department of Defense, Law of War Manual,p748. 155 Rules of Procedure), 17July2002, p5. 154 this regard,threeelementsmustbefulflled. For anoccupationtoexist,hostileforeignforcesmustexerciseeffectivecontrol.In der theauthorityofhostilearmy. Under international law, for a territory to be considered occupied it must be un- subsequent tothedateofDelimitationDecision’. Eritrean territorypersonsofEthiopianoriginwhohavemovedintothat cision is implemented. The EEBC instructed Ethiopia that it should ‘remove from ruling, whileEthiopiainsiststhatfurtherbordertalksarenecessarybeforethede- of EritreaandhascalledontheinternationalcommunitytoenforceEEBC’s troops fromthearea.EritreaaccusesEthiopiaofoccupyingsovereignterritory Eritrea. Ethiopiarejectedthisdecisionand,consequently,refusedtowithdrawits areas andtheflashpointofwar,Badmesurroundingarea,belongedto As mentionedearlier,on13April2002,theEEBCdecidedthatoneofdisputed 7. Ethiopia’sRefusaltoWithdrawItsTroopsFromBadme of whether border is demarcated, the law of belligerentoccupationapplies to ter- for occupation,aslongthetitletoterritorybelongsEritrea,andregardless tinued presenceofEthiopiantroopsinandaroundtheBadme areasatisfesthetest tion intheterritoriesadjacenttoborderbetweentwo countries.Thecon- changed hands.Thequestioniswhetherthisraisestheissueof belligerentoccupa- demarcate theborder(exceptvirtualdemarcation),and infact,noterritory in astalematefortwodecadesmarkedbysporadicskirmishes.TheEEBCdidnot Despite theEEBC’sdelimitationdecision,EritreaandEthiopiaremainedlocked ers. Third,theforeignforcesestablishtheirownauthority. effective localgovernmentinplaceatthetimeofinvasionfromexercisingitspow- consent totheirpresence.Second,thepresenceofforeignforcesprevents state shouldbephysicallypresentintheterritoryandterritorialdidnot Inthisregard, theEECC rightlystated that‘even territory to whichEritrea hadavalid claimaccording Art 42, The Art42, HagueRegulations, Annex to HagueConvention (IV)Respecting theLaws andCustoms T. Ferraro, ‘Determining theBeginning andEnd of anOccupation UnderInternational Humanitarian Art 42, HagueRegulations; Art42, Art2(1)common to theGeneva Conventions of 1949. EEBC, Order EEBC, of theCommission (MadePursuantto Article20 andArticle27(1) of theCommission’s 156 Occupationarisesevenwhentheoccupierdoesnotencounterarmed 155

It isalsogenerallyunderstoodthatIHL 158 First,thearmedforcesofaforeign 154

157

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Ethiopia isestimatedtohave162,000activefrontlinemilitarypersonnel. on respectofinternationallaw,whichEthiopiacontinuesto flout to-date’. will indeedbebenefcialtothetwopeoplesbutobviously,thismustpredicated land changedhands). under Ethiopia’scontrolwasthesameasthatwhichexistedbeforewar–no situation cannotreallybequalifedasanoccupation(emphasizingthatthearea territory’, andforinstance,allowsthe‘occupier’ to knowhowfarpullback,the tory wasnotindividualizedthroughphysicaldemarcation,anddefnedas‘enemy view tothisconclusion,whichmaintainsthataslongtheportionofterri- 2018 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-440042122018 . 165 December 2018). http://www.eprdf.org.et/web/en/-/statement-of-eprdf-s-executive-committee (last accessed 2 164 163 tary-strength-detail.asp?country_id=ethiopia (last accessed 2December 2018). 162 cessed 2December 2018). Eritrea isestimatedtohavesome200,000mobilizedmilitarypersonnel, of Ethiopia. tion=com_content&view=article&id=30387:eritrea&catid=119:african-militaries&Itemid=255 (last ac 161 Setting’, 260–261. 160 159 puted townofBadme. giers AgreementandtherulingsofEEBC,whichcouldinvolvecedingdis- pian GovernmentmadeanannouncementinJune2018tofullyimplementtheAl- With recentpoliticaldevelopmentsandchangeofleadersinEthiopia,theEthio- in June2016. and anotheronTserona,thesceneofonedeadliestbattlesduringwar, of armedhostilities,includinganattackonEritreanmilitaryinstallationsin2012 Until veryrecently,theborderdisputehasrumbledon,withsporadicoutbreaks EEBC’s decision,thetwocountrieswerelockedinastateof‘nowar,nopeace’. Following Ethiopia’s refusal to accept the ‘unconditional’ implementation of the 1. JointDeclarationofPeaceandFriendship,9July2018 The partiestotheconflictareEritreaandFederalDemocraticRepublic ritory thatbelongstoanenemystate. array ofconventionalweaponryispossessedbybothstates. C. KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2018 B. PARTIES TO THE CONFLICTS ‘Eritrean Defence Forces’, defenceWeb, 6May 2013,http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?op Pineau, ‘Eritrea-Ethiopia Peace’. T. Araia, ‘Remembering Eritrea-Ethiopia Border War: Africa’s Unfinished Conflict, BBC News, 6May CrisisGroup, EthiopiaandEritrea: Preventing War, p14. Global Firepower, ‘EthiopiaMilitary Strength’ 2018, https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-mili EthiopianPeoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front, Statement of Eprdf’s Executive Committee, Anebo, ‘The Fallacy of Virtual Demarcation asaPrimaryScheme of International LandBoundary 163 160 164

TheEritreanMinisterofInformationhassaidthat‘peace 159 Itisworthnotingthatthereacontrary 162 161 165 Awide while On9 -

in theJointDeclarationtomakeupquicklyforlostopportunities’. will beimplemented’. sub-committees whichwillworkoutindetailwhenandhoweacheveryissue commissions headedbytherespectiveforeignministersofbothcountries,and agreements reachedandindicatedthatthetwosideshadalreadyestablished‘two opian ForeignMinister,DrWorknehGebeyehu,providedfurtherdetailsonthe and ‘follow-uptheimplementationofborderdecision…relatedissues’. border disputeandhelp implement the Algierspeace agreement signed in2000’ doc.htm (last accessed 2December 2018). Between Eritrea andEthiopia on9July2018, 10 July2018, https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13416. 173 withdraw-from-ethiopian-border-eritrean-press-agency-idUSKBN1K90QR. Agency’, 172 171 170 accessed 2December 2018). 13 July2018, https://mfaethiopiablog.wordpress.com/2018/07/13/a-week-in-the-horn-13-07-2018/ 169 news/2018/07/ethiopia-eritrea-sign-declaration-peace-friendship-180709101214478.html. 168 167 9 July2018, §1, http://www.shabait.com/news/local-news/26639 (last accessed 2December 2018). 166 border linesforthefrsttimeindecades. Recently, itwasreportedthatEritreahasstartedwithdrawingitstroopsfromthe Peace andFriendship,whichbringsthestateofwartoanend. no peace’andheraldedaneweraofrapprochementwiththeJointDeclaration July, Eritrea and Ethiopia determined to close the very costly chapter of‘no war, mentation ofthefve-pointplan. Africa andbeyond,expresseditsreadinesstofacilitatethesuccessfulimple- signifcant developmentwithfar-reachingpositiveconsequencesfortheHornof In supportoftheJointDeclaration,UNnotedthatthisrepresentsahistoricand cision oftheEEBCandwillendconfrontationoverdisputedborderareas. contested areas.Hopefully,thedeclarationwillresultinimplementationofde- whether Ethiopiahasfollowedsuitandstartedtowithdrawitstroopsfromthe the twocountries’, Abiy Ahmed,said‘wewilldemolishthewalland,withlove,buildabridgebetween In hishistoricvisittoAsmera on 08July2018,the Ethiopian PrimeMinister, Dr or informationprovidedaboutmissingPOWs? ally withdrawtheirtroopsfromthedisputedareas?Willtherebeareleaseofand/ commitment isnotclear.Doesitmeanthatthecountriesarereadytouncondition- will beimplemented’. tion alsostipulatesthat‘thedecisionontheboundarybetweentwocountries Ibid. UN,Security Council Press Statement onSigningof JointDeclaration of Peace andFriendship E.Biryabarema and MFick,‘Eritrean Troops Withdraw from Ethiopian Border: Eritrean Press Ibid, §4. Ibid,§4. Ibid. Eritrea Ministry of Information, JointDeclaration of Peace andFriendshipbetween Eritrea andEthiopia, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, ‘A Week in the Horn’, ‘EthiopiaandEritrea Declare War “HasCome to anEnd”’, AlJazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/ Reuters, 19 July 2018, 168 andthatEthiopiais‘keentoimplementthetermslaidout 170 167 Hesaidatechnicalcommitteetobesetupwill‘resolvethe Thisisaninterestingdevelopment,butthescopeofthis https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-eritrea/eritrean-troops- 173

172 However,thereisnoinformationabout 166 TheJointDeclara- 169 TheEthi- (last 171

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183 cessed 2December 2018). war’. study andproposesolutionsoverprisonersofwarcapturedduringthe1998–2000 Foreign Ministerwasexplicitwhenhestatedthat‘onecommitteewouldalso medical examinationofthebodybeforeburial. date andplaceofburialallparticularsnecessarytoidentifythegrave,a death certifcateindicatingthedateandplaceofdeath,cause Moreover, therearedetailedprocedurestobefollowedincludingtheissueofa inquiry andtotakeallmeasuresfortheprosecutionofperson(s)responsible. Under IHL,whenaPOWdies,stateisunderobligationtoconductanoffcial There areongoingnegotiationsontheexchangeofPOWs of threemonthsfollowingEritrea’sreleaseEthiopianPOWsinAugust2002. obligation topromptlyrepatriatethePOWsitheld,asrequiredbylaw,foritsdelay 2018, 182 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/world/africa/ethiopia-eritrea-war.html. 181 databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule116 (last accessed 2December 2018). 180 179 178 Protected Persons inInternational Humanitarian Law’, pp342–344. 177 176 175 https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule128 (last accessed 2December 2018). (GC III);ICRC Customary IHLDatabase, Rule 128:Release andReturn of Persons Deprived of Their Liberty 174 hostilities. obligation toreleaseandrepatriatePOWswithoutdelayuponthecessationofactive Under bothtreatyandcustomaryIHL,thepartiestoanIACareunderunconditional 2. TheOngoingDiscussionRelatingtoPrisonersofWar(POWs) itrea claimedthatthepilothaddied,withoutproducingevidenceofhisdeath). a POW,butitdidnotreceiveanydirectevidenceconcerninghisfate(thoughEr- Colonel BazbehPetros.TheEECCestablishedthatthepilotwascapturedandmade One notableissueregardingPOWswasthedisputeonmissingEthiopianpilot release andrepatriationofPOWswassubjecttocriticism. war. only inDecember2000followingtheAlgiersAgreement,whichformallyended Agreement in June 2000, the EECC held that Article 118 of GC II came into operation repatriate all prisoners of war’. ternational Committee of theRedCross, the parties shall without delay releaseand obligations underinternationalhumanitarianlaw…andincooperationwiththeIn- S.Gebrekidan, ‘EthiopiaandEritrea Declare anEndto Their War’, The New York Times, 9July2018, Sassoli, ‘The Approach of theEritrea-Ethiopia ClaimsCommission Towards theTreatment of EECC, Partial Award, Prisoners of War –Eritrea’s Claim17, §145. Article118, Geneva Convention (III)Relative to theTreatment of Prisoners of War, 12August 1949 EECC, Partial Award, Prisoners of War –Eritrea’s Claim17, paras 154–155. Art2(2),AlgiersAgreement. Art 121, GCIII. Art121, EECC, Partial Award, Prisoners of War –Eritrea’s Claim17, paras 156–158. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia,‘PrimeMinister DrAbiy’sHistoric Visit to Asmara’, 13July Art 120, GCIII;Rule 116: Accounting for theDead, ICRC Customary IHLDatabase, https://ihl- 175 182 https://mfaethiopiablog.wordpress.com/2018/07/13/a-week-in-the-horn-13-07-2018/ (last ac Article 2(1) of the December Algiers Agreement states that ‘in fulflling their ItshouldberememberedthattheEECCfoundEthiopiainviolationofits 174 ThoughEritreaandEthiopiahadsignedtheCessationofHostilities 176 The position adopted by the EECC regarding the 180

177

181 andtheEthiopian 183 179 178 - ,

tarian law’. repatriations werecarriedoutwasnotinaccordancewithinternationalhumani- withdrew from the process when it becameclearthatthe manner in which these region inEthiopia,weresenttoEritreawithouttheassistanceofICRC.Thelatter group of704personsEritreandescent,mostlylong-termresidentstheTigray In addition,inthereportofUNSG,itwasindicatedthat‘on25June2001,a protected personsduringthewar. IHL regardingmaterialdestruction,killings,rape,ill-treatmentandexpulsionsof 185 the Protocol). eng/docs/v1_rul_rule158 Prosecution of War Crimes, ICRC Customary IHL Database, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/ databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule144 Respect for International Humanitarian Law Erga Omnes’, ICRC Customary IHLDatabase, https://ihl- 184 of. spect andtoconductaneffectiveinvestigationpunishseriousviolationsthere- International humanitarianlawrequirespartiestoanarmedconflictensurere- protections underIHLuntiltheirfnalreleaseandrepatriation. to release and repatriate POWs without delay. The POWs continue tobeneft from of thewarislegallyunjustifable,andaclearviolationobligationunderIHL Accordingly, talking about ‘captured POWs’ after almost two decades after the end 2001, §35. 188 databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule156 (last accessed 2December 2018). 187 186 www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/POL1000012005ENGLISH.PDF (last accessed 15March 2019). ed, andthisunjustifabledelaytorepatriatePOWsisaseriousviolationofIHL. over, as indicated in the preceding section,there are POWswho not repatriat- the measurestakentoinvestigateandprosecutetheseseriousviolations.More- these actsmayamounttowarcrimes,therehavebeennooffcialreportsregarding prevent rapefromoccurringagainstinnocentEritreancivilianwomen. en, the Commission found Ethiopia liable for failure to take effective measures to claim thatEthiopiantroopscommittednumerousrapesofEritreancivilianwom- D. WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS 184 Art85,Protocol I;Rule 156:Definition of War Crimes,ICRC Customary IHLDatabase, https://ihl- Amnesty International, UNSC, Report UNSC, of theSecretary-General onEthiopiaandEritrea, UNdocS/2001/843, 5September EECC, Partial Award, Central Front – Eritrea’s 6, 7, Claims 2, 4, 8 parasand 22, 28 April 2004, 80–81. Common Art 1 of the Four Geneva Conventions of Ensuring August 1949;Art 129, GCIII;Rule 144: The EECC has established that both sides were liable for serious violations of 188

(last accessed 2December 2018). Art85,Protocol I(onlyEthiopiaisaparty to Report 2005: The State of theWorld Human Rights,pp102,https:// 104, 185 Tocitejustoneexample,followingEritrea’s (last accessed 2December 2018); Rule 158: 186 Though 187

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 53 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 54 2008. Georgia andtheRF,AgreementonImplementingMeasuresof8September sides withtheEU-brokeredSix-PointAgreementof12August2008,signedbyboth writings ofpreviouscenturies–wereinrealityGeorgiantribes, whilethecontem- ‘historical’ Abkhaz–thepeopletowhichauthorsusedrefer asAbkhazinthe dox ChristianChurch.TheGeorgianhistorianPavleIngoroqva claimedthatthe speak auniqueSouthCaucasianlanguageandthemajority belong totheOrtho- are Sunni Muslims, they belong to the Orthodox Christian Church. The Georgians belongs totheNorthwestCaucasianfamilyoflanguages,and whilesomeofthem The AbkhazareanethnicgroupwholiveintheCaucasusregion. Theirlanguage committed tostabilityandconflict-relatedincidentsarerare. Although theconflictisfarfromasolution,mainactors on thegroundremain pied bytheRFandRussianpeacekeepersanoccupyingforce. unanimous resolutiondeclaringAbkhaziaandSouthOssetiatobeterritoriesoccu- ognition declaredbySyria.On28August2008,theParliamentofGeorgiapasseda by theRF,followedsomePacifcandLatinAmericancountries,withrecentrec- UN docS/2008/631, 3October 2008. 191 190 EUMM%20Factsheet%20ENG%202018%20MAY.pdf (last accessed 28August 2018). 189 the stabilizationofsituationonground. civilian monitorsweredeployedtoGeorgiabyEUMemberStatescontribute forces, whichturnedthewarintoanIAC.Inaftermathofconflict,over200 with AbkhazsecurityactorswereembroiledinaconflictGeorgianarmed zia andcomplicatedtheprocessofreconciliation.InAugust2008,RFforcesalong again in1998and2001,whichdroveawedgefurtherbetweenGeorgiaAbkha- Moscow Agreementdidnotpreventfurtherbloodshedandtheconflictpeaked Separation ofForcessignedinMoscowon14May1994(MoscowAgreement).The of theCaucasusin1992–1993,whichresultedanAgreementonaCeasefreand the breakawayterritoryofAbkhaziaandConfederationMountainPeoples Georgian regularArmedForcesandvolunteersfoughtagainsttheAbkhazfrom Georgia was engaged in an Abkhaz conflict in 1992–2008 with some respites. The Georgia (AbkhaziaandSouthOssetia). conflict (IAC)in2018byvirtueofcontinuedRussianoccupationterritory Georgia andtheRussianFederation(RF)wereinvolvedinaninternationalarmed Classification oftheConflict 2. THE ARMED CONFLICT BETWEEN GEORGIA AND RUSSIA IN A. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT ABKHAZIA: THE PREDOMINANCE OF IRRECONCILABLE POSITIONS UN Security Council (UNSC), Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, European UnionMonitoring Mission inGeorgia, Factsheet, https://eumm.eu/data/image_db_innova/ Ibid. 190 On26August2008,Abkhaziawasrecognizedasanindependentcountry 189 Theymonitorcompliancebyall Grazvydas Jasutis 191

the AbkhazianAutonomousSSRwithinGeorgianSSR;this proposalwascon- in 1931 when a resolution was passed on changing the Abkhazian Republic into status wasinitiallydowngradedtoautonomousrepublicwithintheGeorgianSSR egation hadnotbeenempoweredtosignit. with Georgia. Abkhaz historians claim that the treaty was invalid because the del- June ofthatyear,anAbkhazdelegationwenttoTbilisisignatreatyunion First WorldWar.On25May1918,Georgianindependencewasdeclared,andin The Georgian-Abkhazconflictstemsfromtheturbulentperiodatendof not usedinoffcialdocumentstherstSovietdecade(1921–1931). the AbkhazianSSR.However,term‘autonomy’inreferencetoAbkhaziawas zia wasproclaimed. in Georgia,andon31March1921,theSovietSocialistRepublic(SSR)ofAbkha- However, afteronlyafewdays,on25February,Sovietrulewasforciblyestablished Georgian SSR. 1921, noting that foreign affairs would remain fully within the competence of the 199 August 2018). abkhazworld.com/aw/reports-and-key-texts/589-constitution-ssr-abkhazia-1april1925 (last accessed 28 198 (last accessed 28August 2018). World, 197 196 tion-of-georgia-1921/ (last accessed 28August 2018). 195 194 p119.Image, 1994, 193 VUBPRESS, 2011, p68. 192 Caucasus tosettleinAbkhaziathe17th–18thcenturies. porary AbkhazdescendedfromAdygheantribeswhohadcometheNorth my intheadministrationofitsaffairs. Sukhumi) wasanintegralpartofGeorgiathatwouldneverthelessenjoyautono- of Georgiaadopteditsconstitution,whichspecifedthatAbkhazia(District frst wedgebetweenGeorgiaandAbkhazia.On21February1921,theParliament ignored thelocalauthoritiesandoppressedpopulation, aggravated thesituationinAbkhaziaasmilitarycommandofMazniashvili the wholeseashorefromTuapsetoSochicounterRedArmythreat.This the GeorgianArmywithitscommander,GeneralMazniashvili,wasdeployedto ist Federative Republic through the Georgian SSR’ basis ofUnionTreatywiththeGeorgianSSR,entersTrans-CaucasusSovietSocial- stitutions thatagainreferredtopoliticalunion:‘TheAbkhazSSR,unitedonthe Federation aspartofGeorgia.In1925,GeorgiaandAbkhazia adopted Sovietcon- Union oftheSocialistSovietRepublicTranscaucasiaandAbkhaziaentered UnionTreaty Between theSSR of Georgia andtheSSR of Abkhazia–16December 1921, Abkhaz S.Chervonnaya, Conflict intheCaucasus: Georgia, Abkhazia andtheRussian Shadow, Gothic At17 osiuino Georgia, 1921, https://matiane.wordpress.com/2012/09/04/constitu Art107, Constitution of C. Francis, C. Conflict Resolution andStatus: The Case of Georgia andAbkhazia(1989–2008), ASP/ Art 4, Constitution Art4, of theSoviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia,1April1925, Abkhaz World, http:// Chervonnaya, Conflict intheCaucasus, p121. Chervonnaya, Conflict intheCaucasus, p121. Ibid,p119. http://abkhazworld.com/aw/reports-and-key-texts/601-union-treaty-between-december-1921 197 In1922,Georgia,ArmeniaandAzerbaijanformedtheFederative 196 BothSovietrepublicscraftedapoliticalunioninDecember 195

193 Followingthis,on17–22June1918, 198 underlies the Constitution of 192

194 199 drivingthe Abkhazia’s

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 55 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 56 and infavourofthecreationanindependentAbkhazianstate. preted thesefactsintheirstruggleagainstthehomogenousstatehoodofGeorgia the Georgianacademics,whoclaimedthatAbkhazsideessentiallymisinter- 205 204 203 202 1921–1931’, 6The Caucasus and in Globalization 2(2012). Political-State Status of Abkhazia’s Question Ideology: Onthe 201 200 claims thenewConfederationtobe‘thelegitimatesuccessor of the“MountainRe- tive Unionof the MountainPeoples of the Caucasus, took placeinSukhumiandtheparticipantsadoptedTreaty foraConfedera- In November1991,theThirdCongressofMountainPeoples oftheCaucasus of remainingwithintheSovietUnion,whileGeorgiaboycotted thereferendum. March 1991,AbkhaziaparticipatedinaSovietreferendum and votedinfavour The Abkhaz community continued its efforts to separate from Georgia. On 17 intelligentsia. the forcedimportationofvariousnationalitiesanddeportationAbkhaz of theAbkhazlanguage,introductionGeorgianlanguageandscript, and strengtheneduntilbothhisStalin’sdeathsin1953,includingtheabolition ties. From 1933, Lavrenti Beria instituted an anti-Abkhaz policy that was maintained political atmosphereandtheanti-AbkhazapproachemployedbySovietauthori- Georgian-Abkhaz relationsintheSovietperiodweretenseduetounderlying frmed bytheStalinConstitutionin1936. on 16July1989. tween Georgian andAbkhaz communities in Sukhumi on 15July and Ochamchira Abkhazian StateUniversity.Thisresultedinafurtherseriesofethnicclashesbe- of TbilisiUniversityinSukhumi,tobebasedtheGeorgiansectorexisting Georgian MinistryofHigherEducationannouncedthatitwasopeningabranch grade oftheregion’sstatustoarepublic. Abkahz elderstosignadeclarationdemandingsecessionfromGeorgiaandtheup- with thesupportofotherAbkhazgroupsfromvillageLykhny,gathered rated intolaw.On18March1989,thePopularForumofAbkhazia,Aidgylara, ed thatGeorgianwouldbeusedforalloffcialcommunication;thiswasincorpo- In 1988,Georgiaadoptedaprogrammewithregardtothestatelanguagethatstat- 1. TheGeorgian-AbkhazSchismintheEarly1990s between theGeorgianandAbkhazcommunitiesdidnotoccuruntil1989. their rightsandtherewascontinuouslow-levelmistrust;however,therealschism tally dispersed by the Soviet Army. organized by the pro-independence movement in Tbilisi in April, which were bru- See Z. Papaskiri, ‘Another Look at One of the False Historical Postulates of the Abkhazian Separatist the Abkhazian Historical Postulates of the False See Z.Papaskiri, ‘Another Look at One of C. Francis, C. Conflict Resolution andStatus, p72. Ibid,p74. G.Hewitt, ‘Abkhazia: AProblem of IdentityandOwnership’, 12 Central AsianSurvey 3(1993). Ibid,p72. Chervonnaya, Conflict intheCaucasus, p121. 202 The Abkhaz population periodically requested the expansion of 205 204 In the days following these events, the Soviet 203 200 Thisledtoprotestsanddemonstrations Thisperiodwascriticallyanalysedby frst article of whichpro- 201 gia-moscow-agreement92 (last accessed 28August 2018). 209 (last accessed 28August 2018). 2008, 208 crisisgroup.org/_/media/Files/europe/176_abkhazia_today.pdf (last accessed 28August 2018). 207 Ossetian Conflict, Brill,2013, p85. 206 public”’ createdon11May1918,ofwhichAbkhaziawasapart. proceeded straighttoSukhumisuppressthesecessionistregime. the operation,ignoredclearinstructionsfromPresidentEduardShevardnadzeand Nevertheless, GeorgianMinisterofDefenceTengizKitovani,whowascommanding rdia insurgentsinwesternGeorgiaandwerebeingheldsomewhereGaliDistrict. uty PrimeMinisterAlexanderKavsadze,whohadbeenabductedbypro-Gamsakhu- national guards were sent to Abkhazia to release Georgian offcials, including Dep- security of objects of strategic importance. The second version claims that Georgian menia (whichpassesthroughAbkhazia),thesecurityofmainhighwaysand security ofmovementalongtherailroadconnectingRussiawithGeorgiaandAr- why itstarted.Accordingtothefrst,Georgiastagedamilitaryoperationensure The frstGeorgian-AbkhazconflictbeganinAugust1992.Therearetwoversionsof sian interimmonitoringgroupsandthephaseddemilitarization oftheconflict and peacekeepingforces,theestablishmentoftrilateralGeorgian-Abkhaz-Rus - against eachotherintheconflictzone,deploymentofinternational observers ceasefre agreementwasattempted.Thesetout the non-useofforce periodically attemptedtoregaincontroloverSukhumi,until on27July,anew tical andmilitarysupportfromNorthCaucasus.Throughout 1993,Abkhazforces Abkhazia andmanagedtoregaincontrolofGagra,whichensuredaccesslogis- Mountain PeoplesoftheCaucasusmilitary,weredeployedinoperationsacross On 1October1992,Abkhazforces,alongwithfghtersfromtheConfederationof for theprotectionofrailwayandstrategicinstallations. armed forcespresentintheconflictzonewouldnotexceedagreedlevelrequired ties agreedthatGeorgianterritorialintegritywouldbepreservedandthe ceasefre agreement,whichwassignedinMoscowon3September1992.Thepar- fghting, GeorgiantroopsnallyreachedSukhumiandtheRFsponsoredaninitial which referredtoAbkhaziaasanequalmemberoftheGeorgian-Abkhazunion. on 23JulytoreinstatetheconstitutionthatAbkhazianSSRhadadoptedin1925, as autonomous.Inresponse,theSupremeCouncilofAbkhaziainSukhumivoted the independentGeorgianrepublichadadoptedin1921,whichreferredtoAbkhazia In February1992,theParliamentofGeorgiavotedtoreinstateconstitutionthat and hisopponents. later inacivilwarbetweenthosewhosupportedPresidentZviadGamsakhurdia its independenceinApril1991andwasembroiledawarwithSouthOssetia International CrisisGroup, AbkhaziaToday, Europe Report no176, 15September 2006, http://old. D. Shenfield,‘Origins andEvolutions of theGeorgian-Abkhaz Conflict’, AbkhazWorld, 15October UNSC, Moscow UNSC, Agreement, UNdocS/24523, 8September 1992, https://peacemaker.un.org/geor G.Hewitt, http://abkhazworld.com/aw/conflict/31-origins-and-evolutions-of-the-georgian-abkhaz-conflict Discordant Neighbours: A Reassessment of the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-South 209

206 Georgiadeclared 208 Afterferocious 207

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 57 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 58 the ceasefreagreement. military observers,plusminimalciviliansupportstaff,toverifycompliancewith to establishtheUNObserverMissioninGeorgia(UNOMIG),comprisingup88 peacemaker.un.org/georgia-ceasefire94 (last accessed 28August 2018). 215 Conflict, March 1997, https://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/Georgia2.htm (last accessed 28August 2018). 214 213 in Abkhazia,Republic of Georgia, UN docS/26795, 17November 1993. 212 background.html (last accessed 28August 2018). 211 27 July1993, https://peacemaker.un.org/georgia-ceasefireobservance93 (last accessed 28August 2018). 210 be withdrawntotheirplacesofdeploymentbeyondthefrontiers ofAbkhazia. tives of the parties from the Kodori Valley, the troops of the Republic of Georgia would of theCISpeacekeepingforceandUNobservers,withparticipation ofrepresenta- Commonwealth ofIndependentStates(CIS).Underthesupervision ofrepresentatives equipment). Thepartiesagreedtothedeployment of thepeacekeepingforce forces orheavymilitaryequipment)andrestricted-weaponszones (noheavymilitary 1994, theagreementwassignedinMoscow.Itestablishedsecurityzones(noarmed groundwork foranAgreementonaCeasefreandSeparationofForces.On14May In thespringof1994,GeorgiaandAbkhaziasignedfourdocumentsthatlaid since autumn1994. been supervisingtherepatriationofsome200,000displacedpersonstoAbkhazia missing inaction.TheOffceoftheUNHighCommissionerforRefugeeshasalso and 1,820 civilians), approximately 8,000 were wounded and 122 were marked as 1,000 reportedmissing.OntheAbkhazside,4,040werekilled(2,220combatants Watch report,included4,000Georgianindividualskilled,10,000woundedand The war resulted in signifcant casualties which, accordingto a Human Rights zone. According totheUNfact-fndingmissionreport, with militaryforces. man rightsviolationscommittedbyallsides,includingcivilianswhocooperated of AbkhaziaexceptUpperKodoriGorge.Fiercefghtingfollowed,withserioushu- control ofSukhumion27September1993,andinafewdayscontrolledthewhole and physicalintegrity,therighttopersonalsecuritypropertyrights. ticipating inarmedconfrontations,werevictimsofviolationstherightto life dren andelderlypersons,aswellcombatantswhowerenolongeractivelypar- ‘ethnic cleansing’intheareasunderitscontrol.Civilians,includingwomen,chil- deportations. Eachpartytotheconflicthasalsoaccusedotherofcarryingout apartments aswelltheirunlawfuloccupation,oftenatgunpoint,andforced included extrajudicialexecutions,torture,rape,looting,burningofhousesand both duringandintheaftermathofattacks.Suchviolationsaresaidtohave are reportedtohavetakenplaceduringeachofthephasesarmedconflict, UN,‘Georgia –UNOMIGBackground’, 2009, https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unomig/ Ibid. Agreement onaCeasefire andSeparation of Forces, UNdocS/1994/583, 14 May https:// 1994, UNSC, Report UNSC, of the Secretary-General’s Fact-Finding Mission to Investigate Human Rights Violations Agreement onaCease-Fire inAbkhaziaandArrangements to Monitor itsObservance, UNdoc S/26250, HumanRightsWatch, Georgia/Abkhazia: Violations of the Laws of War andRussia’s Role inthe 210 On24August1993,theUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(UNSC)decided 214 211 Despitethis,Abkhazforceslaunchedattacksandtook 212 gravehumanrightsviolations 213 215

itary organizations forcefully; Kvitsiani escaped capture, however. would notdisarm,andTbilisithuslaunchedanoperationtodisarmtheparamil- representative oftheGeorgianpresidentinKodori),defantlyannouncedthathe gion’s controlinKodoriGorge.TheMonadireleader,EmzarKvitsiani(theformer paramilitary groups(Monadire,SvanetiandKhevsureti)operatingunderthere- 2004 and 2005, the Georgian Ministry of Defence took steps to abolish the three ous againin2006forapoliceoperationconductedbyGeorgiansecurityforces.In it hadseveralseriouspracticalandpoliticalimplications.Kodoribecamenotori- ed toadvanceintoAbkhaziathroughKodoriGorge. commander Ruslan Gelayev, at therequestof the Georgian authorities, attempt- Heavy fghtingrecurredinAbkhaziaOctober2001,whentheChecheneld 221 220 219 218 28 August 2018). Forcible Activities, 25May 1998,https://peacemaker.un.org/georgia-protocol-ceasefire98 (last accessed 217 216 the economicsanctionsithadimposedonAbkhaziaunder collectivepressure intense relationship betweenAbkhazia and theRF. On 6 March 2008, the RF lifted pendence inKosovoaffectedtheentireRF,promptingdevelopment ofamore The year2008wascrucialforGeorgian-Abkhazrelations.A declarationofinde- 3. TheAugust2008War with Abkhazforces. where Georgianirregularforces(theWhiteLegionandForestBrothers)clashed New violencesparkedbetweenGeorgiaandAbkhaziainGaliDistrictMay1998, 2. NewViolencein1998and2001 effects onthepoliticalprocessesinregion. mations andindividualsintoAbkhazterritory,activitiesthathaddetrimental aimed atpreventingthepenetrationofterroristandsubversivegroups,armedfor- lation oftheGaliregion.TheGeorgiansideundertooktotakeeffectivemeasures mitted itselftorefrainingfromunlawfulforcibleactsagainstthepeacefulpopu- signed inGagra. Armed FormationsandGuaranteesonInadmissibilityofForcibleActivitieswere the politicalsettlementofconflict. dum andproclaimedindependence,whichprofoundlyaffectedattitudestowards ment werepresentinthatarea. the countrytoensurethatnotroopsunauthorizedbyMoscowceasefreagree- the Georgian special operation in the Upper Kodori Valley, and the UNSC urged knowledged thatthe‘newandtensesituation’hadresulted,atleastinpart,from Protocol onCeasefire, Separation of Armed Formations andGuarantees onInadmissibility of UN,‘Georgia –UNOMIGBackground’. Shenfield,‘Origins andEvolutions of theGeorgian-Abkhaz Conflict’. Author’sfieldinterview. Author’sfieldinterview. CrisisGroup, AbkhaziaToday. Both sidesagreedtotheceasefreand,separately,Abkhaziacom- 216 On25May1998,theProtocolonCeasefre,Separationof 221 218

217 In1999,Abkhaziaheldareferen- 219 Theoperationfailed,but 220 The UN ac-

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 59 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 60 of forcesagreement. ernment, too,sayingthattheuseofdronesoverAbkhaziaviolatedseparation consistent’ withRussia’sroleasapeacekeeperanditcriticizedtheGeorgianGov- ments/eu_georgia/13august2008_en.pdf (last accessed 28August 2018). Brussels, 13August 2008’, press release, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/georgia/docu 228 227 226 curity.org/military/world/russia/railroad-troops.htm (last accessed 28August 2018). 225 224 www.nytimes.com/2008/05/27/world/europe/27georgia.html. 223 2008, http://unpo.org/article/7700 (last accessed 28August 2018). 222 of theCISin1996 principles towhichthepartieshavesubscribedare: Russia alongsidetheAgreementonImplementingMeasures on 8September. The The EUSix-PointAgreementwassignedon12August2008 by bothGeorgiaand 4. TheEUSix-PointAgreementanditsImplications Georgian-Abkhaz zone ofconflict. the subsequentGeorgian-Russianconflictprofoundlyaffectedsituationin The dramaticescalationofhostilitiesinSouthOssetiaon7and8August2008 together theGeorgians,CISpeacekeepingforceandUNOMIG. forces inKodoriandthesuspensionoftripartitemeetingsthathadbrought July asaresultofdeadlyexplosioninGali,clashbetweenGeorgianandAbkhaz involvement intheepisode. by anair-to-airmissilefredfromaRussianghterjet.Russia’smilitarydeniedany April thatyear,aremotelypilotedGeorgianreconnaissanceaircraftwasdestroyed rizing theestablishmentofdirecttieswithAbkhaziaandSouthOssetia.Later,in ation’. TheGovernmentofGeorgiacharacterizeditas‘aggression’. along thecoast.TheRFcalledthisintroductionoftroopsa‘peaceenforcementoper- of conflictandadjacentareasinSenakiPoti.Russiannavyshipsweredeployed Gali sideoftheceasefreline,theywerelatermovedintoZugdidizone zone ofconflictbyroad,railandair.Whilethetroopswereinitiallydeployedon of Zugdidi.On10and11August,theRFintroducedlargenumberstroopsinto aki militarybaseandtargetsintheportofPoti,aswellaroundtown forces reportedlycarriedout aerial attacksinwestern Georgia, including onthe Sen- established control over the Upper Kodori Valley. Meanwhile, on 9 August, Russian Upper KodoriValley.On12August,theAbkhazsidelaunchedagroundattackand of the 1994 MoscowAgreement and aseries of bombardments was carried out in the side beganintroducingheavyweaponsintotherestrictedzoneinviolation Georgian Government. Abkhazia torepairtherailroadon31Maywithoutwarningorconsentof and abattalionofsome400reportedlyunarmedRFRailroadTroopswassentto Ibid. C. J. C. Chivers, ‘U.N. BlamesRussia for Downed Drone’, The New York Times, 27 May 2008, https:// GlobalSecurity.org, ‘Railroad Troops /Railway Forces (Zheleznodorozhniki)’, https://www.globalse Unrepresented Nations andPeoples Organization, ‘Abkhazia: Russian SanctionsLifted’, 7March Council of theEuropean Union,‘Extraordinary Meeting, General Affairs andExternal Relations UNSC, Report UNSC, of theSecretary-General ontheSituationinAbkhazia. Ibid. 222 and,subsequently,theRussianpresidentissuedadecreeautho- 224 TheRFincreasedthenumberofpeacekeepersinAbkhazia 225 ThesituationinAbkhaziabecameevenmoretense 223 AUNreportsaidtheattackwas‘fundamentallyin- 226 FollowingaUNreport, on 8August,theAbkhaz 228

227

Agreement nullandvoid. and ResponseMechanism(IPRM),whichdealswithincidents alongtheAdminis- the GenevaInternationalDiscussionsandispartofGali IncidentPrevention pying force. occupied bytheRF,claimingthatRussianpeacekeepersconstitutedanoccu- resolution declaring that its territories in Abkhazia and South Ossetia were being pendent state.On28August2008,theParliamentofGeorgiapassedaunanimous It isalsonoteworthythaton26August,theRFrecognizedAbkhaziaasaninde- into aSpecialPoliticalMissionoftheUNfnancedthroughitsregularbudget. tative totheGenevaInternationalDiscussions.Atalaterstage,itwastransformed OMIG. On1October2009,aUNteamwasestablishedtosupporttheRepresen- October 2008,andinJune2009,theUNSCfailedtoextendmandateofUN- accessed 28August 2018). 11 April2017, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1403135/1226_1499158040_sg-inf-2017-18e.pdf (last 232 231 230 eumm (last accessed 28August 2018). 229 ly March2017,whichlimiteditsaccesstoAbkhazia. southernmost controlledcrossingpointsatNabakeviandMeore Otobaiainear- serious concerns with regard to the decision of Abkhazauthoritiesto close two citizen GigaOtkhozoriabyanAbkhazborderguardin2016. Georgiaexpressed flict, withtheexceptionofafewgraveincidentssuchas murderofGeorgian Since then,thesecuritysituationongroundhasbeencontrolled toavoidcon- in GaliDistrict,whichmadethesecuritysituationverytenseandunpredictable. 2012 was marked by a series of murders targeting Abkhaz and RF security actors Since then,Georgian-Abkhazrelationshavereachedastalemate.Theperiod2008– ber. through theEUMonitoringMissioninGeorgia(EUMM)establishedSeptem- stabilization ofthesituationongroundfollowingAugust2008conflict Over 200civilianmonitorsweresentbyEUMemberStatestocontributethe in AbkhaziaandSouthOssetia (6) Theopeningofinternationaltalksonthesecurityandstabilityarrangements plementing additionalsecuritymeasures hostilities; pendinganinternationalmechanism,Russianpeacekeepingforcesim- (5) Russianmilitaryforceswithdrawingtothelinesheldprioroutbreakof (4) Georgianmilitaryforceswithdrawingtotheirusualbases (3) Toprovidefreeaccessforhumanitarianaid (2) Toendhostilitiesdefnitively (1) Nottoresortforce 229 Ibid. Council of Europe, Consolidated Report ontheConflict inGeorgia (October 2016–March 2017), UNSC, Report UNSC, of theSecretary-General ontheSituationinAbkhazia. European UnionMonitoring Mission inGeorgia (EUMM), ‘About Us’ , https://eumm.eu/en/about_ TheCIScollectivepeacekeepingforcewasthusoffciallyterminatedon15 230 Thenextday,theGovernmentofGeorgiadeclared1994Moscow 231

232 Abkhaziaparticipatesin

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 61 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 62 on Abkhaz territory. the respective parties’jurisdictionsregardingintegratedRussianmilitarybase khazia’s Territorywassignedin Moscow.Theagreement’sprovisionsregulate public of AbkhaziaonanIntegratedRussianMilitaryBasetheRepublicAb- and using theRussian-AbkhazianJointGroupofArmedForces. On 17 February 2010, the Agreement Between the relationship withRussia,norisareturntoGeorgiaconsideredviableoption. among eithertheAbkhazeliteorwithinsocietyaboutarea’sfuture tached provisions set out the purpose of and theRepublic ofAbkhaziawassignedinMoscow.Theagreementat- public of AbkhaziaonaJointGroupArmedForcestheRussianFederation On 21November2015,theAgreementbetween RussianFederationandRe- ty ServiceborderguardsinAbkhazia. to bedeployedintheregion.Therearealsoapproximately1,000RFFederalSecuri- become nearlytotal,with4,000–5,000Russianland,airandnavaltroopsbelieved 234 work/caucasus/history-georgian-abkhaz-conflict (last accessed 28August 2018). 233 the navyandairforces.Landforcesaredeployedinthreemilitary districts:the The AbkhazianArmedForcesaremadeupofthreearmedbranches –landforces, 3. AbkhazForces ment. The RF called thisintroductionoftroops a ‘peace enforcement operation’. keeping forceandwerethereforeclearlyactingoutsidethe1994MoscowAgree- part inthe2008waronAbkhazterritory.ThetroopswerenotofCISpeace- According toaUNreport,9,000troopsand350unitsofarmouredvehiclestook 2. RussianArmedForces The numberofpersonnelinvolvedintheGeorgianArmedForcesisabout37,000. 1. GeorgianArmedForces law enforcement,educationandsocialwelfare. coordination intheareasofdefence,foreignpolicy,customsandbordercontrol, of atreatydeclaringan‘allianceandstrategicpartnership’,whichdiscussescloser Abkhazia havebeenstrengthened,culminatinginthesigningNovember2014 trative BoundaryLine(ABL).Inthepoliticaldomain,tiesbetweenRussiaand of Forces’, 22November 2016, http://en.kremlin.ru/acts/news/53291 (last accessed 28August 2018). 237 (lastnews/12221 accessed 28August 2018). Ratification’, 8August 2011, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/ State Dumafor the Submitted to 236 235 da.ge/en/news/2016/2188. B. PARTIES TO THE CONFLICTS Office of thePresident Agreement Group of Russia-Abkhazia of Russia, ‘Law on Ratification on Joint ‘History: Georgian and Abkhaz Conflict’, Conciliation Resources, UNSC, Report UNSC, of theSecretary-General ontheSituationinAbkhazia. Ofc ftePeieto usa Areeto a usa iiayBs n AbkhaziaHas Been Russian Military Base in a Office of thePresident of Russia, ‘Agreement on ‘Georgian Armed Forces Capacity Retained for 2017’, Agenda.ge, 15 September 2016, 236 At the presenttime,Russia’s dominance of Abkhazia has and the 233 procedure for creating, deploying However,thereisnoconsensus Russian Federation and http://www.c-r.org/where-we- 237 http://agen the Re- 235 234

of engaginginadirectdialoguewiththe‘AbkhaziansandOssetians’, Meanwhile, theGeorgianCentralGovernmentreaffrmedprincipledposition parliament ratifedtheagreementwithRussiaonmedicalservicesandassistance. Abkhazia continues its cooperation with Russia and, in February 2018, the Abkhaz in theprocessofEuropeanintegration. in thecourseofdevelopmentandsuccessfulcooperationwithpartners,including Abkhazia andTskhinvaliregion/SouthOssetiatotheservicesbeneftscreated and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia and further ease access for the population of lines; tosimplifyeducationopportunitiesforthepopulationlivinginAbkhazia Future’, coveringthreemainobjectives:toeaseandexpandtradeacrossdividing legislative amendmentsintheframeworkofitspeaceinitiative,‘ASteptoaBetter nication. Alternatively,inApriltheGeorgianGovernmentadoptedapackageof no concretestepshavebeenundertakentoestablishaplatformfordirectcommu- s-resheniyami-soveta-evropy-/ (last accessed 18September 2018). mfaapsny.org/en/allnews/news/statements_speeches/kommentariy-mid-respubliki-abkhaziya-v-svyazi- 243 making-open-determined-peace-statement-50197 Statement”’, 242 241 240 and_public_information/press_releases/6284/?year=2018&month=5 (last accessed 28August 2018). 239 html (inRussian). https://www.pnp.ru/politics/2016/11/02/voennye-rossii-i-abkhazii-budut-deystvovat-edinym-frontom. 238 IPRM undertheauspicesofUN. his resignation.BothGeorgianandAbkhazparticipantshavebeenengagedinthe tion condemnedPresidentRaulKhajimbaforreleasingawarcriminalandcalled authorities, caused massive protests across Abkhazia inJanuary2018.Theopposi- The releaseofGeorgian prisoner GiorgiLukava,labeleda‘warcriminal’bySukhumi (350 persons)and15motorboats. transport aircraftsand6helicopters.TheAbkhazianNavyconsistsof1battalion active personnel, the Abkhazia Air Force is equipped with 5 L-39 jet trainers, 3 central (Sukhumi),eastern(Ochamichira)andwestern(Pitsunda).Thereare2,200 Georgia’s westernpartners. regards thisasanotherpopulistmovebytheGeorgiansideinordertoimpress not served, underlining that impunityin such grave crimes remains unacceptable. remains high onthe agenda andthe EUMM reminds participants that justicewas posing visarestrictionsforindividualsincludedintheblacklist, andbanningtheir ministries to workwithforeignpartnersandinternationalorganizations onim- Otkhozoria-Tatunashvili list,adecreeauthorizingitsforeign affairsandjustice ticularly inJune2018whentheGovernmentofGeorgiaapprovedso-called C. KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2018 Council of Europe, Consolidated Report ontheConflict inGeorgia (October 2017 –March 2018). EUMM, ‘The 55thIPRMMeeting Takes Place in Gali’,25April2018, ‘Russian andAbkhazMilitary willbeacting asaUnited Front’, Parliamentary Gazette, 2November 2016, Republic of Abkhazia, ‘The Commentary of theMFA of the Republic of Abkhazia’,4May 2018, http:// K. Tsikhelashvili, ‘Ketevan Tsikhelashvili: “We are Making Open and Determined Peace Ibid. Democracy andFreedom Watch , 4April2018, http://dfwatch.net/ketevan-tsikhelashvili- 243 Abkhaz-Georgianrelationsfurtherdeteriorated,par- 238 239 ThecaseofthemurderGigaOtkhozoria 242 . TheAbkhazMinistryofForeignAffairs https://www.eumm.eu/en/press_ 241 though 240

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 63 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 64

’State ofAbkhazia’. however, thereturneeshadtounderstandthattheywouldbereturning Abkhaz Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that there were no obstacles to return; the returnofthesedisplacedpersons. neva International Discussions, hardly any progress has been made with regard to framework oftheworkinggroupaddressinghumanitarianissuesduringGe- response tohumanrightsandhumanitarianneeds. cation inrelationtoAbkhazia,thoughthedocumentenvisagessomeflexibility Occupied Territories imposes targeted restrictions onaccess, trade andcommuni- ther tensionsinGeorgian-Abkhazrelationships.Similarly,theGeorgianLawon ment, security measures and irreconcilable positions have increased, creating fur- of borderization,fencingandpassportization.Therestrictionfreedommove- changed. Infact,theAbkhazauthoritieshaveintroducedmultipleprocesses Tbilisi; inthisregard,thequestionofpassportsandcitizenship wasoneofthemost preserving theiridentity,languageandculture,aswellmaintaining linkswith ingly concernednotonlyabouttheirsecurity,butalsofutureprospectsfor Following theOSCEreport,ethnicGeorgiansinGaliDistrictwereincreas- matsne.gov.ge/en/document/download/19132/5/en/pdf (last accessed 18September 2018). 250 rm.coe.int/16806db689 (last accessed 18September 2018). Europe (Tbilisi, Sukhumi andGali,8to 12February 2009), CommDH(2009)22, 15May 2009, https:// August 2008 Armed Conflict by Thomas Hammarberg, Commisioner of HumanRightsfor theCouncil of 249 248 247 pdf (last accessed 18September 2018). 246 2018). 27 November 2008, and Human Rights (ODIHR), 245 245184. 244 occurring ineitherareaduringtheconflictoritsaftermathwerereported. bombing orothercombatoperationsandthatfewinjurieshousedestructions Co-operation inEurope(OSCE)indicatedthattherewerenoreportsofdeathsfrom predominantly inGaliDistrictandKodori.TheOrganizationforSecurity The 2008warnegativelyimpactedAbkhaziaandGeorgianresidents,wholived fnancial andpropertytransactions. proper. viduals, mainly from the Svan ethnic group, fled over the mountains into Georgia during themilitaryoperationon12August2008and,asaconsequence,2,500indi- Upper KodoriValleyinnortheastAbkhaziawastakenoverbyAbkhazianforces al Discussionframeworks. search formutuallyacceptablesolutionswithintheIPRMandGenevaInternation- D. WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS OSCE,ODIHR,HumanRightsintheWar-Affected Areas . Organization for Security andCo-operation inEurope (OSCE),Office for Democratic Institutions Law ontheOccupied Territories of theRepublic of Georgia. No431–IIS,23October 2008, https:// Ibid. Council of Europe, Commissioner for HumanRights,Report on HumanRightsIssues Following the UNHCR,Emergency Operation inGeorgia, 9September 2008, http://www.unhcr.org/uk/48c688c32. ‘Government Unveils Tatunashvili-Otkhozoria List’, Civil.Ge , 27 June2018, https://civil.ge/archives/ 246 Ofthese,onlybetween100and150arereportedtohavereturned. https://www.osce.org/odihr/35578?download=true (last accessed 18 September 248 Inpractice,despiteeffortsundertakenbyco-chairsinthe Human Rights in the War-Affected Areas Following the Conflict in Georgia , 244 249 Thishashadnegativeimplicationsforthe Thesituationhasfundamentallystillnot 250

245 247 The The taught asaforeignlanguageoranelectivesubject. Districts formallyshiftedtoRussian-languageinstructionin1994;Georgianwas resulting inclassifyingGalireturneesasforeigners. December 2015inAbkhazia,affectingtheresidentsofGaliandpossiblyslowly the LawonProceduresforExitandEntry previous years. only 16childrenarereportedtobecrossing,whichisconsiderablylessthanin 261 260 259 the-conflict-in-georgia-october-2017-march-2018/16807b81cc (last accessed 18September 2018). Document presented by theSecretary General, 11 April2018, https://rm.coe.int/consolidated-report-on- 258 257 256 255 254 citizenship-issuing-passport-49812. Freedom Watch, 24 January2018, http://dfwatch.net/abkhazia-demands-georgians-renounce- 253 and-Magdalena-Grono.pdf (last accessed 18September 2018). ter.se/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Human-Rights-in-Abkhazia-Today-report-by-Thomas-Hammarberg- 252 251 to theGeorgianlanguage. use Russianasthelanguageofinstruction,allowingonlyforverylimitedaccess gian CentralGovernmentcontinuedtoobjecttheruleswhichobligeschools Serious problemsremainwithregardtoeducationinthemothertongue.TheGeor- troubling currentissuesforthem. been heavilycriticizedbytheAbkhazauthorities. them to travel abroad; however, this has in practice been very complicated and has Gali, aresimultaneouslycitizensoftheRF. majority ofthoseresidinginAbkhaziatoday,exceptmostGeorgianreturneesto from theclosureofotherpoints. bridge overtheInguriRiver,markinganincreasethathaspresumablyresulted to issuethemwithanAbkhazpassport. Justice proving thatsomeonehasrenouncedtheirGeorgiancitizenshipinorder ever, AbkhaziarequiresanoffcialdocumentissuedbytheGeorgianMinistry to beneftfromAbkhazservicesandcrosstheABLwithoutanyhindrance.How- Gali arestronglyadvisedtoobtainAbkhazpassportsorresidentpermitsinorder ports have no possibility of making real-estate transactions, even in Gali. an impactontheGaliinhabitants’propertyrightsandthosewithoutAbkhazpass- 128 in2009–2010toaround502014–2016and382016–2017. into Galionadailybasis,thoughthenumbershavesteadilydecreasedfromsome cation andcommercialactivities.Anumberofschoolchildrenhavebeencrossing placed onABLcrossingscontinuetohaveadetrimentalimpactaccessedu- OSCE,ODIHR,HumanRightsintheWar-Affected Areas. Hammarberg andGrono, HumanRightsinAbkhazia Today. Hammarberg andGrono, HumanRightsinAbkhaziaToday . ‘Abkhazia DemandsGeorgians Renounce Citizenship Before Issuing Passport’, Democracy and Ibid. T. Hammarberg andM.Grono, HumanRightsinAbkhaziaToday, July2017, https://www.palmecen Council of Europe, Consolidated Report onthe Conflict inGeorgia (October 2017–March 2018), Ibid. Author’sfieldinterview. Hammarberg andGrono, HumanRightsinAbkhaziaToday. Ibid. 258 Anaverageof3,000crossingsperdayarereportedonthemain 260 Georgian-languageschoolsintheGaliandTkvarcheli 259 251 TheLawontheStatusofForeignCitizensand 253

The lackofAbkhazdocumentshashad 255 Russiancitizenshipformallyentitles were adoptedsimultaneouslyin 256 261 Furthermore,therestrictions 252 EthnicGeorgianslivingin 257 Currently, 254 The

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 65 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 66 ‘borderization’ processandcondemnitinstrongterms, cern. TheGeorgianauthoritiescontinuetoresolutelyprotestagainsttheso-called Detentions remainanadditionalkeychallengeinAbkhazia,andasignifcantcon- publication/why-did-russia-give-away-crimea-sixty-years-ago (last accessed 27 August 2018). Russia Give Away Crimea SixtyYears Ago?’, Wilson Centre, 19March https://www.wilsoncenter.org/ 2014, look-back-at-its-complicated-history/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.632aebba0e1e; M.Kramer, ‘Why Did https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/02/27/to-understand-crimea-take-a- Understand Crimea, Take aLook BackatItsComplicated History’, The Washington Post, 27 February 2014, 264 263 262 Roman empires,bothofwhichincorporatedtheregionatcertain points. Before itwascalledCrimea,thepeninsulaknownas‘Taurica’ intheGreekand 1. Crimea:HistoricalFacts illegally annexingCrimea. reunifcation. Meanwhile,UkraineaccusesRussiaofaggressionagainst itandof unify withtheRF.TheRFrecognizeditsindependenceandagreed toitsrequestfor declared independencefromUkraineinareferendumandexpressed awishtore- tory approachestoclassifyingthesituationinCrimea.TheRFclaimsthatCrimea 20 Februaryto18March2014.Therearetwocompetingandcompletelycontradic- city ofSevastopol(henceforthreferredtoasCrimea)lastedlessthanamonth,from cess ofannexationorreunifcationtheAutonomousRepublicCrimeaand facing afterthe political crisis and internal clashes in Kiev in 2013–2014. The pro- The case of Crimea has proven to be a thorny issue for the RF and Ukraine, re-sur- conflict in 2018 by virtue of the Russian occupation of territory in Ukraine (Crimea). Ukraine andtheRussianFederation(RF)wereinvolvedinaninternationalarmed Classification oftheConflict 3. THE ARMED CONFLICT BETWEEN UKRAINE AND RUSSIA IN concerns tonothaveitssovereigntyundermined. terparts haverunintoproblemswithTbilisi;mosthadtoleave,givenTbilisi’s and someforeigncompaniesthat have soughttoestablishlinkswithlocalcoun- Georgian LawonOccupiedTerritoriespenalizesbusinessdealingswithAbkhazia authorities havehadadetrimentaleffectoncross-ABLtrade.Inthiscontext,the The restrictionsimposedandnumberofcrossingpointsreducedbytheAbkhaz them forviolatingthestateborder. ties detainthosewhocrosstheABLwithoutproperdocumentationandpenalize A. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT CRIMEA: BETWEEN ANNEXATION AND REUNIFICATION? Council of Europe, Consolidated Report ontheConflict inGeorgia (October 2017–March 2018). The historical facts given here are based on N. Kent, Ibid. Crimea: A History , Taylor,Hurst, 2016; A. ‘To 262

263 whileAbkhazauthori- Grazvydas Jasutis 264 Inthe ukrainian-relations (last accessed 27 August 2018). September 1995,https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/crimea-and-black-sea-fleet-russian- International Affairs (CSIA) Discussion Paper 95-11, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 266 Balkan Studies, 28 June2015, http://www.ifimes.org/en/9035 (last accessed 27 August 2018). 265 changed theoffcialnamelandtoRepublicCrimea. Soviet oftheCrimeanASSR,withoutconsentUkrainianauthorities, tween KievandSimferopolbecameedgyin1992.On26February,theSupreme political landscapeinCrimeamadethesituationdiffculttocontrol.Relationsbe- Tatars, therevivalofpro-Russianmovementanddominancebothin dependence andclaimsfortherightsofTatars.Internally,returnCrimean bate overtheRussianBlackSeaFleet,ashort-livedpro-Russianmovementforin- 1990s, somecontroversiesandskirmishesoccurredinCrimea,includingthede- dent Ukraineanditsstatuswasupgradedtoautonomousrepublic.Intheearly After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Crimea remained in the hands of indepen- the jurisdictionofUkrainianSSR. portation oftheCrimeanTatarstoCentralAsia.In1954,Crimeawastransferred was downgradedtoautonomousdistrict(oblast)inMay1945aftertheforcedde- Soviet SocialistRepublic(ASSR)withintheRussianSSRinOctober1921.Itsstatus Civil War.ThisfnallyresultedintheestablishmentofCrimeanAutonomous the BolsheviksandbecameaboneofcontentionbetweenpartiesinRussian of theGermanEmpire.FromApril1919,Crimeaagainwitnessedinvasion man command.ApuppetCrimeangovernmentwasestablishedwiththesupport military controloverCrimeainAprilbutwereforcedtohandittheGer- claimed bytheBolsheviks.ThetroopsofUkrainianNationalRepublicgained them. In March–April 1918, the Taurida Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) was pro- January 1918. The Bolsheviks immediately clashed with the Tatars and defeated National RepublicwasfoundedbytheTatarsandexistedfromDecember1917to Following theRussianRevolutionandensuingturmoilinRussia,Crimean and theterritoryunderwentseriousbattlesmayhem. of theRussian-Ottoman war, Crimea became a part of the Russian Empire in 1783 of theOttomanEmpire,andruledterritoryfrommid-1400to1783.Inwake the Mongolssettledin.TheTatarsestablishedCrimeanKhanate,aprotectorate tenth century,KievanRusdominatedtheregion;itlostcontrolafter200yearsand recognized byKiev. signed aframeworkagreementoneconomyandtradewiththe RF,whichwasnot Yuri MeshkovasPresidentofCrimea.On13May1994,the CrimeanRepublic The demandforindependencecameupagainwiththeelection ofethnicRussian concessions were made and Crimea was granted autonomy in economic relations. on independence from Ukraine. sia for the Crimean population. It also passed a resolution calling fora referendum constitution establishingindependenceandprovidingdualcitizenship withRus- the Crimeanparliamentdeclaredindependence,andon6May 1992,itvotedfora A. Bebler, A. ‘The Russian-Ukrainian Conflict Over Crimea’, International Institute for MiddleEast and V. Zaborsky, ‘Crimea andtheBlackSea Fleet inRussian-Ukrainian Relations’, Center for Science and 266 Though this was not accepted by Kiev, some 265 On5May1992,

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 67 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 68 manded proofofthecountry’srighttoit. tober, whenMoscowquestionedUkraine’ssovereigntyoverthetinyislandandde- Taman PeninsulawiththeUkrainianislandofTuzlainKerchStraiton20Oc- in 2003.ThisbeganwiththeconstructionofadykebyRussiatolinkRussian Despite theseagreements,aterritorialdisputesurfacedovertheislandofTuzla States. ciple of the inviolability of borders within the Commonwealth of Independent ernment oftheRFandunderlinedthathiscountryremaineddedicatedtoprin- tive statedthatthisdecreedivergedfromthepolicyofPresidentandGov- urgent meeting of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the RF representa- decree proclaimingtheUkrainiancityofSevastopolasbelongingtoRF.Atan The conflictculminatedon9July1993,whentheparliamentofRFissued a 21 April2010,theKharkivagreementwassigned,extendingleaseuntil2042. decided thatRussiawouldleasetheportsinandaroundSevastopolfor20years.On was signedbetweentheRFandUkraine,bywhichtheysplitBlackSeaFleet Ukraine in1992.On28May1997,thePartitionTreaty(composedofthreetreaties) ations, whichhadstartedbetweenPresidentYeltsinandtheKravchukof kerch-strait-bridge-project-32624 4 March 2014, 271 2018). October 2003), http://www.ukrweekly.com/old/archive/2003/430301.shtml 270 www.theguardian.com/world/2010/apr/21/ukraine-black-sea-fleet-russia. 269 (last accessed 27 August 2018). President, Federation Concerning Sevastopol, Decision of 20 July1993 (3256thmeeting): Statement by the 268 267 Georgian-Russian War.ThethenUkrainian Minister ofForeignAffairs,Volody- The tensioninRussian-Ukrainianrelationswasrekindled the wakeof2008 lution declaringthe1954transferofCrimeatoUkraineillegal. Ukrainian controloverCrimea;inMay1992,theRussianparliamentpassedareso- Ukraine togiveupitsclaimtheBlackSeaFleet,Russiashouldquestion parliament’s CommitteeonForeignAffairs,suggestedthatinordertopressure based inCrimea.InJanuary1992,VladimirLukin,thenChairmanoftheRussian of nuclearweaponstotheRFandpartitionBlackSeaFleet,whichwas Externally, UkrainewasengagedintensenegotiationswiththeRFonreturn a feasibility study. and commissioned Avtodor,theRussianHighwaysStateCompany,toconduct try ofTransportto beginnegotiationswithUkraineonstartingconstructionwork 2014, theRussianFirstDeputyPrimeMinister,IgorShuvalov,ordered Minis- vedev oftheRFsignedanagreementtobuildKherchStraitBridge.InFebruary years in2010,whenPresidentYanukovichofUkraineandDimitryMed- ‘Medvedev Signs Decree Creating Contractor for Kerch Strait Bridge Project’, The Moscow Times, Ibid. R.Woronowycz, ‘Russian-Ukrainian Dispute Over Tuzla Escalates’, LXXI L.Harding, ‘Ukraine Extends Lease for Russia’s BlackSea Fleet’, The Guardian April2010,, 21 https:// United Nations,Complaint by Ukraine Regarding the Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian 268 ThestatusoftheBlackSeaFleetwasultimatelyresolvedthroughnegoti- http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/93-95/Chapter%208/EUROPE/93-95_8-22-UKRAINE.pdf https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/medvedev-signs-decree-creating-contractor-for- 271 . 270 Anagreementwasreachedafterseven The Ukrainian Weekly 43(26 (last accessed 27 August 267

269

and controlledthetraffc. and raisedRussianflags.CrimeanBerkutunitsvolunteersseizedcheckpoints later establishedcontrolovertheCrimeanparliamentandCouncilofMinisters tered the territory of Ukrainein Crimea. They took hold of strategic positions and On 27 February 2014, the Russian-speaking security actorswithout insignias en- on Ukraine’sterritorybutnotagainstUkraine. the RFambassadoracknowledgedthatparliamenthadapproveduseofforce country andtheirnumberswereincreasing,constitutinganactofaggression, the UkrainerepresentativeunderlinedthatRFtroopshadalreadybeenin to pro-Russianself-defencegroups. other installations;however,thePresidentofRFexplainedthattheybelonged what appearedtobeRussianuniformssurroundedUkrainianmilitarybasesand http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26433309. 278 2018). Federation’, 1March https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11302.doc.htm 2014, 277 https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-crimea-forces-russian/25281291.html. 1 March 2014, 276 cessed 27 August 2018). info/news/news-archive/120-2014/4592-pod-armyansk-styanulis-siloviki-iz-berkuta (inRussian; last ac 275 274 Russian, withsubtitles; last accessed 27 August 2018). 273 against-russia-threat-20080906-4auh.html. Herald, 6September 2008, https://www.smh.com.au/world/cheney-urges-divided-ukraine-to-unite- 272 return ofCrimea. the President of the RF tasked the security agencies with starting working on the litical crisisinUkrainefromNovember2013–February2014.On23February, The situationchangeddramaticallyintheaftermathofEuromaidanandpo- 2. TheEventsin2014 Russian passportstothepopulationthere. myr Ogryzko,accusedRussia’sconsulateontheCrimeanpeninsulaofdistributing of Ukraine’s Crimea region, for peacekeeping support). lowing arequeston1MarchbySergeyAksyonov,thepro-RussianPrimeMinister imir Putin’srequestforauthorizationtouseRussianarmedforcesinUkraine(fol- On 1March2014,theRussianparliamentunanimouslyapprovedPresidentVlad- dures torestorethenational-territorialautonomyofTatarsinCrimea. Their HistoricalTerritory–Crimea’ and decided tostartpoliticalandlegalproce- ‘Implementation oftheRightCrimeanTatarPeopletoSelf-Determinationin One daylater,theQurultay(Assembly)ofCrimeanTatarsvotedinfavour broke outon26February2014infrontoftheparliamentbuildingSimferopol. A. Kondrashev, A. Crimea: The Way Home, UN,‘Ukraine, in Emergency Meeting, Calls on Security Council to Stop Military Intervention by Russian ‘Berkut UnitsDeployed inArmyansk’, Armyanks Information, 27 February 2014 Bebler, ‘The Russian-Ukrainian Conflict Over Crimea’. A. Tsukanova, A. ‘Cheney Urges Divided Ukraine to Unite against Russia “threat”’, The Sidney Morning ‘Putin:Russia Force Only“Last Resort” inUkraine’, BBC News, 4March 2014, ‘Parliament OKsPutinRequest To Use Russian Forces InUkraine’, RadioFree Europe/Radio Liberty, 273 Clashesbetweenpro-Russianandpro-Ukrainianprotesters 275

278 ThiscontradictsthereportofInterna- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t42-71RpRgI (in 272 277 In thefollowingdays,troopsin 276 At the UNSC meeting, (last accessed 27 August , http://armyansk. 274

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 69 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 70 ment oftheRFPrimeMinister,DimitryMedvedev. Crimea. CrimeawasfullyintegratedintoRussiainJuly2015,accordingtothestate- started theprocessofreunifcationbyextendingRussianlegislationandpoliciesto impact ontheground.Sincethen,CrimeahasbeenunderfullcontrolofRFand that ledtoRussia’sannexationofCrimeaasillegal; General AssemblyapprovedaresolutiondescribingtheMoscow-backedreferendum the RFandformationofnewconstituentmemberswithinit. Sevastopol, andthetreatybetweenRussiaCrimeaonlatter’sadmissioninto declaration ofindependencetheAutonomousRepublicCrimeaandcity supported thereunifcationofCrimeawithRussiaasaconstituentmember, the resultsofall-Crimeareferendumheldon16March2014,inwhichpeople According totheKremlin,decisionadmitCrimeaintoRussiawasbasedon the territoryofCrimeawasunderfullcontrolRFforces. and, on26March,RussianChiefofGeneralStaff,ValeryGerasimov,announcedthat tary bases and ships were stormed by RF regular forces and Crimean security actors putin-eliminates-ministry-crimea-region-fully-integrated-russia-russian-leaders-say-2009463. Russian Leaders Say’, International Business Times, 15July2015, http://www.ibtimes.com/ 285 www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26776416. 284 krymu-zakhopleni-i-rozzbroyeni/ (inUkranian). 26 March https://www.volynnews.com/news/authority/rosiia-zvituye-usi-ukrayinski-viyskovi-v- 2014, 283 282 tass.com/russia/724749. 281 280 ENG.pdf (last accessed 27 August 2018). Examination Activities 2017, https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/2017-PE-rep/2017-otp-rep-PE_ 279 citing the unconstitutional nature of the referendum. send observers from the OSCE Offce for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, (OSCE), DidierBurkhalter,didnotacceptaninvitationfromCrimea’sauthoritiesto Chairperson-in-Offce oftheOrganizationforSecurityandCo-operationinEurope joining the RF, which was declared invalid by the Ukranian authorities. The then On 16 March, the Crimeans participated in a referendum and voted in favour of tary personnelhadbeeninvolvedintakingcontroloftheCrimeanpeninsula. tional CriminalCourt,whichstatesthattheRFlateracknowledgeditsmili- Sevastopol, Aleksei Chalyi, signed the treaty of accession to theRFat the Kremlin. man, VladimirKonstantinov,PrimeMinisterSergeyAksyonovandtheMayorof join theRF;on18March,PresidentVladimirPutin,Crimea’sStateCouncilChair- parliament declaredindependenceandmadeanoffcialapplicationforCrimeato ‘Russian Federation Council Ratifies Treaty on Crimea’s Entry to Russia’, TASS The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), International Criminal Court (ICC), Report on Preliminary ‘Russia Reports: AllUkrainian Military Are Captured andDisarmed inCrimea’, Volynsky Noviny, J. McHugh,‘PutinEliminates Ministry of Crimea, Region FullyIntegrated Into Russia, Ibid. ‘Ukraine: UNCondemns Crimea Vote asIMFandUSBackLoans’, BBC News, 27 March http:// 2014, Bebler, ‘The Russian-Ukrainian Conflict Over Crimea’. 285 284 280 however,thishadalmostno The next day, the Crimean 283 On27March,theUN , 21 March, 21 http:// 2014, 282 Ukrainianmili- 279 281

self-defence unitsreached11,000. to theinterviewwithAksyonov,whosaidthattotalnumberofmembers 40 tanks and 8 submarines thathadnot been there before. artillery systemsfrom24to174andaircraft22113.TheRFhasdeployed increased from12,000in2013to32,0002018;armouredvehicles92680; 2013, basedonthesourcesofUkrainianMinistryDefence.Manpowerhas The numberofRFmilitaryforcesinCrimea2018is2.7timesmorethan them on11June2014byadoptingaLawthePeople’sMilitia. 2015, https://crimeahrg.org/en/legalization-of-crimean-self-defense/ (last accessed 27 August 2018). 292 11000-members-338360.html. www.kyivpost.com/article/content/war-against-ukraine/aksionov-self-defense-units-in-crimea-have- 291 rt.com/news/self-defense-oath-crimea-962/. 290 289 cia-krimu-za-pat-rokiv-rosia-zbilsila-kilkist-vijskovih-do-32-tisac.html (inUkranian). to 32,000’, Ukrinform, 24 April2018, https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-crimea/2448023-militariza 288 dorozhnii.pdf the BlackSea Fleet, 3Ukraine Analytica 5(2016), http://ukraine-analytica.org/wp-content/uploads/za 287 ru/politika/1829681 (inRussian). 286 ployed inFebruaryandMarchbuttheydidnotdiscloseanyfgures. RF authoritiesadmittedthatspecialoperationsforcesandintelligencewerede- The RFforcesdeployedinCrimeaarepartoftheSouthernMilitaryDistrict. 1. RussianArmedForces claimed inMarch2014thattherewere Alexandr Bochkarev,thethenheadofpro-Russianself-defenceforcesCrimea, 3. Self-DefenceCrimeanForces (‘[this] isn’tmuch,butwedon’tneedmore’). without resistance. a shotbeingfred.TheRussianmilitaryalsocapturedmostoftheUkrainianNavy to theRFforces.About20,000Ukrainianmilitarypersonnelcapitulatedwithout resist, andthusall190militaryinstallationsmostweaponsweresurrendered The UkrainianmilitarypersonnelstationedinCrimeawerenotgivenordersto 2. UkrainianArmedForces did notconfrmthis. Military District of Russia were deployed to engage in the operation of Crimea. the analytics,anadditional22,000soldiersofSpecialForcesandSouthern B. PARTIES TO THE CONFLICTS ‘Aksionov: Self-Defense UnitsinCrimea have 11,000 Members’, Kyiv Post, 4March https:// 2014, O. Zadorozhnii, ‘Russia’s Annexation of Crimea intheLightof Russian-Ukrainian Agreements on O. Skrypnyk, ‘Legalization of “Crimean Self-Defense”’, Crimean HumanRightsGroup, 27 November ‘The Militarization of Crimea: Within Five Years, Russia HasIncreased theNumberof Military Forces Bebler, ‘The Russian-Ukrainian Conflict Over Crimea’. ‘Putin: The GRU Forces Were Sent to Disarm the Ukrainian Units’, ‘Crimea Creates OwnMilitary by Swearing InSelf-Defense Units’, RT, 16March https://www. 2014, . 289

291 TheCrimeanauthoritiesaimedtolegitimize 1,500 Crimeansintheself-defenceforces 290

However, Ukraniansourcesreferred TASS 288 , 15 March 2015, http://tass. The Russiansources 292 286 Accordingto 287

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 71 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 72 html?ltflags=mailer 2018, 298 http://tass.com/politics/994756. 297 296 and sectorssuchasagriculture,tourismsmallbusinesscontinuetofaceseri- tics. According to theUkrainian sources, the Crimean economy abruptly declined, links withUkrainearedisrupted,whichwillensurelandtransportationandlogis- https://www.rt.com/news/355385-fsb-ukraine-terrorist-attacks/ 295 by Sniper’, RiaNovosti, 22March https://ria.ru/incidents/20140322/1000633150.html 2014, (inRussian). says-ministry-idUSBREA360GB20140407; ‘Tribute Paid to Cossack andMilitary Man in Simferopol, Killed www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-military/russian-marine-kills-ukraine-navy-officer-in-crimea- 294 ICC, Report onPreliminary ExaminationActivities 2017. Organization, 26 September 2017, http://unpo.org/article/20358 (last accessed 27 August 2018); OTP, Documents HumanRightsAbuses by Russian Agents inCrimea’, Unrepresented NationsandPeople’s ference=P8-RC-2016-0173&language=EN for aResolution, 3February 2016, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&re Parliament, OntheHumanRights SituationinCrimea, inParticular of theCrimean Tatars, JointMotion hrw.org/report/2014/11/17/rights-retreat/abuses-crimea 2018); HumanRightsWatch, ‘RightsinRetreat: Abuses inCrimea’, 17November 2014 www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/EUR5053302016ENGLISH.PDF 293 tion fromKiev,theEuropeanUnionandUnitedStates. Crimean peninsula,drivingatruckacrossthespananddrawingangrycondemna- In May2018,PresidentPutinopenedRussia’snewlybuiltbridgetotheannexed tion andoverwhelminglysupportedVladimirPutin. On 18March,theCrimeansvotedforfrsttimeinRussianpresidentialelec- soldier killedaUkrainiannavaloffcerineasternCrimeaApril2014. unit wereshotdeadatanarmybaseinSimferopolMarch2014andaRussian in Crimea.AUkrainiansoldierandonememberoftheCrimeanself-defence There have been no direct combat activities between the RF and Ukrainian forces appearances, ill-treatmentandtortureatleastoneextrajudicialexecution. of humanrightsviolations,suchasarbitraryarrestsanddetentions,enforceddis- ities oflawenforcementagenciesthathavebeeninvolvedinnumerousincidents tion ofthosewhohaveopposedRussia’sactionsinCrimeaandtheunlawfulactiv- community, limitedfreeexpression,restrictedpeacefulassembly,theintimida- From 2014–2017,theRFwas repeatedly blamed for targeting the Crimean Tatar and atleastoneUkranianbeingshotdead. in northernCrimeaAugust2016,whichresultedoneFSBoffcerbeingkilled gaged intheshootoutwithallegedUkranianfltrators townofArmyansk worthy thattheFederalSecurityService(FSB)ofRFannouncedithaden- was frmlydeniedbytheUkrainianMinistryofDefence. C. KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2018 ‘Crimea Votes for First Time inRussian Presidential Election’, TASS, 18March 2018, Amnesty International, Crimea intheDark:The Silencingof Dissent, December 2016, https:// ‘Russian FSB Foils Terrorist Attacks Plotted by Ukrainian Intel Agents inCrimea’, RT ‘PutinOpensCrimean Bridge Condemned by Kyiv, EU’, RadioFree Europe/Radio Liberty,15May Ibid. ‘Russian MarineKillsUkraine Navy Officer inCrimea, Says Ministry’, Reuters https:// , 7April2014, https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-to-attend-opening-of-bridge-linking-russia-to-crimea/29227926. . (last accessed 27 August 2018); ‘Crimean Tatars: UNReport 295 However,theoperationofinfltration (last accessed 27 August 2018); European .

297 296 298 (last accessed 27 August Mostoftheeconomic , 10 August 2016, , https://www. 294 Itisnote- 293

division ofS-400surface-to-airmissilesinCrimea. In militaryterms,itisnoteworthythatinJanuary2018Russiadeployedanew play=2&ts=1522053780 (last accessed 27 August 2018). http://unesdoc.unesco.org/ulis/cgi-bin/ExtractPDF.pl?catno=261576&lang=e&from=7&to=36&dis 303 russias-ongoing-violations-in-ukraine-14/ (last accessed 27 August 2018). Permanent Council, U.S.Mission to theOSCE,Vienna, 1February 2018, https://osce.usmission.gov/on- the Russian Federation inUkraine’, AsDelivered by Acting DeputyChiefof Mission MicheleSidersto the 302 to-air-missiles-in-crimean-build-up-idUSKBN1F20BD https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-crimea-russia/russia-deploys-more-surface- 301 Russian). 16 March 2018, http://www.expertsouth.ru/novosti/tipichnyi-rossiiskii-region-4-goda-krymu.html (in 299 ria. While it is important to note that there are other regions of Brazil that suffer groups involved(gangsandmilitias)donotmeettherequisite organizationcrite- the intensityofviolenceincity,TheWarReportconsidersthatarmed forces inthefavelas(slums)ofRiodeJaneiro,Brazil,isdebatable.However,despite The legal classifcation of the ongoing violence betweendruggangs and police Classification oftheConflict 1. BRAZIL: HIGH LEVEL OF ARMED GANG VIOLENCE BUT NOT A nexation ofCrimeaandserioushumanrightsviolations. In 2018,theinternationalcommunitycontinuedtocondemnRFforan- ous problems. 300 opinion/liev/krym-v-okkupatsii-chetyre-hoda-spustja-2453286.html (inRussian). heritage. highlights gross violations, particularly in the the federalbudgetandexperiencingpositiveeconomictrends. Crimea hasbecomeatypicalRussianregion,whichiscurrentlybeneftingfrom D. WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS NON-INTERNATIONALARMEDCONFLICT ARMED CONFLICTS SELECTED NON-INTERNATIONAL ‘Russia Deploys More Surface-to-Air Missiles inCrimean Build-Up’, Reuters, 13January2018, UNSECO, Follow-Up of theSituation intheAutonomous Republic of Crimea, Paris, 9March 2018. ‘Ongoing Violations of International Law andDefiance of OSCEPrinciplesandCommitments by A. Liev, A. ‘Crimea in Occupation. Four Years Later’, O. Merkulova,‘Typical Russian Region: Four Years of Crimea Being a Part of Russia’, 303

299 Tothecontrary,Russianmediainformsusthat,infouryears, . Novoe Vremya, 22 February 2018, feld of the protection of cultural 301 302 A2018UNESCOreport 300

Liliana Muscarella https://nv.ua/ EkspertYug,

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 73 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 74 such, affordedthemironcladsocialtieswithfavelacommunities. portantly, thefrstgangs’leftist,grassrootsorigins,whilenotalwaysrecognizedas Brazil hasinfactsurpassedColombiaitsinvolvementwithcoca production. services, althoughthiswouldnotalwaysbethecase. ly intosupportingincarceratedmembersandtheirhomecommunitieswithsocial tias) andpolicebeneftingfromthedrugtradeviaexploitationorbribery. of Brazil’sarmedgroups.Suchoperationsarebuoyedbytieswithformerpolice(mili- has increasinglyreliedondrugtraffcking,whichnowbecomethedeningfeature While thefrstgangswerebornofsociopoliticalmotives,inrecentdecadesfunding 2. TheTransitiontoDrugs ty protectionandthepossibilityofexpansion. political representationinitiallyallowedgangmemberssomedegreeofcommuni- the favelasandsufferingfromsimilarpoverty,racism,policetargetinglackof 312 europe-africa-asia/ (last accessed 13December 2018). June 2016, https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/brazil-is-top-cocaine-transshipment-country-for- 311 310 309 308 crime-news/pure-third-command/ (last accessed 23February 2019). 307 306 305 news/red-command-profile/ (last accessed 30January2019). 304 poverty andlackofpoliticalrepresentation. prisoners whobandedtogetherwhileinjailanddiscoveredtheirsharedorigins the RedCommand(CV),wasbornofunionvariousinmatesandpolitical larly salientintheprisonsystemof1960s,whenoldestandlargestgang, emerged seekingrepresentationandrecognition.Thisphenomenonwasparticu- de Janeiro.Throughyearsofmilitarydictatorship,politicaloppositiongroups Brazil’s gangs are deeply rooted in thehistory of Brazil itself, particularly in Rio 1. FavelaViolence:GangOrigins graphical focusofthisanalysis. from similarviolence,itismostlypresentinRiodeJaneiro,whichthusthegeo- of Friends(ADA). CV has expanded to nearly 6,000 membersin Rio, with offshoot gangs – Friends Revolutionary ArmedForcesofColombia(FARC). gangs arealsoknowntohavetieswithColombia’sinfamousyetlargelydemobilized Brazil, ofteninexchange for weapons. the majorityofcocaineflowingoutLatinAmericaatsome pointpassedthrough A. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT Ibid. InSightCrime,‘Red Command’. InSightCrime,‘Pure Third Command’, 26 April2018, https://www.insightcrime.org/brazil-organized- Ibid. InSightCrime,‘Red Command’. InSightCrime,‘Pure Third Command’. Ibid. M. LaSusa,‘Brazil Is Top Cocaine Transshipment Country for Europe, Africa, Asia’,InSightCrime, 24 InSightCrime,‘Red Command’, 18May 2018, https://www.insightcrime.org/brazil-organized-crime- 306 ItsarchrivalisthePureThirdCommand(TCP). 311 cking, Despite theFARC’sreputation for traffcking, 304 Atfrst,theCV’sprotswentdirect- 310 In 2017, it was determined that In2017,itwasdeterminedthat 305 Sinceitsconception,the 308 Comingfrom 307 309 Mostim- Brazilian Brazilian 312 targets arewhite. portionate totheirpopulation,butalsoshootkillmoreoftenthanwhen according toHumanRightsWatch,allegedlynotonlykillmoreblacksthanispro- to prosecution. as arethegangmemberstheyhost. poverty andmarginalization;favelaresidentsarealmostentirelypeopleofcolour, rate of30.8per100,000. gangsters.html. July 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/12/lens/in-brazils-favelas-caught-between-police-and- 323 322 the-silence-on-brazils-soaring-youth-homicide-rate/ (last accessed 12December 2018). Amnesty International, 26 November https://www.amnestyusa.org/young-black-alive-breaking- 2014, 321 accessed 11 December 2018). http://www.forumseguranca.org.br/publicacoes/anuario-brasileiro-de-seguranca-publica-2018/ (last 320 SeriesHistoricasLetalidadeViolenta.pdf (last accessed 11 December 2018). do RiodeJaneiro egrandes regiões’, January2019, p3,http://www.ispdados.rj.gov.br/Arquivos/ 319 altering-crime-scene. 1 October 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/30/brazil-rio-police-arrested-video- 318 317 316 police-violence-rio-de-janeiro# (last accessed February 2019). 21 De Janeiro’, 7July2016, https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/07/07/good-cops-are-afraid/toll-unchecked- 315 stories/2015-11-02/brazilian-student-mapped-out-rios-racial-segregation-what-he-found-was-startling. Rio’s RacialSegregation. What HeFound Was Startling, PRI,5November 2015 , https://www.pri.org/ 314 2018, p 4. Rio deJaneiro, Brazil’, Dissertation, Graduate Institute of International andDevelopment Studies, Geneva, Implications for Rethinking Intensity andOrganisation of Urban Violence inLatinAmerica. The Case of 313 in RiodeJaneirois40per100,000 According totheBrazilianForumofPublicSecurity,as2017homiciderate predictability. they areimpassableforpolicecarsandoftenevenmotorcycles,withlittleorderor fliates, numbersswelled.Favelasweretheidealterritoryforsuchgroupsbecause As drugtraffckingandcommunityextortionprovedtobelucrativeforgangaf- 3. DrugTraffickingandtheMãoDuraCrackdownunderTemer ings. population ofRiodeJaneiro,butthree-quartersthevictimsextrajudicialkill- homicide, in afarcicalattempttosavethem,thusshieldingthemselvesfromaccusationsof cording to Amnesty International, 77 percent are black; Ibid. E.Pramendorfer, ‘Favela Wars –Between Law Enforcement andArmed Conflict: The Legal HumanRightsWatch (HRW), ‘“Good Cops Are Afraid”: The Toll of Unchecked Police Violence inRio A. Roque, A. ‘Young, Black,Alive: Breaking the Silence onBrazil’s Soaring Youth HomicideRate’, J. Watts, ‘RioPolice Arrested Over Video Showing Them Altering Scene of Shooting’, The Guardian, Instituto deSegurança Pública, ‘Sérieshistóricas anuaisdetaxa deletalidade violenta noesta - Ibid. H.N.BarbosadeGusmão, ‘Mapa RacialDePontos’, inW. Carless, ABrazilian Student Mapped out D. Gonzalez, ‘InBrazil’s Favelas, CaughtBetween Police andGangsters’, The New York Times, 12 HRW, ‘“Good Cops Are Afraid”’. Fórum Brasileiro deSegurança Pública, ‘Anuário Brasileiro DeSegurança Pública 2018’, 2018, 322 If drug bustsdo not immediately lead to violence, police may take bribes 316 andplantingweaponsondeadblackmen, 313 318 Theyarealsoamenablehostsduetotheirpopulations’historical 315 Riopolicehavealsobeenaccusedoftakingcorpsestohospitals 320 Ofpeopleagedunder29killedeachyearinBrazil,ac- 319 314 people,comparedtoBrazil’soverallhomicide Thismakesforeasytargetingbypolicewho, 317 321 onecaseofwhichhasled blacks make up half the 323

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 75 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 76 basic services. tice identicaltotraffckinggroups,exploitinglocalsinexchangeforprotectionand some legitimacyinprotectingcommunitiesfromgangs,today’smilitiasareprac- gang membersandtheover-zealouspolicemilitary.Whileinitiallyachieving years, thusbringinghomicideratesbackto2009levels. of murderssurpassed60,000,havingremainedbelowthatthresholdforseveral chel Temerin2016wasaccompaniedbyaspikehomiciderates.Thenumber ty presidencies,theirregularassumptionofpowerbyconservativePresidentMi- murder rates.However,afterseveralyearsofimprovementduringWorkers’Par- Rio deJaneiro’smorethan1,000favelashavealwaysbeennotablefortheirhigh fcking business. Rio deJaneiro,andtherearemorecomplaintsfromresidentsaboutthesemafa-type a ‘social pacifcation’missions.Itinsteadresultedinincreasedpolicepresenceand hosted byBrazil,seenasanopportunitytolowerstreetcrimeinthecitythrough 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/16/brazilian-army-rio-de-janeiro-michel-temer 327 180216183747559.html. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/02/michel-temer-signs-security-decree-stem-rio-violence- 326 325 www.voanews.com/a/over-50-sao-paulo-police-arrested-accused-of-ties-to-drug-gang-/4706877.html. 324 Militias, orparamilitarygroups, or insomecasesevenworkwithgangs, 332 renata-giannini-robert-muggah/rio-de-janeiros-militia-on-rise-ag. openDemocracy, 22May 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/ana-paula-pellegrino-dandara-tinoco- 331 although they are referred to as‘militias’ inthissection. of both civiliansandtrained officers. Thus, they may betechnically classified as paramilitary militias, 330 rise-in-rio-de-janeiro-six-months-into-intervention-idUSKBN1L12A6. Reuters, 16August 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-security/murders-killings-by-cops- 329 olympic-security-segregation. August 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/19/rio-police-killings-favela-residents- 328 whether ornottheywerecriminals. or penitentiaryoffcers, emerged inthe1990s.Theyarecomposedofrent-seekingformeroractivepolice in 1985. military, thefrstpolicyofitskindsinceendlastmilitarydictatorship ly causedbyTemer’ssigninganemergencydecreehandingRio’spoliceovertothe percent fromthepreviousyear. intervention in2018,therewereatotalof3,479murders,anincreasenearly5 mão dura(heavy-handed)policeandmilitarycrackdown R.Muggah,Giannini,D. Tinoco P. andA. Pellegrino, ‘RioDeJaneiro’s Militiaonthe Rise (Again)’, D. Phillips,‘Brazilian Army to Take Control of Security inRioasViolence Rises’, The Guardian, 16February Ibid. FórumBrasileiro deSegurançaPública,‘Anuário Brasileiro DeSegurançaPública2018’. J. Watts, ‘Police Killingsof Favela Residents Continue asGamesGooninRio’, The Guardian, 19 Itisdifficultto distinguish these groups aseither militiasorparamilitaries, since they are composed S. Cowie, ‘Michel Temer Signs Security Decree to Stem Rio Violence’, G.Stargardter, ‘Murders, Killingsby Cops Rise inRio DeJaneiro, SixMonthsinto Intervention’, ‘Over 50SaoPaulo Police Arrested, Accused of Ties to DrugGang’,VOA 326 Temer’sdecisionwasinprincipleinspiredbythe2016OlympicGames 332 Today, an estimated 2 million people live under militia control in 331 whobandedtogethertoflltheopportunitygapbetween 329 330 havealsoincreasedinnumbers,havingfrst 328 Inthefrstsixmonthsaloneofmilitary 324 thusthemselvesbeneftingfromthetraf- 325 Thiswasatleastpartial- Al Jazeera , 16 February 2018, 327 , 18December 2018, https:// onfavelaresidents, .

with servicesandprotectionthatthelocalauthoritiesareunabletooffer. icies havebeenineffectiveagainstthemilitiasbecausetheyprovidecommunities schools andbusinessestoclose, the stateofviolenceinwhichtheylive.Itisanormaloccurrenceforgangstoorder February andJuly,comparedtothesameperiodin2017. 2018 duetothe35percentincreaseinpeoplekilledbypoliceRiostatebetween their homes, Even if these events are sporadic, they leave residents in constant fear of leaving nessinsider.fr/us/r-unfazed-by-brazils-army-rio-drug-gangs-willing-to-wait-out-occupation-2018-4. Deployment Won’t Interrupt Their Business’, Business InsiderFrance, 24 April2018, https://www.busi 341 rio-voices-view-from-the-favelas-olympics-they-promised-a-legacy-of-peace-but-brazil-is-now-at-war Bullet”’, 340 339 https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/weapon-smuggling-us-brazil_us_5aa053d8e4b0d4f5b66d14e8 338 ing-arms-venezuela/ (last accessed 31January2019). February 2018, https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/brazil-pcc-expands-criminal-activity-traffick 337 336 favela-leaves-at-least-eight-people-dead. Guardian, 25March 2018,https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/25/police-operation-in-rio- 335 334 333 intervention’. an estimated 1,115 people lost their lives as a direct result of ‘opposition to police cability internationalhumanitarianlaw(IHL)iseasilymet.In2017,inRioalone, der rates,andRiodeJaneiro’sstatisticsare even worse,thischallengeto the appli- ons. GiventhatBrazilisoneofthecountrieswithhighesthomicideandmur- such ashomiciderate,materialdamage,impactonciviliansandaccesstoweap- The intensityoftheviolenceinRiodeJaneirocanbemeasuredbyseveralfactors 4. TheIntensityofViolence organizations thanaboutdrugtraffckinggangs. ly killingtheirtargetsandpassersby. shootouts, weapons totalmorethan4,000for15,000gangmembers,andareoftenusedin lice, andstudiesshowlowerscoreshigherteacherabsenteeismwithexposure imported fromembattledVenezuela AK-47s and other military-grade arms have beenconfscated or recordedas being ally associatedwitharmeddruggangs:inthepasttwoyears,arisingnumberof surprising consideringthattheweaponsusedarenotsmallarmsperhapsusu- B.Brooks, ‘“They DoNot Really Want to Come After Us”: Rio’s GangsSay Brazil’s Historic Military InSightCrime,‘Brazil’s PCC Expands Criminal Activity, Trafficking ArmsFrom Venezuela’, 21 Ibid. D. PhillipsandJ. Carvalho, ‘Police Operation inRioFavela Leaves At Least EightPeople Dead’, The T. Waldron, ‘How Brazil’s “Lord of Guns” Armed Rio’s DrugWar With U.S. Weapons’, HuffPost, 8March 2018, Ibid. Stargardter, ‘Murders, Killingsby Cops Rise inRioDeJaneiro’. Ibid. D. Mendes,‘View from theRioFavelas: “We’re Often Scared to Leave theHouse inCase We’re Hitby aStray The Guardian , 19August 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/aug/19/ fring thousands of rounds of ammunition at a time and indiscriminate- 340 335 disrupttheirdailylivesandleavebulletholestoremindthemof Theintensityofviolencemayalsobeconsideredtohaverisenin 341 especiallyduringheightenedconflictwithpo- 339 337

ortheUnitedStates. 333 Policesweepsandsecuritypol- 336 Thesestatisticsareun- 338 Theseheavy-grade 334 . -

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 77 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 78 sonnel. armed groupsbecauseoftheircompositionbothciviliansandstateforcesper- It is diffcult to ascertainthese groups’ status as potential paramilitary or non-state that havebranchedoffintoparamilitarymilitias,suchastheLeagueofJustice. trolling favelastoexercisecontrolandintimidation. upholding thebusiness and the rest of the members acting as foot soldiers, pa- institutional frameworkdominatedbytheexecutivebranch. of thesituation,especiallyintermscivilianprotection,isundeniable. and thetollis much higher and less measurable in thefavelas of Rio, the intensity hire formerpoliceormilitaryoffcersas military advisors, structure orrankingsystem.However,itisnotuncommonforarmedgroupsto eize-power-from-drug-gangs. 12 July2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/12/brazil-militia-paramilitary-wield-terror-s 350 349 348 347 346 com/2018/05/22/opinion/rio-janeiro-terrorize-militias.html. 345 traficonorio/faccoes.shtml. 344 343 abs/10.1162/REST_a_00628?journalCode=rest (last accessed 23February 2019). Favelas’, 99Review of Economics andStatistics 342 dependent actors’ the largestarmedgroups,suchasCV,havebeendescribed‘anetworkofin- three (theCV,TCPandADA),plussmalleroffshootsroguefactions.Ingeneral, such groups. Rather thantherebeingjustoneoreventwomajorgroups, there are armed gangsduetoboththegenerallackofinformationandbroadrange It isdiffculttodeterminetheorganizationandhierarchicalcompositionof 1. TheLevelofOrganizationtheArmedActors state policeandmilitaryforces. of variousgangs–thethreeprimaryonesbeing The majoractorsinRiodeJaneiro’sarmedviolencearetheleadersandmembers to drugwars. police-gang (ormilitia)shootouts. mentioned tacticsemployedbyoffcerstocoverupthemurderthosecaughtin deaths arealsodiffculttomeasure,andthusmoreintense,becauseoftheafore- fence. AccordingtoRio’spublicprosecutor,themilitiasarebetterorganizedthan extent theleveloforganizationrequiredtocoordinatemilitaryoffencesandde- B. MAIN ACTORS Cowie, ‘MichelTemer SignsSecurity Decree’. FórumBrasileiro deSegurançaPública,‘Anuário Brasileiro DeSegurançaPública2018’. V. Barbara, ‘The MenWho Terrorize Rio’, The New York Times, 22May 2018, https://www.nytimes. D. Phillips, ‘“Lesser Evil”: How Brazil’s Militias Wield Terror to Seize Power From Gangs’, J. Monteiro and R. Rocha, ‘Drug Battlesand SchoolAchievement: Evidence from J. RioDeJaneiro’s Monteiro andR.Rocha, ‘Drug InSightCrime,‘Red Command’. Pramendorfer, ‘Favela Wars’, p16. Muggahetal,‘RioDeJaneiro’s MilitiaontheRise (Again)’. ‘Facções’, Folha deS.Paulo https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/especial/2004/, 15April2004, 346 Since2016,themilitaryandstatepolicehaveoperatedwithinsame 342 ConsideringthatonaverageinBrazil,175peoplearekilledperday, 348 withwarlordsoverseeingdrugtraffcking,severalkeyofcers 344 A crucialthirdpartyistheoffcersanddissidents 2 (May 2017), https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/ 349 CV, TCPandADA–the Thereisnorigidcommand 350 thusmeetingtosome 347 The Guardian, 343 Civilian 345

such aclaimcannotbemadedefnitivelyatpresent. ing combinationoftheseindicators’maybesuffcienttotriggerIHL,although that zone. the favela(s)inwhichtheywork,living,workingandconductingbusinessfrom have establishedheadquarters,barracksorcommandoffces,theyeffectivelyrule One could argue that the still relativelylittleisknownaboutanyhierarchicalstructure. January 2019). 2012, Approaches’, Humanitarian Action inSituationsOtherThan War (HASOW), Discussion Paper no2,October 356 Hadzihasanovic andKubura, Trial Chamber, 15March 2006, p 177. 355 354 353 352 351 even ifallofthecharacteristicslaidoutbycaselawarenotfulflled, ganization requirementsofIHL,somescholarssuchasSvenPeterkesuggestthat only anegativeresultcanbeanticipated.Despitesomedoubtsregardingtheor- Brazil, andthedifferentdruggangsareoftenmisunderstoodtobeoneforce,so monetary orterritorialdemands.Thatsaid,nothingofthesorthasbeentriedin little togainpoliticallyandwouldhavetoofewcommonalitiesleverageany the governmentweretolaunchpeacenegotiations,othergroupswouldhave and territorialcontrol,sincethedaysofCV’spoliticalstancearelonggone.If lem isthatthegoalforbothgroupsofactorscanonlybesaidtofnancialgain organization, theycannotbeconsideredmerelyhaphazardgangs.Anotherprob- forcement offcialsareofteninvolvedorcomplicit.Atthesametime,duetotheir while, are an entity that is hard to de fne: they work outside the law and yet law en- speak withonevoiceandnegotiateacertainpoliticalorsocialgoal.Militias,mean- that intheeventofapeaceagreementornegotiationswithstate,theycould Since thedifferentcomandosarenumerousandoftenfghteachother,itisunlikely the druggangsthemselves, rial control,throughmilitaryorganization,overRioresidents. people liveundertheircontrol,theycanalsobesaidtoexercisesubstantialterrito- guide militias’activitiesarealsounknown,thoughgiventhefactthat2million able –perhapsasigninandofitselfthegroups’lacklegitimacy.Anyrulesthat an establishedsetofrulesguidingthegroups’actions,littleinformationisavail- torially controlled,thoughthisisadefactosituationthatevolvesovertime.Asfor Ibid. Pramendorfer, ‘Favela Wars’, p8. ICTR, The ICTR, Prosecutor v Musema, Trial Chamber, 27 January 2000, §248; ICTY, The Prosecutor v Muggahetal,‘RiodeJaneiro’s MilitiaontheRise (Again)’. S. Peterke, ‘Regulating ‘Drug Wars’ and Other Gray Zone Conflicts: Formal and Functional Muggahetal,‘RioDeJaneiro’s Militiaon the Rise (Again)’. https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Regulating-Drug-Wars.pdf (last accessed 31 353 Differentfavelasandneighbourhoodsareknownbylocalstobeterri- comandos exercise territorial control. While they do not 351 includingintheirintimidationtactics, 356

354 355 352 a‘convinc- although

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 79 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 80

have notyetbeenheardandcouldpotentiallybeblockedagain. main limitedgiventhatappealstochallengethecontinueduse ofmilitarytribunals cally motivated,butnoarrestshavebeenmade. perpetrators werelikelytobeinvolvedwithmilitiasandthatthecrimewaspoliti- murder, the Brazilian Secretary of PublicSecurity confrmed suspicions that the no conclusionhasbeenreached.InNovember2018,eightmonthsafterFranco’s harsh lightonthedeteriorationofsecuritysituationinBrazilsince2016,yet broke itsownrecordformurdersin2017,up3percentfrom2016. exacerbating theviolence.InNovember2018,itwasfoundthatBrazilonceagain settled into the hands of the army, taking over swaths of poor urban areas in Rio and Since MichelTemerassumedthepresidencyin2016,policeforceshavesteadily 2. TheUptickinViolenceandArmyPowersUnderTemerBolsonaro 358 death-champion. March 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/18/marielle-franco-brazil-favelas-mourn- 357 lice, promptedprotestsaroundtheworld. activism andthefactthatbulletswerefromabatchboughtbyfederalpo- state forces.Herdeath,widelyconsideredtobepoliticallymotivateddueher of policebrutalityandtheextrajudicialkillingfavelaresidentsbymilitias an outspoken,black,lesbian,feministpolitician,knownforbeinghighlycritical perception ofwarbeingwagedagainstfavelaresidentsandactivists.Francowas which contributednotonlytothepoliticalfervour in thecountrybut also tothe past yearwastheassassinationinMarch2018ofRioactivistMarielleFranco, Perhaps themostimportantdevelopmentinpoliticalfabricofBrazil 1. Activist’sMurderHighlightsOverlookedUrbanViolence military-justice-intervention-and-human. 2018, 362 2018/10/28/brazil-urgent-call-protect-rights# (last accessed 12December 2018). 361 brazil-president-election-run-off-latest-a8573901.html. 8 October 2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/jair-bolsonaro-who-is-quotes- 360 brazil-murder-rate-record-homicides-killings-rio-de-janeiro-police-a8485656.html. 63,880’, 359 ficou-participantes-do-assassinato-de-marielle.shtml. 22 November 2018, https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2018/11/secretario-diz-que-policia-identi comments, ration forthebrutalmilitarydictatorship,torture,shoot-to-killpolicingandracist than Temer’s.Itisreasonabletoassumethat,giventhenewpresident’sopenadmi- election ofPresidentJairBolsonaro,onacampaignplatformevenmoreprecarious ty situationhasintensifedoverthepastthreeyears,leadingtoOctober2018 Temer. escalating inseverity,buildingonthe30,000-strongmilitarypresencelaunchedby C. KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2018 HRW, ‘Brazil: AnUrgent Callto Protect Rights’, 29October 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/ D. Phillips, ‘Marielle Franco: Brazil’s Favelas Mournthe Death of a Champion’,The Guardian, 18 ‘Secretário Diz Que Polícia Identificou Participantes Do Assassinato De Marielle’, T. Embury-Dennis, ‘Brazil Breaks Own Record for Number of Murders in Single Year as Deaths Hit A. Del RíoandJ. Cesario A. ‘Military Justice, Intervention and Human Rights inBrazil’, openDemocracy, 5 July A. Forrest, A. ‘Jair Bolsonaro: The Worst Quotes From Brazil’s Far-Right Frontrunner’, The Independent, https://www.opendemocracy.net/democraciaabierta/andr-s-del-r-o-juliana-cesario-alvim-gomes/ 361 The Independent, 10 August 2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/

Furthermore, legalrecourseforextrajudicialpolicekillingsissuretore- 360 theviolenceinRiowillonlyworsen,takingmorelivesthaneverand 357 Theassociatedmediacoverageshed 358

362 359 Folha de S.Paulo, Thesecuri- government, includingstateforcesandmilitiaallies.Meanwhile, violenceinits ment despite(orbecauseof)potentialevidentiarylinksbetween thebranchesof capably politicalinnature,yettherehasbeenlimitedresponsefromthegovern- high-profle killinglikethatofMarielleFranco.Franco’sassassinationwasines- killings fordecades,thejudiciaryhasalsoneglectedtofullyinvestigateevena Besides failingtoproperlyregulateRiopoliceandprosecutemostextrajudicial rowing divisionbetweenitandtheotherbranchesofgovernmentareworrying. The Brazilianjudicialsystemisknowntobeineffcientingeneral,andthenar- violence areinthemeantimeleftwithlittletonorecourse. not yetbeenheardbytheFederalSupremeCourt. to returntheforce with extrajudicialkillingorotherseverecrimes,offcershaveinthepastbeenable the lastdictatorshipof1980s). nals to carry out investigations of their ownranks (a legal vestige unaltered since the factthatBrazilianconstitutionhastraditionallyallowedmilitarytribu- the police and military forces enjoy immunity from homicide convictionsdue to 370 369 brazils-military-react-51088 (last accessed 23February 2019). Conversation, 7December 2015, https://theconversation.com/as-dilma-rousseff-stumbles-how-will- 368 367 366 365 between-drug-gangs-police-and-militias (last accessed 23February 2019). Revista: Harvard Review of LatinAmerica (Winter 2008), https://revista.drclas.harvard.edu/book/ 364 record-for-homicides-63880-deaths. The Guardian, 9 August 2018, 363 lead toarrestandonly4percentresultincharges. a Brazilianthinktankspecializinginsecurityissues,just10percentofhomicides urban violence’ssheerintensityandlongevity.AccordingtotheIgarapéInstitute, The lackofinvestigationsintotheviolenceinRio’sfavelasisnotablegiven to kill. tribunals jurisdictionincasesofintentionalhomicide,includingwithintention progress inthisareasincetheenforcementofLaw13491,whichgivesmilitary pacifcation’ missionsofRioin2016/2017(extendedthrough2018),reversedany their oversight. ward civiliantribunals,butappealswereleftinlimboandmilitarycourtsretained the human rights concerns evoked by thisjudicial practice, inspiring a turn to- but nomorethan20wereheldduetosupposedlackofevidence. tias ofBrazil,in2018,159suspectedmemberswerearrestedduringapoliceraid, militias orcollaboratingwithdrugtraffckersasadvisors. D. WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS DelRíoandCesario, ‘Military Justice, Intervention andHumanRightsinBrazil’. D. Phillips,‘“A Devastating Scenario”: Brazil SetsNew Record for Homicidesat63,880 Deaths’, Ibid. Phillips,‘“Lesser Evil”’. DelRíoandCesario, ‘Military Justice, Intervention andHumanRightsinBrazil’. C. HarigandP. C. Scuticchio, ‘As DilmaRousseff Stumbles, How Will Brazil’s Military React?’, The Muggahetal.‘RioDeJaneiro’s MilitiaontheRise (Again)’. R.Gay, ‘Between DrugGangs,thePolice andMilitias:AnAnatomy of Violence inRioDeJaneiro’, 369 Appealsregardingtheconstitutionalityofthislawarependingandhave 368 PresidentTemer’sexpansionofmilitarycapacitiesinthe‘social 364 orotherwisemakeastablelivingbyjoiningextrajudicial https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/09/brazil-sets-new- 367 Inthe1990s,moreattentionwasbroughtto 363 370 Importantly,evenifcharged Civiliansandvictimsofthe 365 Inregardtothemili- 366 Meanwhile,

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 81 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 82 for hisfailure to implement the disarmament,demobilizationandreintegration of PatriotsforJusticeandPeace(CPJP),stronglyopposedPresident FrançoisBozizé the PatrioticConventionforCountry’sSalvation(CPSK) andtheConvention Forces forUnity(UFDR),DemocraticFrontoftheCentralAfrican People(FDPC), posed ofarmedgroupsfromnortheasternCAR,includingtheUnionDemocratic From theendof2012tobeginning2013,Selekacoalition,mainlycom- series ofnon-internationalarmedconflicts(NIACs). factions oftheSelekacoalitionitself.Thus,situationincountryremainsa ex-Seleka, apredominantlyMuslimumbrellagroup,aswellbetweenandwithin world-africa-13150040 374 of-our-house-by-his-parents. 2018, 373 gangs-militias-streets (last accessed 23February 2019). for Strategic Studies, 16 October 2018, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2018/10/urban-security- 372 to-identify-marielle-francos-killers-after-six-months-is-unacceptable/ (last accessed 12December 2018). Unacceptable’, 14September 2018, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/09/brazil-failure- 371 organized acoupd’étatseizingpowerinChristian-majoritycountry. most recentrootsin2013,whenMuslimrebelsfromtheSelekaumbrellagroup The currentviolenceinCAR,oftenreferredtoasthe‘forgotten’conflict,hasits es. trolling around80percentofthecountryandoftencompetingfornaturalresourc- d’état. Attacks against civilians increased again in 2017, with armed groups con- Turmoil intheCentralAfricanRepublic (CAR) has continued sincethe2013coup Classification oftheConflicts 2. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: SECTARIAN AND INTERCOMMUNAL inadequacy, oratworst,apolicecover-up. to considerFranco’sassassination,atbest,furtherevidenceofthejudicialbranch’s political andmilitaryformscontinuestointensify,leadingAmnestyInternational based NGO,FightforPeace,‘Thisisnotawar,butcertainlypeaceeither.’ to aidBrazil’srecoveryasastable,democraticstate.AsputbythefounderofRio- therefore bothsustainimpunityandcomplicatethepotentialofinternationallaw police, army,militiasandtheexecutivejudiciarybranchesofgovernment A. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICTS VIOLENCE CONTINUES 373 Amnesty International, ‘Brazil: Failure to MarielleFranco’s Identify Killersafter SixMonthsIs W. Baxter, ‘Widows “IWas inCAR: Kicked Out of OurHouse by hisParents”’, The Guardian , 12June ‘Central African Republic Country Profile’, A. Sampaio, A. ‘Urban Security: When GangsandMilitiasRun the Streets’, International Institute Clashesoccurbetweenanti-Balakagroups,mostlyChristianmilitias,andthe https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/jun/12/widows-in-car-i-was-kicked-out- . BBC News, 1 August 2018, 371 Theintimatepoliticaltiesbetween https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ Giulia Marcucci 374

372 primarily Christianself-defencemilitiasknownastheanti-Balaka (‘anti-machete’), Nonetheless, violencecontinuedand,inresponse,manyciviliansdecidedtoform against humanityallegedlycommittedduringhistimeinoffce; May, hisgovernment seemed to take apositivestep by indicting Bozizé forcrimes months; DjotodiawaseventuallyselectedasInterimPresidenton13April2013.In Council aimedatcreatinganewconstitutionandorganizingelectionswithin18 pended theconstitution.ECCAScalledforcreationofaTransitionalNational the Selekaleader,MichelDjotodia,proclaimedhimselfPresidentofCARandsus- gui and15ofthecountry’s16provinces.Asaresult,BozizéfledtoCameroonwhile tion, whichdecidedtotakeactionand,by24March2013,gainedcontroloverBan- self played a marginal role. state whiletheleadersofwarringpartiesinCARandAfricanUnion(AU)it- However, theLibrevilleAgreementwasmainlynegotiatedbyregionalheadsof third term. provided that Bozizé would remain in power until 2016 but could not run for a January 2013,establishingathree-yearpower-sharingagreement.Furthermore,it en byBozizé’sgovernment. to beafailureandthereformsrequiredundertransitionwereneverundertak- with Bozizé’s government. of CentralAfricanStates(ECCAS)managedtopersuadetheSelekanegotiate Bangui; nonetheless,neighbouringChadalongwiththeEconomicCommunity early 2013,itsoonbecameclearthattheSeleka’spurposewastoseizecapital, of governanceintheregion.Aftergainingcontroloversomestrategictowns occurred since2005,whenBozizéwasoffciallyelected,andforthegenerallack www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24088995. 380 20130531_1_michel-djotodia-seleka-crimes. http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-05-31/news/sns-rt-centralafrica-presidentwarrantl5n0ec39h- 379 378 https://www.cfr.org/blog/growing-crisis-central-african-republic (last accessed 9August 2018). 377 (last accessed 7August 2018). Republic’, 376 respectively signed in2007 and2008, between thegovernment andseveral of CAR rebel groups. of thepeace deals known astheBirao Peace Agreement andtheLibreville Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 375 programme Seleka coalition,statingthatanyoneactinginitsnamewouldbepunished. In September 2013, President Djotodia offcially called for the dissolution of the while overthrowingBozize’sgovernment,butwerenotbroughttojustice. cused ofseriouscrimes(i.e.therecruitmentchildsoldiers)allegedlycommitted was sooncriticizedattheinternationallevelashisSelekafghterswerealsoac- The disarmament,demobilization andreintegration programmes for former combatants formed part See Council onForeign Relations, ‘The Growing CrisisinCentral African Republic’, 20 March 2013, ICRtoP, ‘Crisis intheCentral African Republic’. International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP), ‘Crisis intheCentral African ‘Central African Republic Issues Arrest Warrant for Ex-President’,Chicago ‘CAR President Djotodia BansFormer Seleka Rebel Backers’, BBC News, 13September 2013, https:// http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-the-central-african-republic 375 inthenortheast,investigaterebelandgovernmentcrimesthathad 377 376 378 Thus, its actual implementation immediately proved The negotiations led to the Libreville Agreement of ThisgeneratedfrustrationwithintheSelekacoali- Tribune, 31May 2013, 379 however,he 380

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 83 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 84 In retaliation,theex-SelekaforcesattackedChristianresidentsinarea. ized bylawlesscompetitionfornaturalresourcesamongdifferentarmedgroups. lim minorityinCAR,thusaddingasectarianelementtoconflictalreadycharacter- fghting fueledlongstandingrivalriesbetweentheChristianmajorityandMus- the RepublicofCongo. neighbouring Cameroon,Chad,theDemocraticRepublicofCongo(DRC)and out inthewesternpartofcountrybyanti-Balakamilitias. ers ofhavingfailedtopreventtheethniccleansing Muslim civilianscarried CAR. 389 388 tarian-violence/ (last accessed 7August 2018). 2014, 387 August 2018). hrw.org/news/2014/02/05/central-african-republic-seleka-fighters-regroup-north 386 republic-killings-idUKBREA0D0VL20140114. https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-centralafrican/u-n-points-to-chadian-collusion-in-central-african- 385 the-future-is-very-dark-central-african-republics-relentless-cycle-of-suffering. The Guardian, 18December 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/dec/18/ 384 383 african-republic (last accessed 7August 2018). December 2013, https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/12/18/they-came-kill/escalating-atrocities-central- 382 analysis/2014/02/12/who-are-anti-balaka-car 381 killings inthecountry found thatChadiancitizensandpeacekeeperswerealsoresponsibleformass mayor ofBangui,tookoverasInterimPresident.A2014UnitedNationsreport creasing violenceandinstability.Aweeklater,CatherineSamba-Panza,former On 10January2014,Djotodiaresignedovercriticismofhisfailuretostopthein- loyal toformerpresidentBozizé,asameansofcounterattack. committed widespread abuses, particularly in Ouham province, north of Bangui. December thatyear,theanti-BalakaspecifcallytargetedMuslimcommunitiesand 2013 andquicklyescalated.AccordingtoaHumanRightsWatchreportissuedin clashes betweenformerSelekafghtersandtheanti-BalakabeganinlateSeptember rican Republic,knownasMISCA,intoaUNpeacekeepingmissioncomposedof transformed thepreviousAU–ledInternationalSupportMissiontoCentralAf- Mission intheCAR(MINUSCA)actingunderChapterVIIofUNCharter.This Resolution 2149,establishedtheUNMultidimensionalIntegratedStabilization with morethan232,000inBanguialone. crimes. By March 2014, more than 650,000 people had been internally displaced, interim government arrested 11 anti-Balaka offcers and charged them with war ‘Briefing:Who Are theAnti-Balaka of CAR?’,IRIN,12February http://www.irinnews.org/ 2014, Amnesty International, ‘Central African Republic: EthnicCleansing andSectarian Killings’, 12February Ibid. T. Miles, ‘U.N. Points to ChadianCollusion inCentral African Republic Killings’, Reuters , 14January2014, HumanRightsWatch (HRW), ‘They Cameto Kill’:Escalating Atrocities in theCentral African Republic, 18 MINUSCA, ‘About’, MINUSCA, https://minusca.unmissions.org/en/about (last accessed 7August 2018). Ibid. HRW, ‘Central African Republic: Seleka Fighters Regroup inNorth’,5February 2014, R.Ratcliffe, ‘“The Future is Very Dark”: Central African Republic’s Relentless Cycle of Suffering’, 386 https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/02/central-african-republic-ethnic-cleansing-sec Inaddition,AmnestyInternationalalsoaccusedinternationalpeacekeep- 389 385 InApril2014,theUNSecurityCouncil(UNSC),through andforfacilitatingSelekaregroupingsinnortheastern . 388 Over290,000peoplehadalsofledto 387 381 Inresponse,the Intercommunal (last accessed 7 https://www. 383 The 384 382

of Adam’sPopularFrontfortheRebirthCentralAfrica(FPRC) Noureddine AdamdeclaredtheAutonomousRepublicofLogone, new militias,oftenfghtingeachother,andon14December2015therebelleader establish thecapitaloftheirfuturenortheasternCARstateinBambari. Central AfricanPatrioticMovement(MPC),aimedatdefeatingtheUPCinorderto Seleka groupitselfashewasnotamember. of CARbyPresidentSamba-Panza;hisappointment,however,wasrejectedthe lim politicianMahamatKamounwasappointedthefrstMuslimprimeminister the capital,Bangui,wasverylimited.InAugust,inwakeofthisdeal,Mus- south. Accordingly, hostilities slowlydecreased but government control outsideof partition ofCARwiththeSelekacontrollingnorthandanti-Balakamilitias agreement in Brazzaville leading, by the end of the year, to a de facto territorial In July 2014, ex-Seleka factions and anti-Balaka representatives signed a ceasefre security situationinBanguideterioratedsignifcantlyfromJune2016onwards. armed groupsbecauseoftheirinsuffcientrepresentationintheinstitutions; appointment also led to discontent within the Muslimcommunity and among as welltheneedtosetupSpecialCriminalCourt(SCC). bilization, reintegrationandrepatriation,thesecuritysectorreformprocesses government immediatelyemphasizedtheimportanceofdisarmament,demo- tional orderaftertwoyearsoftransitionalgovernment,andthenewlyappointed elected Presidentin February 2016.Theelectionsmarkedthereturnto constitu- in December2015andformerprimeministerFaustin-ArchangeTouadérawas mediately denouncedbyCAR’sinterimgovernment.Generalelectionswereheld https://international.la-croix.com/news/the-battle-of-ouaka-in-central-african-republic/4756#. 397 396 395 394 third_public_report_on_car_hrd_final.pdf (last accessed 7August 2018). 2016 to 31March 2017, pp8–9,https://minusca.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/20171228_minusca_ 393 www.reuters.com/article/us-centralafrica-politics-idUSKBN0TY1F620151215. 392 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-28738994 391 int/carII (last accessed 7August 2018). 390 Ali DarassaUnionforPeaceinCentralAfrica(UPC) Ouaka withintheSelekagroup,dividedintotwomainbranches:ononeside, At theendof2016,tensionseruptedinBambariandsurroundingregion August 2012totheInternationalCriminalCourt(ICC). 30 May2014,theGovernmentofCARreferredsituationinitsterritorysince1 10,000 militarypersonnel,whichbecameoperationalon15September2014.On reinforced itstroops to prevent the FPRCtaking city and, in February 2017, beginning of2017,violenceagainrosetothelevels2013 crisis.MINUSCA ‘Central African Republic Crisis:Rebels Reject New MuslimPMKamoun’, BBC News, 11 August 2014, L.Larcher, ‘The Battleof Ouaka inCentral African Republic’, LaCroix International, 27 February 2017, MINUSCA, Report ontheHumanRightsSituation in theCentral MINUSCA, African Republic from (CAR): 1 April Mainlycomposed of Muslimsfrom theFulaniethnicgroup of Bambari. ‘Central African Rebel Leader Declares Automous Republic’, Reuters , 15December 2015, https:// Mainlycomposed of Muslimsfrom theGulaandRunga ethniccommunities. Ibid. See International CriminalCourt (ICC), ‘Central African Republic II’,ICC-01/14, https://www.icc-cpi. . 395 391 and,ontheother,acoalition Ex-Selekafghtersformed 390

396 392 393 andAliKatim’s whichwasim- However,the 397 Bythe 394

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 85 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 86 major townofBria. were killedinfghtinginvolvingmainlyananti-BalakamilitiaandtheFPRC lim communityagainsttheanti-BalakaforcesofGaëtanBoade; UPC departuremeantthatMINUSCAwasnolongerobligedtoprotecttheMus- exchange foranendtoattacks. agreement, armedgroupsweretobegivenrepresentationinthepoliticalarena was signedinRomebetweentheCARGovernmentand14armedgroups.Under an ‘immediateceasefre’mediatedbytheRomanCatholicpeacegroupSant’Egidio was signedbetweentheUPC,FPRCandanti-Balakagroups. african-republic (last accessed 8August 2018). https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker?co=C042701#!/conflict/violence-in-the-central- 406 places-dans-le-nord-ouest_5239303_3212.html. https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/01/09/centrafrique-au-moins-25-000-nouveaux-de 405 404 ra.com/news/2017/08/sees-early-warning-signs-genocide-car-170807215828039.html. www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-40350057 402 aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/car-government-signs-peace-deal-rebel-groups-170619175516668.html. 401 com/news/2017/05/red-cross-115-bodies-car-bangassou-170517114611855.html. 400 399 fleeing-war-suffer-congo. October 2017, http://www.irinnews.org/feature/2017/10/30/people-are-dying-every-day-car-refugees- 398 Central AfricanRepublic(MNLC), Bélanga, waskilledbymembersoftheNationalMovementforLiberation In November2017,theleaderofChristianRevolutionandJustice(RJ),Clément 403 bari soastocreatean‘armedgroup-freezone’inCAR’ssecondlargestcity. same time,MINUSCAnegotiatedtheUPCleaderAliDarassa’sremovalfromBam- the FPRC’sChiefofStaff,JosephZoundeko,waskilledbyBlueHelmets.At early warningsignsofgenocide’ on onesideandChristianstheotherbecameevident;thus,UNstatedthat‘the ganized andclashedwiththeFPRCaswellanti-Balakagroups. By thesecondhalfof2017,fghtingshiftedtosoutheastwhereUPCreor- their missionendedinApril2017afterfveyearsofghting. inate theLord’sResistanceArmyinordertokeeppeacesoutheast,but relied onUgandanandAmericanspecialforcesdeployedinthecountrytoelim- caused thefghtingtospreadfromurbanruralareas.Additionally,MINUSCA FPRC havebeenboycottingpresidentTouadéra’sdisarmingefforts. Hautte-Koto regions.Finally,mostarmedgroupsincludingtheanti-Balakaand Paoua. Meanwhile,theUPCandFPRCkeepbattlingforcontrolinOuaka Accordingly, tensionsbetweenthetwogroupseruptedinnorthwesternCAR,around ‘CAR Government SignsPeace Deal With Rebel Groups’, AlJazeera, 19June2017, P. Kleinfeld, ‘“People Are DyingEvery Day” Refugees –CAR Fleeing War Suffer inCongo’, IRIN,30 Larcher, ‘The Battleof Ouaka inCentral African Republic’. ‘UN Sees Early Warning Signs of Genocide in CAR’, ‘Centrafrique: au moins 25,000 nouveaux déplacés dans le nord-ouest’, ‘CAR Violence: Deadly ClashesinBriaDespite Ceasefire Deal’, BBCJune2017, News, 21 https:// Council onForeign Relations, ‘Violence intheCentral Africa Republic’, Global Conflict Tracker, Kleinfeld, ‘“People Are Dying Every Day”’. ‘Red Cross: 115 bodiesFound Bangassou’, inCAR’s AlJazeera, 17May 2017, https://www.aljazeera. 402 ApatternofreprisalkillingstargetingethnicMuslimFulani 401 403 Adayafteritssigning,however,around100people 405 werepresent. In October2017,anotherceasefre . allegedlybackedbyFulanifghtersfromChad. Al Jazeera, 7 August 2017, Le Monde, 9 January 2018, 404 400 399 On19June2017, however,italso 406 https://www.aljazee

https://www. 398 The

is amongPresidentTouadéra’smosturgenttasks. africa/car-army.htm (last accessed 9August 2018). 409 asp?country_id=central-african-republic (last accessed 9August 2018). African Republic Military Strength’, https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail. 408 cessed 9August 2018). ghproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/SplinteredWarfare_August2017_Enough_final.pdf Politico-Military Groups intheCentral African Republic , The EnoughProject, August 2017, https://enou 407 can ArmedForces(FACA) different armed groups in the country, rebuilding a mixed army – Central Afri- Within thecurrentcontextoflawlessnesscharacterizingviolenceamong • with formerpresidentBozizé: and theMPC)ananti-Balakagroup(anti-Balaka–Mokom wing)associated ka factions(i.e.theFPRC,AssemblyforRenaissanceofCentral Africa(RPRC) foreigners. The Coalition is composed of various armed groups, including ex-Sele- which refusedtojoinit,aswellthePeuhl/Fulanicommunitiesaccusedofbeing tion ofitsresourcestobeneftleaders.IthassystematicallytargetedtheUPC, members, expandthedefactopartitionofcountryandallowforexploita- The CoalitionformedinSeptember2016tostrengthenthenegotiatingpowerof its a. TheCoalition the sameclaimforothersisnotunequivocal. old requiredfortheapplicationofinternationalhumanitarianlawNIACs,while Return, Reclamation,Rehabilitation(3R))seemtoreachtheorganizationalthresh- most important and active ones: among these, some (i.e. the Coalition, the UPC and ganization controlmostofthecountry.Thefollowinglistattemptstoidentify Currently, a wide array of armed groups characterized by different degreesof or- 2. Non-StateParties theless remainscontroversial. for MINUSCAtobeconsideredapartytheconflictwithPK5groups.Thisnever- One couldarguethattheconfrontationreachedintensitythresholdrequired frontation betweentheUNmissionandarmedgroupsinPK5neighbourhood. der todismantlemilitiabasesinBanguiled,April2018,somedirectfrecon- The increasinginvolvementofMINUSCAinjointoperationswiththeFACAor- 1. MINUSCA to thecurrentconflictinfollowinganalysis. power andcontroloutsideofthecapital,Bangui,itisnotconsideredtobeaparty B. PARTIES TO THE CONFLICTS See N.Dukhan,Splintered Warfare: Alliances, Affiliations, and Agendas of Armed Factions and FACA iscurrently estimated to have 5,825active military personnel. See Global Firepower, ‘Central GlobalSecurity.org, ‘Central African Republic Army’, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ and NourredineAdamMichelDjotodia,thepreviousSeleka leaderand The FPRC was created in August 2014 from the previous Seleka coalition Popular FrontfortheRebirthofCentralAfrica(FPRC) 408 –representingthediversityofCAR’sethnicgroups, 407 409 Asthearmystillhaslimited (last ac -

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 87 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 88 well asbeintegratedwithinthe governmentandthenationalarmedforces. central governmentbutrather tomaintainandexpandtheirterritorialcontrolas Congo. TheleadersoftheUPC declarethattheirpurposeisnottooverthrowthe to armsfromtheregion,particularly SudanandtheDemocraticRepublicof part ofthecountry,andremains strongthankstoitsmilitarycommandandaccess to leaveitsstrongholdinBambari.ItnowoccupiestheAlindao area,thesoutheast became themaintargetofCoalition’sattacksand,inMarch 2017,wasforced armed groupinCAR,thuscreatingtensionswithotherex-Seleka factions.Itthen Muslims fromtheFulaniethnicgroupofBambari.In2016, itwasthestrongest The UPCwasformedinOctober2014byAliDarassaandis mainly composedof c. UnionforPeaceinCentralAfrica(UPC) according tosome,theMLCJisunoffciallypartofCoalition. of theSelekacoalitionin2012and2013.Itsleaderssupport FPRC’sagendaand, The MLCJdatesbackto2008,whenitsplinteredfromtheUFDR, andwasthenpart b. MovementofCentralAfricanLiberatorsforJustice(MLCJ) • • • rage againstthecentralgovernmentandinternationalcommunity. the so-called‘AllianceofNairobists’,withFPRCsoastoincreasetheirleve- Coalition and,sinceJanuary2015,theMokomwinghasalsoformedanalliance, Mokom anditsparticularaimistobringingBozizébackpower.Itpartofthe gime andinself-defencegroups.ItsmainleadersareFrançoisBozizéMaxime vious members of Bozizé’s presidential guard as well as army offcers under hisre- The Anti-Balaka–Mokomwing formed in2015andismainlycomposedofpre- Anti-Balaka –Mokomwing(associatedwithBozizé) political system. and alsoseektoensuretheinclusionofCARcitizenswithChadianoriginin share thesamepoliticalagendaasCoalition,whichtheyaremembersof, RJ, mainlybasedonsharingeconomicrevenueinareastheybothcontrol.They since May2017.Additionally,2016theMPChasalsohadanalliancewith of theMPCleaders,Mahamatal-Khatim,hasbeenCoalition’sChiefStaff The MPC emerged in July 2015 and was until then affliated with the FPRC. One Central AfricanPatrioticMovement(MPC) offcial partitionthecountrywithBambariasnewcapitalitsownstate. government inordertore-establishaSelekaregimeor,alternatively,havean from theGulaethnicgroup,anditsmainobjectiveistooverthrowcentral the FPRC.ItsmainleadersareGontranDjonoAhabaandZakariaDamane,both The RPRCformedinNovember2014havingbeen previously affliatedwith Assembly fortheRenaissanceofCentralAfrica(RPRC) the Muslimcommunityinordertojustifyitsreprisals. groups, itsstrategyistomanipulatethethreatofanti-Balakaviolenceagainst president of CAR, are among its main leaders. Together with other affliated 412 411 3035217671.html. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/newly-formed-3r-rebel-group-inflicts-horrors-car-16122 410 non-Muslim communityfromthethreatofex-Selekafactions. Thus,itrefusesto The NationalCoordinationoftheEx-Anti-Balakaemergedin 2014toprotectthe i. NationalCoordinationoftheEx-Anti-Balaka not haveaspecifcpoliticalagenda,normilitarytraining. joined theanti-Balakamovementsince2013tocounterattack theSeleka.Theydo Such groups were initially created around 1980–1990 in northern CAR and have h. Anti-BalakaLocalGroups April 2018,theywereinvolvedinviolentfreconfrontationswithMINUSCA. ers from PK5, fourself-defence groups remained active but became less powerful.In were usedforpoliticalgain.InAugust2016,afterthedepartureofFPRClead- 2015, ex-SelekaleaderstookcontrolofthePK5areaandMuslimself-defencegroups (also knownasKM5)toprotecttheMuslimcommunityfromanti-Balakaattacks.In These groupsemergedinDecember2013Bangui’sMuslimneighbourhoodPK5 g. MuslimSelf-DefenceGroupsinBangui tensions eruptedafterthekillingofRJleaderClémentBélangainNovember2017. Fulani fghtersfrom Chad. It divided the territoryin the northwest with RJ,but a formermemberandco-founderoftheFPRCMPC,isallegedlybackedby The MNLCwasfoundedinOctober2017underthecommandofMahamatBahar, Christian anti-Balakamilitias. purpose ofprotectingtheminorityMuslimPeuhlpopulationsfromattacksby 3R wasformedtowardstheendof2015byGeneralSidikiAbasswithinitial d. Return,Reclamation,Rehabilitation(3R) ever, itseemstobeaCameroonianorCentralAfricangroup ants threateningtheFulani/PeuhlcommunitieswholiveinsouthwestCAR.How- has noknownlinkswithSelekarebels.3RalsoclaimstofghtagainstRJcombat- (MNLC) f. NationalMovementfortheLiberationofCentralAfricanRepublic under itscontrol.Insuchterritories,RJcohabitateswiththeMPC. has builtitspoweronasystemoftaxationanddefactopartitiontheterritories CAR, mostlybymembersofthepresidentialguardformerpresidentPatassé.It RJ wascreatedin2015withotherself-defencegroupslocatednorthwestern e. RevolutionandJustice(RJ) resources throughtaxationandkidnapping. is tomaintainthedefactopartitionofcountrysoaskeepbeneftingfromits Ibid. ‘Centrafrique: aumoins 25,000 nouveaux déplacés danslenord-ouest’. A. Essa, ‘Newly A. Formed 3RRebel Group InflictsHorrors UN’,AlJazeera inCAR: , 23December 2016, 412 410 ItismadeupofmostlyMuslimcattleherdersand 411 whoserealpurpose

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 89 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 90

state actors thermore, inJanuary2018theUNSCextendedCARarmsembargoagainstnon- safrica.com/2018/03/26/scores-killed-in-renewed-car-rebellion/. 418 https://www.voanews.com/a/security-council-renews-central-african-republic-arms-embargo/4232352.html. 417 African-Republic/un-arms-embargo-on-the-central-african-republic (last accessed 9August 2018). the Central African Republic’, https://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/un_arms_embargoes/Central- UN Sanctions Committee. See Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, ‘UN Arms Embargo on and related material to thecountry except to itssecurity forces, ifpreviously approved by therelevant embargo onnon-state actors whichhassince inCAR, been extended annually. Itbans allsuppliesof arms 416 415 414 sis-sub-prefecture (last accessed 9August 2018). unmissions.org/en/minusca-denounces-violence-rj-and-mnlc-armed-groups-provoked-humanitarian-cri Humanitarian CrisisintheSub-Prefecture of Paoua’, press release, 20 January2018, https://minusca. 413 gatoloum SayoandtheMNLCundercommandofMahamatBahar, the townofPaouatoescapeclashesbetweenRJundercommandArmelNin- At thebeginningof2018,around60,000peopleflednorthernCARendingupin specifc politicalagenda. is inwesternCAR,neartheborderwithCameroon.Currently,itdoesnothavea regime, thenbrieflyjoinedtheSelekacoalitionin2013.Itsmilitarystronghold The FDPCfrstemergedin2003withthemainpurposeofoverthrowingBozizé’s j. DemocraticFrontoftheCentralAfricanPeople(FDPC) Ngaïssona, whosecandidacywasrejectedbythetransitionalgovernment. disarm aslongtheSelekagroupsremainarmed.ItisledbyPatrice-Edouard a jointoperationaimedatdismantlingthemilitiabasesin area.Thisquickly ly MuslimneighbourhoodofPK5inBangui,MINUSCAandtheFACAconducted against civiliansperpetratedbyself-defencegroupscontrollingthepredominant- During thenightof7–8April2018,followingcontinuedviolenceandabuses to establishasecureareaandenablethereturnofdisplacedpopulations. NUSCA conductedanoperationtooustthearmedgroupsaroundPaouainorder and theresultingdisplacementofpopulationsinsuchareas. believed toberesponsibleforthedestructionofseveralvillagesnorthPaoua targeting theMuslimandPeuhlcommunities.TheMNLC,onotherhand,was CA’s investigations,membersofRJhaveintentionallykilledcivilians,specifcally voking ahumanitariancrisisinthesub-prefectureofPaoua.AccordingtoMINUS- civilian population. of peopledeadandresultedinseveralinjuriessignifcantdisplacementthe in thevillageofTagbara,located70kmfromBambari,leftanunspecifednumber deadly confrontationbetweentheanti-BalakaandelementsofUPCoccurred C. KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2018 ‘UNSecurity Council Renews ArmsEmbargo, CAR Threatens More Sanctions’, MINUSCA, ‘Minusca Denounces MINUSCA, theViolence by RJ andMNLC Armed Groups That Provoked a Ibid. O. Mbiko, ‘Scores Killed inRenewed Rebellion’, CAR News Africa Caj , 26 March 2018, http://cajnew InDecember 2013, theUNSecurity Council unanimouslyadopted Resolution 2127 imposinganarms Ibid. 416 for another year, threatening further sanctions. 418

VOA News, 30January2018, 414 417 Accordingly,MI- In March 2018,a 413 thuspro- 415 Fur-

quarter oftheyear. cluding armedrobberies,murderandkidnapping),comparedwith63inthefrst fairs, fromApriltoJune2018,118incidentsaffectedhumanitarianworkers(in- increasing. AccordingtotheUNOffceforCoordinationofHumanitarianAf- contain theviolence. protect civilianlivesonthesitehavebeenharshlycriticizedfortheirfailureto people withdisabilitieshavebeenkilledandtheUNpeacekeepersmandatedto Between 70 and100 camp residentsincluding women, children, older people and geting peacekeepersandgovernmentforces. denied theaccusations,arguingthattheywerearmedcriminalswhohadbeentar- Bangui, claiming they were civilians killed by UN peacekeepers; a UN spokesman people whodiedduringthefreconfrontationinfrontofUNheadquarters 425 16 December 2018). Alindao, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR1995732018ENGLISH.PDF (last accessed 424 af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKBN1KJ06N-OZATP 423 cdl8n2ede23t/central-african-republic&link_location=live-reporting-story www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43964817?intlink_from_url=https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/ 422 www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43735333. 421 casque-bleu-a-ete-tue_5283837_3212.html. April 2018, https://mobile.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/04/11/regain-de-violences-a-bangui-ou-un- 420 apres-le-debut-d-une-operation-militaire-contre-des-groupes-armes_5282835_3212.html. Monde, 9April2018, https://mobile.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/04/09/regain-de-tension-a-bangui- 419 tion initsterritorytotheICC. CAR ratifedtheRomeStatuteon3October2001andhastwicereferredsitua- the armedgroups, turned intoaviolentfreconfrontationbetweentheUNstabilizationmissionand the Muslimcommunity,thiscampwasusedbyanti-Balakafghtersasarefuge. of Alindao in the Basse-Kotto region. According to a growing perception within vilians, carriedoutanattackoninternallydisplacedpeople’scampinthetown On 15November2018,theUPC,togetherwithlargenumbersofarmedMuslimci- peacekeeper, and46wounded. el groupwasarrested. MINUSCA spokesperson,violencerenewedafterasuspectedmemberofPK5reb- the Notre-DamedeFatimachurchinBangui,nearPK5area.Accordingtoa including apriest,werekilledand99injuredinanattackdirectedagainst D. WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS ‘UN:Central African Republic Corpse Protest Was Propaganda’, BBC News, 12April2018, https:// ‘Regain detension àBanguiaprès ledébutd’uneopération militaire contre desgroupes armés’, Le N.Peyton, ‘Attacks onAid Workers Rise inCentral African Republic, Reuters, 29July2018, https:// Ibid. ‘BanguiChurch Attack: 15Killed inCentral African Republic’, BBC News, 1May 2018,https:// Amnesty International, “Everything Was inFlames”: The Attack onaDisplaced Persons Campin ‘Le regain desviolences àBanguifait aumoins18 morts,dontuncasque bleu’,Le Monde , 11 419 423 resultinginatleast18peopledead,amongwhomwasone 425

422

Furthermore,attacksagainstaidworkersaredrastically 420 On11April,protestorsplacedthebodiesof17 . 421 On1May2018,atleast15people, . 424

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 91 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 92 which reversedTrialChamberIII’sdecisionof21March2016. was acquittedon8June2018byamajoritydecisionoftheICCAppealsChamber, operating inCARandalliedwiththethenpresident,Ange-FélixPatassé,buthe dent andCommander-in-Chiefofthe Movement for the Liberation of Congo,also operated withintheanti-Balakamovement. is againstAlfredYekatom,allegedcommanderofagroup3,000memberswhich the contextofrenewedviolencesince1August2012.Theonlycaseopenedsofar mitted byboththeMuslimSelekacoalitionandChristiananti-Balakagroupsin humanity (i.e.murder,rape,forceddisplacementandpersecution)allegedlycom- humanitarian missionsandtheuseofchildsoldiersunder15)crimesagainst and currentlyfocusesonwarcrimes(i.e.murder,rape,pillaging,attacksagainst afrique/20181023-rca-justice-lancement-cour-penale-speciale-bangui-cps. 433 (last accessed 9August 2018). 2018), 432 (last accessedname=PR1425 16December 2018). Humanity andWar Crimes’, press release, 12December 2018, https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx? 431 December 2018). Answers, 430 429 ICC-01/05-01/08 8June2018. A, Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo Against Trial Chamber’s III ‘Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute’, 428 427 2018). 426 into theCentralAfricanjusticesystem. mulgated organiclaw15/003establishingtheSCC,ahybridtribunalintegrated On 3June2015,thetheninterimPresidentofCAR,CatherineSamba-Panza,pro- The secondICCinvestigationinCAR(CARII) The frstICCinvestigationinCAR(CARI) aka, wasarrestedbytheFrenchauthoritiespursuanttoanICCarrestwarrant. Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, leader ofthe National CoordinationoftheEx-Anti-Bal- 2003. IthasproducedonemaincaseagainstJean-PierreBembaGombo, government andrebelforcessince1July2002,withapeakofviolencein2002 crimes againsthumanitycommittedwithinthecontextofaNIACbetween October 2018. ted inCARsince1January2003.Itofficiallylauncheditsinvestigationson22 crime ofgenocide,crimesagainsthumanityandwarcrimes)allegedlycommit- prosecute and try serious human rights and humanitarian law violations (i.e. the ICC, ‘Situation in Central African Republic II: Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona Arrested for CrimesAgainst ‘RCA: inauguration delaCour pénale spéciale’, RFIAfrique, 23October 2018, http://www.rfi.fr/ See ICC, The Prosecutor vJean-Pierre Bemba Gombo,ICC-01/05-01/08. P. Labuda,‘The Special CriminalCourt intheCentral African Republic’, Insights 2(22January 22ASIL See ICC, Situation:Central African Republic, The Prosecutor vAlfred Yekatom, Questions and ICC, The Prosecutor vJean-Pierre Bemba Gombo,Appeals Chamber, Judgmentonthe Appeal of Mr See ICC, ‘Central African Republic’, ICC-01/05, https://www.icc-cpi.int/car (last accessed 9August See ICC, ‘Central African Republic II’. https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/22/issue/2/special-criminal-court-central-african-republic https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/181117-qa-yekatom_ENG.pdf 433

432 The SCCisauthorizedtoinvestigate, 430 426 focusedonallegedwarcrimesand Furthermore, on12December2018, 429 was openedinSeptember2014 428

(last accessed 16 427 Presi- 431

(MLC) wasbackedbytheGovernmentofUganda.Kabila,on otherhand,man- Congolese Democracy(RCD)whiletheMovementfor Liberation ofCongo rebellions, thistimewiththeaimofoustinghim:Rwanda backed theRallyfor be unwillingtoleavethecountrywhenasked.By1998,hisallies supportednew try. HefailedtoexpeltheHutumilitiaandhisforeignalliesin theADFLprovedto However, Kabilaimmediatelyfacedsubstantialobstaclesto governing thecoun- on Kinshasa,overthrewMobutu’sgovernmentandinstalledKabilaasPresident. ward, takingcontrolofbordertownsandmines.Bymid-1997,theADFLmarched against PresidentMobutu.InDecember1996,hebeganaslowmovementwest- the LiberationofCongo-Zaire(ADFL),allowinghimtoleadafull-scalerebellion Rwanda and Burundi, which merged into the Alliance of Democratic Forces for (1996–1997). KabilagainedsupportfromneighbouringcountriessuchasUganda, by LaurentKabila,thusmarkingthebeginningofso-calledFirstCongoWar world-africa-11108589. 436 of-congo (last accessed 12July2018). https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker#!/conflict/violence-in-the-democratic-republic- 435 news/world-africa-13286306. 434 genocide inRwanda. tarian crises, has its origins in the massive refugee crisis that resulted from the 1994 The currentviolenceinDRC,qualifedasoneoftheworld’sworstactivehumani- series ofnon-internationalarmedconflicts(NIACs). (Ituri andNorthSouthKivuprovinces).Thus,thesituationinDRCremainsa of rebelgroupshasescalatedinthelasttwoyears,especiallyeasternregions tion Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), and a wide array Forces ofDRC(FARDC),supportedbytheUnitedNationsOrganizationStabiliza- Violence intheDemocraticRepublicofCongo(DRC)involvingArmed Classification oftheConflict 3. DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: CONFLICT IN THE ations. began toattacktheTutsipopulationwhohadbeenlivingincountryforgener- with MobutuSeseSeko,militarydictatorandPresidentofDRCsince1965, newly establishedTutsigovernmentledbyPaulKagame.Theyalliedthemselves 1994, morethan2millionHutusfledtoneighbouringDRCfearingreprisalsbythe A. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT EASTERN REGIONS Council onForeign Relations, ‘Violence intheDemocratic Republic of Congo’ Global Conflict Tracker, ‘Q&A: DR Congo Conflict’, BBC News, 20 November 2012, https://www.bbc.com/news/ ‘Democratic Republic of Congo Profile –Timeline’, BBC News, 14May 2018, https://www.bbc.com/ 436 Inresponse,Rwanda’sTutsigovernmentstartedtobackmilitiasled 435 AfterRwanda’sgenocidalregimewasoverthrowninJune 434 Giulia Marcucci

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 93 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 94 took partintheRwandangenocideandcontinuedtooperate ineasternCongo. and thedisarmamentarrestof Hutu militiaknownasInterahamwe,which focused ontwomainissues:thewithdrawalofRwandansoldiersfromeast, deal. InJuly,RwandaandDRCsignedapeacedealknownasthePretoriaAccord, was tobethepremier.Rwandan-backedRCDrebels,onotherhand,rejected er-sharing dealwithUgandan-backedrebels,accordingtowhichtheMLCleader the countryfromApriltoDecember.InApril,DRCGovernmentsignedapow- In 2002,undertheauspicesofSouthAfrica,aseriespeacetalkswereheldin recommended thattheUNSecurityCouncil(UNSC)imposesanctions. country inordertoexploititsresources(diamonds,cobalt,coltanandgold) Rwanda, UgandaandZimbabwe,weredeliberatelyprolongingtheconflictin el ofexpertsconductedaninvestigationconcludingthatthewarringparties,i.e. Uganda andtherebels,toaUNpulloutplan.InAprilofsameyear,pan- and theRwandanPresidentKagamemetinWashingtonagreed,alongwith son, JosephKabila,wassworninasPresidenttoreplacehim.Thenewpresident forces. Furthermore,inJanuary2001,Kabilawasshotdeadbyabodyguardandhis tween rebelsandgovernmentforcesaswellbetweenRwandanUgandan Ugandan troopswassignedaswell.Finally,inDecemberaglobal andall-inclusive In September,apeacedealbetweenDRCandUgandaincluding thewithdrawalof and theCongolesearmyonother). tory aswelltheclashesbetweenRwandanandUgandanarmiesononeside tional conflicts(i.e.theconflictbetweenUgandaandRwandaonCongoleseterri- against Kabila’sgovernmentandMLCgovernment)interna- The conflictwasthuscategorizedasacombinationofinternalconflicts(i.e.RCD tion, otherforeignarmiesandatleast16armedgroupstookpartintheconflict. fought onCongoleseland,theso-calledSecondCongoWar(1998–2003).Inaddi- and, accordingly,forthefollowingfveyearsawarinvolvingallsixcountrieswas acronym MONUC,tomonitortheceasefre; groups. By2000,theUNauthorizedaforceof5,537troops,knownbyFrench ceasefre accordinLusaka,whichwasthenalsosignedbytheMLCandRCDrebel In July1999,thesixmainAfricancountriesinvolvedinconflictsigned a theguardian.com/world/2002/jul/31/congo.chrismcgreal. 441 440 439 438 great-lakes-region-1994-2005#congo_part3 (last accessed 12July2018). the Great Lakes Region (1994–2005)’, https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/case-study-armed-conflicts- Res 1999. See International 1234, Committee of theRed Cross (ICRC), ‘Case Study: Armed Conflicts in individual orcollective self-defence, asset outinArticle51 of theUNCharter, and asrecalled inUNSC 437 aged toobtainsupportfrom other countries, i.e. Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe They intervened intheconflict insupportof theCongolese army by invoking theinherent rightof See C. McGreal, See C. ‘Rwanda andCongo SignPeace Accord’, The Guardian, 31July2002, https://www. Ibid. Ibid. UNSCRes 1279, 30November 1999. 439

440 nonetheless, fghtingcontinuedbe- 441 438 437

clared thewinnerwithgeneralapprovalofinternationalmonitors. Bemba. AfterthesecondroundheldinOctoberofsameyear,Kabilawasde- in thepresidentialvotebetweenKabilaandoppositioncandidate,Jean-Pierre elections infourdecadeswereheldJuly2006buttherewasnoclearwinner cordingly, thelatterhadtocompensateKinshasagovernment. sovereignty hadbeenviolatedbyUgandaduringtheSecondCongoWarand,ac- Moreover, inDecember2005,theInternationalCourtofJusticeruledthatDRC’s South Kivuprovinces)totheInternationalCriminalCourt(ICC)inApril2004. the situationineasternpartofcountry(theIturiregionandNorth South Kivu,IturiandNorthernKatanga.TheDRCGovernmentdecidedtorefer eas ofconflictremainedbetweengovernmentforcesandrebelgroups:North refused to give up their power and elections had to be postponed. Three main ar- upcoming elections,hadtofacecontinuousinstability:theformerwarringparties However, the transitional government formed by President Kabila to lead until the within twoyears. disarming andintegratingthewarringpartiesholdingdemocraticelections a planfortransitionalgovernancewiththepurposeofreunifyingcountry, This agreementmarkedtheformalendofSecondCongoWarandputinplace 448 447 https://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/22/world/africa/22congo.html. 446 November 2006, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/nov/16/congo.chrismcgreal1. 445 20051219-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf (last accessed 15January2019). the Congo vUganda),Judgment,19December 2005, https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/116/116- 444 icc-cpi.int/drc (last accessed 15January2019). 443 dr-congo-inter-congolese. https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/global-and-inclusive-agreement-transition- Political Negotiations on the Peace Process and on Transition in the DRC, ReliefWeb, 16 December 2002, 442 with aviewtoendingyearsofviolenceintheeast In January2008,theDRCGovernmentandrebelmilitiassignedapeacedeal agreement wassignedbetweentheDRCGovernmentandmainrebelgroups. through Resolution1925, kept destabilizingthewiderGreatLakesregion.Therefore,InJuly2010,UNSC, Congolese armyand,inNovember2012,successfullytookthe majorcityofGoma ethnic TutsisandallegedlybackedbytheRwandanGovernment,wasfghting and civiliansecurityineasternDRC.Indeed,theM23,arebelgroupcomposedof tralizing armedgroupsandcontributingtoreducingtheirthreatstateauthority 2098, reached inthecountry.InMarch2013,UNSCcreated,throughResolution USCO, adding‘stabilization’toitspreviousmandatesoasreflectthenewphase UNSCRes 1925, 28May 2010. See International CriminalCourt (ICC), ‘Democratic Republic of theCongo’, ICC-01/04, https://www. See C. McGreal, See C. ‘Opposition Objects asKabila Named Congo Election Winner’, The Guardian , 16 See Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DR Congo: Inter-Congolese Dialogue – UNSCRes 2098, 28March 2013. L.Polgreen, ‘Congo Agrees to Peace Deal With Rebels’, The New York Times, 22January2008, International Court of Justice, Armed Activities ontheTerritory of theCongo (Democratic Republic of 448 a specialized Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) with the mandate of neu- 447 re-establishedthepeacekeepingoperationasMON- 446 butrenewedwavesofconflict 444 The frstfree 445 442 443

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 95 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 96 least another year. scheduling electionsfor23December2018andthusextendingKabila’sruleat ber 2017,however,thenationalelectoralcommissionannouncedanewcalendar, armed groupstoallytheirforces,withtheoverarchinggoalofoustingKabila. 450 news/world-africa-20405739. 449 national humanitarianlawofNIACs), of whichdonotmeetthelevelorganizationrequiredforapplicationinter- Given the continuousproliferation of different armed groups in eastern DRC (most located inNorthKivuprovince, forcing civilians to flee. 451 cessed 12July2018). https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/29/dr-congo-repression-persists-election-deadline-nears (last ac Armed%20Groups%20Essay%20KST.pdf (last accessed 12July2018). Tracker, December 271, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Landscape%20of%20 453 Trial Chamber, Judgment,IT-04-82-T, 10 July2008, §§194–203. Judgment, IT-04-84-T, 3April2008, §60; ICTY, The Prosecutor Boškoski vLjube andJohanTarčulovski, of non-state armed groups, see also ICTY, The Prosecutor vRamushHaradinaj andothers , Trial Chamber, a series of indicative factors furtherdeveloped by inorder theICTY to assess thedegree of organization 452 com/2017/11/06/drc-sets-elections-for-december-2018/. and theliftingofbanonpeacefulpoliticalprotestsmeetings. oners, thereturnofpoliticalleaderslivinginexile,amoreopenaccesstomedia mentation of‘confdencebuildingmeasures’suchasthereleasepoliticalpris- 2017, wassignedon31December2016.Thecompromisealsocalledfortheimple- envisaging apoliticaltransitionwithpresidentialelectionstobeheldbytheendof the aegisofinfluentialCatholicChurchandSaintSylvesterAgreement, gotiations betweenKabila’srulingcoalitionandtheoppositiontookplaceunder to postponetheorganizationofdemocraticelections.Accordingly,aseriesne- fnal ve-yearterm;however,herefusedtostepdownandshoweddetermination in offce.InDecember2016,Kabilawasapproachingtheendhissecondand limits thepresidentialtermtoamaximumoftwoconsecutiveperiodsfveyears turmoil. Since the 2005 constitutional referendum, the Congolese Constitution Recent violencewasmainlylinkedtothecountry’sworseningpoliticalcrisisand (FDLR) nonethelesstooktheopportunitytoregroupandstrengthentheirpower. Other rebelgroupssuchastheDemocraticForcesforLiberationofRwanda M23 rebelstoultimatelysurrenderandapeacedealwassignedinDecember2013. conducted bytheCongolesearmy,signifcantlysupportedFIB,caused Kivu provincesalone. straightforward. Around120armedgroupshavebeencountedinNorthandSouth B. PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT See ‘DRC Sets Elections for December 2018’, J. Stearns Vogel, andC. The Landscape of Armed Groups in Eastern Congo, KivuSecurity See ICTY, The Prosecutor vDusko Tadić, Trial Chamber, Judgment,IT-94-1-T, 7May 1997, §562. For See Human Rights Watch (HRW), ‘DR Congo: Repression Persists as Election Deadline Nears’, ‘Goma: M23Rebels Capture DRCongo City’, BBC News, 20 November 2012, https://www.bbc.com/ 451 The growing frustration of this political impasse led several 453 The followinglistattemptstoidentifythemostprominent. 452 Africanews, 6 November 2017, determining thepartiestoconflictisnot 449 Only a strong offensive http://www.africanews. 450 In Novem- -

especially sexualviolence,perpetratedbyFARDCrecruits. ever, therehavebeenmanyinvestigationsandreportsonhumanrightsabuses, warring rebelgroupsareplacedtogetherinordertoenhanceintegration.How- through aprocesscalledbrassage(‘mixingup’)inwhichsoldiersfromformerly part ofthepeaceprocessfollowingendSecondCongoWarinJuly2003 13 July2018). 458 ads/publications/ipi_e_pub_legal_issues_drc_brigade.pdf (last accessed 15January2019). of the Congo, International Peace Institute, Novemberhttps://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uplo 2014, 457 456 S/2009/603, 23November 2009. 455 cessed 13July2018). power.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=democratic-republic-of-the-congo (last ac 454 3. UgandanAlliedDemocraticForces–Nalu(ADF–Nalu) towards activepeaceenforcementandevenbeyond. a radicalchangeinUNpeaceefforts:shiftawayfromtraditionalpeacekeeping ity ledtoMONUSCO’squalifcationasapartytheconflict.Italsorepresented sives conductedbyseveralarmedgroups;thisactiveinvolvementincombatactiv- security. Thus, the FIB hasprovided military support to the FARDC against offen- neutralizing armedgroupsandreducingtheirthreattostateauthoritycivilian under directcommandoftheMONUSCOForceCommanderwithmandate through resolution2098,aspecialized‘ForceInterventionBrigade’(FIB),operating and thewiderGreatLakesregion,on28March2013UNSCdecidedtocreate, tion 2053.AscontinuousconflictineasternDRCkeptdestabilizingthecountry the situationonground.ThismandatewasfurtherdetailedbyUNSCResolu- confgurations ofthemissionwouldbedeterminedaccordingtoevolution DRC Governmentinitsstabilizationandpeace-consolidationefforts.Futurere- rights defendersunderimminentthreatofphysicalviolence,andtosupportthe other things,totheprotectionofcivilians,humanitarianpersonnelandhuman was authorizedtouseallnecessarymeanscarryoutitsmandaterelating,among from theearlierUNpeacekeepingoperationknownasMONUC.Thenewmission MONUSCO wasestablishedbyUNSCResolution1925on1July2010,takingover Republic ofCongo(MONUSCO) 2. UnitedNationsOrganizationStabilizationMissionintheDemocratic rently estimatedtohave 144,625 activemilitary personnel. The FARDCisthestateorganizationresponsiblefordefendingDRC,anditcur- 1. ArmedForcesoftheDemocraticRepublicCongo(FARDC) movement mainlybasedinDRC.Itsmainmilitarycampsare locatedinBeniter- (NALU) under the leadership of Jamil Mukulu, it transformed into an Islamist ernment. AftertheunionwithNationalArmyforLiberation ofUganda The ADForiginallyemergedasanarmedgroupinopposition to theUgandanGov- S.Sheeran andS.Case, The Intervention Brigade:Legal Issues for theUNinDemocratic Republic See UNSC, Final ReportSee UNSC, of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UNdoc See MONUSCO, ‘Mandate’, https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/mandate (last accessed 13July2018). KivuSecurity Tracker, Armed Groups , Global Firepower, ‘Democratic Republic of the Congo Military Strength’, https://www.globalfire 456 https://kivusecurity.org/about/armedGroups (last accessed 457 455 458

454 It was rebuiltas -

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 97 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 98 deputy commanderoftheNDCarmedgroup, The NDC–Rwascreatedin2015byGuidonShimiray,aformer FARDCoffcer,then 6. NdumaDefenseofCongo(NDC–R) senior leadersanditisnowestimatedtohavearound500fghters. support aswellsometerritoriesinNorthKivu,theFARDCarrestedseveralofits groups aswelltheFARDCitselfagainstFDLR;however,itrecentlylostsuch ugees. SuchamoderatestanceallowedtheCNRDtogainfavourofvarious the RwandanGovernment,callingforimmediaterepatriationofref- dan refugeecommunityineasternCongo.Initially,itsupportednegotiationswith due tolongstandingdisagreementsoverpoliticalissues,i.e.thefateofRwan- The CNRD is the group that emerged in May 2016 after the split with the FDLR 2009 totheendofSeptember2010;however,heisstillatlarge. of war crimes allegedly committed in the Kivu provinces of DRC from 20 January warrant againstFDLRmilitarycommander,SylvestreMudacumura,forninecounts hampered bycollusionwiththeFARDC.On13July2012,ICCissuedanarrest tions conductedby the Congolese army, although the latter was onmanyoccasions and thensufferedsomedefectionsaswellaseriesofanti-FDLRmilitaryopera- (FOCA). Itreachedthepeakofitsmilitaryandeconomicstrengthinearly2000s wing oftheorganization,whilearmedisAbacunguziFightingForces casting asidetheirassociationwiththeRwandangenocide.TheFDLRispolitical the formerArmyforLiberationofRwanda(ALiR),withoriginalpurpose The FDLRwasformedin2000throughanamalgamationofHutugroups,including 4. DemocraticForcesfortheLiberationofRwanda(FDLR) extradited toUganda,leavingthegroupunderSekaMusaBaluku’scommand. batants decimated.In2015,itsleader,JamiMukulu,wasarrestedinTanzaniaand FARDC in2014againsttheADF,manyofitscampsweredestroyedandcom- ritory, closetotheIturiRainforest.DuringSukolaIoperationlaunchedby MONUSCO inmid-2017. Itisunclear whether the originalgroup still exists and operates. Ntabo Ntaberi, aformer mineral trader inWalikale territory (NorthKivu),whosurrendered himself to community-based militiasactive inCongo andformed to defend itslocal territory. Itwas created by Sheka 463 462 461 raeng.pdf (last accessed 13July2018). ICC-01/04-01/12, Case Information Sheet, https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/pids/publications/mudacumu 460 459 5. NationalCouncilforRenewalandDemocracy(CNRD–Ubwiyunge) strength inlate2017wasestimatedtobebetween500and1,000fghters. Kivu units.Sincethen,theFDLR’sactivitiesandcapacityhavebeenlimited,its Renewal andDemocracy(CNRD–Ubwiyunge),whichtookoveralltheFDLR’sSouth icant internalsplit led tothecreationofanotherfaction,NationalCouncilfor KivuSecurity Tracker, Armed Groups. The emerging NDC, from theNyanga community, was oneof themainMai-Maigroups, local and Ibid. Ibid. ICC, SituationintheDemocratic Republic of theCongo: The Prosecutor vSylvestre Mudacumura, 462 463 whichhedesertedalongwithmost 459 460 In2016,asignif- 461

group andpusheditbackintoFiziterritory. however, jointFARDC–MONUSCOoperationscausedconsiderablelossesforthe In September2017,itmanagedtocarryoutaseriousoffensiveinUviraterritory; clashed withtheFARDC,takingcontrolofseveralvillagesalongLakeTanganyika. militia commanderWilliamAmuriYakutumba.SinceJune2017,ithasrepeatedly Mai-Mai coalitionsactiveineasternCongo(i.e.Fiziterritory)andisledbyveteran refusal tostepdowninDecember2016.Currently,itrepresentsoneofthebroadest 10 armedmilitiassharingtheoverarchinggoalofoustingpresidentKabilaafterhis The CNPSCemergedtowardstheendof2016asanumbrellagroupformedbyover 466 465 congo (last accessed 15January2019). World Report 2018, 464 live bulletsandteargasintoCatholicChurchgrounds. December 2017,21Januaryand25February2018,Congolese securityforcesfred ety. DuringnationwideprotestsorganizedbyCatholicChurch layleaderson31 protests taking place intheKivuswere often ledbyyouthgroupsand civil soci- tions in Kinshasa were organized by the Collective of Lay Catholics, while smaller by protestsagainstthegovernmentharshlyrepressed police.Demonstra- ment betweenthegovernmentandopposition,wasparticularlycharacterized The endof2017,markingoneyearsincethesigningSaintSylvesterAgree- vilians andinterethnicconflicthasintensifed. have beenrepeatedly accused ofusingunnecessary and excessive force againstci- litical disorderduetothecontinuousdelayofdemocraticelections,securityforces Within the context of Kabila’s government’s lack oflegitimacyandconsequent po- 7. NationalPeople’sCoalitionfortheSovereigntyofCongo(CNPSC) port initsmilitarycampaigns. among othergroups.IthasalsoconsistentlybeenaccusedofreceivingFARDCsup- involved inthelucrativegoldtradeareaspreviouslycontrolledbyFDLR, various Mazembefactions.Since2016,ithasexpandeditsinfluenceandbecome broke upbymid-2017,thusresultinginseveralclashesbetweentheNDC–Rand push theFDLRoutofmostnortheasternWalikale;nonetheless,coalition groups undertheumbrellatermMai-MaiMazembe,Guidon’sfactionmanagedto FDLR andgainedcontrolovernumerousminingsites.Incoalitionwithotherrebel strongholds in Walikale territory (North Kivu), the NDC–R began attacking the of thegroup’scombatantstoformNDC–R.AftertakingoverNDC’sformer man Rights Watch, ruling party offcials also recruited 100 youths to infltrate activists werearrestedduringanotherLUCHAprotestinGoma. AccordingtoHu- (LUCHA) inBeni,arresting42peopleandinjuring4others. Afewdayslater,27 also brutallyrepressedaprotestledbythecitizens’movement StruggleforChange C. KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2018 See KivuSecurity Tracker, ‘Reports’, https://kivusecurity.org/reports . HRW, ‘DRCongo: Repression Persists asElection Deadline Nears’. KivuSecurity Tracker, Armed Groups. See also HRW, ‘Democratic Republic of Congo: Events of 2017’, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/democratic-republic- 465

466 On25April2018,they 464

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voting-machines-ahead-of-drc-election-kabila. Guardian, 13December 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/13/fire-destroys-new- 469 andbrutalone of Congolese themajor armed groups inSouthKivu.Inlate 2016, itjoined theCNPSC. 468 467 referred thesituationinitsterritorysinceentryintoforce oftheRomeStatute The DRCGovernmentratifedtheRomeStatuteinApril2002,and2004it the latterandMai-MaiYakutumba. takamata’ operationsinFiziterritory,whichresultedviolentclashesbetween South Kivuprovince.On19January2018,theFARDCalsolaunched‘Kama- cal militias.TheFARDC,ontheotherhand,killedleadersoftwoarmedgroupsin nation ofseveralarmedgroupsincludingtheADF,Mai-Maiandotherlo- In April2018,20peoplewerekilledinattacksallegedlyperpetratedbyacombi- the FARDCandADF. January 2018inParkingiandresultedatleast24dead13woundedamong immediately followedbycounterattacks,thedeadliestofwhichtookplaceon19 Beni territoryagainsttheADFandaffliatedarmedgroups.Theseoperationswere military operations.On13January2018,itconducted‘UsalamaII’operationsin Beni, Lubero,UviraandFiziterritories,theFARDCdecidedtolaunchlarge-scale carried outinthesecondhalfof2017byarmedgroupsagainstsecurityforces ADF, andresultedinthedeathof17UNpeacekeepers.Followingseveralattacks operating baseinBenioccurredon7December2017,widelyattributedtothe including Kabila’sprivateresidence,inBeniterritory.AnattackagainsttheUN other armedgroupshaveincreasinglytargetedUNandgovernmentinstallations, pecially intheeasternregionswithoutanoverarchingnarrative.TheADFand The conflict remains a decentralized one, with over 120armed groups active es- os soastojustifyanyrepression. churches, arrestpriestsattemptingtoorganizemarchesandgenerallyspreadcha- the vote. tion supportershaveaccusedKabila’sregimeoftryingonce againtopostpone machines duetobeusedinKinshasafortheelectionson23 December.Opposi- the firsthalfofDecember2018,afiredestroyedabout7,000 ofthe10,000voting Finally, tensionshaverisenasthehistoricpresidentialelections approach.In NDC–R intheterritoryofLubero. in August,thedynamicshiftedasFARDClaunchedanoffensiveagainst allegedly to support the FARDC and protect Kabila’s ranch in Kabasha. However, alliance withtheADF.Additionally,NDC–RarrivedinareasouthofBeni the southeasternpart.Asaresult,thesegroupsseemtohavestrengthenedtheir northeastern part ofthe Beni territory while targetingother Mai-Mai groups in anyika. InJune2018,theFARDCpursueditsoperationsagainstADFin was the signifcant influx of Congolese refugees into Burundi across Lake Tang- D. WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS Ibid. This was created in2006 by former FARDC officer William Amuri(aka Yakutumba), andsoon became J. Burke, ‘Tensions Rise asArsonists Burn7,000 Voting MachinesAhead of DRC Elections’, The 469

467 468 Afurtherconsequenceofsuchoperations ing currentactsthatcouldconstitutecrimeswithinthejurisdictionofICC. the Prosecutorcontinuestocarefullymonitorsituationincountry,includ- sized thatasanICCinvestigationintoDRChasbeenopensince2004,theOffceof by theKamuinaNsapumilitia,particularlyinKasaïprovinces.Sheempha- kidnappings andsummaryexecutionsmainlycommittedbytheFARDCbutalso i.e. alargenumberofkillingsciviliansnotdirectlyparticipatinginhostilities, national FederationforHumanRights, internationale. https://www.lesoir.be/178645/article/2018-09-16/rd-congo-le-pays-menace-de-quitter-la-cour-penale- 476 times.com/2018/05/02/icc-prosecutor-bensouda-launches-probe-in-dr-congo/. 475 474 rapportfidh_dec2017.pdf (last accessed 15January2019). au service d’unchaosorganisé , December 2017, https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/massacres_au_kasai_ 473 www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=170331-otp-stat (last accessed 15January2019). Regarding theSituationinKasaï Provinces, Democratic Republic of theCongo, 31March 2017, https:// 472 471 470 down. political andethnicviolence,exacerbatedbypresidentKabila’s refusaltostep ble crimesagainsthumanityallegedlycommittedduringthe country’songoing In May 2018, the ICC Prosecutor visited DRCto begin an investigation intopossi- cerns In March2017,thecurrentICCProsecutorFatouBensoudaexpressedhercon- at largeandtheNtagandatrialisstillongoing. frmed byPre-TrialChamberI,NgudjoloChuiwasacquitted,Mudacumuraisstill and Katangawereconvicted,thechargesagainstMbarushimananotcon- Ngudjolo Chui,leaderoftheNationalIntegrationistFront(FNI).WhileLubanga Sylvestre Mudacumura,allegedSupremeCommanderoftheFDLR,andMathieu Forces fortheLiberationofRwanda–AbacunguziFighting(FDLR–FOCA); ri (FRPI);CallixteMbarushimana,allegedExecutiveSecretaryoftheDemocratic the FPLC;Germain Katanga, Commander of the Patriotic Resistance Force in Itu- Bosco Ntaganda, alleged Deputy Chief of Staff and Commander of Operations of of CongolesePatriots/PatrioticForcesfortheLiberationCongo(UPC/FPLC); six caseswereopenedagainst:ThomasLubanga,formerPresidentoftheUnion gion andtheNorthSouthKivuprovinces.Asaresultofsuchinvestigations, forcible transferofpopulations,committedmainlyineasternDRC,theIturire- der theageof15,murder,attackingcivilians,rape,sexualslavery,mutilationand humanity including,amongothers,enlistingandconscriptingchildsoldiersun- The ICCinvestigationshavefocusedonallegedwarcrimesandagainst committed intheterritoryofDRCorbyitsnationalsfrom1July2002onwards. to theICC,thusgivingCourtjurisdictionovercrimeslistedinRomeStatute the DRCGovernmentoffciallythreatenedtowithdrawfromICC. Ibid. See International Federation for HumanRights,Massacre auKasaï: descrimescontre l’humanité ‘ICC Prosecutor Bensouda Launches Probe inDR Congo’, Africa Times, 2May 2018, https://africa ICC, Statement of theProsecutor of theInternational CriminalCourt. See ICC, Statement of theProsecutor of theInternational CriminalCourt, MrsFatou Bensouda, ‘RDCongo: lepays ménace dequitter laCour pénaleinternationale’, Le Soir,16September 2018, ICC, ‘Democratic Republic of theCongo’. 472 475 regardingseveralreportsissuedbyhumanrightsNGOssuchastheInter- This investigation,however,seemstobestillonhold.InSeptember 2018, 473 alleging seriousactsofviolenceinDRC, 471 476 474 470

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 101 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 102 cessed 20 January2019). pp 30–36, https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/The_roots_of_Malis_conflict.pdf (last ac Moving Beyond the 2012 Crisis, Clingendael: Netherland Institute of International Relations, March 2015, 478 mali-chronologie-demographie-chiffres-economie-géographie. www.jeuneafrique.com/pays/mali/chronologie/, and‘Mali’,RFI,August 2018, http://www.rfi.fr/pays/ of main events can beread (inFrench) in‘MaliChronologie’, JeuneAfrique, 16January2018, https:// Conflict Data Program, http://ucdp.uu.se/#country/432 477 the country’shistorysinceitsindependencefromFrancein1960. The MalicivilwarwastriggeredbyaTuareginsurgencyinthe north,thefourthin 1. TheTuaregRebellioninAzawadandMilitaryCoupBamako the conflictcanbedividedintofourphases. in Maliandstandsstarkcontrasttotherecentpastofcountry. Thehistoryof claims withjihadistextremismandintercommunalclashesrepresentsanovelty Despite repeatedTuareguprisings,theunprecedentedcombinationofseparatist the creationofaregionaltaskforceinSahelwithcounter-terrorismmandate. war crimestrialsbeforetheInternationalCriminalCourt(ICC)and,eventually, regional peaceenforcementoperation,arobustUNpeacekeepingmission,two ism, thedestructionofaUNESCOWorldHeritagesite,foreignintervention, progression, byafailedsecession,militarycoup,theemergenceofSalafjihad- to keeping the conflict activein2018.The Malicivilwarwasmarked,inrapid munity violence,whichextendedthefghttocentralregionsandcontributed law acrossthecountry.Itrecentlyunleashedahithertounknownlevelofcom- the insurgencywasquicklyhijackedbyIslamistgroupsaimingtoimposeSharia ACs. OriginallyaTuaregrebellionfortheindependenceofnorthernregions, Mali hasbeenplaguedsince2012byaseriesofconsecutiveandoverlappingNI- the SahelalsoreachedthresholdofaNIACduringlastyear. munal clashesbetweenDanNanAmbassagouandtheAllianceforSalvationof lamic StateintheGreaterSahara(ISGS).AccordingtoWarReport,intercom- on itsterritoryagainstJama’atNusratal-Islamwal-Muslimin(JNIM)andtheIs- (GATIA), continuedtobeinvolvedinanon-internationalarmedconflict(NIAC) Salvation ofAzawad(MSA)andtheImghadTuaregSelf-DefenseGroupAllies bilization MissioninMali(MINUSMA)andbymilitiasoftheMovementfor Mali, supportedbyFrance,theUnitedNationsMultidimensionalIntegratedSta- Classification oftheConflict 4. MALI: THE OVERLAP AND COMBINATION OF SEPARATIST, agreements ledtothecreationofaself-governingKidalregion inthenortheast, A. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT JIHADIST AND INTERCOMMUNAL CONFLICTS Unless otherwise indicated, background facts provided inthissection are based on‘Mali’,Uppsala For anaccount of previous rebellions, see G.Chauzal andT. van Damme,The Roots of Mali’sConflict: 477 (last accessed 20 January2019). Atimeline Alessandro MarioAmoroso 478 Previouspeace - conducting simultaneousattacks,sometimesincoordinationwiththeMNLA. tive intheregion,andAnsarDine,whichappearedlate2011,joinedconflict, two Islamistgroupsknownasal-QaedaintheIslamicMaghreb(AQIM),alreadyac- Protocol II(APII)tothe1949GenevaConventionsseemedbemet. point intheconflict,conditionsforapplicabilityof1977Additional key centresandlostcontrolofnearlyone-thirdthecountry’sterritory.Atthis By theendofMarch2012,MalianArmedForces(FAMa)werepushedout Legion and/orfoughtonbothsidesoftheLibyancivilwar. Libya ofwell-equippedTuaregfghterswhohadbeentrainedinGadda’sIslamic uploads/psc.mali.20-03-2012.pdf (last accessed 20 January2019). Security Council atMinisterial Level, 20 March 2012, PSC/MIN/COMM.(CCCXIV), http://www.peaceau.org/ 486 Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (APII),8June1977. 485 international/2012/03/14/01003-20120314ARTFIG00773-att-aqmi-epaule-les-rebelles-touaregs.php 484 morts-dans-des-affrontements-avec-des-rebelles-touaregs/. Jeune Afrique, 18January2012, https://www.jeuneafrique.com/177681/politique/nord-mali-plusieurs- 483 final.pdf (last accessed 20 January2019). African Studies, March p7, 2014, https://sites.clas.ufl.edu/sahelresearch/files/Ba_Tuareg-Nationalism_ Present ExplainEach Other,SahelResearch Group Working Paper no007, University of FloridaCenter for 482 481 20 January 2019). de Kidal(Accord d’Alger), 4July2006, https://peacemaker.un.org/mali-accordalger2006(last accessed 480 un.org/mali-accordcessationhostilites91 (last accessed 20 January2019). 479 gency ministerial-levelmeetinginBamako. On 20March,theAfricanUnionPeaceandSecurityCouncil(PSC)heldanemer- populated primarilybyTuareg, tion. marginalized tothebeneftofsoutherndominanceinaftermathdecoloniza- ko, whichlaylargelyinafeelingthatthenorthwaspoliticallyandeconomically however, failedtoremovetherootcausesofTuaregresentmenttowardsBama- vesting inthedevelopmentofnewregion. tain Amadou Sanogo, had seized power, suspended the Constitution of 1992 and tial elections.On22March,itwasannouncedthatthearmedforces,ledbyCap- President AmadouToumaniTouré,justonemonthbeforethescheduledpresiden- military barracksofKati,outsidethecapital,turnedintoacoupagainst the small townand military garrisonof Ménaka. The conflictinnorthernMalistartedon17January2012whentheMNLAattacked ern territoryofMalicomprisedtheregionsGao,TimbuktuandKidal. Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), claimingthe independence of Azawad, the north- tober 2011withformerseparatistrebelstofoundtheNationalMovementfor Chauzal andvan Damme,The Roots of Mali’sConflict, pp17–29. Accord surlacessation deshostilités (Accord deTamanresset), 6January1991, https://peacemaker. P.-F. Naudé,‘Nord-Mali: «plusieursmorts»dansdesaffrontements avec desrebelles Touaregs’, Art1, Protocol Additional to theGeneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,andrelating to the Ibid,p45.See also O. Ba,Tuareg NationalismandCyclical Pattern of Rebellions: How thePast and African Union Peace and Securtiy Council (PSC), Communiqé of the 314thMeeting of thePeace and T. Oberlé,‘AQMI épaule lesrebelles Touaregs’, Le Figaro, 14March 2012, http://www.lefigaro.fr/ Accord d’AlgerpourlaRestauration delaPaix, delaSécurité etduDéveloppement danslarégion 481 Inlate2011,politicalandeconomicfactorscombinedwiththereturnfrom 479 andcommittedthecentralgovernmenttoin- 486 Thefollowingnight,amutinyinthe 480 Theinadequateimplementation, 483 During the following weeks, 482 TheycoalescedinOc- 485 . 484

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 103 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 104 en/20120406-france-24-exclusive-tuareg-rebels-declare-independence-mlna-mali-ansar-dine-azawad. 492 peacemaker.un.org/mali-accord-cadre2012 (last accessed 20 January2019). by theEconomicCommunityofWestAfricanStates(ECOWAS), and proclaimedtheindependenceofAzawad. interview withFrance24,anMNLAspokesmandeclaredtheentirenorthliberated 491 nee=2012 (last accessed 20 January2019). in Mali,press release, 30March 2012, http://news.ecowas.int/presseshow.php?nb=092&lang=en&an- 490 20 January 2019). 23 March 2012, http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-comm-mali-23-03-2012-eng.pdf (last accessed 489 https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/31/mali-rebels-assault_n_1393415.html. 488 national-pour-le-redressement%2C-la-démocrati.html (last accessed 20 January2019). Malijet, 22March 2012, http://malijet.com/actualite-politique-au-mali/40599-communiqué-du-comité- 487 sar DineannouncedaMemorandumofUnderstanding,according towhichboth MNLA andopposethesecession.On26May2012,however, theMNLAandAn- tional LiberationFrontofAzawad(FNLA),wasformedinTimbuktutofghtthe In theaftermathofdeclarationindependence,anewArabmilitia,Na- ever, thefollowingmonthsweremarkedbyinternalchaosonbothfronts. have reasonablyledtoaresurgenceofviolencebetweenBamakoandtheMNLA.How- The proclaimed independence of Azawad and the power transition in the capital could 2. TheJihadistTakeoverandPlannedRegionalOperation The coupimmediatelyrevealed‘aspectacularown-goal’. over powertonewdemocraticallyelectedinstitutions. the conflictinnorthandsavecountryfromdissolutionbeforehanding declared remitofthejuntawastoremedygovernment’sincapacitytackle established aNationalCommitteefortheRestorationofDemocracyandState.The from the African Union (AU) mously condemned at the international level, leading to the suspension of Mali er, DiouncoundaTraoré,appointedinterimPresident. dent TouréagreedtoresignandtransferpowertheNationalAssembly’sSpeak- ECOWAS, achieving a political transition in Bamako. Captain Sanogo and Presi- On 6April2012,aFrameworkAgreementwasbrokeredwiththemediationof centres, wheretheystartedtoimposeSharialaw. Movement forOnenessandJihadinWestAfrica(MUJAO),controlofthemain mists ofAQIMandAnsarDine,joinedbyasplinterfactionknownasthe The balanceofpoweronthegroundatthatmomentappearsblurred,withIsla- Kidal, GaoandTimbuktu,thethreeregionalcapitalsbiggestcitiesofAzawad. the north.Onthreeconsecutivedays(30March–1April2012),rebelsentered provoked thefnalcollapseofFAMa,whoabandonedallmaincentresin Accord cadre demise enœuvre del’engagementsolennel du1 ‘Communiqué duComité NationalpourleRedressement, laDémocratie etlaRestauration del’État’, ‘Tuareg Rebels Declare Independence inNorth Mali’,France 24, 6April2012, https://www.france24.com/ C. Dioura Diarra, C. andA. ‘MaliRebels Assault Gao, NorthernGarrison’, HuffPost, 31March 2012, PSC, Communiqué PSC, of the315thMeeting of the Peace andSecurity Council, PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCXV), ECOWAS, Emergency Mini-Summit of ECOWAS Heads of State andGovernment ontheSituation 489 and the imposition of sanctions and an embargo 492 er 487 491 Avril 2012, 2April2012, https:// Onthatsameday,inan 488 Besidesbeingunani- 490 theputsch imposed bytheUNSCconcerningmandate,planning,mission managementand provide UNfunding.ThestalematelasteduntilDecember, when allconditions was sloweddownbytheinitialrefusalofUNSCtoendorse theoperationand within threeweeks,subjecttoauthorizationbytheUNSecurityCouncil(UNSC), shrines oftheWorldHeritagesiteTimbuktu. sar Dine began the systematic destruction of the ancient mausolea and Muslim expelled theMNLAfrommajorcitiesinnorth.On30June,membersofAn- areg and Islamist rebels. By the end of the month, Ansar Dine, MUJAO and AQIM June 2012, http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-323-mali-12-06-2012.pdf (last accessed 20 January2019). 497 www.rfi.fr/afrique/20140224-mali-deux-fosses-communes-decouvertes-environs-kati/. 496 20 January2019). https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/07/25/mali-security-forces-disappear-20-torture-others (last accessed 495 news/africa/2012/06/2012630101748795606.html. 494 web/20121223052848/http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18377168. 493 enforced disappearances and extrajudicialkillingsof detained RedBerets elite unitofparatroopersloyaltooustedPresidentTouré.Allegationstorture, the endofApril,ex-juntarepelledacounter-coupledbyRedBerets,an Framework Agreement remained underpermanentthreatfromthemilitary.At During the same months, the fragile interiminstitutions established by the 6 April June 2012,inthesurroundingsofKidal, The frstclashesbetweentheMNLAandAnsarDinereportedlyoccurredon8 propaganda thantotheindependentistagendaofMNLA. south toterritoriespopulatedbyotherethnicgroupsmoresensitivejihadist Azawad. Ontheother,Islamistshadstrengthenedtheirrankswhilemoving the group’straditionalsecularismbysigningoffimpositionofSharialawin few dayslater.Ontheone hand, mostofthe MNLA leadershiprefusedto disavow frst steptowardsthecreationofanIslamicStateAzawad.Thedealcrumbleda agreed todissolveandfoundtheTransitionalCouncilofStateAzawad, later confrmedbythediscoveryofmassgravesoutsidecapital. led bytheECOWASStandbyForce. Mali. On12June2012,thePSCauthorizeddeploymentofapeaceoperation and theAUpreparedtointervenemilitarilyeradicatejihadistmenacein With thepoliticalandmilitaryinstitutionsofMaliinastatedisarray,ECOWAS resign. HewasreplacedbyDjangoSissoko,appointedPresidentTraoré. ernment ofnationalunity,wasarrestedbysoldierstheex-juntaandforcedto Traoré. InDecember2012,PrimeMinisterCheickModiboDiarra,chairingagov- pro-junta demonstrators stormed the presidential palace and wounded President PSC, Communiqué PSC, of the 323rd Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCXXIII), 12 ‘MaliRebel Groups “Clash inKidal”’,BBC News, 8June2012, https://web.archive.org/ Human Rights Watch (HRW), ‘Mali: Security Forces “Disappear” 20, Torture Others’, 25 July 2012, ‘Mali:deuxfosses communes découvertes auxenvirons deKati’, RFI, 24 February http:// 2014, ‘Ansar DineFighters Destroy Timbuktu Shrines’, AlJazeera, 1July2012, https://www.aljazeera.com/ 497 Theexpecteddeploymentofthemission 493 triggeringaparallelNIACbetweenTu- 494 496 On21May, 495 were

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 105 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 106 sion inMali(EUTMMali). same date,theEuropeanUnionestablishedamultinationalmilitaryTrainingMis- areas. Thefrsttroops–contributedbyNigeriaarrivedon17January.Onthe deployment inordertohelptheMalianarmyretaincontroloverrecaptured gains obtainedbyFranceinducedECOWASandtheAUtoaccelerateAFISMA’s to bringtheconflictcloseamilitaryandpoliticalsolution.Therapidterritorial By reversingthepowerbalanceonground,Frenchinterventionseemed brate therecaptureofnorth. François HollandeandPresidentTraoréappearedtogetherinTimbuktutocele- Gao andTimbuktu,FrenchsoldiersenteredKidal.On2February,President extremist andarmedgroups’. in recoveringtheareasnorthofitsterritoryundercontrolterrorist, was taskedwithapeaceenforcementmandate‘[t]osupporttheMalianauthorities Support MissiontoMali(AFISMA).Withastrengthof3,300personnel,AFISMA invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter to authorize the African-led International a contingentof2,000soldiers–theChadianArmedForcesIntervention inMali pdf (last accessed 13February 2019). 17 January2013, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/134748. 502 ancient-manuscripts-un-finds. 3 July 2013, 501 11 January2013. Nations Addressed to theSecretary-General andthePresident of theSecurity Council, UNdocS/2013/17, 500 tion, see Lotze, ‘United NationsMultidimensionalIntegrated Stabilization Mission inMali(MINUSMA)’,p858. 499 University Press, 2015, p858. and P. D. Williams (eds), The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Oxford Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission Koops, inMali(MINUSMA)’,J. A. T. Tardy, N.MacQueen 498 only alimitednumberofitsmanuscriptsweredestroyed. ing French and Chadian forces set and disband the rebels. On 28 January, Islamists fleeing Timbuktu from approach- ground support,theFrenchtroopsswiftlymanagedtorepelIslamistoffensive more than 4,000 personnel within a few days. Backing the FAMa with air and On 11January2013,FrancelaunchedOperationServal,progressivelydeploying solved torequestimmediateFrenchmilitaryintervention. centre ofMali.WhenthefallBamakoappearedimminent,PresidentTraorére- of Mopti and Sevaré, a strategically important military garrison and airport in the of AnsarDinecapturedthecityKonnaandadvancedtowithinafewkilometres 2013, however,thesituationinMalichangedonceagain.On10January,militants Preparations forAFISMAwereexpectedtotakeseveralmonths.Inthefrstdaysof 3. FrenchInterventionandTheUN’sRobustPeacekeepingMission accountability were met. T. Ralph, ‘Islamists Have Destroyed One-Tenth of Timbuktu’s Ancient Manuscripts, UN Finds’, Council of the European Union, ‘EU Training Mission in Mali Established’, press statement 5428/13, UNSCRes 2085, 20 December 2012. For thequalification of AFISMAasapeace enforcement opera- For afullaccount of theplanningandauthorization process, see W. Lotze, ‘United Nations Identical letters dated 11 January2013 From thePermanent Representative of France to theUnited https://www.pri.org/stories/2013-07-03/islamists-have-destroyed-one-tenth-timbuktus- 498 502 In Resolution 2085 of 20 December 2012, the UNSC Onthefollowingday,Chadjoinedconflictwith 499 fre to theAhmedBaba Institute, but fortunately 500 501 On30January,after PRI, peacekeeping operation. France, ECOWASandtheAUagreedtorequestAFISMA’stransitionintoaUN Despite AFISMA’santicipateddeployment,theinterimGovernmentofMali, while theMNLArefused. of armedelementstothoseareas’. population centers…anddeterthreatstakeactivestepstopreventthereturn vided with a widelyrobustmandateincludingtheauthorization to ‘stabilizekey personnel. EstablishedunderChapterVIIoftheUNCharter,MINUSMAwaspro- the deploymentofMINUSMA,comprisingupto11,200militaryand1,440police willingness tofavourapoliticalsolutionwhichinvolvedtheTuareg. the following weeks, episodes of actualclasheswerereported, along withFrance’s declared itsreadinesstocooperatewithFranceinthefghtagainstjihadism.In either. The MNLA,whichat the end of 2012 had dropped its separatist claims, 509 508 507 un-haut-conseil-de-l-azawad-pour-n-gocier-avec-bamako/. Jeune Afrique , 6May 2013, https://www.jeuneafrique.com/170970/politique/mali-des-touaregs-cr-ent- 506 idUSBRE9150LR20130206. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mali-rebels/french-battle-mali-islamists-as-tuareg-problem-looms- 505 com/news/africa/2013/01/2013124223130722857.html. 504 afrique/20130310-mali-le-contingent-tchadien-integre-misma. 503 HCUA signedapreliminarypeaceagreementinOuagadougou,whichpavedthe On 18June2013,thegovernmentandTuaregrebelsofMNLA tlement oftheconflict. rejection ofterrorismanddemandedthestartnegotiationsforapeacefulset- of AnsarDinecallingitselftheIslamicMovementforAzawad(MIA)declaredits MUJAO remainedintheGaoregion,conductingsporadicattacks.Asplintergroup ed totheAdrardesIfoghasinnortheast,chasedbyFrenchandChadiantroops. At thispoint,theconflictenteredaguerrillaphase.AnsarDineandAQIMretreat- only beingintegratedintoAFISMAinMarch. (FATIM) –whoinitiallyfoughtundernationalcommandalongsideFrenchtroops, facilitate peacetalkswiththegovernment. the High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA) was founded by the Tuareg to when underimminentandseriousthreatuponrequestoftheSecretary-General’. using ‘allnecessarymeans…tointerveneinsupportofelementsMINUSMA also authorizedFrenchtroopstooperateasaparallelforcealongsideMINUSMA, Lotze, ‘United Nations MultidimensionalIntegrated Stabilization Mission inMali(MINUSMA)’, p859. ‘Mali:lecontingent tchadien rejoint officiellement laMISMA’, RFI,10 March 2013, http://www.rfi.fr/ C. Diouara, C. ‘French BattleMaliIslamists asTuareg Problem Looms’, Reuters, 6February 2013, UNSCRes 2100, 25April2013, §16. Ibid,§18. P.-F. Naudé, ‘Mali: des Touaregs créent un Haut conseil de l’Azawad pour négocier avec Bamako’, ‘New MaliRebel Faction Callsfor Negotiations’, AlJazeera, 25January2013, https://www.aljazeera. 504 507 TheTuaregfrontwasnotimmunefromrealignments On25April2013,UNSCResolution2100authorized 508 GiventhesecuritysituationinMali,UNSC 506 TheMIAdecidedtojointheHCUA, 503 505 On2May, 509

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 107 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 108 with fghtingSalajihadismintheentireSahel. later increasedto4,500,OperationBarkhanewasnotlimitedMalibuttasked replacement withOperationBarkhaneasof1August2014.With3,000personnel, across theborders,FranceannouncedconclusionofOperationServalandits longer controllingafxedterritorybuttakingadvantageofdesertareastooperate Facing adifferentconfgurationofforcesontheground,withIslamistsno turn formedamilitaryalliance:theCoordinationofAzawadMovements(CMA). a campaignagainsttheMNLA,HCUAandrebelfactionofMAA,whoin armed groupscreatedinJune2014.Inthesecondhalfof2014,Platformstarted wing of the MAA and other organizations of the Platform, a coalition of loyalist aligned withthegovernmenttoopposerebels.TheGATIAjoinedloyalist in August2014TuaregoftheImghadtribeannouncedcreationGATIA, refusal to discuss the autonomy ofAzawad. of theFNLA)suspendednegotiationswithBamako,facedgovernment’s MNLA, theHCUAandArabMovementofAzawad(MAA,newdesignation The fragileceasefresignedinJune2013fellapartrapidly.InSeptember,the 4. TheEndoftheTuaregRebellionAlongsideRelentlessJihadistViolence way for presidential elections and inclusive peace talks. amoroa/Download/20181218_NP_EMA%20CABCOM_DP%20BARKHANE_vf.pdf. 514 rfi.fr/afrique/20140522-mali-kidal-cessez-feu-instaure-gouvernement-malien/. 513 rebelles-achoppent-sur-l-autonomie-du-nord/. 27 September 2013, https://www.jeuneafrique.com/168211/politique/mali-les-n-gociations-avec-les- 512 taken-into-custody-in-the-missing-red (last accessed 20 January2019). November 2013, https://www.fidh.org/en/region/Africa/mali/14323-mali-general-sanogo-arrested-and- 511 accessed 20 January2019). Ouagadougou), 18June2013, https://peacemaker.un.org/mali-accord-preliminaire-elections2013 (last 510 rebels’ reintegrationinthenationalsecurityforcesandpromising betterrepresen- was fnallyreachedinAlgiers,grantingmoreautonomytothenorth, providingfor ter negotiatingaceasefreinFebruary,anAgreementforPeaceandReconciliation In 2015,thenorthernMaliconflictseemedtomoveforwardtowardsasolution.Af- ka, Léréandothercitiesinthenorth. Tuareg recapturedKidaland,repellinganarmycounter-offensive,occupiedMéna- its resumptionofthefght.ThetrucenallybrokedowninMay2014,when with crimescommittedduringtheputsch. Captain Sanogo,leaderoftheMarch2012militarycoup,wasarrestedandcharged and August,whichsawthevictoryofIbrahimBoubacarKeïta.Afewmonthslater, frst taskwastooverseethetwoturnsof2013presidentialelectionsinJuly July 2013withthetransferofauthorityoverAFISMA’spersonnel.MINUSMA’s ed thepoliticalconditionsfordeploymentofMINUSMA,whichstartedon1 FIDH,‘Mali:General SanogoArrested andTaken into Custody inthe“Missing Red Berets” Case’, 29 ‘Chassé de Kidal, le gouvernement malien décrète un cessez-le-feu’, P.-F. Naudé,‘Les négociations avec lesrebelles achoppent surl’autonomie duNord’, JeuneAfrique , Ministère desArmées, Dossier depresse –Opération Barkhane,December 2018, file:///C:/Users/ Accord préliminaire àl’élection présidentielle etauxpourparlers inclusifsdepaix auMali(Accord de 513 FollowingtherecentdebacleofFAMa, 511 512 In November, the MNLA announced 514 510 RFI, 22 May 2014 The agreement creat- , http://www. claimed responsibilityfortheattack. from themergerofMUJAOandSignatairesparlesang(‘signatoriesinblood’), process andhaltcommunityviolence. MNLA, theHCUAandMAAfoundedMSA,seekingtostrengthenpeace between theCMAandGATIA.Asaresult,inSeptemberformermembersof flict betweenrivalTuaregfactionsbrokeoutagain,withfrequentconfrontations mali-moussa-ag-acharatoumane-avons-cree-msa-representer-azawadiens/. Azawadiens»’, 521 20 January2019). 2016, 520 new-terror-group-mali-threatens-peace-agreement-1915290 International Business Times , 14May 2015,https://www.ibtimes.com/macina-liberation-movement- 519 belmokhtar/. rfi.fr/afrique/20140514-mali-etat-jihadistes-apres-mort-emir-al-mourabitoune-aqmi-al-qaida-mujao- 518 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34879955#. 517 516 2015, https://peacemaker.un.org/node/2681 (last accessed 20 March 2019). 515 form takingpartinjointpatrolsundertheOperationalCoordinationMechanism, The basehousedgovernmenttroopsandformerrebelsoftheCMAPlat- suicide bombingclaimedbyAQIMhitamilitarycampinGao,killing77people. At thebeginningof2017,peaceprocesscameunderattack.On18January,a clashes between Bambara and Fulani self-defence militias. attention to theescalation of violencein central Mali,the 17 soldiers. In thesame month, a report by the International Crisis Group drew on 19JulyafteranattackbytheMLFNampalaarmybase,whichkilled of newthreats.Thestateemergency,havingexpiredon31March,wasrestored deal wereshatteredin2016byareawakeningofpasttensionsandtheappearance im authoritiesinthenorth.Yet,hopesofasmoothimplementationpeace On 31March2016,theNationalAssemblyofMalipassedalawestablishinginter- ence throughout northernMali. tacks werepeacekeepers,whoremainedthesoleregularforcewithaconstantpres- lence, partlyduetoareorganizationofIslamistforces.Victimsmanyjihadistat- In thesameperiod,jihadistfrontregisteredinsteadarecrudescenceofvio- May, theagreementwasfnallysignedbyCMAon20June2015. tation. Initially accepted only by loyalist groups and international mediators on 15 er Salafgroupthatemergedinmid-2015,spreadterrorthecentralregions. an SpecialForces. Blu hotelin Bamako andkilled20ofthembefore the interventionof the Mali- attacks. On20November,twoIslamistmilitantstook170hostagesintheRadisson ‘MaliHotel Attack: “NoMore Hostages” After Special Forces Raid’,BBC News, 20 November 2015, Accord Pour laPaix etlaRéconciliation auMali–Issu duProcessus d’Alger(Accord d’Alger),20 June C. Muratet, C. ‘Mali:quisont lesnouveaux chefsdeskatibas jihadistes?’, RFI,14May http://www. 2014, K.Caulderwood, ‘MacinaLiberation Movement: New Terror Group InMaliThreatens Peace Agreement’, Report of theSecretary-General 27 ontheSituationinMali,UNdocS/2015/219, March 2015, §69. R. Carayol, ‘Mali – Moussa Ag Acharatoumane: «Nous avons créé le MSA pour représenter tous les International CrisisGroup, Central Mali:AnUprisingintheMaking? , Africa Report no238,6July https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/mali/central-mali-uprising-making (last accessed Jeune Afrique , 9 September 2016, https://www.jeuneafrique.com/355863/politique/ 517 Al-Mourabitoun,ajihadistorganizationcreatedinlate2013 516 The whole of 2015 wasmarkedby continuous 518 521 TheMacinaLiberationFront(MLF),anoth- . 520 frst intercommunal In August,thecon- 515 519

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 109 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 110 of Frenchtroops,EUTMMaliandtheEUCapacityBuildingMissioninMali. the militarycoupofMarch2012.Theyhavesincebeenreorganizedwithsupport hostilities andthefnalizationofpeaceprocess. form signeda‘documentofcommitments’,providingfordefnitivecessation On 20 September 2017, after months of escalating tensions, the CMA and the Plat- On 1November2017,theG5SJFlauncheditsfrstmission,codenamedHawbi. to establishaJointForce(G5SJF)operatingunderclearcounter-terrorismmandate. established an institutional framework for cooperation known as G5 Sahel, agreed On 6February,BurkinaFaso,Chad,Mali,MauritaniaandNiger,whichin2014had hadism hadreachedanewlevelandrequiredtheenhancementofmilitaryefforts. More thanfve years afterthe beginning oftheconflict, thethreat posedbySalafji- 2018, p812. HoferA. (eds), The Use of Force inInternational Law: ACase-Based Approach, Oxford University Press, Christakis, ‘The Intervention of France andAfrican Countries inMali–2013’, inT. Ruys, O. Corten and 528 527 2018 526 525 fr/afrique/20161031-mali-groupe-etat-islamique-officialise-presence-sahel-Abou-Walid-Sahraoui. 524 https://www.newsweek.com/al-qaeda-groups-unite-sahel-563351 523 aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/suicide-blast-gao-army-base-170119112555093.html. 522 fcations werecitedbyFrenchauthorities, Serval, deploying up to 4,500 troops in thecountry.Although different legal justi- French militaryengagementinMalistartedon11January2013withOperation 2. FrenchArmedForces – 10,000 military and 7,800 paramilitary personnel. Ministry of Defence and Veterans. Their current estimated strength is 17,800 troops corps, theGendarmerieandNationalGuard.Allforcesareundercontrolof The FAMaarecomprisedofthearmyandairforce,aswelltwoparamilitary 1. MalianArmedForces(FAMa) established intheframeworkofpeaceagreement. ISGS, asplintergroupofAl-MourabitounprofessingallegiancetotheIslamicState. 2 percentoftheGDP. integration inthesecurityforcesfollowedsoonthereafter. Jama’at Nusratal-Islamwal-Muslimin Al-Mourabitoun, the MLFand the Saharanbranch of AQIM merged toform Dine, Al-Qaeda inMali. B. PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT Report of theSecretary-General ontheSituationinMali,UNdocS/2017/811, 28September 2017, §5. Ibid. C. Gaffey, C. ‘African JihadiGroups Unite andPledge Allegiance to Al-Qaeda’, Newsweek , 3March 2017, , p473. ‘Death Toll From Suicide Blast atGaoArmy Base Rises’, AlJazeera, 19January2017, https://www. For an exhaustive analysisof thelegality of French intervention inMali,see K.BannelierandT. International Institute for Strategic Studies, ‘Chapter 9:Sub-Saharan Africa’, ‘Mali:legroupe Etat islamiqueofficialise saprésence auSahel’,RFI,31October 2016, http://www.rfi. 523 Atthesametime,aseriesofattacksoncivilianswereclaimedby 527 TheFAMasufferedacollapseaftertheTuaregrebellionand (JNIM), whichbecametheoffcialbranch 528 theoperationreliedoninvitation 526 . The defence budget is around 525 522 Theirdemobilizationand On1March2017,Ansar The Military Balance

524

offensive orcounter-terrorismoperations. threats, includingasymmetricandtotakerobust activestepstopro- 536 535 534 533 un.org/sites/default/files/pk_factsheet_10_18_eng.pdf (last accessed 18January2019). 532 531 530 529 tive stepstopreventthereturnofarmedelementsthoseareas’. tres, especiallyinthenorthofMaliand,thiscontext,todeterthreatsandtakeac- lution 2100authorizedMINUSMA,interalia,‘tostabilizethekeypopulationcen- traditional peacekeepingprinciplesofimpartialityandlimiteduseforce.Reso- The robustnessofMINUSMA’smandateisoneexampletheevolution the ous threatuponrequestoftheSecretary-General’. ‘intervene in support of elements of MINUSMA when under imminent and seri- of forcebyFranceinMalialsorestsonUNSCauthorization,whenFrenchtroops of theMalianGovernment.AfteradoptionUNSCResolution2100,use of AFISMAwerere-hattedasaUNforce. April 2013,MINUSMAwasformedon1July2013.Onthatdate,the6,500troops Established underChapterVIIoftheUNCharterbyUNSCResolution210025 3. UNMultidimensionalIntegratedStabilizationMissioninMali(MINUSMA) NIAC intoaninternationalarmedconflict. early stageoftheconflictsupportedGovernmentMalianddidnotturn militias of the MSA and the GATIA. French as well as Chadian intervention in an nate withMINUSMAandEUTMMali.ItalsoconductsjointactionsTuareg signed tocooperateatthemilitarylevelwithforcesofG5Sahel,andcoordi- date’. MINUSMA ‘tomovetoamoreproactiveandrobustposture to carryoutitsman- a halfyears. the most dangerous ongoing operation, having suffered 177 fatalities in fve and rent 13,883,makingitthethirdbiggestongoingUNmission.MINUSMAisalso 12,640 uniformedpersonnel,MINUSMA’stroopswerelaterincreasedtothecur- of armedgroups. standard practice,theUNSCcarefullyavoidedanyreferenceto‘neutralization’ ing toRussia’sconcernsthattheFIB’speaceenforcementmandatemightbecome zation MissionintheDemocraticRepublicofCongo(MONUSCO).Respond- one monthearliertotheForceInterventionBrigade(FIB)withinUNStabili- MINUSMA’s mandatedidnotmatchtheextentofauthorizeduseforcegranted region, Operation Barkhane keeps 1,000 of its 4,5000 troops in Mali. on 1August2014byOperationBarkhane.Aimingtofghtterrorismintheentire UNSCRes 2100, §7. UNSCRes 2100, §16. BannelierandChristakis, ‘The Intervention of France andAfrican Countries inMali’, p813. UNPeacekeeping, ‘Peacekeeping Operations Fact Sheet’, 31October 2018, https://peacekeeping. UNSCRes 2295, 29 June2016, §18. UNSCRes 2098, 28March 2013, §9. Ministère desArmées, Dossier depresse –Opération Barkhane. UNSCRes 2100, §18. 536 Tothisend,MINUSMAwasauthorized‘toanticipate,deter andcounter 532 534 MINUSMA’smandatewasthereforeunderstoodasexcluding 531 Withaninitialauthorizedstrengthof 535 In2016,Resolution2295requested 529 OperationServalwasreplaced 533 Nevertheless, 530 Itwas de-

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 111 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 112 da affliateinMali.Bringingtogetheranestimatedstrengthof800ghters, After swearing allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri, JNIM became the offcial Al-Qae- viding itwithaUN mandate touseforce. olution 2359 of 21 June 2017, the UNSC welcomed the G5SJF, but fell short of pro- constitute activitiesrelatedtotheconductofhostilities. rization, anditslogisticalintelligenceassistancetoMalianFrenchtroops party to the conflict (theGovernmentofMali), pursuant to offcial UNSC autho- com/2018/04/19/politics/africa-isis-al-qaeda-threat/index.html. 544 543 tanding-g5-sahel-joint-force-fighting-terror-building-regional-security (last accessed 20 January2019). Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 November 2017 542 541 20 January 2019). COMM.(DCLXXIX), 540 under thecontrol of theForce Commander. the first UNmission equipped withacentralized military intelligence structure actingatoperational level 539 Forces’, 95International Review of theRed Cross 891/892 (2013) 584–586. 538 537 security in the region to local authorities, was authorized by the PSC. the borders.TheG5SJF,stronglyencouragedbyFrancetoprogressivelyhandover Joint Forcetofghtjihadistorganizationsintheirterritories,oftenoperatingacross and security. In February 2017, member countries announced the creation of a based onacommonunderstandingofthebondsbetweeneconomicdevelopment Mauritania andNiger)asaninstitutionalframeworkforregionalcooperation The G5Sahelwasestablishedin2014byfvecountries(BurkinaFaso,Chad,Mali, 4. TheG5SahelJointForce(G5SJF) ing in direct operations pursuant only to serious and credible threats’. tect civilians…andtopreventthereturnofarmedelementsthoseareas,engag- approach. MA’s mandatemakesitapartytotheconflictinMalifollowingsupport-based the mergerwithMLF,Al-MourabitounandSaharanbranchofAQIM. tion createdinMarch2017,whenIyadAgGhaly,leaderofAnsarDine,announced JNIM (‘the group forthesupportofIslamand Muslims’) isaSalafjihadist organiza- 5. Jama’atNusratal-Islamwal-Muslimin(JNIM) in Mali. seven battalions. frst operationinNovember2017.Itcurrentlycomprises5,000troops,dividedinto ering the necessary funding, the G5SJF was eventually deployed and launched its UNSCRes June2017, 2359, 21 §1. Ibid,§19. T. Ferraro, ‘The Applicability andApplication of International Humanitarian Law to Multinational Since theestablishment of theAllSource Information MINUSMAis inApril2014, FusionUnit(ASIFU) Gaffey, ‘African JihadiGroups Unite andPledge Allegiance to Al-Qaeda’. J. G.Cook, ‘Understanding theG5 Sahel JointForce: Fighting Terror, Building Regional Security?’, R.Browne, ‘USWarns of Growing African Terror Threat’, CNN,19April2018, https://edition.cnn. PSC, Communiqé PSC, of the679th Meeting of thePeace andSecurity Council, 13April2017, PSC/PR/ 538 Indeed, MINUSMA intervened in a pre-existing NIAC to supportone http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/679th-com-g5sahel-13-04-2017.pdf (last accessed 542 WetherG5SJFisasof2018yetapartytothearmedconflicts 541 Despitetheinitialdiffcultyingath- , https://www.csis.org/analysis/unders 539 540 537 With Res- MINUS- 544 the 543

the Levanton30October2016. ISGS was only offcially recognized as an affliate by the Islamic State of Iraq and the maincounter-insurgencypartnersinOperationBarkhane. conflicts andhaslentitssupporttotheFAMasinceinception.Itistodayoneof group supportingtheAlgierspeaceprocess.TheMSAcondemnedintercommunal the CMA,militaryalliancereunitingTuaregrebels,tofoundanindependent The MSAemergedinSeptember2016whenagroupofTuaregfghtersabandoned 7. MovementfortheSalvationofAzawad(MSA) joining Al-Mourabitoun. leader, AdnanAbuWalidal-Sahraoui,wasthespokespersonofMUJAObefore tacks onboththeFAMaandcivilians.ItismainlyactiveinregionofGao.Its lité»’, 551 al-mourabitoun_fr_2017.compressed.pdf (last accessed 20 January2019). Internationales, January 2017, 550 549 sation-etat-islamique-belmokhtar-sahraoui-mourabitoune. 14 May 2015, 548 January 2019). Sanctions List, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/un-sc-consolidated-list 547 accessed 20 January2019). Sanctions List’, press release, 4October 2018, https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13531.doc.htm (last 546 monde.fr/international/article/2017/03/04/les-groupes-djihadistes-s-unissent-au-sahel_5089337_3210.html. 545 Despite itsearlyappearanceinMay2015asasplintergroupofAl-Mourabitoun, 6. IslamicStateintheGreaterSahara(ISGS) merger wassupposedlyaimedatcontainingtheexpansionofISGSinMali. ers, supporting Bamako.TheGATIAremainedactiveaftertheendofTuaregre- the conflictagainst CMA, alongsidethePlatform,acoalitionofloyalistgroups Malian armyagainlostcontroloverlargepartsofthenorthernregions.Itjoined The GATIAwasfoundedinAugust2014asaTuaregself-defencegroupafterthe 8. ImghadTuaregSelf-DefenseGroupandAllies(GATIA) 4 October2018. UNSC ISILandAl-QaidaSanctionsCommitteeaddedJNIMtoitssanctionsliston 3,000 fghters. were alreadyonthelist. http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20160911-mali-creation-msa-nouveau-mouvement-politico-militaire?ref=tw_i. 552 supplementaires-mais-il-nous-faut-gagner-en-mobilite_1665186. 550 C. Macé, C. ‘Au Sahel, «je n’ai pas besoin de canons supplémentaires, mais il nous faut gagner en mobi- M.Zerrouky, ‘Les groupes djihadistes s’unissent auSahel’,Le Monde,4March 2017, https://www.le- ‘Mali:leMouvement pourlesalutdel’Azawad, nouveau groupe politico-militaire’, RFI,11 September 2016, UNSC, ISILandAl-Qaida Sanctions Committee, UNSC, Consolidated United Nations Security Council M.Mémier, AQMI etAl-Mourabitoun: Le djihadsahelienr ‘Sahel:unchefd’Al-Mourabitoune prête allégeance àl’organisation del’État islamique’, France 24, ‘Mali:legroupe Etat islamiqueofficialise saprésence auSahel’. ‘Security Council UNSC, ISIL(Da’esh)andAl-Qaida Sanctions Committee Adds OneEntryto Its Libération, in2017and2018thegroupproveditsremarkablecapacitytoconductat- https://www.france24.com/fr/20150514-sahel-groupe-jihadiste-prete-allegeance-organi https://www.liberation.fr/planete/2018/07/09/au-sahel-je-n-ai-pas-besoin-de-canons- 552 546

Allitsfoundingorganizations,withtheexceptionofMLF, 547

https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/memier_aqmi_et_ 549 Initiallycountingonafewdozenactivefght- eunifi?, Institut Français desRélations 551 Itclaimstohave (last accessed 20 545 The 548

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 113 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 114

late 2018,itsagendaandrealstrengtharecurrentlydisputed. militias wasonlypartlyfulflled.Althoughthegroupclaimedseveralattacksin attacks ofDogonhunters.Itsintentiontogatherexistingvillage-basedself-defence The ASSemergedinMay2018asaself-defencegroupprotectingFulanifromthe 10. AlliancefortheSalvationofSahel(ASS) military hierarchy. Claiming tocountonseveralhundredfghters,DanNanAmbassagouhasaclear ers heldseniorpositionsinthepublicadministration. bassogou, theASSisalsoreportedtohavelinkswithgovernment,assomelead- actualite/monde/afrique/face-a-barkhane-un-ennemi-aux-abois_2001343.html. 558 557 556 terrorism-and-counter-terrorism_727_en_november2018.pdf (last accessed 20 January2019). November 2018, pp50–51, https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/fidh_centre-of-mali_population-sized-between- 555 554 (last accessed 20 January2019). https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/12/07/we-used-be-brothers/self-defense-group-abuses-central-mali 553 Burkina Fasoand,forthisreason,usedasarefugebytheIslamists. ka andcontroltheareaofLiptako,locatedonborderbetween Mali,Nigerand French troopsofOperationBarkhanehelpedtheFAMasecureregionMéna- threshold ofaseparateNIAC. a newdimensionwhenintercommunalclashesinthecentralregionsreached in 2017,2018theMalicivilwarcontinuedagainstjihadistgroupsandacquired Despite theendofarmedconflictagainstandbetweenTuareggroups after the murder of Théodore Soumbounou, head of the Dogonhunting society. central regionofMopti.Thegroupbroughttogetherseveralself-defencemilitias founded inlate2016toprotecttheDogon,acommunityofhuntersliving Dan NanAmbassagou(‘thehunterswhoconfdeinGod’)isaself-defencegroup 9. DanNanAmbassagou against Salafjihadists. bellion asacounter-insurgencyforcepartneringwithFrenchtroopsinthefght erations coordinatedwiththeMSAandGATIAsoughtto neutralizeJNIMand and eration forHumanRightsindicatesthatDanNanAmbassagoureceivedlogistical group, theAllianceforSalvationofSahel.AreportInternationalFed- C. KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2018 FIDH,InCentral Mali,CivilianPopulations Are CaughtBetween Terrorism andCounterterrorism, p51. HRW, FIDH,InCentral Mali,CivilianPopulations Are CaughtBetween Terrorism andCounterterrorism , V. Hugeux, ‘«Face àBarkhane, un ennemi aux abois»’,L’Express, 20 April 2018, https://www.lexpress.fr/ HRW, “We Used to beBrothers”. Ibid. fnancial support from Bamako and collaborated with the FAMa in the past. “We Used to be Brothers”: Self-Defense Group Abuses in Central Mali, 7 December 2018, 554 It gained prominence in 2018,after clashing with the Fulani 557 556 LikeDanNanAm- 558 Militaryop- 555 553

and UN troops, as well as civilians. Yet, theywereabletocarryoutalongseriesofattackstargetingMalian,French state ofemergency,inplacesince20November2015,until31October 2019. political forcesagreedtopostponeparliamentaryelections2019andextendthe was therootoflowestturnoutregisteredincentralregions. munal violenceintensifedintherun-uptopresidentialelectionsJulyand bassagou, aDogonmilitia,andtheASS,protectingFulanicommunity.Intercom- plained asmotivatedbyintercommunalhatred. than 40people.SinceISGSfghtersaremainlyFulani,theattackswerealsoex- the Tuaregcampsof the MSAandGATIAinAndéramboukanekilled more territory –oneconditionfortheapplicabilityofAPIIisthereforenolongermet. September wascrushedbyitsmilitarywinginlateNovember. 569 568 au-centre-du-mali/4668362.html https://www.voaafrique.com/a/un-groupe-de-chasseurs-dogons-met-fin-%C3%A0-une-tr%C3%AAve- 567 566 and-targeting-of-civilians-in-mali-in-2018/ (last accessed 20 January2019). November 2018, https://www.acleddata.com/2018/11/19/neighbors-in-arms-intercommunal-violence- 565 564 563 www.rfi.fr/afrique/20180428-deux-attaques-region-menaka-quarantaine-morts. 562 Report of theSecretary-General ontheSituationinMali,28September 2017, §34 ff. 561 of 8June1977 to theGeneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,MartinusNijhoff Publishers,1987, p1352. 560 acleddata.com/2018/03/21/targeting-of-the-islamic-state-in-the-greater-sahara-isgs/. 559 candidate, Soumaïla Cissé, was rejected by the Constitutional Court. idential electionsheldinJuly–August2018.Acomplaintfledbytheopposition President IbrahimBoubacarKeïtasoughtandobtainedasecondterminthepres- concern over increasing civilian casualties caused by community violence. MA wasnotpresent.AttheendofMarch2018,UNSecretary-Generalexpressed Mali, aterritorywhichwasnotcoveredbytheAlgiersagreementandwhereMINUS- ty-based armedgroups.ViolencegrewexponentiallyintheregionofMopticentral nic grievances eventually contributed to igniting a newNIACbetweencommuni- This event showed how the use of ethnic-based militias and the exploitation of eth- ISGS. quickly becamethe‘mainperpetratorsofrecentviolence’ in Mali: the secondhalfof2018,twoethnic-basedself-defencegroupsstartedclashingand Dan NanAmbassagou. agreement signedbyDogonandFulanivillagechiefson28Augustwasrejected Report of theSecretary-General onthe SituationinMali,UNdocS/2018/273, 29March 2018, §35ff; Report of theSecretary-General onthe SituationinMali,UNdocS/2018/1174, 28December 2018, §12. ‘Ungroupe dechasseurs dogonsmetfin à unetrêve aucentre duMali’,VOA, November 21 2018, Report of theSecretary-General onthe SituationinMali,UNdocS/2018/866, 25September 2018, §42. Report of theSecretary-General onthe SituationinMali,27 March 2015, §40. ACLED, ‘Neighbors inArms:Intercommunal Violence andTargeting of CiviliansinMali2018’, 19 See C. Pilloud,Y. See C. Sandoz, Swinarski C. andB.Zimmermann(eds), Commentary ontheAdditional Protocols ACLED, ‘Targeting of theIslamicState intheGreater Sahara March (ISGS)’,21 2018, https://www. ‘Mali: deux attaques font une quarantaine de morts dans le nord-est’, Report of theSecretary-General onthe SituationinMali,25September 2018, §20. Report of theSecretary-General ontheSituationinMali,25September 2018, §46. 559 Islamist groups no longer exercise stable control over portions of Malian 566 Aunilateralceasefreannouncedbythesamegroupon27 561 On 26 and 27 April, two attacks byISGS on 562 567 RFI, 28 April 2018, 564 568 565 DanNanAm- All the main A frstpeace 569 http:// 563 In 560

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 115 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 116 petrator andsentencedhimtonineyears’imprisonment. On 27September,TrialChamberVIIIunanimouslyconvictedal-Mahdiasaco-per- on 26September2015,hepleadedguiltyatthetrial’sopeningAugust2016. buildings dedicatedtoreligion.SurrenderedtheICCbyauthoritiesofNiger the warcrimeofintentionallydirectingattacksagainsthistoricmonumentsand mosque in Timbuktu, between 30 June and 10July2012.He was charged with di wasaccusedofbeinginvolvedinthedestructionninemausoleumsandone arrest againstAhmadal-Faqial-Mahdi.AnallegedmemberofAnsarDine,al-Mah- On 18September2015,theICCPre-TrialChamberI(PTCI)issuedawarrantof situation inMali. January 2019). Sheet, October 2018, https://www.icc-cpi.int/CaseInformationSheets/al-hassanEng.pdf 572 icc-cpi.int/CaseInformationSheets/Al-MahdiEng.pdf (last accessed 20 January2019). 571 Activities 2013, November 2013, §§230–231. 570 armed conflicts(NIACS)withvariousoppositiongroups sinceDecember2013. The SouthSudaneseGovernmenthasbeeninvolvedinaseries ofnon-international Classification oftheConflict 5. THE SOUTH SUDAN ARMED CONFLICT: A NEW PEACE DEAL mitted inthecountry. basis tobelievethatwarcrimeswithinthejurisdictionofCourthadbeencom- examination, the Offce of the Prosecutor determined that there was a reasonable uary 2012’totheICC,withnoenddate.Basedonoutcomeofitspreliminary On 18July2012,theMalianGovernmentreferred‘theSituationinMalisinceJan- unwilling orunabletoprosecute. its nationalsfrom1July2002onwards,providednationalcourtsareinactive,or has jurisdictionovercrimesinitsStatutecommittedontheterritoryofMaliorby Mali ratifedtheRomeStatuteofICCon16August2000.Thetherefore charges hearingisscheduledfor6May2019. decision. MalisurrenderedhimtotheICCon31March2018.Theconfrmationof the workofIslamiccourtincityandparticipatedexecutionits facto chiefoftheIslamic police in Timbuktu,Al-Hassanwasallegedlyinvolved war crimesinTimbuktubetweenApril2012andJanuary2013.Consideredthede Al-Hassan AgAbdoulAziz,suspectedofcommittingcrimesagainsthumanityand A secondwarrantofarrestwasissuedbytheICCPTCIon27March2018against before theICCtodealwithdestructionofculturalproperty. D. WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS ICC, The Prosecutor vAhmadAlFaqi AlMahdi,Case Information Sheet, 20 March 2018,https://www. ICC, The Prosecutor vAlHassan Ag AbdoulAzizAg Mohamed Ag Mahmoud,Case Information Office of theProsecutor, International Criminal Court (ICC), Report onPreliminary Examination 570 TheICChassofarheardtwocasesoriginatingfromthe 572 571 Hiscasewasthefrst MarijaSulce (last accessed 20 greatly devastatingtheSouthSudaneseeconomy. while theconflicthasalsoledtoseverefoodshortagesforatleast5millionpeople, tance. 4.9 millionpeoplewereinurgentneedoffood,agricultureandnutritionalassis- ing starvationand1millionwereclassifedasbeingonthebrinkoffamine,while declared afamineinthecountry,warningthataround100,000peoplewerefac- 25 August 2018). un.org/en/story/2017/02/551812-famine-declared-region-south-sudan-un#.WKx_qVUrIdU (last accessed 579 September 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-45511352; ‘SouthSudanFast Facts’. 578 Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/26/world/africa/south-sudan-civil-war-deaths.html. 577 south-sudan-fast-facts/index.html. 576 575 south-sudan-civil-war-meeting-ethiopia-riek-machar-salva-kiir-peace-talks. Sides Are Meeting’, Vox 574 applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreatiesByCountrySelected.xsp?xp_countrySelected=SS (last accessed 29August 2018). 573 was accusedoftryingtodisarmguardsontheex-VicePresident’sside. really happened:KiirclaimedthatMacharhadattemptedacoup,whileKiir’sside mained calmformostoftheyearbutclasheseruptedinDecember.Itisunclearwhat These commentsledtotheeventualoustingofMacharfromfce.Thecountryre- announcement that he would run against Kiir in the 2015 presidential elections. tion tookplacefollowingMachar’scriticisminearly2013ofKiir’sleadershipandhis Kiir, clashedwiththethenVicePresident,RiekMachar’s,opposition.Theconfronta- civil warinDecember2013,whenforcesloyaltoSouthSudanesePresident,Salva try intheworld.Theyoungcountrydidnotenjoypeaceforlongasitdescenedinto South Sudanbecameindependentfromin2011,makingittheyoungestcoun- armed conflicts–aswellcustomaryinternationalhumanitarianlaw(IHL). Article 3oftheGenevaConventionsandAdditionalProtocolIIonnon-international cols II(1977)andIII(2005),thepartiesareboundbylawsetoutinthem–namely As SouthSudanhasratifedtheGenevaConventionsof1949andAdditionalProto- ethnicity, whileMacharisNuer. population) andNuer(around15.6percent).PresidentKiirisofthemajorityDinka very diversewiththetwolargestethnicitiesbeingDinka(around35.8percentof noted thattheethnicdimensioniscrucialtothisconflict.SouthSudanethnically ly estimated 50,000. around 383,000 people have been killed – a shocking increase from the previous- The latestreportssuggestthatsincethebeginningoffve-year-longconflict, country, feedingonlong-existingdifferences. A. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT International Committee of theRed Cross, ‘SouthSudan’,IHLDatabase, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ M.Specia, ‘383,000: Estimated Death Toll inSouthSudan’sWar’, 26 September 2018, The New York Ibid. J. Williams, ‘South Sudan’s CivilWar HasRaged for 5Years. Now theLeaders of theTwo E.Igunza, ‘SouthSudanWar: The Handshake That May EndaRecurring Nightmare’, BBC News, 13 ‘SouthSudanFast Facts’, CNN,14August 2018, https://edition.cnn.com/2013/07/10/world/africa/ United Nations, ‘Famine Declared in Region of SouthSudan– UN’,20 February 2017, https://news. 579 Althoughhumanitarianaidreversedthe2017 famine, currently around 577 Furthermore, around 4 million people have been displaced, , 20 June2018, https://www.vox.com/world/2018/6/20/17483232/ 576 Thewarhasinflamedtheethnictensionsin 578 In2017,theUnitedNations 575 It shouldbe 573 574

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 117 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 118 desperation, makingthemselvessick. aid, withOxfamreportingthatpeoplehavestartedtoeatweedsandgrassoutof Furthermore, therainyseasonandconflicthavemadeitdiffculttodeliverfood ganized asthemainthree. around 40 smaller armed groups fghtingin the region,but none as big and as or- is notknownhowmanytroopstheoppositionhas.Itestimated thatthereare 581 conflict-in-south-sudan/ (last accessed 25August 2018). Council, 5June2018, https://www.nrc.no/news/2018/june/five-things-you-should-know-about-the- 580 from theSPLAaswell,questioninglegitimacyofnationalforces. current SouthSudanesecivilwarhasseenotherarmedgroupsclaimingtostem came theoffcialSouthSudanesemilitary;nevertheless,asalreadymentioned, fghting fortheindependenceofSudan’ssouthernregion.Afterindependence,itbe- mination ofSouthSudan.Itwasformedinthe1980sandoriginallyarebelgroup The SPLAhasitsrootsinSudan’scivilwar,duringwhichitfoughtfortheself-deter- 210,000. hind PresidentKiir.Itwasestimatedin2013thattheSPLAhadatroopstrengthof On the one sideare the governmentforces, known as the offcialSPLA,standingbe- 1. SudanPeople’sLiberationArmy(SPLA) tering andfghtingmorebasedonethnicity. Kiir andex-VicePresidentMachar,ithasbecomemorecomplexwithgroupssplin- Though theconflictstartedoffasaconfrontationbetweenforcesofPresident are foodinsecureandthenumberisnotexpectedtodecreaseanytimesoon. 70 percentoffamiliesinthecountrygohungry.Evenmorepeople(6.3million) 586 A/HRC/37/71, 14March 2018. 585 584 strength-detail.asp?country_id=south-sudan (last accessed 25August 2018). 583 582 there-any-hope?t=1534848271167&t=1535177813098. npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2018/07/05/620184859/unimaginable-suffering-in-south-sudan-is- ganization, suchastheDinkaMathiangAnyoorandNuer WhiteArmy. Around thesemainpartiesarevariousarmedgroups,supportingtheirchosenor- President TabanDeng(SPLA-IO/TD). Machar (SPLA-in-oppositionorSPLA-IO/RM),andthesecondloyaltoFirstVice The oppositionissplitintotwogroups:onesupportingex-VicePresidentRiek 2. SPLA-in-oppositionorSPLA-IO/RMandSPLA-IO/TD tions, bringingthecurrentnumberoftroopsdowntoaround197,500. B. PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT J. Lu, ‘“Unimaginable” Suffering In South Sudan. Is There Any Hope?’, International Institute for Strategic Studies, ‘MiddleEast andNorthAfrica’, 113 The Military Balance 1(2013). Global Firepower, ‘SouthSudanMilitary Strength, https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military- HumanRightsCouncil (HRC), Report of theCommission onHumanRightsinSouthSudan,UNdoc Ibid. ‘SouthSudanFast Facts’. T. Jenssen, ‘Five Things You ShouldKnow AbouttheConflict inSouthSudan’,Norwegian Refugee 582 Nevertheless,throughoutthewar group hassuffered losses anddefec- 586 581 NPR, 5 July 2018, 583 584 https://www.

585 It It 580

itself andhasnotbeenimposedonthecountrybyforeignpowers. this peacedealmorethaninanypreviousyearsasithascomefromSouthSudan of DinkaandNuer,followedbythesmallerones. a sharingofpoweramongthemanytribesSouthSudan–twomajor President ofUganda,aretheguarantorsagreement.Theagreementitselfis The PresidentofSudan,OmarHassan Ahmed al-Bashir,and Yoweri Museveni,the ceasefre appears to have been violated within hours, 594 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/24/opinion/south-sudan-peace-agreement.html. 593 180912185452831.html. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/09/south-sudan-president-signs-peace-deal-rebel-leader- 592 machar-to-return-to-a-vp-post/a-44962462. VP Post’, DW peace-deal-idUSKBN1KQ0JV; ‘South Sudan Factions Sign Peace Deal, Riek Machar to Return to a https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southsudan-politics/south-sudan-government-and-rebels-reach- 591 180805172347086.html. www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/08/south-sudan-rival-leaders-sign-power-sharing-agreement- 590 https://apnews.com/e63fdb1275fc423e98625692af05c501. 589 588 org/2018/06/28/624172059/warring-parties-sign-cease-fire-in-south-sudan. 587 5 Augustcouldbeasignofrealchangetideintheconflict–PresidentKiir A promisingdevelopmentafewdaysafterthepower-sharingdealwassignedon sures seemedtobepavingthewayforaneventualpeaceagreement. for humanitarianaid,releasewarprisonersanddisengagetheirforces.Thesemea- June 2018,thepartiestoconflictsignedaceasefre,agreeingopenpassages There isasenseofthetidechanginginSouthSudaneseconflict.Atend nal’ peacedeal,itwasmediatedbySudanandsignedinEthiopia’sAddisAbaba. ceremony ofthefnalagreementtookplaceon12September.Called‘- of whichelectionswillbeheld. form atransitionalgovernment,whichwillbeinpowerfor36months,attheend tional army. dents andtheoppositionforceswillmergewithgovernmenttoformonena- August, RiekMacharwillreturntothecapital,Juba,asoneoffvevicepresi- by PresidentSalvaKiirandRiekMachar.Underthepower-sharingagreementof5 signed atthebeginningofAugust,whilepeacedealwasinSeptember nent peacedeal.Anagreementwasfnallyreachedandapower-sharingdeal towards apeaceagreementandthesummerwasdedicatedtobrokeringperma- most likelythelargest. areas withseveraltribeswillhavetobedefnedasbelongingoneofthetribes, Sudan willhavetobemarkedasbelongingoneofthetribalhomelands.Even C. KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2018 A. Abdelaty, A. ‘SouthSudanGovernment andRebels Reach Peace Deal’, Reuters, 5August 2018, J. Doubek,‘Warring Parties SignCease-Fire inSouthSudan’,NPR,28June2018, https://www.npr. M.Mamdani,‘The Trouble With SouthSudan’sNew Peace Deal’, The New York Times, 24 September ‘SouthSudanPresident Signs Peace Deal withRebel Leader’, AlJazeera, 12September 2018, Lu, ‘“Unimaginable”Suffering InSouthSudan’. S.Mednick, ‘SouthSudanClaimsCivilWar IsOver butSkepticism Abounds’, AP,20 August 2018, Ibid. ‘SouthSudan’sRival Leaders SignPower-Sharing Agreement’, AlJazeera, 6August 2018,https:// , 5August 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/south-sudan-factions-sign-peace-deal-riek- 589 Oncethefnaldealissigned,twosideswillhavethreemonthsto 594 590 Thepresidenthascommentedthathebelievesin 593 588 Underit,eachareaofSouth the conflict has still moved 591 587 Thesigning Thoughthe 592

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 119 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 120

Juba andletrebelstakeupthepostof‘frstvice-president’. rebels, committingtostopthefghtingimmediately,ordermilitaryforcesleave sanctions inordertoencouragepeace.PresidentKiirsignedapeacedealwiththe being the 2015 peace deal. In August2015,theUN threatened SouthSudan with have beenpreviousfailedeffortstobringpeacethecountry,mostnotable Nevertheless, criticismoftheabilitythisdealtoendconflictabounds.There allow thecountrytorebuilditself. minority rights. dominant tribes.Thiscouldinflameethnicgrievancesevenmoreandinfringeon sticking pointwillprobablybetherequirementtodefnecountry’sareasby 601 600 https://www.ft.com/content/c78908d0-b83d-11e8-bbc3-ccd7de085ffe. 599 598 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-45077389. 597 south-sudan-government-rebels-sign-security-deal/a-44563345. 596 180809062138199.html. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/08/south-sudan-kiir-grants-rebel-leader-machar-amnesty- 595 on theEliminationofAllFormsDiscriminationAgainstWomen anditsOption- or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and its Optional Protocol; the Convention South SudanispartytotheConventionagainstTortureandOther Cruel,Inhuman action. Machar. Healsoremindedhisforcestoobservethenewpeacedealandceaseall offered anamnestytoallinvolvedintheconflictandgrantedapardonRiek rent deal as being the same as the 2015 agreement. collapsed ayearlater,leadingtoMacharfleeingJuba.Someanalystsseethecur- children. Nevertheless,theagreementwasviolatedwithinafewdays. that couldleadtoconfrontation,andthereleaseofpoliticaldetainees,women is partof.Thatcalledforthefreezingoftroopsintheirlocations,ceasingactions thority onDevelopment,anAfricantradeblockofeightstatesthatSouthSudan at aceasefrewasinDecember2017,encouragedbytheIntergovernmentalAu- signifcant supporttooppositiongroups,includingMachar’sefforts. ly presentinSouthSudansupportofKiir’sfaction,whilehasprovided the twocountriesaretofutureofSouthSudan.Uganda’stroopsphysical- ‘guarantors’ oftheSouthSudanesepeacedealshowshowstrategicallyimportant young nationaninformalprotectorateofSudanandUganda.Theirrolefcial criticized asbeingimposedonSouthSudanbyforeigncountriesandmakingthe the agreementjustafewdaysafteritwassignedinSeptember. the latestpeacedeal, the UNisalreadyinvestigatingreportedclashesthatviolated D. WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS ‘SouthSudanese Celebrate Peace Deal Signed by KiirandMachar’,BBC News, 6August 2018, Ibid. ‘SouthSudan’sKiirGrants Rebel Leader Machar, OthersAmnesty’, AlJazeera, 9August 2018, HRC, Report of theCommission onHumanRightsin SouthSudan. S.Wilson, ‘SouthSudan’sLatest Peace Deal Faces Early Test’, FinancialTimes, 15September 2018, ‘South Sudan Government, Rebels Sign Security Deal’, Mamdani,‘The Trouble With SouthSudan’sNew Peace Deal’. 595 It remains to be seen whether this deal will be able to end the conflict and 601 DW , 6 July 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/ 597 Another signifcant attempt 596 Nevertheless,thedeal 599 Ithasalsobeen 598 600 Regarding Another

armed robberiesofaidarealsoanissue. people. Almost2,000peopleareestimatedtohavebeendisplaced duetothisvio- 63 individualsalive,amongwhomwerenumerouschildrenand elderlyanddisabled of May2018,rapingaround120girlsandwomen,killing232civilians andburning SPLA tohaveattackedatleast40villagesorsettlementsbetweenAprilandtheend South SudandocumentstheviolationsinsouthernUnity,whereithasfound by theUNOffceofHighCommissionerforHumanRightsandMissionin that humanitarianaidcouldagainbecrucialinavoidingfamine. experts have warned that the country is once again on the brink of starvation and of medicalhelp,foodandwater.Aidwaskeyinrelievingthefamine2017,but workers havetowithdrawfromcertainareasandareunablehelppeopleinneed supplies. Thedangerofbeingattackedortheaidstolencanmeanthat of thelaw.Itnotonlyaffectsaidworkers,butalsopeoplewhodependontheir tacks undercustomaryIHLandharmingthemorraidingaidsuppliesisaviolation 607 606 605 604 third-straight-year/ (last accessed 29August 2018). Year’, 603 (last accessed 29August 2018). Sudan’, 602 ic totheoppositionorwereofadifferentethnicity. targeted simplybecausetheylivedinopposition-controlledareas,weresympathet- were presenttojustifyanattack.Theevidencehassuggestedthatcivilianshavebeen many attacksagainstciviliansandcivilianbuildings,wherenooppositionforces There is evidence to suggest that the SPLA – thegovernment forces – have directed 2. AttacksonCiviliansandCivilianProperty Human andPeople’sRights. al Protocol;theConventiononRightsofChildandAfricanCharter abducted sinceDecember2017. aid workershavebeenkilledsincetheconflictstartedin2013and22 top ofthelistmostviolentcountriesinwhichtodeliveraid. world foraidworkers.TheAidWorkerSecurityDatabaseputSouthSudanatthe The UN has described South Sudan as one of the most dangerous places in the 1. AttacksonAidWorkers and warcrimescommittedbybothsides. less horribleforcivilians.Theconflicthasbeenmarredbyhumanrightsabuses national treatiesandconventions has nothelpedtomaketheSouthSudanesewar Norwegian Refugee Council, ‘SouthSudanDeclared Most Violent for AidWorkers for Third Straight Year’. HRC, Report of theCommission onHumanRightsin SouthSudan. Norwegian Refugee Council, ‘SouthSudanDeclared Most Violent for AidWorkers for Third Straight UNOffice of theHighCommissioner for HumanRights(OHCHR),‘Ratification Status for South Ibid. Jenssen, ‘Five Things You ShouldKnow AbouttheConflict inSouthSudan’. https://www.nrc.no/news/2018/august/south-sudan-declared-most-violent-for-aid-workers-for- https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=215&Lang=en 602 Nevertheless,thisparticipationinanarrayofinter- 604 Detentionofaidworkers,physicalassaultsand 605 Aidworkersareprotectedagainstat- 607 Forexample,arecentreport 606 603 Around100

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 121 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 122 the armedforcesofgovernmentandvariousgroupsincountry. more. Accordingtotheorganization,therearearound19,000childrenservingin already freedaround500childsoldiersin2018andwasplanningtorelease1,000 girls ofvariousages,someasyoung14,werefreed.Atthatpoint,UNICEFhad ganized asymbolic‘layingdownofarms’ceremony,duringwhich112boysand95 611 aljazeera.com/news/2018/07/south-sudan-troops-allies-killed-hundreds-attacks-180710095811167.html; 610 609 civilians-southern-unity-april-may-2018 (last accessed 1September 2018). April–May 2018, 10July 2018,https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/indiscriminate-attacks-against- 608 Greater UpperNile,theEquatoriaregionandBahrelGhazal. armed groups.Theareaswiththehighestratesofsexualviolencehavebeen and mutilationofgenitalia,perpetratedbyboththegovernmentmost documented numerousaccountsofrape,gangforcedstripping,castration Sexual violencehasbeencentraltotheSouthSudanesecivilwar.TheUN 4. SexualViolence arms embargo. review theabuses.ItalsocalledforEuropeanUniontopursueaninternational ability intheSouthSudaneseconflictandsupportedestablishingahybridcourtto condemned inMay2018bytheEuropeanParliament,whichcalledforaccount- ernment andoppositionforces.Thisisillegalunderthelawofconflictwas Recruiting childrenassoldiersappearstobeacommonpracticebyboththegov- 3. ChildSoldiers lence. 180619110209366.html. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/06/relief-chief-rampant-sexual-abuse-violence-south-sudan- 614 613 cnn.com/2018/04/18/africa/south-sudan-child-soldiers-freed/index.html. 612 org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/south-sudan (accessed 25August 2018). groups andtheirfghters. killed by the opposition, as people are not always able to recognize different armed especially inKoch.Nevertheless,itisnotasclearhowmanycivilianshavebeen ployed ascorched-earthpolicy,burninghomesandstealingthousandsofcattle, The SPLA-IO(RM)alsocarriedoutattacksonciviliansandmighthaveem- or areasfordisplacedpeople,saytheyhavebeenraped. three yearsoftheconflict.Around72percentwomen,residing inprotectedsites According to UNICEF, around 1,000 children were sexually assaulted in the that sexualviolencehasbeenusedasaweapontoterrorizeandoppresscivilians. stroying thembytakingcattleandburninghomesfoodsupplies. that theforcescarriedoutascorched-earthstrategy,lootingvillagesandthende- HumanRightsWatch (HRW), ‘SouthSudan:Events of 2017’, World Report 2018 , HRW, ‘SouthSudan:Events of 2017’. ‘SouthSudanTroops, AlliesKilled Hundreds inRecent Attacks: UN’,AlJazeera, 10 July2018, https://www. B.Adebayo, ‘More than200 ChildSoldiersFreed inSouthSudan’,CNN,18April2018, https://edition. ‘InSouthSudan’sWar, Thousands Suffer RapeandSex Attacks’, AlJazeera, 19June2018, OHCHRandUNMission inSouthSudan,Indiscriminate Attacks Against CiviliansinSouthernUnity Ibid. 608 LootingbytheSPLAhasalsobeencommonandthereisevidencetosuggest 611 InApril2018,theUnitedNationsChildren’sFund(UNICEF)or- 610 614 609 https://www.hrw. 613

Itappears 612 frst

long timefortheSouthSudanesecommunitiestoheal. crimes againsthumanityunderIHL. cution onethnicgrounds,meaningthatthepartieshavecarriedoutwarcrimesand manizing theotherside.Certainactsduringconflictpointtoevidenceofperse- The ethnicdimensionhasledtheconflicttobecomeawarof‘themagainstus’,dehu- theless, manyarguethatthecompensationforvictimswasnotsuffcient. as abreakthroughforhumanrightsandhumanitarianlawinthecountry;never- to evenmoreconflictinthefuture. in frontoffamilyandcommunitymembers,havetraumatizedpeoplecouldlead girls, boys,womenandmen,haserodedthesocialfabric.Theacts,oftencarriedout conflict, whichhasincludedrapeandmutilationsofsexualorgans,targeted 619 618 617 616 for-murder-rape-in-2016-hotel-raid-idUSKCN1LM0XK. 2018, 615 Government, followinganallegedchemicalattack. France haveattackedallegedchemicalweaponandresearchfacilities oftheSyrian consent tothecoalitionbeingonitsterritory.TheUStogether withtheUKand (IAC) betweentheUS-ledcoalitionandSyrianGovernment asSyriadidnot and theUnitedStates-ledcoalition.Thereisalsoaninternational armedconflict groups are also engagedinconflicts witheachother,as wellaswithTurkey, Israel ternational armedconflicts(NIACs)withvariousrebelgroups, whiletherebel the SyrianGovernment,withsupportofRussiaandIran, is engagedinnon-in- gan as a civil war in 2011 between the Assad regimeand rebel groups. Currently, There are many parallel armed conflicts taking place inthe Syrian war, whichbe- Classification oftheConflict 6. THE SYRIAN ARMED CONFLICT: NEARING THE END? tions, rapeandsexualviolence,aswelllootingthedestructionofvillages’. geting civilians on the basis of their ethnic identity and by means of killings, abduc- and otherarmedgroupsthatsupportthepartiestoconflictare‘deliberatelytar- Sudan, thereissuffcientevidencetoconcludethattheSPLA,bothSPLA-IOgroups According to the March 2018 report of the Commission on Human Rights in South nalist andrapedforeignaidworkers,whileattackingothers. out inJuly2016.ThesoldiersattackedtheTerrainHotelJuba,murderedajour- government soldiersweresentencedtoprisonformurdersandrapestheycarried soldiers oftenbeingtheonesperpetratingsexualviolence.InSeptember2018,10 crimes committedasthepolicingofsexualisnon-existent–policeand The situationisaggravatedbythefactthatnooneheldaccountablefor HRC, ‘Report of theCommission onHumanRightsinSouthSudan’,§126. D. Dumo, ‘SouthSudan SoldiersSentenced to Jailfor Murder, Rapein2016 Hotel Raid’,Reuters, 6September Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southsudan-security/south-sudan-soldiers-sentenced-to-jail- 619 618 Becauseofthesehorrifccrimes,itwilltakea Furthermore,thesexualviolenceduring 615 Thecasewasseen MarijaSulce 616 617

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 123 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 124 Free SyrianArmy(FSA)withtheaimofoverthrowingPresidentAssad’sregime. July 2011, when a group of defectors from the Syrian military began forming the ponents startedtakinguparmsandtheunrestbeganitsdescentintocivilwarin demonstrations, protestsagainsttheregimeeruptednationwide.Theregime’sop- power intheregionhasdrawnintoconflictcountriessuch astheUS,Russia, players pursuingtheirowngoalsandinterestsamidtheunrest. Thestrugglefor There hasalsobeenalotofinternationalinvolvementinthe conflict,withmany former selfinSyria. Since then,itspowerhasgreatlydeclinedandthegroupis now ashadowofits ment in2016. the civilwar.AnimportantchangecamewhenAleppowasretakenbygovern- territory, includingthestrategicallyimportantcityofAleppo,throughoutmost the war.TheFSAwithotheroppositiongroupshavecontrolledvastareasofSyrian conflict, includingmanyrebelgroupsaswellotherstates,highlycomplicating During thealmosteightyearsofensuingcivilwar,manypartieshavejoined and 2014,IScontrolledmorethan88,000squarekilometersacross IraqandSyria. form forhardlinegroups,suchasIslamicState(IS)tobecomekeyplayers.In2013 world/isis-fast-facts/index.html. 624 September 2011, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010_5/168276.htm (last accessed 15August 2018). 623 622 com/news/2016/05/syria-civil-war-explained-160505084119966.html. 621 world-middle-east-35806229. 620 percent. Shia, represented13percent,whileChristiansconstituted10andDruze3 the populationin2011.OtherMuslimreligions,suchasAlawites,Ismailisand nities, ofwhichthelargestareSunniMuslims,representingaround74percent The politicalunrestrevealedthegreatreligiousdivisionswithinSyriancommu- the regimetriedtocrushdissentbyforce. cal freedomandunemployment.Thedemonstrationstookanuglyturnwhen against thecorruptionofPresidentBasharal-Assad’sgovernment,lackpoliti- Spring protests.TheSyrianpeoplestartedprotestinginMarch2011Daara The Syrianarmedconflictbeganin2011asacivilwar,stemmingfromtheArab of thewar. the mostimportantpointsarediscussedregardingbeginningandevolution The War Report 2016 provides a more detailed history of the conflict. Here, only Syrian territory. There isalsoarguablyaninternationalarmedconflictbetweenIsraelandIranon A. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT ‘Syria’s CivilWar Explained from theBeginning’, AlJazeera, 14April2018, https://www.aljazeera. U.S. Department of State, Syria: July–December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report , 13 Ibid. ‘ISISFast Facts’, CNNInternational Edition, 3September 2017, https://edition.cnn.com/2014/08/08/ ‘Why IsThere aWar inSyria’, 623 Religious differences have fueled the conflict and have provided a plat- 622 BBC News, 7September 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/ 620 Aftertheforcefulresponseto 624 621

rently around2,000UStroopsonSyria’sterritory. up de-escalationzonesinSyria,sponsoredbyRussia,TurkeyandIran, opposition groups.OneexampleistheAstanatalksin2017,whichmanagedtoset important role intrying to facilitate peace talks between the Assad regime and the people withinSyrianterritory. people, produced around 5.6 million refugees and displaced roughly 6.6 million of thetwenty-frst century. So far, it has taken the lives of around half a million Approaching itseighthyear,theSyrianwarisoneofmostdevastatingconflicts and theAssadgovernment,asestablishedbyTheWarReport2016. sented to this foreign-troop presence,thereis an IAC betweentheUS-led coalition coalition’s purposeistofghtterrorism,sincetheSyrianGovernmenthasnotcon- the UnitedArabEmirates,Kingdomand,ofcourse,US.Though France, Germany,Italy,Jordan,Morocco,theNetherlands,SaudiArabia,Turkey, Country’, Business Insider,http://uk.businessinsider.com/troop-levels-in-syria-trump-2018-4. 631 War%20Report%202016.pdf (last accessed 26 November 2018). Law andHuman Rights,2017, https://www.geneva-academy.ch/joomlatools-files/docman-files/The%20 630 (last accessed 15August 2018). 629 despite-tensions-russia-seeks-u-s-help-to-rebuild-syria-idUSKBN1KO2JP Syria’, 628 180921142500450.html. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/09/russia-turkey-agree-borders-demilitarised-zone-idlib- 627 626 https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/02/syria-civil-war-next/553232/. 625 Syria. The US-ledcoalitionof77stateswasformedin2014tocombatISIraqand a. US-ledCoalition 1. InternationalArmedConflicts the Middle East. corruption; inrecentyears,ithasbecomeapawnthegeopoliticalstrugglesof civil warroots.TheconflictisnolongeronlyaboutSyria’sgovernmentandAssad’s international incharacter,ratherthanremainingfaithfultoitsnon-international Turkey, Iran, Israel and many others. To a degree, the conflict has become more that theconflictmightbeenteringitsfnalstages. appeared tobeaflickeroflightattheenddarkseven-yeartunnel,suggesting stronghold inIdlibSeptember2018. the demilitarizedzonebrokeredbyTurkeyandRussiainlastremainingrebel B. PARTIES TO THE CONFLICTS M.Kranz, ‘Trump Reportedly Wants to GetOutof Syria —Here’s How Many Troops the US Hasinthe ‘Russia, Turkey Agree onBorders of Demilitarised Zone inIdlib’, AlJazeera, 22September 2018, U. Friedman, ‘Syria’s War HasNever Been More International’, 14February 2018, The Atlantic, A. Bellal,The War A. Report: Armed Conflicts in2016, Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian A. Mohammed andP. A. Stewart, ‘Exclusive: Despite Tensions, Russia Seeks U.S.Helpto Rebuild ‘Syria’s CivilWar Explained from theBeginning’. Global Coalition, ‘79Partners United inDefeating Daesh’,http://theglobalcoalition.org/en/partners/ Reuters, 3 August 2018, 629 Themostnotablestatesinthecoalitionare:Belgium,Canada,Denmark, 625 Having said that, the international community has played an https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-russia-syria-exclusive/exclusive- 628 Nevertheless,astheyear2018unfolded,there 627

631 . 630 Therearecur- 626 aswell

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 125 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 126 number ofactiveSyrianmilitarypersonneliscurrentlyaround154,000. the currentnumberoftroops,butaccordingtoGlobalFirepowerrankings, by PresidentAssadnearDamascus. on storage,militaryandresearchfacilitiesafteranothersuspectedchemicalattack when theUS,BritainandFrancelaunchedairstrikesagainstSyrianchemicalweap- Another directconfrontationtookplacealmostexactlyayearlaterinApril2018, strength-detail.asp?country_id=Syria (last accessed 15August 2018). 637 com/international/archive/2018/05/syria-assad-conscription-refugees-lebanon/560282/. 636 www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/10/erdogan-turkey-leave-syria-election-held-181004174206836.html. 635 story.html?utm_term=.a6c0b089ff13. in-syria-us-takes-on-new-goal-iranian-retreat/2018/09/30/625c182a-c27f-11e8-97a5-ab1e46bb3bc7_ The Washington Post, 30 September 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/ 634 world/middleeast/trump-strikes-syria-attack.html. Chemical Weapons Attack’, The New York Times, 13April2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/13/ 633 responses-to-syrian-chemical-attack.html. Times, 6April2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/world/middleeast/us-said-to-weigh-military- 632 fght againstrebelgroups.InFebruary2018,anIraniandronewent intoIsraeliair- complicating the situation. Iran is on Syrian territory to aid the Assad government’s There isarguablyanIACbetweenIsraelandIranwithinSyrianterritory,further d. IsraelVersusIranonSyrianTerritory fections anddesertions,thisnumberhasgreatlydecreased. 300,000 troops; nevertheless, over the years of the conflict,due to casualties, de- At thebeginningofwar,SyrianArmynumberedbetween250,000and c. SyrianGovernment a generalelectionisheldinSyria. 2016 andPresidentErdoanhasrecentlysaidthatTurkishtroopswillremainuntil accepted Turkishpresenceonitssoil.Turkeyhasbeenpresentintheconflictsince Kurdish militantgroups,andalsoinanIACwithSyriaasthegovernmenthasnot Syrian Kurds,thusarguablymeritingaseparatementionforbeinginNIACwith Turkey ispartoftheUS-ledcoalition,butitalsoactingunilaterallyagainst b. Turkey Syria untiltheendofwarasawaytohaltIran’sexpansionacrossMiddleEast. its mostrecentstancehasshiftedastheTrumpadministrationvowedtostayin Though theUShasbeenplayingwithideaofwithdrawingfromSyriaforawhile, base afterthegovernmenthadusedchemicalweaponsonitsownpopulation. in April2017whentheUScarriedoutamissilestrikeonSyrianGovernmentair Direct confrontationbetweenSyriaandthecoalitiontookplaceforfrsttime ‘Erdogan: Turkey Will not Leave Syria UntilanElection IsHeld’,AlJazeera, 4September 2018, https:// Global Firepower, ‘2018 Syria Military Strength’, https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military- H. Cooper, T. Gibbons-Neff and B. Hubbard, ‘U.S., Britain and France Strike Syria Over Suspected H. Cooper, M. R. Gordon and M. D. Shear, ‘Dozens of U.S. Missiles Hit Air Base in Syria’, S.Dagher, ‘Assad IsDesperate for Soldiers’, The Atlantic, 14May 2018, https://www.theatlantic. M. Ryan, P. Sonne and J. Hudson, ‘In Syria, Trump Administration Takes On New Goal: Iranian Retreat’, 635 633 636 Itisdiffculttoknow The New York 637 632 634

trolled cityofAfrin. tion Units(YPG)whoarebackedbytheUS.InMarch,FSAtookYPG-con- fghting theKurdishmilitiainnorthernSyria,alsoknownasPeople’sProtec- sign thatIsraelandIranaremovingclosertoopenwarfare’. from, butUSoffcialshavepointed the fngeratIsrael,warning that thisis‘thelatest po, reportedlyhittingtwoIran-linkedbases.Itisnotclearwheretheattackcame April, thereweremorestrikestargetingSyrianmilitarypositionsinHamaandAlep- https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/future-syrian-democratic-forces-171124110417741.html. 643 aljazeera.com/news/2018/03/free-syrian-army-group-captures-afrin-city-180318081430817.html. 642 jazeera.com/news/2017/10/syria-opposition-alliances-171010075809951.html. 641 www.nbcnews.com/news/mideast/israel-seems-be-preparing-war-iran-say-u-s-officials-n870051. 640 air-base-tasnim-idUSKBN1HH0U2. www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-iran/seven-iranians-were-killed-in-strike-on-syrian- 639 August 2018). atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-ongoing-israel-iran-proxy-war-in-syria (last accessed 15 638 militant groups. gence, aerialsupportandlogistics,theFSAwouldbeunabletooverpowerother or cohesiveideology.WithoutsupportfromtheTurkishmilitarythroughintelli- term formanyarmedgroups,withlittlecoordination,organizedmilitaryplanning group. Sinceitsbeginnings,theFSAhasexpandedandbecomealooseumbrella in 2011whendefectorsfromtheSyrianArmyorganizedthemselvesintoa militant The frstorganizedoppositiontotheSyrianGovernment,FSA,cameintobeing a. FreeSyrianArmy(FSA) relations. ish militias,whicharesupportedbytheUS,puttinggreatstrainonUS-Turkish key shouldalsobementionedseparatelyasitisengagedinaNIACwiththeKurd- the mostimportantbeingFSA,IS,Hay’atTahriral-ShamandYPG-YPJ.Tur- ernment, assistedbyRussiaandIran,theUS-ledcoalitionvariousrebelgroups, There arevariousparallelNIACs,themainplayersinwhichSyrianGov- 2. Non-InternationalArmedConflicts fre, IsraelresortedtoabroaderwaveofstrikesonSyrianandIraniantargets. centre, whichhadallegedlylaunchedthedrone.AsthistriggeredSyriananti-aircraft space from Syriaandprompted a subsequent Israeli strikeon the Iranian command coordination, itisnotpossibletoknowhowmanytroopshas. killed 7Iranianmilitarypersonnel,whichIsraelhasnotconfrmed. was anotheralleged Israeli airstrike on Syria’s air base at thebeginningofApril that Turkey’s southernborder. of theirgoalsistoreducetheinfluenceSyrianDemocraticForce(SDF)at S.Abboud,‘Who Are Syria’s OppositionAlliances?’, AlJazeera, 10 October 2017, https://www.al M. Alami, ‘The Ongoing Israel-Iran Proxy War in Syria’, Atlantic Council, 8 March 2018, ‘Seven Iranians Were Killed in Strike on Syrian Air Base: Tasnim’, F. Najjar, ‘What IstheFuture of theSyrian Democratic Forces?’, AlJazeera, 25November 2017, ‘Turkish Forces and Free Syrian Army Capture Afrin City’, AlJazeera, 18March 2018, https://www. C. Kube, C. ‘Israel Seems to BePreparing for War withIran, U.S.OfficialsSay’, NBC News, 1May 2018, https:// 641 TheFSAtogetherwithTurkeyhavebeenheavilyinvolvedin 642 ThoughseveralFSAbrancheshaveshiftedalliances,one 643 AstheFSAisaverylooseorganizationwithnoclear Reuters, 10 April 2018, 640 639 Attheendof http://www. 638 There https://

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 127 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 128 as-many-as-30000-isis-fighters-still-in-iraq-and-syria-2018-8. as attheHeightof Their Power’, 14August 2018, Business Insider,http://www.businessinsider.fr/us/ 649 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/21/isis-caliphate-islamic-state-raqqa-iraq-islamist. 648 cnn.com/2015/12/06/news/isis-funding/index.html. the banksitcontrolled. 2014 alone,itearnedaround$2billionfromitsoilfelds,mineralmines,taxesand is alsooneofthewealthiestmilitantgroupsinterroristorganizationhistory– 647 646 645 www.trtworld.com/mea/turkey-backed-rebels-to-form-new-army-in-northern-syria-367931 644 ferce, now[is]patheticandalostcause’. Envoy fortheGlobalCoalitiontoDefeatISIS,tweetedthatIS‘oncepurportedas – RaqqahadfallentoKurdishfghters,BrettMcGurk,USSpecialPresidential the endhadcomeforIS.InOctober2017,afterlastofgroup’sstrongholds By 2017,thegrouphadlostmostofitsterritory,leadingtoproclamationsthat 2014 and,in2015,itwasbelievedtobeholdingaround3,500peopleasslaves. and propaganda.Initsprime,IScontrolled34,000squaremilesinIraqSyria across theworldwithhelpofinternetandsocialmediatodiffuseitsideas erned bySharialaw.Ithasbeenextremelysuccessfulinrecruitingmembersfrom of creatinganIslamicstate(caliphate)acrossIraqandSyria,whichwouldbegov- detached itselffromal-Qaedain2014toformitsownorganizationwiththeaim The IslamicStateinIraqandSyria(ISIS),orsimplyIS,isanextremistgroupthat b. IslamicState(IS) Army (UNA)inmid-2017. groups hascomefromTurkeywiththecreationofUnitedNational(orSyrian) The mostrecentattempttounitethesplinteringFSAaswellsomeotherrebel infghting betweendifferentgroupscontinues. was tounitedifferentrebelgroups under onebanner,it has not beensuccessful as namely theSDF,ISandHay’atTahriral-Sham.Thoughpurposeofunion around AleppoandIdlib.TheUNAhasrepeatedlyclashedwithotherrebelgroups, ly dispersedacrossSyriaandarelocatedinsuchareasastheSouth,Ghouta taking placein2012.ThegroupworkedtogetherwithISuntil internalfghtingpit- sad’s regimewithanIslamicgovernment.Itwasformedin2011 withitsfrstattack the FreeMenofLevant)isaSunniSalafstarmedgroupthataimstoreplaceAs - Ahrar al-ShamorHarajatal-Islamiyya(theIslamic Movementof c. Ahraral-Sham in boththesecountries. and 30,000IStroopsinIraqSyria. premature as the latest reports claim that there remain anywhere between 20,000 J. Pagliery, ‘Inside the $2 Billion ISIS War Machine’, Abboud,‘Who Are Syria’s OppositionAlliances?’ J. Burke, ‘Rise andFall of Isis:Its Dream of aCaliphate IsOver, SoWhat Now?’, The Guardian November, 21 R. Pickrell, ‘As Many as 30,000 ISIS Fighters May Still Be Crawling Across Iraq and Syria — as Many ‘ISISFast Facts’. ‘Turkey-Backed Oppositionto Form New Army inNorthernSyria’, TRT World, 30May 2017, https:// 647 644 Thevariousgroupsthatcomprisethearmyarewide- 649 Therefore,itremainsasignifcantthreat 648 However,thisclaimcouldhavebeen CNN Money, 11 December 2015, 645 https://money. . 646 It It which is backing the SDF, should learn from Iraq and remove its troops from Syr- or retakingSDF-controlledareasbyforce.AssadsoundedawarningthattheUS, to dealwiththeSDF:negotiations,whichgovernmentclaimshavestarted, problem leftinSyriaistheSDF’.Hecontinuedbysayingthattherearetwooptions interview withRussiaTodayinMay2018,PresidentAssadstatedthat‘theonly The grouphasbetween7,000and11,000troops. 2018 thatithadtaken25villagesfromISandwasincontrolofmostthearea. ment. IthasalsobeenatwarwithISinIdlibandAleppo,announcingMarch currently emergingasoneofthestrongestoppositiongroupstoAssad’sgovern- com/indepth/interactive/2015/05/syria-country-divided-150529144229467.html. 656 has-been-raging-7-years-what-n849851 February 2018,Behind it?’,21 NBC News, 655 654 19 April2018, http://www.businessinsider.fr/us/syria-terrorist-group-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-2018-4 653 form-new-armed-group-in-northern-syria/ (last accessed 16August 2018). SouthFront, 18February 2018, https://southfront.org/ahrar-al-sham-and-nour-al-din-al-zenki-merge-to- 652 www.dw.com/en/german-prosecutors-charge-two-syrians-for-ahrar-al-sham-membership/a-36444080 651 mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/523 (last accessed 16August 2018). 650 northern area during 2017 and now controls almost a quarter of Syria. Rojava region.TheKurdishYPGanditsalliespushedISout,tookoveralarge stated aimistheestablishmentofademocraticandfederalSyriainnorthern nian andKurdishfghters.Foundedin2015toghtISotherrebelgroups,its Dominated bytheYPG,SDFisaUS-backedallianceofArab,Turkmen,Arme- e. SyrianDemocraticForces(SDF) rah Front)mergedwithfourotherIslamistgroupsinthesummerof2016. end of2016/beginning2017whenJabhatFathalSham(previouslytheAlNus- is basedprimarilyinthenorthwesternregionofSyriaandemergedroughlyat which aims to overthrow the Assad regime and introduce Sharia law in Syria. It Hay’at Tahriral-ShamisaunionoffvedifferentrebelIslamistorganizations, d. Hay’atTahriral-Sham by thetwogroupstocounterHay’atTahriral-Sham’sinfluenceinIdlib. Liberation Front(SLF)inthegovernorateofIdlib.Thisisthoughttobeanattempt In February2018,thegroupmergedwithNoural-Dinal-ZenkitoformSyrian ted themagainsteachotheratthebeginningof2014. estimated 20,000troops. powerful andperseveringoppositiongroupsthroughout the conflict,boasting an ‘German Prosecutors Charge Two Syrians for Ahrar al-Sham Membership’, B.Brimelow ‘A New Terrorist Group IsPopping UpinSyria andCapitalizing onISIS’Defeat’, Business Insider, F. Brinley CheikhOmar, Bruton andA. ‘Syria’s Civil War HasBeen Raging for 7Years. What’s ‘Ahrar Al-Sham andNour Al-DinAl-Zenki Merge to Form New Armed Group inNorthernSyria’, A. Chugthai,‘Syria’s A. War: Who Controls What?’, AlJazeera, 7June2018, https://www.aljazeera. Ibid. ‘Ahrar al-Sham’, Mapping Militants Project, Stanford University, http://web.stanford.edu/group/ 651 . https://www.nbcnews.com/news/mideast/syria-s-civil-war- 655 650 Ithasbeenoneofthemore DW , 18November 2016, https:// 652 656 653 In an . Itis 654 .

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Trump followedsuit,declaringthegroup‘militarilydefeated’inJanuary2018. ment announcedthatitswaragainstISwasoverinDecember2017,whilePresident Currently, almost96percentofIS-heldterritoryhasbeenretaken. but roughestimatesputthenumberat60,000–75,000personnel. 665 664 https://www.businessinsider.com/us-backed-forces-clear-up-raqqa-after-isiss-crushing-defeat-2017-10 663 com/news/world-middle-east-27838034 662 isis-ideology-180508042421376.html (last accessed 16August 2018). Centre for Studies 8May 2018, http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2018/05/100-percent-defeat- 661 660 659 16 August 2018). reports/military-and-security-structures-of-the-autonomous-administration-in-syria.html (last accessed Report, Omran Center for Strategic Studies, 24 January 2018, p 7, 658 aljazeera.com/news/2018/05/syria-assad-vows-retake-areas-held-backed-kurds-180531072938002.html. 657 2016, 13,000squaremileshadalreadybeentakenfromthegroup. in 2014,whenitcontrolled34,000squaremilesoflandacrossSyriaandIraq.By Islamic Stateterritoryhaschangedimmenselysincethepeakofgroup’spower 1. TheDeclineofIslamicState social existence’. Both groupsaimto‘protecttheKurdishpeopleandtheircultural,political, to astwoseparateentitiesandtheYPJjoinedSDFseparatelyfromYPG. YPG wascreatedinJuly2012andtheYPJApril2013.Theyprefertobereferred (YPG) –andtheWomen’sProtectionUnitsYekîneyênParastinaJinê(YPJ).The separated intotwogroups:thePeople’sProtectionUnits–YekîneyênParastinaGel The mostimportantpartoftheSDF,KurdishPeople’sProtectionUnits,are f. YPG-YPJ ia. territory since2014. the IraqiGovernmentretookMosulfromIS,whichhadbeenpartoflatter’s Party (PKK)fortheirtrainingandmilitaryplanning. 20,000–30,000 fghters.TheyhavegenerallydependedontheKurdistanWorker’s lition andSDFtroops. 2014, thecitywasclearedofgroupthroughheavyairstrikesbyUS-ledcoa- heart oftheIS-proclaimedcaliphate–inOctober2017.PartISterritorysince C. KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2018 657 A. Bendaoudi, A. ‘Syria’s Assad Vows to Retake Areas Heldby US-Backed Kurds’, AlJazeera , 31May 2018,https://www. ‘US-Backed Forces Clear UpRaqqaAfter ISIS’sCrushing Defeat’, Business Insider,18October 2017, B.M.Rashid,Military andSecurity Structures of theAutonomous Administration inSyria , Special Ibid,p15. Ibid. ‘IslamicState andtheCrisis inIraq andSyria inMaps’, BBC News, 28March 2018, https://www.bbc. Bendaoudi,After the‘Almost 100 Percent’ Defeat of ISIS,What AboutItsIdeology? Ibid,p4. ThereisnoconfrmedinformationonthenumberofghterswithinSDF, After the ‘Almost 100 Percent’ Defeat of ISIS, What About Its Ideology?, Al Jazeera 659 Theforcesofthetwogroupsareestimatedtostandataround 662 663 ButthemostimportantmomentwasfallofRaqqa– Theairstrikesleftthecityinruins. . http://omranstudies.org/publications/ 660 658 664 661 Iraq’sgovern- InJuly2017, 665 At . is-happening-in-syria-assad-forces-retake-rebel-stronghold. Rebel Stronghold’, The Week , 13July2018, http://www.theweek.co.uk/syrian-civil-war/91922/what- open-border-crossing-with-syria-idUSKBN1KN2MJ; ‘What Is Happening in Syria? Assad Forces Retake https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-jordan-border/jordan-says-not-yet-ready-to- 670 News, 13April2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-43631838. UN docA/HRC/38/CRP.3; M.Patience, ‘Syria War: Fall of Eastern Ghouta Pivotal Moment for Assad’, BBC of the IndependentInternational Commission of InquiryontheSyrian Arab Republic, 18June–6July2018, 669 668 667 666 Russian andUSgovernmentsappeartobeslowlyshifting towards discussions Assad’s government’sterritorialgainshavebeenhugeandthe Syrianaswell civilians thatresidedinthecitywithineightweeks. tinuous bombardment, which reportedly killed more than 170,000 of the 400,000 its fve-yearsiege,thelongestinmodernhistory.Thecampaignwasbasedoncon- mascus. Meanwhile,betweenFebruaryandApril,itretookEasternGhouta,ending February andMay2018,theSyrianGovernmentclearedcitiesofHomsDa- aerial bombings,hasreclaimedmostofSyrianterritoryfromtherebels.Between theless, theSyrianGovernment,withhelpofIran-backedmilitiasandRussian course, theconflictisnotoverandmorebattlesareprobablystilltocome;never- Currently, AssadappearstobeemergingasthewinnerofSyrianconflict.Of 2. Assad’sTerritorialGains fense andaUnitedNationspanelofexperts. ers maystillexistacrossSyriaandIraqaccordingtotheU.S.DepartmentofDe- no longer poses a threat could be premature.Between 20,000 and30,000ISfght- Nevertheless, the threat of IS has not been dissipated and claims that the group along theEuphratesRiverinSyria,atotalofaround1,900squaremiles. the startof2018,ISwasholdingasmallpartJazeeraDesertandfewtowns becomes weakandcomingbackwhenitsstrengthisreplenished. could remainaproblemformanyyearstocome,movingundergroundwhenit great innumberevenafterdecisivelossesonthebattlefeld.ThismeansthatISIS tiveness ofISideologyappearstohaveallowedthegroupsurviveandremain ing, which it exercised during most of the Syrian conflict. The strength and attrac- switching tomoreinsurgency-likepracticesratherthanopenfghtingandgovern- IS hasbecomelesspresentonthebattlefeld,itissimplymovingundergroundand Jordan, whichwillfacilitateinternationaltrade. these areashasmeantthatthegovernmentregaineditsborderwithIsraeland to bethe‘birthplace’of2011revoltagainsthim.Strategically,reclaimingall This isanimportantstrategicandsymbolicwinforAssadasDeraaconsidered trict ofDeraa,whichhasbeenunderrebelcontrolsincethebeginningwar. Finally, inJuly2018,AssadmanagedtoretakecontrolofthesouthernSyriandis- stronghold nearthecapitalDamascus,itisanimportantachievementforAssad. Pickrell, ‘As Many as30,000 ISISFighters May Still BeCrawling Across Iraq andSyria’. S.Al-Khalidi,‘Jordan Says Not Yet Ready to OpenBorder Crossing with Syria’, Reuters, 2August 2018, HumanRightsCouncil (HRC), The Siege and Recapture of Eastern Ghouta, Conference Room Paper Bendaoudi,After the‘Almost 100 Percent’ Defeat of ISIS,What AboutItsIdeology? Ibid. 667 Ithasbeensuggestedthatthough 670 669 Asthiswasthelastrebel 668 666

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Syria agreedtosigntheCWC,whichprohibitscountriesfromusing,stockpil- the seven-yearwar. try isgettingreadytowelcomebackmorethan5millionrefugeeswhofledduring al-Moallem, claimedthatSyria’sfghtwithterrorismisalmostoverandthecoun- term=.70004f866cbe. www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/04/12/syria-explained/?noredirect=on&utm_ 677 181007111324444.html. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/10/idlib-rebels-shifting-heavy-arms-planned-buffer-zone- 676 middleeast/idlib-syria-russia-turkey.html. Part of Syria’, The New York Times , 17September 2018,https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/17/world/ 675 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/21/syria-idlib-putin-assad-winners-iran. 674 syria/187-keeping-calm-southern-syria (last accessed March 21 2019). no 187, June2018, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/ 21 673 www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/09/syria-fm-battle-terrorism-180929150446410.html. 672 671 chemical weaponsandsignthe1993ChemicalWeaponsConvention(CWC). curity Council decided on a diplomatic solution, ordering Assad to destroy Syria’s dent pushedforastrikebutcouldnotconvinceCongress.Nevertheless,theUNSe- nerve agentinEasternGhouta,nearDamascus,killing1,400people.TheUSpresi- counts. Thefrstaccusationcamein2013whenAssad’sgovernmentusedasarin The SyrianGovernmenthasbeenaccusedofusingchemicalweaponsonseveral ted bymanyofthepartiesinvolved. The Syrianconflicthasbeenmarredbyhumanrightsabusesandcrimescommit- home. on howtorebuildSyriaandwhenstartsendingSyrianrefugeesback are noforeignforcesstationedthere. parts ofthenortheastandsouthwest,whichlooksmostvulnerableasthere The remainingpocketsofrebelcontrolaretheIdlibprovinceinnorthwest, started. equipment bymid-October. that allfghtersshouldleaveadesignateddemilitarizationzoneandpullouttheir agreement –RussiaandTurkey,whoareonoppositesidesintheconflict–stated would haveensuediftherehadbeenaSyrianmilitaryassault.Thebrokersofthe September overIdlib’scontrolinordertoavoidthehumanitariancatastrophethat there insearchofasaferplace. ens tobeaGhouta-styledisasterfortheroughly2millionciviliansthathavefled al-Sham, is the keyareaforAssad in ordertoendthewar,butreclaiming it threat- D. WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS Mohammed andStewart, ‘Exclusive: Despite Tensions, Russia Seeks U.S.Helpto Rebuild Syria’. International CrisisGroup, Keeping theCalminSouthernSyria, MiddleEast &NorthAfrica Report A. Erickson, ‘6 A. BasicQuestions AbouttheWar inSyria’, The Washington Post, 15April2018, https:// A. HigginsandR.Gladstone, A. ‘Russia andTurkey Announce Demilitarized Zone inLast Rebel-Held S.Tisdall, ‘PutinHoldsWinning Cards asSyrian War Nears IdlibShowdown’, The Guardian July , 21 ‘Syria FM:OurBattleAgainst Terrorism “Almost Over”’, AlJazeera, 29September 2018, https:// ‘Syria Rebels Begin Moving Heavy Armsfrom IdlibBuffer Zone’, AlJazeera, 07 October 2018, 671 676 Atthisyear’sUNGeneralAssembly,Syria’sDeputyPrimeMinister,Walid Itremainstobeseeniftheagreementwillhold. 672

675 Aretreatbyrebelforcesfromthezonehasalready 674 Luckily,ademilitarizationdealwasstruckin 673 Still,Idlib,astrongholdofHay’atTahrir 677

Syrian ArabRepublic. capture of Eastern Ghouta has been produced by the Commission of Inquiry on the Furthermore, a recent report onhuman rights violations during the siege and re- various partiestotheconflict’. January 2018,atleast‘34documentedincidentsoftheusechemicalweaponsby 682 681 detainees-dead.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FSyria. The New York Times, 26 July2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/26/world/middleeast/syria- 680 Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=22939&LangID=E (last accessed 17August 2018). on theAlleged Use of Chemical Weapons inEastern Ghouta, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/ 679 www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/18/why-does-syria-still-have-chemical-weapons. 678 in thegovernment’sjails,wheretortureandmistreatmentarerife. man rightsgroupssaythatsincetheconflictbegan,manypeoplehavedisappeared ments showthatthesepeoplediedyearsago,atthebeginningofconflict.Hu- has detainedatleast800,000people,somorenameswillfollow.Mostofthedocu- for HumanRightshasconfrmed312recentcasesbutclaimsthatthegovernment oners diedandhowmanythereareoverallhasbeenmade.TheSyrianNetwork oners thathavediedwhileingovernmentcustody.Nocommentonhowthepris- In July 2018, the Syrian Government published documents with the names of pris- 2016. and Britain.IShasalsousedchemicalweaponsonatleasttwocountsin2015 airstrikes inretaliationand,April2018,leadingtostrikesbytheUS,France not stopped,themostnotableofwhichtookplaceinApril2017,leadingtoUS with thepossibilityofreplenishingitsstores.Sincethen,chemicalattackshave were destroyed;nevertheless,notallthestockpilewaseliminated,leavingSyria ing ordevelopingchemicalweapons.Around1,300tonnesofweapons aimed toinstilterrorinciviliansaswelltheopposition. smuggling offoodandmedicine.Thereportconcludesthatthe government’s attacks mostly survivedbecauseoftheexistenceamanmadetunnel, whichenabledthe and denyingthemhumanitarianaid.BetweenJuly2014February 2017,citizens was carried out by the government by deliberately starving the besieged civilians completely erodethehealthservicesinoppositionareas.Collective punishment tals havebeentargetedsooftenthatithassuggested theforcesintendto humanity ofinhumaneactscausingseriousmentalandphysicalsuffering’.Hospi- under siegehasalsobeendenied,whichtheCommissioncalleda‘crimeagainst least 17children,4womenand1man.Accessto food andmedicine for thecitizens March, pro-governmentforceslaunchedanairstrike,hittingaschoolandkillingat ernment forceskilledaround1,100civiliansandinjured4,000.Forexample,on19 It isestimatedthatbetween18Februaryand11March2018,attacksbypro-gov- tected objects.Governmentmissileshavefallenonhomes,marketsandhospitals. carried outwarcrimes,suchaslaunchingindiscriminateattacksandattackingpro- was subjecttothelongest siege (fveyears)inmodern history, governmentforces HRC, The Siege andRecapture of Eastern Ghouta. P. Wintour, ‘Why Does Syria Still Have Chemical Weapons?’, HRC, IndependentInternational Commission of InquiryontheSyrian Arab Republic, Press Statement Ibid. B.Hubbard and K.Shoumali,‘Hundreds Died inSyrian Custody, Government Acknowledges’, 678 TheCommissionofInquiryontheSyrianArabRepublichascounted,as 681 Accordingtothereport,whenrecapturingcity,which 679 The Guardian, 18 April2018, 682 680

https://

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 133 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 134 cent) ofthestrikescamefromUSforces. discriminate. WhileBritishandFrenchforceswereinvolved,most(around90per- strikes killedhundredsandinjuredthousandsweredisproportionatein- After conductinganinvestigationontheground,organizationarguesthat crimes and understand the links between crimes and individuals, ranging from to ‘mapcrimepatterns,examinethecontextualelementsof coreinternational is prioritized.TheMechanismalsocollectinginformation andevidencetotry cords. already collected around 4 terabytes of evidence consisting of almost 900,000 re- In itssecondreporttotheGeneralAssembly,Mechanism reportedhaving the Syrian Arab Republic Since March 2011, 3August 1–16. 2018, pp4, UNdocA/73/295, Prosecution of Persons Responsible for theMost SeriousCrimesUnderInternational Law Committed in 686 accessed 26 November 2018). 685 raqqa-180605175041277.html. www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2018/06/led-coalition-commit-war-crimes-syria- 684 in-denial-about-civilian-casualties-in-raqqa/ (last accessed 17August 2018). Raqqa’, 17July2018, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/07/syria-us-led-coalition-deeply- 683 diction overthesecrimes. and facilitatetrialsincourtsortribunalsthathavemaythefuturejuris- humanitarian lawandhumanrightsviolationsabuses’inordertopreparefles collect, consolidate, preserve andanalyse evidence ofviolationsinternational Mechanism). Accordingtotheresolution,purposeofMechanismis‘to international lawcommittedintheSyrianArabRepublicsinceMarch2011(the gation andprosecutionofpersonsresponsibleforthemostseriouscrimesunder an International,ImpartialandIndependentMechanismtoassistintheinvesti- In December2016,theUNGeneralAssemblyadoptedaresolutionestablishing 1. TheInternational,ImpartialandIndependentMechanismofSyria ty International,forexample,doesnotconsider‘accurate,credible,[or]serious’. nevertheless, thecoalitionclaimedtohaveonlykilled23civilians,whichAmnes- airstrikes betweenJuneandOctober2017.Thedestructionleftthecityinruins; 2017, the coalition used more than 30,000 artillery rounds and several thousand mitted warcrimesduringtheconflict.DuringcampaigntoretakeRaqqain The US-ledcoalitionhasalsobeenaccusedbyhumanrightsgroupsofhavingcom- also aimedtoinstilfearincivilians. al dignity’.Thereportconcludesthatjustlikethegovernment,oppositionforces prevalent, oftenleadingto‘crueltreatmentandtorture,outragesuponperson- market, killing44civiliansandinjuringhundreds.Arbitraryarrestswerealso ary, oppositionattackskilled13civilians;on20March,arocketlandedinfood and moreterritory,theseactsonlyincreasedinnumberseverity.On20Febru- especially betweenFebruaryandApril2018.Asthegovernmentregainedmore The reportalsodiscussestheindiscriminateattackscarriedoutbyarmedgroups, Amnesty International, ‘Syria: US-Led Coalition “Deeply inDenial”About Civilian Casualtiesin International, Impartial andIndependentMechanism, ‘Mandate’, https://iiim.un.org/mandate/ (last Report of theInternational, Impartial andIndependentMechanism to Assist intheInvestigation and ‘DidUS-Led Coalition Commit War CrimesinSyria’s Raqqa?’,AlJazeera, 5June2018, https:// 686 Materialthatcouldassistongoingnationalcriminaljustice processes 685

684 683

sexual andgender-basedviolencegenderissuesmorebroadly. quests forassistancefromnationalcriminaljusticeactors. nism hasbeenengagingextensivelywithcivilsocietyandreceivingre- cal lawsanddiscriminatedagainsttheuseofPattaniMalaylanguage, the late1930s.Asaresult,publicresentmentgrew,governmentremovedlo- provinces. Itincreasedwhenamilitary-lednationalisticregimecametopowerin This subjugationwasreflectedinforcibleassimilationpolicies Diversity andNationalUnity:Language Ecology inThailand. tion withthestate and itsrepresentatives where Thai istheonlyaccepted language’,W. Smalley, Linguistic officials. Since Pattani Malay isdistinctively different from Thai, thiscreates asignificant barrier for interac 693 com/2018/02/the-slow-burning-insurgency-in-thailands-deep-south/. Burning Insurgency inThailand’s Deep South’,The Diplomat , 6February 2018,https://thediplomat. University Press, 1977. Pp. xii, 322’, 11 Prince Damrong Rajanubhab. By Tej Bunnag. East AsianHistorical Monographs. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford 692 files/MuslimThailand.pdf (last accessed 11 February 2019). Politics of theMuslimsinThailand’, December 2003, https://seap.einaudi.cornell.edu/sites/seap/ p14, Thailand: AShortHistory, 2ndedn, Yale University Press, 2003, p220; T. Aphornsuvan, ‘History and 691 Peninsula, 1906–1909’, 12The Historical Journal1(1969). 690 689 688 687 the Anglo-SiameseTreaty. ing pointin2004;however,theoriginofconflictcanbetracedbackto1909and The mostrecentwavesofintenseviolenceinSouthernThailandhavetheirstart- (Mara Patani). Front (BRN)andthecoalitionofarmedgroups,PataniConsultativeCouncil armed conflict(NIAC)with,atleast,thePataniMalayNationalRevolutionary Thailand anditsarmedforcescontinuedtobeinvolvedinanon-international Classification oftheConflict 7. THAILAND’S DEEP SOUTH: A CONTINUOUS NON-INTERNATIONAL events’. direct physicalperpetratorstowieldingpowerandauthorityoverthe the directruleofBangkok. historically governedbyMuslimrulerswhopaidtributetoSiam,wasplacedunder A. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT ARMED CONFLICT ‘The region hasbeen claimed as a vassal state by Thai kingdoms since the 15th century’, D. Wyatt, ‘There isalong-standing government policy to allow onlyThai inallcommunication withgovernment Ibid,p4. J. Chandran, ‘The Provincial Administration of Siam,1892–1915: The Ministry of theInterior Under Ibid,p7. Ibid,p6. This determines thecurrent Thailand–Malaysia border. See I.Klein,‘Britain, SiamandtheMalay 687 Someofitsotherworkhasfocusedondevelopingstrategiestoaddress 691 690

Withitssignature,theMalaySultanateofPattani, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies University of Chicago Press, pp220. 1994, 689 2 (1980); M. Morch, ‘The Slow Laura Baron-Mendoza 692 inthesouthern 688 TheMecha- 693 and -

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 135 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 136 maintain theiruniqueculturalandlinguisticidentitiesliveautonomously’. is saidtobeethnicallymotivated. 702 of Southeast AsianStudies 1(2009). 701 Southern Thailand’, 173. standards of livingthanMalay Muslimvillagers’, Engvall andAndersson, ‘The Dynamicsof Conflict in 700 http://peacebuilding.asia/1226/23 January2014, (last accessed 19November 2018). 699 Papers 3(2014) 173. 698 https://www.dw.com/en/thailands-muslim-rebellion-has-army-living-in-constant-fear/a-46177073. 697 https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/no-end-in-sight-for-thailands-deadly-southern-insurgency 696 695 gued-south-190108061040496.html. January 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/01/artists-promoting-peace-thailand-conflict-pla- 694 nomic cleavageswithinthearea, Policies forassimilationthroughlanguage,instance,aswellthepersistenteco- times when centralcontrol over the area hasincreased’. been unstableandpredisposedtoperiodicinsurgenciesthathaveescalated‘at the poorerregionsofThailand.Whatismore,theseprovinceshavehistorically An importantcultural,religious,ethnicandlinguisticfrontier,itisalsoamong bouring SongkhlaProvince. southern provinces (Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat), as well as parts of theneigh- forces andavarietyofANSAs.ItbordersMalaysiaencompassesthreeThai The DeepSouthofThailandisthebattlegroundinterplaybetweenThai 1. UnderstandingtheArea dinate strikestopushtowardstheirgoals. state actors(ANSAs)havethemilitarycapacitytodestabilizeregionand despite itsrelativediminution.Infact,2018revealedthattheactivearmednon- coups d’étatandsporadicincidentsthatsuggesttheNIACisnotabouttoend, The history of thesouth Thailand has thus been marked byattempts at dialogue, 1950s withongoingtensionsoverthefollowing60years. armed campaigns–separatistmovementsdidnot take longtoappearinthemid- tion, thoughtheyareasmallminorityinlargelyBuddhistcountry. Muslims constituteamajorityinthearea,representing80percentofitspopula- Thailand andthecentralgovernment’snon-recognitionofMalayidentity. for clashesisexplainedbyitsethniccomposition,thelackofwilltobepart should beacknowledged. tic policies current militaryregime’sdenialofMuslimMalayidentity,conservativelinguis- M.Jerryson, ‘Appropriating aSpace for Violence: State BuddhisminSouthernThailand’, 40Journal J. Küng, ‘Thailand’s MuslimRebellion HasArmy Livingin“Constant Fear”’, DW Horiba, ‘Overview andContext of Thailand’s Deep SouthConflict’. The onlylanguageinwhichpeople can communicate withgovernment officials isThai. A. Engvall A. andM.Andersson, ‘The Dynamicsof Conflict inSouthernThailand’, 13AsianEconomic A. Horiba. ‘Overview A. andContext of Thailand’s Deep SouthConflict’, Asia Peacebuilding Initiatives, Z.Abuza, ‘NoEndinSightfor Thailand’s Deadly Southern Insurgency’, The Diplomat,18July2017, The Sino-Thai merchants that dominate the urban economy and the Thai Buddhists ‘enjoy higher C. Quinley, C. ‘The Artists Promoting Peace inThailand’s Conflict-Plagued South’,AlJazeera, 8 695 anditscondemnationofthepopulation’sresistancetoassimilation 696 697 700 701 aresomereasons,amongothers,whytheNIAC Itisthe‘desireofPattani-Malaypeopleto 698 694 The region’s proclivity Bythesametoken, , 6November 2018, 699 . coor- 702 another inthebackofmilitarytransporttracks’. Muslims demonstratorsdiedfromsuffocationaftertheywerestackedoneontop and theTakBaimassacreinOctoberofsameyear,‘where78unarmedMalay in 2007and2010. ta continuestodelayelections,whicharecurrentlyscheduledforMarch2019. atimes.com/article/thai-insurgents-revive-ahead-of-new-polls/. 710 Thailand: Implications for Political Conflicts andResolution’, 5AsianJournalof Peacebuilding 1(2017) 131. 1932 and2016, withtwenty constitutions andcharters’, J. Sombatpoonsir’i, ‘The 2014 Military Coup in 709 708 Download.ashx?IDMF=c425bed3-5864-4e00-9963-d11427fb1ba5 (last accessed 11 February 2019). and Use of Children by Armed Groups, September p7, 2014, https://www.child-soldiers.org/Handlers/ 707 706 Pathan, ‘InGoodwillMove, BRNRebels HaltViolence inDeep SouthDistrict’. news/2014/10/25/thailand-no-justice-10-years-after-tak-bai-killings (last accessed 28December 2019); 705 hrw.org/news/2006/04/28/thailand-investigate-krue-se-mosque-raid (last accessed 26 December 2018). 704 https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/far-south-view/violence-halt-06042018142131.html. 703 cade-long politicalconflict. Later, in2014theThaiarmystageditsthirteenthcoup,claimingtoresolvede- by Thaiforces. caused distrustandhatetowardsthemajorityMuslimpopulationretaliation vilians fromdifferingminoritiesaswell.Theyintentionallyplannedattacksthat The situationworsenedaround2012whenANSAsbegandeliberatelytargetingci- army depotinNarathiwaton4January. 2001, butwasnotoffciallyacknowledgeduntil2004wheninsurgentsraidedan went underinthelate1980s.Theconflictresurfacedandescalatedagainmid- Armed separatistmovementsinThailand’sDeepSouthsurfacedthe1960sand Since 2004 2. TheStartofaLong-SimmeringInsurgencyandtheIncreaseinViolence these gaveriseto. latest developmentsduring2018andtheallegedviolationsofinternationalrules the multipleperiodsofincreasedviolence,activepartiestoconflict, vital to outlinethe dynamics of these longstanding tensions, while pinpointing Thus, in order to comprehend the complex setting of the Thai Deep South, it is to concurrentattacks,inadditionasymbolicstormingoftheKruSeMosque on 28April2004,whenadozencheckpointsthroughouttheregionweresubject which alsocontributedtothesteadyescalationofconflict, resulted fromdailyactsofviolenceusingsmallarms,explosivesandarsonattacks, D. Pathan, ‘InGoodwillMove, BRNRebels HaltViolence inDeep SouthDistrict’, BenarNews, 4June2018, J. Johnson, ‘Thai Insurgents Revive Ahead of New Polls’, AsiaTimes, 2January2019, http://www. ChildSoldierInternational andCross Cultural Foundation, SouthernThailand: OngoingRecruitment HRW, ‘Thailand: NoJustice 10 Years After Tak BaiKillings’, 25October 2014, https://www.hrw.org/ HumanRightsWatch (HRW), ‘Thailand: Investigate KrueSeMosque Raid’,28April2006, https://www. Quinley, ‘The Artists Promoting Peace inThailand’s Conflict-Plagued South’. ‘There have been thirteen successful military coups andseven coup attempts inThailand between Engvall andAndersson, ‘The Dynamicsof Conflict inSouthernThailand’, 179. 708 707 709 Still, almost fveyears after the coup, Thailand’sjun- 703 Thiswasfollowedbymoreviolence: 705 Nonetheless,mostcasualties 706 reachingitspeaks 710 704

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 137 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 138 resulted inmorethan6,000deaths,withsome20,000documentedattacks. articulated mainlythroughwordofmouth,banners,leaflets andgrafftiinpublic carried out during the last decade ‘and the rationale for their struggle has been key guidance. 718 717 716 715 https://deepsouthwatch.org/en/node/11892 (last accessed 15March 2019) 714 713 712 711 are diffculttodetermine. The structureandcompositionofcurrentlyactiveANSAsinSouthernThailand from 2004. leading totheaforementionedintensifcationofmilitaryoperationsonbothsides theless, factions andthereforenewactors emerged andreorganizedunderground, low-level armedactivitiesuntilthe1980s,whentheystartedtodwindle.Never- tion Organization(PULO).Alongwithothersmalleractors,thesethreecarriedout the PataniNationalLiberationFront(BNPP),BRNandUnitedLibera- Armed violencesensustrictosurfacedwiththeappearanceofthreemainANSAs: rights’. ‘mostly limitedtosomedegreeofautonomyandimprovedrespectforminority assimilation, havehelpedfuellocalresistance,thedemandsofwhichbeen Economic andpoliticalconcerns,linkedwithharshpoliciesofsuppression to thisday,withciviliansoftencaughtinthemiddle. merous boutsofviolence.Armedviolencehascontinuedovertheyearsandpersists Even though2017sawarecordlowof235peoplekilled,2018ledtofnalenu- 2012. Attacks have generally focused on security force patrols, vices suchascarbombs,whichhavebecomelargerandmoresophisticatedsince adaptive, unpredictableandheavilyreliantontheuseofimprovisedexplosivede- standing thegovernment’scrackdowns,ANSAshaveprovedtobeinnovative, counter-insurgency measures takenby government forcesover the year.Notwith- In 2014,thelevelofviolenceremainedconsistentlyhigh,evenwithlarge-scale per month,withanevenhighernumberofpeopleinjured. civilian targets.In2013and2014,theaveragetollclaimedbyconflictwas50lives turing targetedkillingandattacksonpolicearmybases,butalsoincluding B. PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT ChildSoldierInternational andCross Cultural Foundation, SouthernThailand, p6. Ibid. Quinley, ‘The Artists Promoting Peace inThailand’s Conflict-Plagued South’. ChildSoldierInternational andCross Cultural Foundation, SouthernThailand, p. 5. Ibid. The Thai Government’s official reports andthefieldwork of different organizations have provided Ibid.

See theCumulative Incidentsfrom January2004 to December 2008 reported by Deep SouthWatch, 715 Thisresistancewasnon-violentuntilthe1960s. 717 718 Onthewhole,noneclaimresponsibilityforattacks 713 Since2004,theconflicthas 716 712 711 thus mostly fea- 714 the South’, actors took on new roles including ‘the suppressionofseparatistviolence in is toorestrictedfordirectchannelsofcommunication. they belongtoorthenamesoftheirleaders,andknowledgecounterparts systems ofsecrecyinwhichnotallmembersareawarethenamegroup ary 2018. land’s DeepSouthanditwaspromisedthat3,000wouldbewithdrawnfromFebru- but alsoinpolitics.Bythebeginningof2018,61,000troopswerepresentThai- Consequently, thestatearmedforceshaveapivotalrolenotonlyinpublicsecurity, is headedbyPrayutChan-o-cha,whoalsoservesasthePrimeMinisterofThailand. the ruleofmilitaryjunta,NationalCouncilforPeaceandOrder(NCPO).This 725 ramilitaries.pdf (last accessed 29December 2019). 23 October 2007, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/140-southern-thailand-the-problem-with-pa 724 p18,https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/450836.pdfJune 1964, (last accessed 19December 2018). 723 722 www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-25149484 news/world-asia-27483816; ‘Why isThailand Under Military Rule?’, BBC News, 22Mayhttps:// 2014, asia-27519940; ‘Thailand Army’s Pivotal Role inPolitics’, BBC News, 22May https://www.bbc.com/ 2014, 721 720 Cultural Foundation, SouthernThailand , p.6. with militants inNarathiwat, from October to December 2013, see ChildSoldierInternational andCross 719 Since thethirteenthmilitarycoupon22May2014, 1. TheRoyalThaiArmedForces bodied bytwomaingroups:theBRNandMaraPatani,anumbrellaentity. struggle is largely between the Thai Government and the highly fractured ANSAs, em- other minoractorshavedecidedtotakepartinpeacetalkssince2015.Therefore,the Yet, itisgenerallystressedthattheBRNdominantANSAcurrentlyactive,while places’. guerrillas during the 1970s and 1980s. policing andcounter-insurgency,particularlyagainstcommunistseparatist knowledge –oftheterrain,languageandculturewhowereprotagonistsin along withvillagemilitias,weremainlyformedbyvolunteersbetterlocal an arrayofirregularforcesengagedinparallelmilitaryactivities.Theseforces, Moreover, theRoyalThaiArmedForceshavereceivedextramilitarysupportfrom growth sincetheninthenumberofMuslimsoldiersmilitary. strength oftheThahanPhran(Rangers).Still,asincase theregularforces, army wereBuddhist,while6percentMuslim, tion ofthemilitaryforces.Accordingtoa1964study,94percentsoldiersin ‘As ItHappened: Thailand Coup’, BBC News, 22May https://www.bbc.com/news/world- 2014, ChildSoldiersInternational andtheCross Cultural Foundation carried outconfidential interviews R. M.White, Anthropometric Survey of the Royal Thai Armed Forces, U.S. Army Natick Laboratories, Ibid,p2. Morch, ‘The Slow BurningInsurgency inThailand’s Deep South’. International CrisisGroup, SouthernThailand: The Problem withParamilitaries , AsiaReport no140, Ibid. 719 722 Moreover,theidentifedstrategiesarebasedonclandestinemethodsand 725 Alongsidetheseestimations,itisvitaltohighlighttheethniccomposi- andsincetheeruptionofviolencein2004,armyenhanced . 724 However, during the early 2000s these 723 721 andthereisnoevidenceofany Thailandhasremainedunder 720

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 139 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 140 South underthearmy’ssecuritygrid’. – allreceivingsalariesfromtheMOI‘willconnect262tambonsinDeep under theMOIchainofcommand.Inotherwords,kamnanandhis/herteam the region,workinginisolatedteams. by Tengku Abdul Jalal in 1959, https://jamestown.org/program/a-breakdown-of-southern-thailands-insurgent-groups/ 732 731 730 729 09222017161932.html. September 2017, https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/far-south-view/tambon-defense- 728 Management, Springer, 2016, pp75–76. 727 726 san laysia. Itwasoriginallyestablishedon13March1963byHajiAbdulKarimHas- The BRNisanANSAoperatinginSouthernThailand,beingbasednorthernMa- a. ThePataniMalayNationalRevolutionaryFront(BRN) weakening overthelastfewyears. The presenceofANSAscontinues,particularlyinruralvillages,despitetheir 2. ArmedNon-StateActors December 302018). August 2007, p15, 733 29 December 2018). der region. In late2017,theNCPObegantore-organizeTambonDefenseForceinbor- lages. (Village DefenceVolunteers),whichhasbeenthemainsecurityforceinmostvil- the MinistryofInterior(MOI).Yet,largestforcesince2004isChorRorBor Corps), establishedbytheVolunteerCorpsAct1954andundercommandof The secondmostwell-knownirregularforceistheOrSor(VolunteerDefence exclusively Buddhist. no morethan30percentofrecruitsarelocalMalayMuslims;theforceisalmost unit thatcomprisesagroupofvillages,andiscommandedbykamnan tive subdivisionbelowthedistrictandprovinciallevels.Itisalocalgovernment three politicalfactions: The BRNwasactiveinthe1970sandearly1980s.However,1980sitsplitinto place in1947NarathiwatProvince. 732 Morch, ‘The Slow Burning Insurgency inThailand’s Deep South’. HRW, NoOneIsSafe: Insurgent Attacks onCiviliansin Thailand’s SouthernBorder Provinces, M. Oishi (ed), Z.Abuza, ‘A Breakdown of SouthernThailand’s Insurgent Groups’ 4Terrorism Monitor 17(2006), D. Pathan, Thai Military Re-Organizes Tambon Defense Initiative inDeep South,BenarNews , 22 Ibid. Ibid,pp4–12. Ibid. asasplintergroupoftheBNPP.Althoughlatterisallegedtobefounded 727 Asaresult,theThaimilitaryhasbeensupportedbylocalvillagersacross 729 Incontrasttotheabovementionedbodies,atambonisanadministra- https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/thailand0807.pdf Contemporary Conflicts in Southeast Asia: Towards Waya New ASEAN of Conflict 726 733 it traces its origin to a local revolt which took 731 730 728 (last accessed 30 (last accessed who falls al sovereigntyandMalayidentity. amnesty.org/download/Documents/48000/asa390012009eng.pdf 744 743 (last accessedUC0FbP7gZsKTKHzZFW7U2mKA 11 February 2019). 742 the New Haven Schoolof International Law’, 20 AsiaPacific Law Review 2(2012) 242–243. 741 740 739 738 Imperial College Press, 2016, p98. 737 736 735 and Peace 1(2011). T. M. Möller, ‘Insurgency inSouthernThailand: AQuest for Identity’,29SicherheitundFrieden/Security acrefore/9780199340378.001.0001/acrefore-9780199340378-e-255 (last accessed 11 February 2019); ‘Salafism’, emulate the“piouspredecessors” as closely andinasmany spheres of life aspossible’, J. Wagemakers, 734 armed violenceintheregion. Narathiwat. Thiswasitslargestattackinthreedecadesandledtotheescalationof On 4January2004,theBRN-CattackedChulapornmilitaryarmycampin With nosocialmedia,exceptforself-promotedvideos, eventually launchingitsviolentstruggle’. trination ofthelocalsouthernpopulationtobuildasolidpoliticalbasebefore of itsprecursors.Consequently,mainfocushasbeen‘asystematicmassindoc- Since itsemergence,theBRN-Chasalteredstrategiesfollowingmistakes is Salafsm. At present,theonlyactivefactionin the DeepSouth is theBRN-C,whoseideology • • • security forces. Thai statefromwhatwastheSultanateofPattani. brought autonomyintothediscussion. BRN-C’s objective of seeking an independent Pattani state has evolved, which has and destroythestate’slegitimacy primarily centredonbuildingmasssupporttogaincontroloverthepopulation bombing attacks. ment, Pemuda,whichisbelievedtobeliableforday-to-daysabotage,shootingsand security agenciestotargetthemsuccessfully. As proved by former PattaniANSAs, claiming responsibility is lethal as it enabled is tomaintaintotalsecrecyandusuallyneverclaimresponsibilityforitsactions. N.Jungamm,‘The Secessionist Movement intheSouthernmost Provinces of Thailand: A View From S.Kam, ‘Thailand’, inR.Gunaratna andS.Kam (eds), Handbookof Terrorism inThe Asia-Pacific, Engvall andAndersson, ‘The Dynamicsof Conflict inSouthernThailand’, 179. Engvall andAndersson, ‘The Dynamicsof Conflict inSouthernThailand’, p181. Engvall andAndersson, ‘The Dynamicsof Conflict inSouthernThailand’, 179. Ibid,181–182. Ibid. ‘Salafism…represents those SunniMuslimswhoclaimto be“like and,assuch,say they thesalaf” Amnesty International, Thailand: Torture intheSouthernCounter-Insurgency, 2009, p7. https://www. See, e.g., theInformation Departement-BRN channelonYouTube, https://www.youtube.com/channel/ Ibid,179. BRN-Ulema BRN-Coordinate (BRN-C) BRN-Congress (BRN-K) Oxford Research Encyclopaedias, August 2016,http://oxfordre.com/religion/view/10.1093/ 734 ItclaimsthattheannexationwithSiamwasendofbothnation- 740 741 Allegedly,ithascontroloverpartofasecessionistyouthmove- 744 739 735 whileprovokingviolentreactionsfromthe Thus, itsprimaryaimwastodriveoutthe 737 738 743 Thus,BRN-C’spoliticalstrategyis 736 (last accessed 11 February 2019). Someanalystsassertthatthe 742 akeyprincipleofBRN-C

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 141 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 142 cal level. military –servingasanexusbetweenleadersandthegeneralpopulationatlo- the DewanPimpinanParti(DPP)andtwomainchainsofcommand–political argue thatithasawell-organizedstructurewithleadershipcouncilknownas mander. military areas based in the three southern provinces, each led by a military com- and political-administrativefunctions. charge of the military, the economy, youth, foreign affairs, propaganda, religious 2017, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/thai/brn-leader-03202017163737.html. 755 754 News/AsiaOne%2BNews/Asia/Story/A1Story20120402-337305.html. 753 752 751 https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/far-south-view/more-talks-01082018131535.html. 750 749 748 747 11 (2012) 784–785. Warriors: Individuals andtheInsurgent Collective inSouthern Thailand’, 35Studies inConflict &Terrorism –YusofBRN Coordinate IshakInstitute,, ISEAS 2015, Ch2;M.Askew andS.Helbardt, ‘Becoming Patani 746 isn/115176/2010_04.pdf (last accessed 3January2019). Southern Insurgency, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2010, pp8–10, https://www.files.ethz.ch/ Press, 2008, pp174–175; J. Chinyong Liow andD. Pathan, Confronting Ghosts: Thailand’s Shapeless 745 number ofindividualsinvolvedintheBRN. Given thesecretivenatureofANSAanditsstrategies,itisdiffculttoestimate as abodythatmakescollectivedecisionsonthemovement’sdirection. At theFebruary2013peacetalks,BRNrepresentativereferredtoa‘shuracouncil’ which operateindependently. Some analystsmaintainthatitisdecentralized,composedofautonomouscells In termsoforganizationalstructure,theBRNisfarfromhavingaguerrillastyle. has recentlyrisentowards6,000. mated to have around 3,000 fghters. friend fromfoewhileemployingtraditionalcounterinsurgencytactics’. ‘this modeofoperationprovidesachallengetostatesecurityagenciesinseparating as small-group units and as independent cells for small operations. sent. mation Department, some members act on their own and without the DPP’s con- of the existence of the DPP, according to the movement’s Indonesia-based Infor- Engvall andAndersson, ‘The Dynamicsof Conflict inSouthernThailand’, p174. ‘Army ChiefSays Thailand Facing 3,000 Militants’, AsiaOne,2April2012, http://www.asiaone.com/ Helbardt, Deciphering SouthernThailand’s Violence, p38. ‘Ex-Headmaster Becomes Top BRN Rebel Leader in Deep South: Thai Officials’, BenarNews, 20 March D. McCargo, Tearing Apart theLand:IslamandLegitimacy inSouthernThailand, Cornell University Ibid,179. Engvall andAndersson, ‘The Dynamicsof Conflict inSouthernThailand’, 174. Ibid,pp38–40. ChildSoldierInternational andCross Cultural Foundation, SouthernThailand, p7. See S.Helbardt, Deciphering SouthernThailand’s Violence: Organization andInsurgent Practices of D. Pathan, ‘Where Next for Peace Talks inThailand’s Deep South?’,BenarNews, 8January2018, 750 Infact,ithasbeenassertedthatmembersareorganizedinsquadsoperating 747 746 TheDPPisresponsibleforforeignrelationsasitssevencouncilsarein Accordingtothis,themilitarychainofcommandisdividedintothree 745 755 Meanwhile,Thaimilitaryintelligenceanalysts Theaccuracyoftheestimatesisopentoquestion. 754 Yet, Thai military offcials claim the number 748 753 Until2011,themilitarywingwasesti- 751 Undoubtedly, 752 749 Inspite 766 765 shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/127211/6/chapter%204.pdf ‘Chapter IV:Melayu-Muslim Movements inSouthernThailand’, Shodhganga, 2015, pp144–146, http:// rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2008/RAND_OP198.pdf (last accessed 11 February 2019); see also Dynamic, RAND, NationalDefense Research Institute, 2008, p5,https://www.rand.org/content/dam/ 764 763 thwatch.org/en/node/7211 (last accessed 26 December 2018). 762 761 760 759 758 757 756 • • Its aimistoachieveeffectivedialoguewiththeThaiGovernment. ment (GMIP). (PULO-P4, PULO-DSPP and PULO-MKP) and the Pattani Islamic Mujahideen Move- Group, theIslamicLiberationFrontofPatani(BIPP),threefactionsPULO voice, sixpoliticalliberationorganizationsintheDeepSouth:BRNAction Mara Patani,createdin2014,isanumbrellaactorencompassing,asasoleunifed b. ThePataniConsultativeCouncil(MaraPatani) Following thedeathofMasaeUseng mainstream BRNoritsmilitarywing. negotiation table,todayitisunclearhowmuchsupportthisgrouphasfromthe it wasaninitiativeofpro-dialogueBRNmembersasaproactivesteptowardsthe was designatedthenewChairmanon17January. tion. AbdullahWanMatNoor(DoonlohWae-Mano),formermilitarycommander, January 2017, Morch, ‘The Slow BurningInsurgency inThailand’s Deep South’. BRN’sspiritualleader. Libya, Syria, andAfghanistan for advanced training. See Abuza, ‘A Breakdown of Southern Thailand’s Insurgent Groups’. Abuza, ‘NoEndinSightfor Thailand’s Deadly SouthernInsurgency’. See P. Kularb, Reporting Thailand’s SouthernConflict: Mediating Political Dissent , Routledge, 2016. Presumably, theideologue of theorganization. A. Hafez A. Al-Hakim,‘What isMara Patani?’ Deep SouthWatch, 26 May 2015, https://deepsou Engvall andAndersson, ‘The Dynamicsof Conflict inSouthernThailand’, 179. P. Chalk,The Malay-Musilm Insurgency inSouthernThailand: Understanding theConflict’s Evolving Ibid,pp15–25. guerrilla warfareconductedfromjunglebases 1970s and1980ssawitsextendedseparatistcampaign,relyingontraditional struggle basedonreligion,nationalism,homelandandhumanitarianism. tions byitsattempttocreateanindependentMuslimstatethrougharmed PULO. Thiswascreatedin1968anddistinguishesitselffromotherorganiza- PULO-P4, PULO-DSPPandPULO-MKP:Theseareallegedfactionsofthe sing itsoperationsin1990andre-emerging2002. seas.763 Itsarmedstrategiesstartedtoshifttowardspoliticalefforts,withitcea- was religiousteachers,followedbybasicmilitarytraininginlocalareasorover- accentuating itsowncommitmenttoIslam.Itsmainchannelofrecruitment The BIPP:KnownastheformerBNPP,itchangeditsnametoBIPPin1986, 760 757 theBRNendureditsfrstfullchangeofleadershipsinceincep- 756 762 inMay2016anddeathofSapae-ingBasoe 758 .766 759 764 (last accessed 2January2019). 761 Even though 765 The

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 143 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 144 several safetyzoneswhichitwasnotpossibletodevelopuntilnow. to theprovinces,focalpointduringprocesshasbeenestablishmentof distinct identityofthePattanipeopleorgrantingsomelevelself-government Even thoughMaraPataniwantedtodiscussmeasuresliketherecognitionof stalled Malaysian-facilitatedpeaceprocess, 2014 bythemilitaryinnameofendingpoliticalturmoil. cratically electedgovernmentofPrimeMinisterYingluckShinawatra,oustedin Peace Talks, Conflict Monitor Says’, Reuters , 19April2017, 770 conflict-southern-thailand (last accessed 26 December 2018). & International Studies, 1March 2013, https://www.csis.org/analysis/peace-talks-announced-address- 769 768 Thailand’s MuslimInsurgency?’ armed-conflict-between-the-thai-milit (last accessed 26 December 2018); Lintner, ‘Who’s Who in Groups’, RULAC, 29 November 2018, 767 the supportoftheirtopleaders, At present, Mara Patani, along with a minority of BRN members who do not have of civiliandeathssincetheresurgenceviolencein2004. Although therewasnosharpdropinviolenceandcasualties,2013sawthelowestrate the BRNtoseekanendarmedconflict. On 28February2013,theThaiGovernmentagreedtoholdtalksinMalaysiawith 3. StalledPeaceTalks • web.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/negociaciones18i.pdf (last accessed 13January2019). Talks inFocus 2018: Report onTrends andScenarios, Escola deCultura dePau, 2018, p74,https://relief 776 775 08032018161110.html. August 2018, https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/far-south-view/philippines-militants- 774 thai/official-meeting-01042019161241.html. Violence CanEndin2Years’, BenarNews, 4January2019, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/ 773 Insurgency inThailand’s Deep South’. 772 771 us-thailand-south-attacks-idUSKBN17L243. concessions, with the retirement of the BRN in 2015, purportedly due to the government’s lack of ChildSoldierInternational andCross Cultural Foundation, SouthernThailand, p7. W. Watcharasakwet, P. Rakkanam andM.Mustafa, ‘SouthernThai Peace Talks: Malaysian Broker Says Johnson, ‘Thai Insurgents Revive Ahead of New Polls’. ‘SouthernThailand: ANon-International Armed Conflict Between theThai Military andArmed D. Pathan, ‘Thailand: Junta Has Littleto Show for Deep SouthPeace Efforts’, BenarNews, 3 Abuza, ‘No End in Sight for Thailand’s Deadly Southern Insurgency’; Morch, ‘The Slow Burning J. M.Royo Aspa, J. Urgell Garcia, P. UrrutiaArestiz P. Tanakasempipat and P. Thepgumpanat, ‘SouthernThailand Attacks Reflect Tension Over K.Rustici, ‘Peace Talks Announced to Address theConflict inSouthern Thailand’, Center for Strategic ‘Chapter IV:Melayu-Muslim Movements inSouthernThailand’, p150. inspired bywidespreadinternationaljihad. hideen Movement(GMP).767WithaspirationsforaMuslimPattanistate,itis man, theGMIPisasplinteredfactionofearlier,nowinactive,PattaniMuja- The GMIP:Formedin1995byNasoreeSaesaengandChekuMaeAbdulRah- 772 andthenegotiationswithMaraPatani,whichweremadepublic. http://www.rulac.org/news/southern-thailand-a-non-international- 774 andtheThaiGovernmentareengagedina bal, A. Villellasabal, A. AriñoandM. Villellas Ariño, Peace 775 stillataconfdence-buildingstage. 769 768 Thetalksbeganunderthedemo- 771 https://www.reuters.com/article/ However, the talks failed However,thetalksfailed 770 776 773

the BRNratifeditsrefusaltoparticipateinpeacetalks. the peaceprocesssuffereditssecondsetbackofyearwhenarmedwing the IslamicStatecontinuedtobepartofdebate. to somemonthsin2017,whilethefaintindicatorsofBRN’sconnectionswith with peacenegotiationsMaraPatani.Armedviolenceevenspikedcompared https://www.phnompenhpost.com/international/spike-bomb-and-grenade-attacks-south-thailand. 783 thailand-peace-talks-suffer-setback. December 2018, https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2018/12/436550/efforts-continue-southern- 782 781 security/1454846/joint-panel-to-oversee-safety-zone-plan. Panel to Oversee Safety Zone Plan’,Bangkok Post, 20 April2018,https://www.bangkokpost.com/news/ www.benarnews.org/english/news/thai/Thailand-militants-04172018150934.html; W. Nanuam,‘Joint 780 https://prachatai.com/english/node/6961. 02152018163957.html; ‘Framework Agreed for Safety Zones in Deep South’, Prachatai, 1 March 2018, South’, 779 https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/what-to-make-of-recurring-fears-of-jihadism-in-southern-thailand/. 778 com/news/security/1390370/south-safest-in-14-years-army-boasts#cxrecs_s. 777 four inChanaedistrictandabaseambushRangaeusinggrenades). three districts ofNarathiwat Province (two bomb attacks in SriSakhon district, site nearSongkhlaProvinceand,onFriday28December,sevenseparateeventsin a roadsidebombhiddeningascylinder;twoexplosionspopulartourist The mostrecent incidents occurred during the last week of 2018: the detonation of and NarathiwatoneinPattani). ceasefre invedistrictsthethreeDeepSouthernprovinces(twoeachYala in mid-February2018oftheagreementtocreatesafetyzonesorderlauncha One eventthatofferedhopeofadeclineinarmedviolencewastheannouncement 2018. olence in2017andthepromiseofwithdrawalmorethan3,000troops proving, giventhewithdrawaloftroopssince2016,apparentdeclineinvi- At thebeginningof2018,situationinThaiDeepSouthseemedtobeim- felt belittledbythewayThaiGovernmenthadgoneaboutit. announcement ledtothesuspensionoftalksbyMaraPataniinAugust,which frst territorytocreateapilotsafetyzoneaidthepeacetalks. In April2018,theCho-I-rongdistrictinNarathiwatProvincewasannounced school inMuangdistrict. four civilianswhenabombwassetoffneartheroadleadingtoPracha-utit ly, anincidenttookplaceinjuringthreeschoolgirls,defencevolunteersand where stateforcesandANSAshaveagreedtoaceasefre.However,simultaneous- C. KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2018 Pathan, ‘Thailand: Junta HasLittleto Show for Deep SouthPeace Efforts’. ‘SouthSafest in14Years, Army Boasts’, E.Mark,‘What to Make of Recurring Fears of JihadisminSouthernThailand?’, The, 30March Diplomat 2018, ‘Spike inBombandGrenade Attacks inSouthThailand’, The Phnom Penh Post, 31December 2018, M.AhmadandIsmail,‘Thailand Announces “Safety Zone” Agreement With Rebels inDeep ‘Efforts to Continue With SouthernThailand Peace Talks Suffer Setback’, New Strait Times, 2 M.Ahmad,‘Thai Leader Reveals New Deep SouthSafety Zone’, BenarNews, 17April2018, https:// 777 BenarNews, 15February 2018, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/thai/safety-zone- Theyearpassedwithupsanddowns,witnessingviolentactionsinparallel Bangkok Post, 5January2018, 779 Thesearemeanttobedesignatedareas 778 782 https://www.bangkokpost. 780 781 However,this Subsequently, 783

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 145 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 146

its leadershiptoexercisecontroloverlocalcommandersontheground. armed ANSAinthesouthernprovinces,whichhasdemonstratedcapabilityof the Maratalks,itmustbeacknowledgedthatismostinfluentialandwell- the unrelentingrefusalofhardcoreelementsBRNtostayawayfrom across theregionsince1January2019. this incident,sixpeoplewerekilledandseveninjuredinattackscarriedout on thetable. dependence isnotapossiblesolution,otherformsofpowerdecentralizationare Abdul Rahim Noor, appointed in August 2018. While it has been stressed that in- cial dialoguewithavarietyofmeetings,mainlyMalaysianpeacefacilitator of the Thai negotiation team, General Udomchai Thammasaroraj, beganthe off- 791 January 2019, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/thai/Deep-South-violence-01102019132014.html . 790 Watch, 9September 2013. http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/node/4720 (last accessed 5January2019). 789 788 787 post.com/news/security/1604914/southern-peace-talks-rev-up 786 785 784 there were54incidents,with41casualties,18deadand23injured. Oftheseinci- people diedand13,511wereinjured.FromDecember2018to4 January2019alone, From January2004toDecember2018,therewere20,163incidents, inwhich6,921 uary 2019:fourcivildefencevolunteersguardingaschoolwereshottodeath. The lastviolentepisoderegistered,atthetimeofwriting,wasreportedon10Jan- freedom ifthewillofThaistatetoachievepeaceprovesbeabsent. announcement bytheBRN-Cconfrmingitswillingnesstocontinueghtfor niversary ofthefcialescalationviolenceinareahasbeenmarkedbyan While thedelegatesattabletalkabouthowtomoveforward,15-yearan- table, whichhasbeenfutilethusfar. the attempt to convince the armed wing of theBRN-C to come to the negotiating signs ofanewmomentforSouthernThailand:anescalationarmedviolenceor attempts by the government to move the peace process out of the deadlock, are The incidentsattheendof2018andbeginning2019,aswellrecent violence aheadofthegeneralelectionon24March. frst weekoftheyearsawmultipleincidentsthatwarnedanescalationarmed There hasbeennoindicationoftheconflictbecominglessintensein2019.The meaningful dialogueorcompromisebetweenthemilitaryandseparatists’. National WarCollege,‘onereasonwhythefghtingcontinuestodayisduetoalackof According toZacharyAbuza,aspecialistontheongoingconflictandprofessorat Ibid. Watcharasakwet, Rakkanam andMustafa, ‘Southern Thai Peace Talks’. Johnson, ‘Thai Insurgents Revive Ahead of New Polls’. M.AhmadandI.Matahari, ‘Gunmen Kill4Guards atSchoolinThailand’s Deep 10 South’,BenarNews, Johnson, ‘Thai Insurgents Revive Ahead of New Polls’. S. Jitpiromsri Engvall, and A. ‘A Meaningful Peace: Ramadan Ceasefire Assessment’, Deep South W. Nanuam,‘SouthernPeace Talks Rev Up’, Bangkok Post, 4January2019, https://www.bangkok Quinley, ‘The Artists Promoting Peace inThailand’s Conflict-Plagued South’. 786 787 791 . 785 Meanwhile,thenewchief 789 788 Despite 784 790 In In

forces, suchastheRangers,alsoresortedtoextrajudicialkillingsandabductions, mainly in2007. provinces, themajorityofwhomarecivilians. ple havebeenkilledintheongoingarmedconflictThailand’ssouthernborder dhist monks, targets ofviolenceforbothparties.TherehavebeendecapitationsunarmedBud- 799 my-son-no-longer-existed/enforced-disappearances-thailands# (last accessed 29December 2018). Southern Border Provinces, 19March 2007, https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/03/19/it-was-suddenly- 798 797 report_download/201801world_report_web.pdf (last Accessed 1January2019). 796 ment.org/countries/thailand/ (last accessed 12February 2019). 795 reached-a-tipping-point/ (last accessed 1January2019). 12 September 2018, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/09/12/has-thailands-deep-south-insurgency- 794 793 deepsouthwatch.org/en/node/11892 (last accessed 10 January2019). 792 placed duetoviolenceandconflictasofApril2015, While theInternalDisplacementMonitoringCentrerecorded35,000peopledis- civilians, therecruitmentanduseofchildrenlandmines. ties. Theseallegationsincludetorture,extrajudicialkillings,deliberateattackson tional humanitarianlaw(IHL)andhumanrightsviolations,carriedoutbyallpar- The context in Thailand’s Deep South has been characterized by alleged interna- worsen andthreatentoreachatippingpointasin2004subsequentyears. to beareality, taking itstollmostlyonthecivilianpopulation, but thatitcaneasily 2019, cannot be disregarded. This is astark reminder that aNIAC not only continues In sum, the events in 2018, alongwith several episodes during the frstmonthof tween theBRNandThaisecurityforces 241 remain unclear. The coordinated attacks and the normal tit-for-tat violence be- 218 and injuring 265), of which 240 arerelatedto separatism/independence and The persistenceofviolenceisdemonstratedbythe548incidentsin2018(killing and 12wereshootings. ed withorganizedcrimeand1drugs;19oftheseincidentswerebombings dents, 23areallegedtohaveanexuswithseparatism,24unclear,6connect- disappeared orhavebeenextrajudiciallyexecuted. been reportedsincethe2010peak,whentherewereatotalof2061incidents. despite thefactthatsuchactshavebeencommonplaceforyearsandadeclinehas D. WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTION HRW, NoOneisSafe. Pathan, ‘Where Next for Peace Talks inThailand’s Deep South?’ See Thailand’s IDPfigures, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, http://www.internal-displace Deep SouthWatch, ‘Summaryof IncidentsinSouthernThailand, 2018’, 7January2019, https:// HRW, Amnesty International, Thailand: Torture intheSouthernCounter-Insurgency , pp29–32. HRW, World Report 2018: Events of 2017, p546,https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_ J. Blaxland,HasThailand’s Deep SouthInsurgency Reached aTipping Point?, East AsiaForum, ‘It Was Like Suddenly My Son No Longer Existed’: Enforced Disappearances in Thailand’s 797 andIslamicleaderstakenintocustodybysecurityagencieshave 792 793 evidencetheclearexistenceofviolence, 796 Religiousleadershavebecome 798 Securityagenciesorirregular 795 approximately6,800peo- 794 799

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 147 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 148 the ranksofBRN. less, nodirectevidencehasbeenfoundofunder-18sbeingforciblyrecruitedinto active fghtingorinsupportingroles,suchaslookoutsandinformers’. NGO’s havereportedhowANSAs‘usedthemtoparticipateinhostilities,either emerged inthecourseof2016. OPAC/THA/1, 20 January 2012. and Updated Information Related to theConsideration of theInitialReport of Thailand, UN doc CRC/C/ 806 gb/reports/2017/thailand/mine-action.aspx (last accessed 12February 2019). Mine Action’, Landmine&Cluster MunitionMonitor, 11 December 2017, http://www.the-monitor.org/en- sonnel mines.Landrelease results for 2016, includingclearance, were adecrease from 2015’, ‘Thailand 0.07km2 was reduced by technical survey and0.39km2 was cleared, withthedestruction of 1,231 antiper released,of 28.19km2 was of which98%(27.72km2) was cancelled by non-technical survey. Just over July 2017, theKingdomof suspected Thailand hadanestimated mined area. 410km2 of In2016, atotal news/2018/07/04/thailand-insurgents-use-landmines-south 805 804 803 16 May 2018, §§250–252. Assembly, Children andArmed Conflict –Report of the Secretary-General, UNdocA/72/865-S/2018/465, General, UNdocA/68/878–S/2014/339, 15May §§200–204; 2014, UNSecurity Council andUNGeneral UN Security Council and UN General Assembly, Children and Armed Conflict – Report of the Secretary- of Thailand to theUNCommittee ontheRightsof theChild,31May 2005, UNdocCRC/C/83/Add.15; childrens-rights-up-front_lr.pdf March 2017, p45,https://watchlist.org/wp-content/uploads/watchlist_2017-annual-report-putting- 802 files/SHCC2016final.pdf (last accessed 12February 2019). Under Attack 2015 and Early 2016, May 2016, pp 9, 40, 801 news/2016/08/25/thailand-insurgents-target-civilians-south (last accessed 27 December 2018). 800 amounts toaNIAC,eveniftheThaiGovernmentdeniesitsexistence. such astheBRN-C,itmustbesaidthatsituationinThaiDeepSouthstill In sum,basedonthecontinuanceofhostilitiesandpersistentpresenceANSAs rubber plantations. have beenincreasinglyaffectedbylandmineswithsomecasualtiesreportedin mines andplacingthemnearcivilianscivilianobjects.Allegedly, been usedoverthepastdecadeandreportsin2018accusedBRNofusingland- Last butnotleast,bothvictim-activatedandcommand-detonatedlandmineshave of weapons,andthedetentionchildrenforallegedassociationwithANSAs; UN bodieshavereportedthetrainingofchildrenasyoung13yearsoldinuse priate responsesistherecruitmentanduseofchildrenbyANSAs.Infact,different One ofthemainallegedsituationsthatremainsaconcernduetolackappro- ture. amount tocrimesagainsthumanityduetheirwidespreadandsystematicna- Similarly, therenewedbombingsagainstciviliansin2016,2017and2018may all parties to the conflict are bound by IHL rules including the prohibition ofan- Safeguarding Health inConflict, NoProtection, NoRespect: Health Workers andHealth Facilities ChildSoldierInternational andCross Cultural Foundation, SouthernThailand, pp9–10. HRW, ‘Thailand: Insurgents Use LandminesinSouth’,4 July2018, https://www.hrw.org/ Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, UNCommittee ontheRights of theChild59th Session, Reply to List of Issues Concerning Additional Ibid. HRW, ‘Thailand: Insurgents Target CiviliansintheSouth’,25August 2016, https://www.hrw.org/ 800 Inaddition,reportsofattacksonhealthworkersandfacilities 805 804 (last accessed 29December 2018); see also Second Periodic Report 801 2017 Annual Report: Putting Children’s Rights up Front , https://www.safeguardinghealth.org/sites/shcc/ (last accessed 20 December 2018); ‘By 803 806 Neverthe- Thissaid, 802 -

Russian military volunteers, had beenpresent. bass conflict,butconcededthatpeopledealingwithtasksinthemilitarysphere ident VladimirPutindeniedthatRussianregularforceswereinvolvedintheDon- is noteworthythat,speakingatanannualtelevisedpressconferencein2015,Pres- ratists andthecaseofCrimeamightimplyRussianengagementinconflict.It 807 the conflict. Ukraine clearly states that the Russian Federation (RF) is directly participating in Additional ProtocolII. east ofthecountry.Theconflictmeetsthresholdforapplicability1977 Donetsk People’sRepublic(DPR)andtheLuhansk(LPR),in against pro-Russian separatist armed groups, whichproclaimed themselves the in 2016whichthearmedforcesofGovernmentUkrainewerefghting Georgia andtheUkrainewereinvolvedinanon-internationalarmedconflict Classification oftheConflict 8. THE CONFLICT IN EASTERN UKRAINE (DONBASS): ti-personnel landminesbannedbytheOttawaTreaty, on theRightsofChildinvolvementchildreninarmedconflict. treaties onthesubjectsuchasArticle4ofOptionalProtocoltoConvention rules prohibitingchildrecruitmentandtheuseofchildreninhostilities,ratifed vesti.ru/doc.html?id=2699315 (inRussian). 813 ukraine-russia-fighters-donbass. to Normal’, The Guardian, 29February 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/29/ 812 says.html?emc=edit_na_20140613&nlid=13240517 2014, 811 ukraine-are-ex-russian-soldiers-46657 Times, 19May 2015, https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/moscow-admits-two-fighters-captured-in- 810 occupied-territories#close-modal. https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2018-01-18/ukrainian-parliament-passes-bill-on- 809 Involvement of Children inArmed Conflict, ratified on27 February 2006. Thailand is also part of OPAC, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter39 808 security actors, DIRE CONSEQUENCES AND ZERO RECONCILIATION M.R.Gordon, ‘Russia SentTanks to Separatists inUkraine, U.S.Says, ‘PutinDeniesthePresence of Russian Troops inDonbass’, Vesti, 17December 2015, https://www. G.Pereborshchikov, ‘Life After Ukraine: The “Invisible” Russian Fighters Struggling to Return G.Garanich, ‘Moscow Admits Two Fighters Captured inUkraine Are Ex-Russian Soldiers’, Moscow

‘Ukraine Passes Billto GetOccupied Regions BackFrom Russia’, U.S.News, 18January2018, Thailand ratified thistreaty on27 November 1998. See Rules 136and137, International Committee of theRed Cross, Customary IHLDatabase, https:// https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/14/world/europe/russia-has-sent-tanks-to-ukraine-rebels-us- 809 This is denied by Moscow, though the occasional detention of RF 810 theallegedappearanceofRFmilitaryequipment, 813

812 . the constant economic support provided to sepa- . (last accessed 12February 2019); 807 alongwithcustomaryIHL The New York Times, 13June Grazvydas Jasutis

811 theflowof 808

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 149 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 150 April 2014. ists intheeasternUkrainiancitiesofDonetsk,KharkivandLuganskbeganon6 A well-coordinatedattackonlocaladministrativebuildingsbypro-Russianactiv- war inDonbassispredominantlyexplainedthroughgeopoliticalnarratives. operation (ATO)againstpro-Russianseparatists. of Ukraine,OleksandrTurchynov,announcedthebeginningananti-terrororist Following instabilityandunrestinothertownsDonbass,theactingPresident ments/2017-PE-rep/2017-otp-rep-PE_ENG.pdf (last accessed 27 August 2018). 820 com/world/729768. 819 bbc.com/news/world-europe-27035196. 818 817 lugansk-may-trigger-a-russian-invasion/ (last accessed 27 August 2018). Daily Monitor 816 Geography 4 (2014). 815 (last accessed 15March 2019). Examination Activities 2018, §72. https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/181205-rep-otp-PE-ENG.pdf 814 forces bydecree. the countrywason‘fullcombatalert’andreinstatedconscriptiontoarmed no longerinfullcontroloftheprovincesDonetskandLuhansk,declaredthat By theendofApril,TurchynovannouncedthatUkraineGovernmentwas Donetsk andotherRussian-speakingareasjoinRussia; siya (NewRussia)asanethnicstate,andorganizationformedadvocatingthat small numbersoffringeintellectualschampionedtheestablishmentNovoRos- and thecommunitiesdidnotfacesignifcantethnicchallenges.Inearly1990s, flicts anddeadlyclashes.TheycohabitatedpeacefullyduringtheSovietperiod In Donbass, Russian-speaking residents and Ukrainians did not haveprior con- July 2014atthelatest,inparalleltonon-internationalarmedconflict’. indicated theexistenceofaninternationalarmedconflictineasternUkrainefrom14 gagement betweentherespectivearmedforcesofRussianFederationandUkraine, Prosecutor oftheInternationalCriminalCourt(ICC)reminded‘thatdirectmilitaryen- In itsNovember2018ReportonPreliminaryExaminationActivities,theOffceofthe their self-determination.On11May,thereferendumswereheld and,inboth,an place on28April2014. expected resultsandtheinstitutingofLPR,anotherbreakawayentity,took pied. ment buildingsandtheSecurityServiceheadquarterswereransackedoccu- A. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT Ibid. C ars ‘tncTnin nteScesrRpbisi 93adEry19’ 35Post-Soviet ‘Ethnic Tensions in the Successor Republics in 1993 andEarly 1994’, Harris, C. ‘Ukraine Says Donetsk“Anti-Terror Operation” UnderWay’, BBC News https://www., 16April2014, ‘Federalization Supporters inLuhansk Proclaim People’s Republic’, P. Felgenhauer, ‘Armed Pro-Russian Activists inLugansk May Trigger aRussian Invasion’ 11 Eurasia The Office of theProsecutor (OTP), International Criminal Court (ICC) Report on Preliminary OTP, ICC, Report on Preliminary ExaminationActivities 2017, https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocu 817 The nextday,DonetskseparatistsproclaimedtheestablishmentofDPR. 816 68 (10 April2014), https://jamestown.org/program/armed-pro-russian-activists-in- Localpoliceforcesdidlittletostoptherioting,whilelocalgovern- 820 BoththeLPRandDPRpledgedtoholdareferendumregarding 819 818 However,thisdidnotbringthe 815 however,theeruptionof TASS , 28 April 2014, http://tass., 28April2014, 814 convoy-crosses-border-ukraine-without-permission. Border’, 827 on-russia-over-ukraine-idUSKBN0FY0OX20140729. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-east/eu-and-u-s-announce-new-sanctions-July 2014, 826 responsible-downing-malaysia-airlines-plane-prosecution-charges-vladimir-a7334246.html. 28 September 2016, 824 https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/ukraine-running-out-of-time.pdf 823 822 eastern-ukraine-referendum-donetsk-luhansk. Region Referendum, The Guardian, 11 May 2014, 821 unlawful militaryformations,hardwareandmilitantsmercenaries local electionsinaccordancewiththeLawonSpecialStatusandremovalof permanent monitoringoftheUkrainian-Russianstateborder;holdingearly in certainareasoftheDonetskandLuganskregions’(LawonSpecialStatus); the LawofUkraine‘[w]ithrespecttotemporarystatuslocalself-government non-use ofweapons;decentralizationpower,includingbymeansenacting tion bytheOrganizationforSecurityandCo-operationinEurope(OSCE)of the immediatebilateralcessationofuseweapons;monitoringandverifca- In On5September2014,theMinskProtocolwassigned,whichincluded,interalia, 1. TwoCeasefireAgreements:QuoVadis? overwhelming majorityvotedinfavourofindependenceandsovereignty. 825 cow tobeincorporatedintotheRF. 12 May,bothregionsdeclaredindependence,whileDonetskappealedtoMos- Russia andfredfromrebel-controlledterritory, said therewas‘nodoubt’themissilethatdownedplanebroughtinfrom of a civilianair jet on 17 July. A report by the Dutch-led Joint InvestigationTeam fghting continuedinDonbassduringthesummer,includingshootingdown er, theelectiondidnottakeplaceineasternpartofcountry.Theintense 2015. On25May,theUkrainianselectedPetroPoroshenkoasPresident;howev- the Federal StateofNewRussia(NovoRossiya), hansk Republicsoffciallyannouncedthattheyhadformedaconfederationcalled and UnitedStatessanctionsagainsttheRF. the expresspermissionofUkrainianauthorities. fueled bytheRussiandecisiontosendhumanitarianconvoysDonbasswithout ground and the battlein Illovaisk inAugustwas particularly cruel. It was further any armedgroupsthatresisted. expelling thosewhorefusedtopledgeallegiancethenewstateanddestroying announced theywouldtakecontrolofallarmedandsecurityforcesintheoblast, S.Walker, O. Grytsenko andH.Amos,‘Ukraine: Pro-Russia Separatists Setfor Victory inEastern E.Giuliano, ‘The SocialBases of Supportfor Self-determination inEast Ukraine’, 14Ethnopolitics A. Luhn andD. A. Roberts, ‘Ukraine Condemns “Direct Invasion” asRussian AidConvoy Crosses International CrisisGroup, Ukraine: Running outof Time, Europe Report no231, 14May 2014, L. Dearden, ‘MH17 Shot Down by Rebels With Missile From Russia, Say Investigators’, ‘Birthof theDonetskRepublic’, Donetsk,http://donetsk.tilda.ws/ (inRussian). J. Pawlak andE.Beech, ‘EU andU.S.Announce New SanctionsonRussia Over Ukraine’, Reuters, 29 The Guardian , 22August https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/22/russian- 2014, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/mh17-russia-ukraine-rebels- 823 BytheendofMay,bothDonetskandLu- 822 Thesameday,Donetskseparatistleaders https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/11/ 826 Theferceghtingpersistedonthe 824 825 whichwasabandonedinMay whichledtoEuropeanUnion 827 (last accessed 27 August 2018). The Independent, 5 (2015). 821 On On

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 151 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 152 be withdrawnandUkrainewillregaincontrolofitsstateborders. to providefor‘decentralisation’;inexchange,all‘foreignarmedformations’will separatist-held territories. Ukraine promises to implement constitutional changes of humanitarianaidandtoworktowardthesocio-economicreintegration and amnestyforfghtersaretofollow;bothsidesensurethesafedelivery to be monitored by the OSCE. An ‘all-for-all’ prisoner exchange, local elections gan withaceasefreandthewithdrawalofheavyweaponsfromfrontlines, 1 December2014,thegovernmenthaltedfundingtotheseinstitutions. all areasnotunderthecontrolofgovernmenttoterritorycontrolledbyit.On location ofallstateinstitutionsandenterprises,aswelltheirpersonnel,from Following these elections, the Government of Ukraine ordered the temporary re- the positionsofarmedgroups. corresponding influxesoftroops, vehiclesandweaponry fromthe RF toreinforce attributed theincreasedfghtingfromAugust2014toFebruary2015alleged in thefollow-upmemorandum. ceasefre agreementwassignedon11February2015. tinued violencebroughttheconflictingpartiestonegotiationtableandanew Ukrainian troopshadtomakeanorganizedwithdrawal. the rebelsadvancedonDebaltseveinspiteofrecentceasefreagreementand DPR andLPRon2November,whichinfringedthenormsofMinskProtocol. tinued. Additionalproblemssurfacedwithregardtotheelectionsorganizedby However, theceasefreagreementwasimmediatelyviolatedandskirmishescon- since 2014–2015. Mission toUkraine,saidthatthisleveloffghtinginUkrainehadnotbeenseen ander Hug,thePrincipalDeputyChiefMonitorofOSCESpecialMonitoring fghting occurredinAvdiivkaandYasynuvatainJanuary–February2017.Alex- Small-scale skirmishescontinuedafterthebattleofDebaltseveand,again,ferce from the territory of Ukraine. indepth/features/2017/02/losing-avdiivka-170205121126909.html. 836 835 bbc.com/news/world-europe-31519000. 834 833 https://www.osce.org/cio/140156. 832 831 smm/148326?download=true (last accessed 27 August 2018). the DonetskandLuhansk Regions, Thematic Report, 30March 2015, https://www.osce.org/ukraine- 830 August 2018). Chairperson-in-Office says’, 20 September https://www.osce.org/cio/123808 2014, (last accessed 27 829 (last accessed 27 August 2018). of theTrilateral Contact Group, Signed inMinsk,5September 2014, 828 Ibid. Ibid. OTP, ICC, Report onPreliminary Examination Activities 2017. OSCE,Package of Measures for theImplementation of theMinskAgreements, 12February 2015, C. Borys,‘Losing C. Everything inAvdiivka’, AlJazeera , 5February 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/ ‘Ukraine Troops Retreat From Key Town of Debaltseve’, BBC News, 18February 2015, https://www. OSCESpecial Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, Findings onFormerly State-Financed Institutions in Organization for Security andCo-operation inEurope (OSCE),Protocol ontheResults of Consultations OSCE, ‘Memorandum on Stabilizing Ceasefire Another Important Step Towards De-Escalation, OSCE 836 InFebruary2017,theRFissuedadecreetemporarilyrecogniz- 828 829 The implementation parameters were laid down

835 https://www.osce.org/home/123257 832 Theso-calledMinskIIbe- 834 TheICC’sassessment 833 Nevertheless, 831 Thecon- 830

Countries/UA/UAReport20th_EN.pdf (last accessed 27 August 2018). Rights SituationinUkraine 16August to 15November 2017, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ 842 separatists-luhansk/28869751.html. Europe/Radio Liberty,22November 2017, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-russia-following-situation- 841 Ukraine-crisis-No-breakthrough-in-talks-between-Hollande-Merkel-and-Putin.html. Telegraph, 7February 2015, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/11397591/ 840 russia/?utm_term=.8163364e2c14 views/wp/2017/07/19/ukrainian-separatists-claim-to-have-created-a-new-country-malorossiya-or-little- “LittleRussia”’, 839 nomics.unian.info/2338645-ukrainian-energy-industry-thorny-road-of-reform.html. 838 recognize-documents-issued-in-rebel-held-east-ukraine-idUSKBN15X0KR. people killedand24,778injured. armed forces,civiliansandmembersofthegroups.Thisincluded10,303 Rights recorded 35,081 conflict-related casualties in Ukraine among Ukrainian vember 2017,theUnitedNationsOffceofHighCommissionerforHuman between theconflictingparties,withlittlesuccess.From14April2014to15No- Throughout 2017,theinternationalcommunityattemptedtoreintroduceatruce goods acrossthedemarcationlineinATOzone. 2017, PresidentPoroshenkosignedadecreetemporarilybanningthemovementof The decision was highly criticized by the Ukrainian authorities. In mid-March RF. Ukraine. Theideawasreceivednegatively,evenbylocalDonetskpoliticiansandthe the nineteenthcentury,whenitwasusedtodescribelandthatnowmakesup (Little Russia),awordthatcameinto widespread use duringtheRussianEmpirein In July2017,theDPRleadercameupwithideaofestablishingMalorossiya unmarked uniformstookuppositionsinthecentreofLuhanskNovember2017. changes. LocalseparatistleaderIgorPlotnitskyfledtoRussiawhenarmedmenin 2017, 837 thought tohavemorethan 200,000active-servicemilitarypersonnel,including maximum sizeofthemilitaryfrom184,000to250,000;as2016,Ukrainewas In early2015,UkrainianPresidentPetroPoroshenkodecreedanincreaseinthe 1. UkrainianArmedForces istration platesissuedintheeasternUkraineregionsofDonetskandLuhansk. ing identitydocuments,diplomas,birthandmarriagecertifcatesvehiclereg- 1918 by a close associate of Joseph Stalin. the Donetsk–Krivoy Rog Republic, a short-lived independent territory founded in olution inFebruary2015statingthattheterritorywaslegitimatesuccessorto B. PARTIES TO THE CONFLICTS 839 ‘Kremlin “Following” SituationInUkraine’s Russia-Backed Separatist-Controlled Luhansk’, ‘PutinOrders Russia to Recognize Documents Issued inRebel-Held East Ukraine’, Reuters , 18February I.Orel, ‘Ukrainian Energy Industry: Thorny Road of Reform’, UNIAN,10 January2018, A. Taylor, A. ‘Ukrainian Separatists Claimto Have Created aNew Country: Malorossiya, or Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Report onthe Human T. Parfitt, ‘Ukraine Crisis:NoBreakthrough inTalks Between Hollande,Merkel andPutin’,The ItisnoteworthythatthemembersofparliamentinDPRhadpassedares- https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-russia-documents/putin-orders-russia-to- The Washington Post, 19July2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/world . 842 840 Meanwhile, the LPR faced internal elite 838

https://eco Radio Free 837 841

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 153 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 154 personnel; marginalizedlocalsfromeconomicallydistressedareas;radicalgroups units areprimarilycomprisedofRussianmercenaries,intelligenceandmilitary According toFranklinHolcomb’sreportpublishedinSeptember2017, and LuhanskPeople’sRepublic 3. Non-StateArmedGroups:TheSelf-ProclaimedDonetskPeople’sRepublic that itsregulartroopswereoperatinginDonbass. in combatoperationsonUkrainiansovereignterritory. artillery freagainstUkrainianterritoryfromRussiansoilordirectlyparticipating in thevicinityofRusso-Ukrainianborder–eitherstationedthere,delivering and combat-supportunitstogeneratetheapproximately42,000troopsrotating mid-December 2014.TheRussianMinistryofDefencehadtoinvolve117combat ed, reachingapproximately10,000atthepeakofdirectRussianinvolvementin between 3,500and6,000–6,500bytheendofAugust2014.Thatnumberfluctuat- a RoyalUnitedServicesInstitutereport, mitted thatadecisiononmilitarybuild-upmaybemadelater. the frststage,numberoftroopsinDonbasswouldremainunchanged,butad- to aJointForcesOperationinDonbassanditsdefencechiefexplainedthatduring rusi.org/sites/default/files/201503_bp_russian_forces_in_ukraine.pdf 847 August 2018). org/sites/default/files/ISW%20Separatist%20ORBAT%20Holcomb%202017_Final.pdf (last accessed 27 Study of War, Russia andUkraine Security Report 3,September 2017, http://www.understandingwar. 846 April 2018, http://tass.com/world/1001232. 845 844 fight-challenge-of-military-reform-pub-75609 (last accessed 27 August 2018). International Peace, 22 February 2018, 843 totals 11,000,including3,000regularcombattroops. sian nationalsfghtingalongsidetheseparatistsinUkraine’sDonbassregionnow Recently, theUkrainianmilitaryprosecutorunderlinedthatnumberofRus- sian-Ukrainian bordersinceJune2017. operating inDonbass,withtensofthousandsmorestationedalongtheRus- The UkraineGovernmentestimatesthatatleast6,000Russiansoldiersare 2. RussianArmedForces in thenavy. 145,000 inthearmy,45,000airforce,8,000commandoforceand6,000 850 (last accessed 27 August 2018). October 2017, http://www.janes.com/article/74682/russian-forces-now-11-000-strong-in-the-donbass 849 848 the east at15,000in as many 50 units. I.Sutyagin, Russian Forces inUkraine, Royal United Services Institute, BriefingPaper, March 2015, https:// V. Akimenko, ‘Ukraine’s Toughest Fight: The Challengeof Military Reform’, Carnegie Endowment for ‘Ukrainian Defense ChiefHintsthatKiev May RampUpUse of Force inDonbass Conflict’, TASS Holcomb, The Kremlin’s Irregular Army. Ibid. F. Holcomb, The Kremlin’s Irregular Army: Ukrainian Separatist Order of Battle,Institute for the R.Johnson, ‘Russian Forces “Now 11,000 Strong intheDonbass’’’, IHSJane’sDefence Weekly, 6 Ibid. 843 Conservativeestimatesputthenumberof volunteerswhofoughtin http://carnegieendowment.org/2018/02/22/ukraine-s-toughest- 846 844 847 Accordingtodifferentsourcescitedin In 2018, Ukraine shifted from an ATO RussiantroopsinUkrainenumbered (last accessed 27 August 2018). 849 TheRFhasneveradmitted 848 845 850 separatist , 23

Horlivka, wheretheUkrainianarmyretookChiharivillageinMay. ed. TheOSCESpecialMonitoringMissionvoicedconcernoverskirmishesnear terminated theATO. tion law,theATOformatwaschangingtoaJointForcesOperationandthereby 16 March,PresidentPoroshenkonotedthat,accordingtotheDonbassreintegra- mission-idUSKBN1J726I. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis/ukraine-russia-fail-to-agree-on-un-peacekeeping- 857 30 April2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/javelin-missile-delivery-ukraine-us-confirmed/29200588.html . 856 2018#ukraine. 855 with-attacks-on-ukrainian-positions.html. 30 March 2018, https://www.unian.info/war/10062323-easter-ceasefire-in-donbas-fails-on-its-first-day- 854 info/war/10045583-poroshenko-ato-over-joint-forces-operation-starting.html. 853 occupied-territories#close-modal. https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2018-01-18/ukrainian-parliament-passes-bill-on- 852 separatists-donbas.html. September 2017, https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/kyiv-says-6000-russian-soldiers-40000- 851 March. agreed onacomprehensive,sustainableandunlimitedceasefrestartingfrom30 March, theTrilateralContactGrouponsettlementofsituationinDonbass The securitysituationonthegroundremainschallengingandfragile.On26 in Ukrainewithunpredictableconsequencesforworldpeaceandsecurity’. preparation for a new war’, and warned that the bill ‘risked a dangerous escalation Ministry ofForeignAffairssaidinastatement,‘Youcannotcallthisanythingbut regions as‘temporarilyoccupied’bythe‘aggressorcountry’Russia. TheRussian eastern territories. The bill describestheareasin Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk On 18 January 2018, Ukraine’s parliament passed a billthataims to reintegrate the Donbass accordingtotheUkrainianarmedforces. defectors from Ukrainian security forces. There are about 40,000 separatists thodox Christianradicals,Russiannationalistsandcommunists;sportshooligans; from RussiaandtheformerSovietUnion,includingCossackbands,RussianOr- how toimplementitwerestill‘verymuchapart’. Ukraine agreedinprincipletoaUNpeacekeepingmission,buttheirideasabout ployment ofaUNpeacekeepingmissioninthecountry’sconflictzone.Russiaand Berlin todiscusstheimplementationofafragileceasefreforUkraineandde- On 11June, theforeignministersofRussia,Ukraine,GermanyandFrancemetin to Ukraine. worthy thattheUShasconfrmeditsdeliveryofJavelinantitankmissilesystems C. KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2018 ‘Kyiv Says There Are About6,000 Russian Soldiers,40,000 Separatists inDonbas’, Kyiv Post, 11 M.Nienaber, ‘Ukraine, Russia Fail To Agree onU.N. Peacekeeping Mission’, Reuters , 12June2018, ‘Poroshenko: ATO Over, JointForces Operation Starting’, UNIAN,16March 2018, https://www.unian. C. Miller, C. ‘U.S.Confirms Delivery OfJavelin Antitank Missiles To Ukraine’, RadioFree Europe/ Radio Liberty, International CrisisGroup, ‘Ukraine’, May 2018, https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/may- ‘Ukraine Passes Billto GetOccupied Regions BackFrom Russia’, U.S.News, 18January2018, ‘«Easter Ceasefire» inDonbas Fails onItsFirst Day With Attacks onUkrainian Positions’, UNIAN, 854 Theceasefreparameterswereimmediatelyviolatedandghtingpersist- 856

853 857 851 855 Itisnote- 852 On On in

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 155 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2018 156 the country. nary investigation into allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity in 858 Human Rights. Crimea and Eastern Ukraine arecurrentlypending before the European Court of Finally, threeinter-statecasesinitiatedbyUkraineconcerningRussia’sactionsin 2014. alleged crimescommittedinitsterritoryfrom21November2013to22February 12(3) oftheRomeStatuteICCacceptingjurisdictionover On 17April2014,theGovernmentofUkrainelodgedadeclarationunderArticle the-ecthr/ (last accessed 15March 2019). 24 December 2018, https://www.ejiltalk.org/a-quick-holiday-update-on-ukraine-russia-litigation-before- 861 cessed 15March 2019). https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/ReportUkraine16Nov2018-15Feb2019.pdf (last ac 860 http://jurist.org/paperchase/2014/04/icc-opens-preliminary-investigation-into-alleged-ukraine-crimes.php 859 cessed 15March 2019) and LuhanskPeople’sRepublicwereresponsiblefor154. responsible for126violationsandtheself-proclaimedDonetskPeople’sRepublic Of theviolations,OHCHRunderlinedthatGovernmentofUkrainewas mented duringthepreviousreportingperiodof16Augustto15November2018. this representedanincreaseofdocumentedviolationscomparedwiththosedocu- during thereportingperiod,whichaffected202victims.AccordingtoOHCHR, missioner forHumanRights(OHCHR)documented315humanrightsviolations November 2018to15February2019,theOffceofUnitedNationsHighCom- In itsreportonthehumanrightssituationinUkrainecoveringperiodfrom16 D. WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS See M.Milanovic, ‘A QuickHoliday Update onUkraine/Russia Litigationbefore theECtHR’, Talk EJIL: !, K.Bennett,‘ICC OpensPreliminary Investigation Into Alleged Ukraine Crimes’, JURIST, 25April2014, See ICC, Ukraine, https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/181205-rep-otp-PE-ENG.pdf (last ac OHCHR,Report on theHumanRightsSituationinUkraine 16November 2018 to 15February 2019, 858 On 25 April 2014, the ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, opened a prelimi- 859

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