Thurston, A 2013 Mali: The Disintegration of a “Model African Democracy”. stability Stability, 2(1): 2, pp. 1-7, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.aq COMMENTARY Mali: The Disintegration of a “Model African Democracy” Alex Thurston* This commentary examines how Mali entered its current crisis, tracing the fall of the regime of President Amadou Toumani Touré and the rise of armed Islamist groups in northern Mali, as well as the events that led to an armed intervention by France. The piece then discusses some of the conceptual frameworks that could impede effective policy formation in post-conflict Mali. The piece argues that Somalia does not offer a compelling model for Mali. The commentary closes by recommending that the Malian government and its partners should prioritize addressing humanitarian and security concerns in northern Mali over staging elections. On 17 January 2012, a separatist group ern cities. Yet as the Malian government and in northern Mali, the National Movement its partners move to reunify and rebuild the for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA), country, flawed assumptions and imported launched a rebellion against the government models risk undermining reconstruction and of President Amadou Toumani Touré. Led by sowing seeds of future conflict. Tuaregs, a politically disenfranchised ethnic Mali’s rebellion began with the MNLA’s group that had organized previous uprisings uprising against Touré, but neither the in Mali and neighboring Niger, the MNLA MNLA nor Touré remained a central player quickly scored a string of victories. Observers in it for long. Disgruntled Malian soldiers, watched to see how Touré – a former general embarrassed by their losses to the MNLA, and a supposed symbol of African democ- charged that the government had failed to racy – would respond. They wondered how properly equip and fund them. A mutiny in the country’s next president, the winner of March 2012 escalated into a successful coup elections scheduled for April 2012, would against Touré (Schneider 2012). As it turned attempt to placate the Tuaregs, as previous out, the image of Touré as a great statesman administrations had done. Instead, Mali – an image not wholly undeserved, given unraveled, with a coup in March 2012 and the that he relinquished power after leading a emergence of armed Islamists in the north. coup in 1991, and seemed willing to respect As political instability wracked the south, term limits and do so again before the March French forces intervened in January 2013 to 2012 coup – had blinded outsiders to rot in halt Islamist advances into the Mopti region. his administration. Systemic corruption and The French rapidly reconquered major north- broken promises had weakened the military, hollowed out government institutions, and left northern communities bristling with resentment (Whitehouse 2012). * Department of Religious Studies, Northwestern University, USA The mutineers-turned-putschists spoke [email protected] of retaking the north, but once in power Art. 2, page 2 of 7 Thurston: Mali: The Disintegration of a “Model African Democracy” they made no immediate move to do so. manders sketched plans for war. ECOWAS’s The MNLA, left with a freer hand, declared efforts in 2012 overcame initial skepticism independence for the north. But the osten- from Washington, DC and Paris about the sibly secular rebels soon found themselves group’s capacity to organize an interven- sidelined by a coalition of armed Islamists. tion. Plans to deploy an external force were This coalition includes the Tuareg-led Ansar ratified first by ECOWAS, then by the African al Din (Arabic for “Defenders of the Faith”), Union, and, finally, in December 2012 by the an Al Qa’ida franchise called Al Qa’ida in the United Nations Security Council. Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and an AQIM splin- In the latter half of 2012, a de facto parti- ter group called the Movement for Unity and tion of Mali held. Islamist forces conducted Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA). The MNLA had sporadic attacks, capturing Douentza from robbed and raped civilians, creating political a local garrison in September, and tak- space for Islamists to offer northern com- ing the towns of Lere and Menaka from munities a version of law and order. Islamist the MNLA in November. But at year’s end justice horrified some, including thousands clashes were limited. who fled into southern Mali and neighbor- In early January 2013, planning for an ing countries. But others were grateful for external intervention was overtaken by Islamists’ efforts to distribute aid and pun- events. Islamist fighters attacked towns in ish crime. Islamists outmaneuvered the the central region of Mopti, perhaps hop- MNLA politically and militarily. By summer ing to capture key infrastructure, like an air- 2012, the Islamist coalition controlled the port in Sevaré, which outside commanders northern provincial capitals of Gao, Kidal, hoped to use in staging their coming inter- and Timbuktu. vention. The Islamist advance evoked a swift In the capital Bamako, with soldiers in response from Mali’s former colonial ruler charge, presidential elections were cancelled. France, which retains a strong political and Facing sanctions from the regional bloc, the security role in Francophone Africa. Within Economic Community of West African States days, French planes were bombing northern (ECOWAS), coup leader Captain Amadou targets. By January 30, French and Malian Sanogo ceded official power in April 2012 to soldiers recaptured Gao, Timbuktu, and a transitional civilian administration headed Kidal. Troops from ECOWAS and Chad moved by President Dioncounda Traoré and Prime to join the French, with the idea that after Minister Cheick Modibo Diarra. But Sanogo securing the north militarily, France would continued to influence politics. Sanogo loyal- leave West African governments and Bamako ists obtained key cabinet posts (Dicko 2012). to reassert political order. Sanogo’s supporters proved willing to intimi- The battle for Mopti and the resulting date civilian leaders who displeased the Cap- French intervention underscored a key les- tain. In May, pro-Sanogo demonstrators beat son of the Malian crisis: the rapid, unpredict- Traoré so badly that he was flown to France able nature of events. Every twist of Mali’s for extended treatment. On 10–11 Decem- tragedy can be explained with the benefit of ber, soldiers arrested Diarra and forced him hindsight, from the way regime corruption to resign. weakened and angered the army to the way Outside forces strove to stabilize Bamako that the MNLA’s brutality created political politics while searching for a way to reinte- opportunity for Islamists. But the thread of grate northern Mali. As ECOWAS negotia- continuity in events in Mali in 2012–2013 has tors met with Ansar al Din representatives been the way that each new status quo frag- in Burkina Faso, attempting to convince ments and shifts, rendering figures like Diarra Ansar al Din to renounce links with AQIM powerful one month and irrelevant the next, and make peace with Bamako, ECOWAS com- and raising hopes of progress only to dash Thurston: Mali: The Disintegration of a “Model African Democracy” Art. 2, page 3 of 7 them soon after. In December, Ansar al Din 16 January, “The kind of support we would delegates in Burkina Faso signed a ceasefire give to the ECOWAS states and others in the deal with the Malian government. In early African theater [in Mali] is very, very similar January 2013, further talks were delayed, to what we have done in support of the [Afri- the ceasefire in shambles. Policymaking has can Union Mission in Somalia, or AMISOM] sometimes moved too slowly to help Mali’s effort in Somalia” (Shinkman 2013). allies in addressing the country’s crises. One problem with using Somalia as a By the end of January 2013, French and model for Mali is that the trajectory of exter- Malian advances had dealt powerful blows to nal military interventions – plural – in Soma- Islamist forces. Yet a key question remained lia bears little resemblance to the present unaddressed: Who will rule Mali both dur- and expected experience of Mali. Somalia ing and after the intervention? Eyeing a has seen occupation by its neighbor Ethio- model that supposedly succeeded in Soma- pia from 2006 to 2009, the deployment of lia – involving African peacekeepers and primarily Ugandan and Burundian soldiers Western funds – French Foreign Minister as part of AMISOM from December 2007 Laurent Fabius and other senior French offi- to the present, and an invasion by Kenyan cials have expressed their intention to head Defense Forces (KDF) in October 2011 (KDF for the exits once Mali’s territorial integrity units in Somalia officially joined AMISOM in is re-established. Even then, Western gov- July 2012). Since 2009, Ethiopian soldiers ernments will likely continue to influence have continued making periodic incursions efforts at political reconstruction in Mali. Yet into Somali territory. Unlike in Mali, where two of the main tools the Western powers outside policymakers hope African troops have in their toolkit for dealing with rebel- will maintain French gains, in Somalia Afri- lions against weak states – elections and can troops have retaken territory at different military might – seem insufficient for solving paces. Ethiopian and Kenyan troops have Mali’s problems. largely acted on their own countries’ behalf rather than as part of a unified mission. Shoot and vote It is, moreover, premature and reductive In the last decade, a number of countries to call Somalia a success. First, the Ethiopian in the greater Middle East and Africa have occupation from 2006–2009, which aimed experienced versions of a model that might to break the power of an Islamist group be called, in plain English, “shoot and vote.” called the Union of Islamic Courts, was bru- Outside policymakers assert that outfight- tal (Hassan and Lefkow 2007).