DOCSLIB.ORG

War in Mali. Background Study and Annotated Bibliography

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
War in Mali. Background Study and Annotated Bibliography OCCASIONAL PAPER War in Mali Background study and annotated bibliography July 2012 - March 2013 Emy Lindberg www.nai.uu.se ISBN 978-91-7106-736-4 Emy Lindberg Contents Acronyms .................................................................................................. 4 Foreword .................................................................................................. 5 Summary of dominant arguments and perspectives, main themes and divergences .................................................................. 7 Causes and drivers of conflict ......................................................... 7 Solutions.......................................................................................... 8 Involvement of the International community ................................. 8 Humanitarian consequences ........................................................... 9 Divergent themes and notable perspectives ................................... 9 Summaries of the material by date ........................................................11 2012 January .........................................................................................11 May ...............................................................................................11 July ...............................................................................................12 November ....................................................................................13 December .....................................................................................13 2013 January .........................................................................................14 February .......................................................................................18 March ...........................................................................................27 References .............................................................................................. 32 Additional sources .................................................................................. 34 Websites of interest ................................................................................ 34 – 3 – War in Mali - Background paper and annotated bibliography Acronyms AFISMA African-led International Support Mission to Mali AQIM Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb AU African Union COPAM Co-ordination of Patriotic Organisations in Mali ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States EEAS European External Action Service EUTM EU Training Mission Mali FDR United Front to Safeguard Democracy and the Republic FRIDE Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior HRW Human Rights Watch IBK Alliance Ibrahim Boubacar Keita ICC International Criminal Court MAA Arab Movement of Azawad MENA Middle East and North African Countries MNLA National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad MOJWA/ MUJAO Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NOREF Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre PKO Peacekeeping Operations RUF Revolutionary United Front UNHCR UN High Commissioner for Refugees UNMAS UN Mine Action Service – 4 – Emy Lindberg Foreword Not long ago, Mali was considered a beacon of stability and a model of dem- ocratic evolution in West Africa. The country then experienced a military coup in the capital in March 2012, followed by the usual post-coup volatility and uncertainty. In the immediate aftermath of the coup, armed insurgents swiftly took over half the country. It did not take long to dismantle a country that on the paper appeared to be functioning, stable and democratic. French troops intervened in the conflict in the north. Yet even if this intervention put a stop to the outright threat of the insurgents taking over the south and significantly shifted the balance of forces in the north, it did not end the conflict. The insurgents have dispersed into remote areas in the sub-region, changing their tactics to terrorist-like activities. Different forms of political negotiation and reconciliation are certainly needed in the region. With the current global clash between radical Islam and the Western “War on Terror”, northern Mali will probably continue to be contested terrain for a long time. In the meantime, a transition to democratic rule is planned for the country, with elections scheduled for July this year. In all likelihood, this will prove to be only an illusory end to an intense power tussle over state control in Bamako. In the following text, Emy Lindberg has gathered material from successive reports covering the conflict in Mali from its outbreak to the present. The text, in providing the conclusions of these reports in chronological order, al- lows the reader to follow the unfolding of events on the ground as well as the interpretations placed upon the crisis by a variety of experts. Mats Utas Head, Conflict, Security and Democratic Transformation Cluster Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala June 2013 – 5 – Emy Lindberg Summary of dominant arguments and perspectives, main themes and divergences In the papers, reports, blogs and articles presented in this paper, there are a few main themes, which will be summarised in this first section of the background paper on the war in Mali and the international interven- tion. These themes are: Causes and drivers of conflict; Solutions; Involvement of the international community; Humanitarian consequences and Diverging themes and notable perspectives. Causes and drivers of conflict Several researchers point out that many analyses of flict. Actors such as the National Movement for the Mali and the ongoing violent conflict are, and have Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) rebelled because been, deficient. Perhaps this is because the crisis they had been excluded from deals with Bamako was unexpected both to outsiders and to Malians, and President Touré. However, as bargaining posi- as well as to the coup-makers themselves. Many tions changed, they chose to collaborate with France texts argue that the conflict and crisis have been (Boukhars 2013; Lacher and Tull 2013). over-simplified: they were, in fact, the culmination Local grievances are recognised as a motive for of many historical, social and political factors and and driver of the conflict. The rebellion by the Tu- triggers (Boisvert 2012, 2013; Boukhars 2013; Bøås areg and other northern peoples was born not only 2013b; Marchal 2012; Whitehouse 2013a, 2013b). of economic motives but also the failure by ruling This perspective is explored below. elites in Bamako to acknowledge their grievances. State failure, including weak and corrupt insti- Ethnicity is a major factor in Malian conflict dy- tutions, and unfulfilled promises from earlier peace namics both among the Tuareg themselves and settlements are, according to several researchers, between the different communities in the north. among the causes of conflict in Mali (Boukhars Some researchers stress that these ethnic grievances 2013; Bøås, 2013b; Bøås and Torheim 2013; Lebo- have a history of being used in political games. The vich 2013; Marchal 2012). This includes a govern- government uses them to play northern groups and ance system built on patronage in which ruling elites tribes off against each other. Ethnic discourses are in Bamako cooperated with regional power-holders also apparent in the current crisis, in which tensions in the north, in return for stability. They also col- between north and south and within the north are laborated with northern terrorist groups, which growing (Armstrong 2013; Boisvert 2012; Boukhars could safely pursue their economic interests, such 2013; Bøås and Torheim 2013; Guichaoua 2013a; as the extensive trans-border drug trade in the Sahel Lacher and Tull 2013; Marchal 2012; Whitehouse region. It is important to consider these “big men” 2013b). The military coup of March 2012 was also and the informal networks to understand why the built on military grievances with the government conflict in Mali began and continues (Bøås 2013a, (Boisvert 2012; Bøås 2013b; Marchal 2012). 2013b; Bøås and Torheim 2013; Galvin 2012; Several readings apply the concepts of power Guichaoua 2013a; Lacher and Tull 2013; Marchal balance and political marketplace more broadly and 2012; Utas 2012b, 2013a, 2013b). Another cause of emphasise the importance of the regional context conflict is thus identified as economic interests, or to understanding the causes of the conflict. Before greed. Frequently used concepts are elite bargains, the fall of Qaddafi, there was extensive collabora- power balance and the political marketplace. Many tion between Bamako, Algeria and Libya to control writers argue that the main stakeholders in the con- northern Mali. Several of the fighters who formed flict are seeking influence and financial gain (Bouk- the MNLA returned from Libya with weapons and hars 2013; Guichaoua 2013a; Lacher and Tull 2013; ammunition. The wider Sahelian region is also con- Marchal 2012). It is argued that central to the cri- nected to the crisis in Mali, since larger economic sis is a conflict between elites from different ethnic interests, including the trans-border drug and arms groups, which ally themselves with extremists when trade, affects the conflict (Boukhars 2013; Bøås this is considered beneficial to their cause (Lacher 2013b; Bøås and Torheim 2013; Ellis 2013; Guicha- and Tull 2013). At the moment, Bamako lacks alli- oua 2013a; Utas 2012b). The transnational terrorist ances in the north, and this is prolonging the con- groups involved have
Load more

Recommended publications
  • From Operation Serval to Barkhane
    same year, Hollande sent French troops to From Operation Serval the Central African Republic (CAR) to curb ethno-religious warfare. During a visit to to Barkhane three African nations in the summer of 2014, the French president announced Understanding France’s Operation Barkhane, a reorganization of Increased Involvement in troops in the region into a counter-terrorism Africa in the Context of force of 3,000 soldiers. In light of this, what is one to make Françafrique and Post- of Hollande’s promise to break with colonialism tradition concerning France’s African policy? To what extent has he actively Carmen Cuesta Roca pursued the fulfillment of this promise, and does continued French involvement in Africa constitute success or failure in this rançois Hollande did not enter office regard? France has a complex relationship amid expectations that he would with Africa, and these ties cannot be easily become a foreign policy president. F cut. This paper does not seek to provide a His 2012 presidential campaign carefully critique of President Hollande’s policy focused on domestic issues. Much like toward France’s former African colonies. Nicolas Sarkozy and many of his Rather, it uses the current president’s predecessors, Hollande had declared, “I will decisions and behavior to explain why break away from Françafrique by proposing a France will not be able to distance itself relationship based on equality, trust, and 1 from its former colonies anytime soon. solidarity.” After his election on May 6, It is first necessary to outline a brief 2012, Hollande took steps to fulfill this history of France’s involvement in Africa, promise.
    [Show full text]
  • Territorial Autonomy and Self-Determination Conflicts: Opportunity and Willingness Cases from Bolivia, Niger, and Thailand
    ICIP WORKING PAPERS: 2010/01 GRAN VIA DE LES CORTS CATALANES 658, BAIX 08010 BARCELONA (SPAIN) Territorial Autonomy T. +34 93 554 42 70 | F. +34 93 554 42 80 [email protected] | WWW.ICIP.CAT and Self-Determination Conflicts: Opportunity and Willingness Cases from Bolivia, Niger, and Thailand Roger Suso Territorial Autonomy and Self-Determination Conflicts: Opportunity and Willingness Cases from Bolivia, Niger, and Thailand Roger Suso Institut Català Internacional per la Pau Barcelona, April 2010 Gran Via de les Corts Catalanes, 658, baix. 08010 Barcelona (Spain) T. +34 93 554 42 70 | F. +34 93 554 42 80 [email protected] | http:// www.icip.cat Editors Javier Alcalde and Rafael Grasa Editorial Board Pablo Aguiar, Alfons Barceló, Catherine Charrett, Gema Collantes, Caterina Garcia, Abel Escribà, Vicenç Fisas, Tica Font, Antoni Pigrau, Xavier Pons, Alejandro Pozo, Mònica Sabata, Jaume Saura, Antoni Segura and Josep Maria Terricabras Graphic Design Fundació Tam-Tam ISSN 2013-5793 (online edition) 2013-5785 (paper edition) DL B-38.039-2009 © 2009 Institut Català Internacional per la Pau · All rights reserved T H E A U T HOR Roger Suso holds a B.A. in Political Science (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, UAB) and a M.A. in Peace and Conflict Studies (Uppsa- la University). He gained work and research experience in various or- ganizations like the UNDP-Lebanon in Beirut, the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) in Berlin, the Committee for the Defence of Human Rights to the Maghreb Elcàlam in Barcelona, and as an assist- ant lecturer at the UAB. An earlier version of this Working Paper was previously submitted in May 20, 2009 as a Master’s Thesis in Peace and Conflict Studies in the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Swe- den, under the supervisor of Thomas Ohlson.
    [Show full text]
  • FINAL REPORT Quantitative Instrument to Measure Commune
    FINAL REPORT Quantitative Instrument to Measure Commune Effectiveness Prepared for United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Mali Mission, Democracy and Governance (DG) Team Prepared by Dr. Lynette Wood, Team Leader Leslie Fox, Senior Democracy and Governance Specialist ARD, Inc. 159 Bank Street, Third Floor Burlington, VT 05401 USA Telephone: (802) 658-3890 FAX: (802) 658-4247 in cooperation with Bakary Doumbia, Survey and Data Management Specialist InfoStat, Bamako, Mali under the USAID Broadening Access and Strengthening Input Market Systems (BASIS) indefinite quantity contract November 2000 Table of Contents ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS.......................................................................... i EXECUTIVE SUMMARY............................................................................................... ii 1 INDICATORS OF AN EFFECTIVE COMMUNE............................................... 1 1.1 THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE..............................................1 1.2 THE EFFECTIVE COMMUNE: A DEVELOPMENT HYPOTHESIS..........................................2 1.2.1 The Development Problem: The Sound of One Hand Clapping ............................ 3 1.3 THE STRATEGIC GOAL – THE COMMUNE AS AN EFFECTIVE ARENA OF DEMOCRATIC LOCAL GOVERNANCE ............................................................................4 1.3.1 The Logic Underlying the Strategic Goal........................................................... 4 1.3.2 Illustrative Indicators: Measuring Performance at the
    [Show full text]
  • Africa Yearbook
    AFRICA YEARBOOK AFRICA YEARBOOK Volume 10 Politics, Economy and Society South of the Sahara in 2013 EDITED BY ANDREAS MEHLER HENNING MELBER KLAAS VAN WALRAVEN SUB-EDITOR ROLF HOFMEIER LEIDEN • BOSTON 2014 ISSN 1871-2525 ISBN 978-90-04-27477-8 (paperback) ISBN 978-90-04-28264-3 (e-book) Copyright 2014 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Global Oriental and Hotei Publishing. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper. Contents i. Preface ........................................................................................................... vii ii. List of Abbreviations ..................................................................................... ix iii. Factual Overview ........................................................................................... xiii iv. List of Authors ............................................................................................... xvii I. Sub-Saharan Africa (Andreas Mehler,
    [Show full text]
  • Rwanda 20 and Darfur 10
    Rwanda 20 and Darfur 10 New Responses to Africa’s Mass Atrocities By John Prendergast April 2014 WWW.ENOUGHPROJECT.ORG Rwanda 20 and Darfur 10 New Responses to Africa’s Mass Atrocities* By John Prendergast April 2014 COVER PHOTO A young Rwandan girl walks through Nyaza cemetery outside Kigali, Rwanda on Monday November 25, 1996. Thousands of victims of the 1994 genocide are buried there. AP/RICARDO MAZALAN * This Enough Project report expands on an earlier argument advanced in a Foreign Affairs article entitled “The New Face of African Conflict: In Search of a Way Forward,” by John Prendergast, published March 12, 2014. Introduction As commemorations unfold honoring the 20th anniversary of the onset of Rwanda’s genocide and the 10th year after Darfur’s genocide was recognized, the rhetoric of commitment to the prevention of mass atrocities has never been stronger. Actions, unsurprisingly, have not matched that rhetoric. But the conventional diagnosis of this chasm between words and deeds – a lack of political will – only explains part of the action deficit. More deeply, international crisis response strategies in Africa have hardly evolved in the years since the Rwandan genocide erupted. Until there is a fuller recognition of the core drivers of African conflict, their cross-border nature, and the need for more nuanced and comprehensive responses, the likelihood will remain high that more and more anniversaries of mass atrocity events will have to be commemorated by future generations. Conflict drivers need to be much better understood in order to devise more relevant responses. The band of crisis and conflict spanning the Horn of Africa, East Africa, and Central Africa is ground zero for mass atrocity events globally.
    [Show full text]
  • Enjeux Spatiaux Et Fonciers Dans Le Delta Intérieur Du Niger (Mali) : Delmasig, Un SIG À Vocation Locale Et Régionale
    tnjeux spatiaux et fonciers dans le delta intérieur du Niger (Mali) Delmasig, un SIG à vocation locale et régionale Jérôme Marie Géographe Le présent article expose brièvement quelques-uns des résultats obtenus par l'utilisation du SIG Delmasig concernant l'évolution des rizières et les relations entre espace rizicole et espace pastoral. Ce système d'information géographique est dédié à l'aide à la décision pour une gestion régionale et locale des hommes, des milieux, des enjeux spatiaux et fonciers dans le delta intérieur amont du fleuve Niger au Mali (Marie, 2000). L'espace traité couvre les plaines de la cuvette du Niger depuis, en amont, Ké- Macina sur le Niger et Baramandougou sur le Bani, jusqu'au lac Débo en aval, y compris une fraction du Farimaké au nord-ouest du lac Débo, soit une superficie totale légèrement supérieure à 22 000 km2. Les données portent sur : - les formations végétales et leur relation avec la crue, dont dérive une modélisation des surfaces inondées ; -une analyse de l'évolution des surfaces cultivées en riz entre 1952, 1975 et 1989 : la comparaison diachronique de l'emprise des cultures de riz à ces trois dates permet d'en retracer l'évolution sur une quarantaine d'années, tandis que la comparaison de l'emprise des rizières avec les formations végétales permet de mettre en 558 T Gestion intégrée des zones inondables tropicales évidence les stratégies des riziculteurs et de suivre plus particulièrement l'évolution de l'espace « des crues utiles » année par année ; -une modélisation des nouveaux cadres territoriaux
    [Show full text]
  • Under Attack
    UNDER ATTACK V IOLEN CE A GA INST HEALTH WORKERS, PATIENTS AND FACILITIES Safeguarding HUMAN Health RIGHTS in Conflict WATCH (front cover) A Syrian youth walks past a destroyed ambulance in the Saif al-Dawla district of the war-torn northern city of Aleppo on January 12, 2013. © 2013 JM Lopez/AFP/Getty Images UNDER ATTACK VIOLENCE AGAINST HEALTH WORKERS, PATIENTS AND FACILITIES Overview of Recent Attacks on Health Care ...........................................................................................2 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................5 Urgent Actions Needed .......................................................................................................................7 Polio Vaccination Campaign Workers Killed ..........................................................................................8 Nigeria and Pakistan ......................................................................................................................8 Emergency Care Outlawed .................................................................................................................10 Turkey ..........................................................................................................................................10 Health Workers Arrested, Imprisoned ................................................................................................12 Bahrain ........................................................................................................................................12
    [Show full text]
  • Operation Serval. Analyzing the French Strategy Against Jihadists in Mali
    ASPJ Africa & Francophonie - 3rd Quarter 2015 Operation Serval Analyzing the French Strategy against Jihadists in Mali LT COL STÉPHANE SPET, FRENCH AIR FORCE* imilar to the events that occurred two years earlier in Benghazi, the crews of the four Mirage 2000Ds that took off on the evening of 11 January 2013 from Chad inbound for Kona in central Mali knew that they were about to conduct a mis- sion that needed to stop the jihadist offensive to secure Bamako, the capital of Mali, and its population. This time, they were not alone because French special forces Swere already on the battlefield, ready to bring their firepower to bear. French military forces intended to prevent jihadist fighters from creating a caliphate in Mali. They also knew that suppressing any jihadist activity there would be another challenge—a more political one intended to remove the arrows from the jihadists’ hands. By answering the call for assistance from the Malian president to prevent jihadists from raiding Bamako and creating a radical Islamist state, French president François Hollande consented to engage his country in the Sahel to fight jihadists. Within a week, Operation Serval had put together a joint force that stopped the jihadist offensive and retook the initiative. Within two months, the French-led coalition had liberated the en- tire Malian territory after destruction of jihadist strongholds in the Adrar des Ifoghas by displaying a strategy that surprised both the coalition’s enemies and its allies. On 31 July 2014, this first chapter of the war on terror in the Sahel officially closed with a victory and the attainment of all objectives at that time.
    [Show full text]
  • If Our Men Won't Fight, We Will"
    “If our men won’t ourmen won’t “If This study is a gender based confl ict analysis of the armed con- fl ict in northern Mali. It consists of interviews with people in Mali, at both the national and local level. The overwhelming result is that its respondents are in unanimous agreement that the root fi causes of the violent confl ict in Mali are marginalization, discrimi- ght, wewill” nation and an absent government. A fact that has been exploited by the violent Islamists, through their provision of services such as health care and employment. Islamist groups have also gained support from local populations in situations of pervasive vio- lence, including sexual and gender-based violence, and they have offered to restore security in exchange for local support. Marginality serves as a place of resistance for many groups, also northern women since many of them have grievances that are linked to their limited access to public services and human rights. For these women, marginality is a site of resistance that moti- vates them to mobilise men to take up arms against an unwilling government. “If our men won’t fi ght, we will” A Gendered Analysis of the Armed Confl ict in Northern Mali Helené Lackenbauer, Magdalena Tham Lindell and Gabriella Ingerstad FOI-R--4121--SE ISSN1650-1942 November 2015 www.foi.se Helené Lackenbauer, Magdalena Tham Lindell and Gabriella Ingerstad "If our men won't fight, we will" A Gendered Analysis of the Armed Conflict in Northern Mali Bild/Cover: (Helené Lackenbauer) Titel ”If our men won’t fight, we will” Title “Om våra män inte vill strida gör vi det” Rapportnr/Report no FOI-R--4121—SE Månad/Month November Utgivningsår/Year 2015 Antal sidor/Pages 77 ISSN 1650-1942 Kund/Customer Utrikes- & Försvarsdepartementen Forskningsområde 8.
    [Show full text]
  • AQIM's Blueprint for Securing Control of Northern Mali
    APRIL 2014 . VOL 7 . ISSUE 4 Contents Guns, Money and Prayers: FEATURE ARTICLE 1 Guns, Money and Prayers: AQIM’s Blueprint for Securing AQIM’s Blueprint for Securing Control of Northern Mali By Morten Bøås Control of Northern Mali By Morten Bøås REPORTS 6 AQIM’s Threat to Western Interests in the Sahel By Samuel L. Aronson 10 The Saudi Foreign Fighter Presence in Syria By Aaron Y. Zelin 14 Mexico’s Vigilante Militias Rout the Knights Templar Drug Cartel By Ioan Grillo 18 Drug Trafficking, Terrorism, and Civilian Self-Defense in Peru By Steven T. Zech 23 Maritime Piracy on the Rise in West Africa By Stephen Starr 26 Recent Highlights in Political Violence 28 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts An Islamist policeman patrolling the streets of Gao in northern Mali on July 16, 2012. - Issouf Sanogo/AFP/Getty Images l-qa`ida in the islamic As a result, even if the recent French Maghreb (AQIM) is military intervention in Mali has occasionally described as pushed back the Islamist rebels and an operational branch of the secured control of the northern cities of Aglobal al-Qa`ida structure. Yet AQIM Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu, a number of should not be viewed as an external al- challenges remain.1 The Islamists have Qa`ida force operating in the Sahel and not been defeated. Apart from the loss of Sahara. For years, AQIM and its offshoots prominent figures such as AQIM senior About the CTC Sentinel have pursued strategies of integration leader Abou Zeid and the reported death The Combating Terrorism Center is an in the region based on a sophisticated of Oumar Ould Hamaha,2 the rest of the independent educational and research reading of the local context.
    [Show full text]
  • Bibliography: Boko Haram
    PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 13, Issue 3 Bibliography: Boko Haram Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes [Bibliographic Series of Perspectives on Terrorism – BSPT-JT-2019-5] Abstract This bibliography contains journal articles, book chapters, books, edited volumes, theses, grey literature, bibliog- raphies and other resources on the Nigerian terrorist group Boko Haram. While focusing on recent literature, the bibliography is not restricted to a particular time period and covers publications up to May 2019. The literature has been retrieved by manually browsing more than 200 core and periphery sources in the field of Terrorism Stud- ies. Additionally, full-text and reference retrieval systems have been employed to broaden the search. Keywords: bibliography, resources, literature, Boko Haram, Islamic State West Africa Province, ISWAP, Abu- bakar Shekau, Abu Musab al-Barnawi, Nigeria, Lake Chad region NB: All websites were last visited on 18.05.2019. - See also Note for the Reader at the end of this literature list. Bibliographies and other Resources Benkirane, Reda et al. (2015-): Radicalisation, violence et (in)sécurité au Sahel. URL: https://sahelradical.hy- potheses.org Bokostan (2013, February-): @BokoWatch. URL: https://twitter.com/BokoWatch Campbell, John (2019, March 1-): Nigeria Security Tracker. URL: https://www.cfr.org/nigeria/nigeria-securi- ty-tracker/p29483 Counter Extremism Project (CEP) (n.d.-): Boko Haram. (Report). URL: https://www.counterextremism.com/ threat/boko-haram Elden, Stuart (2014, June): Boko Haram – An Annotated Bibliography. Progressive Geographies. URL: https:// progressivegeographies.com/resources/boko-haram-an-annotated-bibliography Hoffendahl, Christine (2014, December): Auf der Suche nach einer Strategie gegen Boko Haram. [In search for a strategy against Boko Haram].
    [Show full text]
  • Mali's Political Crisis and Its International Implications
    BULLETIN No. 53 (386) May 22, 2012 © PISM Editors: Marcin Zaborowski (Editor-in-Chief), Katarzyna Staniewska (Executive Editor), Jarosław Ćwiek-Karpowicz, Beata Górka-Winter, Artur Gradziuk, Beata Wojna Mali’s Political Crisis and Its International Implications Kacper Rękawek Civil war and a coup d’état in Mali constitute a serious threat to the stability of Western Africa, a region bordering the “Arab Spring”-engulfed Northern Africa. The European Union should support African efforts aimed at resolving the crisis, and condition future aid for Mali on the results of political mediation organised by the country’s neighbours who are aiming to restore the country back to civilian rule. Mali is a Western African state inhabited by fourteen and a half million people. Up to 65% of Mali’s area is desert and it is one of the poorest countries in the world. However, during the last 20 years it had become a regional leader in democratic transition. The Tuareg Rebellion in Mali. Ten percent of Malians living in the northeast of the country lead nomadic lives. The mostly white Tuareg constitute the largest group of Malian nomads, who have a history of anti-state rebellions (in 1962–1964, 1990–1995 and 2007–2009) against the dominance of the black Mande tribes that inhabit the country’s southern part. The Tuareg rebellions were motivated by unfulfilled promises by the government in Bamako to provide the derelict North with necessary investment. In October 2011, various armed Tuareg groups formed the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), which aims to create an independent Tuareg state (Azawad) in northeast Mali.
    [Show full text]