Operation Franklin Report into the shooting of Mr Khalid Masood at Westminster on 22 March 2017

Please note, this investigation was completed and submitted to the decision maker before 8 January 2018, while we were still the IPCC. Therefore, the report will contain the investigator’s opinion, which may differ from the final outcome. The report refers to the IPCC and the Commission throughout, and does not reflect the new structure of the IOPC.

Independent investigation report

Operation Franklin – Final redacted report 1 Investigation information

Investigation name: Operation Franklin

IPCC reference: 2017/082787

Investigation type: Death or Serious Injury (DSI)

IPCC office: London

Lead investigator: Chris Lovatt

Case supervisor: Colin Dewar

Commission delegate: Sarah Green

Status of report: Final

Date finalised: 5 July 2017

Contents

Introduction ...... 4 The investigation ...... 5 Policies, procedures and legislation considered ...... 6 Summary and analysis of the evidence ...... 7 Analysis ...... 30 Conclusions ...... 35 Appendix: The role of the IPCC ...... 39

Introduction

The purpose of this report

1. I was appointed by the IPCC to carry out an independent investigation into the death of Mr Khalid Masood, who was shot by a police officer in the grounds of the Palace of Westminster on Wednesday 22 March 2017. This came to the attention of the IPCC on the same day as a Death or Serious Injury (DSI) referral.

2. This is my report for the Commission. It summarises and evaluates the evidence, refers to relevant documents and, where necessary makes factual findings. In my conclusions I will: a) analyse the facts that have been established, the sequence of events and their consequences b) give my opinion about the nature and extent of the police contact prior to death, and analyse what evidence is available in relation to whether the police may have caused or contributed to the death c) draw attention to any lessons which may need to be learned by any organisation related to the investigation about which the Commission delegate may wish to make a recommendation

Other investigations

3. The Metropolitan Police Counter Terrorism Command is investigating the terrorist attack at Westminster Bridge and the Houses of Parliament on Wednesday 22 March 2017. The attack resulted in the deaths of four members of the public on the bridge, and of Police Constable (PC) Keith Palmer in the grounds of the Houses of Parliament. A further 50 people were injured. 4. The Metropolitan Police Service is also carrying out reviews of the security arrangements at the Palace of Westminster and into the protective vest worn by PC Palmer.

Operation Franklin – Final report redacted for publication 4 The investigation

Terms of reference

5. Deputy Chair Sarah Green approved the terms of reference for this investigation on 23 March 2017. The terms of reference specific to this investigation are:

1. To investigate a) The actions and decisions, including the use of lethal force, of the officer who fired the shots on 22 March 2017.

2. To assist in fulfilling the state’s investigative obligation arising under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) by ensuring as far as possible that the investigation is independent, effective, open and prompt, and that the full facts are brought to light and any lessons are learned. 3. To consider and report on whether there may be organisational learning, including: i. whether any change in policy or practice would help to prevent a recurrence of the event, incident or conduct investigated; ii. whether the incident highlights any good practice that should be shared.

6. On receipt of this report, the Commission must determine whether the report indicates that a person serving with the police may have (a) committed a criminal offence, or (b) behaved in a manner which would justify the bringing of disciplinary proceedings (an indication of misconduct). If so those matters will be investigated. The Metropolitan Police Service, who will have been sent the report, must then advise the IPCC whether or not it considers the performance of the police officers unsatisfactory, and what action (if any) it will take in respect of any such person's performance. If the IPCC does not agree with the Metropolitan Police Service, it may make recommendations. Family concerns and complaints

7. At a meeting on 2 June 2017 a member of Mr Masood’s family asked whether it may have been possible for the officers to have used non-lethal force to incapacitate Mr Masood.

Operation Franklin – Final redacted report 5 Policies, procedures and legislation considered

8. National and local policies have been examined in relation to this incident, in order to ascertain whether the policies were complied with, and whether the existing policies were sufficient in these circumstances. These include the College of Policing, Authorised Professional Practice (APP) into Armed Policing. 9. The APP states, “The primary intention of the police, when discharging a firearm, is to prevent an immediate threat to life by shooting to stop the subject from carrying out their intended or threatened course of action. In most circumstances this is achieved by aiming to strike the central body mass (i.e., the torso).” 10. In relation to individual responsibility, the APP states, “Each authorised firearms officer is individually responsible and accountable for their decisions and actions; nothing can absolve them from such responsibility and accountability. This includes decisions to refrain from using force as well as any decisive action taken, including the use of force, the use of a firearm and the use of a less lethal weapon. 11. Authorised Firearms Officers are answerable, ultimately, to the law in the courts. They must be in a position to justify their decisions and actions based on their honestly held belief as to the circumstances that existed at the time, and their professional and legal responsibilities.” 12. In establishing whether the force used was reasonable, consideration must be given to section 3, Criminal Law Act 1967 and section 117, Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the Police Standards of Professional behaviour. 13. Section 3, Criminal Law Act 1967 states, “A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large.” 14. Section 117, Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 states, “an officer may use reasonable force, if necessary, in the exercise of the power”.

Summary and analysis of the evidence

15. During this investigation, a volume of evidence was gathered. After thorough analysis of all the evidence, I have summarised the evidence that, in my opinion, answers the terms of reference for my investigation. As such, not all the evidence gathered in the investigation is referred to in this report. 16. However, the methodology of the investigation – including key decisions that were made, strategies that were set, and details of people referred to in this report – will be included in the appendices when the final report is completed.1 17. On Wednesday 22 March 2017, police were informed of an incident involving a car being driven over Westminster Bridge, deliberately hitting and injuring a number of members of the public. The car stopped near to the Houses of Parliament and the male driver, later identified as Mr Khalid Masood, made towards the Houses of Parliament on foot. 18. Mr Masood, who was armed with two large knives, entered the grounds of the Houses of Parliament via a vehicle entrance known as the Carriage Gates. Here, in an area known as New Palace Yard, he attacked PC Keith Palmer, who was on duty at the gates, inflicting fatal injuries. Mr Masood then continued into the grounds towards Westminster Hall, still armed with the knives. 19. This investigation focuses on the period between Mr Masood entering the grounds of the Houses of Parliament, and a police officer discharging his weapon, killing Mr Masood. This report provides details of the accounts given by the officers on duty at that time in New Palace Yard, and by members of the public who were working or nearby at the time and who witnessed the police officer shooting Mr Masood, and of CCTV evidence available. 20. The evidence from the post-incident procedure and post-mortem examination of Mr Masood confirmed that three shots were fired. Each shot struck Mr Masood, although the interim pathologist report indicated only the shot to his chest caused fatal injuries. 21. There are various descriptions of Mr Masood from the witnesses, but there is no dispute that Mr Masood was the man carrying the knives inside the grounds of Parliament. The CCTV evidence verified this. 22. There are commonalities in the accounts given by the officers within the grounds of the Palace of Westminster. For example, initially their attention was drawn by a loud bang from Bridge Street, where Mr Masood’s car came to rest. Some officers reported seeing smoke – again this related to Mr Masood’s car. Officers reported seeing a large crowd of people running from Bridge Street into Parliament Square and the officers’ view of Mr Masood’s car and the scene was limited. 23. Some police officers on duty and referred to in this report were granted pseudonyms at the time of the incident. It is recognised that continuing anonymity is a matter for HM Senior Coroner Dr Fiona Wilcox to address but, for the purpose of this report, the officers are referred to by their pseudonyms.

1 This appendix is not included in the published report as it contains personal data.

Operation Franklin – Final redacted report 7 Account of Officer SA74 24. SA74 was a plain-clothes armed close protection officer on duty by the members’ entrance to Parliament waiting for his protected person. He was with Officer SB73. SB73 was assigned the role of personal protection officer. The officers work together but each has a designated role. 25. At 2.30pm on 22 March 2017, SA74 said he heard a loud bang that sounded like a car crashing, and saw a number of people running and shouting, both in the area close to Westminster Bridge and at the entrance to the Palace of Westminster, known as Post 3. 26. SA74 said he believed he heard someone shout, “Get down” and someone shout, “Allah Akbar”. He made his way towards Post 3 and saw a number of police officers wearing high-visibility jackets running from the gates towards him. 27. SA74 described the officers as appearing “worried and concerned”. At this stage, SA74 drew his police-issued Glock handgun from his right-hip holster. 28. In his initial witness account, SA74 described drawing his weapon and seeing “a black male with a bald head and a black beard” running into the Palace towards him. In his later detailed account, SA74 stated that he drew his weapon “as” he saw the black man. The man described by SA74 was Mr Masood. 29. SA74 stated that he saw Mr Masood carrying two large knives covered in blood. SA74 believes he or SB73 shouted, “knife” or “drop the knife” but Mr Masood continued towards them. 30. SA74 stated he believed Mr Masood was going to kill him and “immediately feared for my own safety and life”. SA74 said he brought his gun up to aim. He said he did not have time to take a carefully aimed shot and instead used a “rapidly acquired sight picture”. 31. SA74 stated that he fired a “number of shots”, aiming at the central body mass, in line with his training, until satisfied that Mr Masood was no longer a threat. SA74 explained that the training taught him to aim for the central body mass as it is “more likely to achieve rapid incapacitation.” 32. SA74 then saw Mr Masood fall to the ground. SA74 stated that, once Mr Masood was secured, he went to his vehicle to retrieve a medical bag, which was used to assist a number of people attending to Mr Masood. Shortly after, he and SB73 were moved away from the scene. 33. On 17 May 2017, SA74 made a further account in response to questions posed by the IPCC. 34. SA74 confirmed that, in addition to his Glock 19 firearm, he was in possession of a police issued baton and CS spray. SA74 said he was not in possession of a Taser. 35. SA74 explained he was in not possession of a Taser as his role that day was as the nominated driver and he had other non-lethal options. 36. SA74 stated, “I very quickly assessed that faced with an imminent threat to my life and the lives of others, I had to take action to neutralise that threat. I assessed that drawing and firing my Glock 19 was reasonable, necessary and proportionate response to achieve the objective of neutralising the threat”. 37. SA74 explained that the use of self-defence techniques, his baton or CS spray were not suitable responses to the level of threat posed by Mr Masood. SA74 stated that by aiming shots at Mr Masood’s upper torso he had the best chance of achieving rapid incapacitation. 38. SA74 estimated that he was six to eight metres from Mr Masood when he first saw him and as Mr Masood “was rapidly closing (me) down”, about four metres when the first shot was fired. 39. SA74 explained the meaning of the phrase “rapidly acquired sight picture”, used in his earlier account. SA74 told the IPCC that a Glock19 weapon had a fore and rear sight, so it was possible to aim by holding the weapon at eye level and looking along the top of it. SA74 said that, in this incident, he did not have time to do this, so he “aimed the weapon as well as (he) was able to do so to be able to fire a shot as quickly as possible utilising solely the fore sight.” 40. SA74 stated that at the time he believed he had fired three shots. He said he fired three shots because it was only after he had fired the third shot that he saw a reaction from Mr Masood, and was then able to assess the threat was decreasing. He added that he had continually assessed the threat as he fired. Account of Officer SB73 41. SB73 was a plain-clothes armed personal protection officer on duty by the members’ entrance to Parliament waiting for his protected person. He was with Officer SA74. 42. At around 2.30pm on Wednesday 22 March 2017, SA73 stated that he heard a loud bang, which both he and SA74 thought was “odd”. He said his position meant he was lower than street level to Westminster Bridge and was therefore unable to see anything. SB73 stated that he then heard shouting and started walking towards the main gates. 43. SB73 describes how SA74 was slightly ahead and to the left of him. He said he became aware of lots of people running around outside of Parliament and described it as “panic”. 44. SB73 described himself as feeling “uneasy” at the situation. SB73 believed SA74 had a view around the vehicle barricade and shouted something like, “knife”. 45. In his detailed witness account, SB73 said he reacted by drawing his police issue Glock handgun and, while doing so, he saw “a large black man with a knife in both hands” coming towards SA74. The man described by SB73 was Mr Masood. 46. SB73 stated he heard SA74 shout and saw the man coming towards SA74, so he drew his weapon intending to shoot to stop, fearing Mr Masood was going to attack SA74. SB73 stated that, as Mr Masood was inside the perimeter of the Parliament, he knew he must have used force to have been able to get that far. 47. SB73 stated he may have issued a challenge to Mr Masood but cannot be sure. He stated Mr Masood continued to approach SA74, and he (SB73) knew he would have to “use deadly force” as he feared for his safety and that of

Operation Franklin – Final redacted report 9 SA74. SB73 said he placed his finger on the trigger to fire and, as he did so, he heard a number of shots. 48. SB73 said Mr Masood stopped and went to the ground. SB73 stated he did not fire any shots. 49. SB73 assisted in securing Mr Masood and providing first aid before being relieved. Shortly after, he and SA74 were moved away from the scene. 50. SB73 stated that he believed Mr Masood was intent on hurting them both, as he could see there was already blood on both the knives. 51. On 20 May 2017, SB73 made a further account in response to questions posed by the IPCC. 52. SB73 confirmed that, in addition to his Glock 19 firearm, he was in possession of a police issued baton and handcuffs. SB73 said he was not in possession of a Taser. 53. SB73 explained he was not in possession of a Taser as his role that day was as a personal protection officer. SB73 explained his priority in the event of an attack on his principal; his key responsibility was to ensure their safe evacuation. SB73 said it was the role of the close protection officer (SA74) to deal with any threat. 54. SB73 stated that had he been in possession of a Taser at the time when Mr Masood confronted him, he would not have used it. SB73 said he had very short time to assess the threat. He said, “I immediately assessed this as an immediate threat to my life and that of SA74”. 55. SB73 said that as Mr Masood, armed with two knives, was advancing towards him, he decided to take immediate action to neutralise the threat. SB73 considered the best option was to use his handgun, aiming the shots at Mr Masood’s upper torso, to achieve rapid incapacitation. SB73 stated that, in his opinion, the use of a Taser would not have been a “realistic option when faced with an immediate threat to life”. 56. SB73 said it was very difficult to estimate distances in such a dynamic situation. SB73 estimated that Mr Masood was six to eight metres from him when he first saw him and about four metres from SA74 when the shots were fired. 57. SB73 was asked to clarify his meaning of the phrase, “use deadly force”. He stated the phrase indicated that he made the decision to use his firearm, as he assessed the threat posed by Mr Masood meant an immediate threat to his life and the life of SA74. “In the very short time available I assessed the threat as one so serious and so immediate that the level of force reasonable in the circumstances to neutralise this threat was the use of my firearm”. Further police officer accounts 58. The following accounts were made by uniformed, unarmed officers on duty on Wednesday 22 March 2017 inside the grounds of the Houses of Parliament near to the Carriage Gates. These officers were wearing high-visibility clothing. Account of Officer BX15 59. BX15 was positioned at the Carriage Gates with BX14 and PC Palmer. He recalls that he was about to leave his post, having been relieved by BX14. 60. At approximately 2.40pm, he said, he heard a loud bang in the Bridge Street area about 30 metres away. BX15 heard reports of an explosion over the radio and could see the top of what appeared to be a grey 4x4 vehicle, and grey smoke. 61. BX15 stated he saw people running, and heard shouting and screaming, and people saying, “Men with knives stabbing people”. He said PC Palmer shouted for pedestrians to come in through the gate, but did not think that anyone came in. 62. BX15 described how out of the crowd came “a tall, large black or Asian man with a shaven head and black beard with two large hunting/butcher type knives, at least 8 inches long”. BX15 described his face as calm but determined and his arms as being raised above his shoulders so that his hands were level with the top of his head. This man was Mr Masood. 63. As he came in, BX15 thought that it was clear this was a terrorist incident and that Mr Masood wanted to kill a police officer. Mr Masood was about six metres away from BX15, who ran backwards. He turned back and saw Mr Masood had run into New Palace Yard and to the left, and was standing over PC Palmer, who was sitting on the ground close to the vehicle barrier facing the man. 64. BX15 could see PC Palmer was injured but did not see how this had happened. BX15 took a step towards Mr Masood to assist PC Palmer. Mr Masood turned and followed BX15, who, out of fear for his own personal safety and that of others, retreated. Mr Masood was ten metres away. BX15 retreated through the vehicle barrier and shouted for armed support. 65. BX15 stated he saw two plain-clothes officers, now known to be SA74 and SB73, already approaching with their guns drawn. BX15 heard three shots and saw Mr Masood, who still had possession of the knives, go down. 66. BX15 describes how Mr Masood was lying on his front facing away from him. He helped handcuff Mr Masood. 67. BX15 stated he then became aware of PC Palmer’s injuries so went to assist him, along with several others including doctors, London Ambulance Service staff and Helicopter Emergency Medical Service staff. BX15 assisted with giving PC Palmer first aid. Account of Officer BX14 68. BX14 was at the Carriage Gates with BX15 and PC Palmer. At approximately 2.40pm, she heard a loud bang, screaming and shouting from Bridge Street. 69. BX14 turned to look, but her view was restricted to seeing smoke and people running into the Palace grounds. BX14 heard the words, “gun” and “they” but did not know where from. 70. From the crowd of people, BX14 saw “a large, heavy built, black man” appear diagonally to her right. In her initial account, BX14 said she saw the man was holding a knife. In her later, more detailed, account, she stated that the man was holding a large knife in each hand, holding up his right hand, standing two metres away from them. The man described was Mr Masood. 71. BX14 described Mr Masood as pallid in colour, as if in shock, on drugs, or using cannabis, and “expressionless”. According to BX14, Mr Masood “had no expression and [I] remember he glanced his head to the left swiftly”. BX14

Operation Franklin – Final redacted report 11 stated that she shouted that Mr Masood had knives. She then ran towards Westminster Hall, shouting at people to run. At the hall, BX14 heard the crack of a gun, but did not know whom it was from or how many shots were fired, although she stated she thought there was more than one. 72. BX14 stated she was not clear whether she then went and closed the gates first for fear of further attackers, or stopped and assisted with Mr Masood, before then closing the gates. 73. BX14 stated she assisted another officer with cardiopulmonary resuscitation on Mr Masood and with the equipment needed. BX14 asked other officers where PC Palmer was, and then saw him being treated. A police colleague took BX14 away from the scene. Account of Officer BX20 74. BX20 was positioned at the South Gate with Officer BX16. He heard a loud crash from the direction of Bridge Street that sounded like a small explosion. BX20 stated he saw a cloud of dust, a large number of people running and lots of shouting and screaming. 75. BX20 stated he heard one woman shout, “There’s a man stabbing people”. BX20 stepped back and immediately looked to his right and approximately 20– 30 yards away saw “a large-built man of Arabic appearance” standing approximately five to eight metres inside the Parliamentary Estate. This man was Mr Masood. 76. BX20 said Mr Masood was moving towards PC Palmer. BX20 stated he could see Mr Masood had a large bread knife in each hand and had his arms raised above his head with the blades pointed down. BX20 described how PC Palmer was facing Mr Masood, who was stabbing downwards towards his chest area. There did not appear to be any talking or shouting. 77. BX20 said PC Palmer had his hands up in front of him in a defensive position and saw him backing away slowly. BX20 was surprised that PC Palmer was not attempting to retaliate and described Mr Masood as “dominating the situation”. 78. BX20 believed PC Palmer was injured, but he could not see any injuries. BX20 could not see anyone else and felt unable to assist PC Palmer and was “filled with fear”. 79. BX20 stated he heard a voice shouting for assistance and so turned right and clambered around the barrier towards the members’ entrance and shouted, “firearms firearms”. 80. BX20 immediately noticed a person in a suit running towards him with a handgun drawn, pointed towards the ground. 81. BX20 stated he saw the person raise the handgun and take aim, heard shouting and then a number of gunshots. 82. BX20 said he immediately turned to see Mr Masood lying on the floor on his back. BX20 assisted with first aid; during which time he asked how many times Mr Masood had been hit, to which someone responded “two shots”. 83. BX20 said he retrieved a first-aid kit from the Carriage Gates and assisted PC Palmer, who was lying on his back, not communicating. Account of Officer BX16 84. BX16 stated he was at the South Gates with BX20. At an unknown time, he heard a bang that he thought was an explosion from the Bridge Street area, so he relayed this over the radio. 85. BX16 said he looked but could not see anything. BX16 then heard lots of screaming and saw a large number of pedestrians running past, one shouting, “They’re throwing grenades.” 86. BX16 stated he could not see any other officers at this point. In his initial account, BX16 stated that he started to retreat from the gates. 87. BX16 stated he looked over his right shoulder and saw “an Asian man of large build with a bald head” just inside the North Gate, carrying two large knives. BX16 describes him as “walking like a robot and repeatedly swinging the knives up and down in large exaggerated movements.” This man was Mr Masood. 88. BX16 thought there may have been multiple attackers and thought he might die. BX16 retreated backwards and ran for cover into the Palace estate. 89. BX16 shouted, “Where’s the firearms officers” or “we need firearms”. 90. BX16 stated he became aware of a person in a suit with a pistol drawn, now known to be SA74. BX16 believed SA74 was shouting something towards them based on his mouth moving and his facial expression. BX16 said SA74 was running towards the threat. 91. SA74 passed BX16 who turned to see Mr Masood in the rear of the vehicle lane, in the corner behind the pedestrian gate. 92. BX16 said he heard two gunshots and saw Mr Masood fall to the floor. He says SA74 was near to Mr Masood. 93. BX16 stated he then saw PC Palmer running down the railings and fall to the floor. BX16 initially thought PC Palmer had fallen but then saw a gash on his head and then heard people shouting that PC Palmer had been stabbed. He then assisted with first aid. Account of Officer BX13 94. BX13 was positioned at the pedestrian entrance to the Palace next to the Carriage Gates. He heard a loud crash from Bridge Street; he saw a number of people running and heard a lot of screaming. One man shouted, “There’s a man with bloody big knives running this way.” 95. BX13 heard a noise to his right and saw PC Palmer on the floor against a metal barrier by the down ramp. A man was standing over him, hitting him in the head area with foot-long kitchen knives with great force. The man had a knife in each hand. This man was Mr Masood. 96. BX13 stated he saw at least two colleagues challenging the man with batons. BX13 approached the man from behind, drawing his CS spray, but was distracted by a car leaving the estate. When BX13 looked again, PC Palmer had got up and run past him towards the members’ entrance. The other two officers had also run. The car leaving the estate had caused an automatic barrier to lower, giving them an escape.

Operation Franklin – Final redacted report 13 97. BX13 stated that Mr Masood was walking after the officers and so he backed away from him to create space. BX13 then followed the man along the down slope where he saw two plain-clothes officers. BX13 says Officer SA74 shouted, “armed police”, but Mr Masood continued towards him. SA74 raised his Glock towards the man and BX13 heard a number of shots and saw Mr Masood fall backwards. 98. BX13 then went to close the gates to secure the area. Account of Deputy Commissioner Craig Mackey 99. Deputy Commissioner Craig Mackey was in the front seat of a car with Officer BX22 driving and Officer BX21 in the back seat. The car was leaving New Palace Yard. 100. Mr Mackey stated that they were driving through New Palace Yard and towards the security blockers, waiting for the light to go green and the security blockers to go down. He said that, just before getting to the blockers, he heard a loud bang from the direction of Westminster underground station. He could see a number of unarmed officers at the outer cordon of the gate looking in the direction of the noise, one of them talking on their radio. He stated that he saw a crowd running outside of the gates, and then “a black man run in through the ‘in’ gate with a butcher’s knife in his right hand with the blade pointed down”, about five to ten metres in front of the car. This man was Mr Masood. 101. Mr Mackey stated he could see two officers in front of the car in reflective clothing moving away, and one of them had a baton at shoulder height in a “back off pose”. He stated that, at some point, an officer stumbled or slipped and the man with the knife went down, not kneeling, and was stabbing down at the officer, with at least two stabs to the torso, and possibly the head. 102. Mr Mackey stated that the man then quickly got up and the stabbed officer followed him. They went past the car towards the entrance to the Palace. He stated that the man was not paying any attention to the car and that he believed the man walked away and seemed calm and not rushed or panicked. 103. He stated that at that point he heard a number of shots – he thinks two. The shots were fired from behind the car and so he could not see them being fired. 104. At that point, Mr Mackey said, he went to get out of the car but was told by an officer to leave, so they left. He stated that the windows were up in the vehicle so he could not hear what was being said, but did hear shouting from what he believed was the officers being attacked. Account of Officer BX22 105. BX22 was driving the car. He provided the same description of the scene as Mr Mackey. 106. BX22 described the attack on the officer and seeing Mr Masood holding a “massive” eight-inch knife in his right hand. He said he saw “the black man” striking the officer three times with the knife in the chest area, striking from head height. He then described how officers and Mr Masood ran past their vehicle. 107. BX22 stated that the car windows were closed. BX22 stated he then heard two shots and looked in the wing mirror to see Mr Masood lying on the floor on his side. BX22 could see an officer standing beside him pointing his pistol at the man. They then left the scene. Account of Officer BX21 108. BX21 was in the rear passenger seat of the car. She provided the same description of the attack as Mr Mackey. 109. BX21 described how she saw people running across the front of the House of Parliament, and that there was a lot of shouting, although she could not make out what was being said. 110. BX21 stated some people were running in through the gates, which were two thirds open, and BX22 then stopped the car about eight to ten metres from the gates. 111. BX21 then noticed a man holding a big sharp knife running into the grounds. This man was Mr Masood. 112. One of the officers in a high-visibility jacket appeared to have seen Mr Masood and started moving away from him in front of the car. The officer then went down on the floor and BX21 could not see him anymore. 113. BX21 said Mr Masood then jogged past the left side of the car, paying no attention to it. BX21 described the man as, “completely focused” and said she was scared and in fear for her safety. 114. In order to see Mr Masood, BX21 turned around in her seat, which took a few moments. She could see Mr Masood was now behind the car facing away. 115. BX21 stated she saw a police officer facing the car, although she did not see what direction the police officer had come from. BX21 says she heard the police officer shouting a warning, but could not remember the words used. The police officer was pointing a handgun at Mr Masood. 116. BX21 stated she heard two shots and saw Mr Masood, who still had possession of the knife, jerk twice and collapse to the floor. BX21 could not see how he collapsed. At this point, they drove out through the gate and left. Other police witnesses Inspector Z 117. Inspector Z was on duty at 2.40pm on Wednesday 22 March 2017 in an armed response vehicle (ARV) when he was made aware of an incident at Westminster. He stated he made his way to the location and became the Tactical Firearms Commander for the incident. 118. Inspector Z said that he saw a number of casualties and people working on casualties inside the Palace grounds. Inspector Z said he was told that a man had left a vehicle, jumped over the fence and drawn two large kitchen knives before stabbing PC Palmer. Two plain-clothes officers then drew weapons and shot the man before securing him. 119. Inspector Z made a number of decisions regarding the ongoing incident before speaking to Officers SA74 and SB73. In line with the Approved Professional Practice guidance for the management of police firearms incidents, Inspector Z gave both officers a non-conferring warning before obtaining brief details of the

Operation Franklin – Final redacted report 15 incident. Inspector Z was wearing a body-worn camera and recorded the initial account in a Post Incident Management log. 120. Inspector Z contemporaneously recorded that SA74’s initial account given at 3.25pm was: “There was screaming & shouting, words ‘Allah Akubar’, heard words of get, police officers in high vis jackets from PaDP [Palaces and Diplomatic Protection Command] running from front gate of POW [Palace of Westminster] into building. I saw a black male, baldhead, black beard coming towards me carrying 2 large knives. I discharged my firearm, I fired I believe a number of shots. The black male fell to the ground.” 121. Inspector Z also recorded the initial account made by Officer SB73 at the same time who stated, “Heard a bang Westminster Bridge Road, lots of people. Started making way to front gate. I heard Bravo One [this original pseudonym was later replaced with SA74], shout ‘knife’. I drew my weapon. I heard a number of shots, the male was down. He was then handcuffed and first aid began.”

A summary of accounts of members of the public 122. The accounts below come from members of the public who were in the Houses of Parliament, at Portcullis House with a view of New Palace Yard, on Westminster Bridge or in Parliament Square at the time of the incident. 123. In total 26 accounts have been summarised. As many of the witnesses described hearing the car crash, seeing crowds of people running from Westminster Bridge towards Parliament Square and the intrusion into the grounds of the Houses of Parliament, these details are not given in each account. 124. Each account focuses on the actions of Mr Masood and Officers SA74 and SB73. 125. The IPCC has reviewed over 190 statements during this investigation. Many statements duplicate the events within New Palace Yard. The following summarises 26 accounts from witnesses who were able to provide specific descriptions of SA74 actions: Accounts by members of the public from within the Houses of Parliament Security Officer BX11 126. BX11 was positioned at the members’ entrance in the right-hand corner of New Palace Yard. 127. BX11 stated he saw a man, referred to by him as the “offender” trying to access the ‘in’ gates. BX11 described the “aggressive” man as having white skin. He believed two officers were trying to shut the gates to stop him from getting in, and the offender was “attacking as he was trying to get in” and “wanted to hurt someone”. 128. BX11 stated that the offender got in through the gate and it looked like he was attacking the two officers, who were dodging and attempting to get away from him by backing away. 129. At this point, BX11’s view was obscured and he could not see a weapon. The two officers got away, but the offender kept going and went towards the ‘out’ gate. 130. BX11 stated the offender was waving a 12-inch long knife in his right hand but could not recall if he was holding anything in the other hand. BX11 described the offender as making “slashing and stabbing” movements with the knife at the officers. BX11 stated that he did not see the knife make contact with any of the officers but that the offender was really close to the officers. 131. BX11 stated that one of the officers was “having a fight with the offender”. BX11 stated that the officers were doing their job trying to protect the Palace rather than running away. BX11 said he did not hear the officers or the offender shout or say anything, as there was so much other noise. 132. BX11 said he walked towards the turnstiles and saw two plain-clothes, armed officers wearing suits run from behind him towards the offender. 133. BX11 stated he was not sure if the officers or offender said anything, as it all happened fast and there was a lot of other noise, but that he heard two bangs that were gunshots and saw the offender fall to the floor backwards. 134. BX11 stated that he did not see their weapons or who fired the shots, but thought it must have been one of the two plain-clothes officers. BX11 said the firearms officers were about six metres from the offender when he fell to the floor. 135. BX11 stated he then saw an officer who had been on the gate and had been attacked by the offender collapse to the floor. Mr A 136. Mr A stated he left Westminster Hall and turned left towards the exit. He described how his attention was drawn to a large group of people running, and then seeing Mr Masood. 137. Mr A stated Mr Masood’s hands were down by his side but it looked like he had something in his hands. He was running in a “fast” jog as he entered the vehicle entrance and jogged up to an officer wearing a reflective jacket who he now believed to be PC Palmer. Mr A described the attack on PC Palmer. 138. After a few seconds, Mr A saw Mr Masood stand up and that he was carrying two large knives or machetes, one in each hand, held downwards from the bottom of a closed fist, out to the side of his body and raised above his head. 139. Mr A described how the other officers in yellow jackets ran up to Mr Masood, and how they backed off when as he stood up. Mr A stated that Mr Masood began to charge at the officers and on each charge the officers would back away – this happened two or three times, with shouting. 140. Mr Masood then began to make his way to where Mr A was standing. He stated his walking was, “fast and aggressive”. Mr A described seeing PC Palmer run after Mr Masood with the other officers who looked like they were trying to “contain him”.

Operation Franklin – Final redacted report 17 141. Mr A stated that a man in a black suit then turned up holding his hand out in front of him, and shouted something like, “Stop, drop your weapons.” Then as Mr Masood looked like he was about to run at the man in the suit, he heard two gunshots and saw Mr Masood fall to the floor. 142. Mr A said he did not see the man in the suit holding a gun, but that it was clear to him that this person had shot Mr Masood. Mr B 143. Mr B was visiting the Houses of Parliament with Mr C. As he was leaving, he said, “All hell broke loose”. 144. Mr B gave an interview to Sky News after the incident and showed footage from his mobile from within New Palace Yard. 145. Mr B described Mr Masood’s attack on PC Palmer. Mr B said, “He [Mr Masood] didn’t intend to hurt anyone, he didn’t intend to wound anyone, he was trying to kill the officer. That’s the only, that’s the only word for it, you know, it was savage.” 146. Mr B described seeing SA74, “There was one calm figure and that was the armed police officer. When he, sort of, walked through the mad crowd, towards the attacker”. 147. Mr B described seeing the uniformed police officers running away from Mr Masood and hearing two shots fired. 148. Mr B said of SA74, “(he) did what he had to do. If he didn’t pull the gun out and give the guy two bullets then, other people would have died. I’m sure of it.” Mr C 149. Mr C was with Mr B visiting the Houses of Parliament. He was leaving the Palace through the exit into New Palace Yard when he heard a commotion in front of him, which he thought was a protest. He described seeing people running the other side of the Carriage Gates. 150. A few seconds later, Mr C saw Mr Masood running through the gates with his hands aloft carrying a large knife in each hand. Mr C stated he, [Mr C], jumped over the fence. 151. Mr C described seeing three or four officers running towards him, away from the attacker, shouting for people to run. Mr C described seeing PC Palmer moving with difficulty in front of Mr Masood. Mr C stated he assumed the officer had been attacked. Mr C said he began to move towards PC Palmer and Mr Masood who was then about seven metres away. 152. Mr C stated he then saw “a marksman” in dark clothing draw alongside him and fire three shots at close range, within five metres, into the chest of Mr Masood, who continued for a couple of paces, probably due to his momentum, before falling to the ground on his back. 153. Mr C said he then ran to assist PC Palmer. Mrs D MP 154. Mrs D MP was walking in the cloisters area near New Palace Yard when she heard an undefined noise, but believing it might be protesters, kept walking. She stated there was then an eerie silence so she stopped. She then heard a commanding shout from a man’s voice, followed by a second shout of “stop” at which point she realised something was wrong. 155. Mrs D stated she saw Mr Masood burst into the area from the main gate, moving rapidly although not “necessarily running”, towards the door to the House of Commons. 156. Mrs D stated that she then heard another voice shout, “stop” but could not be sure if this was the same voice as before, but was sure it was aimed at Mr Masood. 157. Mrs D said Mr Masood continued to run. Her attention was then drawn to a man standing by the area of the main gate to the Parliamentary Estate. She stated she saw him raise both arms, holding something that she could not make out, and then instantaneously heard four loud shots. She saw Mr Masood fall to the ground forward onto his face. 158. Mrs D said she then went inside. She described feeling relieved the man had shot Mr Masood and that his “calmness and skill undoubtedly saved many lives.” Mr E 159. Mr E was on the third floor of Westminster Palace looking out into New Palace Yard. Mr E stated he saw someone breaking through the crowd coming through the Carriage Gates. 160. Mr E described the attack on PC Palmer, and that he believed the attacker was holding a knife. He stated that other officers appeared and were skirting around them. 161. Mr E described a black-suited officer advancing towards the attacker, who was advancing with “purpose”. Mr E stated he then saw what appeared to be a large kitchen knife that was being held extended and outwards, although he was unsure which hand it was held in. 162. Mr E said the black-suited officer ran fast to the scene and shouted a warning, which may have been just a word. The attacker showed no sign of desisting and still held the knife. The officer adopted a shooting stance with arms out in front, as he shouted the warning. Mr E described how the attacker was still advancing and “appeared to be seeking to harm”. The officer fired three shots that sounded like “bang”, followed by “bang bang”, lasting one to two seconds. The attacker fell onto his back onto the floor. 163. The attacker was attended to and Mr E said he was asked to move away. Mr F 164. Mr F was in an office on the third floor of the Houses of Parliament in an area known as Burma Road. 165. Mr F described seeing two people tussling on the floor. He stated his vision was partially obstructed, and so he could not see what they looked like or their gender. 166. Mr F said he then saw a “man in a dark suit” who was holding some kind of handgun with both hands, pointed out in front of him. He was standing to the

Operation Franklin – Final redacted report 19 left of the grass area with the gun pointing in the direction he was facing. Mr F stated he heard two shots in quick succession and then saw a person on their back with their hands out in front of them. Mr F said he did not see the man being shot as he was focused on the armed officer. Mr G 167. Mr G had been attending a meeting in the Houses of Parliament. He said that, as he left the building into an outside courtyard opposite Parliament Square, his attention was immediately drawn to someone shouting, “get down”. 168. Mr G described seeing “a dark-skinned man running towards a man dressed in a dark suit”. He says he heard three bangs and saw the dark-skinned man fall to the ground a few feet from the man in the suit. Mr H 169. Mr H stated he was leaving Parliament with a group of other people. He said he was about halfway between the building and Carriage Gates when he heard a loud bang, which he assumed to be a car crash. He continued walking to the gates and was extremely close to the gates when he heard police shouting. Mr H stated he could not remember the exact words. 170. Mr H described seeing a group of three to five officers run past him into the Parliament building, looking extremely scared. A few seconds later, he saw a man armed with a knife run after them. The man was non-white and of stocky build. He believed he was carrying a 12-inch knife in his left hand. He was very close to the officers and focused on the police officers only. Mr H described the man giving out a “war cry”. 171. Mr H stated he immediately heard an officer shout a command/warning, something similar to “stop” or “get down”. He heard two shots in quick succession and then a further one or two shots. He stated he then saw an armed officer stood over the motionless man. He could not recall seeing the officer shoot the man. Mr I 172. Mr I was in an office on the third floor of the Palace looking out into New Carriage Yard with colleagues, including Mr E. Mr I stated he heard people shouting and running. He then saw a man he referred to as an “attacker” run through the first set of Carriage Gates. 173. Mr I described in detail the attack on PC Palmer and then how the attacker moved towards Westminster Hall. 174. Mr I said he saw a police officer shout a warning or instruction. He heard two warnings in quick succession and then two or three shots that went “bang, bang”, then “bang”. 175. Mr I said he did not see a gun at any point and was not completely sure of who shot the attacker. He also stated that there was about ten yards between the officer who shot and the attacker, who immediately dropped to the ground. Mr J 176. Mr J is a member of the security team at the Palace. He described the lead up to the shooting. 177. Mr J stated he saw two plain-clothes armed police officers, both wearing suits, run up from behind him towards the man, who he described a white, 30 to 40 years old with fair hair, and waving knives around. 178. Mr J said he believed the officers were close-protection officers and had come out of a black BMW. He described hearing two gunshots and saw the man fall backwards. He also saw one of the uniformed police officers fall to the floor. 179. Mr J said that, if the close protection officers had not been there, he “might have ended up seriously hurt or dead” and “more people would have been hurt”. Mr K 180. Mr K was in an office in the Palace on the fourth floor with an unobstructed view of New Palace Yard. 181. Mr K described a large man running directly towards a police officer in a high- visibility jacket inside the gate. He described the attack on PC Palmer as a “ferocious attack” and the officer backing away with his hands raised in defence. 182. Mr K said he was not able to see the large man holding anything in his hands. He stated that the officer lost his balance and fell backwards. 183. Mr K said he saw what he assumed was a plain-clothes police officer emerge from the general direction of the entrance to Westminster Hall, jogging towards the large man with a pistol in his right hand, pointing it at the man. Mr K said he could see the large man was jogging and getting closer and closer to the armed officer. He described hearing the officer shout something at the man and seeing the man’s arms moving up and down as he jogged. 184. Mr K stated that, when the man was ten to 12 yards away from the officer, he heard a long bang, which he took to be a gunshot. He stated the large man collapsed and the officer closed in on him. Mr K also described hearing a second shot. He says the exchange lasted one or two seconds. Mr K then described the officer standing over the man and pointing his gun directly at him and being joined by another person. Ms L 185. Ms L was in an office on the second floor of the Palace overlooking New Palace Yard. She described hearing a high level of noise and shouting coming from outside, so she looked out of the window and saw people, including police officers running around. 186. Ms L described seeing Mr Masood after he entered New Palace Yard. She stated seeing him at the top of the path on the cobbled roadway coming towards the building. He was running reasonably fast. She stated that there were still other people running around and that there may have been people nearby to apprehend him but that she could not remember any detail of this.

Operation Franklin – Final redacted report 21 187. Ms L stated she next saw a group of people around a person she believed to be the same man, and there looked like there was a tussle going on with potentially some uniformed officers involved. 188. Ms L next recalled seeing a man in civilian clothes with his arm outstretched with a handgun, and simultaneously hearing a crack. She stated that she saw him taking aim and then heard the shot within two seconds. 189. Ms L described as “pretty quick” the time from when she first saw the man in civilian clothes to hearing the shots. 190. Ms L could not recall if the man was holding the gun with one or two hands. She stated she then heard what she assumed was a second shot, a few seconds after the first. She stated he was firing at someone close to him, less than a couple of metres away. She stated she had a sense that the person was already on the floor and could see the end of a person's feet that she thought belonged to the man in black. Mr M 191. Mr M was inside New Palace Yard in a car parked about 40 yards from the entrance. He stated he could see a car he assumed belonged to police protection officers, and a car with fellow driver Mr N. 192. Mr M stated he could see the entrance gates to the yard through his right window. He described seeing the crowd running and then seeing “a chunky black man”, described by him as the “bandit” with a knife in each hand, moving towards an officer to the right of the gate. Mr M described the attack on PC Palmer. 193. Mr M said that at some point he got out of his car and started moving towards them. 194. Mr M described the man as standing and leaning over a barrier, and making stabbing motions with both hands, which he said he assumed were towards an officer he had seen being attacked. Mr M stated the man was clearly intent on causing serious injury. 195. Mr M described officers running away from the man, including the officer he saw being attacked, and said that the man had “loped” after him, “idling along”. 196. Mr M said he heard someone shout, “he's got a knife” and then three cracks or pops, which he knew to be from a pistol or firearms. He recalled that the first two cracks were immediately after each other and that there was then a short pause before the third. The man collapsed to the floor. 197. Mr M described then seeing two officers he presumed to be protection officers level with the man. He did not see either of them holding a firearm and was not aware where they were prior to the shots. Mr M believed one of these officers fired the shots. 198. He said he then stood over one of the knives that he stated had blood on it. He could also see another knife and described them as identical eight-inch knives. Mr N 199. Mr N was in a car inside New Palace Yard, parked near to the steps to the gardens almost in front of the Members Entrance. 200. Mr N described how he heard a lot of noise from Westminster Bridge and then a female voice screaming, so he stepped out of his car on to the step. He described seeing an officer having a scuffle with a man who had “foot long metal bars or similar objects” in both hands. He said that the man raised one of his arms above his head and brought the object down in a stabbing motion. He said he was not sure what he was doing with the other hand, but he saw the man make two or three similar motions with one or both hands. 201. Mr N watched the attack for a few seconds and then briefly looked away for three seconds. When he looked back, the officer who had been attacked was coming towards him, walking in a way that looked like he had been injured. He stated he then saw the attacker come past the barrier used when cars leave the yard and run towards the railings near the entrance to Westminster Hall. 202. Mr N then saw that the man had two clenched fists in front of him at shoulder height and saw that he was holding at least one knife in one of the fists and possibly a second in the other. He described the knife as a foot-long kitchen knife. 203. Mr N stated he then saw three people, who he believed to be officers, moving towards the attacker, one in a suit and the other two in blue search uniforms. He did not see any of the officers carrying weapons. 204. Mr N said he heard someone shouting “get back” and then three shots. He stated the first two followed each other and that there was a slight delay before the third. He could not see where the shots came from as the three officers were close together, but did recall seeing a puff of smoke. 205. Mr N described the three officers as being 15 feet from the attacker when the shots were fired. He saw the attacker fall on the floor, and then the injured officer also go to the floor. 206. Mr N described people coming to assist the officer and the attacker. Mr O MP 207. Mr O MP said he was walking from Portcullis House to the Commons to vote, through the Cloisters adjacent to New Palace Yard. Mr O said he stopped at the second or third cloister as he became aware of a large number of people milling around and of a sense of panic in the air. He recalled hearing a number of people shouting and pushing in the walkway between Westminster Hall and the security hut in the yard. 208. Mr O described a light blue car being held at the gates and approximately 10– 15 officers running from the direction of the main gates in his direction, some wearing fluorescent jackets. He stated he heard a shout from a solitary male voice: he was not sure where from, but believed it came from nearer to him than the group of officers running towards him. 209. Mr O stated he then heard three or four distinctly single and separate shots like a “pfft” sound. After hearing the first shot, he said, his attention was drawn to a man running in his direction. His attention was immediately drawn back to where the shots had been fired.

Operation Franklin – Final redacted report 23 210. Mr O stated he thought he saw the person who had fired the shots, holding a weapon that did not appear to be very big. He stated that the man was in plain clothes, standing about 15–20 metres away. 211. Mr O described seeing another “stocky man” he now knows to be the attacker approximately 20–25 metres away, facing the shooter, with about two car lengths between the two. He said he saw the attacker fall straight backwards to the floor. Mr O stated he then left and went inside Parliament. Mr P 212. Mr P was at work in the Houses of Parliament walking along a corridor with a view of Parliament Square in the distance through a bay window. He stated that he looked out the window and saw two people, one of whom may have been a police officer running away from the entrance to Parliament Square. 213. Mr P said he then saw a man in plain clothes in the posture of someone holding a handgun with his arms outstretched. Although he could not see the gun, he stated that his stance and the shots made him assume it was a small gun. 214. Mr P said he then heard a one-word “commanding” and “authoritative” shout, which he believed was from this man. He stated that, less than two seconds later, the man fired what he believed were three shots at a man who was standing, stationary, three metres away. 215. Mr P did not remember the second man moving towards the first man at any point and could only recall the second man as a dark shape. He did not recall seeing the second man fall. 216. Mr P described seeing first aid given to the man and to PC Palmer.

Accounts by members of the public within Portcullis House Mr Q 217. Mr Q was on the first floor of Portcullis House in a room overlooking New Palace Yard. Mr Q stated he was informed of a car crash on Westminster Bridge and, as a result, went to the window. He described the scene and seeing injured people and, a few seconds later, a dark figure sprinting across the yard just inside the gates. The figure had light brown skin and was bald with a beard. 218. Mr Q described the attack on PC Palmer, which he stated only lasted a few seconds. Mr Q stated he saw the attacker had a long pointed object in his right hand that looked like a knife. There may have been something in his left hand but it was not completely clear. 219. Mr Q said he saw multiple officers running around, including an officer in a black/dark blue uniform running towards the attacker, giving chase. There was a group of people standing by the entrance and the suspect was running towards them with the long pointed knife-like object in his right hand. 220. Mr Q stated that at the front of this group was a man wearing dark clothes, positioned between the suspect and the group. He stated he had raised his arms with his hands clasped together, giving Mr Q the impression that he was holding a firearm/pistol. As he was running, the suspect suddenly fell to his right, out of sight, Mr Q believed the man with his hands out had shot him. Ms R 221. Ms R was in Portcullis House in an office on the third floor with a view onto Bridge Street, the House of Parliament and Parliament Square. She described the car crash and a colleague saying “that man's got a knife.” 222. Ms R described seeing a tall man on the corner of Bridge Street and Parliament Square running, holding a long kitchen-style knife with the blade facing downwards in his right hand. She could not see anything in his left hand. He did not seem to be going after any of the people with the knife but was waving it around with wild movements. 223. Ms R described the man as “lumbering”. She stated that, after he had turned the corner onto Parliament Square, she lost sight of him for about two seconds. The next time she saw him he was about three paces inside the gate. He was not running with any purpose and appeared to be lumbering and looking around. 224. Ms R said she saw many police officers in fluorescent jackets running away from the gate. One officer tried to go left and fell on the floor. The attacker went towards the police officer, leaned over him and stabbed him forcefully two or three times with the knife. He then moved away immediately. 225. Ms R stated she closed her eyes and, when she reopened them, the attacker had moved to the right. The officer got up, ran past him, and collapsed on the other side of a small green. 226. Ms R described the attacker heading towards Westminster Hall but stated he was not sprinting or running with any purpose, and was “lumbering”. 227. Ms R described how she saw a man in a grey suit run out from the cloisters in the direction of the attacker and take a small handgun from his jacket that he raised. He then paused. The attacker was not running fast at him but was moving towards him waving the knife around and was still a “clear risk”. He was about four to five metres away from the man in the suit, and the officer who had been attacked was off to the side. Ms R stated she believed he would have been visible to the man in the suit. 228. Ms R said she could not hear, so did not know if anything was said. She stated she then saw the man in the suit shoot the attacker. She heard three shots and saw the attacker fall to his knees and then backwards onto the floor. She did not see the impact of the shots but think they all hit the attacker. She then described the first aid given to the officer and attacker. Mr S 229. Mr S was in an office on the fourth floor of Portcullis House with a view of Bridge Street and the Palace of Westminster. He stated that he saw a car crashed into the railings outside and people injured. The car driver's door opened and “a Middle Eastern, heavyset bald man got out carrying two eight or nine inch kitchen knives, one in each hand, pointing upwards”. 230. Mr S described how he saw the man enter Parliament through the first set of gates. At the gates were two officers in high-visibility jackets. As the man was

Operation Franklin – Final redacted report 25 running to the gates, the officers were challenging him and gesticulating to him to get back but it was clear he was ignoring them. 231. Mr S described the officers as “panicking”. As the man entered the gates, the officers stopped and turned and one of them tripped and fell over. The man changed his direction slightly and set on the officer, stabbing him four or five times in a violent and forceful way. 232. Mr S said he saw the man stand up and jog towards the entrance of Westminster Hall, still with the knives in his hands. As he got close to the entrance two men in suits, who looked like security personnel ran out towards him. One of the men was slightly in front of the other and they both had handguns in their hands. 233. Mr S stated the officers challenged the man, who stopped but continued to edge forward towards them with the knives held out. The armed men took aim and shot. Mr S stated he heard words just before the shots but was not sure whom they were from. 234. Mr S said he recalled hearing the shots – “bang bang, slight pause, and bang”. The man went down immediately. Mr T 235. Mr T was in a third floor office in Portcullis House with two colleagues. He recalled both his colleagues thinking something was going on and he got up and went to the window. Mr T described seeing the crashed car and people running and aiding injured people. 236. He said he saw “a large man standing just past Carriage Gate with a four inch knife in his right hand that was facing down”. He stated he saw two police officers run away from him in opposite directions. One officer, who he believes was PC Palmer, ran north-west. He said that he did not see him fall or trip but he suddenly saw him lying on his back on the floor. The attacker appeared to be standing over him making stabbing motions. The officer had his arms up in a defensive manner. Mr T believed that this lasted for 30 seconds to a minute. Mr T stated he saw the officer get up and run around the railings, although he did not know how. He said he saw a vehicle and was worried the attacker would get into it. 237. Mr T said the attacker instead walked straight past the vehicle. He stated he then saw an officer in a suit approach the attacker from the House of Commons with a handgun in both hands, pointed towards the floor. He was five to six feet away when the attacker continued walking forwards with purpose towards him. The officer then raised his hands and shot the attacker. Mr T said he believed he heard three shots and saw the attacker crumple to the floor. Mr U 238. Mr U was on the third floor of Portcullis House overlooking New Palace Yard and Parliament Square. He stated he heard a crashing sound and saw a silver car crashed into the railings. 239. Mr U described seeing a man with a ten- to 12-inch long knife who then ran towards the Carriage Gate, and how he feared the man might attack members of the public. 240. Mr U described the man at the Carriage Gate and four to five officers moving away from him and the stabbing of PC Palmer. 241. Mr U described how the man ran towards Westminster Hall towards other officers. He said he saw a plain-clothes officer emerge and point a handgun at the man. He said he saw other uniformed officers in and around the area. Mr U stated he heard three shots and saw the man fall to the floor. Ms V 242. Ms V was in an office on the fourth floor of Portcullis House with a view towards Westminster Hall with her colleague, Mr S. She stated she saw a man she described as the knifeman running in through the Carriage Gates, holding two knives she described as meat cleavers, with the blade pointing downwards and his arms raised at head height. 243. Ms V described the initial reactions of the officers in high-visibility clothing and the attack on PC Palmer. 244. Ms V stated that the knifeman then stood up and ran across the yard. She then saw two men wearing suits, one a few paces behind the other, walking from the area of Speaker Yard into New Palace Yard. 245. Ms V said she saw that the suited man in front was holding a small handgun in his right hand, holding it out in front of him pointing it towards the knifeman. She could not see if the suited man behind was carrying anything. 246. Ms V described seeing the arm of the suited man in front move slightly two or three times with the recoil of the gun, but does not remember hearing shots. She did not see the knifeman fall the floor. 247. She then described seeing the suited men then walk calmly back in the direction of Speaker’s Yard. Accounts by members of the public on Westminster Bridge or in Parliament Square Mr W 248. Mr W, a taxi driver, was driving over Westminster Bridge towards Westminster tube station, and heard a loud crash from behind. He stated he saw “a mixed- raced man carrying a knife in each hand” running but did not see the man get out of the vehicle. Mr W described the man as holding a large ten- to 12-inch knife in his right hand, which he was pointing towards his elbow. He had a restricted view of the left hand, but stated he was carrying a “knife-shaped object”. 249. Mr W stated that the man ran towards a group of people but seemed to be fixated on something as if “he had a purpose”. Mr W described the man as jogging rather than sprinting. 250. Mr W drove his taxi parallel to the man and stated he saw him run into the Palace of Westminster. He saw three police officers near to the gated area. The man attacked the closest officer, pushing out and stabbing with his hands. The officer (PC Palmer), put his hands out in surprise, went backwards, and

Operation Franklin – Final redacted report 27 stumbled to the floor. The man got on top of PC Palmer and stabbed down at least five times. 251. Mr W recalled that, about seven to eight seconds later, two other officers came back towards the first officer. It appeared none of the three officers had anything with which to defend themselves. One of the officers was trying to get the man to stop. The man appeared to be straddling the officer. 252. Mr W said he then saw the man get off PC Palmer and run towards the down ramp and out of sight. He stated PC Palmer was helped by another officer and then ran out of sight. 253. This all lasted 15 seconds. Shortly after, he said, he heard “3 clacks” of what he now knows to be gunshots. Mr W then left the scene. Ms X 254. Ms X was in an office in Parliament Square overlooking New Palace Yard. She was informed of a crash by a colleague, looked out of the window, and saw people running. 255. Ms X said that, just inside New Palace Yard Gates, she saw “a bulky tanned bald man with his fists up”, gesticulating, in what she described as “a boxer stance”. She stated that he may have been brandishing something, but she could not see. She described the actions of the police officers in high-visibility jackets, and how the bald man was advancing. She stated the man advanced in the same direction as the officers. She described this as frenetic, not running or walking, and as “walk/lunging”. 256. Ms X said she saw a plain-clothes police officer advance quickly and “calmly”, possibly jogging. He reached a point and either stopped or advanced slowly, holding a handgun in both hands with his arms outstretched. The bald man continued towards him, not showing any signs of stopping. She stated she then heard two shots in quick succession, a pause and then a third. She stated that there may have been shouting, but did not know who it was from. The bald man did not collapse immediately, but did stop advancing. Ms X believed the man fell to the ground on the third shot. She then described the first aid given to the man. Ms Y 257. Ms Y was in an office on the fourth floor of 1 Parliament Street with one window with a partial view of Westminster Bridge and another window with a view over New Palace Yard. 258. She described hearing a loud crunching sound, screaming and seeing that a grey vehicle had crashed into the railings and wall around New Palace Yard with injured people around. 259. Ms Y described “a man in dark clothing holding something in his right hand that he held up in the air” that she believed might be a device or gun. 260. She described five to eight police officers in the area, some wearing high- visibility jackets and some wearing dark clothing. 261. Ms Y said she saw two police officers pointing guns at the man, who was still holding something in the air in his right hand, and the officers moving backwards and forwards. She stated she believed the officers were trying to make the man move back or stay away but he kept walking towards them. 262. Ms Y described hearing two loud bangs in quick succession and saw the man fall to the floor. She then described the aftermath of the incident and the first aid given to the man. She stated the incident in the Palace lasted five to six seconds and that she had a clear unobstructed view of what happened. CCTV evidence 263. The CCTV evidence is drawn from cameras near the Palace of Westminster. The IPCC has viewed and recorded the information contained on each camera and the following section is a compilation of the views. 264. The events that are significant to this report begin at 2.41.10pm with a police officer, believed to be PC Palmer, beginning to move backwards quickly from the Carriage Gates. 265. Many other people can be seen coming through the right-hand gate, including a figure in dark clothing who appears to move in the same direction as PC Palmer. The figure in the dark clothing is later identified as Mr Masood. 266. PC Palmer is seen moving his arms. Multiple other police officers can be seen running away from the gates. 267. At 2.41.12pm PC Palmer appears to turn and fall a few metres away from the gate, landing against a black circular barrier inside the yard. A figure in dark clothing, believed to be Mr Masood, is following PC Palmer, having appeared to come from the gate. There appears to be a struggle between Mr Masood and PC Palmer by the black barrier. 268. At 2.41.16pm the cameras show a second officer, believed to be BX15, running to within a short distance of PC Palmer and Mr Masood. 269. Officer SA74 is first seen on CCTV at 2.41.17pm appearing from the corner of New Palace Yard near the Cloisters, running towards the car barrier. 270. Officer SB73 is first seen on CCTV at 2.41.19pm running in the same direction as SA74. 271. At 2.41.19pm, PC Palmer stands up, turns and runs along the circular barrier away from the gate towards Westminster Hall and SA74 and SB73. BX15 also turns and runs in the same direction. 272. Mr Masood has his right arm in the air. He then walks for a few paces slightly to the right before beginning to run in the same direction as PC Palmer and BX15. 273. Other officers in high-visibility clothing are running in the same direction. They run past and around a stationary car, known to contain Mr Mackey, BX21 and BX22, through an open barrier. 274. Mr Masood walks in the same direction as the two officers for a few paces before running to the left-hand side of the car at 2.41.26pm. 275. At 2.41.27pm, SA74 is still running towards the officers, Mr Masood and the stationary car. Mr Masood is still running after the officers, towards SA74. 276. At 2.41.28pm, SA74 stops and raises his right arm and appears to be directly facing Mr Masood. The officers in high-visibility clothing, including PC Palmer, run past him in the opposite direction and out of shot. BX15 stops running and

Operation Franklin – Final redacted report 29 stands a few metres to the right of SA74. BX15 can be seen raising his left arm in the direction of Mr Masood, who is continuing to run towards SA74. 277. At 2.41.29pm, SA74 takes a few steps backwards. Mr Masood appears to raise both arms and quickly bring them down. A very quick flash can be seen in the area between Mr Masood and SA74. 278. At 2.41.30pm, Mr Masood continues to move towards SA74 but then falls to the ground. SA74 and SB73 then move towards Mr Masood. Analysis

279. I have considered the accounts made by SA74 and SB73, the other officers present, the accounts by the members of the public referred to in this report and the evidence provided by the CCTV. 280. Although the events on Westminster Bridge are now well known, it is important to remember that SA74 knew nothing of them at the time. Mr Masood’s demeanour 281. The descriptions of Mr Masood’s demeanour are consistent. Many witnesses described how they feared that Mr Masood appeared intent on causing further injury. This fear is echoed by SA74 and SB73 in their accounts. SB73 described himself as feeling “uneasy” at the situation. 282. Many witnesses from within the grounds of Parliament described Mr Masood’s demeanour. He was described by security officer BX11 as “wanting to hurt someone”. 283. Mr B described Mr Masood’s behaviour as “savage”. 284. Mr E said that, as Mr Masood advanced, he “appeared to be seeking to harm”. In his account, he gave this description just before mentioning that he heard three shots. 285. Mr H described Mr Masood carrying a 12-inch knife, shouting something like a “war cry”. 286. Mr J stated that, if the close protection officers had not been there, he “might have ended up seriously hurt or dead” and “more people would have been hurt”. Mr Masood’s actions 287. The CCTV showed Mr Masood jogging towards SA74 and SB73, with the officers in high-visibility clothing running away from him, past the car containing Mr Mackey, BX21 and BX22. 288. SA74 stated Mr Masood “was rapidly closing [me] down”, and about four metres away when he fired the first shot. 289. The CCTV showed SA74 had stopped and raised his right arm towards Mr Masood, who continued to move towards him. 290. Witnesses also described Mr Masood’s actions. Mr E said Mr Masood was advancing with purpose, even after hearing a police officer shout a warning. Mr E described Mr Masood as showing no signs of desisting and stated that he was still in possession of a knife. 291. SB73 stated he knew Mr Masood must have used force to gain entry into New Palace Yard. 292. Mr G described Mr Masood as running towards SA74. 293. Mr K saw Mr Masood jogging, getting closer and closer to the armed officers. 294. Ms X described Mr Masood as continuing towards SA74 after SA74 had drawn his handgun, saying Mr Masood showed no signs of stopping. 295. Ms R described Mr Masood as “lumbering” towards Westminster Hall. 296. Ms Y said she saw SA74 and SB73 had their handguns drawn and Mr Masood was holding something in the air. She stated the officers were trying to make Mr Masood move back but he kept walking towards them. Warnings given by SA74 or SB73 297. SA74 stated that he saw Mr Masood carrying two large knives covered in blood. In his account, SA74 believed he or SB73 shouted “knife” or “drop the knife” but Mr Masood continued towards them. 298. SB73 believed SA74 had a view around the vehicle barrier and shouted something like “knife”. 299. Of the officers present in the immediate area when Mr Masood was shot, BX15, BX16 and BX20 all recalled shouting requests for firearms officers to support them. 300. BX13 recalled SA74 shouting “armed police” but then seeing Mr Masood continuing towards him. 301. BX21 said she heard an officer she described as SA74 shout a warning but could not be specific to the words used. 302. Witnesses within the grounds of the Houses of Parliament recalled hearing a shouted warning. Mr E stated that, as SA74 and SB73 ran quickly to the scene, he heard a shouted warning that may have been just one word, but that Mr Masood showed no sign of desisting. Mr E added that he saw the officer adopting a “shooting stance” as he shouted the warning. 303. Mr H stated he heard an officer shouting a command or warning similar to “stop” or “get down”, and then heard the shots. 304. Mr I said he saw an officer shout a warning or instruction, which he described as two warnings in quick successions, before the shots were fired. 305. Mr N described hearing someone shout “get back” followed by the shots. 306. Mr P said he heard a one-word command shouted by SA74, who he described as in a “stance”. 307. Many witnesses recalled hearing someone shout, which supports SA74’s evidence that he did shout a warning. The distance between Mr Masood and SA74 308. Neither SA74 nor SB73 had seen the CCTV evidence at the time they gave their statements. In his account to the IPCC, SA74 estimated that Mr Masood

Operation Franklin – Final redacted report 31 was six to eight metres from Mr Masood when he first saw him and about four metres when the first shot was fired. SB73 agreed with these estimates. 309. Giving an accurate description of time or distances in such a dynamic situation is very difficult. However, a number of witnesses within the grounds of Westminster have estimated the distances between SA74 and Mr Masood at the point the shots were fired. 310. BX11 estimated the distance at about six metres. 311. Mr K estimated the distance was about ten to 12 yards (approximately ten to 12 metres) when he heard the bang. 312. Mr N stated the officers were 15 feet (approximately five metres) from Mr Masood. 313. Mr P said the distance was three metres. 314. Mr C estimated SA74 was within five metres of Mr Masood when the shots were fired. 315. Ms L described the distance as less than a couple of metres. The number of shots fired. 316. The evidence from the post-incident procedure and the post-mortem examination confirmed three shots were fired by SA74. 317. Witnesses variously described the shots as two shots followed by a slight pause and then a further shot (Mr M, Mr H, and Mr I, Mr N), or one shot followed by a short pause and then two further shots (Mr E). 318. SA74 told the IPCC that he fired three shots. 319. The Armed Policing APP states, “In most circumstances this is achieved by aiming to strike the central body mass (ie, the torso).” 320. The post-mortem examination confirmed that Mr Masood was struck by three bullets, to the chest, abdomen and the right hand. The shot to his chest caused the fatal injury. 321. In the Sky News broadcast taken from Mr B’s mobile phone, it is clear that two shots were fired, followed by a slight pause and then a third shot. Accounts given by SA74 and SB73 322. The accounts given by SA74 and SB73 have been consistent throughout. Inspector Z assumed control of the incident and was the first senior officer to speak to SA74 and SB73. The initial verbal accounts made by both officers were recorded on Inspector Z’s body-worn camera. This is difficult to hear due to other radio transmissions and interruptions, however, Inspector Z can be seen on the body-worn video footage making notes. These have been reviewed and provide a consistent account of events. Justification for use of force 323. The evidence showed SA74 had little time to make a decision on his use of force. The CCTV evidence showed that the events from Mr Masood entering New Palace Yard to him being shot by SA74 happened in about 20 seconds. 324. The CCTV showed that SA74 was running for 13 seconds before the shooting. The first view of SA74 on the CCTV is as he emerges from near to The Cloisters and the entrance to Westminster Hall, and some way from the vehicle barrier and Carriage Gates. However, by the time SA74 had reached the point where he confronted Mr Masood, this time had reduced to about four seconds. 325. SA74 stated he moved towards this area in response to hearing a loud bang, shouting and screaming. Mr Masood can be seen on the CCTV moving in the opposite direction. It was clear from the CCTV evidence that the officers in the high-visibility jackets were running away from Mr Masood and, according to their witness accounts, in some cases calling for firearms support. 326. Two seconds after SA74 is first seen on a CCTV camera, PC Palmer stands up and runs from Mr Masood. Mr Masood is then seen “jogging” after PC Palmer and BX15. From this time onwards, SA74 and Mr Masood are approaching each other. 327. Mr Masood passes Mr Mackey’s car nine seconds after the CCTV first showed SA74 approaching. Therefore, at this point SA74 had been seen on the CCTV footage for 11 seconds. 328. SA74 said that, when he saw Mr Masood, he was carrying two large knives, which he described as covered in blood. Although SA74 did not see the attack on PC Palmer, he did know that Mr Masood should not have been in New Palace Yard and he had earlier heard someone shout “Allah Akbar”. 329. SA74 and SB73 described their decision making as “immediate”. It is therefore likely that SA74 had considerably less than 13 seconds shown on the CCTV to make his decision to draw and use his weapon. This is due to the distance between Mr Masood and the officers, and the fact that Mr Masood was crouched over PC Palmer close to the vehicle barrier. 330. SA74 is seen on the CCTV with his handgun in his hand. In his initial witness statement, SA74 described drawing his weapon and seeing “a black male with a bald head and a black beard” running towards them. In his later detailed account, SA74 stated that he drew his weapon “as” he saw the black man. 331. Analysis of the CCTV evidence showed that SA74 very quickly drew his weapon as he ran towards the area but, as this was such a dynamic event, it is difficult to establish whether SA74 saw Mr Masood and drew his weapon, or whether he drew it in response to shouts and the situation he found himself in. 332. From the evidence of the witnesses, it seems likely that SA74 shouted a warning, in line with his account, as many recalled hearing this. Witnesses recall a variety of words being shouted, but it is important to note that, whatever warning was used, the evidence suggests Mr Masood continued to approach the armed officers. 333. The CCTV and witness accounts showed the next action taken by SA74 was for him to stop and point his handgun at Mr Masood and crouch in a shooting stance. 334. The CCTV evidence and witness accounts showed that Mr Masood did not stop or put the knives down, but continued to move towards SA74. The CCTV showed that SA74 seems to take a step back. SA74 stated that he feared for his own and others’ safety and decided at this point to shoot Mr Masood. SA74 stated that he did not have time to take a carefully aimed shot and instead used

Operation Franklin – Final redacted report 33 a “rapidly acquired sight picture”. SA74 stated that he fired a “number of shots”, aiming at the central body mass, in line with his training, until satisfied that Mr Masood was no longer a threat. 335. The amount of force used by SA74 is not in doubt. It is known that three shots were fired by SA74 with a number of witnesses describing two shots, then a short pause followed by a third shot. 336. SA74 was asked by the IPCC what other protective equipment he was carrying and whether he considered its use before his Glock handgun. SA74 stated he quickly assessed Mr Masood posed an “imminent threat” to his and others’ lives and therefore he had to take action to neutralise that threat. 337. SA74 told the IPCC that firing his Glock handgun was, in his opinion, a “reasonable, necessary and proportionate response to achieve the objective of neutralising the threat”. 338. SA74 stated that the use of other self-defence techniques, such as his baton or CS spray were not suitable responses to the level of threat posed by Mr Masood. SA74 stated that, by aiming shots at Mr Masood’s upper torso, he had the best chance of achieving rapid incapacitation. 339. SB73 confirms SA74’s views. Reasonable force 340. In establishing whether the force used was reasonable, consideration is given to section 3, Criminal Law Act 1967 and section 117, Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the College of Policing, Authorised professional Practice (APP) into Armed Policing. 341. Section 3, Criminal Law Act 1967 states, “A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large.” 342. The degree of force used by a person will not be regarded as having been reasonable if it was disproportionate in the circumstances. 343. Section 117, Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 states, “An officer may use reasonable force, if necessary, in the exercise of the power”. 344. In these circumstances, the APP into Armed Policing echoes legislation. The APP identifies the primary intention when the police discharge a firearm. It is to “prevent an immediate threat to life by shooting to stop the subject from carrying out their intended or threatened course of action.” 345. The APP continues, “Each authorised firearms officer is individually responsible and accountable for their decisions and actions, nothing can absolve them from such responsibility and accountability. This includes decisions to refrain from using force as well as any decisive action taken, including the use of force, the use of a firearm and the use of a less lethal weapon.” 346. The APP states that, in most situations, it is the individual firearms officer who must assess the immediacy and proximity of the threat and make an operational decision on whether it is necessary to discharge a firearm or take other decisive action. 347. A firearms officer’s appreciation of the critical nature of the situation may be informed by a combination of the following factors, including their observation and assessment of the situation: their perception of any imminent threat and their understanding of the wider police operation. 348. The evidence suggests that SA74 only had a few seconds to make an assessment. The evidence indicates that SA74 had heard a loud bang and saw people running. SA74 knew Mr Masood was an intruder within the grounds of the Houses of Parliament as he could not have entered without using force or threat and could see Mr Masood was armed with two bloodied knives. SA74 could see the officers in high-visibility jackets calling for firearm assistance and running from Mr Masood; and in spite of a shouted warning and pointing a gun at him, Mr Masood continued to approach SA74. 349. At the time SA74 fired his shots, he did not know PC Palmer had been fatally injured or that Mr Masood had killed and injured pedestrians on Westminster Bridge. However, the fact that Mr Masood had done so, supports the evidence of SA74 that Mr Masood’s appearance and demeanour led him to believe his own safety and life were in danger. 350. SA74 was asked whether he had considered the use of less lethal options. SA74 was in possession of a baton and CS spray. He stated that the use of self-defence techniques, baton or CS spray were not suitable to the level of threat posed by Mr Masood. SA74 stated he assessed Mr Masood’s demeanour as posing an immediate threat to his life or the lives of others. 351. SA74 stated that Mr Masood was six to eight metres from him when he first saw him and four metres away when he fired. SA74 decided that, as Mr Masood posed such an imminent threat, he had no choice but to “neutralise” the threat. 353. SA74 said that his training was to aim for the central body mass, as this was likely to achieve rapid incapacitation. Two of the three shots fired by SA74 (including the fatal shot), struck Mr Masood in the central body mass. 354. It is also important to note the reaction and decision making of SB73. He was slightly behind SA74 and believed that Mr Masood was intent on hurting them both, so he drew his weapon. Furthermore, SB73 stated that, had he not heard the shots and seen Mr Masood stop, he knew he would have to use “deadly force”. Conclusions

355. To conclude the investigation, I, as lead investigator, have considered the evidence with a view to addressing the following issues: 356. a. What was the nature and extent of police contact with Mr Masood prior to his death? 357. b. What evidence is available in relation to whether the police may have caused or contributed to Mr Masood’s death? 358. c. Why, having regard to the evidence, there is no indication that any person serving with the police may have committed a criminal offence or behaved in a manner that would justify the bringing of criminal proceedings?

Operation Franklin – Final redacted report 35 359. There is no question that Mr Masood had contact with the police and that a police officer, SA74, caused his death. The terms of reference for this investigation are to investigate “the actions and decisions, including the use of lethal force, of the officer who fired the shots on 22 March 2017”. 360. I have considered Mr Masood’s actions and demeanour once he was inside the grounds of the Houses of Parliament. Although the reasons why Mr Masood behaved as he did are not known, the evidence from CCTV and numerous witnesses about his actions on Westminster Bridge and towards PC Palmer, supports that he was intent on causing injury or death to anyone that he was able to come into contact with. 361. SA74 and SB73 were not wearing body-worn cameras because plain clothes close protection officers are not issued with them. However their actions are captured on CCTV and documented in witness accounts. 362. From CCTV it appears Mr Masood entered the grounds of the Palace of Westminster at 2.41.10pm. The evidence from SA74 is that, on hearing sounds indicating a disturbance and a threat to safety, he ran towards where the threat appeared to be coming. CCTV first shows him running in that direction at 2.41.17pm. 363. SA74 has said that he drew his weapon when he first saw Mr Masood. Analysis of the CCTV evidence showed that SA74 very quickly drew his weapon as he ran towards the gate but, as this was such a dynamic event, it is difficult to establish whether SA74 saw Mr Masood and drew his weapon, or whether he drew it in response to shouts and the perception of there being a threat. 364. The CCTV suggests that SA74 and Mr Masood first came into close proximity with each other at approximately 2.41.27pm, when Mr Masood, who was chasing the unarmed officers in high-visibility clothing, ran around the stationary vehicle containing Mr Mackey as SA74 was running towards it. SA74’s could see Mr Masood was armed with two knives and that unarmed officers were fleeing from him. He says he “immediately feared for [his] own safety and life” and believed he was in “imminent” danger. 365. The CCTV evidence shows that at 2.41.28pm, SA74 stopped and raised his right arm, pointing his handgun at Mr Masood; he appeared to be directly facing Mr Masood. The officers in high-visibility clothing, including PC Palmer, ran past him in the opposite direction from which he had come. 366. By his actions, SA74 had placed himself between Mr Masood and the officers he had been pursuing. The evidence from Mr Masood’s attack on PC Palmer strongly suggests that he was a serious and imminent threat to the life of SA74 and those he had been pursuing. 367. SA74 believes he or SB73 shouted, “knife” or “drop the knife”. The evidence of the witnesses supports that SA74 shouted a warning, as many recalled hearing a shout, although their recollections of what was said vary. The CCTV evidence suggests Mr Masood continued to approach SA74 even though he was now pointing his firearm at him and came to within a distance of two to six metres. 368. SA74’s evidence is that, because Mr Masood had continued to move towards him, he decided to use his firearm to protect himself against the threat he presented. He shot three times and says he stopped shooting when he saw that Mr Masood had fallen to the ground and he was satisfied that Mr Masood was no longer a threat to his own or other’s lives. The evidence from the CCTV and witnesses supports that SA74 stopped shooting once Mr Masood fell to the ground. 369. SA74 was carrying a baton and CS Spray in addition to his firearm. He has said he did not use these as they were “not suitable responses to the level of threat posed by Mr Masood”. Put another way, he believed the imminence and the severity of the threat presented by Mr Masood was such that CS spray or a baton could not adequately protect his life and that of others. 370. For the reasons given above the evidence supports that Mr Masood presented an imminent and serious threat to the lives of SA74 and others; also that SA74 honestly believed that to be the case at the time he fired his weapon at him. Taking into account the seriousness and the imminence of the threat and the other options for using force available, there is no indication that any of the three shots fired amounted to an unreasonable degree of force or that he continued firing for any longer than necessary. 371. In conclusion, having regard to the evidence, there is no indication that SA74 or any person serving with the police may have committed a criminal offence or behaved in a manner that would justify the bringing of misconduct proceedings 372. After reviewing my report and considering my recommendations and the appropriate authority’s response under paragraph 24 of the Police Reform Act, the Commission will decide whether any organisational learning has been identified that should be shared with the organisation in question. They may also ultimately recommend or direct, unsatisfactory performance procedures. Death and serious injury investigations 373. In this case, based on the evidence presented, I do not believe that the performance of any of those mentioned in this report fell below the standard expected. The Commission and appropriate authority may, however, wish to reconsider this.

Operation Franklin – Final redacted report 37

Operation Franklin Report into the shooting of Mr Khalid Masood at Westminster on 22 March 2017

Please note, this investigation was completed and submitted to the decision maker before 8 January 2018, while we were still the IPCC. Therefore, the report will contain the investigator’s opinion, which may differ from the final outcome. The report refers to the IPCC and the Commission throughout, and does not reflect the new structure of the IOPC.

Independent investigation report

Appendices Appendix: The role of the IPCC

The IPCC carries out its own independent investigations into complaints and incidents involving the police, HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC), the National Crime Agency (NCA) and Home Office immigration and enforcement staff when the seriousness or the public interest require it.

We are operationally independent of the police and the government. IPCC commissioners by law may never have worked for the police.

All cases are overseen by a Commission delegate, providing strategic direction and scrutinising the investigation. The investigation At the outset of an investigation, a lead investigator will be appointed who will be responsible for the day to day running of the investigation on behalf of the Commission. This may involve taking witness statements, analysing CCTV footage, reviewing documents, obtaining forensic and other expert evidence, as well as liaison with the coroner and other agencies.

The lead investigator is supported by a team that includes other investigators, lawyers, press officers and other specialist staff.

Throughout the investigation, meaningful updates are provided to families and other stakeholders both inside and outside the IPCC at regular intervals. Each investigation also passes through a series of reviews and checks to ensure quality.

The IPCC has three main types of investigation. This case was what we refer to as a Death or Serious Injury (DSI) investigation. In these cases, the lead investigator has concluded that there is no indication that any person serving with the police may have committed a criminal offence or behaved in a manner that would justify the bringing of disciplinary proceedings. Our investigations in these cases will aim to establish facts and set out the sequence of events and their consequences. The investigation should help to determine the nature of the police contact and cover what evidence there is available in relation to whether the police may have caused of contributed to the death or injury. The possible outcomes of these investigations reflect the fact that it is not an inquiry into any criminal, conduct or complaint allegation against any person serving with the police. Investigation reports Once the investigator has gathered the evidence they must prepare a report. The report must summarise the evidence and refer to or attach any relevant documents.

The report must then be submitted to the Commission delegate who will review how and to what extent, if any, the person who died or was seriously injured had contact

Operation Franklin – Final redacted report 39 with the police, and the degree to which this caused or contributed to the death or injury. At this point they will also consider whether there was an indication that any person serving with the police may have committed a criminal offence or behaved in a manner that would justify the bringing of disciplinary proceedings. If the Commission delegate decides that there is such an indication, the case will then be investigated as a conduct matter.

Once the Commission delegate has received the finalised report, they will then decide whether to make individual or wider learning recommendations for the police. They also consider whether the actions of anyone serving with the police were unsatisfactory. If so, they will be dealt with through the police force’s unsatisfactory performance procedure (UPP). UPP is handled by the person’s line manager and is intended to improve the performance of both the individual and police force.

The report must also be given to the appropriate authority (normally the police force). They must then inform the Commission what action they propose to take in relation to any unsatisfactory performance. If the Commission delegate considers that the appropriate authority’s response is not appropriate, the Commission has powers to recommend or ultimately direct UPP.

Inquests Following investigations into deaths, the IPCC’s investigation report and supporting documents are usually provided to the coroner. The coroner may then hold an inquest, either alone or with a jury. This hearing is unlike a trial or tribunal and is a fact finding forum. A coroner might ask a selection of witnesses to give evidence at the inquest. At the end of the inquest the coroner and/or jury will decide how they think the death occurred on the basis of the evidence they have heard and seen. Publishing the report After any possible proceedings relating to the investigation have concluded, and the IPCC is satisfied that they will not be prejudiced by publication, the IPCC may publish its investigation report.

Redactions might be made to the report at this stage to ensure that individuals’ personal data is sufficiently protected and occasionally for other reasons.