![Operation Franklin Report Into the Shooting of Mr Khalid Masood at Westminster on 22 March 2017](https://data.docslib.org/img/3a60ab92a6e30910dab9bd827208bcff-1.webp)
Operation Franklin Report into the shooting of Mr Khalid Masood at Westminster on 22 March 2017 Please note, this investigation was completed and submitted to the decision maker before 8 January 2018, while we were still the IPCC. Therefore, the report will contain the investigator’s opinion, which may differ from the final outcome. The report refers to the IPCC and the Commission throughout, and does not reflect the new structure of the IOPC. Independent investigation report Operation Franklin – Final redacted report 1 Investigation information Investigation name: Operation Franklin IPCC reference: 2017/082787 Investigation type: Death or Serious Injury (DSI) IPCC office: London Lead investigator: Chris Lovatt Case supervisor: Colin Dewar Commission delegate: Sarah Green Status of report: Final Date finalised: 5 July 2017 Contents Introduction .............................................................................................................. 4 The investigation ...................................................................................................... 5 Policies, procedures and legislation considered .................................................. 6 Summary and analysis of the evidence ................................................................. 7 Analysis .................................................................................................................. 30 Conclusions ............................................................................................................ 35 Appendix: The role of the IPCC ............................................................................ 39 Introduction The purpose of this report 1. I was appointed by the IPCC to carry out an independent investigation into the death of Mr Khalid Masood, who was shot by a police officer in the grounds of the Palace of Westminster on Wednesday 22 March 2017. This came to the attention of the IPCC on the same day as a Death or Serious Injury (DSI) referral. 2. This is my report for the Commission. It summarises and evaluates the evidence, refers to relevant documents and, where necessary makes factual findings. In my conclusions I will: a) analyse the facts that have been established, the sequence of events and their consequences b) give my opinion about the nature and extent of the police contact prior to death, and analyse what evidence is available in relation to whether the police may have caused or contributed to the death c) draw attention to any lessons which may need to be learned by any organisation related to the investigation about which the Commission delegate may wish to make a recommendation Other investigations 3. The Metropolitan Police Counter Terrorism Command is investigating the terrorist attack at Westminster Bridge and the Houses of Parliament on Wednesday 22 March 2017. The attack resulted in the deaths of four members of the public on the bridge, and of Police Constable (PC) Keith Palmer in the grounds of the Houses of Parliament. A further 50 people were injured. 4. The Metropolitan Police Service is also carrying out reviews of the security arrangements at the Palace of Westminster and into the protective vest worn by PC Palmer. Operation Franklin – Final report redacted for publication 4 The investigation Terms of reference 5. Deputy Chair Sarah Green approved the terms of reference for this investigation on 23 March 2017. The terms of reference specific to this investigation are: 1. To investigate a) The actions and decisions, including the use of lethal force, of the officer who fired the shots on 22 March 2017. 2. To assist in fulfilling the state’s investigative obligation arising under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) by ensuring as far as possible that the investigation is independent, effective, open and prompt, and that the full facts are brought to light and any lessons are learned. 3. To consider and report on whether there may be organisational learning, including: i. whether any change in policy or practice would help to prevent a recurrence of the event, incident or conduct investigated; ii. whether the incident highlights any good practice that should be shared. 6. On receipt of this report, the Commission must determine whether the report indicates that a person serving with the police may have (a) committed a criminal offence, or (b) behaved in a manner which would justify the bringing of disciplinary proceedings (an indication of misconduct). If so those matters will be investigated. The Metropolitan Police Service, who will have been sent the report, must then advise the IPCC whether or not it considers the performance of the police officers unsatisfactory, and what action (if any) it will take in respect of any such person's performance. If the IPCC does not agree with the Metropolitan Police Service, it may make recommendations. Family concerns and complaints 7. At a meeting on 2 June 2017 a member of Mr Masood’s family asked whether it may have been possible for the officers to have used non-lethal force to incapacitate Mr Masood. Operation Franklin – Final redacted report 5 Policies, procedures and legislation considered 8. National and local policies have been examined in relation to this incident, in order to ascertain whether the policies were complied with, and whether the existing policies were sufficient in these circumstances. These include the College of Policing, Authorised Professional Practice (APP) into Armed Policing. 9. The APP states, “The primary intention of the police, when discharging a firearm, is to prevent an immediate threat to life by shooting to stop the subject from carrying out their intended or threatened course of action. In most circumstances this is achieved by aiming to strike the central body mass (i.e., the torso).” 10. In relation to individual responsibility, the APP states, “Each authorised firearms officer is individually responsible and accountable for their decisions and actions; nothing can absolve them from such responsibility and accountability. This includes decisions to refrain from using force as well as any decisive action taken, including the use of force, the use of a firearm and the use of a less lethal weapon. 11. Authorised Firearms Officers are answerable, ultimately, to the law in the courts. They must be in a position to justify their decisions and actions based on their honestly held belief as to the circumstances that existed at the time, and their professional and legal responsibilities.” 12. In establishing whether the force used was reasonable, consideration must be given to section 3, Criminal Law Act 1967 and section 117, Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the Police Standards of Professional behaviour. 13. Section 3, Criminal Law Act 1967 states, “A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large.” 14. Section 117, Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 states, “an officer may use reasonable force, if necessary, in the exercise of the power”. Summary and analysis of the evidence 15. During this investigation, a volume of evidence was gathered. After thorough analysis of all the evidence, I have summarised the evidence that, in my opinion, answers the terms of reference for my investigation. As such, not all the evidence gathered in the investigation is referred to in this report. 16. However, the methodology of the investigation – including key decisions that were made, strategies that were set, and details of people referred to in this report – will be included in the appendices when the final report is completed.1 17. On Wednesday 22 March 2017, police were informed of an incident involving a car being driven over Westminster Bridge, deliberately hitting and injuring a number of members of the public. The car stopped near to the Houses of Parliament and the male driver, later identified as Mr Khalid Masood, made towards the Houses of Parliament on foot. 18. Mr Masood, who was armed with two large knives, entered the grounds of the Houses of Parliament via a vehicle entrance known as the Carriage Gates. Here, in an area known as New Palace Yard, he attacked PC Keith Palmer, who was on duty at the gates, inflicting fatal injuries. Mr Masood then continued into the grounds towards Westminster Hall, still armed with the knives. 19. This investigation focuses on the period between Mr Masood entering the grounds of the Houses of Parliament, and a police officer discharging his weapon, killing Mr Masood. This report provides details of the accounts given by the officers on duty at that time in New Palace Yard, and by members of the public who were working or nearby at the time and who witnessed the police officer shooting Mr Masood, and of CCTV evidence available. 20. The evidence from the post-incident procedure and post-mortem examination of Mr Masood confirmed that three shots were fired. Each shot struck Mr Masood, although the interim pathologist report indicated only the shot to his chest caused fatal injuries. 21. There are various descriptions of Mr Masood from the witnesses, but there is no dispute that Mr Masood was the man carrying the knives inside the grounds of Parliament. The CCTV evidence verified this. 22. There are commonalities in the accounts given by the officers within the grounds of the Palace of Westminster. For example, initially their attention was drawn by a loud bang from Bridge Street,
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