The One-party dominant regime in the Legislature was not built in a Day: Institutionalization of the Japanese Diet from 1947-2000 determined using the Individual Government Bills Database Kentaro FUKUMOTO Gakushuin University, Faculty of Law 1-5-1 Mejiro Toshima-ku Tokyo 171-8588, JAPAN Tel: +81-3-3986-0221 ext. 4913 Fax: +81-3-5992-1006
[email protected] http://www-cc.gakushuin.ac.jp/~e982440/ Paper prepared for delivery at the 73rd Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Sheraton Colony Square Hotel, Atlanta, GA, USA, November 7- 10, 2001 Comments are welcome. Please don’t cite without author’s permission. Abstract According to the conventional view, based on the widely accepted theory of viscosity, the Japanese legislative process is characterized by a mode of operation known as “long deliberation without discussion”. It did not, however, appear as soon as the Constitution was enacted in 1947, nor did it emerge when the ever-dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Government started in 1955. It is not until around 1970 that it was “institutionalized” with the advent of political equilibrium between the LDP and the opposition in the one-party dominant regime. I believe that some of the new quantitative tools here will contribute to improving the study of legislatures in parliamentary systems. Introduction The Japanese legislative process is characterized by a mode of operation known as “long deliberation without discussion”. Conventional viscosity theory attributes this to the one-party dominant regime, in which semi-permanent opposition parties delay consideration in order to kill bills and annoy the government.