Collective Security Theory and Practice of an Institution for Peace in the XX Century UMI Number: U091461
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Filippo Andreatta International Relations Department London School of Economics and Political Science Summer 1996 Ph.D. Dissertation Collective Security Theory and Practice of an Institution for Peace in the XX Century UMI Number: U091461 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U091461 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 Tt4£££S> • • , -J.. j V ., , ? F 7322 Oi£ ABSTRACT: The dissertation is divided into two parts. Part I will concentrate on the theoretical debate and will put forward hypotheses on the functioning of security institutions. This section updates the classical literature on collective security with contemporary contributions and original insights and it attempts to shed light on the limits of the current debate between paradigms on the question of international institutions. Chapter 2 will summarize the arguments of the main paradigms. The two main positions -the neorealist/pessimistic one and the liberal/optimistic one- will be analyzed and a new concept of the conditional utility of institutions in international relations will be proposed, attempting to overcome the "all or nothing" deadlock of the current debate. The other three chapters of Part I will concentrate on the central concept of the work. Chapter 3 will introduce the various definitions of collective security and their position within the wider contest of the theory of international relations. In particular, it will be argued that there are two different conceptions of collective security. A maximalist one defines the concept as a security system replacing all other mechanisms. A minimalist one sees collective security as an international regime which can operate alongside other mechanisms. Chapter 4 will analyze the limits and the shortcomings of the maximalist conception, which is both unrealistic and even counterproductive. Chapter 5 will look at the positive effects of collective security either as an instrument for dealing with specific contingencies or as a general framework for facilitating cooperation and improving international standards of behaviour. Part II applies the findings of the first section to the historical record and to three case studies: the Abyssinian crisis, the Korean War and the Gulf Conflict The cases were selected because they are the only uncontrovera^l instances in which collective security has been applied and because they are conveniently placed in three different international systems: the multipolar inter-war period, the bipolar Cold War and the post-Cold War period. Finally, in the conclusion, crucial issues for practitioners will be highlighted with special reference to the prospects for a more stable system in the future. Table of Contents INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................1 PARTI: THEORY 2. Anarchy; Institutions and Peace................................................................................12 i. Neorealism and Neoliberalism......................................................................... 13 ii. Anarchy and Its Effects...................................................................................21 iii. International Institutions...............................................................................25 3. The Definition of Collective Security..........................................................................41 i. The Concept of Collective Security.................................................................. 42 ii. Collective Security and World Order Proposals.............................................53 iii. Two Conceptions of Collective Security.........................................................59 4. The Limits of Maximalist Collective Security...........................................................72 i. The Conditions for a Multilateral System........................................................73 ii. The Chimera of Maximalism ............................................................................83 iii. The Dangers of Automaticity.........................................................................89 5. The Merits of Minimalism.........................................................................................99 i. The Utility of Minimalism...............................................................................100 ii. Collective Security as a Tool for Cooperation................................................103 iii. Collective Security and the Abolition of War...............................................114 PART U: PRACTICE 6. The Origin and History of Collective Security.......................................................125 i. The League of Nations.................................................................................... 126 ii. The United Nations.......................................................................................141 7. The Abyssinian Crisis..............................................................................................157 i. History............................................................................................................ 158 ii. Italian Motivations......................................................................................... 167 iii. Britain's Policy.............................................................................................. 172 8. The Korean War.......................................................................................................183 i. History............................................................................................................ 184 ii. China's motivations.......................................................................................196 iii. US Policy...................................................................................................... 199 9. The Gulf Conflict......................................................................................................212 i. History............................................................................................................213 ii. Iraqi Strategy.................................................................................................226 iii. The US, the UN and the International Coalition..........................................232 CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................244 i. Theory and Evidence................. 245 ii. Prescriptions for UN Reform.........................................................................253 iii. Prospects for Collective Security..................................................................258 BIBLIOGRAPHY.......................................................................................................... 264 MAPS............................................................................................................................ 281 INTRODUCTION1 Man, Aristotle said, is a social animal. As long as memory goes back, humankind has always been organized in communities based on family, tribe, religious or national identities. However, man is also a competitive animal. lEversince^there has been a recorded history, human communities have fought one another for scarce resources and have identified themselves in negative terms. Egyptians distinguished themselves from Hyksos, Jews from Philistines, Romans from Carthaginians. Part of the meaning of being Egyptian or Jew or Roman was that one was not Hykso, Philistine or Carthaginian. Competition between diverse communities has indeed been part of the fabric of history and it has at times even determined the evolution of civilization. The tension between cooperation and conflict characterizes international relations because -unlike in domestic politics- there is no world government to guarantee the safety of states and to impose peace on them. A world government is unattainable because the various communities are too diverse to tolerate each other in a single entity and -following Freud's remarks in his famous letter to Einstein- domestic violence would readily replace international rivalry. It is as unlikely that China endures American policemen as Europeans would not tolerate Islamic schools. As Kant remarked two Centuries ago, a truly global government would necessarily be perceived as tyrannical because it would have to impose itself on too many different and distinct cultures. Until power is decentralized into a constellation of multiple and equally sovereign units, there will always be the possibility of a war. Rousseau perceptively emphasized this point when he affirmed th a t "It is quite true that it would be much better for all men to remain always at peace. But as long as there is no security for this, everyone, having no guarantee that he can avoid war, is anxious to begin it at the moment which suits his own interest and so forestall a neighbour, who would not fail to forestall