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Collective Security and the League of Nations

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Collective Security and the League of Nations WWlf Cors"s f.^,ope a Collective security and the League of Natlons """b.,J.F^,'u li Efq [. ]sEG) ,o rhc L:rut! A$.nbrr tr .Pr' d; '. ' '. The Covenant of the League of Nalions Why did collective securit fail in the 1930s? i I r.turc b a wid &Dh&d l))' iilio! fore rhc usxr mrimr hon€ rlr q pEom9l"ruggl.db@F$thsan h4rJh ro i mrior rcrcDn or4r ii ihc ercdsdd t [ \ i F! Gd ed Ftide $iid b ish-Nhs partie (he Bitrh bbou. ofiirud drbd n M:r rer. h taPe i drrstr'bd.rio!r dbmibryadbR .IIE CAUSES OFWOBLDWAF IN EL.]FOPE] TtsE FALURE OF @LIfCTNTE SEC'I]RI sdEunodfohid'6.hpidollheD TheD+!smh.jshtn.dth.f.o.d olqPi6'l!n'oditin{|d&EP|iaft olE Y dirfori b ruis. d'. srch& ro!5 ii.Ehst fdred ,o lds rh.i snrsj GaF!1./|gPonofeiofij.gFtb ud d€Pldird d rhe) ltnptd ro Prett rh.n .oph ii rhe o,bwAsJnnois oer). Fnr. dd ldv eok brsr b b.afur.d,*lhqw<!ndt*hddyd. ^hhoud 'lylcd'plohz+l's'!nia'oda..n D.pBbD* rishto4 i3 gric,, dbh.tbi The Abyssinian Cti6is (1935) id Lg.n kild elzlo4rot e tn@n iii*^r,,p*' ar+,"+.a'. ;;;.,;,;,.."," 2_ o I d fi<Ld qi6 Po$[L I]Ni$! !$(5Dn i E \ I Lc f q,l1ro o+ U'tar^( pe4i The Washington Conference \1921 22) and J3Fi ii pdnuh @nihEd ro bu tll up .itfonrt.'ftu|bnna8!b'j'oilo rid rx,0@6rFGft.!!dhrGonoo.5rr.orrnqK,sriailnd,4{) rh. asrord surd Dnrlc Bn6 d6hn r irci rhr 1s: altnnc vnh JiPai, rsi otr pror.d rh. 4hri of dr jsnqrs b e$tr.Aglbdt$,[email protected] isblldrh. The London Nava Conference (1930) . mijor Po*6 vse nir rQn b I nir rhor 5lgaDo!iho4i'h4didercb@nibu The London Naval Treaty (1936) h rerj-r6, rhe Drtor eoq.( nd r o 'o The Geneva Disarmament Conference (1932-34) br'btIt4u.ofNnfi'EKaid€Pa 4 Ii3rr b @rn. Br dn dn. 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