NATHAN NOVEMSKY, RAVI DHAR, NORBERT SCHWARZ, and ITAMAR SIMONSON*

The authors propose that consumer choices are often systematically influenced by preference fluency (i.e., the subjective feeling that forming a preference for a specific option is easy or difficult). Four studies manipulate the fluency of preference formation by presenting descriptions in an easy- or difficult-to-read font (Study 1) or by asking participants to think of few versus many reasons for their choice (Studies 2–4). As the authors predict, subjective experiences of difficulty increase choice deferral (Studies 1 and 2) and the selection of a compromise option (Studies 3 and 4), unless consumers are induced to attribute the experience to an unrelated cause. Unlike studies of decision conflict, these effects are obtained without changing the attributes of the alternatives, the composition of the choice sets, or the reference points. The authors discuss the theoretical and practical implications of the results.

Preference Fluency in Choice

Understanding the factors that determine which options ous ways, such as by changing the choice options, the con- consumers choose and whether they make rather than defer tent that is the focus of attention, and the reference points purchase decisions is critical for the development of mar- used in choice (e.g., Luce, Bettman, and Payne 1999), in keting strategies. A major contribution of behavioral deci- general, these manipulations are associated with changes in sion research has been to establish the notion of constructed the content of decision makers’ thoughts. Recent judgment preferences, the idea that consumer preferences are not well research indicates that there is more to thinking than defined but rather are constructed in the process of making thought content. As we discuss subsequently, the impact of a choice. This constructive viewpoint suggests that different thought content can be qualified by a person’s metacogni- tasks and contexts highlight different aspects of the options, tive experiences during the processing of information (for a focusing consumers on different considerations that lead to review, see Schwarz 2004). seemingly inconsistent decisions (Bettman, Luce, and In this research, we focus on metacognitive experiences Payne 1998). Research on preference construction has that occur during the construction of preferences. We define implicated choice difficulty as a source of the failure of preference fluency as the subjective feeling of ease or diffi- preferences to be invariant across tasks and contexts (Dhar culty experienced while making a decision, and we examine and Simonson 2003; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1992). how this fluency affects two well-known choice phenom- Although decision difficulty has been manipulated in vari- ena: deferral and compromise (Dhar and Simonson 2003). Prior research has demonstrated that both purchase deferral and choice of the compromise option are consequences of *Nathan Novemsky is Associate Professor of Marketing (e-mail: [email protected]), and Ravi Dhar is George Rogers Clark Pro- difficulty associated with making trade-offs among specific fessor of Management and Marketing (e-mail: [email protected]), Yale aspects of the provided options (Dhar 1997; Kivetz, Netzer, School of Management. Norbert Schwarz is Professor of Psychology; Pro- and Srinivasan 2004; Simonson 1989; Tversky and Shafir fessor of Marketing, Ross School of Business; and Research Professor 1992). An important difference between our work and pre- at the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan (e-mail: vious work on choice effects is that by manipulating [email protected]). Itamar Simonson is Sebastian S. Kresge Professor of Marketing, Stanford Graduate School of Business (e-mail: simonson_ directly the subjective experience of difficulty, we show that [email protected]). The authors acknowledge the helpful comments the fluency accompanying preference formation bears on from Wendy Liu, James Bettman, and the three anonymous JMR reviewers the size of the deferral and the compromise effect, even on prior drafts of this article. James Bettman served as guest editor for this when the choice and reference alternatives are held article. constant. Next, we review key findings bearing on the role of expe- To read and contribute to reader and author dialogue on JMR, visit http://www.marketingpower.com/jmrblog. riential information in judgment. Then, we introduce the concept of preference fluency and report four studies in

© 2007, American Marketing Association Journal of Marketing Research ISSN: 0022-2437 (print), 1547-7193 (electronic) 347 Vol. XLIV (August 2007), 347–356 348 JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, AUGUST 2007 which we manipulate preference fluency through variables experience was undermined through a misattribution extraneous to the choice alternatives. These variables influ- manipulation. That is, when participants could attribute the ence the subjective experience of the difficulty while hold- experienced difficulty to the distracting effect of back- ing constant the variables that have historically been shown ground music, they reported higher assertiveness after to influence preference construction. In Study 1, we use the recalling 12 examples than after recalling 6 examples readability of the print font to affect preference fluency, and (Schwarz et al. 1991, Experiment 3). Subsequent research in Studies 2, 3, and 4, we use the number of reasons replicated this basic pattern across many content domains requested for a choice as the fluency manipulation. (for reviews, see Schwarz 1998, 2004). Throughout, we observe that variables that increase the dif- The inferences people draw from fluency experiences ficulty of preference construction increase indecision (i.e., depend on the naive theory of the mind they bring to bear deferral and compromise) in ways that parallel the effects of on them, which is context dependent. One set of naive trade-off difficulty. We discuss the implications of this theories pertains to the relationship between external research for the role of preference fluency in consumer variables, such as the frequency of events in the world, and decision making and for managerial tactics that might pro- the accessibility of thought content. For example, people mote preference fluency to influence purchase decisions. assume that it is easier to generate arguments for a proposi- tion when there are many rather than few good reasons that FLUENCY EXPERIENCES IN JUDGMENT support it. Accordingly, they are persuaded more when they A great deal of behavioral decision research has focused must generate few arguments rather than many, even though on decision difficulty arising from the amount of informa- more arguments were brought to mind in the latter case tion presented and from attribute trade-offs involved in (e.g., Wänke, Bless, and Biller 1996). Moreover, they report making a choice (e.g., Lurie 2004). This cognitive orienta- higher attitude strength on measures such as attitude impor- tion has recently been complemented by increased attention tance and certainty after generating a few rather than many to experiential information in the form of moods and emo- arguments (e.g., Haddock et al. 1999). tions (e.g., Luce, Bettman, and Payne 1997). As research in A second source of fluency experiences arises from the social cognition indicates, however, experiential informa- ease with which externally presented stimuli are processed. tion is not limited to ambient affective states, such as moods The premise behind this processing fluency is that any and emotions, but rather includes metacognitive experi- stimulus may be processed with differing degrees of speed, ences that accompany the reasoning process (Clore 1992; effort, and accuracy. An effect of processing fluency that is Schwarz 2004). The effects of these fluency experiences particularly relevant to decision making is its influence on have been studied in many judgment contexts (see Schwarz judgments of truth. People associate familiarity with truth, 1998), but their effects on context effects in choice have not and high fluency can lead to an inference that a statement is yet been examined. A potential link between previous familiar. Accordingly, variables that facilitate fluent pro- research on context effects in choice and the current cessing, such as exposure frequency (e.g., Begg, Anas, and research is that in situations in which choice difficulty Farinacci 1992) or figure–ground contrast (Reber and arises from trading off competing characteristics of the Schwarz 1999), reliably increase the likelihood that a given choice alternatives, its influence on decision behavior is statement is accepted as true. potentially mediated by consumers’ subjective experiences The fluency of processing can also affect evaluative judg- of indecision and conflict (e.g., Dhar 1997; Luce 1998). ments. The more easily a given target can be processed, the Therefore, it may be possible to moderate the effects found more positively it is evaluated. Thus, any variable that in prior work by using the tools of subjective experience, facilitates fluent perception is likely to increase liking, from including changing the subjective experience through extra- figure–ground contrast and presentation time (Reber, neous variables and through the use of attribution manipula- Winkielman, and Schwarz 1998) to previous exposure (as tions, which we describe subsequently. known since Zajonc’s [1968] demonstration of the mere Fluency experiences arise from the ease of generating exposure effect). For example, Reber, Winkielman, and thoughts and accessing memories, as well as from the ease Schwarz (1998) observe that participants liked a given pic- of processing externally presented stimuli. Next, we review ture more when it was preceded by a subliminally presented prior research on these two types of fluency experiences. matching contour rather than a mismatching contour. Challenging the traditional notion that judgments are Winkielman and Fazendeiro (as reported in Winkielman et based solely on what comes to mind, Schwarz and col- al. 2003) obtain parallel findings with another fluency leagues (1991, Experiment 1) observe that the implications manipulation. In their studies, participants saw unambigu- of accessible thought content are qualified by the ease or ous pictures of common objects (e.g., a picture of a lock) difficulty (i.e., fluency) with which a given thought can be preceded by a word. Participants reported liking the pic- brought to mind. In their studies, participants rated them- tures more when they were preceded by conceptually selves as less assertive after trying to recall 12 examples of related primes (e.g., “lock” or “key”) than when they were their own assertive behavior (experienced as difficult) than preceded by unrelated primes (e.g., “snow”). Liking of the after recalling only 6 examples (experienced as easy). picture was a function of the processing fluency resulting Apparently, they concluded from the difficulty of recalling from the primes. 12 examples that they could not be very assertive, because In summary, the reviewed findings illustrate that judg- if they were, recalling 12 examples would not have been so ments are not necessarily based on evaluations of the difficult. In support of this interpretation, the observed pat- descriptive content of the target. Instead, the fluency with tern reversed when the informational value of the subjective which information about the target can be processed or the Preference Fluency in Choice 349 ease of thought generation or recall is informative in its own ture (e.g., Schwarz et al. 1991), we expect that fluency right and feeds into various judgments. Next, we turn to the should affect deferral only when this feeling is attributed to implications of these phenomena for the construction of the choice at hand. When a person’s attention is drawn to preferences. the fluency arising from a source that is irrelevant to the current choice, any effect of fluency should be extin- CHOICE DIFFICULTY AND PREFERENCE FLUENCY guished. Therefore, we propose that the likelihood of defer- Prior research has examined the consequences of deci- ral will increase if people experience low preference flu- sion difficulty and conflict (for a review, see Bettman, Luce, ency when making a choice and if they attribute this and Payne 1998). This research typically accounts for seem- subjective feeling about preference formation to the diffi- ingly irrational or inconsistent choices in terms of the char- culty of the decision. acteristics of the options or in terms of reasons that are used Choice difficulty can also influence the relative prefer- to justify the choice (e.g., Shafir, Simonson, and Tversky ence among options in a choice set. In particular, some 1993; Simonson 1989; Simonson and Nowlis 2000). For options are selected not because they are more preferred but example, deferral and compromise are enhanced when rather as a way to resolve a difficult decision (e.g., Dhar and option sets are modified to make the choice more difficult Simonson 2003). The compromise effect occurs if the (Dhar and Simonson 2003). Luce, Bettman, and Payne choice share of one option, b, relative to another alternative, (1999, Experiment 2) provide an example of decision diffi- c, is enhanced when a third option, a, is added to the choice culty being manipulated without changing the characteris- set, making b a “compromise” (middle) option. Consistent tics of the choice options but rather by presenting partici- with previous process data (Simonson 1989), many con- pants with a high or low reference point. They find that sumers who end up selecting a compromise option find the trade-offs among losses tend to be more difficult than trade- decision difficult and view the middle option as a way to offs among gains, leading to greater preference for the high- resolve this difficulty. Although these studies focus on the quality alternative. effects of difficulty arising from the content of the choice Another factor that can influence the perceived difficulty set, inducing a feeling of difficulty through a direct manipu- of forming a preference is the subjective metacognitive lation of the subjective experience may be sufficient to experience during the decision process. Although this sub- enhance the compromise effect. In the current studies, we jective experience of difficulty can be a direct outcome of manipulate fluency with variables irrelevant to the content the choice process, it can also be influenced by extraneous of the choice and examine how this influences the compro- variables that do not pertain to the content of the choice. mise effect. As with deferral, we propose that compromise Regardless of the source, prior research suggests that increases when preference fluency decreases and when the people presume that their experiences while thinking about fluency is attributed to the choice. a judgment are related to that judgment, and they incorpo- rate those experiences into their judgments. This process is As this discussion indicates, we propose that fluency of consistent with research on the “aboutness” principle (Hig- preference formation can account for the effects of choice gins 1998), which indicates that when thoughts or feelings difficulty resulting from features of the choice alternatives come to mind while a particular target is being considered, and difficulty resulting from extraneous variables. That is, those thoughts or feelings are assumed to be relevant to the whereas previous studies of choice difficulty have focused target or they would not come to mind at that moment. In a on the trade-offs or other antecedents of difficulty, we similar vein, the subjective experience of difficulty that believe that the subjective experience of difficulty, arising accompanies the process of choosing can induce an infer- from either those antecedents or extraneous variables, is ence that the choice itself is difficult. As a result, the sufficient to generate the effects observed in prior research. decrease in preference fluency should be sufficient to pro- Accordingly, the current studies focus on direct manipula- duce effects similar to those found in previous research that tions of the subjective experience to isolate the role of flu- manipulated the content of thoughts about the choice. Sub- ency in choice difficulty effects. We test our proposition sequently, we discuss two effects that have been closely that increased preference fluency decreases choice deferral linked to choice difficulty and are prime candidates for in two ways. In Study 1, we manipulate fluency by present- studying the effects of preference fluency on choice: defer- ing the same choice alternatives in either an easy- or a ral and compromise. difficult-to-read font. In Study 2, we ask participants to Prior research has shown that the consumer decision to think of either a few reasons (easy) or many reasons (diffi- defer choice can be influenced by manipulating the diffi- cult) for their choice. Extending the exploration of prefer- culty of choosing among a set of provided options. Specifi- ence fluency from deferral of choice to the alternative cho- cally, offering several attractive alternatives such that none sen, Studies 3 and 4 address the influence of preference can easily be judged to be the best increases the tendency to fluency on the size of the compromise effect. In these stud- not choose, compared with a choice set in which one of the ies, we again manipulate fluency by asking for a few versus options dominates (Dhar 1997; Tversky and Shafir 1992). many reasons for the choice. Throughout, the results indi- Although these findings have been explained in terms of the cate that the experienced fluency of preference formation difficulty arising from trade-offs among the choice options, has a profound impact on choice behavior, unless the infor- it may be that inducing a subjective feeling of difficulty is mational value of the experience is drawn into question. sufficient to affect deferral. Thus, increasing the subjective Importantly, we obtain these effects in the absence of any feeling of difficulty arising from an extraneous source changes in the attributes of the individual choice alterna- should correspondingly increase deferral for the same alter- tives, the composition of the choice sets, the response natives. Drawing on fluency research in the judgment litera- options, or the salient reference points. 350 JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, AUGUST 2007

STUDY 1: PRINT FONTS, CHOICE DEFERRAL, AND font shown in Figure 1 as significantly more difficult to read ATTRIBUTION than the same materials presented in a standard font (Ms = Study 1 tests the assumption that fluency experiences 3.53 and 4.88; t(32) = 2.75, p < .01). We crossed the font derived from extraneous variables can affect preference flu- manipulation with a manipulation aimed at redirecting the ency and, in turn, deferral. All participants received identi- attribution of difficulty arising from the font. Half of the cal descriptions of a set of choice objects (cordless tele- participants in each font condition received an additional phones), except that the descriptions were printed in a font sentence following the instructions that stated, “This infor- that was either easy or difficult to read. We predicted that mation may be difficult to read because of the font.” participants would attribute the low fluency of processing Results and Discussion information about the alternatives to the difficulty of the decision rather than to the difficulty of reading the informa- We predicted that in the absence of an instruction that tion. Accordingly, respondents should be more likely to mentions the font, participants would misinterpret the pro- defer choice when the information is presented in a cessing difficulty caused by the font as reflecting choice difficult-to-read font than in a standard font. difficulty and that this would result in an increased inci- We expected that the impact of print font on choice defer- dence of choice deferral. The results supported this predic- ral would be reduced or eliminated when participants cor- tion. Whereas 17% of the participants who received the rectly attributed the experienced processing difficulty to the standard font deferred choice, 41% of those who received font. That is, this attribution should undermine (or explain the difficult-to-read font did so (χ2(1) = 6.45, p < .05). In away) the informational value of their difficulty experience contrast, when the instructions mentioned that the font may (Schwarz et al. 1991), resulting in lower deferral rates that be difficult to read, there was no difference in deferral rates are similar to the standard font condition. Accordingly, among those receiving the standard font (16%) and those some of the participants were presented with a choice in a receiving the difficult font (16%), and these two cells had a difficult-to-read font and had their attention drawn to the similar rate of deferral to the standard font–no instruction unclear font. condition (17%). These results support the idea that, when the choice alter- Method natives and the response modes are held constant, the out- As part of a larger Web-based questionnaire, 205 partici- come of preference construction can be affected by the sub- pants were presented with a hypothetical choice problem, jective fluency experience that occurs during choice. An including descriptions of two cordless telephones. As with alternative explanation for the difference between the diffi- many real consumer purchase situations, participants could cult and the standard font conditions could have been an either choose one of the two options presented or defer inference about low quality when the options were choice and continue looking at other unspecified Web sites. described in a difficult-to-read font. Furthermore, this This study used a 2 (subjective difficulty: standard versus explanation would predict that the instruction that drew difficult font) × 2 (attribution manipulation: present versus attention to the font should not eliminate (and possibly absent) between-subjects design. We manipulated subjec- enhance) the difference in deferral rates between the two tive difficulty by presenting the choices to half of the par- fonts. ticipants with the descriptions presented in embossed itali- As we stated previously, a necessary condition for flu- cized gray font (see Figure 1). This font has been shown to ency to affect choice is that the decision itself, not the be fairly difficult to read, though it can be read accurately manipulated extraneous source of fluency (i.e., the font), with some effort (Epley and Norwick 2004; Simmons and must be viewed by participants as the cause of the fluency Nelson 2006). In a pretest, 34 undergraduate students rated experience. Consistent with this explanation, the effect of the fonts used in this study on a nine-point scale ranging the font on deferral was eliminated when participants’ atten- from “very easy to read” to “very difficult to read.” As we tion was drawn to the font. As shown in the judgment litera- expected, the pretest confirmed that participants rated the ture, in the absence of an attentional manipulation, people are likely to draw on their experiences as information that is relevant to the task at hand (Higgins 1998), even when its Figure 1 source is fairly obvious (for reviews, see Schwarz 2004; SAMPLE MATERIALS: DIFFICULT-TO-READ FONT Schwarz and Clore 1996). STUDY 2: EASE OF THOUGHT GENERATION AND BRAND A DEFERRAL PRODUCTPRODUCT FEATURESFEATURES Study 1 manipulated preference fluency by changing the ease with which provided information about choice alterna- •2.4•2.4 GHzGHz TechnologyTechnology forfor extendedextended rangerange •Call-waiting•Call-waiting CallerCaller IDID withwith 9999 numbernumber storagestorage tives could be processed. As we predicted, decreased prefer- •40•40 namename andand numbernumber directorydirectory ence fluency increased choice deferral. Study 2 extends this •30•30 ChannelChannel OperationOperation work by turning to the preference fluency associated with •1•1 yearyear warrantywarranty onon partsparts andand laborlabor participants’ own thought generation. Previous research into •Display•Display dialdial judgment formation has shown that subjective experiences •Available•Available inin 88 colorscolors related to a person’s own thought generation process, not •Headset•Headset compatiblecompatible just the fluency of processing externally perceived stimuli, Price:Price: $34.99$34.99 can affect subsequent cognitions (e.g., Schwarz et al. 1991). In the remaining studies, we manipulate preference fluency Preference Fluency in Choice 351 by affecting the experience of thought generation during ated by the subjective feeling of difficulty. To examine this preference construction and examine its effects on choice. idea directly, we conducted a mediation analysis, testing Studies have shown that reason generation is an integral whether ratings of difficulty mediate the effect of reasons part of decision making in many situations (Shafir, Simon- on choice deferral. A Sobel test confirmed that difficulty son, and Tversky 1993). Therefore, reason generation might ratings mediated the effect of the number of reasons on be a common source of fluency during preference construc- choice deferral (z = 3.39, p < .001). When we included dif- tion. In the next three studies, we examine the effect of flu- ficulty ratings in a model that predicted deferral, the num- ency of reason generation on context effects. We asked par- ber of reasons was no longer significant (p > .5), suggesting ticipants in Study 2 how easy it would be to list either two complete mediation. We observed a similar pattern in par- or ten reasons for their choice before they made the choice. ticipants’ choices of microwave ovens. Participants rated On the basis of a pretest showing that most people could generating ten reasons as being more difficult than generat- generate two reasons and few people could generate ten rea- ing two reasons (Ms = 3.64 and 5.08; t(287) = 8.38, p < sons (most people generated four or five), we chose two .001). Those who rated the difficultly of generating ten rea- reasons as an easy thought generation task that would lead sons chose to defer the choice more than those asked about to high fluency and ten reasons as a difficult task that would generating two reasons (32% versus 22%; χ2(1) = 3.50, p = lead to low fluency. This fluency experience is likely to be .061). Finally, those who chose to defer the choice rated attributed to the decision, thus increasing the likelihood of generating reasons as being more difficult than those who choice deferral. did not defer the choice (3.71 for deferral versus 4.60 for no Method deferral; t(287) = 4.23, p < .001). Again, mediation analysis confirmed that difficulty mediated the effect of number of Undergraduate students from a northeastern university reasons on deferral (Sobel z = 3.29, p < .001), and again, and a western university participated in this study. Some reasons became nonsignificant when difficulty was participants were paid to complete a large questionnaire that included in the model (p > .9), suggesting complete included the current study, and others were recruited in their mediation. dorms to complete a brief questionnaire without compensa- In summary, Study 2 extended our findings in two ways. tion. In both cases, all participants were asked to make two First, we found that the subjective experience resulting from choices, one among digital cameras and another among thought generation can influence choice. As we expected, microwave ovens (N = 289). They were shown descriptions lower preference fluency led to increased choice deferral. and pictures of two options in each choice problem. Before Together with Study 1, this result provides evidence that they made their choices, half of the participants were asked fluency experiences extraneous to the content of the choice to rate how easy or difficult it would be to come up with options can influence choice. Second, in Study 2, we meas- two reasons for choosing a specific option on a seven-point ured the subjective experience of difficulty directly and scale ranging from “very difficult” (1) to “very easy” (7). observed that it fully mediated the effect of the fluency The other half were asked to rate the difficulty of generating manipulation on choice. ten reasons. Participants were not required to list their rea- sons but merely rated how difficult they thought it would be STUDY 3: EASE OF THOUGHT GENERATION AND to generate them. We indicated that we might ask them to THE COMPROMISE EFFECT list their reasons later. Prior research by Wänke, Bohner, Studies 1 and 2 examined one consequence of subjective and Jurkowitsch (1997) indicates that drawing attention to difficulty: choice deferral. However, choice difficulty asso- the likely difficulty in this way is sufficient to elicit the ciated with attribute trade-offs has also been shown to influ- effects usually observed with actual thought generation. ence which option is chosen within a choice set. For exam- Debriefing conversations with participants in previous flu- ple, research has shown that difficulty in a choice situation ency studies showed that they attempt to recall a few rea- underlies the preference for the middle or compromise sons and use this experience to estimate how difficult it option (Simonson 1989). The compromise effect has typi- would be to come up with the requested number. After rat- cally been demonstrated with three-item choice sets, in ing the difficulty of generating reasons, participants were which the options require a trade-off between two attributes asked to either choose one of the two options or choose to (e.g., price and quality). This effect arises from the ten- continue looking for other options. dency to choose an option more often when that option lies between two (or more) other options on the relevant attrib- Results and Discussion utes, as opposed to being an “extreme” option in the set. In the choice among digital cameras, participants rated Thus, an option can be chosen more or less depending on its generating ten reasons as being more difficult than generat- relative position in a particular choice set. Recent research ing two reasons (Ms = 3.55 and 4.62; t(280) = 5.50, p < has shown that the choice of the compromise option is not .001). As we hypothesized, 61% of the participants asked associated with a strong preference for that option but rather about ten reasons chose to defer the choice, whereas only is chosen to resolve the conflict arising from the attribute 49% of the participants asked about two reasons chose to trade-offs (Dhar and Simonson 2003). Just as fluency expe- defer the choice (χ2(1) = 4.10, p < .05). Across conditions, riences were sufficient to produce effects on choice deferral those who chose to defer the choice rated coming up with that parallel the effects of difficulty arising from manipula- reasons as more difficult than those who did not defer the tions of the choice options, we propose that preference flu- choice (3.64 for deferral versus 4.63 for no deferral; ency can also influence the compromise effect (Simonson t(280) = 4.99, p < .001). Our theory predicts that the effect 1989). In the next two studies, we manipulate the fluency of of number of reasons on the rate of deferral should be medi- the choice without changing the choice alternatives. Study 3 352 JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, AUGUST 2007 uses the same fluency manipulation as Study 2 and exam- This difficulty then induced them to choose the compromise ines its effect on the tendency to choose the middle option option. Although our focus is on the subjective experience in a forced-choice situation. that accompanies thinking about ten reasons for the choice, Method participants may have brought to mind different reasons when they were asked to think about ten versus two rea- Undergraduate business students were asked to make a sons. To confirm that the content of the reasons is not driv- hypothetical choice among three digital cameras (N = 178) ing the increase in compromise, Study 4 again asks partici- as part of a large questionnaire completed for course credit. pants to generate many versus few reasons, while The choice sets included a common core set of two cam- manipulating whether the subjective experience is relevant eras, in which one was more expensive and of higher qual- to the difficulty of the choice. If generating ten reasons no ity (Option B) than the other (Option C). Half of the partici- longer increases choice of the middle option when the pants saw a choice set that included these two cameras in informational value of the subjective experience is under- addition to an even higher-quality, higher-priced camera mined, we can be confident that the content brought to mind (Option A). The other half saw a choice set that included the when thinking about ten reasons is not driving the effect. In two core cameras in addition to a lower-priced, lower- Study 4, we try to shift the attribution for the feeling of dif- quality camera (Option D). A sample choice set appears in ficulty away from the process of choosing, thus attenuating the Appendix. Before participants indicated their choice, the effect of asking about ten reasons on the tendency to half were asked to rate how easy or difficult it would be to choose the compromise option. generate two reasons for their choice. The remaining par- ticipants were asked to rate the difficulty of generating ten STUDY 4: THOUGHT GENERATION, ATTRIBUTION, reasons before indicating their choice. AND COMPROMISE Results and Discussion In Study 4, we use the setup from Study 3 and ask par- The ratings of difficulty showed that the manipulation ticipants to rate the difficulty of generating two or ten rea- based on the number of reasons was successful. As we sons for their choice. In addition, we used a manipulation expected, participants rated generating two reasons as being that would lead participants to believe that the difficulty significantly less difficult than generating ten reasons (Ms = they were having generating reasons was not due to a diffi- 4.73 and 3.50; t(178) = 4.93, p < .001). To test for the com- cult choice but rather to a difficult reason generation task. promise effect, we computed the choice share of Option B By attributing their difficulty to the task and away from the relative to Option C (see Simonson and Tversky 1992). The choice, the effect of the difficulty on preference for the mid- compromise effect is revealed if the relative share of Option dle option should be eliminated. B is higher in the choice set that includes Option A (i.e., To induce participants to attribute the difficulty to the when Option B is the compromise) than in the set with reasons task and away from the choice task, we informed Option D (in which Option B is an “extreme”). The choice them about how many reasons others could generate shares appear in Table 1. There was a marginally significant (Schwarz et al. 1991, Experiment 2). Specifically, we compromise effect in the two-reasons condition. The choice informed participants that we ran a previous study in which share of Option B among respondents who chose Option B others were able to generate either 2.4 or 9.6 reasons, on or C was 69% when the choice set contained Option A and average. As we observed in Study 3, participants found it only 47% when the choice set contained Option D, for a difficult to generate 10 reasons. Learning that others could compromise effect of 22% (χ2(1) = 3.00, p = .083). The generate 9.6 reasons on average suggests that this difficulty magnitude of the compromise effect doubled to 44% in the is not a result of an unreasonable task but rather is related to ten-reasons condition (76% versus 32%; χ2(1) = 12.8, p < the difficulty participants have with the choice. Thus, these .001). A Sobel test confirmed that the effect of number of participants should interpret their own difficulty as a reflec- reasons on choice of the middle option was mediated by the tion of their own preference fluency, resulting in a pro- rated difficulty of generating the reasons (z = 2.09, p < .05). nounced compromise effect. Conversely, learning that oth- In summary, as we expected, enhancing the subjective ers could generate only 2.4 reasons suggests that the feeling of difficulty (i.e., reducing the sense of preference difficulty of generating 10 reasons is a common experience fluency) during the choice task increased the tendency to and probably due to an unreasonably difficult task rather choose the middle option. Participants apparently than to the difficulty of the choice. This attribution should (mis)attributed the difficulty associated with the task of attenuate the compromise effect. generating ten reasons to the difficulty of the choice task. Study 3 also indicated that participants find it easy to generate 2 reasons. When these participants learn that oth- Table 1 ers could generate 2.4 reasons on average, they may infer that the task is appropriate. Therefore their high fluency PERCENTAGE OF PARTICIPANTS CHOOSING EACH will be related to the choice task. In contrast, learning that ALTERNATIVE (STUDY 3) others could generate 9.6 reasons on average is potentially more informative, but its specific impact is difficult to pre- Two-Reasons Condition (%) Ten-Reasons Condition (%) dict. On the one hand, participants who are asked to rate the Option {A, B, C} {B, C, D} {A, B, C} {B, C, D} difficulty of generating 2 reasons may simply infer that the A39 26 task they are given is fairly easy compared with the 9.6 rea- B42405723sons that others could generate, and their high fluency may C19441748not be particularly informative. This would lead to less D1629compromise than the 10/9.6 condition, in which the task is Preference Fluency in Choice 353 considered appropriate and the low fluency is attributed to condition in which participants evaluated the difficulty of the choice. On the other hand, participants may imagine generating 10 reasons before being told that others could how much difficulty they would experience if they were generate 9.6, much as would be expected if they considered asked to generate the 9.6 reasons listed by others; thus, they whether they could generate as many reasons as others. As a might realize that they would find such a task difficult, result, a logistic regression predicting choice of the middle resulting in low fluency. This low fluency would be attrib- option revealed only a significant main effect of number of uted to their idiosyncratic preference because generating others’ reasons (B = .87, p < .01). 9.6 reasons cannot be a particularly difficult task if others In summary, this study replicates the influence of prefer- can do it. Note that the ambiguity regarding the direction of ence fluency on the compromise effect observed in Study 3. the effect in this cell depends on whether participants stick It further demonstrates that this influence is due to informa- with the reason generation task they were given or go fur- tion provided by the subjective experience and thus attenu- ther and try to generate the average number of reasons that ated when the informational value of the experience is others could generate (9.6). In any case, this more involved called into question, paralleling the attributional effect of distinction does not appear to be central to the present Study 1. analysis of the impact of preference fluency. GENERAL DISCUSSION Method Choice difficulty has been an important factor in the As part of a large questionnaire completed for course study of preference construction. Studies of choice diffi- credit, undergraduate business students at a northeastern culty and decision conflict have typically varied the choice university were asked to choose from among three alternatives, the choice set and reference points, the prefer- microwave ovens (N = 218). The materials described three ence elicitation task, and the response options. Thus, previ- microwave ovens that varied in price and quality, in line ous research into choice difficulty has usually manipulated with the typical design of a compromise choice set. Partici- how people process the content of the choice. In contrast, pants were asked to rate the difficulty of generating 2 or 10 the current research proposes that a subjective experience of reasons before making a choice. One question was added difficulty in the absence of any variation in the factors after the rating of difficulty of generating reasons and manipulated in prior studies is sufficient to produce two before making a choice. This question first informed par- important effects of difficulty. We found evidence for this ticipants that in a previous study, the average number of rea- proposition by manipulating preference fluency through sons students could generate for this choice was 2.4 or 9.6 extraneous variables, holding all content-related aspects of (manipulated between subjects) and then asked them how the choice task constant. many reasons they believed they could generate. To summa- rize our predictions, the condition in which we asked about Summary and Theoretical Implications 2 reasons and others generated 2.4 (2/2.4) should produce The findings of this research support the notion that pref- little compromise compared with the 10/9.6 condition erence fluency (i.e., the consumer’s subjective feeling because the former has high fluency and the latter has low regarding the ease or difficulty of forming a preference) is fluency and both are attributed to the choice task. The 10/ an important determinant of whether a purchase decision 2.4 condition should produce similar compromise to the 2/ will be made and which option will be chosen. The results 2.4 condition because the low fluency in the former should of Study 1 demonstrate this principle using a manipulation be attributed to the reasons task and not to the choice. We of font clarity. When participants had difficulty reading the did not make specific predictions about whether the 2/9.6 description of the options (i.e., low preference fluency) and condition would be similar to the 2/2.4 or the 10/9.6 their attention was not drawn to the true source of the condition. experience (i.e., the difficult font), they were more likely Results and Discussion than the control group to defer the purchase decision. How- As we expected, the share of the middle option was high- ever, when their attention was drawn to the difficult font, est (70%) when participants were asked to generate 10 rea- the influence of low fluency was eliminated. sons and told that other students averaged 9.6 reasons, ren- Studies 2, 3, and 4 employed a different manipulation of dering the experienced difficulty particularly diagnostic. preference fluency, focusing on the ease of thought genera- However, this share dropped significantly to 48% (χ2(1) = tion rather than on the ease of processing new information. 6.92, p < .01) when participants were told that others could In these studies, participants were asked to consider how generate only 2.4 reasons. In this case, the experienced dif- difficult it would be to generate either two or ten reasons for ficulty was likely to be attributed to the unreasonably diffi- choosing a particular option. We showed that the difficulty cult task, not to a participant’s own difficulty in forming a of generating many reasons, which decreases preference preference. Participants in the 2/2.4 condition chose the fluency, increases the likelihood of choice deferral (Study middle option with the same frequency (48%) as those in 2) and of choosing a compromise option (Studies 3 and 4). the 10/2.4 condition. The difference between the 10/9.6 Mediation analyses confirmed that choice difficulty medi- condition and the 2/2.4 condition is statistically significant ated the impact of the number of reasons on choice deferral (χ2(1) = 6.87, p < .01). and compromise. Study 4 further showed that the effect of The results for the 2/9.6 condition suggest that partici- subjective difficulty on the compromise effect is moderated pants attended to the information that others could generate by the interpretation of that feeling. When participants 9.6 reasons and realized that they would find this difficult. attribute difficulty to the high demands of the reason gen- In this condition, 66% of participants chose the middle eration task rather than to the decision, the effect on choice option. This percentage is not reliably different from the is eliminated. 354 JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, AUGUST 2007

In the studies, when attention was drawn to the source of mise. Further research could extend the range of both inde- fluency (i.e., print font or number of reasons), the effect of pendent and dependent variables, which would provide fluency was eliminated. However, not all fluency experi- insights into the boundaries of preference fluency effects. ences will lose their potency when attention is drawn to For example, preference fluency might affect risk attitudes their source. We chose to manipulate fluency using two and price–quality trade-offs. Further research could also variables that would be judged to be irrelevant to the prefer- examine the conditions that moderate the degree of impact ence construction process so that when the source of flu- of a given level of preference fluency on choice. For exam- ency was made salient, decision makers would attribute ple, it might be conjectured that preference fluency plays a their feelings to something they deemed to be irrelevant to greater role under conditions of low involvement and low the choice at hand and would no longer be influenced by task importance. their fluency experience. If the source of fluency had been Finally, we assume that preference fluency mediates viewed as relevant to the choice (e.g., similarity of choice some of the influences of objective characteristics of the options), decision makers would likely continue to be choice set on decisions. Studies have shown that many affected by their fluency experience, even when the source variables present in the consumer environment, such as of fluency was made salient. Further research could fruit- assortment size (i.e., the number of available options), dis- fully explore which sources of fluency decision makers traction (e.g., loud music), and cognitive load (e.g., needing deem to be relevant to their preference construction process to perform a secondary task), can affect choices. Further and, therefore, which fluency experiences have an impact research could test whether these effects operate, at least in even when their source is salient. part, through their effects on preference fluency. It is useful to consider the relationship between prefer- Note that our results do not imply that preference fluency ence fluency and preference stability. A key finding from is detrimental to effective consumer decision making. In research on preference construction is that preferences vary natural settings, truly difficult decisions have low prefer- across time and situations, depending on the framing of ence fluency. Deferring these decisions or selecting a com- options, the preference elicitation task, and the choice con- promise option may be an adaptive response under these text. However, the degree to which preferences are suscepti- conditions. To isolate the role of preference fluency, how- ble to such influences depends on various factors, such as ever, we needed to use manipulations that did not confound whether the decision represents a new task or a repeated fluency with characteristics of the choice set. The resulting choice. In addition, differences in preference fluency are “effect” (e.g., consumer choice is influenced by print font), likely to contribute to the level of (in)stability of consumer however, should not distract from the usually adaptive value preferences. To the extent that choices vary in their mode of of the underlying process. presentation and consumers vary across time and situations in their ability to generate thoughts about a particular Practical Implications choice, the preference fluency experienced during choice Marketers want consumers to buy their products and, will also vary, resulting in variations in expressed accordingly, try to offer the target customers the most preferences. attractive set of options. Much of the academic and applied Preference fluency may also affect preference stability marketing research has focused on ways to achieve this goal through its influence on the reconstruction of memories of and present products so as to maximize sales (e.g., the right prior choices and inferences drawn from those memories. assortment, persuasive advertisements). The current For example, is the difficulty experienced at the time of research highlights the potential promise of a new class of choice stored as part of the memory of that choice? If not, tactics designed to increase the likelihood that a customer options chosen in part because of high or low fluency may will make a purchase rather than go elsewhere or procrasti- be misremembered as being more preferred than they really nate. Specifically, our findings indicate that conditions that were. Alternatively, if fluency is well remembered, infer- promote preference fluency often play a key role in deter- ences about the choice options may be based on the recalled mining whether a purchase will be made. This is particu- fluency. For example, a memory of high fluency (i.e., an larly important because consumers perceive many market- easy choice) may cause consumers to make biased infer- place decisions as being difficult. Importantly, marketers ences, such that chosen options are distorted to have more should not assume that preference fluency is an uncontrol- positive attribute values and forgone options are distorted to lable factor that merely reflects the characteristics of the have less positive attribute values (for a related discussion, choice. Instead, they should proactively create conditions see Liberman and Förster 2006). Conversely, memory of that are conducive to preference fluency. low fluency may lead to inferences about choice options This principle highlights the importance of making it as being more similar than they really are. easy as possible for the consumer to form a preference. In Further research could examine the processes underlying particular, attribute information needs to be easy to read and the impact of preference fluency on choice and the bound- process and presented in a way that facilitates preference aries of preference fluency effects. Regarding process, it formation. For example, information displays that help con- would be worthwhile to examine whether processing flu- sumers compare options along relevant attributes are likely ency directly affects choice or is mediated by choice confi- to promote preference fluency. Similarly, using the same dence, risk perception, and/or a decrease in the perceived units across options will make it easier for shoppers to com- attractiveness of options. Furthermore, the current research pare options and form a preference. Note that facilitating focused on two particular contributors to preference flu- comparisons that were going to be made anyway will pro- ency—font clarity and number of reasons—and on two mote preference fluency. However, in situations in which behavioral consequences—choice deferral and compro- fewer spontaneous comparisons are made, these displays Preference Fluency in Choice 355 may increase the number of comparisons, which some inform debating (prospective) purchasers that the informa- research has shown reduces the attractiveness of the choice tion provided by the manufacturers makes comparing prod- options (Brenner, Rottenstreich, and Sood 1999). Further ucts difficult. If consumers attribute their experienced diffi- research could determine which effect dominates in particu- culty to an incidental aspect of the choice environment, they lar situations. may be less inclined to use their subjective experience as a Marketers could redirect attributions from choice diffi- basis to defer the choice. In summary, preference fluency is culty by offering consumers reasons for any difficulty in a key determinant of consumer choice, and marketers making up their minds. For example, a salesperson might should make every effort to manage this important variable.

Appendix SAMPLE DIGITAL CAMERA MATERIALS (STUDIES 3 AND 4)

Canon PowerShot

Product Features •2.31-megapixel resolution •2× digital zoom •1.75” LCD screen with magnification for previewing photos •8MB internal flash memory; CompactFlash memory card expansion slot for additional memory •Automatic focus, exposure and image controls •USB connection directly to PC or Mac Price: $199

Minolta DiMAGE S304 Product Features •3.34-megapixel CCD for high-resolution images •3× optical/2× digital zoom •1.8” color TFT LCD monitor and real-image zoom viewfinder •High-performance autofocus and autoexposure •Simple menus displayed on LCD monitor •USB interface for easy connection to PC or Mac •16MB CompactFlash card included Price: $499

Hewlett-Packard PhotoSmart Product Features •4.0-megapixel CCD for high-resolution images •3× optical/3.6× digital zoom lens •1.8” color LCD monitor •Take stills or record AVI movies •Through-the-lens (TTL) autofocus, autofocus lock and manual focus •Shooting modes: pan focus, portrait, landscape, night scene, and auto, in addition to these photo effects: sepia, vivid, neu- tral, and black-and-white •Built-in flash with red-eye reduction •Store images on CompactFlash memory cards •USB connection directly to PC or Mac Price: $799 356 JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, AUGUST 2007

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