DOCSLIB.ORG

Processing Fluency and Aesthetic Pleasure: Is Beauty in the Perceiver’S Processing Experience?

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Processing Fluency and Aesthetic Pleasure: Is Beauty in the Perceiver’S Processing Experience? Personality and Social Psychology Review Copyright © 2004 by 2004, Vol. 8, No. 4, 364–382 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Processing Fluency and Aesthetic Pleasure: Is Beauty in the Perceiver’s Processing Experience? Rolf Reber Department of Psychosocial Science University of Bergen, Norway Norbert Schwarz Department of Psychology and Institute for Social Research University of Michigan Piotr Winkielman Department of Psychology University of California, San Diego We propose that aesthetic pleasure is a function of the perceiver’s processing dynam- ics: The more fluently perceivers can process an object, the more positive their aes- thetic response. We review variables known to influence aesthetic judgments, such as figural goodness, figure–ground contrast, stimulus repetition, symmetry, and pro- totypicality, and trace their effects to changes in processing fluency. Other variables that influence processing fluency, like visual or semantic priming, similarly increase judgments of aesthetic pleasure. Our proposal provides an integrative framework for the study of aesthetic pleasure and sheds light on the interplay between early prefer- ences versus cultural influences on taste, preferences for both prototypical and ab- stracted forms, and the relation between beauty and truth. In contrast to theories that trace aesthetic pleasure to objective stimulus features per se, we propose that beauty is grounded in the processing experiences of the perceiver, which are in part a func- tion of stimulus properties. What is beauty? What makes for a beautiful face, kiewicz, 1970). This objectivist view inspired many appealing painting, pleasing design, or charming scen- psychological attempts to identify the critical contrib- ery? This question has been debated for at least 2,500 utors to beauty. Among the identified features were bal- years and has been given a wide variety of answers ance and proportion (Arnheim, 1974; Birkhoff, 1933; (Feagin, 1995; Tatarkiewicz, 1970). However, one can Fechner, 1876; Gombrich, 1995), symmetry (Arnheim, broadly distinguish three main positions. 1974; Birkhoff, 1933; Gombrich, 1984; Humphrey, Many theorists, dating back at least to Plato, saw 1997), informational content and complexity (Berlyne, beauty as a property of an object that produces a plea- 1971, 1974; Eysenck, 1941; Garner, 1974), as well as surable experience in any suitable perceiver (Tatar- contrast and clarity (Gombrich, 1984, 1995; St. Thom- as of Aquinas, see Maritain, 1966; Solso, 1997). The objectivist view of beauty was so dominant in the The reported research was supported by the Swiss National Sci- 16th century that artists introduced pattern books, of- ence Foundation (Grant 61–57881.99 to Rolf Reber) and the Na- fering pictorial elements that artists could copy and tional Science Foundation (Grant BCS–0217294 to Piotr Winkiel- combine with each other to create beauty (see Gom- man). Preparation of this article was supported through a fellowship from the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences to brich, 1995). Norbert Schwarz. We thank Marilyn Brewer, Tedra Fazendeiro, Other theorists, dating back at least to the Sophists, Greg Feist, Jamin Halberstadt, Kent Harber, Christian Jakob, Jack proposed that anything could be beautiful if it pleases Katz, Bruce Morton, John Skowronski, Bruce Whittlesea, Bernd the senses (Tatarkiewicz, 1970). From this perspective, Wittenbrink, and an anonymous reviewer for comments on the arti- beauty is a function of idiosyncratic qualities of the cle and helpful discussions. Requests for reprints should be sent to Rolf Reber, University perceiver and all efforts to identify the laws of beauty of Bergen, Department of Psychosocial Science, Christiesgate 12, are futile. This subjectivist view, reflected in expres- N-5015 Bergen, Norway. E-mail: [email protected]; Norbert sions like “beauty is in the eye of the beholder” or “de Schwarz, Institute for Social Reseach, 426 Thompson Street, Ann gustibus non est disputandum” (taste cannot be de- Arbor, MI 48106–1248. E-mail: [email protected]; Piotr Win- kielman, Department of Psychology, University of California at San bated), underlies the social constructivist emphasis on Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, CA 92093–0109. E-mail: the historically changing and culturally relative nature [email protected] of beauty (see Kubovy, 2000). 364 FLUENCY AND AESTHETIC PLEASURE Most modern philosophical analyses, however, re- Beauty and Judgment ject the objective versus subjective distinction. Instead, Research participants in experimental aesthetics they suggest that a sense of beauty emerges from pat- and psychology studies are rarely asked to judge terns in the way people and objects relate (e.g., In- “beauty” per se. Instead, most studies have focused on garden, 1985; Merleau-Ponty, 1964). In this article, we judgments like figural goodness, pleasantness, liking, adopt this interactionist perspective and seek to iden- and preference. One may wonder whether these more tify those patterns. As detailed later, we propose that modest judgments capture the grand realm of beauty. beauty is grounded in the processing experiences of Most researchers, including us, believe that by study- the perceiver that emerge from the interaction of stimu- ing such simple judgments, one can identify basic pro- lus properties and perceivers’ cognitive and affective cesses underlying the aesthetic experience. Further, processes. several lines of research, for example on the mere ex- posure effect (addressed later in this article), demon- strate that different kinds of evaluative judgments op- Beauty, Experience, and Judgment erate via similar processes (see Bornstein, 1989). Thus, there are reasons to believe that judgments of prefer- Before we present our proposal, a few clarifications ence, liking, and beauty are closely related. are in order. We first introduce our use of the concept of Another issue raised by the focus on basic processes beauty and relate it to the concept of aesthetic pleasure. and the requirements of experimental control is that Subsequently, we discuss the relation between beauty most psychological studies explore fairly mild aes- and various aesthetic judgments, such as judgments of thetic experiences, such as those likely to accompany preference and judgments of aesthetic value. the perception of a vase, a simple melody, an abstract shape, or a human face. Clearly, much of what most hu- mans call “beautiful” on a daily basis falls into the cat- Beauty and Aesthetic Pleasure egory of such mild experiences. However, we hope that future research will also explore stronger subjective The philosopher George Santayana described three experiences and examine to what extent our analysis defining features of beauty: “beauty … is value posi- can inform such research. tive, intrinsic, and objectified” (Santayana, 1896/1955, Finally, we note that beauty as explored in this arti- p. 31). By value positive and intrinsic, Santayana cle is unrelated to aesthetic value (see, e.g., Beardsley, meant that beauty provides pleasure without any rea- 1981). Since the emergence of modern art, a piece of soning about expected utility. This is similar to Thom- art can have aesthetic value without being beautiful as of Aquinas’ definition of beauty as what gives plea- (i.e., without producing an experience of aesthetic sure at sight (“id quod visum placet”), suggesting pleasure). Conversely, a painting that “pleases the immediate joy without intermediate reasoning (see eyes” may be without any artistic merit. The judgment Maritain, 1966). Similarly, the art historian Read of aesthetic value, in contrast to beauty or aesthetic (1972) did “not believe that a person with real sensibil- pleasure as defined here, often involves substantial rea- ity ever stands before a picture and, after a long process soning about the piece of art under consideration. We of analysis, pronounces himself pleased. We either like return to these issues in the discussion. at first sight, or not at all” (p. 38). Finally, beauty is objectified. For example, the experience of having a cold drink on a hot day is both value positive and intrin- sic, but this immediate pleasure lies exclusively in a Overview positive sensation of the body and has little to do with aesthetic appreciation of the object. In contrast, per- Our core proposal is straightforward. We suggest ceivers look at a painting not to please their body, but to that aesthetic experience is a function of the perceiver’s enjoy the painting’s beauty. Hence, people experience processing dynamics: The more fluently the perceiver beauty as something that lies in the object. Therefore, can process an object, the more positive is his or her beauty is not an “objective,” but an “objectified” prop- aesthetic response. This proposal entails four specific erty (see also Feagin, 1995). assumptions. First, objects differ in the fluency with In our analyses we follow this philosophical tradi- which they can be processed. Features that facilitate tion and define beauty as a pleasurable subjective expe- fluent processing include all the core features identi- rience that is directed toward an object and not medi- fied in the objectivist tradition, like goodness of form, ated by intervening reasoning. This definition closely symmetry, figure–ground contrast, as well as variables resembles the definition of aesthetic experience used that have not received attention in traditional theories in empirical aesthetics (e.g., Kubovy, 2000; Martindale of aesthetic
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Book Spring 2006.Qxd
    Why? Recent psychological research sheds new light on this issue. A growing number of experiments show that judgments of beauty and judgments of truth share a common Norbert Schwarz characteristic: People make them, in part, by attending to the dynamics of on judgments of their own information processing. truth & beauty When an object is easy to perceive, people evaluate it as more beautiful Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/135/2/136/1829119/daed.2006.135.2.136.pdf by guest on 27 September 2021 than when it is dif½cult to perceive; similarly, when a statement is easy to process, people are more likely to ac- cept it as true than when it is dif½cult to process. Psychologists refer to the ease or dif½culty of information pro- cessing as ‘processing fluency.’ Its shared role in judgments of beauty and Poets and scientists alike often assume truth renders it likely that we ½nd the that beauty and truth are two sides of same stimulus beautiful as well as true. the same coin.* From John Keats’s fa- In an influential series of experiments, mous assertion that “beauty is truth, Robert Zajonc observed in the 1960s that truth beauty” to Richard Feynman’s the more often his participants saw un- belief that “you can recognize truth known graphical stimuli, like Chinese by its beauty and simplicity,” beauty ideographs, the more appealing they has often been offered as a heuristic found them. Later research traced this for assessing truth. Yet the history of ½nding to the role of processing fluen- science is full of beautiful theories cy.
    [Show full text]
  • What Is the Cognitive Neuroscience of Art… and Why Should We Care? W
    What Is the Cognitive Neuroscience of Art… and Why Should We Care? W. P. Seeley Bates College There has been considerable interest in recent years in whether, and if so to what degree, research in neuroscience can contribute to philosophical studies of mind, epistemology, language, and art. This interest has manifested itself in a range of research in the philosophy of music, dance, and visual art that draws on results from studies in neuropsychology and cognitive neuroscience.1 There has been a concurrent movement within empirical aesthet- ics that has produced a growing body of research in the cognitive neuroscience of art.2 However, there has been very little collaboration between philosophy and the neuroscience of art. This is in part due, to be frank, to a culture of mutual distrust. Philosophers of art AMERICAN SOCIETY have been generally skeptical about the utility of empirical results to their research and vocally dismissive of the value of what has come to be called neuroaesthetics. Our counter- for AESThetics parts in the behavioral sciences have been, in turn, skeptical about the utility of stubborn philosophical skepticism. Of course attitudes change…and who has the time to hold a An Association for Aesthetics, grudge? So in what follows I would like to draw attention to two questions requisite for Criticism and Theory of the Arts a rapprochement between philosophy of art and neuroscience. First, what is the cognitive neuroscience of art? And second, why should any of us (in philosophy at least) care? Volume 31 Number 2 Summer 2011 1 What Is the Cognitive Neuroscience of There are obvious answers to each of these questions.
    [Show full text]
  • Curriculum Vitae Julie Y. Huang
    CURRICULUM VITAE JULIE Y. HUANG College of Business Office: Harriman 319 Stony Brook University Email: [email protected] Stony Brook, NY 11794-3775 APPOINTMENTS Associate Professor of Marketing, 2020-present College of Business, Stony Brook University Assistant Professor of Marketing, College of Business, Stony Brook University 2014-2020 Post-Doctoral Fellow and Lab Manager, 2011-2014 Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto EDUCATION Ph.D. Yale University, Social Psychology 2011 M.S. Yale University, Social Psychology 2007 B.A. University of Maryland, Psychology and English 2003 AWARDS, HONORS, AND GRANTS Stony Brook Trustees Faculty Award, $20 000, Stony Brook Foundation 2019 Transformative Consumer Research Grant, $2025, Association for Consumer Research 2019 Elected Member, Society for Experimental Social Psychology 2017 NCID Exemplary Diversity Scholar, University of Michigan 2011 Finalist, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Health & Society Scholars 2010 Fellowship, Summer Institute in Social Psychology 2009 Phillip G. Zimbardo Dissertation Award, Yale University 2008-2009 Graduate Student Travel Grant, Society for Judgment and Decision-Making 2008 National Merit Scholarship 1999-2003 RESEARCH EXPERTISE Goals and Motivation Consumer Behavior Interpersonal Judgments Labor practices Julie Huang August 2021 Curriculum Vitae Page 2 PUBLICATIONS/ARTICLES UNDER REVIEW 1. Huang, Julie Y. (2020), “Unfit by Accident: Third-party Perception of Parental Fitness Based upon Childbearing Intention.” Social Psychological and Personality Science, 11:1, 126-33. 2. Lee, Spike W.S., Julie Y. Huang and Norbert Schwarz (2020), “Risk Overgeneralization in Times of a Contagious Disease Threat,” Frontiers in Psychology, 11:1392. 3. Chan, C.S. Richard, Haemin Dennis Park, Julie Y. Huang and Annaleena Parhankangas (2020), “Less is More? Evidence for a Curvilinear Relationship Between Readability and Screening Evaluations Across Pitch Competition and Crowdfunding Contexts.” Journal of Business Venturing Insights, 14, e00176.
    [Show full text]
  • Recent Advances in the Economics of Individual Subjective Well-Being
    IZA DP No. 4850 Recent Advances in the Economics of Individual Subjective Well-Being Alois Stutzer Bruno S. Frey March 2010 DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit Institute for the Study of Labor Recent Advances in the Economics of Individual Subjective Well-Being Alois Stutzer University of Basel, CREMA and IZA Bruno S. Frey University of Zurich and CREMA Discussion Paper No. 4850 March 2010 IZA P.O. Box 7240 53072 Bonn Germany Phone: +49-228-3894-0 Fax: +49-228-3894-180 E-mail: [email protected] Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author.
    [Show full text]
  • The Distancing-Embracing Model of the Enjoyment of Negative Emotions in Art Reception
    BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2017), Page 1 of 63 doi:10.1017/S0140525X17000309, e347 The Distancing-Embracing model of the enjoyment of negative emotions in art reception Winfried Menninghaus1 Department of Language and Literature, Max Planck Institute for Empirical Aesthetics, 60322 Frankfurt am Main, Germany [email protected] Valentin Wagner Department of Language and Literature, Max Planck Institute for Empirical Aesthetics, 60322 Frankfurt am Main, Germany [email protected] Julian Hanich Department of Arts, Culture and Media, University of Groningen, 9700 AB Groningen, The Netherlands [email protected] Eugen Wassiliwizky Department of Language and Literature, Max Planck Institute for Empirical Aesthetics, 60322 Frankfurt am Main, Germany [email protected] Thomas Jacobsen Experimental Psychology Unit, Helmut Schmidt University/University of the Federal Armed Forces Hamburg, 22043 Hamburg, Germany [email protected] Stefan Koelsch University of Bergen, 5020 Bergen, Norway [email protected] Abstract: Why are negative emotions so central in art reception far beyond tragedy? Revisiting classical aesthetics in the light of recent psychological research, we present a novel model to explain this much discussed (apparent) paradox. We argue that negative emotions are an important resource for the arts in general, rather than a special license for exceptional art forms only. The underlying rationale is that negative emotions have been shown to be particularly powerful in securing attention, intense emotional involvement, and high memorability, and hence is precisely what artworks strive for. Two groups of processing mechanisms are identified that conjointly adopt the particular powers of negative emotions for art’s purposes.
    [Show full text]
  • Metacognitive Experiences and the Intricacies of Setting People Straight: Implications for Debiasing and Public Information Campaigns
    METACOGNITIVE EXPERIENCES AND THE INTRICACIES OF SETTING PEOPLE STRAIGHT: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEBIASING AND PUBLIC INFORMATION CAMPAIGNS Norbert Schwarz Lawrence J. Sanna Ian Skurnik Carolyn Yoon I. Introduction Decades of psychological research documented that human judgment often falls short of normative ideals. Social and cognitive psychologists discovered an ever increasing number of systematic biases and illustrated their pervasive role in judgment and decision making (for reviews see Gilovich, GriYn, & Kahneman, 2002; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Kerr, MacCoun, & Kramer, 1996; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Pohl, 2005). Similarly, researchers in applied fields, like health and consumer behavior, identified numerous erro- neous beliefs that impair good decisions and prevent people from doing what would be in their best interest (Christensen, Moran, & Wiebe, 1999; Webley, Burgoyne, Lea, & Young, 2001). In both cases, the remedy seems obvious: If people only thought enough about the issues at hand, considered all the relevant information and employed proper reasoning strategies, their deci- sion making would surely improve. This assumption is at the heart of numerous strategies that attempt to debias human judgment (for a review see Larrick, 2004); it is likewise central to public information campaigns designed to dispel erroneous beliefs and to replace them with more accurate information (for a review see Rice & Atkin, 2001). Unfortunately, these attempts to improve decision making often fail to achieve their goals, even under conditions assumed to foster rational judgment. 127 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL Copyright 2007, Elsevier Inc. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, VOL. 39 All rights reserved. DOI: 10.1016/S0065-2601(06)39003-X 0065-2601/07 $35.00 128 NORBERT SCHWARZ et al.
    [Show full text]
  • Heuristics and Biases the Psychology of Intuitive Judgment. In
    P1: FYX/FYX P2: FYX/UKS QC: FCH/UKS T1: FCH CB419-Gilovich CB419-Gilovich-FM May 30, 2002 12:3 HEURISTICS AND BIASES The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment Edited by THOMAS GILOVICH Cornell University DALE GRIFFIN Stanford University DANIEL KAHNEMAN Princeton University iii P1: FYX/FYX P2: FYX/UKS QC: FCH/UKS T1: FCH CB419-Gilovich CB419-Gilovich-FM May 30, 2002 12:3 published by the press syndicate of the university of cambridge The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom cambridge university press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK 40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA 477 Williamstown, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia Ruiz de Alarcon´ 13, 28014, Madrid, Spain Dock House, The Waterfront, Cape Town 8001, South Africa http://www.cambridge.org C Cambridge University Press 2002 This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 2002 Printed in the United States of America Typeface Palatino 9.75/12.5 pt. System LATEX2ε [TB] A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication data Heuristics and biases : the psychology of intuitive judgment / edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, Daniel Kahneman. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-521-79260-6 – ISBN 0-521-79679-2 (pbk.) 1. Judgment. 2. Reasoning (Psychology) 3. Critical thinking. I. Gilovich, Thomas. II. Griffin, Dale III. Kahneman, Daniel, 1934– BF447 .H48 2002 153.4 – dc21 2001037860 ISBN 0 521 79260 6 hardback ISBN 0 521 79679 2 paperback iv P1: FYX/FYX P2: FYX/UKS QC: FCH/UKS T1: FCH CB419-Gilovich CB419-Gilovich-FM May 30, 2002 12:3 Contents List of Contributors page xi Preface xv Introduction – Heuristics and Biases: Then and Now 1 Thomas Gilovich and Dale Griffin PART ONE.
    [Show full text]
  • Archives De Pierre Buser
    Fonds Pierre Buser (1921-2013) Centre d’Archives en Philosophie, Histoire et Édition des Sciences (UMS3610, CNRS-ENS Paris) Fonds Pierre Buser (1921-2013) Plan de l’inventaire : Informations liminaires I. Carrière (PB 1.1) II. Textes de Pierre Buser (PB 1.2-PB 4) III. Cours de Pierre Buser (PB 5.1-PB 5.3) IV. Journées d’études (PB 5.4-PB 6.8) V. Correspondance (PB 6.9-PB 7.5) VI. Documentation de travail (PB 7.6-PB 19.4) Index des noms cités dans l’inventaire CAPHÉS -2018 Page 1 Fonds Pierre Buser (1921-2013) Biographie : Notice issue du site de l’Académie des sciences Pierre Buser, né le 19 août 1921 est décédé le 29 décembre 2013. Il avait été élu correspondant de l'Académie le 4 février 1980, puis membre le 6 juin 1988 dans la section actuellement dénommée Biologie intégrative. Ancien élève de l'École normale supérieure, il était professeur émérite à l'Université Pierre-et-Marie-Curie. Neurophysiologiste, il fut un des fondateurs, en France et dans le monde, de la physiologie intégrative moderne du système nerveux. Il appartenait à l'École de neurophysiologie du comportement qui poursuit ses investigations dans le champ de la psychophysiologie et des fonctions infiniment complexes du cerveau. Avec lui, c'est le maître de toute une génération de neurobiologistes qui [a disparu]. Pierre Buser a consacré ses travaux à la neurophysiologie et à la psychophysiologie. Il [a poursuivi] ses investigations dans le champ infiniment complexe des fonctions du cerveau. Les travaux de Pierre Buser se sont de façon permanente centrés autour des activités électrophysiologiques du cerveau, comme marqueurs de son activité, en liaison avec le comportement de l’animal.
    [Show full text]
  • Edited by Warren Neidich
    Part Two Final File First Edition_cover part two 5/21/14 9:43 PM Pagina 2 Edited by Warren Neidich ESSAYS BY INA BLOM ARNE DE BOEVER PASCAL GIELEN SANFORD KWINTER MAURIZIO LAZZARATO KARL LYDÉN YANN MOULIER BOUTANG WARREN NEIDICH MATTEO PASQUINELLI ALEXEI PENZIN PATRICIA REED JOHN ROBERTS LISS C. WERNER CHARLES T. WOLFE ARCHIVE BOOKS VOX SERIES Edited by Warren Neidich ESSAYS BY INA BLOM ARNE DE BOEVER PASCAL GIELEN SANFORD KWINTER MAURIZIO LAZZARATO KARL LYDÉN YANN MOULIER BOUTANG WARREN NEIDICH MATTEO PASQUINELLI ALEXEI PENZIN PATRICIA REED JOHN ROBERTS LISS C. WERNER CHARLES T. WOLFE ARCHIVE BOOKS This book collects together extended papers that were presented at The Psychopathologies of Cognitive Capitalism: Part Two at ICI Berlin in March 2013. This volume is the second in a series of book that aims attempts to broaden the definition of cognitive capitalism in terms of the scope of its material relations, especially as it relates to the condi- tions of mind and brain in our new world of advanced telecommunica- tion, data mining and social relations. It is our hope to first improve awa- reness of its most repressive charac- teristics and secondly to produce an arsenal of discursive practices with which to combat it. Edited by Warren Neidich Coordinating editor Nicola Guy Proofreading by Theo Barry-Born Designed by Archive Appendix, Berlin Printed by Erredi, Genova Published by Archive Books Dieffenbachstraße 31 10967 Berlin www.archivebooks.org ISBN 978-3-943620-16-0 CONTENTS INTRODUCTION Warren Neidich The Early and Late Stages of Cognitive Capitalism .................................... 9 SECTION 1 Cognitive Capitalism The Early Phase Ina Blom Video and Autobiography vs.
    [Show full text]
  • Schwarz, Norbert; and Others Recalled Behavior and Ease
    DOCUMENT RESUME ED 251 743 CG 017 871 AUTHOR Schwarz, Norbert; And Others TITLE Recalled Behavior and Ease of Recall es Information in Self-Assessment. SPONS AGENCY Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, Bonn - Bad Godesberg (West Germany). PUB DATE Aug 84 GRANT . Schw-278/2-1 NOTE 11p.; Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association (92nd, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, August 24-28, 1984). PUB TYPE Reports - Research/Technical (143) -- Speeches/Conference Papers (150) EDRS PRICE MF01/PC01 Plus Postage. DESCRIPTORS Assertiveness; Attribution Theory; Cognitive Processes; College Students; *Difficulty Level; Foreign Countries; Higher Education; Personality Traits; *Recall (Psychology); *Self Concept; *Self Evaluation (Individuals) IDENTIFIERS West Germany ABSTRACT In studies examining the influence of recall on judgments, social psychologists have generally concentrated on the content of recalled material rather than on the process of recall. To investigate the impact of recalled behaviors (content) and the ease with which these behaviors came to mind (process) on assessment of one's own assertiveness, 158 West German students were asked to .describe either six (easy recall) or twelve (difficult recall) examples of their own assertive or non-assertive behaviors. To manipulate the distinctiveness of the recall, subjects were told the task would or would not be difficult. On the basis of the availability heuristic it was assumed that subjects in the difficult recall conditions would assess themselves as being less assertive (or non-assertive) than subjects in the easy recall condition, despite the larger number of recalled behaviors. Results clearly supported this prediction, suggesting that the ease with which examples could be brought to mind was used as an informational basis for evaluating personal attributes.
    [Show full text]
  • The Presenters Paradox
    Journal of Consumer Research, Inc. The Presenter’s Paradox Author(s): Kimberlee Weaver, Stephen M. Garcia, and Norbert Schwarz Reviewed work(s): Source: Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 39, No. 3 (October 2012), pp. 445-460 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/664497 . Accessed: 22/09/2012 14:19 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. The University of Chicago Press and Journal of Consumer Research, Inc. are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Consumer Research. http://www.jstor.org The Presenter’s Paradox KIMBERLEE WEAVER STEPHEN M. GARCIA NORBERT SCHWARZ This analysis introduces the Presenter’s Paradox. Robust findings in impression formation demonstrate that perceivers’ judgments show a weighted averaging pat- tern, which results in less favorable evaluations when mildly favorable information is added to highly favorable information. Across seven studies, we show that pre- senters do not anticipate this averaging pattern on the part of evaluators and instead design presentations that include all of the favorable information available. This additive strategy (“more is better”) hurts presenters in their perceivers’ eyes be- cause mildly favorable information dilutes the impact of highly favorable information.
    [Show full text]
  • Connecting and Separating Mind-Sets: Culture As Situated Cognition
    Journal of Personality and Social Psychology © 2009 American Psychological Association 2009, Vol. 97, No. 2, 217–235 0022-3514/09/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0015850 Connecting and Separating Mind-Sets: Culture as Situated Cognition Daphna Oyserman and Nicholas Sorensen Rolf Reber University of Michigan University of Bergen Sylvia Xiaohua Chen Hong Kong Polytechnic University People perceive meaningful wholes and later separate out constituent parts (D. Navon, 1977). Yet there are cross-national differences in whether a focal target or integrated whole is first perceived. Rather than construe these differences as fixed, the proposed culture-as-situated-cognition model explains these differences as due to whether a collective or individual mind-set is cued at the moment of observation. Eight studies demonstrated that when cultural mind-set and task demands are congruent, easier tasks are accomplished more quickly and more difficult or time-constrained tasks are accomplished more accu- rately (Study 1: Koreans, Korean Americans; Study 2: Hong Kong Chinese; Study 3: European- and Asian-heritage Americans; Study 4: Americans; Study: 5 Hong Kong Chinese; Study 6: Americans; Study 7: Norwegians; Study 8: African-, European-, and Asian-heritage Americans). Meta-analyses (d ϭ .34) demonstrated homogeneous effects across geographic place (East–West), racial–ethnic group, task, and sensory mode—differences are cued in the moment. Contrast and separation are salient individual mind-set procedures, resulting in focus on a single target or main point. Assimilation and connection are salient collective mind-set procedures, resulting in focus on multiplicity and integration. Keywords: culture, individualism, collectivism, independent, interdependent Everyone should understand this in this way.
    [Show full text]