Personality and Social Psychology Review Copyright © 2004 by 2004, Vol. 8, No. 4, 364–382 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Processing Fluency and Aesthetic Pleasure: Is Beauty in the Perceiver’s Processing Experience? Rolf Reber Department of Psychosocial Science University of Bergen, Norway Norbert Schwarz Department of Psychology and Institute for Social Research University of Michigan Piotr Winkielman Department of Psychology University of California, San Diego We propose that aesthetic pleasure is a function of the perceiver’s processing dynam- ics: The more fluently perceivers can process an object, the more positive their aes- thetic response. We review variables known to influence aesthetic judgments, such as figural goodness, figure–ground contrast, stimulus repetition, symmetry, and pro- totypicality, and trace their effects to changes in processing fluency. Other variables that influence processing fluency, like visual or semantic priming, similarly increase judgments of aesthetic pleasure. Our proposal provides an integrative framework for the study of aesthetic pleasure and sheds light on the interplay between early prefer- ences versus cultural influences on taste, preferences for both prototypical and ab- stracted forms, and the relation between beauty and truth. In contrast to theories that trace aesthetic pleasure to objective stimulus features per se, we propose that beauty is grounded in the processing experiences of the perceiver, which are in part a func- tion of stimulus properties. What is beauty? What makes for a beautiful face, kiewicz, 1970). This objectivist view inspired many appealing painting, pleasing design, or charming scen- psychological attempts to identify the critical contrib- ery? This question has been debated for at least 2,500 utors to beauty. Among the identified features were bal- years and has been given a wide variety of answers ance and proportion (Arnheim, 1974; Birkhoff, 1933; (Feagin, 1995; Tatarkiewicz, 1970). However, one can Fechner, 1876; Gombrich, 1995), symmetry (Arnheim, broadly distinguish three main positions. 1974; Birkhoff, 1933; Gombrich, 1984; Humphrey, Many theorists, dating back at least to Plato, saw 1997), informational content and complexity (Berlyne, beauty as a property of an object that produces a plea- 1971, 1974; Eysenck, 1941; Garner, 1974), as well as surable experience in any suitable perceiver (Tatar- contrast and clarity (Gombrich, 1984, 1995; St. Thom- as of Aquinas, see Maritain, 1966; Solso, 1997). The objectivist view of beauty was so dominant in the The reported research was supported by the Swiss National Sci- 16th century that artists introduced pattern books, of- ence Foundation (Grant 61–57881.99 to Rolf Reber) and the Na- fering pictorial elements that artists could copy and tional Science Foundation (Grant BCS–0217294 to Piotr Winkiel- combine with each other to create beauty (see Gom- man). Preparation of this article was supported through a fellowship from the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences to brich, 1995). Norbert Schwarz. We thank Marilyn Brewer, Tedra Fazendeiro, Other theorists, dating back at least to the Sophists, Greg Feist, Jamin Halberstadt, Kent Harber, Christian Jakob, Jack proposed that anything could be beautiful if it pleases Katz, Bruce Morton, John Skowronski, Bruce Whittlesea, Bernd the senses (Tatarkiewicz, 1970). From this perspective, Wittenbrink, and an anonymous reviewer for comments on the arti- beauty is a function of idiosyncratic qualities of the cle and helpful discussions. Requests for reprints should be sent to Rolf Reber, University perceiver and all efforts to identify the laws of beauty of Bergen, Department of Psychosocial Science, Christiesgate 12, are futile. This subjectivist view, reflected in expres- N-5015 Bergen, Norway. E-mail: [email protected]; Norbert sions like “beauty is in the eye of the beholder” or “de Schwarz, Institute for Social Reseach, 426 Thompson Street, Ann gustibus non est disputandum” (taste cannot be de- Arbor, MI 48106–1248. E-mail: [email protected]; Piotr Win- kielman, Department of Psychology, University of California at San bated), underlies the social constructivist emphasis on Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, CA 92093–0109. E-mail: the historically changing and culturally relative nature [email protected] of beauty (see Kubovy, 2000). 364 FLUENCY AND AESTHETIC PLEASURE Most modern philosophical analyses, however, re- Beauty and Judgment ject the objective versus subjective distinction. Instead, Research participants in experimental aesthetics they suggest that a sense of beauty emerges from pat- and psychology studies are rarely asked to judge terns in the way people and objects relate (e.g., In- “beauty” per se. Instead, most studies have focused on garden, 1985; Merleau-Ponty, 1964). In this article, we judgments like figural goodness, pleasantness, liking, adopt this interactionist perspective and seek to iden- and preference. One may wonder whether these more tify those patterns. As detailed later, we propose that modest judgments capture the grand realm of beauty. beauty is grounded in the processing experiences of Most researchers, including us, believe that by study- the perceiver that emerge from the interaction of stimu- ing such simple judgments, one can identify basic pro- lus properties and perceivers’ cognitive and affective cesses underlying the aesthetic experience. Further, processes. several lines of research, for example on the mere ex- posure effect (addressed later in this article), demon- strate that different kinds of evaluative judgments op- Beauty, Experience, and Judgment erate via similar processes (see Bornstein, 1989). Thus, there are reasons to believe that judgments of prefer- Before we present our proposal, a few clarifications ence, liking, and beauty are closely related. are in order. We first introduce our use of the concept of Another issue raised by the focus on basic processes beauty and relate it to the concept of aesthetic pleasure. and the requirements of experimental control is that Subsequently, we discuss the relation between beauty most psychological studies explore fairly mild aes- and various aesthetic judgments, such as judgments of thetic experiences, such as those likely to accompany preference and judgments of aesthetic value. the perception of a vase, a simple melody, an abstract shape, or a human face. Clearly, much of what most hu- mans call “beautiful” on a daily basis falls into the cat- Beauty and Aesthetic Pleasure egory of such mild experiences. However, we hope that future research will also explore stronger subjective The philosopher George Santayana described three experiences and examine to what extent our analysis defining features of beauty: “beauty … is value posi- can inform such research. tive, intrinsic, and objectified” (Santayana, 1896/1955, Finally, we note that beauty as explored in this arti- p. 31). By value positive and intrinsic, Santayana cle is unrelated to aesthetic value (see, e.g., Beardsley, meant that beauty provides pleasure without any rea- 1981). Since the emergence of modern art, a piece of soning about expected utility. This is similar to Thom- art can have aesthetic value without being beautiful as of Aquinas’ definition of beauty as what gives plea- (i.e., without producing an experience of aesthetic sure at sight (“id quod visum placet”), suggesting pleasure). Conversely, a painting that “pleases the immediate joy without intermediate reasoning (see eyes” may be without any artistic merit. The judgment Maritain, 1966). Similarly, the art historian Read of aesthetic value, in contrast to beauty or aesthetic (1972) did “not believe that a person with real sensibil- pleasure as defined here, often involves substantial rea- ity ever stands before a picture and, after a long process soning about the piece of art under consideration. We of analysis, pronounces himself pleased. We either like return to these issues in the discussion. at first sight, or not at all” (p. 38). Finally, beauty is objectified. For example, the experience of having a cold drink on a hot day is both value positive and intrin- sic, but this immediate pleasure lies exclusively in a Overview positive sensation of the body and has little to do with aesthetic appreciation of the object. In contrast, per- Our core proposal is straightforward. We suggest ceivers look at a painting not to please their body, but to that aesthetic experience is a function of the perceiver’s enjoy the painting’s beauty. Hence, people experience processing dynamics: The more fluently the perceiver beauty as something that lies in the object. Therefore, can process an object, the more positive is his or her beauty is not an “objective,” but an “objectified” prop- aesthetic response. This proposal entails four specific erty (see also Feagin, 1995). assumptions. First, objects differ in the fluency with In our analyses we follow this philosophical tradi- which they can be processed. Features that facilitate tion and define beauty as a pleasurable subjective expe- fluent processing include all the core features identi- rience that is directed toward an object and not medi- fied in the objectivist tradition, like goodness of form, ated by intervening reasoning. This definition closely symmetry, figure–ground contrast, as well as variables resembles the definition of aesthetic experience used that have not received attention in traditional theories in empirical aesthetics (e.g., Kubovy, 2000; Martindale of aesthetic