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Heuristics and Biases the Psychology of Intuitive Judgment. In P1: FYX/FYX P2: FYX/UKS QC: FCH/UKS T1: FCH CB419-Gilovich CB419-Gilovich-FM May 30, 2002 12:3 HEURISTICS AND BIASES The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment Edited by THOMAS GILOVICH Cornell University DALE GRIFFIN Stanford University DANIEL KAHNEMAN Princeton University iii P1: FYX/FYX P2: FYX/UKS QC: FCH/UKS T1: FCH CB419-Gilovich CB419-Gilovich-FM May 30, 2002 12:3 published by the press syndicate of the university of cambridge The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom cambridge university press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK 40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA 477 Williamstown, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia Ruiz de Alarcon´ 13, 28014, Madrid, Spain Dock House, The Waterfront, Cape Town 8001, South Africa http://www.cambridge.org C Cambridge University Press 2002 This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 2002 Printed in the United States of America Typeface Palatino 9.75/12.5 pt. System LATEX2ε [TB] A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication data Heuristics and biases : the psychology of intuitive judgment / edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, Daniel Kahneman. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-521-79260-6 – ISBN 0-521-79679-2 (pbk.) 1. Judgment. 2. Reasoning (Psychology) 3. Critical thinking. I. Gilovich, Thomas. II. Griffin, Dale III. Kahneman, Daniel, 1934– BF447 .H48 2002 153.4 – dc21 2001037860 ISBN 0 521 79260 6 hardback ISBN 0 521 79679 2 paperback iv P1: FYX/FYX P2: FYX/UKS QC: FCH/UKS T1: FCH CB419-Gilovich CB419-Gilovich-FM May 30, 2002 12:3 Contents List of Contributors page xi Preface xv Introduction – Heuristics and Biases: Then and Now 1 Thomas Gilovich and Dale Griffin PART ONE. THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL EXTENSIONS A. Representativeness and Availability 1 Extensional versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment 19 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman 2 Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment 49 Daniel Kahneman and Shane Frederick 3 How Alike Is It? versus How Likely Is It?: A Disjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgments 82 Maya Bar-Hillel and Efrat Neter 4 Imagining Can Heighten or Lower the Perceived Likelihood of Contracting a Disease: The Mediating Effect of Ease of Imagery 98 Steven J. Sherman, Robert B. Cialdini, Donna F. Schwartzman, and Kim D. Reynolds 5 The Availability Heuristic Revisited: Ease of Recall and Content of Recall as Distinct Sources of Information 103 Norbert Schwarz and Leigh Ann Vaughn B. Anchoring, Contamination, and Compatibility 6 Incorporating the Irrelevant: Anchors in Judgments of Belief and Value 120 Gretchen B. Chapman and Eric J. Johnson vii P1: FYX/FYX P2: FYX/UKS QC: FCH/UKS T1: FCH CB419-Gilovich CB419-Gilovich-FM May 30, 2002 12:3 viii Contents 7 Putting Adjustment Back in the Anchoring and Adjustment Heuristic 139 Nicholas Epley and Thomas Gilovich 8 Self-Anchoring in Conversation: Why Language Users Do Not Do What They “Should” 150 Boaz Keysar and Dale J. Barr 9 Inferential Correction 167 Daniel T. Gilbert 10 Mental Contamination and the Debiasing Problem 185 Timothy D. Wilson, David B. Centerbar, and Nancy Brekke 11 Sympathetic Magical Thinking: The Contagion and Similarity “Heuristics” 201 Paul Rozin and Carol Nemeroff 12 Compatibility Effects in Judgment and Choice 217 Paul Slovic, Dale Griffin, and Amos Tversky C. Forecasting, Confidence, and Calibration 13 The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of Confidence 230 Dale Griffin and Amos Tversky 14 Inside the Planning Fallacy: The Causes and Consequences of Optimistic Time Predictions 250 Roger Buehler, Dale Griffin, and Michael Ross 15 Probability Judgment across Cultures 271 J. Frank Yates, Ju-Whei Lee, Winston R. Sieck, Incheol Choi, and Paul C. Price 16 Durability Bias in Affective Forecasting 292 Daniel T. Gilbert, Elizabeth C. Pinel, Timothy D. Wilson, Stephen J. Blumberg, and Thalia P. Wheatley D. Optimism 17 Resistance of Personal Risk Perceptions to Debiasing Interventions 313 Neil D. Weinstein and William M. Klein 18 Ambiguity and Self-Evaluation: The Role of Idiosyncratic Trait Definitions in Self-Serving Assessments of Ability 324 David Dunning, Judith A. Meyerowitz, and Amy D. Holzberg 19 When Predictions Fail: The Dilemma of Unrealistic Optimism 334 David A. Armor and Shelley E. Taylor P1: FYX/FYX P2: FYX/UKS QC: FCH/UKS T1: FCH CB419-Gilovich CB419-Gilovich-FM May 30, 2002 12:3 Contents ix E. Norms and Counterfactuals 20 Norm Theory: Comparing Reality to Its Alternatives 348 Daniel Kahneman and Dale T. Miller 21 Counterfactual Thought, Regret, and Superstition: How to Avoid Kicking Yourself 367 Dale T. Miller and Brian R. Taylor PART TWO. NEW THEORETICAL DIRECTIONS A. Two Systems of Reasoning 22 Two Systems of Reasoning 379 Steven A. Sloman 23 The Affect Heuristic 397 Paul Slovic, Melissa Finucane, Ellen Peters, and Donald G. MacGregor 24 Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications for the Rationality Debate? 421 Keith E. Stanovich and Richard F. West B. Support Theory 25 Support Theory: A Nonextensional Representation of Subjective Probability 441 Amos Tversky and Derek J. Koehler 26 Unpacking, Repacking, and Anchoring: Advances in Support Theory 474 Yuval Rottenstreich and Amos Tversky 27 Remarks on Support Theory: Recent Advances and Future Directions 489 Lyle A. Brenner, Derek J. Koehler, and Yuval Rottenstreich C. Alternative Perspectives on Heuristics 28 The Use of Statistical Heuristics in Everyday Inductive Reasoning 510 Richard E. Nisbett, David H. Krantz, Christopher Jepson, and Ziva Kunda 29 Feelings as Information: Moods Influence Judgments and Processing Strategies 534 Norbert Schwarz 30 Automated Choice Heuristics 548 Shane Frederick 31 How Good Are Fast and Frugal Heuristics? 559 Gerd Gigerenzer, Jean Czerlinski, and Laura Martignon P1: FYX/FYX P2: FYX/UKS QC: FCH/UKS T1: FCH CB419-Gilovich CB419-Gilovich-FM May 30, 2002 12:3 x Contents 32 Intuitive Politicians, Theologians, and Prosecutors: Exploring the Empirical Implications of Deviant Functionalist Metaphors 582 Philip E. Tetlock PART THREE. REAL-WORLD APPLICATIONS A. Everyday Judgment and Behavior 33 The Hot Hand in Basketball: On the Misperception of Random Sequences 601 Thomas Gilovich, Robert Vallone, and Amos Tversky 34 Like Goes with Like: The Role of Representativeness in Erroneous and Pseudo-Scientific Beliefs 617 Thomas Gilovich and Kenneth Savitsky 35 When Less Is More: Counterfactual Thinking and Satisfaction among Olympic Medalists 625 Victoria Husted Medvec, Scott F. Madey, and Thomas Gilovich 36 Understanding Misunderstanding: Social Psychological Perspectives 636 Emily Pronin, Carolyn Puccio, and Lee Ross B. Expert Judgment 37 Assessing Uncertainty in Physical Constants 666 Max Henrion and Baruch Fischhoff 38 Do Analysts Overreact? 678 Werner F.M. De Bondt and Richard H. Thaler 39 The Calibration of Expert Judgment: Heuristics and Biases Beyond the Laboratory 686 Derek J. Koehler, Lyle Brenner, and Dale Griffin 40 Clinical versus Actuarial Judgment 716 Robyn M. Dawes, David Faust, and Paul E. Meehl 41 Heuristics and Biases in Application 730 Baruch Fischhoff 42 Theory-Driven Reasoning about Plausible Pasts and Probable Futures in World Politics 749 Philip E. Tetlock References 763 Index 855 P1: FYX/FYX P2: FYX/UKS QC: FCH/UKS T1: FCH CB419-Gilovich CB419-Gilovich-FM May 30, 2002 12:3 List of Contributors David A. Armor Jean Czerlinski Department of Psychology Max Planck Institute for Human Yale University Development Maya Bar-Hillel Robyn Dawes Department of Psychology Department of Social & Decision Hebrew University Sciences Dale J. Barr Carnegie Mellon University Department of Psychology Werner De Bondt University of Chicago Department of Finance, Investment & Banking Stephen J. Blumberg University of Wisconsin – Madison National Institutes of Health Nancy Brekke David Dunning Department of Psychology Department of Psychology Lake Forest College Cornell University Lyle Brenner David Faust School of Management Department of Psychology University of Florida University Rhode Island Melissa Finucane Roger Buehler Decision Research Psychology Department Wilfrid Laurier University Baruch Fischhoff Department of Social & Decision David B. Centerbar Sciences Department of Psychology Carnegie Mellon University University of Virginia Shane Frederick Gretchen Chapman Sloan School of Management Psychology Department Massachusetts Institute Rutgers University of Technology Incheol Choi Gerd Gigerenzer Department of Psychology Max Planck Institute for Human Seoul National University Development Robert B. Cialdini Daniel Gilbert Department of Psychology Department of Psychology Arizona State University Harvard University xi P1: FYX/FYX P2: FYX/UKS QC: FCH/UKS T1: FCH CB419-Gilovich CB419-Gilovich-FM May 30, 2002 12:3 xii List of Contributors Thomas Gilovich Donald G. MacGregor Psychology Department Decision Research Cornell University Scott Madey Dale Griffin Psychology Department Department of Commerce Shippensburg University University of British Columbia Laura F. Martignon Max Henrion Max Planck Institute for Human Decision Laboratory Development Ask Jeeves! V. H. Medvec Amy D. Holzberg Kellogg Graduate School Department of Psychology of Management Cornell University Northwestern University Christopher Jepson
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