How Should We Think About Americans' Beliefs About Economic Mobility?
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Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 13, No. 3, May 2018, pp. 297–304 How should we think about Americans’ beliefs about economic mobility? Shai Davidai∗ Thomas Gilovich† Abstract Recent evidence suggests that Americans’ beliefs about upward mobility are overly optimistic. Davidai & Gilovich (2015a), Kraus & Tan (2015), and Kraus (2015) all found that people overestimate the likelihood that a person might rise up the economic ladder, and underestimate the likelihood that they might fail to do so. However, using a different methodology, Chambers, Swan and Heesacker (2015) reported that Americans’ beliefs about mobility are much more pessimistic. Swan, Chambers, Heesacker and Nero (2017) provide a much-needed summary of these conflicting findings and question the utility of measuring population-level biases in judgments of inequality and mobility. We value their summary but argue that their conclusion is premature. By focusing on measures that best tap how laypeople naturally think about the distribution of income, we believe that researchers can draw meaningful conclusions about the public’s perceptions of economic mobility. When more ecologically representative measures are used, the consistent finding is that Americans overestimate the extent of upward mobility in the United States. To explain the divergent findings in the literature, we provide evidence that the methods used by Chambers et al. (2015) inadvertently primed participants to think about immobility rather than mobility. Finally, using a novel method to examine beliefs about economic mobility, we show that Americans indeed overestimate the degree of mobility in the United States. Keywords: social mobility, inequality, political ideology, lay beliefs 1 Introduction are Americans’ beliefs about economic mobility? We have found that Americans appear to have unrealistic ideas about The rise of economic inequality in the United States over the upward mobility in the U.S., believing that people are signif- past four decades (Piketty & Saez, 2014) has been associated icantly more likely to rise up the economic ladder than they with a host of negative consequences at the individual, in- actually are. When we asked a large, nationally representa- terpersonal, and societal levels (Payne, 2017). Nevertheless, tive sample of adults to estimate the future relative standing despite living in one of the Western world’s most econom- of a person born to a family in the poorest 20% of the in- ically unequal countries, the rising gap between the rich come distribution, respondents significantly underestimated and the poor in the United States does not appear to be a the likelihood of remaining there and significantly overesti- major concern for most Americans (Pew Research Center, mated the likelihood of rising to the middle quintile or higher 2012; Gallup, 2016). Bernie Sanders’ failed Democratic (Davidai & Gilovich, 2015a). Shortly after our paper was primary bid notwithstanding, economic inequality played a published, Kraus & Tan (2015) likewise reported that partic- relatively minor role in the campaigns run by the two major ipants systematically overestimate the chances of rising up parties in the most recent U.S. Presidential election, with the the economic ladder (e.g., indicating that an individual has candidates focusing instead on immigration, terrorism, and roughly a one-in-six chance of rising from the bottom to the personal scandal. Why do Americans seem so willing to top quintile of the income distribution when the actual like- accept vast economic inequality? lihood is closer to one-in-twenty). Thus, Americans seem One reason for this apparent tolerance of inequality may to overestimate the degree of upward mobility in the United lie in people’s beliefs about meritocracy and upward mo- States (for a pre-registered replication, see Kraus, 2015). bility (Kluegel & Smith, 1986). Americans may be will- But whereas Davidai & Gilovich (2015a), Kraus and Tan ing to accept large discrepancies between the “haves” and (2015), and Kraus (2015) found that people overestimate the “have-nots” because they believe that people can easily the likelihood of rising up the economic ladder, Chambers, rise up the economic ladder. But can they? How accurate Swan and Heesacker (2015) reported data indicating that Americans underestimate the degree of upward mobility in Copyright: © 2018. The authors license this article under the terms of the United States. In addressing these conflicting findings, the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License. Swan, Chambers, Heesacker, and Nero (2017) conclude that ∗The New School for Social Research. Email: [email protected]. studying the accuracy of lay beliefs about economic mobility †Cornell University is “the wrong target for judgment and decision making sci- 297 Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 13, No. 3, May 2018 Conceptualizing perceptions of social mobility 298 entists,” who would be better off channeling “future efforts ply that psychologists should give up on the quest to better away from the question of population-level bias.” Although understand people’s beliefs about economic mobility. we sympathize with the desire to move on from a topic that Indeed, given what has been learned in the past half- elicits such diametrically opposed findings, we believe there century from research on judgment and decision making, it is still much to be learned about lay beliefs about inequal- would be surprising if judgments of mobility were not influ- ity and economic mobility. Whether people overestimate enced by subtle differences in research methods, and there or underestimate upward mobility has considerable practical are many such differences in the methods used by Davidai & importance, and resolving the inconsistencies in the results Gilovich (2015a) and Chambers et al., (2015). For example, to date can shed light on basic processes of human judg- whereas Davidai & Gilovich (2015a) asked participants to ment. Thus, rather than attributing the diverging findings to think about an individual’s likelihood of rising up the eco- “methodological fragility” (Swan et al., 2017), we believe it nomic ladder in the future, Chambers et al., (2015) asked is important to examine which methods of assessment best them to consider the frequency of a cohort of individuals capture people’s underlying beliefs about economic mobility. who had experienced mobility/immobility in the past. Given To do so, it is necessary to understand why Chambers et that different mental processes are recruited in judgments of al. (2015) reached such different conclusions from those of probabilities versus frequencies (Kahneman, 2011), it is to Davidai & Gilovich (2015a), Kraus & Tan (2015), and Kraus be expected that people would judge an individual’s likeli- (2015). How can seemingly similar approaches lead to such hood of rising up the economic ladder differently than the divergent conclusions about lay beliefs about mobility? The proportion of people who had experienced such mobility. answer, like the devil, is in the details, and it is the nuanced And given that people put more weight on effort and free effects of these details that we explore here. Like Swan et will when thinking about events in the future than in the al., (2017), we believe that subtle methodological differences past (Helzer & Gilovich, 2012), it is not surprising that they influenced each research group’s findings and, as a conse- would expect more mobility in the future than the past. Fi- quence, the conclusions drawn. However, we argue that the nally, to the extent that the label “lower class” brings to mind different methods of assessment are not equally effective at negative associations that go beyond mere income or wealth, tapping people’s underlying beliefs about economic mobil- it is not surprising that characterizing people at the bottom ity. When researchers use measures that more closely fit with of the income distribution as “lower class” (as Chambers et al., 2015 did) might lead participants to think in terms of how people naturally think about the distribution of income, immobility rather than mobility. It is likely that any sub- a reliable pattern emerges. set of these methodological differences contributed to the conflicting findings highlighted by Swan et al. (2017). But arguably the most consequential difference between 2 How should psychologists think the methods used by Davidai & Gilovich (2015a), Kraus & about economic inequality and mo- Tan (2015), and Kraus (2015), on the one hand, and those used by Chambers et al., (2015), on the other, is how the bility? researchers divided the economic distribution in the United States. Whereas the former researchers asked participants to At the heart of judgment and decision making research is estimate movement up or down an economic ladder with five the insight that judgments can be pushed around by small, rungs (labeled as the richest 20%, the second-richest 20%, seemingly minor features of the prevailing context. People’s the middle 20%, the second-poorest 20%, and the poorest judgments are powerfully influenced by the order of the ques- 20%), Chambers et al. (2015) asked them to estimate mobil- tions asked (Strack, Martin & Schwarz, 1988), the framing ity along three rungs—the lower class, the middle class, and of the prospects presented (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984), the upper class. Although this difference in the depiction of the numerical values of the response scales used (Schwarz, the economic distribution might seem trivial, we believe that Knauper, Hippler, Noelle-Neuman & Clark, 1991), and by it goes a long way toward explaining the conflicting findings whether options are assessed in isolation or in the presence regarding judgments of mobility. Swan et al. (2017) would of other alternatives (Davidai & Shafir, 2018; Hsee, 1996), surely agree. This point, in essence, was one of the main whether respondents are asked to accept or reject different claims in their paper. But, unlike them, we also argue that the alternatives (Shafir, 1993), whether respondents are asked to 5-rung approach better taps how both laypeople and experts opt-in or opt-out of a course of action (Davidai, Gilovich & naturally tend to think about mobility.