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The Illusion of Transparency and the Alleviation of Speech Anxietyq Journal of Experimental Social Psychology Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 39 (2003) 618–625 www.elsevier.com/locate/jesp The illusion of transparency and the alleviation of speech anxietyq Kenneth Savitskya,* and Thomas Gilovichb a Department of Psychology, Bronfman Science Center, Williams College, Williamstown, MA 01267, USA b Department of Psychology, Uris Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853, USA Received 1 July 2002; revised 25 March 2003 Abstract Individuals often believe their internal states are more apparent to others than is actually the case, a phenomenon known as the illusion of transparency. In the domain of public speaking, for example, individuals who are nervous about delivering a public speech believe their nervousness is more apparent to their audience than it actually is, a finding we document in Study 1. We contend that the illusion of transparency can play a role in the self-exacerbating nature of speech anxiety, and show in Study 2 that an awareness of the illusion can improve the quality of a speakerÕs performance, from both the speakerÕs own perspective and in the eyes of observers. Discussion focuses on the application of these findings to the treatment of speech anxiety and other forms of social anxiety. Ó 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved. I turn pale at the outset of a speech and quake in every limb and McFarland, 1987, 1991; Vorauer & Ross, 1999). This in all my soul. illusion derives from the difficulty people have in getting Cicero, De Oratore beyond their own phenomenological experience when Individuals often wish to conceal their internal states. attempting to determine how they appear to others. The Anxiety over approaching a potential romantic partner, adjustment one makes from the ‘‘anchor’’ of oneÕs own feelings of disgust over a disagreeable entreee served at a phenomenology, like adjustments to anchors generally, dinner party, or nervousness over delivering a public tends to be insufficient (Chapman & Johnson, 2002; speech—all are internal states one may wish, for a va- Epley & Gilovich, 2001, 2003; Jacowitz & Kahneman, riety of reasons, to keep private. 1995; Savitsky & MacIntosh, 2003). As a result, people How well can people conceal their internal states, exaggerate the extent to which their internal states and how well do they believe they can do so? Research ‘‘leak out’’ and overestimate the extent to which others suggests that individuals are typically better at dis- can detect their private feelings. guising their internal states than they believe—i.e., The illusion of transparency has been documented in people are prone to an illusion of transparency, or a a variety of domains and across a number of procedural belief that their thoughts, feelings, and emotions are variations (Gilovich & Savitsky, 1999). In one study, more apparent to others than is actually the case participants who were asked to tell lies believed they had (Gilovich, Savitsky, & Medvec, 1998; Miller & leaked more cues to their deception than they actually had and overestimated the extent to which others could detect their falsehoods. In another study, participants q Portions of this research were presented at the annual meeting of who sampled foul-tasting drinks in view of an observer the Eastern Psychological Association, Boston, 1998. This research believed that their disgust was more apparent than was was supported by Research Grant MH45531 from the National actually the case (Gilovich et al., 1998). Other research Institute of Mental Health and SBR9319558 from the National Science has demonstrated that individuals overestimate the ex- Foundation. We thank Adi Bar-Lev and Lucy Berk for serving as experimenters in Study 2. tent to which their internal states are apparent to others * Corresponding author. Fax: 1-413-597-2085. in contexts as varied as negotiations (Van Boven, E-mail address: [email protected] (K. Savitsky). Gilovich, & Medvec, in press; Vorauer & Claude, 1998), 0022-1031/$ - see front matter Ó 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/S0022-1031(03)00056-8 K. Savitsky, T. Gilovich / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 39 (2003) 618–625 619 police interrogations (Kassin & Fong, 1999), and po- illusion of transparency, their anxiety can become self- tential emergencies (Gilovich et al., 1998). perpetuating. An individual who experiences some One purpose of the present investigation is to expand anxiety while giving a speech may believe it is more further the range of situations to which the illusion of apparent to the audience than is actually the case. This transparency applies by investigating a domain in which thought—that the audience is aware of just how nervous such a misconception can be both profound and con- he or she feels—may ironically serve to make the speaker sequential: public speaking. Many individuals report all the more nervous. The speaker may then believe that experiencing significant anxiety when called upon to this newfound nervousness is itself apparent to others, speak in public (Leary & Kowalski, 1995; McCroskey, leading to still more nervousness, concerns about leak- 1 1970, 1977)—anxiety that can interfere with oneÕs social age, and so on. life and education, lead to job absenteeism, and even Speech anxiety may thus be an example of what force one to change careers (Hohenstein, 1986; Monroe, Storms and McCaul (1976) have termed a ‘‘self-exac- Borzi, & Burrell, 1992; Stein, Walker, & Forde, 1996). erbating syndrome.’’ They note that the experience of These individuals may anchor on their internal sensa- certain conditions, such as stuttering, insomnia, or tions of anxiety, correct insufficiently for the fact that writerÕs block, can lead to an ironic increase in those others are less privy to those sensations than they are very conditions (cf., Ascher & Schotte, 1999; Wegner, themselves, and consequently overestimate the extent to 1997; Wegner, Broome, & Blumberg, 1997). We believe which their anxiety is apparent to onlookers. As Miller the illusion of transparency may lend a similar self- and McFarland (1991) note, ‘‘in anxiety-provoking sit- exacerbating quality to speech anxiety. At the same uations, it is often very difficult for people to believe time, however, the realization that oneÕs nervousness is that, despite feeling highly nervous, they do not appear less apparent than one thinks may be useful in allevi- highly nervous’’ (p. 310). ating speech anxiety: If individuals can be convinced Indeed, the literature on speech anxiety provides that their internal sensations are not manifested in some evidence consistent with this possibility. In par- their external appearance, one source of their anxiety ticular, several studies have shown discrepancies be- can be attenuated, allowing them to relax and even tween speakersÕ self-ratings and ratings provided by improving the quality of their performance. Thus, others. Behnke, Sawyer, and King (1987) found that speakers who know about the illusion of transparency public speakers felt more nervous than audience mem- may tend to give better speeches than speakers who do bers believed they did, and Rapee and Lim (1992) found not. that participants evaluated their own speeches more We put this speculation to empirical test in Study 2, negatively than they were evaluated by their audience. examining whether knowledge of the illusion of trans- In the only existing study that reports the key compar- parency can alleviate speech anxiety. But first we seek, in ison between how speakers thought they would be Study 1, to document the illusion of transparency in the evaluated by others and how others actually evaluated domain of public speaking. them, Mansell and Clark (1999) found that socially anxious individuals did indeed overestimate how anx- ious they appeared during an extemporaneous speech Study 1 performance, relative to the judgments of observers. Unfortunately, however, their report does not permit an Participants delivered extemporaneous speeches in assessment of whether this effect held true for their pairs. Each speaker then rated the degree to which he or sample as a whole. she appeared nervous during his or her speech, as well Given the uncertain nature of the existing evidence on as the extent to which his or her counterpart appeared this issue, our first goal in the present investigation was nervous. We expected speakers to overestimate the to collect unambiguous evidence of an illusion of transparency in the domain of public speaking. Our second goal was to explore a significant implication of 1 In fact, an individual need not even experience any bona fide the illusion of transparency—how it can exacerbate the nervousness to set this cycle in motion. Normal preparatory arousal, intensity of speech anxiety, and, more important, how stemming from the simple need to ‘‘get with it’’ and mobilize whatever cognitive and motor programs are required to perform the task at an awareness of the illusion (that is, an appreciation that hand, may be misattributed to pangs of anxiety and self-doubt. As oneÕs anxiety is typically not as apparent to others as one Olson (1988) notes, ‘‘the distinction between arousal caused by suspects) can help alleviate that anxiety. Many people Ôgearing up for a speechÕ and arousal caused by Ôspeech anxietyÕ is report that one component of their fear of public subtle’’ (p. 766). Thus, the individual may reason heuristically and speaking is the concern that they will ‘‘tremble, shake, or conclude, ‘‘If I am feeling these feelings of arousal, I must be nervous about giving this speech’’ (Savitsky, Medvec, Charlton, & Gilovich, show some other signs of anxiety’’ (Stein et al., 1996, p. 1998). The concern that such feelings are apparent to others, then, may 172). In other words, people are often nervous about give rise to a more genuine experience of anxiety, which the individual looking nervous. If public speakers are prone to an may think is also leaking out, and so on. 620 K. Savitsky, T. Gilovich / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 39 (2003) 618–625 extent to which their nervousness was apparent, and order: first vs.
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