A BI-ANNUAL PUBLICATION OF MAGAZINE FALL 2016 VOLUME 2, ISSUE 2

06 - 07 14 - 15 16 - 17 20 - 21 28 - 29 1GNC: MNC NE: LANDCOM: LANDCOM: POLAD: From Nato Response Force Eye On The Northeast Understanding Open LANDCOM Participated In Warsaw Summit A Step Further To Joint Taskforce Source Intelligence Exercise ANAKONDA 2016 Towards Strengthening NATO-EU Partnership UKR Headquarters ROU RUS BGR GEO

GRC ARM Izmir Allied Land IRN

SYR Command IRQ

Table of Contents Exercıse Brilliant Jump 2016, Żagań 6 From Nato Response Force To Joint Taskforce (Land) - 1GnNC ANAKONDA 2016 8 Preparating To Fight In A Negated Space 22 Global Classification Of Mountains - NATO Environment MWCOE 10 Air Land Integration For Joint Taskforce - 26 Area Denial – NATO Challenges For Today NRDC TUR 28 Warsaw Summit a Step Further towards 12 LANDCOM G6 Seminar And strengthening NATO-EU Partnership Interoperability Conference 30 LANDCOM CIS Mobile Training Team Visit To 14 Eye On The Northeast - MNCNE Serbia 16 Understanding Open Source Intelligence 32 Nato Strategic Direction South A New (OSINT) Strategic Reality 18 NATO: How To Synchronize And Integrate 35 SACEUR Recognition Award Multinational Fires? - NRDC ESP 36 Visits And Key Events 20 LANDCOM Participated In Exercise

Exercıse ANAKONDA 16,

The LANDPOWER Magazine is a bi-annual publication produced by Allied Land Command (LANDCOM) dedicated to the promotion of actions and ideas contributing to the improvement of the NATO Force Structure (NFS) efficiency and effectiveness. Most of the authors belong to the command but the views and opinions expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect those of the LANDCOM Commander, SACEUR, NATO or its member nations and none can be quoted as an official statement of those entities. An electronic version that includes additional links to in-depth articles, supplementary articles and an ability to provide online comments is available from the LANDCOM website (www.lc..int). All articles are edited for content.

To contact The LANDPOWER Magazine staff and/or to submit an article to be The LANDPOWER Magazine TEAM AT LANDCOM HQ: published in the next issue of LandPower (Spring 2017– Deadline for submission: Lieutenant Colonel (USA) Matthew R. Gregory Senior Editor March 15, 2017), please use the following contacts: Captain (TUR) Ismet Istekli Asst Content Coordinator E-mail: [email protected] Sergeant First Class (ESP) Fernando Ruiz Desıgn Edıtor Postal: Public Affairs Office, Mr. Claudio Ranierı (ITA) Asst Content Coordinator General Vecihi Akin Garrison 35148 Izmir / Cover and Back Pictures: Exercise Brilliant Jump 2016 In Żagań Poland. Provided Special thanks to the commitment of the staffs at both Allied Land Command and each of the Graduated by MNC NE PAO. Readiness Forces for their contributions to this edition. The Allied Land Command COMMANDER’S MESSAGE

Lieutenant General Darryl A.Williams Commander

t the time of writing this handing over a highly capable and article I am just shy of functioning team. A 120 days in Command . As such this will be a reflection of It is indeed an exciting time to my first impressions having recent- be in NATO. Post Warsaw we have ly visited SHAPE, NATO, each of the the distinct responsibility and hon- nine Graduated Response Force HQs or to play our role in the evolution (GRF-L), plus Multinational Division of the Alliance and let there be no Southeast (MND-SE), Sister Service doubt that the land forces are criti- Components, Joint Force Commands cal in this endeavor. We cannot rest and other key stakeholders such as on our laurels or accomplishments of NATO Special Operations Headquar- our predecessors. The security envi- ters. I come away from this whirl- ronment and operational context will wind tour across Europe and Turkey continue to remain ambiguous and with a sense of confidence and pride; complex. We must remain committed confidence in the strength and unity to high levels of readiness and agility. of the Alliance that is extant in these LANDCOM will continue to provide headquarters as demonstrated by ex- strategic advice to SACEUR and the tremely capable Commanders and SHAPE Staff on all land domain matters and provide several Soldiers and pride in being able to call myself a member of key proponent roles on land domain matters including but this incredible team of teams that comprise the Alliance and not limited to: it’s partner nations. The state of the land forces is strong, cohesive, and vibrant. For any ally or potential adversary to ¡ ³¨µ«ª¶´ í÷ µ¨»¶÷ Žðåòè ìùæ åòè ÷ùôôóöø÷ think otherwise would be incorrect. NATO and its partners. ¡ ³¨µ«ª¶´åèúóçåøé÷êóöøìéðåòèèóñåíò† My initial focus was to get out on the ground and see as ¡ ³¨µ«ª¶´ í÷ øìé çóòèùíø êóö éòìåòçíòë åòè éòå- much of the NATO Command Structure (NCS) and NATO bling, in a complimentary manner, the capability and capac- Force Structure (NFS) as well as key stakeholders in other ity already extant with the Alliance and partner land forces. domains. It was important for me to do so as part of my in- ¡ ³¨µ«ª¶´í÷ùòíõùéðýôó÷íøíóòéèøó÷éöúéå÷çóò- itial commander’s assessment. Meeting as many key players nective tissue amongst the NATO Force Structure (NFS) as personally and getting to, “know you before I need you”, as well as between the NFS and NATO Command Structure my good friend Mikhail at 1 GNC so aptly stated, was of the (NCS). Serving as the bridge between the tactical and oper- utmost importance to me. I know that this challenged you ational to the strategic. Exercıse ANAKONDA 16, Poland and your staff with off-site travel and the associated tasks ¡ ³¨µ«ª¶´ í÷ ùòíõùéðý ôó÷íøíóòéè øó ÷éöúé å÷ øìé with a Command visit. The time, insights and perspectives “key link” between the land domain and the sister services of each of you offered was instrumental in allowing me to best the NCS and other key stakeholders (NSHO, CoEs, JALLC, form my initial assessment and gain fundamental under- NATO School, etc) standing of the entire enterprise. It will allow myself and the LANDCOM team to better advocate on your behalf. Additionally, LANDCOM must be agile and capable enough to provide the core element of a Land Component Being able to see with my own eyes the incredible ca- Command HQ in crisis for a Major Joint Operation (MJO+). pability and capacity of land forces was truly inspiring. This By ensuring we are capable we provide SACEUR with the is a testament to the great teams you all command as well agility that comes with an additional option for a mission as the LANDCOM staff. I offer personal thanks to my pre- command element. This provides him depth and agility in decessor GEN Nicholson, as well as LTG Paulo Ruggiero, for terms of decision space – something critical to any com- The Allied Land Command COMMANDER’S MESSAGE

mander. To this end, LANDCOM will find itself deployed tionally, we must continue to ensure we inform and nest to Stavanger, next year for exercise Trident Javelin with both SHAPE and the two Joint Headquarters as we 2017. This will be a great opportunity to test and capture move forward with Enhanced Forward Presence, MJO(+) critical lessons learned for MJO(+) doctrine, standardiza- concepts and doctrine, Tailored Forward Presence, and tion and interoperability. We have already begun our own NATO Strategic Direction South to mention just some of internal training as we start on glide path to this exercise. the vitally important work that will continue moving for- I look forward to this exercise and working alongside many ward. This work serves as a reminder to all of the cohesion, of you as LANDCOM is evaluated. It will be another great determination, and readiness of the Alliance to respond in opportunity to continue to fortify and grow this team of order to fulfill the outcomes of Warsaw – Deter and Defend teams that comprises the Alliance. and Project Stability. You and your teams play a vital role in ensuring that the ambitions and aim of Warsaw in fact remain reality and not hollow words. Lastly, I wish to take a brief moment and thank everyone for the collaborative effort and undertaking as we continue to work through Graduated Response Plans In closing, I will start where I began. I am incredibly (GRPs). I have received initial briefings on GRP 3 and am confident in this team of teams because of your demon- once again incredibly impressed with the professionalism strated competence, capability and capacity. I am extreme- and skill of both my staff and your teams of planners who ly proud to be a member of the Alliance and your advocate. contribute to these planning efforts. We could not execute Our diversity is our strength and together we can accom- this without your support. I look forward to starting work plish any mission, anywhere, anytime. on GRP4 and the continued level of collaboration. Addi-

For the Soldier! The Allied Land Command For the Soldier!

Chief Warrant Oficer Stephen A. Rice Commander Senior Enlisted Leader

rior to sitting down to Commander as I am afforded the write the Command rare opportunity into his personal Sergeant Major Message space. Establishing and finding my for theP 5th edition of LAND POWER new role within the HQ and the magazine, I could not help myself in Commander’s battlespace will be my reading past messages in the archives. next bound as I establish trust with It is evident that much work has been the Commander and this will pave the done in promoting the NCO corps, way forward to where I can provide describing Command Senior Enlisted the most value. I look forward to the Leader (CSEL) focus areas and being 9th Land Commanders conference in an advocate for the Command Team November to be held in Strasbourg, concept. These are all things that . This will be the first time institutional leaders do in order to for myself to gather the Corps better the NCO corps and strengthen CSEL’s. Topics that I see beneficial the Alliance. Obviously much work are promoting LANDCOM and has been done and it would be wrong not to recognize my NCO Corps social media, NATO Protocol and parade predecessor CWO Daniel Moyer who has truly set the bar standardization/data bank, and CSEL visits to other Corps high for me to follow. Dan, you have left a strong impression exercises which will promote the power of Senior Enlisted with many national CSEL’s and many junior leaders during Leaders. your numerous speaking engagements supporting NATO’s intermediate and advance level leadership courses. Your In closing I am truly honored to have the work has not gone unnoticed and I would like to recognize opportunity to fill the Land Command Senior Enlisted you for your efforts and for a job well done. Leader position. I look forward to my new role and will be focused on ensuring and enabling the NCO corps to be a With only two months in the chair, I have yet to find postured and ready force, which is interoperable and able to my comfort zone. As with any new leader, I have spent the adapt to the current complex environment. I’m also excited first couple of months traveling and establishing contacts to assist in the development of a resilient NCO corps, while up and out within the NATO Command Structure, which promoting quality of life for our soldiers and their families. will provide huge dividends while I try to establish my own NCO network, down and in. Attending the International Senior Enlisted Seminar in Garmisch, and the CSEL course at the NATO School in Oberammergau, I have met all of the key players that will set the stage in filling my new role as LAND COMMAND Senior Enlisted Leader. For the Soldier! Concurrently, I have been building a relationship with the From NATO Response

1 German Netherland Corps http://www.1gnc.org/ Force To Joint Taskforce (Land) By 1GNC PAO

Exercise Truthful Sword 2016: On the Way to VJTF (Photo by CPL Allesıo Felix, 1GNC Publıc Afaırs)

hen the stand-by period for NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task ForceW ended in mid 2015, 1(German/ ) Corps (1GNC) had to change its structure and mindset from being at the level of Land Component Command (LCC) to that of being a Joint Taskforce (Land) (JTF(L)) for Small Joint Operations. Tis means that 1GNC has to be able to lead up to one division while at the same time it needs to plan for maritime, air and special operations. Te framework nations and the Netherlands prefer to use the so-called integrated model, i.e. being both the JTF plan and conduct land-centric Small Joint on a permanent basis, but mainly in the headquarters and the LCC simultaneously. Operations, commanding up to a division. planning and execution of exercises and Te additional personnel that is needed Whilst principally acting in a “double- operations. to execute this model will be provided by hatted” mode whenever feasible, it will split Acting on a diferent level means both framework nations as augmenters. tactical and operational responsibilities as other responsibilities and this requires required. a diferent set of Standard Operating Integrated model As a frst visible sign of the structural Procedures (SOPs). 1GNC has put great reorganisation the branch indication efort in rewriting its SOPs and brought Acting as a JTF HQ (L), 1GNC must changed from General to Joint. But more them completely in line with those of be able to cope with both tactical and important is the signifcant organisational SHAPE. operational levels of war. Whilst 1GNC is change of the formation of the new J35 to provide sufcient Direction & Guidance What was next was the use of cell within the J3 branch for mid term to the subordinate formations to perform various Functional Area Systems. All synchronisation and planning. their missions, it has to concurrently operations planning should be done in synchronize its land-centric objectives and Although 1GNC has had an Air NATO TOPFAS. With the help of the joint efects with SHAPE, other supporting Operations Coordination Cell in its NATO Communications and Information component commands, and the political/ midst, this does not sufce to become a Systems School in Latina, , the Corps’ civilian framework in theatre. In order fully fedged JTF HQ. Terefore 1GNC planners were taught how to use TOPFAS. to best organise this challenge, the HQ has requested additional personnel from the framework nations Germany and structure has been adapted to a mission Stepping stones tailored Integrated Model. Tis new the Netherlands to augment its staf with Exercise Truthful Sword 2016 was mission tailored JTF HQ (L) will be able to air, maritime and SOF expertise. Not

6 LAND POWER

Exercise Truthful Sword 2016: On the Way to VJTF (Photo by CPL Allesıo Felix, 1GNC information updates and thus contributed Publıc Afaırs) to the quality of the Operations Plan. Tis concerted efort led to the certifcation of the CRP and a positive evaluation of the OPLE and OLRT. During exercise ULSD16 it will be the Joint Logistics Support Group (JLSG) and the Initial Command Element (ICE) that are deployed to the Joint Forces Training Centre (JFTC) in Bydgoszcz, Poland and subsequently evaluated by SHAPE. In the scenario the process of Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOMI) will be carried out with three brigades. Some 300 people will be working at the JFTC, but it involves other people from the Corps too. Te ICE and JLSG have a reach back capacity in Münster. SHAPE will certify the JLSG.

TRIDENT JAGUAR 2017 (certifcation exercise) the frst test for 1GNC to adapt from a aferwards, it all worked really well on the Te exercise TRIDENT JAGUAR Land Component Headquarters into a whole. 2017 (TRJR17) aims at certifying 1GNC. JTFHQ(L). In the past it was sufcient Right afer summer leave a large part Tis will be executed while 1GNC to focus on a certain stretch of land of the Corps’ Headquarters was involved conducts a Command Post Exercise at the with a clear focus on mid and long term in the Crisis Response Planning (CRP) in (JWC) in Stavanger, planning. Now, 1GNC had to take a much preparation for exercise Ultimate Sword Norway, during the latter part of March broader view, encompassing both the air 2016 (ULSD16) and Trident Jaguar 2017 and the frst week of April 2017. It builds and maritime domains. (TRJR17). Tis deployment exercise saw upon a Non-Article 5 Crisis Response But this wasn’t quite enough. the Operational Planning Liaison Element Operation (NA5CRO) with a focus on With new players on board (including (OPLE) going to SHAPE in Mons, combat operations. Afer certifcation, a new command group) and new SOPs, for some last guidance on the planning 1GNC will be on stand-by for NATO as 1GNC also decided to run new sofware. being done in Münster. It also entailed JTFHQ(L) from mid 2017 for the duration TOPFAS for the planners, LOGFAS for the the Operational Liaison Reconnaissance of a year. logisticians and LC2IS for the operations Team (OLRT) which was sent to Stavanger side of the house. And it all came to liaise with people on various levels together during exercise Truthful Sword from the scenario’s host nation Arnland. 2016. Although changes had to be made Te OLRT provided the planners with

LAND POWER7 Preparing To Fight In A Negated Space Environment

GPS an important-technology to US troops (Photo by thebalance.com)

magine fghting a war with little or no Position Navigation Timing (PNT), very little over the horizon communications,I and much less respon- sive Strategic Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). Our soldiers on the ground would need to navigate with a map units to fght in a negated space environ- informal, than land, sea or air. and compass, they would have difculty ment. Negation includes denying, disrupt- ing, degrading, deceiving, or destroying an timing radios for secure communications, One can argue that a worldwide prec- asset. Te next NATO engagement with a and be unable to drop precision munitions edent of freedom of maneuver in space was near peer will likely be fought, at least ini- on targets. Te lower echelon units would set on October 4, 1957 when the Soviet Un- tially, in both space and cyberspace. Space be unable to communicate to their higher ion’s Sputnik I orbited over the United States is a key enabler for all domains, with land headquarters unless they were equipped (US) at the height of the Cold War1. Te forces having more users than any other with High-Frequency (HF) radios which US could not have successfully engaged and domain. We ofen take this for granted, but would be voice only. Battlefeld tracking destroyed the satellite during the time and almost every soldier uses Satellite Commu- could be almost non-existent, and higher did not even contest the Soviet Union for nications (SATCOM), Global Positioning headquarters would be unable to obtain overfight of US territory. Tis essentially System (GPS), and receives intelligence ob- Strategic ISR quick enough to support allowed the space domain to become a free tained from space assets. Space is less rigor- the planning process. For this very reason maneuver area for all nations and eventual- ously structured with laws, both formal and leaders at all levels should be training their ly commercial users. Since that time, every- one has been sharing space and no one has intentionally destroyed the satellites of their enemies. If NATO were to become engaged with Russia, then the space domain could change signifcantly.

Space, by nature, has strategic impli- cations. Due to orbital mechanics, a satel- lite is not confned to one region, with the exception of geosynchronous and geosta- tionary orbits, which are commonly used by SATCOM systems. Any destruction of a satellite within the space domain has im- mediate strategic repercussions. Terefore, the US and NATO are attempting to deter A Soldier From Te Britsh Army’s 250th Gurkha Signal Squadron Talks any hostile actions in space. In the simplest on a HF Radio form, we have demonstrated that the alli-

8 LAND POWER

It is not likely that a near peer would A French ofcer working on Exercise Steadfast Cobalt 2015 (SFCT 2015) in Walcz, Poland is backed by an array of satellite communication dishes. NATO troops from over 20 countries are taking part risk a military engagement that could de- in the exercise in Walcz, Poland.- NATO (Photo by SSGT Dan Bardsley GBR A) stroy the use of space. However, the uncer- tainty in the behavior and actions of our adversaries could lead to a confict in space. Te US and NATO have, through precedent and current policies, declared that space is free and should not be a battleground. NATO’s near peers can be assured that we would never intentionally, preemptively, destroy an opponent’s satellite. We cannot assume that our adversaries will respect these same rules because they are actively researching and developing advanced an- ti-satellite technology. ance is also capable of shooting satellites in If there is only one target that the en- their orbits and destroying them. However, emy could destroy without causing massive NATO must prepare to defend our this deterrence theory has problems when disruption to a specifc orbital regime, they space system, mitigate adversary capabili- applied to a confict in space with a near are much more likely to attempt the attack. ties, and train to operate in a negated-space peer. Our adversary’s strategic goal will be However, if you make it impossible for environment. NATO must use the best to even the playing feld against NATO by the opponent to destroy your capabilities knowledge we have about our enemy, their negating our advantage in space. Our en- without causing substantial destruction to policies and their military actions, to shape emies are fully aware that they may lose all other nations, both militarily and eco- our decisions and our counter-actions. Tis all of their space assets in the process, but nomically on a global scale, then the threat potential campaign in space has major im- this may be part of their plan. Tey believe of punishment from the entire world may plications to the world order, much like the that if NATO does not have an advantage prevent kinetic action in space. Simply by Cold War. Tis time, global life does not in space, that their military, through sheer launching more satellites and creating more hang in the balance, but the global econ- numbers, can defeat our militaries or make targets, NATO can prevent an enemy from omy and quite possibly the use of certain the confict so difcult NATO will give up attacking the space domain. orbital regimes are at risk. If the wrong de- before the war escalates. Terefore, our cision is made, on either side, the lives of strategy must shif to resiliency through everyone on Earth (not just the soldier on On the 11th of January in 2007, the disaggregation. Disaggregation is make the ground) will not be able to cope with Chinese Military intentionally destroyed more, less expensive, one mission satellites possible impacts. Additionally, at this time one of their own weather satellites in Low- instead of spending excessive amounts of there is no way to clean up space debris, Earth Orbit (LEO) creating a massive debris money on one satellite that can do multi- which may leave certain orbital regimes cloud from 200km to 3800km in altitude, ple missions. In 2013, U.S. Air Force Gen. useless for hundreds of years. In any case, which is almost the entire LEO regime. Tis William Shelton said, “beyond the necessi- our land forces must be prepared to fght event has caused other satellites in LEO to ty of fnding efciencies and cost savings, in a negated space environment. Commu- maneuver in order to avoid a collision, re- we may very well fnd that disaggregated nications might be slower and less efcient, ducing mission life on those satellites4. Te or dispersed constellations of satellites will PNT may not work, and ISR may be much Chinese, with this one action, created a de- yield greater survivability, robustness and more difcult to obtain. Leaders must be bris feld that will remain in orbit for dec- resilience in light of environmental and aware that a negated space environment is ades to come. Tose specifc orbits are now adversarial threats2.” Part of the solution to highly likely, and should train their units to more difcult to operate within efectively. this problem is Operationally Responsive operate with degraded space capabilities. Space (ORS). ORS is a program designed to provide simple, one-mission, satellites in 1 Garber, Steve. “NASA - HISTORY HOME.” Sputnik and Te Dawn of the space Age. order to deliver capabilities to the warfght- October 10, 2007. Accessed September 28, 2016. er in operationally relevant time lines3. Tis 2 is a form of strategic messaging designed to Olsen, James M. “Op-Ed | U.S. Air Force Takes Positive Step with space Based Envi- inform our enemies that if they attack our ronmental Monitoring RFI - spaceNews.com.” spaceNews.com. 2016. Accessed September 29, satellites, they will not be able to negate all 2016. of NATO’s advantages in space. Tis, hope- 3 “ORS Background.” Accessed September 28, 2016. http://www.kirtland.af.mil/Portals/52/ fully, deters our enemies from attempting documents/AFD-150701-028.pdf?ver=2016-06-28-112634-317. to destroy any NATO satellite assets. 4 David, Leonard. “Chinau0027s Anti-Satellite Test: Worrisome Debris Cloud Circles Earth | space.com.” February 2, 2007. Accessed September 28, 2016.

LAND POWER9 Air Land Integration For

HEADQUARTERS NATO RAPID DEPLOY- Joint Taskforce ABLE CORPS- TURKEY: www.hrf.tu.nato.int

Land, Air and Maritime. Whilst this article to ‘Coordinate’ which is ‘bring diferent ele- is written from the Air Perspective, the is- ments into a harmonious efcient relation- sues of Air Land Integration (ALI) are in ship’. A defnition of ALI could therefore be, fact entirely relevant across all components ‘Te focused orchestration and application and, most importantly, within the JTF HQ. of the full range of Air and Land capabilities f you can knit up the power of Moreover, although it will touch upon some within a Joint Force to realize efect…… the Army on the land and the of the characteristics of airpower, it is not regardless of component to which they be- power of the Air in the sky, then meant to be a lesson in how to integrate air- long, operating together to achieve a com- nothing‘I will stand against you and you will power into the Joint battle space, the pro- mon aim’. Air Power, however, is recognised never lose a battle’. Field Marshal Mont- cesses and procedures; its aim, however, is as ‘Te ability to project power from the air gomery, North Africa Campaign 1943. to ofer the mantra of ‘Understand Together, in order to infuence the behavior of people Train Together, Fight Together’ – in that or- or the course of events. In this, Infuence is As we fnd ourselves in an era of both der, and that this is a cyclical and continual usually a strategic goal, although Air also regular and irregular warfare, and operat- process and to challenge all of those within has other specifc purposes which demon- ing within a spectrum of activities compris- a JTF HQ to acknowledge that ‘Jointness’ strate its utility across the Strategic, Opera- ing the Comprehensive Approach, modern extends far beyond relabeling ‘J numbers’, tional and Tactical spectrum: Control of the warfare and its battle space are arguably and to ask ‘what else could I/we do?’ Air, Rapid Mobility and Lif, Intelligence more complex that at any time previous- and Situational Awareness, and Coercion. With respect to Land operations, Air Pow- ly. In addition, current Doctrine indicates Te Oxford English Dictionary de- er’s greatest contribution is through control that military success relies on the joint ef- fnes ‘Integrate’ as ‘combining one thing of the air, enabling surface manoeuvre and forts of the 3 environmental components of with another to form a whole’, as opposed the ability of commanders to retain the initiative. Rapid Lif and Mobility, whilst acknowledging limitations of payload, is Tree key elements of successful Air-Land Integration nevertheless a rapid and precise way to deploy and sustain forces. Intelligence and Situational Awareness can now be provid- ed, through long endurance UAVs/Space, in real-time and over extended periods, reducing an Air Power weakness of lack of persistence, and satisfying the emphasis of contemporary operations on intelligence and the Find function. Finally, one of Air Power’s greatest strengths, Reach, provides a commander with the ability to extend continuous coercive efect over distance.

So, for the JTF, what is ALI? As can be expected, ALI within a Land-focused HQ is usually associated with Close Air Support (CAS) or Air Interdiction (AI). But ALI is far more than CAS or AI, or even just bringing to bear the inherent strengths of

10LAND POWER

Needless to say, the air battle is complex, and le- thal with imperative need for highly disciplined agile command and control processes Lot of noise and moving parts in this picture that not only got your attention here but require the undivided attention of those who conduct the air battle However, a very silent and invisible part of this picture is the massive amount information that must fow, uninhibited, uninterrupted, and un- corrupted to make all the movement happen at the right time, and in the right place. While this picture depicts a mature theater, peacetime and contingency ops can be just as complicated. Complex ROE in an area with little infrastructure can require lots of infor- mation sharing between in-theater assets and remote C2 nodes. But there also needs to be a true un- derstanding of the other Components in order to build trust. However, developing all of this is not easy; this lesson is hard- learned, but also highly perishable and easily forgotten. ALI has traditionally fol- lowed a cyclical pattern; it improves when Land and Air are forced together through the imperative of confict, or Exercise, and Air Power (Speed, Reach and Flexibility) inforce each other from the start. Tis re- then reverts to single-service habits when in a kinetic fashion, such that the airman quires quality, knowledgeable and empow- these no longer apply. would see Air as being able to provide the ered individuals to be incorporated within Commander with many capabilities for the the staf and Components. In terms of the In summary, ALI within the JTF beneft of the overall Plan. However, the planning stage, I ofer some thoughts: HQ is a concept that requires strong joint soldier generally expects to have Air Power - Control of the air allows air and relationships, efective and relevant joint on-call, when and where he needs it – and surface manoeuvre. training, an awareness of joint doctrine to be able to see and feel its efects through - Air Power allows the airman to and capabilities, and detailed coordination CAS. Tis, however, reduces Air’s strength fght or coerce an enemy before anyone else and liaison from the outset of planning for of being able to achieve Strategic efect one can. an operation; there also needs to be a real day, and tactical efect the next. Indeed, this willingness to cooperate. Experience has - Air attacks on strategic assets can philosophy has also resulted from the ‘les- shown that these requirements rapidly di- shape the land environment before a deci- sons’ of recent conficts (such Op TELIC or minish as conficts/Exercises end because sive act begins, adding tempo to the fght. HERRICK) where a preliminary air cam- resources reduce and priorities change; paign to shape the battle space was deemed - AI can deal with threats early, that once lost, they take even more time and re- to be unnecessary, that Land would lead the may otherwise require CAS later but with sources to replace. Within a JTF HQ, ALI ofensive and Air would follow on through increased risk. should be a day-to-day activity, not a tech- CAS and Reconnaissance. But this ignored - Air Recce, manned and un- nique brought out when required. It is a the fact that Iraq’s air defences had been manned, ofers greater reach and fexibility challenging concept to achieve, even in an progressively degraded since the end of the than Land Recce, although the Land/Air era of high technology equipment and net- First Gulf War and Afghanistan had no air/ mix of information is optimum. working; in the end, the weak link is invari- anti-air capability at all. - Air Mobility, for light or special ably the human being. forces, is an accurate way of rapidly project- In fact, Air is not just part of the exe- ing force. Understand, cution of the Plan, or added to a Plan that - Air platforms, particularly fxed- has already been developed….it needs to wing, are increasingly fexible and able to be part of the Plan and truly involved from rapidly switch between tasks within the Train Together, the very start; integration occurs when the same mission, and over large distances. efects of Land and Air are planned to re- then Fight

LAND POWER11 LANDCOM G6 Seminar And Interoperability Conference

s NATO continues to implement improvements and deliverA capabilities to meet the needs of the Coalition, interoperability among nations and multinational NATO forces becomes more important. Critical to the enhanced capability is the Computer Information Systems (CIS) interoperability among the NATO Reaction Forces (NRF). To promote technical interoperability LANDCOM actively encourages CIS interoperability throughout all NATO Land Forces. Since its establishment, LANDCOM has contributed Group Photo From Personnel Participating In Te Conference heavily to the advancement of interoperability as a bridge between attended with representatives from present to inform the GRF(L) CIS staf NATO Command Structure (NCS) across the CIS community, SHAPE, about the status of the agency’s works and NATO Force Structure (NFS). Allied Command Transformation and projects related to Land Forces CIS. One important event in this context (ACT) and full NATO Rapid deployable NATO HQ Consultation, Command is the Annual G6 Conference and Corps (NRDC) representation. and Control (NATO HQ C3) Staf, Interoperability Seminar. Te aim SHAPE, SACT and Joint Forces Commands’ J6 representatives were of the conference is to gather all Tis year’s G6 Seminar and also present to give Joint and NATO Graduated Readiness Land Forces Interoperability Seminar took place level CIS information and expertise to (GRF(L)) CIS managers and planners in NRDC-GRC, Tessaloniki during the Land forces CIS community. to discuss their major CIS projects, the period of 26-30 September challenges, experiences, and to 2016. Tis was the frst time that exchange views. LANDCOM hosts the Conference and Seminar took During the conference and this annual conference to advance place outside of LANDCOM-Izmir. the seminar, a lot of experiences, interoperability by discussing these NRDC-GRC was an excellent host challenges and mitigation points important topics, looking at issues, and elevated the standards. Te entire were briefed by the GRF(L) and fnding solutions to difcult group enjoyed wonderful Tessaloniki representatives. All Corps’ G6’s were problems. During the conference weather, food and hospitality. Along given time to discuss issues important LANDCOM helps to enable CIS with the multinational corps and to their respective organizations. interaction, understanding and Multinational Division – South East Tis discussion gave the other interoperability across the CIS (MND-SE), elements of the NCS were organizations diferent perspectives domain. Tis forum provides the best represented at the conference lending and possible solutions to some of their opportunity to identify, understand their perspective and help in solving own problems. Most of the breaks and track interoperability across the issues. NATO Communications and were also used for continuation of the Land domains. Tis activity was well Information Agency (NCIA) was discussions, questions and answers.

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Ofen the additional discussions and conversations were where the most valuable information was exchanged.

Some of the main topics discussed included the following: t ćF NBOOFS CZ XIJDI /$*" and Allied Command Operations (ACO) align sofware releases and control the baselines of Command and Control Information Systems and Functional Services (FS) that NATO provides to that GRF(L); thereby enabling them to adopt and implement projects which are compatible and interoperable. t *OUFSPQFSBCJMJUZ FČPSUT BDSPTT ACO and ACT. t 'FEFSBUFE .JTTJPO /FUXPSL (FMN) requirements and how GRF(L)’s Presentation of CIS Material are managing those requirements. t 'SFRVFODZ .BOBHFNFOU GPS the STEADFAST COBALT (SFCT) the attendees and agreed upon. Te Graduated Response Planning. exercises as well as information fow of action items and updates to any of the t 8PSLJOH JNQSPWFNFOUT JO interoperability experiments between issues will continue to be discussed tactical interoperability. those two exercises. during LANDCOM’s monthly CIS WG VTCs, in which the same audience t $SZQUPNPEFSOJ[BUJPOQSPKFDUT participates. in NATO and how those will serve to At the conclusion of the event, enable secure communications. numerous action items regarding t 1MBOT GPS CPUI UIF the main questions were identifed. Given the complexities of Coalition Warrior Interoperability Although the majority of the action interoperability in a multinational eXperimentation, eXploration, items were given to LANDCOM to environment, the CIS community eXamination, eXercise (CWIX) and coordinate, these were shared with is working hard and cooperatively, to overcome shortfalls and fnd solutions to difcult problems. Tis is demonstrated every year during interoperability exercises leading up to units assuming the role of the NRF through working solutions and sharing of those solutions across the community. Tis year’s conference was able to serve that end and enabled interoperability as issues were discussed, solutions were shared, and most importantly, leaders in this efort got to form relationships with each other. For that, LANDCOM is grateful to NRDC-GRC for the outstanding eforts in making this a quality event and for showing all participants the beautiful city of

CIS Discussion In Te Conference Room Tessaloniki.

LAND POWER13 Eye On The Northeast HEADQUARTERS MULTINATIONAL CORPS NORTHEAST- POLAND: www.mncne.pl

Exercise Brilliant Capability 2016 DvDay Szczecin NFIU COMs (Photo by Karol Sito, Adam Lapszynski) High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), also re- ferred to as the “spearhead force”.

“Tis is a completely new situation in comparison to what we have dealt with in the old Western world so far. Tat is why there is a need to think outside the box.” – says Lieutenant Gen- eral Manfred Hofmann, the Corps’ Commander.

To comply with the given role, for the past several months the Corps has been undergo- ing a major transformation. Tis process began in June 2015 with introducing a new organiza- tional structure. As a consequence, the number of personnel has been doubled to 400 military staf including joint capabilities of land, air force, navy and special operations specialists. Also, the Corps’ multinational family has grown from 13 to 25 nations. Shortly aferwards, more fundamental changes have followed. ollowing the decisions taken at the countries. Next to the three Framework Nations, they are Belgium, Canada, , the Czech most recent Summit in Warsaw, “Te team spirit has been rising week by Republic, , Finland, France, , Hun- NATO has approved a schedule of week, month by month. In the end, it was a com- measuresF to boost security in and around Europe. gary, , , , the Netherlands, mon understanding of the task and a common Norway, , , , , Swe- One of them is signalling the ability to promptly commitment. – emphasizes General Hofmann. scale-up its deterrence presence along the “East- den, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United ern fank” in the event of deteriorating crisis. Tis States. has resulted in increasing the strategic impor- To be able to fulfll these increased require- ments, the Corps’ personnel were involved in an tance of the Headquarters Multinational Corps Multinational Corps Northeast, as a part extended series of exercises that culminated with Northeast (HQ MNC NE), located in Szczecin, of the NATO Force Structure, falls under the au- ”Brilliant Capability 2016”. Both “Trident Joust” North-western Poland. As stated in the ofcial thority of its Framework Nations. Nonetheless, it and “Brilliant Jump” – the two preceding parts in declaration issued by the Heads of State and Gov- may be deployed to a mission area on order of the a very tight training schedule – have laid a strong ernment participating in the Summit, the Corps Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) foundation for the Corps to meet the fnal chal- is now fully operational to undertake the tasks to conduct diferent type of operations, including lenge in terms of high readiness, efectiveness coming out of the Readiness Action Plan (RAP). the joined ones. To perform the duties assigned and command and control capabilities. Tis was, to it, the Corps has been upgrading its readiness again, treading a new path: Multinational Corps Northeast was found- status from low to high. Te path leading to this “When we talk about the Reception, Stag- ed on 18th September 1999 following a joint ini- long-term goal covered many stages and began at ing and Onward Movement, no one has done tiative started by , Germany and Poland the Wales Summit in 2014. Te Readiness Action what we have done for our certifcation togeth- – the Corps’ Framework Nations. Since the begin- Plan, authorised in Newport, paved the way for er with the Spanish VJTF.” ¬– reminds General ning, it has been situated in Szczecin (North-west- the Corps to take over the responsibility for the Hofmann. ern Poland) and, as such, is the only NATO corps Northeastern fank of NATO. Tis has resulted established on former Warsaw Pact soil. No less directly from the four tasks written in the Plan – importantly, it is also the only NATO unit with establishing an area-covering Joint Comprehen- With the Corps’ substantial assistance, the a specifed territorial responsibility, which spans sive Situational Awareness, being involved in all Spaniards moved 40 % of their assigned combat the Northeastern part of the Alliance. Current- Assurance Measures within the region as well as power to the territory of Poland in less than a few ly, the Corps consists of soldiers representing 25 providing command and control over the NATO days. Later on, it has been successfully certifed Force Integration Units (NFIUs) and the Very that the Corps is ready to assume command and

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Photo Provided by NRDC Spain Photo Provided by NRDC Spain

control over the VJTF as stated by the Command- the Headquarters in Szczecin assumed command Readiness Force Headquarters in mid 2017. Te er of the Allied Joint Force Command over another two units – Hungarian and Slova- training and exercise plan is and continues to be and reported to the Supreme Allied Commander kian. Altogether, the Corps and the NFIUs have demanding. Still, with the progress that has been Europe. essentially improved the responsiveness of NATO made in-between the two NATO Summits, the along its Northeastern borders. Some challenges, Corps has already become the NATO custodian however, are still to be faced. of regional security providing a permanent pres- Importantly to add, providing a closer ence on the Alliance’s Northeastern fank. Te of- insight into an assigned Area of Responsibility fcial stamp given in the Warsaw Summit Decla- would have not been fully possible without a tight “We’re not at the end of the venue. Te ration has been a fnal confrmation that all of the cooperation with the Corps’ subordinated entities next step will be to prepare ourselves for the new hard work that has been done over the last several – the NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs), es- enhanced forward presence. – indicates General months to implement new Standard Operating tablished in September 2015 in Poland, Estonia, Hofmann – Although the discussion and plan- Procedures has been efective. Latvia and Lithuania. Tese new liaison head- ning in NATO is still ongoing, I am quite sure quarters have already made a great contribution that our Headquarters will play an important role to the situational awareness in the region. Tey within enhanced forward presence.” “It shows that we are an important part of are also operationally ready to create the condi- the game, that we have a key role to play in this tions for the Allied forces to be quickly deployed region. It is also a huge responsibility on our Having reached the objectives coming if ever there is a crisis within the Baltic area. Ex- shoulders. And for sure something to be proud out of the Readiness Action Plan, the Corps is actly a year afer launching the frst four NFIUs, of.” – summarizes General Hofmann. now preparing for getting certifed as the High

Exercise Brilliant Jump 2016 Żagań DVDay (Photo by Karol Sito, Adam Lapszynski)

LAND POWER15 Understanding Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)

tion of where and when the information was produced and acquired and the full identifca- tion of the source to achieve the fnal OSINT product, representing a substantial part of its value. Finally during the dissemination phase, OSINT reports are divided in two primary categories: information of generic interest col- lated together and widely disseminated and information deliberated, searched, collected, distilled, and disseminated to a specifc cus- ntelligence derived from cessing, Analysis and Dissemination. Within tomer to answer specifc intelligence require- ments. As an intelligence professional navi- publicly available infor- the direction or planning phase of this cycle, the intelligence analyst can experience an gates through the intelligence cycle feedback mation as well as oth- enormous challenge in the selection and iden- must be a part of the entire cycle as a running er unclassi“Ifed information that has estimate. Customer’s feedback on the OSINT tifcation of the sources, and the assessment of limited public distribution or access”. their reliability. Usually diferent kinds of in- products released is essential; in order to im- NATO Defnition APP-6. formation may be required for searches from prove the quality in what can be described as a According to the defnition, what char- diferent kind of sources. customer-oriented process. acterizes OSINT from other Intel disciplines Within the collection phase of the cy- is the tool box where one can research the cle, a good OSINT operator will be a source Te importance of OSINT information required. Let’s have a look at collector more than an information collector, It is obvious that there has been an ex- that tool box: it includes Traditional Media meaning that his experience would guide him ponential growth of publicly available infor- Sources (traditional printed and broadcasted to know where to fnd the information needed. mation via the internet and social media plac- media, radio and television, the current set An established and updated selection of good ing OSINT higher in priority of importance. of electronically available products), Internet, sources in diferent matters can reduce the If you match it with the growth of the Internet Commercial Online Sources (available for eforts in the collection phase, leaving more and social media usage, in percentage, (more free or against a fee payment), Grey Literature time to the analysis. Time management and evident especially in the less developed ar- (available through specialized channels or di- the respect of the degree of details required eas of the world), and the collapse of many rect local access), Commercial Imagery (an- are key factors to keep the OSINT operator formerly denied areas, with the consequent other expanding sector), and the Deep Web. focused on his aim. Ten, in the processing shortage of traditional intelligence sources in As you can see by yourself, the pool looks like phase raw data is collected and processed, the emerging threats zones, one could easily an Ocean! which includes translations from diferent lan- imagine how OSINT has become of vital im- How is it possible for an OSINT collector to guages, working on diferent kind of formats portance for NATO Land Component Com- research all the tools available within the tool- and sizes, managing of pictures, maps and da- manders and governments. box and control the plethora of information, tabases, and security checks. Te end result is In the past, with NATO facing well de- without being lost? It is all about applying a a large sum of data available in the same sys- fned and conventional counterparts, there rigorous and disciplined procedure for defn- tem, ready to be compared, linked and fused was an abundance of old style sources (as ing the requirements to be addressed through during the analysis phase. HUMINT, SIGINT, and IMINT) providing open sources using the intelligence cycle. In the analysis phase, it is vital to val- lots of valuable information. Today, most of the idate the credibility of sources and for the threats are located in areas with no established OSINT and the Intelligence Cycle OSINT operator to remain mindful of and sources, as most of our current adversaries do determine the origin of the information gath- OSINT operators follow the same Intel- not belong to recognized and structured enti- ered confrming or denying the degree of trust ties, so it is very difcult to target them uncon- ligence cycle as any other Intelligence disci- assigned to it. Key to the analysis phase, the pline: Direction or Planning, Collection, Pro- ventionally. Tese smaller organizations make OSINT operator must confrm the descrip- a large use of the Internet to publish and share

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and prevent a commander from receiving the correct answer to his requirement. Sec- ond, a lack of approved NATO doctrine and policy can create ambiguity and imprecision. Tird, NATO nations are currently debating how to approach Social Media related issues. Key considerations include: legal details in- volving people, their personal rights, privacy and copyright aspects. Fourth, a big shortfall NATO-wide is the unavailability of diferent language translators. Nowadays extremists are releasing a huge amount of information that information about themselves, their ideas and LANDCOM is lacking its own intelligence OSINT is barely able to track. Large eforts their TTPs. collection assets, especially considering the should be put in that direction, to be able to Te largest expansion in the informa- non-traditional operating areas and transna- keep up the pace of understanding them. Fi- tion environment is now noticeable in the So- tional threats in which LANDCOM is focus- nally, but not less important, covering all the cial Media domain. Te coverage of historical ing its attention. Rather than relying mostly on events, like the Ukraine crisis, has been mas- national assets, an efective OSINT capability sive and timely. Social media is ofen the frst allows intelligence stafs to answer many intel- and main source of information. Te results ligence requirements with internal resources. obtained through the analysis of pictures, vid- Addressing a recognized intelligence eos, geo-location and links are amazing tools gap in his structure, LANDCOM recently es- for our understanding of adversaries’ propa- tablished a pilot Open Source cell in addition ganda. Social media is a platform that should to HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT as a kind of not be sidestepped or ignored. new Single Source, with the main task to fully What OSINT is not! It is not, or at least support the all-source analysts’ teams. Almost not only, a summary of the news or media re- pioneers in a NATO environment, with only porting. OSINT should represent the applica- few predecessors, and no approved NATO tion of intelligence processes to a global range doctrine nor policy available, LANDCOM G2 of sources, with the aim of producing tailored made a pioneering efort in research, restruc- intelligence for the commander. OSINT is, like turing and optimizing the best procedures to OSINT phases, Operations Security (OPSEC) other single source Intel disciplines, a contrib- be able to produce added value to the Intelli- is of course paramount. Surfng the Internet uting source to an all-source intelligence efort. gence efort. could represent a risk, and security measures Open sources could be used to compliment Big strides have been made in the niche (both in the procedures and in the tools uti- the already available classifed intelligence, as sector of extremists’ publications like maga- lized) must be established and followed in or- well as to answer to specifc intelligence need zines, newspapers, and newsletters. LAND- der to safeguard the NATO and LANDCOM to which they are best optimized, but also to COM G2 Open Source cell is systematically information environment. establish a very robust common foundation for collecting, comparing and analyzing them, other intelligence disciplines, reducing so the with attention in both contents and statistical Conclusion demands on intelligence collection resources data, to help the leadership achieve a better un- World is changing rapidly. All kinds of and limiting the requests for information only derstanding of extremism and this phenome- information travel faster and with fewer re- to some specifc questions. non. strictions than in the past, while our countries LANDCOM are struggling to allocate the resources needed Nowadays, if compared to the needs, Challenges for OSINT to monitor them in order to prevent, or re- OSINT is a big opportunity for intelli- act, to the threats they are facing. An efcient gence community, but it presents some chal- OSINT capability could be one way to address lenges that have to be addressed. First, the that need. Te ratio costs/results is very con- greatest challenge an OSINT intelligence pro- venient, compared to many other Intelligence fessional faces is the overwhelming amounts assets. OSINT is naturally destined to grow in of information gathered. Tis can be avoided, importance. If well directed and tasked by a or limited, with the most narrowed and tai- leadership aware of the potential, specialized lored information requirements plan possible. and well-trained OSINT operators can max- Vague or non-specifc requirements submit- imize the quality and efectiveness of Intelli- ted to analysts can cause large gaps in time gence in providing the Commander Situation- al Awareness.

LAND POWER17 NATO: How To Synchronize

HEADQUARTERS NATO RAPID DEPLOABLE CORPS- SPAIN: And Integrate Multinational www.ejercito.mde.es/organizacion/hqnrdc-sp_eng/index.htm Fires?

multiple nations. Bottom Line is interface between diferent FA C2 how will NATO forces shoot, move, systems; allows interoperable between and communicate using diferent only ASCA members (there are only ATO at all echelons will Multinational FA C2 in order to 5 full members at the current time). operate in a Multinational provide timely and accurate Fires? For this reason, ASCA would not environment. To provide Furthermore, how will the Fires section be a workable solution for NATO’s CommandersN the capability to make at a Headquarters build a Fires COP current Enhanced NRF Headquarters; informed decisions, he/she will need across the Area of Operations (AO), NATO Rapid Deployable Corps-Spain to visualize the battlefeld. At the providing the Commander situational (NRDC-SPAIN), there had to be tactical level, in order for the Maneuver awareness? Tis will provide the another course of action. Commander to shape the battlefeld and Commander the capability to make support his/her forces with timely and informed decisions and visualize the accurate fres, Call For Fires will need battlefeld, the “so what”. Due to the Te current solution is to provide to be in the digital arena. Tis can only majority of the 28 NATO members’ Liaison Ofcer (LNO) packages be accomplish by having Multinational FA C2 systems not being digitally with their nation’s FA C2 system digital interoperability; providing a interoperable with each other, how at HQs NRDC-SPAIN. However, Common Operating Picture (COP) will NATO accomplish the above LNO packages are manpower and for all to see and Allied Nations’ Field mentioned tasks? communications equipment intensive. At the VJTF BDE level, the BDE Artillery Command and Control (FA C2) systems that can share data. HQs is Spanish with subordinate A solution for Multinational FA battalions from Spain, , UK, C2 interoperability is the Artillery Poland, and Belgium with Spanish Fires assets will be provided to Systems Cooperation Activities and British Artillery batterys. Due NATO Response Forces (NRF) from (ASCA). ASCA provides a common to no FA C2 interoperability between

Figure 1. Figure 2. Figure 3. VJTF BDE Fires Task Organization VJTF BDE Fire Support Liaison VJTF BDE Call For Fire procedure with LNO/FSLT teams Team Structure

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3-27 FAR & VJTF BDE FA C2 Testing.photo by OR-2 Saskya Duncum, NRDC-ESP Photographer

these forces, the VJTF BDE’s Spanish (HIMARS) battalion from Fort Bragg, Support Coordination Measures across Artillery Battalion provided three 3rd Battalion, 27th Field Artillery the LCC AO. Te test environment with LNO/Battalion Fire Support Liaison Regiment, and the VJTF BDE. In order TALOS and AFATDS was conducted Team (FSLT) packages (over 15 to provide timely and accurate fres and on an Unclassifed closed network. personnel dedicated to LNO mission) a LCC-level Fires COP, NRDC-SPAIN with communication packages. With and 3-27 FAR used the Fire Command Without ASCA, the web based this course of action, fre mission Web (FCW) interface provided by server is the optimal course of action processing time and the probability of the Fires Data Server (FDS) from the in operating in a Multinational human error is increased, due to the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data environment. Te server provides the information transfer from one nation’s System (AFATDS), thus allowing the Fires section the capability to develop a FA C2 system to another nation’s FA C2 sharing of data from NRDC-SPAIN digital lethal fre chain from LCC level system. and 3-27 FAR. All data was “cut and to the executing unit, the ability to C2 paste”, with no map overlay available on Fires elements across the LCC AO, clear this web based server. Te web based During exercises Brilliant Jump airspace in near-real time, and provide server allowed all units the ability to cut and Valiant Falcon 2016, NRDC-SPAIN the LCC Commander a Fires COP. It is and paste data between NRDC-SPAIN, served as NATO’s Land Component not the ideal solution, but is the start VJTF BDE, and 3-27 FAR; providing Command (LCC) with an attached of providing NATO forces timely and the digital capability to conduct digital High Mobility Artillery Rocket System accurate Fires. fre missions, unit locations, Fire

TALOS And AFTADS Testing. Photo By Or-2 Saskya Duncum, NRDC-ESP Photographer

LAND POWER19 LANDCOM In Exercise ANAKONDA 16

was purely defensive and not direct- feld training, cyber and electronic ed against any country. Te exercise warfare drills. Te operations not only took place in the Polish military train- depend on comparing the procedures ing areas (Drawsko, Orzysz, Ustka, of operations, but also on capabilities Wędrzyn, Żagań, Dęba, Biedrusko, to realize common complex opera- Toruń, Chełmno, Biała Góra) and in tions of fre support in favor of fght- NAKONDA is a Pol- international air space and sea waters ing units. ish-led training event of the Baltic Sea. Tis exercise was ful- ly in line with the commitments tak- that takes place every Within the past few years, two A years. Exercise ANAKONDA en by Allies at the NATO Summit in ANAKONDA exercise has evolved Wales in September 2014, particular- 2016 (AN16) trained, exercised and from a typically military undertaking, ly in terms of the key elements of the integrated Polish national com- through the exercise involving nation- Readiness Action Plan such as assur- mand and force structures into an al non-military sector, to an alliance ance measures and adaptation. allied, joint, multinational envi- exercise with active engagement of ronment. It was the biggest military NATO member countries. drills held in Poland since the end of Te combined efort of approx- the Polish People’s Republic in 1989. imately 31000 troops equipped with LANDCOM staf deployed to 3000 vehicles, 105 aircraf and 12 ves- Krakow on 5 June 2016. Afer run- sels resulted in a joint defensive op- AN16 was also one of U.S. Army ning an internal dry training and eration including countering hybrid Europe’s premier multinational train- conducting a Take-Over of Land Do- warfare. AN16 provided participat- ing events. main Responsibility from (POL) LCC, ing countries with an opportunity to Tis exercise further supported LANDCOM in its HICON and opera- showcase their ability to operate to- assurance and deterrence measures tional role participated in AN16 Stage gether and defend against any threat by demonstrating allied defense capa- 2 CPX/CAX. Stage 2 (13-17 JUN) to their security. Te exercise was also bilities to deploy, to mass and sustain served as a venue to train commands a manifestation of transatlantic bonds combat power. in large-scale high-intensity warfare (participation of more than 14000 Tis exercise involved more than (HIW) operations on the territory of USA and CAN troops) and indivisi- 31000 participants from 24 nations, Poland. Te primary training audi- bility of security. including , , Cana- ence was MNC NE and the secondary da, Croatia, , Estonia, Transparency matters for Poland. training audience consisted of LAND- Finland, Germany, , Latvia, Poland invited up to two observers COM and the (POL) Land Compo- Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Roma- from each OSCE participating states nent Command as the POL Corps HQ nia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, to monitor the exercise. in the Rear Area. Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. Tis Polish-led exercise tested AN16 ofered LANDCOM a AN16 was the largest exercise the readiness and interoperability of training platform, which provided in the modern history of Poland and with participat- a multinational training audience a one of the most important military ing Allies and partners. Te 10-day unique opportunity to integrate com- events in Europe this year. Its scenario exercise had live fre, command post, mands and forces in planning and con-

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Landcom Staf Deployed To Krakow

ducting joint operations across all do- joint scenario provided a more realis- planning, preparation and execution mains; verify coordinating measures tic play than that which LANDCOM in both training audience and EX- to include both military and non-mili- could have achieved in any other BST. CON. tary interactions; set the standards and Furthermore, LANDCOM saved time procedures regarding Hand-Over and and resources in terms of exercise de- Finally, special thanks and great Take-Over for further implementa- sign, EXCON manning and scenario credit is awarded to BG Slawomir tion; help demonstrating the military development. Interaction and training WOJCHECHOWSKI, DCOM POL structures transformation efects. MG with national forces provided valuable Armed Forces Operational Com- Wilhelm GRUEN, LANDCOM DCOS lessons for Interoperability and Stand- mand. BG Wojchechowski was the OPS and acting Commander Initial ardization. Overall, AN16 provided tireless and assiduous multiple-hat- Command Element HQ during AN16, excellent resources to efect ratio for ted actor of the POL Armed Forces assessed all LANDCOM Exercise LANDCOM.” at the joint echelon and he defnitely Objectives as achieved. LANDCOM contributed greatly to the overall suc- used AN16 as their 2016 frst semester LANDCOM in its HICON role cess of AN16. Te importance of this BST. During the AAR, MG GRUEN for MNC NE also deployed a remote national exercise and NATO involve- concluded: “Te highly realistic truly team to Warsaw which was embedded BG Slawomir Wojchechowski MG Wilhelm Gruen (lef) and MG Dr. in the POL EXCON establishment. Cezary Podlasinski (Right) From that location JEMM was used to insert injects developed during multi- ple MEL-MIL scripting sessions with the dedicated and professional sup- port of OAKAS Ltd. In order to closely monitor the training requirements of the primary training audience MNC NE and the secondary training audi- ences, another LANDCOM EXCON Team was embedded in the LAND- COM Initial Command Element (ICE) at Krakow.

LANDCOM’s involvement in ment was not lost on the road to the TRIDENT JAVELIN 17, the venue for Warsaw Summit. evaluation, will further beneft of all internal lessons identifed regarding

LAND POWER21 Global Classification Of Mountains NATO MOUNTAIN WARFARE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE www.mwcoe.org

Introduction Defning the characteristics of military operations requires a clear understanding of the players involved, operational environment and tasks given. When addressing the operational environment, planners include both Figure 1. Classical Humboldt profle of the latitudinal position of altitude belts in mountains across the globe and compression of thermal zones of mountaions, altitude or latitude. Grey is montain, black is alpine, white is the the psychological as well as the physical nival belt (Körner 2003) perspective. Physical terrain analysis, combined with mission objectives and transport to narrow corridors, and territory is referred to as: “…extremely capabilities available, is an important are refuges to minorities and political uneven terrain, which has steep slopes element of pre-deployment activities. Te opposition. As such they are ofen focal and valleys and which covers a large area. following article focuses on mountainous areas of armed conficts” (Körner & Ohsava, Mountainous terrain includes built-up terrain – a component which has been 2005). Common to all conficts in the past, areas and lowlands between the mountain underscored in the past decades, as seen e.g. Asiago Ofensive and the Isonzo Front ridges, highlands and passes. Towns and from the NATO military perspective. in World War I, land battle at Narvik in other built-up areas are concentrated in Te main purpose of this article is to World War II, Kashmir, Afghanistan, the valleys. Te weather conditions are 2 raise issues that should to be taken into etc., were difcult mountainous terrain extremely changeable.” consideration when planning operations and, in many cases, extreme climate Tis, and several other defnitions in the mountains. conditions. What signifcantly difered, of mountains contained in STANAGs was the elevation and the steepness of Classifcation of mountains is dealt and national feld manuals, ofer similar slopes of the mountains. In this context, with in many geographical sources1 , explanations of a highly diverse and the question emerges of how to transform however, for NATO military purposes, demanding environment. From the all mountain-specifc features (elevation, they are more or less irrelevant. military perspective, mountains appear to altitude, weather, geology, etc.) into be much more than the above-mentioned military language, so as to be understood sentences convey, since the shapes of Mountains in general the same way by all personnel involved in mountains vary around the globe as Mountains have always been a an operation. Within NATO, classifcation planets in our solar system are diferent signifcant part of the human environment. could be a part of an answer. from each other. For a variety of reasons, people inhabiting Pierce proposes a military mountainous areas were always strongly Existing defnitions defnition for mountain and cold weather connected with them, knowing well how According to the Oxford English environment including the following to live with the advantages and cope with Dictionary, a mountain is defned as characteristics: persistent ambient air risks. Mountains provide water, mineral “…a large natural elevation of the earth’s temperatures below 21°C, persistent resources and space for grazing livestock, surface rising more or less abruptly from mean snow depths of approximately and ofer plenty of tourism opportunities. the surrounding level.” Furthermore, 50 cm, signifcant glaciated terrain and In addition, mountains “ofen represent within the NATO context, mountainous rugged, severely compartmented terrain, political and cultural borders, restrict

22LAND POWER combining mean slope angles of 45 degrees, An interesting approach to any environment. To know exactly what we with elevation diferentials exceeding landscape fne comparison is the are talking about when developing a 300 meters, with peaks exceeding 2400 consideration of four key elements: altitude, relevant Common Operational Picture, meters above sea level (Hamilton 1988; relief, climate and type of land exploitation standardized defnitions and unifed Pierce 2008, 12). Te fact is, that globally (fr.: typ de population, set by Veyret & descriptions are indispensable in order agreed classifcation is more complex if Veyret, 1962). Tis method is accurate to provide clear information needed. considering the latitudinal position of an enough to describe the key characteristics As NATO involves more combined area. of any location on Earth. Still, the question forces, the need for agreed standards and Te NATO Mountain Warfare is of where do the mountains exactly terminology signifcantly arises. T rough Centre of Excellence (NATO MW COE) begin, or what altitudes are needed to refer studying existing NATO standards (mostly understands the complexity of identifying to them as high or even extremely high within AJDA and ALPA), a lack of clear numerous characteristics of mountains mountains. Te community of interest defnitions concerning the mountain that should be used as basis for their would certainly agree that mountain environment has been identifed. A categorization. Although mountains seem warfare begins at the valley’s fat terrain more detailed examination based on to be all the same at frst glance, they difer and continues higher according to mission the perspectives of soldiers deployed, signifcantly when some military objective requirements. In addition to this, available equipment used and procedures set, some is set, and a tasked unit is deployed to specialized capabilities and correlating additional explanations and defnitions are conduct a mountain operation. Te interdependent training levels require needed. mountains of Greenland are not the same particular consideration. In general, existing descriptions as the Dolomites in Italian Alps, Afghan provide a rough explanation of mountains mountains cannot be treated the same way Justifcation for classifcation referring to their height, toughtness and as those in South America. Some are steep, extremely changing climate. What else Te justifcation for military snowy, or covered by glaciers, but not very does the military need besides that? When classifcation of mountains shall be based high, others are arid, full of scree and rocks, a certain terrain analysis is ready, the on common understanding of terrain but signifcantly high-elevated. Te crucial frst thing that commanders have in their features, mountain operations and question arises of how to make a precise mind is to consider the efects of terrain related specialized capabilities. Receiving and useful classifcation and defnition on personnel, equipment and procedures. a mission, commanders are faced with of mountains across the Globe. Some Although movement and survivability many initial inputs, which are supposed accurate defnitions and classifcations might be very limited, deploying highly- to support the fnal goal. In the pre- are set in national doctrines (France, Italy, trained and equipped units should result deployment stage, decisions taken by USA, etc.)3 , however, it is impossible to in an advantage against opposing forces. commanders cannot be simulated and generalize them in any simple way for the Crossing snow-covered mountain ridges tested with respect to various unforeseen use in a wider global environment. takes an enormous amount of time, particularities of the mountainous

Figure 2. Classifcation matrix of mountains

LAND POWER23 efort, knowledge, team spirit and special low (heavier breathing only), but can be individuals and units. equipment. Many special requirements managed easily by good physical ftness. Like all across our planet, the climate in mountains are connected with logistic t )JHI NPVOUBJOT TUSFUDI GSPN in the mountains depends on the latitude support provided to operating troops. 2500 m and up to 5500 m, where the efect and its position related to the oceans Above certain heights, they have to of altitude is signifcant and acclimatization (Veyret & Veyret, 1962). Te climate, which primarily rely on their own capacities, of troops is needed. includes temperatures, precipitation, using the “pulling principle of supplying”. t &YUSFNFMZ IJHI NPVOUBJOT humidity and wind, isprimarily afecting On the other hand, certain types of include terrain above 5500 m including survivability of units. Combining all of mountainous terrain allow good mobility, highest peaks on Earth. Even fully these components calls for a tool which so that objectives can be achieved through acclimatized personnel may operate for could assist planners in pre-deployment capabilities which can conduct limited shorter period, usually by small teams, stage. Tey should be aware of peculiarities, mountain warfare (e.g. light infantry trained according to highest standards5 which are expected on the way of mission brigades). . Some rare exceptions are known from accomplishment and incorporate training To ensure a general understanding Siachen confict, where highest objectives and equipment assets. Writing about of issues concerning operations conducted were located up to 6800 m above the sea mountains, the whole spectre of dry, hot, in the mountain environment, and level (Malik 2004). wet and cold environments have to be mainly to help commanders understand taken into account. Relief or the shape of the terrain the complexity of the impact mountains efects mainly mobility. Relief has ofen a pose on troops, the NATO MW COE major impact on the climate conditions Conclusion is preparing a general classifcation of in the area. It can be divided into average mountains. It could be used as a starting Tis article refects the complexity and steepness of slopes and extension of point for further NATO mountain warfare difculties concerning the identifcation of elevated peaks. development by including elements mountain environment and all pertaining 6 additional to those already described Slopes may be divided into : features, important for military usage. in relevant sources. Altitude, relief and t 6Q UP ¡  BOE NPVOUBJO QFBLT Numerous defnitions, descriptions and climate, as a basis, contribute to mobility, less than 600 m of relative height allow, classifcations of mountains set by nations survivability and sustainability of deployed in general, a good mobility for vehicles, as and international organizations, call for capabilities. Te fnal product should well. Capabilities with a limited capability agreed, valid and overall classifcation, refect this through scheme, which should of conducting mountain warfare, might be constructed to be a simple and helpful tool be clear and easy to understand. Existing deployed to such areas. for all users within NATO. Constructive discussions will be indispensable to bring material will be used and upgraded with t #FUXFFO ¡ ¡  BOE QFBLT this idea to life. a mobility level and level of individual/ above 600 m of relative height limit the collective training needed to perform mobility and require specifc knowledge operation efectively. and equipment. Motorized transportation, Notes, comments, discussions and any other To accomplish the classifcation as including helicopters, is possible in low information are welcome. Article is also shown in Figure 2, mountains should and high mountains. available at: http://www.mwcoe.org/ primarily be classifed by their height, and t "CPWF ¡ BSF DPOTJEFSFE be commonly named. Altitude may be as extremely steep slopes, which can understood in two ways, that is in terms be managed only by special trained of local altitude (also relative, from fat terrain to the measured point) and in terms 1C. Körner, M. Ohsava: Millenium Ecosystem Assesment, Chapter 24, Mountain systems of the absolute altitude (altitude above the (283-284). United Nations Environment Programme World Conservation Monitoring Centtre sea level). Just to mention, high altitude (Kapos et al. 2000). within NATO is defned by air component 2 ATP 3.2.1 – Allied Land Tactics only (height above 10,000 meters), and is, as such, of no relevance for mountain 3USA: FM 3-97.6 (90-6) Mountain Operations, ITA:PSE 3.2.10 »Le operacioni in ambiente warfare. montano e climi rigidi, FRA: EMP 23 431 Doctrine d’ emploi des forces terrestres en zone mon- Based on national classifcations of tagneuse... NATO countries and additional medical 4Research and Technology Organization, transformed to CSO (Collaboration Support Ofce) arguments, presented by the NATO within NATO Science and Technology Organization. RTO4 (Muza 2011), the initial option for 5Currently, the majority of standards is established within national authorities. generalization would be as presented: 6 t -PXNPVOUBJOTEPOPUFYDFFEUIF Up to 2014 defned within NATO STANAG 3992, which has been cancelled and superseded altitude of 2500 m. Efects of altitude are by STANAG 2592.

24LAND POWER

Figure 3. Tasiilaq Town With Fjord And Mountains – Acessed On: www.randalharlow.com

REFERENCES Hamilton, Allan J. Biomedical Aspects of Military Operations at High Altitude. US Army Research Institute of Environmental Medi- cine, 1988.

Körner C., Ohsava M. (2005). Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Current State & Trends Assessment 24: 683.

Malik, Muhammad Asim. Mountain Warfare - Te Need for Specialized Training. In Military Review, pp 94-102. Fort Leavenworth, 2004.

Mountain Types.Wikipedia Te Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_mountain_types (accessed on 3 NOV 2015) Mountain. In Oxford Dictionaries - Dictionary, Tesaurus, & Grammar. Retrieved from http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/defni- tion/english/mountain (accessed on 15 FEB 2016)

Muza, Stephen R. (HFM 146 Task Group Chair). Review of Military Mountain Medicine Technology and Research Barriers – Final Report. NATO Research and Technology Organization, 2011. NATO ATP-3.2.1 – Operations in Mountains.

NSO.NATO.int/natoterm/Web.mvc, (accessed on 3 NOV 2015)

Pierce, Scott (2008). Mountain and Cold Weather Warfghting: Critical Capability for the 21st Century. Troll, Carl. (1973). High Mountain Belts between the Polar Caps and the Equator: Teir Defnition and Lower Limit. Arctic and Alpine Research, 5(3), A19–A27. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1550149 (accessed on 21 FEB 2016) Veyret Paul, Veyret Germaine. Essai de defnition de la montagne. In: Revue de geographie alpine. 1962, Tome 50 No1, pp. 5 -35.

LAND POWER25 Area Denial – NATO Challenges For Today

operations. So what exactly is a Barrier? The following extract provides a The Cold War Playing Field succinct explanation of the exciting world of t " LOPXO DPOWFOUJPOBM FOFNZ the engineer and covers digging large holes, force, even down to the names of opposing generally blowing things up and the laying he focus for NATO Land forces Divisional and Bde commanders, with of mines. Do not lose interest reader; this for over a decade has been intelligence on when, where and how your article is not just for the engineer. centred on counter insurgency opponent trained. Fire, movement and obstacles are and stability.T With a focus now centred on t 3FBMJTUJD USBJOJOH PO UIF WFSZ decisive factors in all operations. Obstacles operations against a near peer adversary, terrain you were expecting to conduct are an essential element of defensive the requirement of the alliance to deny that operations. operations and their effects on the physical adversary access to areas and routes remains t 'PSDFTCBTFEPOB$PSQT OBUJPOBM battlespace contribute to impose our will on as valid today as it did 25 years ago. Whilst in nature and responsible for a specific the adversant. As such the Alliance defines the requirement may remain effectively geographic area. A Corps which could tactical obstacles as Barriers.3 Be assured unchanged, in the context of an Article 5 tailor its equipment, tactics and procedures this will be the last reference to any NATO MJO(+) operation, the alliances ability to to the threat it faced and the ground it was Doctrine contained in this article. prosecute this capability is very different expected to fight upon. to the days of the Cold War. This article t /P TJHOJGJDBOU JOUFSPQFSBCJMJUZ will explore some of those differences and issues or national caveats. aims to provide some ‘food for thought’ to t " (FOFSBM %FGFODF 1MBO UIBU the reader, specifically on alliance barrier changed little other than to encompass new capabilities. military technologies and tactics. There have been a number of policies allied to political and structural changes that have impacted on national abilities to emplace barriers; mines in particular are politically sensitive and comparatively costly as stocks must be replenished as they pass their useful life. With the introduction of the Ottawa Treaty in 19971, denying area and route access through the use of anti- personnel mines is no longer viable for signatory or acceded nations, of which 27 The Good Old Days – The Cold War are NATO members. Many countries have Why the Good Old Days? The Te Author Superimposing Anti-Personnel Mines on also reduced the use of anti-tank mines to an Anti-Tank Minefeld in the mid 1980’s. Cold War afforded a degree of stability impose control and or use through denial in the military psyche, whether East or methods, which further exacerbates into a The Cold War – Emplacement of Barriers West. It provided a level of certainty to the current capability gap.2 The General Defence Obstacle Plan protagonists on a well understood theatre of centred on the emplacement of large

1 Te Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruc- defensive barrier minefields. For the engineer this meant: tion, 18 September 1997. t &BDI $PSQT IBE BO JOUFHSBUFE

2 ATP-3.12.1 Allied Tactical Doctrine for Military Engineering Edition A Version 1 dated February 2016, p 2-7. barrier plan to contribute to the effects required by the commander. 3 ATP-3.12.1 Allied Tactical Doctrine for Military Engineering Edition A Version 1 dated February 2016, p 4-5. t &BDI QMBO IBE QSF SFDPOOPJUFSFE areas, for mine dumps, safe lanes and 4 Warsaw Summit Communique issued by Heads of State and Government Participating in Meeting of the NAC 8-9 July 2016. minefield gaps.

26LAND POWER

defend. system of barriers which whilst they have The future of barriers looks toward the appearance ofcontainers, are in fact effects based obstacles with a greater square steel pipes, bushings and steel cables emphasis on more mobile operations. that can be assembled to build elements of a Engineer barriers are of course a part of this effect and not the effect in isolation.

‘Barriers buy time and space; time is the most precious of all resources which when lost can never be recovered. Space is manoeuvre and to manoeuvre is to win.’ Bde Comd Ex IRON HAMMER - West Germany t 6OJUTQSBDUJDFEUIFJSFNQMBDFNFOU 1987. t &BDINJOFGJFMEIBEBTTJHOFEVOJUT to emplace them. Non Explosive Barriers t &BDI NJOFGJFME XBT QSPWJTJPOFE Tere are many alternatives to explosive with sufficient mine stocks to achieve the based barriers which have and continue to effect required. prove efective, particularly against armour. t .JOFTUPDLTXFSFQSFQPTJUJPOFEUP reduce the logistic effort required. From the earliest beginnings of mechanised roadblock. An element consists of three tubes warfare to the present day a well-constructed which are then connected together with steel hole in the ground is capable of cables and fxed frmly. Te fastening points restricting the mobility of the very earliest or of concrete are the only fxed installations. most modern of armoured vehicles. To deploy, establish and fght a NATO force Simple and efective, the anti-tank in an Article 5 MJO+ operation requires an ditch requires specialist equipment to afect ability to buy time through a combination a crossing tying up resources and time and of political and limited military means; this concentrating an enemy force. Anti-tank is a strategy which continues to develop. ditching is of course time consuming to Te recent Warsaw Summit reinforced the construct and therefore does not provide the message of Alliance eforts established to most practical counter mobility option for date, the Readiness Action Plan and the mobile warfare. specifcally NRF with up to a Divisional sized So What? Peacetime prepared obstacles, pre- land element. Tis was further reinforced The borders of NATO have increased constructed and prepositioned if required, within the Warsaw Summit Communique significantly from those halcyon days of also provide a viable counter mobility looking to deliver an enhanced forward the cold war and now see NATO with a option. Whilst no country will wish to see presence in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and significantly increased border length with lines of concrete obstacles protruding from Poland. Multinational forces based on four our principal adversary. the countryside, unlikely to be a palatable battalion sized battlegroups. NATO capabilities, post the peace solution politically or nationally, a stockpile Te Cold War is long dead and dividend of the 1990s on the breakup of able to be moved quickly provides one of a new initiatives in force placement to the Soviet Union, became more national in number of counter mobility option to block ‘unambiguously demonstrate, as part nature with increased focus on The War not routes. More modern systems are available of our overall posture, Allies solidarity, A War. in order to produce the efect required. determination, and ability to act by The conflicts of the late 20th and early Manufactured in Switzerland and triggering an immediate Allied response to 21st century have been Counter Insurgency 4 positioned in border areas is a modular any aggression’ does not see a return to Cold in nature which for many nations has meant War basing of troops. the focus shifting to capabilities perhaps less We do not live in the past but we may relevant to the operations we face today. sometimes be blinded by what we once NATO has moved from the Cold War had. Perhaps the time has come to re- days of eight Corps equipped in place and evaluate NATO barrier capabilities within a trained to defend against a well understood systematic and efects based approach and to adversary, to today’s model of a scalable consider reinvestment in this critical area of force, adaptable and more able to meet the alliance capability. challenges we face. This must be a force with the full range of capabilities to deter and

LAND POWER27 Warsaw Summit a Step Further towards strengthening NATO-EU Partnership

Photo From NATO Press & Media, NATO HQ website

espite the fact that NATO Important steps have been taken based on starting from 2017 and 2018; remains the most advanced respect towards the decision making au- t #VJMEUIFEFGFOTFBOETFDVSJUZDB- military alliance on the plan- tonomy of both organizations. pacity and foster the resilience of partners et, givenD the evolving unprecedented secu- 1 in the East and South. rity challenges and the need for a compre- Te last development on this regard hensive approach to tackle them, NATO has been the Joint declaration by the Pres- has started to put signifcant emphasis on NATO, the EU and their member ident of the European Council, the Presi- partnerships, among which partnership states are already contributing to the Eu- dent of the European Commission, and with the EU is of particular importance. ro-Atlantic security. Yet the implemen- NATO Secretary General during the War- Te importance of NATO-EU partner- tation of the cooperation on areas high- saw Summit in July 2016. Tis declaration ship lies in the fact that apart from the 22 lighted on the joint declaration will avoid refected the agreement between the parties countries that are members of both organ- the blatant duplication of structures, capa- on the strategic priority of NATO-EU co- izations, other EU members work together bilities and eforts and contribute towards operation and implementation of common with NATO as part of the Alliance’s Part- more efective actions. However, this has action in order to: nership for Peace. In addition, both organ- not been the initial step. Te decision to co- izations share the same principles and val- t #PPTUUIFBCJMJUZUPDPVOUFSIZCSJE operate on security issues has a long history ues based on their strong commitment to threats; starting with the Berlin Plus Agreement in freedom and democracy, human rights and t #SPBEFO BOE BEBQU PQFSBUJPOBM 2003 which constitutes the foundation for the rule of law. Most importantly, NATO cooperation; practical work in crisis management be- tween EU and NATO. Tat was a milestone and the EU share common strategic inter- t &YQBOEDPPSEJOBUJPOPODZCFSTF- agreement allowing the European Union to ests and almost the same geographical area curity and defense; as well as the same threats and challenges have access to NATO’s collective assets and t %FWFMPQDPIFSFOU DPNQMFNFOUB- from their Eastern and Southern neighbor- capabilities for EU-led operations, in which ry and interoperable defense capabilities, as 2 hoods and the instability they are prone to. NATO as a whole is not engaged . On the well as multilateral projects; other hand, EU serves with its ability and t 'BDJMJUBUF B TUSPOHFS EFGFOTF JO- institutional framework using foreign and For, the relationship between two or- dustry and greater defense research and security policy instruments such as sanc- ganizations has grown signifcantly despite industrial cooperation; tions, diplomacy, development and eco- the political constraints and sensitivities. t 4UFQVQDPPSEJOBUJPOPOFYFSDJTFT  nomic assistance.

28LAND POWER Warsaw Summit a Step Further towards strengthening NATO-EU Partnership

During this time, leaders of both or- ganizations have participated at each oth- er’s summits and ministerial meetings and shared with the member states and allies their views on issues of common interest.

Later, it was the Ukraine crisis that created a new strategic feld for coopera- tion. Te two organizations have used in coordination their sof power (EU’s eco- nomic sanctions and diplomatic measures) and hard power (NATO’s conventional mil- itary measures) as a reaction to Russia’s ac- tions in Ukraine.

Afer all those positive developments very recently EU presented the Global Strat- Common Foreign And Security Policy egy for the European Union’s Foreign and that NATO and the EU are able to cooper- long term. As General Mercier from SACT Security Policy, which was welcomed by ate for mutual beneft. stressed during an exchanging views ses- NATO as stated during the Warsaw Sum- sion at the European Parliament subcom- mit. NATO recognizes the importance of mittee on security and defense on 17 June a stronger and more capable European de- Both organizations have been suc- 2016, “NATO and the EU have no other fense, which will lead to a stronger NATO3. cessfully cooperating in the feld in several choice but to leverage the competencies of Nevertheless, this strategy has been shown cases. Tey have worked together aiming at each organization and make the most of resistance even within the European Parlia- bringing stability to the Western Balkans, limited resources4”. ment. Moreover, within this strategy there namely in the FYROM, Bosnia and Herze- is the approach of what the high represent- govina and Kosovo; Tey have cooperated ative of the Union for Foreign Afairs and in Afghanistan as part of the international Te organizations have no other Security Policy and Vice-President of the community’s broader eforts to implement choice but to cooperate for many reasons European Commission Federica Mogher- a comprehensive approach to assist the as mentioned previously while upgrading ini calls ‘strategic autonomy’ for the EU. country; Tey have supported the African their partnership now is of particular im- Tis has been one of the reasons for some Union’s mission in Darfur; Both NATO portance for some crucial reasons. First, member countries to oppose the strategy and the EU have been deployed together they should use the EU’s Global Strategy in addition to the reluctance of some oth- for anti-piracy missions; and lately NATO and the Warsaw Summit as a political op- er members to transfer more authority and is cooperating with the EU’s border man- portunity. Secondly, neither NATO nor competences. agement agency, FRONTEX, as part of the the EU has the capabilities to address the international eforts to stem illegal trafck- today’s increasingly complex threats alone ing and illegal migration in the Aegean Sea. for which they should go for smart division Whether a strategic and/or military of labor. And fnally, through BREXIT, an autonomy for the EU could be considered important driver behind the EU’s Common as a duplication of eforts and sources be- All the previously mentioned mutual Security and Defense Policy. Consequently, tween NATO and the EU depends on the activities as well as expanding political con- there have been fears that a BREXIT will political and strategic orientation of the two sultations between the two organizations destabilize the whole European security organizations. Speaking in practical terms, on important security issues constitute a architecture. On the contrary, NATO-EU apart from the view that the EU is far from strong prospect for a successful strategic partnership could be the best security re- a ‘military autonomy’ and the uncertainty partnership which will serve the mutu- sponse to this5. of what a European army and its function- al beneft for both NATO and the EU as ality would look like, the proven truth is well as their member states in short and

1Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and NATO Secretary General, signed at Warsaw on 8 July 2016. 2NATO’s relations with the European Union, http://www.nato.int/summit2009/topics_en/21-nato-eu_strategic_partnership.html. 3Ofcial text of the Warsaw Summit outcomes, 123-124. 4NATO and EU: Complementarity and collaboration in capability development, Brussels - 17 June, 2016, https://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/ press-centre/latest-news/2016/06/17/nato-and-eu-complementarity-and-collaboration-in-capability-development. 5Tree arguments for an ever closer EU-NATO cooperation, Dr. Nicole Koenig and Jekaterina Grigorjeva, 21 July 2016, http://www.delorsinstitut. de/en/publications/three-arguments-for-an-ever-closer-eu-nato-cooperation/

LAND POWER29 LANDCOM CIS Mobile Training Team Visit To Serbia

Photo From Personnel Participating in the Event

Te relationship of NATO and Serbia future, but still not forgotten. has been tested over the last couple of dec- Te Serbian Army’s desire to oper- ades since NATO bombings on Belgrade in ate in a multinational environment was 1993. Te physical evidence of the damaged demonstrated by their invitation to other caused is clear to be seen, however the psy- PfP Nations to join this NATO CIS MTT n October 3, 2016, three chological afect is more transparent. Te course, held in Belgrade. Te Former Yu- NATO staf personnel trav- Serbian general population are very wel- goslav Republic of Macedonia*, Bosnia elled to Belgrade, Serbia. Te coming and the Serbian Army’s interest and and Azerbaijan accepted this invitation, purposeO of the visit was to present training proactivity towards the OCC programme is sending a representative student from each on NATO Communication and Informa- commendable. Te events of 1993 are still nation. Tese students exhibited extreme tion Systems (CIS) to Serbian Army CIS very much in the memories of the cur- interest and participated fully within the Staf. As part of the Operational Concept rent generation and personal accounts are event. Tis emphasised the efectiveness, Capability (OCC) programme and a Part- readily told expressing views, experiences interest and recognised value of the MTT nership for Peace (PfP) Nation, the Serbi- and opinions of the times back in the ear- and OCC programme across the PfP Na- an Army requested a training package on ly 1990’s. With this is mind, the hospitali- tions. NATO CIS to enhance their clarity and ty and welcome shown to the MTT upon understanding of NATO CIS policy, doc- arrival in Serbia, demonstrates the change trine, practises and capabilities. Te addi- in Serbian Army interests. Te enthusiasm, Te NATO specifc Land Command tional desired efect was to present a clear from the Serbian Army students to gain topics presented to the students were: STRATCOM message to Serbia. As part knowledge of the NATO policy, doctrine of the OCC programme and a PfP Nation, and practises was highly encouraging, es- t /"50 $PNNBOE 4USVDUVSF BOE NATO is committed to supporting Serbia pecially as their enquiries were specifcally NATO force Structure to ensure interoperability for future joint focussed on how the Serbian Army could t /"50$*4*OUSP military activities, reinforcing their under- integrate with NATO to operate alongside standing of NATO’s capacity and structure in the future. Te events of 1993 are con- t /"50$*4'VODUJPOBM4FSWJDFT and develop interoperability. sidered by the Serbian people to be in the t /"50 $PNNVOJDBUJPOT *OGSB- past as the Serbian Nation moves on to the structure

30LAND POWER LANDCOM CIS Mobile Training Team Visit To Serbia

Captain Macmillan Briefng About CIS

Sergeant First Class Castelli addressing the MTT Staf

t /"50%FQMPZBCMF$*4 programme and future MTT programmes ings in Belgrade city is the NATO Liaison t /"504"5$0. minimises disconnects between NATO team, led by Brigadier General Cesare Mar- Member nations and PfP Nation capabili- inelli (ITA A), Chief of NATO MLO. Te t 'SFRVFODZ.BOBHFNFOU ties. intent and sentiments of the MTT students t /"50$ZCFSćSFBU was heavily echoed from the NATO liaison t $*44FDVSJUZ ofce. Te Ofce was extremely proactive Amongst the MTT students, a better towards supporting the MTT event and t /"50*OGPSNBUJPO.BOBHFNFOU appreciation of the capabilities of NATO gratefully appreciated assistance in promot- t /"50$*41MBOOJOH was established. With the diversity of the ing NATO and Serbian Army relations. As Job specifcations in the syndicate, whether t /"50-$*4*OUSPEVDUJPO expressed by Brig Gen Marinelli, the posi- within a Battalion, Brigade or at Divisional tive and active participation of all the MTT level, all were able to relate within their own students was encouraging for the future. He All students participated in question specifc environment to the lessons taught expressed a great interest in continuing the and answer sessions afer each presentation. from the NATO lectures. A strong desire MTT programme with Serbia and identi- A great deal of emphasis was given to glob- for future MTT visits was expressed, to en- fed it as a resource to enhance his work and ally critical subjects such as NATO Cyber sure that as NATO and technology evolves, eforts towards stronger mutual benefts be- Treats, CIS Security and NATO Deploya- Serbia have a keen interest to gain and re- tween NATO and Serbia. ble CIS, by the students. For Cyber security, tain an interoperable status with NATO. within the realms of security classifcation *Turkey recognizes the Republic of Mace- and security, much interest was expressed donia with its constitutional name. on how the Serbian Army could further Located in the Governmental build- develop their Cyber Security and the or- ganisational structure required to set up a robust Cyber Programme. Whilst discuss- ing the topic of NATO Deployable CIS, in- teroperability and CIS support required to interoperate with an alliance of 28 nations (i.e NATO) from an outside military force were conversed. Te whole process of the OCC programme and the MTT is designed to aid interoperability and to facilitate working in a multinational environment. CIS technology is always evolving and Na- tions with diferent National budgets do inherently progress diferently. Te issue of interoperability is managed but can never be said to be fully resolved as new technol- ogy will be developed in the future. In the same vein, the more active participants that are involved within the alliance amplify the interoperability challenges. Te clear mes- sage presented to the MTT students in Ser- LANDCOM MTT With Colonel Representative Of Serbian Army bia was that active engagement in the OCC

LAND POWER31 NATO Strategic Direction South A New Strategic Reality

Jordan Army In Combat Training

here are but two powers in the world, the sword and the mind. In the long run the sword“T is always beaten by the mind.” Napoleon Bonaparte

NATO has preserved the peace in Eu- rope for almost seven decades by gathering together allies who share the same values of democracy, liberty, human rights and the rule of law. But today peace and security are put at risk, on one side, by an unpre- dictable Russia in the east and, on the other side, in the south, by the arc of instability across the Middle East and Africa.

all of those being a part in the security risks displaced persons and refugees. So what is NATO Strategic Direction and threats, regarding the Alliance defence South (NSD-S)? NSD-S is defned as being capability. NATO has identifed the follow- the area of “the Middle East, North Africa From a brief analysis of all the fac- ing six threats emanating from that region3: – Sahel and Sub-Saharan – Africa together tors, threats and risks already mentioned, with adjacent areas, waters and airspace1”. - Competing states in the region, it is clear that NATO must address three Our leaders articulated this issue concern- defned as states with competing national main issues, using a comprehensive ap- ing the Alliance in 2014; in article 32 of objectives with the potential to descend proach and in coordination with other the Wales Summit Declaration it stipulat- into an openly adversarial relationship international organizations (EU, UN) and ed that “peace and stability in this region with the Alliance; actor-states. Initially the International are essential for the Alliance”. Te Heads of - Irregular threat networks, defned Community should address the absence State and Government defned it in more as state sponsored and ideologically–in- of state power which has led to the rise of detail, this new strategic reality, as being spired sub national organizations (E.g. non-state actors. Chief among these is the “the framework for NATO’s adaptation in AQAP, Al Shabaab, Boko Haram); so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Levant response to growing challenges and threats - Hybrid threats, defned as ac- (ISIL/Daesh), as observed by the NATO emanating from the South. Te framework tors capable of applying a broad spectrum Deputy Secretary General: focuses on better regional understanding of complex and integrated military and “ISIL seizure of territory and its reign and situational awareness, the ability to non-military instruments, which are easily of terror contributed to the escalation of anticipate and respond to crises emanating adaptable (E.g. Hezbollah, ISIL/Daesh); the civil war in Syria, a worsening string from the South, improved capabilities for - Local armed groups, organized of crises across the Middle East and North expeditionary operations, and enhancing around tribal, clan or village interests, Africa, a series of terrorist attacks in sev- NATO’s ability to project stability through functioning either in opposition to or in eral NATO countries, and the biggest mi- regional partnerships and capacity build- grant and refugee crisis in Europe since the 2 concert with local governments; ing eforts ”. World War II”4. - Broad-based criminal networks;

- Crisis spill over into NATO’s terri- Why is NSD-S important to NATO? tory – overmatching governments ability to Additionally the immediate and Mainly because is a wide and complex en- respond to crisis by creating large fows of asymmetric threat posed by terrorism vironment with a lot of variables included,

32LAND POWER Nato Strategic Direction South A New Strategic Reality

against the security of NATO’s populations and infrastructure must be countered. Te ability of ISIL and similar organizations to not only recruit others to fght for them, but also to plan and conduct a wide varie- ty of attacks within NATO’s territory must be disrupted. In recent times, the terrorist strikes in Paris, San Bernardino, Ankara, Brussels, Orlando, Istanbul, Nice demon- strates our nations’ inability to deal with that kind of a threat alone.

Moreover, enabled by human-traf- fckers and complex criminal organiza- tions, migrants and refugees are a poignant reminder of the growing complexity of the European security environment. Emigrants Rescued In the Mediterranean Sea. Photo from PO1 RJ Stratchko identifed by DVIDS

Two key aspects contribute to the Tis is achieved through a series of coordi- (DAT POW). migrant crisis in Europe: “the push” and nated actions and initiatives. “the pull” aspects. Te push factors such as war and instability will continue to be the Recently, NATO has increased its main root causes of the problem, while the To start with, for many years NATO presence in the Mediterranean Sea and pull factors of stability, asylum and poten- has played an active role in stabilization boosted counter-terrorism and intelli- tial economic opportunity will continue to operations. At the Warsaw Summit, leaders gence-sharing activities by transforming extract migrants from their countries. Te decided that the Alliance will increase its the Active Endeavour maritime operation conclusion we must reach is that large scale support to the US-led coalition to counter into a new, broader maritime security oper- migration will continue for the foreseeable ISIL, by assigning advanced AWACS sur- ation: Sea Guardian. Tis operation is com- future. veillance aircrafs to Coalition forces. NA- plementing the EU’s current activities in TO’s presence in Afghanistan, the Alliance’s the area by providing cooperation between biggest operation ever is, in fact, a stabiliza- the navies and coastguards of the region in How does NATO deal with this kind tion and capacity building operation: “We order to strengthen their ability to fght ter- of problem and unacceptable conditions? went there to prevent Afghanistan from rorism and to curtail human trafcking. At the Warsaw Summit the Alliance provid- becoming once again a safe haven for in- ed an answer to this question, or at least a ternational terrorist5”. In addition, NATO Last but not least, the Alliance is sig- part of it. NATO’s response is to bolster the is developing new, cutting-edge technolo- nifcantly increasing support to its partners deterrence capability against state and non- gies and capabilities to protect troops and in the south in order to enable them to bet- state actors and to increase the Alliance’s ef- civilians against terrorists attacks – Defence ter defend themselves and fght efciently forts to project stability to our neighbours. Against Terrorism Programme of Work against terrorism and extremism, “Part- nership is a necessity not a luxury6”. Tis is being achieved through a number of initi- atives, an example of which is the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building In- itiative (DCB).

Te DCB Initiative7 is NATO’s fag- ship capacity building initiative that at- tempts to provide assistance across a wide spectrum of activities8.

Te DCB package for Iraq involves numerous Allies and partner nations. Training for the Iraqi forces is being con- ducted in Jordan, a Mediterranean Dia- logue country. Jordanian and NATO forces Emigrants Rescued In the Mediterranean Sea. Photo from PO1 RJ Stratchko identifed by DVIDS are providing C-IED, EOD and demining

LAND POWER33 Nato Strategic Direction South A New Strategic Reality

tween NSD-E and NSD-S. LANDCOM provides military advice to SACEUR and all the way up to the political decision mak- ing forums, focusing on the land domain of this issue. Also, it has a part in the military cooperation. Te support provided in plan- ning, conducting and evaluating exercises with partners across the south is a big “slice of the pie” where LANDCOM could bring its expertise – for instance to the NATO Regional Exercise 2017 (REGEX 2017), the frst NATO exercise to be held in a Mediter- ranean Dialogue country, hosted by Jordan. Also, LANDCOM can deploy some experts as part of mobile training and mentoring teams in support of the partners countries in the South. Tese are just few examples of what the LANDCOM’s contribution to this issue is and some directions in which it could evolve.

United States 82nd Division Staf Training Iraqi Forces All in all, the frst line of the Alliance’s defence rests with settled and secure neigh- training. NATO is providing Iraqi forces ed border security. bours. It is as simple as that. Is NATO doing with military medicine and medical assis- everything it takes to meet this challenge? tance, while military advisors are assisting At the moment the Alliance is providing NATO provided advice in establish- with security sector reform. Tere are CI- only a military solution to a political prob- ing an Intelligence “Fusion Centre” and also MIC and MILCOOP teams conducting civ- lem which comes with its challenges. Te support to special operations forces to Tu- il military planning support to operations, Alliance needs to adapt in order to be able nisia. Te Alliance is also developing its in- civil emergency planning and civil proce- to project stability in its immediate neigh- stitutional links with the Gulf Cooperation dures, while NATO is also helping to devel- bourhood. Furthermore, NATO has a his- Council, the Arab League and the African op Iraq’s cyber defence capabilities. tory in doing just that, from operations in Union. Afghanistan or in the Balkans, to training missions and capacity building. And re- At the same time, NATO is also pro- What could Allied Land Command member “when the chips are down, NATO’s viding assistance to Jordan, where the DCB bring to the table in order to enhance NA- allies have always come together to meet package consists of information protection, TO’s contribution in solving this challenge? every new challenge9”. cyber defence, military exercises, C-IED, NATO LANDCOM is based in Izmir, Tur- C3 (communications, command and con- key and, as such, sits on the “fulcrum” be- trol), harbour protection and defence relat-

1NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Sub-committee on future security and defence capabilities, Mission Report, 267 DSCFC 15 E, Cagliari, and Rome, Italy, 28-30 October 2015, page 4. 2Warsaw Summit Communique, 09 July 2016, article 42. 3Idem. 1. 4NATO in Transatlantic Security Policy, Keynote Address by NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Alexander Vershbow at 3rd Annual Helsinki Summer Session, Finish Institute of International Afairs, Helsinki, September 1st, 2016. 5Press point by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following informal EU Defence Ministers meeting, Bratislava, September 27th, 2016. 6Idem 4. 7Nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132756.html. 8Activities include providing strategic advice on defence and security sector reform and institution building, the development of local forces through education and training, advice and assistance in specialized areas such as logistics and cyber-defence. 9“NATO post-Warsaw: Strengthening Security in a Tough Neighbourhood ”, speech by NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Alexander Vershbow at the Annual Meeting of Romanian Ambassadors in , August 29th , 2016.

34LAND POWER SACEUR Recognition Award

Gen. Curtis M. Scaparrotti and Sergeant First Class Kristijan Njavro

he Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), Curtis M. Scaparrotti, presented Croatian soldier, Sergeant First Class Kristijan Njavro with the SACEUR RECOGNITION Award at the Allied Land Command Headquarters June 24, 2016. Njavro received the award “by virtue of his engagement with numerous intelligence forums gaining recognition across the NATO-wideT SIGINT (Signal Intelligence) and All-Source community” according to the ofcial nominations. Njavro proved strong competence and expertise leading and developing “innovative on-the-Job training programs for SIGINT personnel” working day by day as senior SIGINT Analyst in the LANDCOM (LC) G2 Intelligence Acquisition (IA) Branch. He also distinguished himself as a good teacher holding a SIGINT training course for analysts from NIFC, AIRCOM and SHAPE J2 SIGINT and as lecturer both launching the SIGINT “community of Interest”, an informal forum eager to share data and knowledge as best as possible amongst NATO SIGINT analysts and taking part at the frst ACO SIGINT Conference, held in Izmir in 2016. He demonstrated his analytical skills as well by presenting a “module on SIGINT collaboration to the bi-annual NATO SIGINT Operations Course and to the NACSI Plenary”. Because of these reasons, he earned the prestigious SACEUR RECOGNITION Award for his “extraordinary professionalism and dedication to the greater good of the Alliance”.

Lt. Gen. Mate Ostović, Croatian Land Forces Commander, and Sergeant First Class Kristijan Njavro

LAND POWER35 27 May 2016, SACEUR Visists LANDCOM

May 2016, Exercıse Brilliant Jump 16

June 2016, Exercise Brilliant Capability 16

24 June 204, General Scaparrotti (SACEUR) and Lıeutenant General Williams (LANDCOM Commander), Durıng Te Assumption Of Command Ceremony June 2016, Exercise ANAKONDA 16 August 2016, Major General Erhan Uzun, LANDCOM Chıef Of Staf, Arrıves To Te Garrison

September 2016, LANDCOM Of-Sıte Workıng Group

September 2016, Farewell to Mrs. Heidi Meyer (LANDCOM PO LAD) and Colonel Gordon Falconer (ACOS G3)

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September 2016, SHAPE Vıce Chıef Of Staf Visits LANDCOM International Day Scuba Diving At LANDCOM - The LANDCOM Frogs

cuba diving is one of the most popular activities taking place within the LANDCOM social community. Conducted during the Staf’s free time, in the warm, clear waters of the Aegean Sea, diving has been instrumental in bringing together a signifcant number of the Staf from diferent Divisions, Branches and Nationalities (and their families) in an environment unparalleled for developingS cohesion, teamwork, responsibility and trust. In no small way, the popularity of diving within the Headquarters has been as a result of the considerable energy put into the sport by the recently-departed ACOS G3, Colonel Gordo Falconer (GBR). Using a combination of persuasion, attrition, charm and blackmail (sometimes all at once), Colonel Falconer has undoubtedly approached the majority of the Staf at some point in their time here in or- der to wear down their defences and encourage them to participate. As the de-facto leader of the LANDCOM Frogs (as the divers have unofcially become known), he has built the ‘club’ into the collective that is today, with diving of some description being conducted on most weekends throughout the year.

LAND POWER39