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Western Military Capability in Northern Europe 2020 Part I: Collective Defence Western Military Capability in Northern Europe 2020 Part I: Collective Defence Eva Hagström Frisell and Krister Pallin (eds) Albin Aronsson, Bengt-Göran Bergstrand, Robert Dalsjö, Johan Engvall, Jakob Gustafsson, Michael Jonsson, Diana Lepp, Viktor Lundquist, Björn Ottosson and Anna Sundberg FOI-R--5012--SE February 2021 Western Military Capability in Northern Europe 2020 Part I: Collective Defence Eva Hagström Frisell and Krister Pallin (eds) Albin Aronsson, Bengt-Göran Bergstrand, Robert Dalsjö, Johan Engvall, Jakob Gustafsson, Michael Jonsson, Diana Lepp, Viktor Lundquist, Björn Ottosson and Anna Sundberg FOI-R--5012--SE Title Western Military Capability in Northern Europe 2020 Part I: Collective Defence Report No. FOI-R--5012--SE Month February Year 2021 Pages 132 ISSN 1650-1942 Customer Ministry of Defence Research Area 8. Security Policy Project No. A 12112 Approved by Malek Finn Khan Division Defence Analysis Cover: Jonathan Nackstrand/AFP. US Marines prepare their M1 Abrams tank before taking part in an exercise to capture an airfield during Trident Juncture 2018, near the town of Oppdal, Norway. This work is protected by the Swedish Act on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works (1960:729). Citation is permitted in accordance with article 22 in said act. Any form of use that goes beyond what is permitted by Swedish copyright law, requires the written permission of FOI. ii FOI-R--5012--SE Abstract The conclusion of our analysis of Western military capability in Northern Europe in 2017 was that the West had several shortcomings compared to Russia when it came to high-intensity warfighting. Considerable resources and time would be required before the West could change the situation. In 2020, three years later, our wish was to enhance the analysis and perform a first cutnet assessment of the force balance between the West and Russia. The aim is to identify important characteristics of the force balance with respect to relative strengths and weaknesses. We also suggest some keys to improving Western defence of Northern Europe. In order to maintain Western cohesion, there is a need to show solidarity in handling Russia as well as other strategic competitors and non-state threats. NATO allies and partners should also prepare for action in smaller coalitions to enable rapid reaction. In addition, Western strategy should include flexible response against a range of enemy actions. Russia’s means of power are limited compared to a united Western alliance, but the country could pose a serious threat on NATO’s eastern flank. Given likely funding constraints, improvements in the defence of Northern Europe should focus on the near term, while still keeping an eye on the future. Relatively limited and inexpensive measures can make a considerable difference. Keywords: NATO, EU, regional cooperation, bilateral cooperation, security and defence policy, military expenditures, collective defence, armed forces, military policy, military doctrine, military capability, readiness, war game, net assessment. iii FOI-R--5012--SE Sammanfattning Slutsatsen av vår analys av västlig militär förmåga i Nordeuropa 2017 var att det fanns flera brister i jämförelse med Ryssland vad gäller högintensiv krigföring. Bedömningen var att väst skulle behöva avsätta betydande resurser och tid för att ändra på situationen. År 2020, tre år senare, var vår önskan att förbättra analysen och genomföra en systematisk värdering avseende styrkebalansen mellan väst och Ryssland. Syftet är att identifiera viktiga särdrag i balansen avseende relativa styrkor och svagheter. Vi drar också några viktiga slutsatser för arbetet med att förbättra det västliga försvaret av Nordeuropa. För att upprätthålla den politiska sammanhållningen i väst finns det ett behov att visa solidaritet i hanteringen av Ryssland såväl som av andra strategiska konkurrenter och icke-statliga aktörer. Nato- medlemmar och partnerländer bör också planera för att kunna verka i mindre koalitioner för snabb respons. Vidare bör västlig strategi inkludera flexibla svar på en rad olika fientliga aktioner. Rysslands maktmedel är begränsade i jämförelse med en enad västlig allians, men landet kan utgöra ett allvar- ligt hot mot Natos östra flank. Givet trolig återhållsamhet med framtida försvarssatsningar bör för- bättringar av försvaret av Nordeuropa fokusera på närtid, med en samtidig blick på framtiden. Även relativt begränsade och mindre kostnadskrävande åtgärder kan göra stor skillnad. Nyckelord: Nato, EU, regionalt samarbete, bilateralt samarbete, säkerhetspolitik, försvarspolitik, militärutgifter, kollektivt försvar, väpnade styrkor, militär policy, militär doktrin, militär förmåga, beredskap, krigsspel, värdering. iv FOI-R--5012--SE Preface This is the second comprehensive study of Western military capability in Northern Europe conducted by the Northern European and Transatlantic Security (NOTS) Programme since our start in 2015. A number of people have contributed their knowledge and expertise to the fulfilment of the study. First, we wish to thank our reviewers. Professor Magnus Petersson of the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS) – now at Stockholm University – and Dr. Johan Eellend of the Swedish Armed Forces commented on early drafts in June 2020. In October 2020, the thematic chapters were the object of a two-day seminar with external experts. Chapter 2 was reviewed by Ms. Justyna Gotkowska, Programme Coordinator for Regional Security at the Polish Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW); Chapter 3 by Dr. Paal S. Hilde, Associate Professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS): Chapter 4 by Dr. John R. Deni, Research Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the U.S. Army War College; and Chapter 5 by Lieutenant General (Ret.) Heinrich Brauß, Senior Associate Fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). The study relies considerably on other FOI expertise, both within and outside of the NOTSprogramme, in particular concerning war-gaming, Russia, air power, nuclear weapons and electronic warfare. Special thanks are due to Erik Nordstrand, Johan Elg, Johan Norberg, Jonas Kjellén, John Rydqvist, Niklas Rossbach, Emma Sjökvist and retired colleagues Bo Tarras Wahlberg and Krister Andrén. We are also indebted to Pär Blid and Magnus Danielsson of the Swedish Armed Forces and Anders Larsson of the Swedish Defence University for their contributions during our war game. As always, Per Wikström designed maps for us with the greatest professionalism. Richard Langlais reviewed and edited the language of all texts with outstanding diligence and attitude. Lena Engelmark and Marianna Serveta provided tenacious and infallible support for the layout of the report. Our sincerest thanks to all of you; without your support this study would not have been possible. Stockholm, February 2021 Krister Pallin Deputy Research Director & Programme Manager Northern European and Transatlantic Security Programme v FOI-R--5012--SE Executive Summary Russia’s military build-up and increasingly aggressive behaviour in NATO’s vicinity have been a wake-up call for the countries in Northern Europe. Multilateral organisations and individual states have begun a political and military transformation to adapt to a changing security environment. Our analysis of Western military capability in Northern Europe in 2017 showed that Western mili- tary capability had several shortcomings compared to Russia, particularly when it comes to readi- ness for high-intensity warfighting in Europe. Considerable resources and time would be required to change the situation. The aim of the 2020 study of Western military capability in Northern Europe is to enhance the analysis and perform our first systematic assessment of the force balance between the West and Russia. Building on the tradition of net assessment, the study covers a number of factors that are in effect necessary for a comprehensive assessment of military capability, such as security and defence policy, armed forces, military policy and doctrine, and conflict scenarios. Our aim is to identify the important characteristics of the force balance between the West and Russia with respect to relative strengths and weaknesses. Given the latter, we also suggest some keys to improving the Western defence of Northern Europe. The study is divided into two parts: a thematic analysis of Western collective defence and a number of country analyses focusing on national military capabilities. The changing security landscape – Western cohesion and coordination The increasingly multipolar world order, now again characterised by the competition between great powers and the weakening of multilateral organisations and norms, affects the security situation in Northern Europe. This has led to greater demands on Western defence but also to diverging priorities among allies and partners. At the same time, the West faces an authoritarian regime in Russia that wants to regain its status as a great power and establish a sphere of privileged interest in its neighbourhood. Uncertainties regarding the future role of the US and the weakening of the European security order may give Russia an incentive to further its interests at the expense of the countries in the region. In order to maintain unity, NATO has to plan for meeting threats in several directions. Diverging geopolitical outlooks and threat perceptions may affect the ability to reach an agreement to counter Russian actions in a crisis, which is why regional and bilateral cooperation formats are fundamental to ensure rapid
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