Political Liberalism in Bulgaria: Achievements and Prospects 1

The definitive ideas of political liberalism – individual rights, constitutionalism, and the market economy – have become universal reference points in democratic politics, and because of that have been largely de-politicised.

This situation spells the predicament of the liberal parties: their agenda has become universally accepted, which makes them hardly distinguishable from their main competitors.

In Bulgaria, essentially only one party has been successfully institution- alised as ‘liberal’ both in terms of ideology and centrism – NDSV.

In terms of positioning, DPS has always been centrist, but in terms of practiced ideology it could hardly be called ‘liberal’.

There are obviously conditions under which ‘liberalism’ as a political ideology could be revived and become successful in electoral contests: the rise of populism in the 2000s also provides an opportunity for liberal parties to consolidate and to create a joint front against attempts to undermine constitutional values.

The dominance of mild populism of a centrist type prevents for now the possibility of the emergence of a strong, centrist liberal party (or the revival of existing ones).

The immediate chances for the revival of the liberal centre depend on the radicalisation of Bulgarian populism in nationalistic or other illiberal direction. If aggressive populist governments, as the one of Orban in Hungary, appear one might expect a possible consolidation of a liberal alternative. One wonders whether such a development would be a cause for celebration for liberals, however. Maybe it is ultimately better to be a victim of one’s own success and to see your ideas shared – imperfectly or simply strategically as it may be - by a wide spectrum of parties.

June 2011 Political Liberalism in Bulgaria: Achievements and Prospects 1

Contents

Introduction...... 2 1. NDSV and the Crisis of the Party System in the 2000s...... 6 2. The Political Trajectory of Populist Movement Transformed Into a Liberal Party...... 9 3. From a Mass Movement to a Loose Union of Clubs and Lobbies?...... 11 4. Political Mobilisation Strategies of a Liberal Party...... 12 5. NDSV and Bulgarian Constitutionalism...... 15 6. NDSV and the Redefinition of the Party System...... 16 7. NDSV and the Challenges of the 1990s: How Did the Party Fare in Comparison to Its Predecessors in Power?...... 21 8. NDSV and the Challenges of the 2000s: the Rise of Populism...... 26 Conclusions...... 29 2 Political Liberalism in Bulgaria: Achievements and Prospects

Introduction terminism. The classical liberal agenda in this case is combined with the belief that Political liberalism is a victim of its own success: the market is omnipotent and maximally it has become so mainstream and accepted efficient, state regulation is always detri- that hardly people recognise it as a separate mental, etc.; and specific political ideology and platform. – Liberal nationalism: a mutation in which a The definitive ideas of political liberalism – in- liberal justification is sought for nationalis- dividual rights, constitutionalism, and the mar- tic policies. Most commonly, this happens ket economy – have become universal refer- through an apology of the domestic tax ence points in democratic politics, and because payer, the national capital, the entrepre- of that have been largely de-politicised. Today, neurial elite, etc.; political battles (in the established democratic – Protective liberal welfarism: a version of regimes) rarely rage round these issues: rath- the nationalist variation, in which the do- er, they form the constitutional frame within mestic tax payer seeks protection for her which ‘routine’ politics takes place. welfare rights against immigrants, out- This situation spells the predicament of sourcing of jobs to foreign countries, etc. the liberal parties: their agenda has become All these mutations create further confu- universally accepted, which makes them sion, and make it virtually impossible to speak hardly distinguishable from their main com- of ‘liberal’ parties in the contemporary world petitors. These competitors seem to offer a as a clearly defined category. Rather, we have more diverse package than the liberals, since a family resemblance concept, in which par- in addition to their ideas, they could add so- ties as different as the Liberal Democrats of cial solidarity, family values, religious or com- the UK (classical liberals) and the Liberal Party munitarian forms of identification, market of Austria (a clear-cut case of mutation) could fundamentalism, and so on. In comparison have some claim over a common label. If there to these illustrious political options, political is a trend, it is one in which the mutations liberalism seems rather austere, economical, become more numerous and more success- and aesthetically modest. In the contempo- ful than the traditional liberal parties, which rary mediatic times, modesty fares less well progressively lose ground. A specific mutation than excess in terms of attracting votes (and of liberalism – combining neoliberal faith in attention more generally). the market and (moderate) forms of national- In such circumstances, there are essential- ism – becomes especially attractive to voters ly two possibilities for contemporary liberals. in Europe and North America.2 A graphic ex- One is to expand their own ideological and ample of the development is the Tea Party in policy package, so that they incorporate some the US, which focuses on the core values of of the ‘excesses’ of the others. In this way we traditional liberalism – constitutionalism and have mutations of the liberal parties, some of the market – but provides an extreme inter- the most widespread are: pretation of these values in a libertarian and – Neoliberalism and market fundamental- nationalistic direction. ism1: this is a common mutation of a liberal party in the direction of economic de- 2 Rumyana Kolarova argues that over the last decades the liberal parties lose electoral support due to the ascendance of extreme right parties, which are not so much xenophobic and 1 For the impact of the neoliberal thinking on liberal parties see nationalistic, but mobilise the vote of the ‘honest taxpayers’. Meny, Yves and Knapp, Andrew, Government and Politics in Румяна Коларова, Сравнително европейско управление, Western Europe, Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 60. София, 2009. Political Liberalism in Bulgaria: Achievements and Prospects 3

Apart from mutation, the second path tions and hybridisations, typical of contempo- open to liberals is to become defenders of rary politics, has become difficult to use.3 If the constitution against the extreme behav- we stick to a narrow, classical conception of iour of the others. In this case, liberals need the liberal ideology, there will be really few to wait until there is a serious enough threat parties to fit – contemporary parties, as sug- to the basic democratic order, which will mo- gested, offer more than constitutionalism, in- bilise the people against their competitors. dividual rights and market competition. If we This was the case in Poland, for instance, expand the conception, however, then the where the populist excesses of the Kaczynski danger is to lose focus and to include most of government led to the consolidation of the the other parties in the liberal family. There- vote in favour of a liberal alternative around fore, there is a need for other markers of po- the Civic Platform of Donald Tusk. In Slova- litical liberalism. Its ‘centrism’ could be such kia, the elections of 2010 spelled a similar an indicator, since contemporary liberals tend development. However, in order for such a to position themselves in the political centre, scenario to materialise, there is a need of a between the conservative and the socialist strong populist wave before that: even more and social-democratic parties.4 Again, taken importantly, the populist wave must be of an on its own, ‘centrism’ is a highly nebulous especially virulent type, threatening the con- concept. It conflates political identity with po- stitutional order of the country as a whole. litical strategy and tactics in electoral compe- The case of Hungary is interesting in this re- titions. Yet, there are many examples in which gard: if this hypothesis is correct, one should contemporary liberal parties are positioned expect consolidation of the liberal parties and between centre-left and centre-right parties, the liberal vote after the present Fidesz gov- this being the situation in Germany and the ernment of Viktor Orban. UK – two of the paradigmatic European party Eastern Europe has added significantly systems. As far as the possibilities of centrism to the confusion regarding liberal parties are concerned, much depends on contextual and their nature. The fall of the communist factors, such as the electoral system, party regimes in 1989 started a process of ‘liber- institutionalisation, and others, but the UK alisation’ in which the main political confron- example shows that liberalism can survive as tation was between the pro-reform, liberal a centrist option even in an extremely unfa- and democratic parties, and the more con- vourable electoral environment, such as the servative, typically ex-communist parties. In first-past-the-post system. these circumstances ‘liberalism’ became an When we combine the ‘ideological sub- umbrella term for all parties supporting the stance’ indicator and the ‘positioning’ indica- transformation of the former Soviet satellites tor, we could probably get a more structured into market democracies, members of the EU and NATO. Needless to say, by the early 2000s 3 For a very sophisticated analysis of party ideologies on the basis of electoral programmes of Bulgarian parties see Ми- most main parties in Central Europe at least лен Любенов, Българската партийна система: групи- became ‘liberal’ in this sense, which made the ране и структуриране на партийните предпояита- ния1990-2009, Университетско издателство „Св. Климент political label of liberalism largely irrelevant in Охридски“, 2011. 4 Herbert Kitschelt has introduced two types of dimensions on political competition. which parties may differ: left-right and authoritarian-libertari- Thus far we have introduced only the first an. These two dimensions broadly correspond to the positioning and ideological markers, which I use in this text. See Party marker of political liberalism – its ideology. Systems in East Central Europe: Consolidation or Fluidity?, Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy. University of This marker, as a result of numerous muta- Strathclyde, 1995. 4 Political Liberalism in Bulgaria: Achievements and Prospects

picture of the liberal family of parties. The Bulgarian case, which will be the focus of the table below applies these indicators to the present paper:

Table 1: Senses of Liberalism

Liberals as Centrists Non-Centrist Liberals in terms NDSV (and splinter groups UDF (1990s) of ideology - Novoto Vreme and BND), UDF-Liberals? Other than liberal DPS? BSP, Ataka, GERB?, by ideology DSB, UDF (2000s)

The table demonstrates the difficulties of Bulgaria. In terms of positioning, DPS has al- applying ideal types to political realities typi- ways been centrist, and has tried to play the fied by mutations and hybridisations – the role of a junior coalition partner in most of the question marks indicate the uneasy fit of a governments of the transition period.5 Yet, in specific party within a given category. Never- terms of ideology DPS could hardly be called theless, the table shows that essentially only ‘liberal’ despite its official programmatic doc- one party has been successfully institution- uments and its focus on the protection of in- alised as ‘liberal’ both in terms of ideology dividual and minority rights. After all, the par- and positioning – NDSV. UDF-Liberals was an ty represents essentially the Bulgarian Turks, unsuccessful attempt to do so in the early and defends their interests. Since they live in 1990s (and anyhow it is difficult to make underdeveloped regions, they are heavily de- firm conclusions about their ideological out- pendent on welfare rights and policies. This look because of their rapid decline): the po- makes DPS a very etatist (in its practical orien- larisation of the vote in the early years of the tation) political party, which does not sit well Bulgarian transition spelled the doom of the with liberalism. Revealing of this etatism is the project. UDF in the 1990s could well be de- tendency of the party to insist on heavy state scribed as a liberal party in terms of ideology, investment in the infrastructure of the regions but it did not position itself in the centre. where Bulgarian Turks live, its attempts to ex- President Zhelyu Zhelev’s attempt to move ercise control over state owned enterprises as the UDF to a more centrist position was one Bulgar Tabak, which are key for the economic of the reasons for the bitter conflict between livelihood of many of its voters6, the wide- him and the UDF leadership. Not surprisingly, spread patronage practices of the party (ap- this was one of the reasons for his identifica- pointments in the state administration, public tion as a ‘liberal’ in comparison to the more companies, etc.), and so on. Generally, it will polarising messages of the core UDF group be a methodological mistake to take DPS as from which he distanced himself. All in all, a core case of a liberal party, because of its the attempts of the 1990s to create a liberal many idiosyncratic features. party in both senses – ideological and positioning – failed. It was only in 2001 when 5 The definition of DPS as a centrist party is universally shared. See such a project became possible. Георги Карасимеонов, Партийната система в България,NIK, The case of DPS – the Movement for Rights София 2010. 6 DPS has also successfully helped to block the privatisation of and Freedoms – is of special importance for Bulgar Tabak on a number of occasions. Political Liberalism in Bulgaria: Achievements and Prospects 5

The UDF – the party which spearheaded form Party.8 But membership in European the ‘liberalisation’ processes during the first parties cannot be conclusive for the identi- ten years of the transition – is also very im- fication of political actors. Especially in the portant for the understanding of Bulgarian Bulgarian case, there is a high degree of co- liberalism. In terms of ideology, in the 1990s incidence and contextuality in the belonging UDF was clearly a liberal party, which inten- of parties to political families at the Europe- tionally avoided centrism, however. Since an level. For instance, NDSV first applied to 2000, the party has tried to turn first Chris- the European People’s Party, and only after tian Democratic, and then (after the split it was turned down, it joined the European with the more conservative DSB) it evolved liberal family. It is true that membership in gradually in a neoliberal direction, especially these parties has an important impact on under its current leader Martin Dimitrov. The domestic actors. In the case of DPS this im- group around Ivan Kostov – which formed pact is particularly visible: over the years the DSB – positioned itself in the more conserva- party has internalised most of the program- tive end of the spectrum. matic liberal documents and main policies. These introductory remarks demonstrate Yet, despite these effects DPS continues to that there could be broader and narrower be largely a regional party offering represen- definitions of political liberalism in Bulgarian tation to an ethnic minority: this is the main context. If we take the broader view, liberal reason for its stable place in the Bulgarian parties in either the ideological or the posi- political process. tioning sense of the word could be consid- Although contemporary Bulgarian politics ered NDSV (and its spin-offs), DPS, and UDF is by no means dominated by liberal parties (1990s).7 If we take a narrower definition of (as in much of the rest of Europe), there are the term – combining both positioning and obviously conditions under which ‘liberalism’ ideology – only NDSV will come into the fo- as a political ideology could be revived and cus of the study. In this paper, the narrower become successful in electoral contests. The view will be taken: we will look more closely experience of Eastern Europe demonstrates into the role of NDSV in the Bulgarian political that there are essentially two situations in process, as a core case, revealing of all char- which liberalism can become a significant acteristics of the liberal parties. Wherever rel- tool for political mobilisation. First, this was evant, the experience of other parties will be the context of the early 1990s, when there mentioned as well. were constitutional revolutions in most of One difficulty with the narrower defini- the countries in the region, and a process of tion is that apparently it is not the one used transition towards market economy and de- by the parties at the European level – both mocracy began. Parties as the Free Democrats NDSV and DPS are members of the Alliance in Hungary (or UDF in Bulgaria) illustrated the of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) ascendancy of political liberalism as ideology. and the European Liberal Democrat and Re- Secondly, the rise of populism in the 2000s

8 Antony Todorov has argued that apart from the differentia- 7 To illustrate the all-inclusiveness of the broader approach, tion of interests in society, of particular importance for the consider the position of Georgi Karasimeonov, who speaks of identification of the political parties is the international envi- three liberal-centrist parties – BSP, NDSV and DPS – all members ronment in which they operate. See Тодоров, Антоний, „Чле- of the triple coalition government 2005-2009. Georgi Kara- нужането в партиите след 1989 г.“ в Любенов, Милен (р.), simeonov (ed.), The Party System in Bulgaria 2001-2009: Trans- Българската политология пред предизвикателствата formation and Evolution of the Political Parties, Friedrich Ebert на времето, Университетско издателство „Св. Климент Foundation Office Bulgaria, Sofia, April 2010. Охридски“, 2010 г., стр.144. 6 Political Liberalism in Bulgaria: Achievements and Prospects

also provides an opportunity for liberal par- yse its impact on the party system and the ties to consolidate and to create a joint front political process of Bulgaria. Then the paper against attempts to undermine constitutional examines the policy output of NDSV vis-�-vis values such as freedom of the media, individ- the challenges both of the 1990s and the con- ual and minority rights, the rule of law. The temporary period of the Bulgarian transition. already mentioned example of Poland is illus- The paper ends with some observations on trative of this possibility. the prospects of political liberalism in Bulgaria. As the ensuing case study will suggest, however, the relationship between populism 1. NDSV and the Crisis of the Party and liberalism is more complex than it may System in the 2000s appear. As the example of NDSV demonstrates, liberal parties may attempt to exploit The National Movement for Stability and Prog- populist strategies for their own goals: for in- ress9 (Национално движение за напредък stance, the charismatic appeal of their lead- и възход) – which was formerly known as ers. The institutionalisation of the party as a National Movement Simeon II (Национално liberal rather than populist/charismatic typi- движение „Симеон Втори”) – is a party cally disenchants most of the public, how- presenting a most interesting case of devel- ever: the cost of populist attraction tends to opment and evolution of an influential actor be very low level of party loyalty. The party in Bulgarian political life. It could be analysed ‘sympathisers’ very often turn their atten- as a Bulgarian idiosyncrasy, a specific blend of tion to ever more attractive and charismatic different historical legacies and contemporary leaders, whose link to liberal values becomes trends in politics. Yet, in this paper it will be thinner and thinner. argued that NDSV is of broader interest and Another peculiarity of the contemporary significance for the student of politics in con- situation is the possible rotation of liberal and temporary Europe; that it was made possible populist parties in power (as again suggested by factors and processes, which are not con- by the Polish and the Hungarian examples). fined only to the Bulgarian context. If this trend is further confirmed, Eastern Eu- In short, the breathtaking political ascen- rope should brace for another turbulent pe- dancy (and equally breathtaking fall) of NDSV riod in its political development. We may face will be presented as a response to a certain oscillation between aggressive populists and crisis of representative democracy as tradi- militant liberals – a situation which will hardly tionally understood. This crisis is most visible contribute to the establishment of stable and in the falling public confidence in the ‘tradi- civilized political process. Thus, one of the tional’ ideological political parties – the parties most important tasks of the present study will based on the “left-right” cleavage. Bulgaria be to elucidate the link between populism is a front-runner in European context in this and liberalism in contemporary politics, and process. Thus, the European Parliament elec- to focus on the potential dangers that this tions in June 2009 showed that the centre-left link may bring. Again, the case of NDSV – the (Bulgarian Socialist Party - BSP) and the centre- core Bulgarian liberal party – will prove most right (Blue coalition) parties control together revealing of these problems. The paper is organised in the following 9 Hereinafter NDSV, as the party is popularly known in Bulgaria. way. It starts with a brief description of NDSV The acronym of National Movement for Stability and Progress in Bulgarian is НДСВ or NDSV in the Latin alphabet. It is the as a political party. Then it proceeds to anal- same acronym as for National Movement Simeon II. Political Liberalism in Bulgaria: Achievements and Prospects 7 only 26.45% of the total vote. If we add to populist-nationalist players. This trend was this the „liberal centre” – NDSV and the Move- only confirmed by the parliamentary elections ment for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) – the re- in July 2009, in which NDSV could not clear sult is still less than a half: 48.55%. The rest the 4% threshold and become an extra-paris controlled by newly emerging populist and liamentary party for the first time since 2001.

Table 2. Results of the 2009 parliamentary elections

№ Party Votes Percentage of the total vote

1 Order, Law and Justice 174582 4.13%

2 Leader 137795 3.26%

3 GERB 1678641 39.72%

Movement for Rights 4 610521 14.45% and Freedoms (MRF)

5 ATAKA 395733 9.36%

6 Coalition for Bulgaria (BSP) 748147 17.70%

Blue Coalition (UDF and 7 285662 6.76% Democrats for Strong Bulgaria

The general lack of confidence in tradi- cal populist movement around a charismatic tional “ideological parties” – or the parties leader into a more or less “traditional” lib- which stand for some long-term, ideologi- eral party, standing for liberal social values cally-defined programmes organised around and free market economy. Unfortunately, this coherent sets of goals – opens room for the evolution coincided with a dramatic loss of emergence of new, more pragmatic, more public confidence in NDSV: from a popular charismatic political players, which manage favourite capable of mobilising huge crowds to capture the public imagination through in the streets, the party was gradually turned attractive media presentation, the personal into a small (though important) parliamentary quality of their leaders, and skilful anti-estab- party, whose main strength is the quality of its lishment campaigns. As explained later in the members and their governmental experience. text, this specific environment was conducive Another issue, which needs to be men- to the rise of some interesting forms of East tioned by way of inevitable introduction, is the European populism. extraordinary role of the former Bulgarian Tsar NDSV was and is involved in this dynamic Simeon II in the formation and development of political process in a rather complex way. Its NDSV.10 The fall of the Berlin Wall and the col- appearance on the Bulgarian political stage lapse of the Zhivkov regime in Bulgaria made can definitely be interpreted as the first major wave of a succession of populist players. 10 Any analysis of the political trajectory of NDSV should start with a short biography of its leader - Simeon Saxe-Coburg Go- However, the subsequent evolution of NDSV tha, who was Bulgarian Tsar (in the 1940s) and Prime Minister of the Republic of Bulgaria (2001 – 2005).He was born on June transformed the organisation from a typi- 16, 1937 in Sofia - the son of King Boris III and Queen Giovan- 8 Political Liberalism in Bulgaria: Achievements and Prospects

possible the return of Simeon II to the coun- There are very few international parallels try. This did not happen immediately, however. of such a political involvement of a royalty in Only in 1996 did he return to Bulgaria after day-to-day democratic politics. Simeon II has almost 50 years in exile. In 1998 the Consti- always expressed keen interest in Bulgarian tutional Court took a decision to give back his political life since the fall of the communist family’s estates: a decision, which was greeted regime in 1989, but it is an important fact enthusiastically by the political elites at the that his involvement took place only after time, but which became the focus of intense 2001 – the time when the grand ideologi- controversy after 2005. On April 6, 2001 Sime- cal confrontation between “ex-communists” on II made one of the most important steps and “democrats” had begun to lose its force. concerning his democratic political career. In Simeon II’s return was perceived by many as an address to the Bulgarian nation he made the emergence of a fresh new actor in an al- public his intention to create a National Move- ready stagnant political system. ment bearing his name and working for a Interestingly, the political return of the Tsar „new morality in politics and integrity in every- as a party leader coincided also with the mo- thing”. As the Leader of this movement, after ment when democracy consolidated in Bul- a series of problems related to its registration garia. Although there are different views and by the court, the Bulgarian King participated in theories of „consolidation”, it could be con- the parliamentary elections on June 17, 2001. vincingly argued that by 2001 democracy had After the landslide victory of NDSV, on 24 become “the only game in town” in Bulgaria. July 2001 Simeon Saxe-Coburg Gotha was This is so, since the ex-communists – its most sworn in as the Prime Minister of the Republic serious opponents – had already committed of Bulgaria. During the following four years themselves to the principles of democratic he ruled the country in a coalition with the governance, market economy and Euro-At- Movement for Rights and Freedom (DPS). Af- lantic integration. In this context, the return ter parliamentary elections in 2005 Simeon of the ex-tsar Simeon as a democratic political Saxe-Coburg Gotha entered the Council of leader was another symbolic triumph for Bul- the Three-party (triple) Coalition: BSP, NDSV garian democracy: it meant that monarchism and the DPS, which formed the cabinet. After was no longer seen as a viable alternative to the 2009 elections, NDSV became an extra- liberal democracy. parliamentary party, failing to clear the 4% Thus, the history of NDSV illustrates two electoral threshold in general elections. parallel and at first sight contradictory processes: the consolidation of the regime in its present constitutional form of a liberal, repub- na. Simeon II ascended the throne on 28 August 1943 at the age of only 6, after the sudden death of his father, King Boris lican parliamentary democracy, and the crisis III. Regency was appointed to rule Bulgaria on his behalf. After the communist coup d’état on September 9, 1944 Simeon II of the party system as the main component remained on the throne, but the regents (among whom was of the political system of representation in the his uncle Prince Kyril) were executed, as well as many of the intelligentsia in the country. Two years later, in 1946, follow- country. NDSV, as a main explanatory variable ing a referendum, King Simeon, his sister Princess Maria Louise and Queen Giovanna were forced to leave Bulgaria. Without in both processes, provides a very suitable en- having abdicated the throne, the young King left for long years try point to the understanding of the contem- of exile. The royal family first went to Alexandria, Egypt, where also in exile lived Queen Giovanna’s father Victor Emanuel, porary Bulgarian democracy. King of Italy. In July 1951 the Spanish government granted asylum to the exiled Bulgarian royal family. Simeon II made his living as a businessman, an experience which he often mentioned as valuable for the purposes of his subsequent career as a democratic politician. Political Liberalism in Bulgaria: Achievements and Prospects 9

2. The Political Trajectory of Populist The June 2009 European Parliament elections Movement Transformed were interpreted as successful for the party, Into a Liberal Party since it narrowly12 elected two MEPs with 205 146 votes or 7.96% of the total. The relative NDSV was founded in April 2001 after Sime- increase of the share of votes for the party is on II declared his decision to take part in Bul- not explainable by its rising popularity, how- garian politics. The movement won 42.7% of ever, but rather by its very popular leader of the popular vote and 120 out of 240 seats in the party list – EU Commissioner Meglena Ku- the 2001 parliamentary elections. It formed neva, who undoubtedly managed to attract a coalition government with the Movement personally significant number of votes. for Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter DPS - a In local elections NDSV has traditionally liberal regional party representing mainly the performed not very well. This is so because it Bulgarian Turks), and gradually developed was set up as a popular movement mobilised into a liberal party, which became a full mem- during parliamentary elections. The party gen- ber of the Liberal International at its Sofia erally lacks solid local structures and some- Congress in May 2005. times whole local sections defect to other par- At the legislative elections on June 25, ties. Very indicative was the high-profile case 2005, it received 21.83% of the popular with the mayor of Dobrich Detelina Nikolova, vote and 53 out of 240 seats, a significant elected in 2003 as a NDSV candidate. In 2007 decrease in comparison to 2001. The elec- she defected to the newly formed party GERB toral result allowed NDSV to stay in power by headed by Boyko Borissov (who himself started becoming a junior partner in government of his career at the time of the NDSV 2001-2005 the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), which had government as a secretary of the Ministry of won 33.98% of the vote (82 seats). A triple Interior). In terms of numbers, in 2003 NDSV coalition was formed - BSP, NDSV and DPS, won only 9 mayoral posts in larger towns and which ruled the country in the period 2005- cities and 101 in small villages – in terms of 2009. As mentioned above, in 2009 the party councillors it had 344 elected candidates. In failed to enter parliament, falling below the comparison, DPS (which was its junior coali- 4% electoral threshold. Thus, in the course of tion partner in government) won 695 council- eight years it has attracted and lost close to lor seats, 29 mayors of larger towns and 549 40% popular support, which is a quite an ex- mayors of villages and small towns. NDSV did ceptional development from the point of view not manage to win the mayoral elections in of stable and consolidated democracies.11 any of the largest Bulgarian cities (Sofia, Plo- Since the time of its establishment, NDSV vdiv, Varna, Bourgas, Rousse) – a fact which took part in two European Parliament Elec- was telling of its weak local structures. The tions and in two local elections. These elec- 2007 results were equally disappointing.13 tions were most indicative of the rapid de- NDSV has taken part in two presidential cline in terms of popularity of the party. In the elections as well. In 2001 it supported the in- 2007 elections for European parliament NDSV cumbent president Petar Stoyanov (a former managed to elect only one MEP (out of 17) leader of the Union of Democratic Forces – the with 121 398 votes (or 6.27% of the total). 12 It is worth noting that also that NDSV’s competitors for the second MEP seat – the centre-right Blue coalition – got 7,95% 11 In the subsequent period, approval ratings for the party and of the votes, just a few hundred less than NDSV. electoral support as identified by sociological surveys has been 13 The detailed results of the 2007 local elections could be found around one per cent, which indicates weak electoral potential. at: http://www.cikmi2007.org/ 10 Political Liberalism in Bulgaria: Achievements and Prospects

major centre-right party of the Bulgarian tran- isolation of the group of Koshlukov from the sition). The joint candidate of NDSV and UDF leadership of the party, which at that time was lost to the candidate of the BSP, however.14 At controlled by the „lawyers” and the „yup- the 2006 presidential elections NDSV actually pies”. In terms of ideas, the split was rather failed to nominate its own candidate, and sup- thinly justified with the emphasis, which NV ported (in the second round) the incumbent put on the reforms of the procedural laws of president Parvanov (former leader of the BSP), Bulgarian democracy: the electoral laws, the who won convincingly against the nationalist laws on party financing, referenda, lobbying, Volen Siderov of Ataka. This was one of the etc. NV ran independently for parliament in lowest point in the political development of the 2005 parliamentary elections and got 3% the party, signalling a very high degree of loss of the vote, falling below the 4% electoral of party identity: for some commentators this threshold. Its most important success was the was the end of the party itself.15 election of its leader Koshlukov for MEP in NDSV has experienced two major internal the 2009 election in coalition with the newly splits. It started as a broad popular movement emerging party Leader of the energy-sector comprised of a number of different elements businessman Hristo Kovachki. and players. Thus, from the very beginning The second splinter group – Bulgarian New within the party there were the lobbies of Democracy (BND)17 – was established on May the so-called yuppies (young Bulgarian pro- 11, 2008. The new party emerged again on fessionals educated and living abroad, who the basis of the parliamentary group of the came back to join the movement), the law- NDSV, after a bitter confrontation with mutual yers (mostly professors from the Law Depart- accusations of rigging the elections for party ment of the University of Sofia), the group of leadership at the Congress of the party in June Koshlukov (a former student leader and politi- 2007.18 This time the internal division was re- cian of the Union of Democratic Forces), and ally major and involved large sections of NDSV. others. These groups never lost their identity The most prominent group, which formed the and at different points in time were in friction new party, was the one of the „lawyers”, in- with one another or with the leader of the cluding the former vice president of NDSV Pla- party. The two most important crises involved men Panayotov, and the former defence minis- the creation of the Novoto Vreme (The New ter Nikolay Svinarov. Other important founding Times) party by Koshlukov, Sevlievski and members of BND were Atanas Shterev, Lidiya Tsekov, and the major split resulting in the Shuleva, Borislav Kralev and Borislav Velikov creation of the New Democracy Party. and others. The rift began in 2007, when most Novoto Vreme (NV)16 was created as a of the above mentioned failed to be elected in splinter party from the NDSV in July 2004. It the governing bodies of the party: they refused starts as a discussion group within the parlia- to accept the results of the Congress and ar- mentary faction of NDSV, but later the ten- gued that the whole procedure had been com- sions lead to the establishment of a new party. promised. Ultimately, the rift escalated and led The main reasons for the split are the relative to the creation of BND. The new party participated for the first time in the elections (for Eu-

14 Results of the second round of elections: Patar Stoyanov 45.87% (1731676 votes); Georgi Parvanov 54.13% (2043443 votes). 15 See for instance the publication in Kapital, There is No 17 See the party website: http://www.bnd.bg/bg/static/partia- Such Party by Sibina Krusteva http://www.capital.bg/show. bnd.html php?storyid=282463 (September 15, 2006). 18 For an account of the events, see http://www.mediapool.bg/ 16 See the party website: http://www.novotovreme.bg/ show/?storyid=129173 Political Liberalism in Bulgaria: Achievements and Prospects 11 ropean parliament) in June 2009, when its re- The second club, in terms of importance, sult was rather disappointing: no elected MEPs is the lobby of the so-called yuppies – Bulgar- and less than one per cent of the total vote. ian professionals educated abroad, who start- BND decided to support the candidates of the ed their careers in international financial insti- Blue Coalition19 in the July 2009 parliamentary tutions. These include Milen Velchev, Nikolai elections: after these elections the party’s pres- Vassilev, Lubka Kachakova and Vladimir Kar- ence on the political scene is hardly detectable. olev. All of them have obtained an advanced degree from a Western university, and have 3. From a Mass Movement to a Loose worked in senior positions for international Union of Clubs and Lobbies? investment banks, consultancies or other such firms. The first two of them were respectively After its populist moment in 2001, NDSV has Minister of Finance and Minister of the Econ- gradually acquired some of the features of the omy (and then of the State Administration) in classical liberal parties before the emergence cabinets with the participation of NDSV. The of mass democracy: from a certain angle, it “yuppies” have always been well situated may appear to be a parliamentary (at the mo- within the party (Veltchev was a deputy presi- ment even extra-parliamentary) club of politi- dent of the party 2001-2005). Since 2007, cal personalities. NDSV’s biggest capital was however, this club became truly dominant, and is the quality of its individual members. with Panayotov and his associates leaving the The party has managed to attract some of the party. In comparison to the BND group, the best Bulgarian professionals in areas such as “yuppies” are much more centre-left leaning law and economics. In the period 2001-2007, in terms of willingness to coalesce with the the so-called lobby of the lawyers prevailed BSP. This was one of the points of tension, in the determination of the overall politics of which ultimately led to the split of the party. NDSV: Plamen Panayotov was a deputy Prime Apart from these two core professional Minister and Daniel Valtchev was deputy groupings within the NDSV, there was a huge vice-president of the Party together with the penumbra of publicly attractive political per- Defence Minister Nikolai Svinarov. Valtchev, sonalities associated with the party. Firstly, Gerdzhikov (Chair of Parliament 2001-2005) one should mention one of the trade mark and Panayotov are respected Bulgarian aca- products of the party – Meglena Kuneva, who demics apart from their political career: all graduated from a Bulgarian Minister of Euro- of them are law professors at the University pean Affairs to a European Commissioner in of Sofia, the most prestigious law school in 2007. Since then Kuneva became one of the the country. In the 2005-2009 government most successful Commissioners, voted Euro- Valtchev became Minister of Education and by pean of the Year in 2008. In the 2009 EP elec- common agreement of most of the commen- tions she headed the NDSV list and was per- tators was one of the most successful minis- sonally responsible for the surprisingly good ters in the cabinet. The club of the lawyers result of the party. At the moment of writing was seriously weakened during the 2008 split, she is discussed as a possible candidate in the however, when most of them (Panayotov, 2011 presidential elections.20 Svinarov, Ralchev and others) joined the BND. 20 Other important members of NDSV include Solomon Passi (former Foreign Minister 2001-2005 and founder of the Bul- 19 This is the 2009 EP and general elections coalition between garian Atlantic Club – a NATO promoting organisation); Lidiya the UDF and the Democrats for Stronger Bulgaria (DSB) party, Shuleva – NDSV MP having a high profile career of a business- formed around the former PM Ivan Kostov woman before joining NDSV; Emil Koshlukov – the most impor- 12 Political Liberalism in Bulgaria: Achievements and Prospects

It has been a major asset of the party that ing the 1990s, but they had never managed it has managed to create and attract new to achieve similar results. Secondly, why did popular figures even after it has been left by the popularity of NDSV fall so quickly, after some of its most influential and charismatic the 2001 landslide victory? Third, how was members. An illustration of this ability came it possible that other players – such as Volen after the 2009 MEP elections, when NDSV re- Siderov’s Ataka and, most importantly, Boyko cruited Plamen Konstantinov – the extreme- Borissov’s GERB managed to mobilise the elec- ly popular captain of the national volleyball torate in a way similar to the way Simeon II did team – to lead one of the party lists in Sofia at it in 2001, although admittedly with a lower the July parliamentary elections. In the same level of success in comparison to the “tsarist time, this search for celebrities outside the movement”? Further, the question is whether party indicates that the internal bleeding dur- we could find international parallels (especially ing the two splits has left its mark. in the context of Eastern Europe) to the rise Thus, if attracting popular individuals is of NDSV in Bulgaria. Is there a relationship one of the main assets of the party, it seems between the ascendency of populist players that its weakness is its inability to keep them in our region and the transformation of the together for a long time. A case in point is Bulgarian party system, which started with the Boyko Borissov – a politician who emerged advent of NDSV? Ultimately, how are we to due to Simeon II’s return to Bulgaria. First he categorise the NDSV? Is it a populist move- was his bodyguard, and then became secre- ment? Or is it rather a parliamentary (cartel) tary of the Ministry of Interior (2001-2005). In party, focused on its members in public office? 2005 Borissov led NDSV’s lists in two regions In order to answer these questions, one in the parliamentary elections and definitely should analyse NDSV as a response to spe- contributed to the good result of the party. cific processes within and outside Bulgaria, Subsequently Borissov left NDSV and formed processes affecting the Bulgarian party sys- his own party – GERB. This party copies much tem, the constitutional infrastructure of the of the electoral strategy of NDSV and definite- country, and the policy making capacity of ly attracts many of NDSV’s potential voters. Bulgarian political actors. First, we start with a brief prehistory – an account of party poli- 4. Political Mobilisation tics before the appearance of NDSV on the Strategies of a Liberal Party Bulgarian stage. During the first decade after the fall of the NDSV raises a number of intriguing ques- communist regime in 1989, the Bulgarian po- tions for the student of party politics in lib- litical process was dominated by two ideologi- eral democracy. Firstly, how was the extraor- cal party camps. On the left there were the ex- dinary success of 2001 possible at all? After communists (BSP – Bulgarian Socialist Party); all, other popular figures – as the charismatic right of the centre were the democrats – the George Ganchev of the Bulgarian Business Union of the Democratic Forces (UDF): the lat- Block had tried to play the populist card dur- ter were the driving force behind most of the liberalisation processes initiated during this pe- tant student leader of the early 1990s, and others. Many of those are no longer with NDSV – Koshlukov found- riod. Thus, for more than ten years there was ed Novoto Vreme, Shuleva joined BND, Passi narrowly stayed a resemblance of a generally established party within the NDSV after the 2008 split. (In fact his inflammatory speech at the 2007 Congress – when he asked the hall to vote system in Bulgaria structured along the left- for NDSV exiting the triple coalition government – led to the split of the party and the creation of BND.) right division typical for the mature democra- Political Liberalism in Bulgaria: Achievements and Prospects 13 cies, with the addition of DPS. The BSP made him from participation in the political process. extensive use of ideas such as the social state, First, the Constitutional Court – in which the greater intervention of the government in the UDF had a clear dominance – banned Simeon economy, minimal privatisation, stronger ties II from participation in the presidential elec- with former foreign partners and Russia in tion because of residence requirements.23 Sec- particular. The UDF, on its part, stood for more ondly, and more controversially, a Sofia court radical economic reforms, including privatisa- denied registration to the National Movement tion and restitution of agricultural lands and Simeon II – the organisation with which the urban properties nationalised by the commu- ex-tsar was planning to take part in the par- nist regime, full integration and membership liamentary elections. The denial was ground- into the Euro-Atlantic structures – EU, NATO, ed in procedural considerations – the lack of etc. Further, the two blocks had a different as- support shown by signatures, etc: all of these sessment of the communist past: the UDF was were rather curious in the case of a political rejecting it as a period of oppressive totalitari- organisation which was just about to win half anism, while the BSP was much more nuanced, of the seats in the Bulgarian parliament. All attempting to stress the positive achievements these efforts came to no avail, since Simeon of its predecessors in government.21 In short, II and NDSV managed to run in the elections the two main parties espoused different vi- even without being registered as a separate sions of the past and the future of Bulgaria, party: they used the registrations of two small defended different programmes before the and insignificant parties for that purpose. electorate, and demonstrated rather sharp di- The results of the June 2001 parliamenta- vergences in terms of concrete policies. During ry elections were shocking: NDSV won more most of the 1990s, Bulgarian society was pas- than forty per cent of the vote and exactly half sionately divided along the ideological lines of the seats in the Bulgarian National Assem- drawn and promoted by the party system. The bly. The result would have been an absolute role of personalities in politics was second- majority in the parliament had it not been for ary: party supported candidates as a rule won several small parties which used Simeon II’s against popular leaders.22 name on their ballot without his authorisation The return of the former tsar Simeon II – some three per cent of the vote were lost from long years of exile was an event, which on such parties through voter confusion. All was greeted by welcoming demonstrations in established “traditional” parties – the right- Sofia and the other major cities of the coun- wing UDF, together with the left-wing Social- try. Not surprisingly, in 2000-2001 the then- ists - won together less votes than Simeon II’s ruling government of Ivan Kostov (UDF) react- NDSV. The party system seemed to be the first ed rather nervously to the popular return of victim of Simeon II’s arrival, which showed Simeon II to the country, and mobilised all of that it was not well established, the parties its resources with the intention of preventing were not truly programmatic, and the political

21 Milen Lyubenov has convincingly argued that the main cleav- 23 The 1991 Constitution requires that candidates for presiden- age-defining feature of the party system of the 1990s was the tial office spend the five years in the country before the elec- attitude towards the communist past. See Милен Любенов, tions. This provision was introduced in 1991 specifically against Българската партийна система: групиране и структу- Simeon II – ironically, it came to be applied ten years later than риране на партийните предпояитания1990-2009, Уни- the original plan. In this case the Constitutional Court faithfully верситетско издателство „Св. Климент Охридски“, 2011. stuck to the plain text of the basic law, although on other occa- 22 The most striking example of this was the win in the 1996 sions the CC has proven that it could interpret rather creatively presidential primaries of the virtually unknown candidate of constitutional provisions. For instance, several years before that the UDF Petar Stoyanov against the former dissident and first the CC had returned all of the real estate property of Simeon II democratically elected president of the country Zhelyu Zhelev. and his family, which amounted to millions of euro. 14 Political Liberalism in Bulgaria: Achievements and Prospects

culture of the population was susceptible to preferences concerning the style of politics, fits of opportunism and populism. rather than ideological preferences about The electoral programme of NDSV looked the substance of ideas of governance. People like the manifesto of a fairy-tale hero: it some- chose the more appealing, having a Europe- times defied the laws of nature, and, more an air Simeon II, instead of the too familiar often, the laws of economics. The beginning Kostov, with his notorious inability to make was innocent: NDSV made it clear that it would himself popular. This might be considered a follow the major policies of the former gov- trivialising explanation, but it followed from ernment, but would bring about more radical Krastev’s main and hardly trivial thesis: since economic reforms, and would eradicate cor- the collapse of grand ideological differences, ruption, which was and is perceived as a major politics (not only in Bulgaria, but world-wide problem in Bulgaria. The heroic part started with as well) had become a contest over style and the promise that the Tsar would make things form, having less and less to do with differ- “substantially better” in the country within ences in substance. As Krastev put it in an- 800 days. The eradication of corrupt practices other context, Balkan democracies became was addressed by a simple and straightforward democracies without choices. strategy – it would be impossible, it was ar- As all elegant theses about political con- gued, for a (former) tsar and all his men to dirty troversies, this one did some violence to re- their hands in inappropriate activities. alities. Krastev was right as long as he was The return of the tsar was by no means a speaking of the perceptions of political ana- trivial matter in Bulgarian politics. As a start, lysts and the public at large before the June all established ‘European-style’ parties – the 2001 elections: few believed that substantive- right-wing Christian Democrats and People’s ly different policies than the ones articulated Union, together with the left-wing Socialists by Kostov were possible. So, Krastev was won less votes than Simeon II’s NDSV. The sta- right that there was a growing consensus in bility of the party system had been one of the the country on issues like budget discipline, major assets of the Bulgarian political regime: the preservation of the currency board, inte- left-wing and right-wing parties had alter- gration within EU and NATO, and finalisation nated peacefully and democratically in power of the privatisation process. He was wrong, since 1990, which helped to make Bulgaria however, to suggest that these consensual an ‘island of stability and democracy’ in the areas exhausted the ground for substantial ‘volatile’ Balkans. The party system seemed to ideological differences. There was still some be the first victim of Simeon II’s arrival, which room for political and ideological controversy. showed that it was not well established: the As another analyst noted25, the NDSV’s parties were not programmatic after all, and electoral victory spelled the end of the “per- the political culture of the population was not estroika” stage of the transition period in immune to opportunism and populism. Bulgaria with its hardly-hid nostalgia for the The prominent Bulgarian political scientist communist times. For the ten or so years af- Ivan Krastev offered an interesting and pro- ter 1989, the whole political spectrum in the vocative explanation of the NDSV’s success country had been moved way towards the in the June 2001 elections.24 He argued that left, because the socialists/former communists the vote for the tsar reflected mostly aesthetic harboured unclear, gradualist ideas for re-

24 Ivan Krastev, When There Is No Alternative, July 12, 2001, (in 25 Luben Dilov, in his column ‘sitting in the air’ in the newspa- Bulgarian), http://www.segabg.com/ per Sega (www.segabg.com), July 2001. Political Liberalism in Bulgaria: Achievements and Prospects 15 form, which had to transform Bulgaria into a the end of Bulgarian constitutionalism in its mix-breed between “socialism with a human present form, and the triumph of fairy-tale face”, a communist ideal from the 1960s, and experimentalism. Nothing of the kind hap- market capitalism. Everyone who was oppos- pened, however, and the explanation for this ing this hybrid model automatically gained the concerns the character of Bulgarian constitu- status of a right-wing reformer (“democrat”). tionalism more generally. In 2001 the former communist hybrid idea of transition was already discredited. The ma- 5. NDSV and Bulgarian Constitutionalism jority of the population, after the 1997 financial collapse of the country, had embraced a The constitutional framework in Bulgaria more orthodox vision of the goal of Bulgarian won its first major victory when Simeon II an- transition: functioning market economy and nounced that he would become a Prime Minis- political democracy. Those more reluctant to ter, and would govern supported by a coalition embrace whole-heartily capitalism did not controlling the majority in Parliament. In the have any positive agenda, and largely did not beginning, he toyed with the idea of a grand believe anymore that the restoration in some coalition encompassing almost everybody, form of communist practices would be ben- but finally settled for a rather commonsensi- eficial for the country. This consensus was the cal option: a coalition with the DPS as a junior first sign of “consolidation” of the regime in partner, with two “expert” ministers from the Bulgaria: democracy and capitalism are al- Socialist party. Thus, the parliamentary logic ready “the only game in town”. reinforced itself: the ex-monarch took the role Thus, the arrival of the tsar’s party on the of a PM in a parliamentary democracy. scene just spurred a process which was already This development supported the theoreti- overdue – the redefinition of the ideological cal argument in favour of parliamentary gov- standing of the major parties made necessary ernment v. presidentialism, super-presiden- by the ideological shifts in Bulgarian political tialism, or semi-presidentialism in Eastern Eu- life. From this perspective, the party system rope. The Bulgarian experience showed that was only an apparent victim of the arrival of the the “logic” of parliamentarism stimulates the tsar. What his electoral success did was just to creation of big (although relatively not very “clear the political market” of the overpriced durable) parties even in societies with no es- stocks of the “former communist – demo- tablished democratic traditions, in which the crats” fault-line. This was not the major divide ideological identification of the major political in Bulgaria anymore because of the collapse of players is problematic. This was the situation the former communist pole, and the decline in 1991, when the new Constitution created of the BSP as a party of communist nostalgia. ex nihilo a party system with two sufficiently The biggest danger before the elections, strong major parties which gradually estab- according to many analysts, was that Simeon lished their identities along the left-right po- II would try just to discredit the political par- litical axis.26 In 2001, the very constitutional ties and run the country, hidden behind pup- set up helped the creation of a large parlia- pet governments. The parliament, on this scenario, would be only a façade of the power 26 As mentioned above, this was not a classical interpretation of the left and right poles: it was more ex-communist v. demo- of the ex-monarch, who could either stay crats/reformists for a very long time. Still, however, despite this behind the scenes or manipulate his way to aberration the parties took their political responsibilities seriously, and played their roles in government or in opposition the presidential post. This would have been according to the rules of the democratic game. 16 Political Liberalism in Bulgaria: Achievements and Prospects

mentary party out of a generally very nebu- Thus, to sum up the preceding discus- lous and heterogeneous political movement. sion, the arrival of Simeon II mostly brought The inadequacy of the ideological opposi- about some overdue ideological re-definition ex-communists/democrats was exposed tion of the party system, which would have by the NDSV as a new player, but just like in eventually taken place even without him. 1991, this new player started to follow the The constitutional framework survived, and parliamentary logic of accountable govern- channelled the popular energy into the par- ments, despite its own ideological ambiguity. liamentary process. If the analogy with 1991 held, one would expect that gradually Simeon II’s NDSV would 6. NDSV and the Redefinition become a political party whose success or of the Party System failure would depend on the cogency and rel- evance of its policies. In this section I explore the immediate In this sense, the Bulgarian example was impact of the entry of NDSV in Bulgarian evidence of the robustness of parliamentarism politics in 2001, including its impact on the in transitional and volatile societies with no other major actors. established, deeply socially rooted parties. In the 1990s Stephen Holmes advanced the a) The Bulgarian Socialist Party thesis that presidentialism might be suitable The socialists (the “former communists” as an arrangement for exactly such societies, trying to shed this identity) probably felt analysing the case of Russia. As it is clear from the least pressure at the moment of NDSV’s the Russian experience, however, the super- arrival. No one expected them to be soon presidentialism there perpetuated the weak- ready for government, so they could take ness of the parties. The gravity of the strong their time and think hard about their meta- presidency transformed the parties in power morphosis. The danger for them was to into mere groupings of lobbyists, representing continue sticking fast to the losing “per- the interests of different clans and oligarchs estroika” card: if they did this, they would seeking direct access to presidential favours. continue to marginalise themselves even if Ultimately, the democratic idea of representa- they paid lip service to EU and NATO. The tive government suffered, being replaced by challenge for them was to work, with the the broad plebiscitarian authority of the presi- help of the European social-democratic par- dent, who claimed to represents the interests ties, for the elaboration of a new image and of the nation as a whole, without having to a new set of policies. rely on the explicit support of structured fac- An interesting twist to the otherwise tions and groups.27 comfortable but marginalised position of

27 To illustrate the dangers of such a disregard of structured, the BSP created Simeon II’s inclusion of two factional, or party interests, I suggest the following thought-ex- socialists in the cabinet. Without a formal periment. Imagine how the Russian super-presidentialism would have dealt with a popular electoral victory of a former tsar. The coalition, the BSP entered the government differences between such an (admittedly unrealistic) scenario and imperial Russia from the beginning of the nineteenth cen- – an arrangement which was wittily called tury would have been very difficult to find. The tsar, as the ulti- an “extra-marital affair” by a leading politi- mate emanation of the interests of the nation, would have been elevated above any factional and party differences, being the cal scientist. The affair, on balance, seemed guarantor of the Constitution – the ultimate sovereign. The Bul- garian parliamentary model, in contrast, has in reality managed promising for the BSP – they would be le- to accommodate even such an influential figure of the past, as a gitimated as a party capable of governing, former tsar, without visible damages to its basic structural logic, and without the resurrection of bygone political arrangements. and, if Simeon II’s cabinet was to be success- Political Liberalism in Bulgaria: Achievements and Prospects 17 ful, the socialists could claim that Videnov’s looking for substantive ideological differ- 1997 demise should be at last forgotten. ences with the NDSV, however, they began The danger for the party, however, was that looking for stylistic, and ultimately popu- the invitation could result in complacency list differences. Without being national- and further delay of its ideological endorse- ists, they were trying to present themselves ment of European social-democracy. as tougher on the nationalistic front than NDSV; without being an anti-Turkish party, b) The Union of Democratic Forces they started using nationalist rhetoric just (the Christian Democrats) to make themselves look different from Simeon II’s party. The party in most obvious danger of los- This was the first clear signal of the arrival ing its political identity and appeal seemed of post-ideological politics in Bulgaria. It was to be Kostov’s UDF. The leader took respon- evident that the major parties are not going sibility for the heavy electoral defeat and to compete on substantive left-right differ- resigned after the elections, which made ences, but would focus their efforts on mat- matters worse, because he was by far the ters of aesthetics or issues of identity, such most dominant and respected politician in as nationalism, or personal integrity (corrup- this party. tion). The road ahead was dangerous indeed, The identity crisis of the UDF led to some and it was by far not the only way before the opportunistic and ill-thought manoeuvres. UDF. The real political battle for the centre- The most obvious were the regular snubs right part of the spectrum of course needn’t against DPS, which marked the whole elec- take place on the ground of nationalism or toral campaign, and culminated in a series personal integrity. But the likelihood of this of outbursts after the elections.28 Leaving happening was great indeed. aside the moral flaws in this aspect of UDF’s Despite this false start in the search for a search for a new identity, it seemed to lead fresher ideological identity, the UDF was still to a political dead-end at best. Such a move well positioned to undergo a positive trans- risked to become a slip towards nationalis- formation. After the inclusion of two social- tic populism. ists in the government, the UDF remained UDF probably still believed that Simeon the only true opposition party, which imme- II had unfairly capitalised on the success of diately set it apart from the rest. This was a their policies and effectively robbed them welcome relief, because it gave the party a of their own ideology. Therefore, instead of bit more time to find its future ways.

28 Weeks before the elections, the UDF created the impression that it had adopted an otherwise needed law revealing the c) NDSV – empty shells, ideological names of candidates for parliament who had been connected arrogance, and the dangers with the former secret services, just to discredit the leaders of the Turkish minority party (DPS), many of whom were known of oppressive majoritarianism to have secret police files. Much of the campaign of the UDF was focused against the DPS. After the elections, leaders of Parliamentary government in Bulgar- the UDF made speeches according to which allowing the DPS into government would be an ‘unprincipled compromise’, and ia follows the ideas for strengthening the would lead to the transformation of Bulgaria into a ‘multi- ethnic democracy’. Further, there was a UDF declaration that cabinet and the executive, popular in west- they would not join a government in which there were minis- ern Europe after WWII, and illuminating ters that were former secret services agents or associates: this was a move aimed explicitly at preventing the leader of DPS, most the post-war constitutions (primar- Ahmed Dogan – who had a file, from becoming a deputy PM in a coalition government. (As it later turned out, he did not ily the German Basic Law, but elements of join the cabinet anyway). 18 Political Liberalism in Bulgaria: Achievements and Prospects

the strategy could be found in the Italian the influence of the president, the opposi- Constitution, and the Constitutions of the tion, or individual MPs).31 Fourth and Fifth French Republics)29. Some- Rationalisation of parliamentarism could times these ideas are grouped together un- be best understood against the background der the heading of rationalised parliamen- of the continuous crises in Germany, Italy, tarism, although there is no clear scholarly and other continental states between the convention as to the constitutional tech- two World wars, which eventually led to the niques and arrangements falling into this collapse of constitutionalism and the com- category.30 The paradigmatic example of ing of fascists and nazis to power. Rationali- such a technique is the German construc- sation has proven to be an almost unquali- tive vote of no-confidence, which is defied success in eliminating such crises in the signed to prevent parliamentary crises by west of Europe since WWII, and in Central combining the voting of a chancellor out of Europe and Bulgaria since 1990. office with the appointment of a successor. One major instrument contributing to this Most of the techniques are designed to cre- success should be pointed out. Rationalisa- ate durable and stable legislative majorities tion offers very strong institutional incentives which can form and support a government, for the creation of stable parliamentary ma- through the introduction of rules in areas jorities and parties in general, even in politi- which have been discretionary before that. cal contexts where there are no established, Rationalisation of parliamentarism con- programmatic political parties and demo- cerns many areas of constitutional law, but cratic traditions. In order to have control mostly: a) the electoral procedures (intro- over the government, a political actor needs ducing legislative thresholds for avoiding to rely on a strong (parliamentary) party, or fragmentation of parliament, prohibiting a cohesive coalition of parties – an incentive dissolution of parliament and new elections which is largely absent in Eastern European in certain cases, limiting the discretion of (semi-, super-) presidential models. Thus, the presidents and executives to dissolve the very institutional logic promotes the emer- parliament and call elections, etc.), b) the gence of strong parties even out of ideologi- process of formation of cabinet (limiting cally ambiguous groupings, once they have presidential discretion in the appointment won a substantial number of votes. of PM, speeding up and facilitating the pro- Sometimes rationalised parliamentarism cedure, etc.), c) the accountability process may create “empty shell” parties, waiting (limiting the possibilities of voting no con- and searching for ideological substance. fidence in the government), and d) the leg- Sometimes the institutional pressure ‘invents’ islative process (ensuring the dominance of fake ideological differences (the above men- the parliamentary majority and the cabinet tioned “populist nationalism” of the UDF), in the production of legislation, and limiting or amplifies increasingly irrelevant differenc-

29 See Joseph Dunner, “Stabilisation of the Cabinet System in 31 From a theoretical point of view, it is useful to distinguish the Western Europe”, Constitutionalism and Constitutional Trends idea of “rationalisation of parliamentarism” from the idea of Since WW2, ed. Zurcher, 1951. ‘checks and balances’, as different approaches to the improve- 30 The coinage of the term is often attributed to Boris Mirkine- ment of constitutionalism: the former does not require transfer Guetzevitch, Les nouvelles tendances du droit constitutionnel, of powers from one power branch of the regime to another. second edition, Paris, 1931. For an introduction to ‘rationalised In other words, rationalisation preserves the basic logic of par- parliamentarism’ in Eastern Europe see Evgeni Tanchev, Parlia- liamentarism in terms of separation of powers, accountability, mentarism Rationalised, East European Constitutional Review, etc.Therefore, the French strong presidency does not fit well winter 1993. with “rationalised parliamentarism”. Political Liberalism in Bulgaria: Achievements and Prospects 19 es, like the case with the ex-communist BSP political realities, expressed in the political and the anti-communist UDF in Bulgaria in attitudes of the citizens. Once having won 2001. Still, the institutional logic of the re- the elections, the ruling party may relax for gime largely excludes extremist parties from three-four years, and consolidate its gains. the leverage of government, and creates a This explanation illuminates well the expe- system of representation based not on a sin- riences of all Bulgarian governments since gle person, or ad hoc electoral alliances, but 1990, which relied on stable and lasting leg- rather on stable and durable parties. These islative majority: especially, Videnov’s 1994- are no doubt positive results from the point 1997 government, and Kostov’s 1997-2001 of view not only of regime stability, but de- one. From an ideological point of view, both mocracy as well, because society is no longer of these governments developed a sort of seen either as a homogenous totality (the arrogance, of which Videnov’s was much nation as a whole) or an anarchy of conflict- more dangerous. ing interests, but as a system of structured, This was so, because after the BSP won articulated preferences and values, rational an absolute majority in the legislature in deliberation among which is possible. 1994, the socialist government got carried The rationalised character of Bulgarian away with its institutional strength, and parliamentarism endowed the new NDSV embarked on over-ambitious, ideologically with all institutional preconditions of be- charged, but clearly disastrous for the coun- coming a long-lasting political formation: try economic policies. When the whole of to mention just two, it got access to various Central Europe was privatising their public forms of (mostly in-kind) public funding for sector, the BSP triumphantly announced party-building purposes, and its parliamen- that they were going to preserve state own- tary group was disciplined and made obedi- ership and monopoly in strategic sectors ent to the PM- party leader by the rigorous (telecommunications, big industry, the en- parliamentary rules.32 ergy sector, etc.) As a result, later Bulgaria So, by winning half of the seats in the was forced to sell these assets for a fraction National Assembly, NDSV received all the of their initial value, and for some of those benefits of a strong institutional “empty there are still no appropriate investors. Sec- shell”: then the question of its substantive, ondly, despite the advice of experts, the ideological content came to the fore. socialists did not enforce budget discipline, The comfortable position of the legisla- but continued to generously subsidise loss tive majority and the cabinet, provided by making enterprises, with the hope that the the rigid empty shell of rationalised parlia- state subsidy would kick-start the economy. mentarism, creates the feeling of institu- What they did kick-start was the financial tional omnipotence in the ruling party or collapse of the country, speeded up by the coalition of parties. This gradually results in reluctance of the government to negotiate an increasing alienation of the party from loans from the IMF and the World Bank. Call this the arrogance of experiment. Kostov (centre-right UDF) drew the right 32 Further, an eventual MP re-election would totally depend on the choice of the party leadership, unless an idea (advanced by lessons from Videnov’s experimentalism, and some representatives of the NMS) concerning the introduction of open ballot lists is not taken on board. Even so, the support established stable relationships with the in- of the party leadership again will be decisive, since the parties, ternational community (the international not the candidates, are the major players in campaigns and fund-raising matters. lenders included), enforced budget discipline, 20 Political Liberalism in Bulgaria: Achievements and Prospects

and pursued a programme of speedy privati- fects of very high unemployment (17-18%), sation. His undoubted success, and the insti- low incomes, and wide-spread poverty. It tutional “empty shell” security of the consti- seemed arrogant to claim that the state can tutional rules, however, committed him and do nothing about these problems, but just his government to another type of arrogance: wait until the market takes care of them. call it the “arrogance of complacency”. Rightly or wrongly, Kostov’s government Especially with the change of the atti- came to this belief, and had to pay heavily tudes of the international community to- for it. Simeon II’s NDSV exposed this belief as wards Bulgaria, expressed in the inclusion “false”, but it had to deliver a set of cogent of the country in the second wave of EU policies substantiating its claims. enlargement, the lifting of the EU visa re- The Scilla and Harybdis of arrogance in strictions for Bulgarians, and the increased the management of the economy were not chances for NATO membership, the self- the only traps produces by the constitutional confidence of the government grew, and framework of Bulgaria. The “empty shell” transformed into a sort of neglect for other, security guaranteed by the rationalised par- not less important but mundane problems, liamentarism had also the dangerous conse- as the rising unemployment, the deteriora- quence of shifting the focus of governmen- tion of the public services, the perception tal efforts in a wrong direction. Feeling om- of corruption among the political elite, etc. nipotent, the governing parties, especially The UDF, and most of the political analysts the ones having absolute majority in parlia- alike, came to the belief that Kostov’s gov- ment, had been tempted to entrench further ernment and its policies had no alterna- their stay in office not by advancing policies tive: this was probably the culmination of tackling important social problems, but by the ‘arrogance of complacency’. Simeon monopolising power centres, and limiting II clearly capitalised on this fallacy of Bul- the resources of the opposition. garian political life, and on the alienation These developments, which could be of the majority of the population from the called “oppressive majoritarianism”, had UDF. The message of the former tsar was been well-illustrated by both Videnov’s and that alternatives existed, and he had the Kostov’s governments. The most obvious team to realise them. This was probably the examples were the attempts of the govern- major promise of NDSV, and its political fu- ments to interfere with the public media and ture depended on its ability to deliver on the judiciary – areas which should be free of this promise. governmental influence. Also, other similar Metaphorically put, NDSV had to navi- attempts of unhealthy interference had been gate carefully between the Scilla of Videnov’s made in the area of administrative appoint- ill-fated “experimentalism”, and Kostov’s ments, leading to accusations of political pa- Harybdis of “complacency”. It was obvious tronage. Finally, the regulation of party fund- that the Bulgarian economy needed some ing and campaign finance created a non- fresh policies, a bit of experimentalism for transparent political environment, in which the speeding up of economic growth. The clientelistic relationships between politicians mantra of monetary stabilisation through liq- and businessmen are set to flourish. As said uidation of loss making enterprises and strict above, all governments before Simeon II’s budget discipline had the disappointing ef- cabinet had engaged in these activities and Political Liberalism in Bulgaria: Achievements and Prospects 21 had spent a lot of energy in pursuing nar- 2001, Bulgaria was an excessively rationalised rowly partisan politics.33 parliamentary democracy – all sorts of pow- To sum up the argument, the weaknesses ers were concentrated in the government and of Bulgarian constitutionalism were a) the the ruling majority, which encouraged them danger of ideological arrogance (experimental to disregard criticism, popular attitudes, and or complacent) encouraged by the excessive opposition views. The problem for the gov- isolation of the governmental parties from erning majority was that it had no incentive voters attitudes, and by the excessive concen- to take seriously feedback information for the tration of institutional power in the hands of effect of its policies: it could pursue them, the cabinet and the ruling majority; b) the lack and stay in office despite all worrying signals. of sufficient constitutional safeguards for the Soon, the majority usually became arrogant – avoidance of governmental interference in ar- either in the complacent, or in the experimen- eas such as public electronic media, judiciary, tal form. Did NDSV withstand this challenge, appointments in the public administration, which was already built in the system? What and party funding and campaign finance. did NDSV achieve in terms of greater separation of power? Consider these specific areas: 7. NDSV and the Challenges of the 1990s: – One of the options was to grant greater How Did the Party Fare in Comparison financial autonomy to the municipalities, to Its Predecessors in Power? the local authorities, in the determination of their budgets. NDSV had prom- In this section NDSV’s performance over the ised this in its 2001 manifesto. Ultimately, period 2001-2005 vis-�-vis the challenges it in- such changes were introduced, involving herited from its predecessors is examined. By even a constitutional amendment. The re- 2000, Bulgaria was already on the track to sus- sults of these amendments are not self- tained economic recovery. There were a num- evident: still the municipalities are heavily ber of areas of governance, in which persistent dependent on the central government for problems remained, however, and these were its funding. Yet, NDSV did change a lot in the immediate challenges that NDSV faced. the relationship between local authorities and central government while in office. a) NDSV and “ideological arrogance” Since it performed badly at local elections NDSV in fact surrendered the local power and oppressive majoritarianism to other parties. This increased the sepa- The constitutional remedy for this ailment ration of powers between the centre and is generally more separation of powers. In the provinces, as a side-effect of the “tsar- ists” coming to power (in other words, a 33 The rationality of these policies from the point of view of positive externality); the constitutional rules is clear – domination over the public media and the judiciary may assure re-election even in case the – Another measure from the NDSV mani- substantive policy of the government proves unpopular. This is so, because through the media, and with the help of the judi- festo, which could help against ideologi- ciary, the government could manage to shape public opinion cal arrogance, was the adoption of a new and curtail the strength of the opposition parties. The same function serves the non-transparent political environment, and referendum law granting the people the the partisan appointments in the public administration. Even in a society of angels, if a government is convinced that it needs right to initiate a national referendum. to stay in office because its substantive policies are ‘right’ but This promise was never materialised when ‘unpopular’, it might resort to this back-door passage to electoral success. Without being angels, all Bulgarian governments NDSV had full control over power. Only in focused heavily on these strategies by sometimes neglecting their substantive policies. 2009 did parliament adopt a new refer- 22 Political Liberalism in Bulgaria: Achievements and Prospects

enda law, which however fell well short of MRF, political power was dispersed to such a the NDSV promises from the beginning of degree that the opposite problem appeared: the new century; the problem of fragmentation of authority – By losing the Presidency to the Socialist and lack of accountability. The coalition part- party, NDSV did increase the separation ners, as often happens, were passing on the of powers within the system, but this responsibility to one another. was a rather unintended consequence, for which the party could be hardly cred- b) NDSV and the governmental interference ited. Part of the UDF problems of the late with the workings of the judiciary 1990s was the excessive concentration In practice, most of the governments of of power: the party controlled both the the 1990s, including Videnov’s and Kostov’s government and the presidency. The very had managed or at least attempted to re- willingness of Simeon II to support the place the members of the body regulating Peter Stoyanov – the incumbent presi- and administering the workings of the judi- dent – indicated that NDSV would not ciary – the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) – strive to accumulate powers; before the end of their constitutionally speci- – In order for the Constitutional Court (CC) fied mandates. The SJC is a body crucial for to become a real check on party power, the autonomy and independence of the ju- individual complaints should be consti- diciary, because it deals with appointments, tutionally provided for. Currently, only promotions and demotions, and supervision certain institutions can address the CC, of judges, the prosecutors, and investiga- which entrenches further party domi- tors.34 The CC – the body supposed to de- nance. NDSV did not manage to initiate fend judicial independence – had a mixed and put through such an institutional record over the 1990s in this regard.35 change, however, which sadly contrib- NDSV in government did change the pre- uted to the relative marginalisation of dominant practices. Direct attempts to control the CC in the period 2001-2009. For the the judiciary decreased dramatically. It needs last several years, for instance, the CC to be mentioned that some of the high pro- has had around 10 cases per year, with a ‘peak’ of 15 in 2010; 34 The membership and the organisation of the Supreme Judi- Ultimately, the impact of NDSV on sepa- cial Council is regulated by Arts. 129-133 of the Constitution. It consists of 25 members, eleven of which are elected by the ration of powers was not so much through National Assembly, another eleven by the organs of the judicial some intentionally introduced institutional power (the judges, the prosecutors, and the investigators). The chairmen of the Supreme Court of Cassation and the Supreme reforms, but through the style of its policy Administrative Court, as well as the Prosecutor General are members of the SJC ex officio. making. First, the party always played in 35 The practice of the Constitutional Court has resembled a coalition with other parties. Secondly, the checkerboard in this regard. In 1991, amendments to the Law on the SJC repealed the prohibition for practising attorneys (ad- party has often acted as a coalition of dif- vocates) to be elected members of the Council. In addition, these amendments provided for the termination of the mandates of ferent groups the disputes among which the current members of the SJC, and for the election of a new were arbitrated by Simeon II. This internal Council. From a constitutional viewpoint, the problem was that the terms of the members had not expired. In Decision 3, 1992: pluralism was imposed on the government The constitutionality of the termination of the mandate of the SJC before its constitutionally prescribed term I, the Court held of the country in general. Thus, the problem that the previous law on the SJC had unjustifiably introduced dis- of excessive concentration of power was al- crimination against the advocates by including a restriction not provided for by the Constitution. Thus, the amendments under leviated to a great extent. Especially at the consideration rectified a previous mistake. The judges upheld the termination of the mandate of the previous SJC. They ruled time of the triple coalition of BSP, NDSV and that not the mandates of the individual judges were terminated, Political Liberalism in Bulgaria: Achievements and Prospects 23 file appointments of the party – as Konstantin c) NDSV and the public electronic media Penchev, the Chair of the Supreme Adminis- For around five years after the adoption trative Court – turned out to be real cham- of the Constitution, the public electronic pions of judicial independence and account- media had been regulated and governed, ability. Especially in the pre-electoral months on a “temporary basis”, by a committee in of 2009, when various political bodies (and Parliament, dominated by the ruling party/ the Sofia regional court) were trying to pre- coalition – the idea of independent media vent the centre-right Blue coalition from com- was hardly well institutionally established.36 peting in the elections, SAC, under Penchev’s The Videnov (BSP) government was the first leadership, became the defender of last re- to pass a special law on the media, and the sort of political legality and morality. Overall, first to establish an “independent” regula- NDSV did not interfere as arrogantly with the tory body, the National Council on Radio and workings of the judiciary, as its predecessors. TV (NCRT), the majority of whose members, On the contrary, during its time in office, an however, were to be elected by the govern- opposite problem occurred: excessive judicial ment and the ruling majority in Parliament. independence and lack of accountability. This The CC, with good reasons, announced that problem (several times mentioned by the EC this formula of setting up the NSRT was un- in its regular and progress reports) was partic- constitutional: in practice, many other pro- ularly visible when Nikola Filchev was in office visions of the law were struck down as well, as Prosecutor General. but the mandate of the body as a whole. Since the Constitution ernmental interference with the SJC weakened, when a UDF does not explicitly consider such a possibility, the CC claimed sponsored Law on the Judicial System 1998, envisaged new that, in a sense, the constitutional text was “neutral” to the formula for the appointment of the judicial quota of the body. amendments: moreover, since they rectified a previous mistake, Following an already established ‘tradition’, the government they could not be unconstitutional. wanted with this move mainly to dissolve the old SJC, and the long awaited Law on the Judicial Power was finally thus to eliminate or limit the influence of certain inconvenient adopted in 1994, almost three years after the constitution- members. The judges upheld the new law, arguing that the ally prescribed time limit had expired. It rearranged the rules reappointment was necessary in view of the final completion on the membership and operation of the SJC, and envisaged of the constitutional structure of the judicial system, with the new possibilities for the dismissal of current members of the creation of appellate courts and appellate prosecutorial offices. body. In fact, the ruling majority wanted to secure a loyal SJC The judges return to the logic of their 1991 decisions – since by new, massive appointments. The traditional first step for the there were parts of the judiciary (the appellate magistrates) achievement of this goal in Bulgaria was to introduce new re- who were not represented in the SJC, the dissolution of the old quirements for the members of the regulatory body. The new one, and the appointment of a new one were justified. law ruled that the members of the Council should have at least even if there is no contradiction between the different deci- 5 years work experience as judges, prosecutors, or habilitated sions, as the judges have always argued, the practice of the academic lecturers and researchers in law (advocates thus being CC in this area is problematic and in need of careful revision in excluded). The law also envisaged an election of new members order to secure the lack of any governmental interference with to the Council within a month after the entering of the law into the workings of the judiciary. force. These provisions sparked a series of constitutional contro- 36 The first major decision of the CC in the area of media regu- versies – the CC had first to answer whether the additional pro- lation was on the constitutionality of these temporary arrange- fessional requirements were consistent with the Constitution. ments: Decision 16, 1995: Constitutionality of the Tempo- As to the election of new members to the SJC within a month rary Rules on the Status of the BNT and BNR. The Court first after the entering of the law into force, the CC ruled in Deci- pointed out that from the discussions in the Grand National sion 8, 1994: Terminating of the mandate of the SJC II, that this Assembly during the adoption of the Constitution it was evi- provision de facto presupposed the termination of the mandate dent that the appointment of directors of the public electronic of some existing members. The CC held that this was unconsti- media should not be in the competence of the parliament or tutional – such a provision could have effect only for the future, the President of the Republic – the discussion pointed out the after the expiry of the mandates of the existing members. In necessity of a public body, an independent council to regulate the substantiation of this argument, the Court reversed its previ- the media. On the basis of these considerations and in rela- ous doctrine on the possibility of termination of the mandate of tion to Art. 40,1 of the Constitution, the CC struck down the the SJC as a whole. The judges changed their view, and ruled provisions of the Temporary Rules granting to a committee of that such a termination could be done only by a constitutional the National Assembly the power to supervise directly the BNT amendment, and not by a law. The change of the position of the and BNR, appoint their directors, approve their structure and Court was criticised by judge Kornezov in his dissenting opinion: internal orders, be informed about and give opinion on their he did not reject the right of the Court to change its views, but programmes, and hear reports from their directors. The judges criticised the lack of sufficient argumentation for such a change. argued that Art. 40,1 of the Constitution prohibited state inter- Unfortunately, in 1999 the resolve of the CC to prevent gov- vention in the workings of the mass media. 24 Political Liberalism in Bulgaria: Achievements and Prospects

and it did not have any effect during the petition from privately owned radio and TV rule of the Socialists.37 With the coming to networks, cable networks, etc. Only towards power of Kostov’s cabinet, hopes were high the end of the mandate of the triple coali- that the situation would be finally resolved tion government (2005-2009) problems of in favour of media independence and pro- governmental favouritism did occur with the fessionalism. Alas, the formula of appoint- suspect acquisition of media outlets by the ing the NSRT provided by the new law was mother of a deputy minister in cabinet – Ire- not a dramatic improvement: the members na Krasteva. It needs to be mentioned, how- were to be elected by the President of the ever, that NDSV was probably the least guilty Republic (4) and the parliamentary major- coalition partner for this development, since ity (5). Since President Stoyanov was from Krasteva was close to DPS and the BSP. All in the same party as the ruling majority (UDF), all, NDSV in government contributed to the although formally different, the formula pluralisation of the media market and the in- provided similar results as the previous ar- dependence of the major media outlets, in- rangements – dominance of one party in cluding the public electronic media (though the appointment process. 38 to a lesser extent than the others). Thus, the media legacy of all previous governments was a real challenge for the d) NDSV and political patronage NDSV. Ultimately, the party stood up to this All previous governments up to 2001 had challenge. Public electronic media gained the opportunity to carry out major person- considerable independence during NDSV’s nel changes in the public administration. It mandate. In fact, part of the problem was was only Kostov’s cabinet which managed resolved by itself due to the increasing com- to pass laws on the status of the public ser- vants, placing restrictions on this practice. 37 Decision 21, 1996: Constitutionality of the Law on Radio and Television (LRT) of 1996. The CC reasoned that: Art. 9 of The laws were passed, however, after Kostov LRT…provides “the National Council for Radio and Television had already carried out some “purges” in to consist of 11 members, appointed by the National Assembly, of whom 7 members are nominated by the National Assembly the administration. proportionally to the size of the different parliamentary fac- tions, two are nominated by the President, and two by the From the very beginning of its term in prime-minister.” It is evident that this formula ensures the pre- office, there were some positive signs that dominance of the parliamentary majority and the government, elected by it… Art. 9 of LRT contradicts Art. 40,1 and Art. 11, NDSV would not carry out massive purges in 1 of the Constitution. The freedom of the media is functionally connected with the principle of political pluralism – Art. 11, 1 of the Constitution. The principle of neutrality in the formation of the NSRT and the government (through a special commis- of independent organs is an important constitutional guaran- sion appointed by the cabinet), there were further suspicions tee for the normal operation of the democratic and pluralistic that candidates close to the government were favoured. These discourse…[This principle] commands the exclusion of the pos- suspicions were exacerbated when weeks after Kostov’s res- sibility for one or more political actors to institutionalise their ignation, the Supreme Administrative Court annulled, on the domination in the NCRT, and through it, in the governing bod- grounds of procedural violations, the license of Nova TV, a pri- ies of the BNR and BNT. vate national programme allegedly close to Kostov. 38 The CC disregarded some of its own arguments from previ- The CC dealt with the new law in Decision 10, 1999: Constitu- ous case law and ultimately upheld the UDF sponsored legisla- tionality of the 1998 Law on Radio and TV. The judges held that tion. It is difficult to explain why the judges went out of their the first factor guaranteeing the independence of the NCRT way in this case, having in mind the serious pressure from civil under the new arrangements was the fact that the MPs were society groups and journalist organisations for striking down obliged by the Constitution (Art. 67,1) to represent the people the law. Was it a sense of political loyalty to the government, as a whole. In the same vain, the President expresses the ‘unity or just a misinterpretation of constitutional principles? In any of the nation’ (Art. 92,1). (Although in a previous decision – No. event, the results of the law were the delegitimation of the 25, 1995 – the judges had held that the President was not a de- NSRT and constant accusations of political partiality. The im- politicised organ of the state, and may express political views.) pression that the ruling party could pick and choose directors The second major guarantee for the independence of the NCRT, of the national radio and TV persisted, as well as the public in the view of the judges, was the principle of ‘rotation’, accord- suspicion that the programmes were generally favouring the ing to which the members were to be elected. Thirdly, the CC ruling party and the government. Since the procedure for li- pointed out that the practice of developed western democracies censing private radio and TV stations was under the control showed that such an arrangement was ultimately acceptable. Political Liberalism in Bulgaria: Achievements and Prospects 25 the administration. Since many key people government39, and this perception was one in the new government came from abroad, of the reasons for his downfall. the pressure on them to appoint their lo- This was all the more curious, since in cal relations to administrative positions the period 1999-2001, according to the TI seemed generally weaker than the usual. Corruption Perception Index, Bulgaria had Generally, political patronage appointments made major improvements in the area of were limited under the NDSV government, corruption, and from being in one league although by no means eliminated. In com- with Romania, had progressed to the more parative perspective, they possibly remained advanced group of Central European coun- more than in other liberal democracies. The tries like Poland and the Czech Republic. practice of appointing party loyalists in the The vagaries of corruption indexes aside, it boards of public companies continued. Yet, was difficult to ascertain what exactly was the end of the privatisation process put going on in this area, despite widespread some natural limits on these practices. With perceptions. The World Bank 2000 report the government of the triple coalition and on “state capture” seemed to come closer the introduction of the infamous formula to the mark by arguing that the major prob- 8:5:3 of division of public positions, the is- lem in Bulgaria was not so much classical sue of political patronage in appointments bribery and Oriental baksheesh mentality, came again very much to the attention of but the “capturing of the state” by special the public. The same is true of the distribu- interests close to the government.40 In other tion of European funds: most of the abuses words, the very institutions (constitutional reported in the press and by European insti- rules included) were so designed as to allow tutions, such as OLAF, involved party-relat- for the usage of public resources and pow- ed businesses, party sponsors, etc. All in all, ers for private gains. If the arguments from although possibly limited, political patron- the previous sections on conflict of inter- age remains to be a problem in Bulgaria af- ests, political patronage, and intervention in ter two governments with the participation the workings of the judiciary and the public of NDSV, which indicates that the party was media are correct, the World Bank findings unable to tackle very efficiently this inher- could be explained with the flaws of these ited problem. rules of the Bulgarian constitutional order. Another regulatory flaw, which -cer e) NDSV and the transparency tainly contributed to the corruption prob- of the political environment lems, was the lack of transparency in the area of party and campaign finance. The “Corruption” is one of these words first serious attempt to regulate party do- which currently enjoy a huge politico-sym- nations and expenditures was made only in bolic power without having a settled mean- 2000, when a new Law on Political Parties ing. The safest way still is to speak about the was passed, together with amendments to public perception of corruption, by allowing different people to have different things in 39 The preceding governments had much more severe prob- mind when they report instances of this elu- lems with the general philosophy of their politics. In particular, Videnov’s BSP government had wrong-headed economic poli- sive phenomenon. With this caveat, corrup- cies, which brought about the financial collapse of the country. tion in Bulgaria started to be perceived as a Corruption becomes “the central” question when the main policies of a government are generally correct, but their imple- big societal problem at the time of Kostov’s mentation is affected by corruption. 40 Anticorruption in Transition: A Contribution to the Policy De- bate, The World Bank, Whashington, DC, 2000. 26 Political Liberalism in Bulgaria: Achievements and Prospects

the relevant campaign finance provisions in to remain in office (without major changes the electoral law. This legislation provided in the balance of power) after its four year for public funding and some reporting and mandate expired. Problems like the lack of disclosure supervised by the Public Accoun- transparency in party financing largely re- tancy Chamber (Smetna Palata). Generally mained unresolved despite the flurry of leg- the new regulations were disappointing and islative activity (especially in 2008-2009). preserved the declaratory character of the If anything, NDSV managed to change, old ones, especially with regard to its en- first, the character of high profile corruption, forcement mechanisms. and, secondly, the governmental response to Other laws, such as the Law on Public the problem. As to the former, during the Register requiring the declaration of the as- 1990s the grip of the ruling party over state sets and the financial standing of political resources was much tighter and centralised actors (MPs, ministers, etc.), were rather ru- than in the subsequent period. The majori- dimentary too, and relied only on the bona tarian style of government of Videnov and fide efforts of politicians. Kostov made corruption an almost exclusive Thus, generally, previous governments prerogative of the governing parties. Since had set the stage for a major battle against 2001 this has been changed. The pluralisa- corruption. The issue was bound to become tion of power (the greater degree of separa- one of the major governmental challenges in tion of powers, the proliferation of centres the first decade of the new century. How did of power around the presidency, the judicia- NDSV fare in the face of this challenge? In ry, the local authorities) led to the pluralisa- the period 2001-2009 a sustained effort was tion of corruption. Apparently, this changes made to introduce a wide variety of anti-cor- the nature of the problem, and explains why ruption measures. Many laws were revised, corruption does not disappear with a change new regulations were adopted, new institu- of government per se. tions were set up, such as the Ombudsman, Secondly, since 2001 governments have DANS, etc. Still, however, corruption remains been much more willing to acknowledge a top societal problem. Moreover, it has be- the problem of corruption and to cooper- come a point of tension between Bulgaria ate with NGOs and foreign partners in the and the European Union and is the issue, fight against it. Sadly, this has not produced which damages severely the quality of Bul- the expected results, although seems to be garian membership. Coupled with the ineffi- a positive step in itself. ciency of the state to tackle organised crime (and some especially dangerous forms of or- 8. NDSV and the Challenges ganised criminality in particular, like contract of the 2000s: the Rise of Populism killings and kidnappings) the situation in the country during the NDSV governments was In the previous sections we saw how NDSV far from satisfying. In fact, the claims of con- tackled the challenges inherited from previ- tinuing corruption brought to power GERB ous governments. The new century brought – the party of Boyko Borisov – in 2009. new challenges to the political scene, how- Generally, NDSV was unable to resolve ever. These became especially evident after the corruption puzzle: public perceptions the entry of the Central European coun- of corruption continued to grow, and they tries in the EU. Paradoxically, instead of explained the inability of any government fast improvements, the accession brought Political Liberalism in Bulgaria: Achievements and Prospects 27 developments, which some analysts called specific political party or platform, but as an “backsliding”, and others called the “rise alternative to the existing representative sys- of populism”.41 tem as a whole. They promise to reinvigorate Populism is difficult to conceptualise political life, to bring back “substance” to partly because it is extremely context-depen- politics. Secondly, populists ( to varying de- dent. Probably, it is more adequate to speak grees) oppose a key idea of liberal democracy: of populisms in the plural. For example, po- that the political majority should be limited in litical scientists use “populism” to describe important ways by constitutional constraints. both Chavez’s Venezuela and Putin’s Russia, The Central European family of populism is even though these are markedly different re- openly majoritarian – it is centred around the gimes.42 Although both of them seem to be belief that the consent of the majority is the “democracy’s doubles”, they part with liberal ultimate ground of legitimation in politics. democracy in different ways: Putin, in contrast Therefore, this type of populism is particularly to Chaves, is more market-oriented and co- opposed to the idea of minority rights. Thirdly, operative vis-�-vis the US, especially regarding and again to varying degrees, populists chal- Bush’s global war against terror. lenge at least some elements of what they see Philippe Schmitter points out that the con- as the “liberal consensus” of the transition cept of “populism” is often abused in politi- period: market-oriented reforms, integration cal discourse.43 By calling someone a “popu- in the Euro-Atlantic organizations, rejection list” people are just expressing their negative of nationalistic language and behaviour. Pop- evaluation of a particular actor or political ulists “challenge” all these “taboos”, reject agenda. Overall, “populism” is most probably the “political correctness” of liberalism, and a family resemblance concept, so it will be a give an opportunity for the citizens to discuss futile exercise to look for a very strict defini- problems which have been “bracketed out” tion of the phenomenon. Nevertheless, the by the mainstream parties. populisms in Central Eastern Europe do share Thus, what is striking about the present some important common characteristics.44 use of the term “populism” is the almost un- First, populists in the region appeal to the imaginable diversity of policies and actors it people as a whole, as opposed to corrupt and tries to cover. Yet commentators and political impotent political elites. In other words, they theorists who insist on using ”populism” as a present themselves as an alternative not to a common family name for such diverse political players have a point. Only a vague and ill-de- 41 See the discussion in Rupnik, Jacques, Butora, Martin, fined concept like ”populism” can allow us to Krastev et al (2000) Is East-Central Europe Backsliding, Journal of Democracy, volume 18, No 4. See also Smilov, Daniel and grasp and reflect on the radical transformation Krastev, Ivan (2008).“The Rise of Populism in Eastern Europe: Policy Paper”, in Grigorij Meseznikov, Olga Gyarfasova, and of politics that is under way in many places in Daniel Smilov (eds.), Populist Politics and Liberal Democracy in the world. Although vague and ill-defined, the Central and Eastern Europe, IVO (IPA) working paper series, Bratislava. Available at: http://www.ivo.sk/5353/en/news/ivo- concept of ‘populism’ does a better job than released-working-paper-populist-politics-and-liberal-democracy-in-central-and-eastern-europe any of the other currently-circulating well- 42 “Democracy’s Doubles”, Journal of Democracy, Volume 17, defined concepts of capturing the nature of No. 2, April 2006. 43 A Balance Sheet of the Vices and Virtues of ‘Populisms’, pa- the challenges facing liberal democracy today. per delivered at the conference the Challenge of New Popu- lism, organized by the Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia, in These challenges emanate not from the rise of May 2006. anti-democratic and authoritarian alternatives, 44 For a discussion of populism in Eastern Europe see Cas Mudde, “In the Name of the Peasantry, the Proletariat, and but from the dangerous mutations within the the People: Populism in Eastern Europe”, in Meny and Surel, Democracies and the Populist Challenge, Palgrave, 2002. conceptual realm of democracy. 28 Political Liberalism in Bulgaria: Achievements and Prospects

It is obvious that the new populism has corrupt. Against this background, he pre- lost its original significance as an ideology or sented his candidacy as the triumph of expression of agrarian radicalism. ‘Populism’ personal integrity in politics; is also too thin and eclectic to pretend to be – Simeon was campaigning against the ex- an ideology in the way liberalism, socialism isting parties. For a long time after his ar- or conservatism is. But the growing interest rival he refused to register the NDSV as in populism has captured the major political a political party,46 still nurturing the idea trend in our world today: the rise of demo- that he was the tsar of all Bulgarians, not cratic illiberalism.45 a simple party leader. Simeon II, himself, From this perspective it is very interesting was not a member of parliament – his that NDSV started as a populist movement, name was in the title of the party list but but was gradually transformed into a liberal not among the party candidates; party. Typically, populism tends to lead to il- – Simeon II’s movement was agnostic and liberalism, but this is not the story of NDSV. indifferent towards political ideology. His Its beginnings were of a populist movement, main message was that the ideologies of sharing many of the features of populists the established political parties were al- around the region – admittedly of the softer ready passé. type, like Fico in Slovakia, rather than the Kac- – The sole source of mobilisation of the zynski brothers in Poland. Soon after, howev- people behind Simeon II was personal er, the party transformed into a rather stan- – his personal charisma and historical dard, liberal party. legacy. Programme and party structure It is justified to classify NDSV at the time were non-existent as sources of mobil- of its conception (or at the time of the coming ising electoral support. As to the party of the former tsar to power) as an instance of structure, it was already made clear that populism for the following reasons: there was not sufficient time for institu- – Simeon II appealed to the people as a tionalising the movement in the coun- whole, without stressing the cleavages, try: the party list of NDSV was created differences and distinctions within this in a haphazard way, little different from whole, and without assuming that there the lottery in its reliance on chance and could be conflicting interest within the formal equal opportunity for the second people, not all of which could be satisfied tier of the Bulgarian political elite, which in the same time; has been left out from the patronage – Simeon II’s campaign portrayed the then- practices of the two major parties – the existing political elite as largely politically UDF and BSP. – In terms of programme, Simeon II was

45 It is precisely the rise of democratic illiberalism that worries arguing that this was an issue for the ex- us when we discuss the proliferation of populist revolutions in perts to decide – not an essentially politi- Latin America, the political turmoil in Central Europe or the political logic behind the ‘no’ votes in the referenda on the EU cal problem. For this purpose he invited Constitution in France and the Netherlands. The new populism does not represent a challenge to democracy understood as young, educated Bulgarians from abroad free elections or as the rule of the majority. Unlike the extreme (without any previous political experi- parties of the 1930s (fascists, communists), the new populists are not planning to ban elections and to introduce dictator- ships. In fact, the new populists like elections and, unfortunately, tend to win them. What they oppose is the representative 46 Before the June 2001 elections Simeon indeed tried to do so, nature of modern democracies, the protection of minorities’ as stated above, in order to be able to compete for parliament. rights, and any constraints on the sovereignty of the people – a After he managed to send people to parliament, he refused to distinctive feature of the process of globalisation. register a party. Political Liberalism in Bulgaria: Achievements and Prospects 29

ence) to become ministers in his cabinet, cipline and strong commitment for integra- and to design the policies in different tion in NATO and the EU. The overall result governmental sectors; of this was positive for the country. From the – In terms of political presentation and point of view of the NDSV, however, the re- communication Simeon II stressed vision of the pre-electoral promises led to a much more appearances than content. quite dramatic fall in public confidence in the In terms of content he was minimalist movement and its leader: only two months and elusive: he spoke slowly and uttered after the June 2001 election the fall of sup- well worn-out cliches. In terms of pre- port started to be noticed. First the move- sentation, however, he was quite skilful ment failed to elect a president – the Social- in stressing the mass support and affec- ists surprisingly won the 2001 presidential tion that he enjoyed, his non-confron- elections. Secondly, the rating of Simeon tational, polite and kind political style, and his party were steadily falling, reach- which was rather refreshing against the ing embarrassingly low levels for less than a background of the rather unrefined Bul- year in government. In the 2005 parliamen- garian political class. tary election NDSV, which had already been – Finally, and probably most importantly, registered formally as a political party, came Simeon II was campaigning not on a second to the Socialist Party with roughly a specific coherent programme, as it was third of its 2001 electoral result. In the 2007 already pointed out, but on people’s EP elections the support for the NDSV fell to expectations for what should be done. a critical minimum of around six per cent, In short, he created the impression that electing only one deputy to Brussels; this after years of austerity measures finally trend was confirmed by a very poor electoral there was coming the time of prosper- result in the autumn 2007 local elections. ity for everyone. The ex-tsar summed Thus, NDSV could meaningfully be dis- up these expectations in his promise to cussed as a populist actor only within the first improve dramatically the situation in the year of its appearance on the political stage, country for 800 days. and especially in the 2001 electoral cycle. After The first wave of populism in Bulgaria, that the party was gradually disciplined by the represented by the NDSV, demonstrated the Bulgarian institutional framework into a player electoral potential of the populist approach: very much resembling the parties that it radi- for a very short period of time it managed to cally criticised. Ultimately, the NDSV became assemble and mobilise the people behind a a member of the European liberal party (after charismatic leader. making unsuccessful attempts to become a It must be stressed, however, that once in member of the European People’s Party), and office the NDSV went through a complex evo- it was transformed into a relatively small party lution which transformed it from a populist with right of the centre, liberal orientation. movement into a “traditional” political party. First, after coming to power the NDSV Conclusions cut back on many of the fantastical promises its leader made or suggested in the pre- NDSV is a party, which is not easy to fit within election period. Ultimately, the NDSV led a conventional political science classifications. government whose politics was continuous For the eight years of its existence it has gone with the previous government: financial dis- through different stages, and possibly through 30 Political Liberalism in Bulgaria: Achievements and Prospects

different types of party organisation. As part And indeed, if we look at the political of the liberal European family, it is easiest to programmes of NDSV, and their fundamen- classify it in ideological terms, as a liberal party. tal values, we will have difficulties distin- And indeed, the values and the programmes guishing them from parties like the UDF and defended by the party have always been liberal even BSP and DSB (Democrats for Strong - a good illustration of this is its declaration on Bulgaria). All of these parties endorse the Fundamental Values of 2002. From the time of tenets of the “liberal consensus” of the Bul- its conception, NDSV has stood for economic garian transition, and differ from each other liberalism: free market economy, small state, mostly in terms of rhetoric. Of course, pro- etc. In terms of social values, NDSV has also grammatic differences still exist, but they are been an advocate of liberal social values, as the increasingly in specialised areas, which are rights of individuals from ethnic and religious not immediately transparent to the ordinary minorities. For the ten years of its existence the voter. A project carried out by CLS – Gla- party has become one of the staunchest de- sovoditel (www.glasovoditel.eu) – studied fenders of the “liberal consensus” of the Bul- systematically the programmatic differences garian transition, which consisted in: among the major Bulgarian parties. One of – Euro-Atlantic integration – membership in the major findings of this project was the EU and NATO; relative convergence of these platforms on – Serious respect for foreign commitments substantive policy issues. This convergence and accepted conditionalities; removes party competition from the arena of – Economic policy based on free initiative policies to the arena of identity politics and and competition, gradualism, financial anti-corruption activities (mostly understood discipline, privatisation, and encourage- as personal integrity politics). ment for foreign investment; At the time it came into office, the main – Political pluralism and relative liberalism in asset of NDSV was not its programme but relation to political freedoms; the charisma of its leader. People did not – Deference to judicial policy-making in im- vote for Simeon II because of a belief that portant areas (through the Constitutional he will fundamentally change the political Court and other high courts). course of the country: rather, they believed This description and classification of NDSV that he would stay (more or less) the same will not give us the full picture of the phenom- course in a non-corrupt manner. Thus, Sime- enon, however, since it is to a large extent a on’s personal integrity and charisma were post-ideological formation as well. Since the the main mobilisational asset of NDSV in its seminal work of Otto Kirchheimer47 on catch- formative period. all parties, there is a growing understanding Not surprisingly, therefore, the first years in political science that political ideologies of the existence of the NDSV were decidedly play a decreasing role in the mobilisational agnostic in relation to party ideologies and efforts of the parties. Ideology does not dis- platforms. Until the Spring of 2002 Simeon II appear, but it becomes less determinative of was hesitating whether to register a party at party programmes and alternatives. all. After that the party went through a process of identity searching, considering applying first to the European Peoples’ Party and 47 “The Transformation of the Western European Party System” in Joseph La Palombara and Myron Weiner (eds.), Political Par- then eventually finding international partners ties and Political Development, Princeton University Press 1966, pp. 177-200. among the European liberals. This hesitation, Political Liberalism in Bulgaria: Achievements and Prospects 31 and the rather stochastic mode of deciding problems with Bulgarian parties in general on the matter48, is indicative of the ideological are two-fold: indeterminacy in the initial stages of forma- – Their programmatic, policy-oriented char- tion of the party. acter is thinning and giving way to an of- This indeterminacy continued even dur- fice-seeking behaviour; ing the later stages, however. The leadership – Political parties compete mostly in the of the party did not use actively the identi- area of identity and personal integrity pol- fication “liberal” in domestic context, since itics (issues such as nationalism and anti- the understanding was that the popularity corruption). of the party could suffer: for one reason or Therefore, when parties are seen as an- another, “liberalism” has become almost a ticorruption players and nationalist-heroes, pejorative word in Bulgarian politics. One of they manage to attract votes. At the moment the failures of NDSV was that it did not man- they lose this status, they lose public trust. age to make amends to this situation. This was the story of NDSV, which enjoyed As a post-ideological party, NDSV came huge public support at the time it was seen as closer to an electoral catch-all party49 espe- anticorruption player (2001-2002), coming to cially in the period 2002-2005. After joining replace the old and corrupt (in terms of public the triple coalition NDSV start gradually los- perceptions) political system. As soon as the ing its identity, and especially after the defec- party became part of the political establish- tion of BND became seriously marginalised. ment, it rapidly lost public confidence. In the period 2007-2009 the party gradu- At the present moment, the core liberal ally was transformed into an office seeking, party in Bulgaria is in a very difficult situation: cartel party50, whose main assets were the – Its public support has been limited to senior public offices its representatives con- narrow sections of the urban middle tinued to hold. classes of the citizens, having relatively Thus, if we need to sum up the trajectory high incomes; of NDSV’s development, it could be conclud- – Most of the advantages it gets as part ed that it has been: of the party cartel in government and in – Populist movement around a charismatic parliament - public offices, public fund- leader (2001-2002); ing, enhanced access to the media – have – Catch-all electoral party (2002-2007); been cut down because of its extra-par- – Office-seeking, cartel party (2007-present). liamentary status; The NDSV case study demonstrates that – Although substitute charismatic person- the Bulgarian party system is in crisis: it would alities come to compensate for the fading be a curious and suspicious fact if a political charisma of Simeon II in Bulgarian politics, party is thriving in such circumstances. The there is a significant gap left by it. In June 2009 Meglena Kuneva played successfully

48 One needs to keep in mind that the Bulgarian parties mem- this role, although it has to be admitted bers of the EPP intentionally blocked the membership of NDSV that the resulting mobilisation is incompa- in this alliance. 49 See the classification of Wolinetz, Steven B. “Beyond the rably weaker than the one from 2001. Catch-all Party: Approaches to the Study of Parties and Party Organizations in Contemporary Democracies” in Political Par- The future is of course open and NDSV ties: Old Concepts and New Challenges, Montero, Gunter, Linz has showed impressive adaptive skills. But it (eds.) Oxford UP, 2002, pp. 136-165. 50 See Katz, Richard S. and Peter Mair “Changing Models of is probably fair to say that the challenges that Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party”, Party Politics, vol. 1, No. 1., pp. 5-28. it faces are quite serious: these are challeng- 32 Political Liberalism in Bulgaria: Achievements and Prospects

es, which most of the “traditional” parties in for the revival of the liberal centre depend Bulgaria need to address very seriously. Be- on the radicalisation of Bulgarian populism in cause, as stated in the very beginning, these nationalistic or other illiberal direction. If ag- traditional parties now may claim to represent gressive populist governments, as the one of much less than half of all Bulgarian citizens. Orban in Hungary, appear one might expect In general, the future of Bulgarian liber- a possible consolidation of a liberal alterna- alism – as a separate political party family - tive. One wonders whether such a develop- seems to be linked with the future of popu- ment would be a cause for celebration for lism in the country. NDSV was responsible for liberals, however. Maybe it is ultimately better the introduction of comparatively mild types to be a victim of one’s own success and to of populist governments in Bulgaria, which see your ideas shared – imperfectly or simply are largely compatible with the main tenets of strategically as it may be - by a wide spectrum the ‘liberal consensus’. GERB seems to follow of parties. True, in such circumstances these NDSV in this regard. More radical and virulent ideas cannot guarantee a distinctive political types of populism, like the one of Ataka are profile – all parties will be liberal in one way or for the time being confined to the margins another. Worse, it may happen that the ‘true’ of the political space. The dominance of mild liberals remain outside parliament in such populism of a centrist type prevents for now circumstances. But political history knows of the possibility of the emergence of a strong, much bigger dramas than that. After all, the centrist liberal party (or the revival of existing future of political liberalism does not depend ones). Somewhat paradoxically, the chances on the faith of a specific liberal party.

About the Author: has also been a Visiting Scholar at the Boalt Daniel Smilov is a comparative constitutional Hall School of Law, University of California, lawyer and political scientist. He is Programme Berkeley in 1995. Dr. Smilov is co-author (with Director at the Centre for Liberal Strategies, Martin Tisne) of From the Ground Up: Assess- Sofia, Recurrent Visiting Professor of Compara- ing the Record of Anticorruption Assistance in tive Constitutional Law at the Central European Southeast Europe, Central European University University, Budapest, and Assistant Professor of Press, 2004, co-editor (with Denis Galligan) of Political Theory at the Political Science Depart- Administrative Law in Central and Eastern Eu- ment, University of Sofia. He holds doctorates rope, CEU Press, 1999, and co-editor (together from the University of Oxford (DPhil, 2003) with Jurij Toplak) of Political Finance and Cor- and the Central European University, Budapest ruption in Eastern Europe, Ashgate, 2007. He (SJD, 1999, summa cum laude). In 2002-2003 has published articles in ICON (International he was Research Fellow at the Centre for Poli- Journal of Constitutional Law, Oxford Univer- cy Studies, at the Central European University. sity Press), Public Law, and the Austrian Journal In 2003-2004 he was Jean Monnet Fellow at of Political Science (ÖZP), as well as a number the European University Institute, Florence. He of chapters in edited volumes. The definitive ideas of political liberalism – individual rights, constitutionalism, and the market economy – have become universal reference points in democratic politics, and because of that have been largely de-politicised.

This situation spells the predicament of the liberal parties: their agenda has become universally accepted, which makes them hardly distinguishable from their main competitors.

In Bulgaria, essentially only one party has been successfully institution- alised as ‘liberal’ both in terms of ideology and centrism – NDSV.

In terms of positioning, DPS has always been centrist, but in terms of practiced ideology it could hardly be called ‘liberal’.

The dominance of mild populism of a centrist type prevents for now the possibility of the emergence of a strong, centrist liberal party (or the revival of existing ones).

June 2011