Appendix B NASA's Approach to International Cooperation*

Since the space program of United States began, the launched beyond man’s ability to repair easily.2 A National Aeronautics and Space Administration great deal of senior management attention, time and (NASA) has pursued a vigorous and successful’ pro- money is spent making sure that the last 3 to 5 per- gram of international cooperation, grounded in the cent of a project is done correctly. The importance of National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958.** One this for international projects is that NASA managers possible reason for NASA’s success derives from a key want as much insight into them as they have into a feature of its cooperative efforts: while NASA has in- NASA-only project. This dictates a principle of “keep ternational programs, it does not fund an international it simple” in management and technical interfaces. This program. There is no “international” line item in the means that NASA prefers bilateral relations over proj- NASA budget and no money set aside especially for ects that might involve three or more countries or orga- international programs. Funding for international proj- nizations. ects must come out of the budgets of the NASA pro- The concern with technical and scientific excellence gram offices (essentially science, applications, space also contributes to NASA’s international programs in flight, and aeronautics), The Associate Administrators another fundamental way. From the very beginning of the Program Offices and their managers are rated the principal area of international space cooperation not on how many international projects they have, has been in the sciences. NASA made a decision early only on how successful they are in achieving their pro- in its history to involve in its programs not only the gram goals. Thus, for an international approach to a best scientists in the United States, but also those from project to be undertaken it must not only contribute throughout the free world. After all, “science” means to achieving the goals of the interested program of- “possession and pursuit of knowledge, ” and the way fice, but it must be considered to be among the best to attain excellence is to work with the very best scien- approaches to achieving those goals. The sole modifi- tists. This may seem like a straight-forward approach, cation to this principle occurs when a major U.S. for- but it has marked a difference over the years between eign policy objective can be effectively served through the science programs of NASA and the European an international space cooperative project; even here, Space Agency (ESA). Until very recently, ESA re- however, the project must be technically sound. stricted direct participation in its own satellite projects NASA recognizes that if a “national” and an “inter- only to European scientists. national” approach are rated about even technically In short, the basic character of NASA’s international and fiscally, the national approach will allow for easier programs has stemmed significantly from the character management and greater resource efficiency. Thus, self of the agency itself and was set quite early: interna- interest and relative efficiency tend to guard against tional projects would be undertaken only if they con- undertaking marginal international projects. tributed to NASA’s own program goals, foreign policy Another factor contributing to the success of NASA objectives would be supported, bilateralism would be and its international programs is the requirement that the fundamental method of conducting international the agency pursue an extremely high standard of tech- projects, and NASA’s science programs would be oper nical excellence. In the space business, it is possible to participation on a competitive basis by the besi to build a spacecraft that is 97 percent perfect and still minds from throughout the free world. have a disaster. While most nonspace organizations Three additional guidelines used in planning NASA’! would be overjoyed with that degree of success in a international programs deserve prominent mention major development effort, it is inappropriate for high First, each cooperating nation is expected to assum[ risk, high visibility projects which have frequently full financial responsibility for its own efforts on z project; i.e., no exchange of funds occurs in either di ● Prepared by the International Affairs Office, NASA. rection between NASA and the foreign cooperatin~ ‘See President’s 1982 report to Congress on International Activities in Sci- agency, This rule serves to reduce considerably the cos ence and Technology (Title V). ● *One of the objectives of the “Space Activities of the United States” is (sec. of the projects to NASA and to ensure close project 102): “Cooperation by the United States with other nations and groups of nations In work done pursuant to this Act and In the peaceful application ‘E Hutchlngs, Jr , “The Autonomous Viking, ” Sc)ence, vol. 219, 1983, pr of the results thereof, ” 803-807.

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budget responsibility. Second, whatever the division sorb its share of the administration’s budget reduc- in responsibilities between the partners in a joint proj- tions, NASA found it necessary to reduce funding in ect, each side must have the capacity to carry out its one of its major science missions. The problem was own responsibilities. This principle was established to that all three of the major ongoing science projects had limit technology transfer to partners. In pursuit of this significant international participation: Space Telescope objective, NASA seeks to define cooperative projects (with ESA), Galileo/Jupiter orbiter probe (Germany) so that the interfaces between the contributions are as and the International Solar Polar Mission (ESA). This well defined and “clean” as possible. Third, the results high degree of involvement of international participa- of scientific cooperative efforts are to be made openly tion in the science program meant that, for the first available to the international scientific community time in its history, NASA found it necessary to step within a reasonable period of time through appropriate back from an international commitment. NASA de- channels (depending on the type of project). cided to terminate development of the U.S. satellite Following these prescriptions, NASA has concluded for the International Solar Polar Mission. The project over 1,000 agreements with over 100 countries in its was subsequently restructured to include only a single 25-year lifespan. 3 These agreements are not general- satellite built by Europe, to be launched by NASA on ized, umbrella-type arrangements, but rather cover the the space shuttle. Situations such as this may never specific elements of a discrete undertaking. NASA’s be fully avoidable but they point up the necessity of philosophy is that specificity avoids misunderstandings carefully reviewing each prospective international and discourages “inventing” projects to satisfy the project to assure, insofar as possible, its long-term spirit of a diffuse agreement. While a number of major merit. This is because the consequences of modifying satellite, experiment and facility development projects or terminating an international project tend to be more are included in these totals, many of the cooperative far reaching and damaging to U.S. interests than with projects are for smaller efforts such as remote sensing projects that are wholly national in character. investigations (with .53 countries), scientific and tech- Limited funding also dictates that NASA cannot do nical information exchanges (70; double counting of everything there is to do of importance in space. In- countries is involved here), geodynamics projects (43) deed, the expanding capabilities of other countries and sounding rocket projects (22). makes this unnecessary. A prime example is the up- The importance of these “smaller efforts” should not coming return of Halley’s Comet. After reviewing its be overlooked. Many of them have been with develop- options, the United States decided not to mount a mis- ing countries providing them with an opportunity to sion to Halley’s Comet. However, ESA, the Soviet learn how to work with remote sensing data or how Union, and Japan all decided to develop encounter to build scientific payloads for sounding rockets or missions. To provide important data and to assure that how to gain access to recent scientific reports in the U.S. scientists and the world scientific community at open literature. One of the strengths of the bilateral large fully participated in this historic event, NASA approach to specific projects is that it facilitates coop- organized of an International Halley Watch (IHW) eration with developed and developing countries on program. IHW is an international network of ground different sized projects at different levels of sophistica- based observatories that will provide significant scien- tion. tific data but which will also provide ephemeris data In addition to the scientific, technical, and political important for assisting the three Halley encounter mis- returns to NASA and the U.S. from this cooperation, sions. In addition, the Space Telescope will make Hal- over $2 billion in contributions have resulted from ley observations from Earth orbit, as will three ultra- NASA’s international cooperative programs. The violet telescopes mounted on board Spacelab mission amount grows to more than $3 billion when reimburs- 0SS-3 in the shuttle’s cargo bay. Finally, NASA is able services are included, such as for launching and sending the ISEE-3 spacecraft, which has successfully providing tracking support for foreign satellites. completed its primary mission through the Earth’s Statistical summaries are useful, but they also have magneto tail to make the first ever in-situ cometary a static quality which may not convey the dynamic measurements with comet Giacobini-Zinner in Sep- nature of NASA’s international cooperative programs. tember 1985. These data will be useful in their own in fact, the NASA program is continually adjusted to right but may also provide valuable insights for the -eflect new situations and opportunities. For example, encounter Halley missions in 1986. By sharing leader- NASA’S success in international participation became ship for exploring the heavens with other qualified a political liability in 1980-81 when, in order to ab- space-faring nations, NASA stretches its own resources ———. . — and is free to pursue projects which, in the absence ‘ A Review ot NASA lnternat]onal Programs, NASA report January of such sharing and cooperation, might not be initi- 983 ated. 70

The space shuttle also presents NASA with the In the same vein, the possibility of the United States means to enter into new international cooperative op- developing a space station to be serviced by the space portunities. For example, during a visit to Sao Paulo shuttle also opens up potential new opportunities for on December 2, President Reagan invited a Brazilian international cooperation. Space Station is not at this payload specialist to fly aboard the space shuttle. The time an approved program. However, should such a President’s remarks were based on the revision in project receive future approval, the possibility of in- NASA policy announced October 22, 1982, expanding ternational participation in its development and use opportunities for foreign and domestic sponsors of is a prospect deserving serious consideration. Poten- payloads on the space shuttle to nominate payload tially interested governments are being kept advised specialists to fly with them. Training and flight of these of developments in the United States and some foreign payload specialists will normally be on a reimbursable studies paralleling U.S. exploratory efforts are under- basis, although in the case of cooperative missions, way. These studies are being funded by the foreign other specific arrangements may be made. Since the government without commitment on either side with announcement, NASA has discussed the expanded pol- respect to future cooperation. icy with a number of its cooperative partners and reim- In summary, the outlook for mutually beneficial in- bursable shuttle customers. ternational cooperation in space, both in the short and It is therefore quite likely that, beginning in late 1983 long term, is very good. As in the past, most of this with the first flight of a foreign payload specialist on cooperation will be conducted on a bilateral basis. Spacelab 1 (Ulf Merbold of ESA), a continuing stream Where multilateral efforts are manageable and make of foreign payload specialists will join U.S. astronauts sense, however, they also will be vigorously pursued. on the shuttle.