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From Guns to Roses Explaining Rebel Use of Nonviolent Action Nora J

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From Guns to Roses Explaining Rebel Use of Nonviolent Action Nora J From Guns to Roses Explaining Rebel Use of Nonviolent Action Nora J. Keller Submitted in partial fulllment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 2017 © 2017 Nora J. Keller All rights reserved ABSTRACT From Guns to Roses Explaining Rebel Use of Nonviolent Action Nora J. Keller As rebel organizations are associated with violence and war, the term “rebel use of nonvio- lent action” seems paradoxical at rst glance. Yet, some rebel organizations — after pursu- ing their aims through militant means unsuccessfully — do start to use mass-based nonvi- olent action, mobilizing and organizing the population to participate in large-scale mass protests, demonstrations, or boycotts. Sometimes, as evidenced by the cases of Timor- Leste’s Maubere Council for National Resistance or the Nepalese Maoists, this strategic shift can bring them considerably closer to their ultimate goal. This study addresses the following question: Why do some rebel organizations strategically use nonviolent mass popular action in a civil war? The aims of this dissertation are two-fold: First, I explore, conceptualize and dene “rebel use of nonviolent action”. Second, I build a theory to explain to explain whether or not rebel groups will seize on an opportunity for using strategic nonviolent action that builds on the rebel group’s internal organizational processes. Precisely because mass- based nonviolent action is unexpected and very dicult to organize, there can be sig- nicant strategic benets for rebel organizations who successfully launch a nonviolent campaign. First, they demonstrate the breadth and depth of their popular support by mo- bilizing the people to actively and en masse put themselves at risk as protesters. Second, the use of nonviolent action displays a high degree of movement resilience and control, as nonviolent events that are most eective in urban areas must be coordinated with a rebel leadership likely located in the periphery. Third, the rebel group can signal norms adherence, as nonviolent action is generally associated with democratic values. Fourth, nonviolent action can garner signicant international attention, as masses of civilians peacefully protesting against a civil war backdrop create a powerful image. The proposed theoretical framework takes an organizational approach to understand- ing rebel group behavior, which accounts for the role of civilians as potential group actors. The appropriateness of this framework is established through an in-depth theory-building case study of Timor-Leste’s violent/nonviolent independence struggle. Based on insights gleaned from this case and a conceptual exploration of nonviolent action as a rebel strat- egy, my theory is anchored on the insight that a rebel operational shift towards the use of nonviolent action constitutes a particularly disruptive instance of strategic innovation. The theory unfolds in two parts: First, I argue that consolidated political authority in a rebel organization is necessary for disruptive innovation in the form of nonviolent action. Second, I explore the operational requirements for actually carrying out nonviolent ac- tion, and argue that embedded organizational structures linking rural rebel strongholds with urban popular centers are necessary to allow for both popular mobilization for non- violent action and control of individual events and the organization as a whole. The com- mon organizational “theme” uniting these two complex features is an operational focus on functional task dierentiation. The Timorese theory-building case study analyzes ndings from in-person interviews, rst-person accounts and historiography of the conict to trace and explore the relevant mechanisms leading from a violent (guerrilla) to a largely nonviolent conict strategy. This case study also establishes that the decision to adopt nonviolent action as a strategy and the actual planning of nonviolent events can be directly linked to a rebel organiza- tion’s leadership. To test the plausibility of the theory and explore the scope, I present two additional medium-length case studies of the Nepali Maoists and the Salvadoran Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional. In addition to providing the rst comprehensive conceptualization of nonviolent ac- tion as a rebel strategy, this dissertation makes two key analytical and conceptual con- tributions: First, I provide a framework for studying rebel groups as organizations with internal frameworks and processes that come together in a dominant structure that can explain operational and strategic choices, options, and trajectories. A comprehensive un- derstanding of a rebel group’s dominant structure requires careful over-time analysis. Second, the example of nonviolent action as a conict strategy shows the necessity of studying the population — and its ties to the rebel organizations — as active resistance participants that must be included in a comprehensive organizational analysis of a rebel group. Contents List of Tables iii List of Figures iv 1 Framing the Issue 1 1.1 The puzzle . 1 1.2 The eects of nonviolent action in a civil war . 7 1.3 Rebel use of nonviolent action and the study of conict . 11 1.4 Analytical approach, argument and contribution . 19 1.5 Dissertation roadmap . 21 2 Denition, Operationalization and Research Design 23 2.1 Denitions and operationalization . 23 2.2 The universe of cases . 36 2.3 Research design . 39 3 Rebel Use of Nonviolent Action: A Strategy 53 3.1 The strategic nature of nonviolent action . 53 3.2 Nonviolent action in civil wars . 60 3.3 What can rebels gain from using nonviolent action? . 63 3.4 Rebel risks of using nonviolent action . 75 4 Louder than Bombs: Timor-Leste’s Violent Nonviolent Independence 80 4.1 Timor-Leste’s colonial and pre-colonial socio-political roots . 83 4.2 Fretilin’s prewar rural-urban political network . 96 4.3 Fretilin’s civil war . 125 i 4.4 The Clandestine Front and nonviolent action . 145 5 Rebel Use of Nonviolent Action: An Organizational Process Theory 175 5.1 The necessity of centralized political authority in rebel organizations . 182 5.2 Nonviolent action, mobilization and control . 200 5.3 Complex rebel organizations and functional dierentiation . 212 5.4 Alternative explanations . 219 6 Probing Plausibility: Nepal’s Capable Maoists Turn Nonviolent 224 6.1 The Maoist insurgency and its nonviolent nale . 228 6.2 Political authority and decision-making in CPN-M . 236 6.3 Maoist communication, mobilization and control . 249 7 Increasing Condence: A Negative case and Refuting Alternative Hy- potheses 261 7.1 The Salvadoran FMLN: A failed attempt at urban popular mobilization . 262 7.2 The Free Aceh Movement and the insuciency of opportunity . 280 7.3 The limited role of ideology: the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front . 283 8 Conclusion and Outlook 287 Bibliography 295 ii List of Tables 2.1 Operationalizing nonviolent action . 33 2.2 Operationalizing rebel use of nonviolent action . 37 2.3 The universe of cases . 39 2.4 Case selection overview . 52 3.1 Rebel benets of nonviolent action . 65 3.2 Rebel risks and drawbacks of nonviolent action . 76 5.1 Summary of hypotheses . 223 iii List of Figures 4.1 Timor-Leste’s precolonial social structure . 84 4.2 Fretilin’s prewar structure . 113 4.3 CNRM’s Structure in 1990 . 166 5.1 Summary of the organizational process theory . 179 5.2 Rebel nonviolent action as an instance of military innovation . 187 5.3 Conict actors and their relationships . 209 iv Acknowledgments In writing my dissertation about how complex organizations often rely on social networks to function and evolve, I was lucky enough to rely on my own social networks in writing this dissertation. At the Columbia University Political Science Department, I received un- wavering support and feedback from my advisors, Jack Snyder and Page Fortna. Tanisha Fazal, even from a distance, was always willing to lend an open ear to my questions and was an invaluable source of advice. Apart from my Columbia advisors, I want to say a special thank you to Stacy Goddard, my advisor at Wellesley College, who encouraged me to follow my intellectual curiosity to New York. At Columbia, I found a supportive and enriching community of peers and some of the best friends I have ever had. I could not have written this dissertation without Hadas Aron, Ali Cirone, Andy Guess, Emily Holland, Sarah Khan, Summer Lindsey, Nick Lotito, Mike Rubin, Stephanie Schwartz, and Camille Strauss-Kahn, with apologies to anyone I left out inadvertently. When a family emergency took me back to Zurich, Lars-Erik Cederman and his International Conict Research Group welcomed me with open arms. I want to thank him for his hospitality and advice. I also want to thank Nils-Christian Bormann, Micha Germann, Mirjam Hirzel, Philip Hunziker, Theresa Leimpeck, Carl Müller-Crepon, Yannick Pengl, Seraina Rüegger, Andi Schädel, Sebastian Schutte, Guy Schvitz, Fran Vil- lamil and Manuel Vogt for accepting me as one of their own and sharing many a lunchtime political debate. Many people volunteered their time, work, and data for my project. I want to thank my Timorese interview partners, in particular Mário Carrascalão, José Ramos-Horta, and Badi Mohammed Slama, who submitted to hours upon hours of interviewing on a painful subject. I also want to thank Dr. Octavianus Mote for sharing his considerable experience v with the West Papuan independence movement. I am particularly grateful to Dr. Helen Hill, Dr. Nuño Rodrigues Tchailoro, and Edith Bowles for sharing unpublished research on Timor-Leste. My research and eld work was generously supported by several insti- tutions and grants. I am indebted to the AC4 fellowship from the Earth Institute and the Weatherhead Institute of East Asian Studies at Columbia for their nancial support. Finally, I owe a big debt of gratitude to my family, both blood related and otherwise: My father, my stepmother, my host mother and host father, my sister and my stepfather, and my friends (you know who you are).
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