Psychologising and Neurologising About Religion: Facts, Fallacies and the Future Transcript
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Neuroscience, Psychology and Religion : Illusions, Delusions, and Realities About Human Nature Pdf, Epub, Ebook
NEUROSCIENCE, PSYCHOLOGY AND RELIGION : ILLUSIONS, DELUSIONS, AND REALITIES ABOUT HUMAN NATURE PDF, EPUB, EBOOK Malcolm Jeeves | 204 pages | 01 Apr 2009 | Templeton Foundation Press,U.S. | 9781599471471 | English | Radnor, United States Neuroscience, Psychology and Religion : Illusions, Delusions, and Realities About Human Nature PDF Book In this volume, Malcolm Jeeves and Warren S. Psychology of Religion Newsletter , 31 , 1—8. To the extent that this relational-deictic stance represents a cognitive default, however, it may still serve as a strong foundation for religious cultural notions. History can be written at any magnification. A critical examination. However, the basic insight that psychological processes depend on neural activity has a clinical base dating back at least to the seventeenth century, to the work of Thomas Willis, whose multifaceted neurological work led him to tie human desires and instincts, memory and imagination, reason and volition to the brain and central nervous system. Religious motivation reduces perceived responsibility for and morality of good deeds. James K. Content Metrics. God is watching you: Priming God concepts increases prosocial behavior in an anonymous economic game. Nov 30, Timothy Wilson rated it really liked it. Of course, questions like this are not only the stuff of film and literature. This article has been cited by other articles in PMC. A historical database of sociocultural evolution. Miles rated it liked it Jun 03, Privacy Statement. Sign in to annotate. Failures to observe the laws of the Kivung are said to delay the miracle of returning ancestors. A latent capacity for evolutionary innovation through exaptation in metabolic systems. Humans should therefore be equipped by natural selection with biased agency-detection mechanisms—what J. -
What Cognitive Science of Religion Can Learn from John Dewey
contemporary pragmatism 15 (2018) 387-406 brill.com/copr What Cognitive Science of Religion Can Learn from John Dewey Hans Van Eyghen vu Amsterdam [email protected] Abstract I use three ideas from philosopher John Dewey that are of service for Cognitive Science of Religion (csr). I discuss how Dewey’s ideas on embodied cognition, embedded cog- nition can be put to work to get a fuller understanding of religious cognition. I also use his ideas to criticize csr’s reliance on the modularity of mind thesis Keywords cognitive science of religion – modularity of mind – embodied cognition – embedded cognition, John Dewey – religious cognition Introduction Cognitive science of religion is a fairly young discipline with the aim of study- ing the cognitive basis of religious belief. Despite the great variation in theo- ries a number of common features can be distilled and most theories can be situated in the cognitivist and modular paradigm. In this paper, I investigate how cognitive science of religion (csr) can be improved by using insights from philosopher John Dewey. I focus on Dewey because he offered important in- sights in cognition long before there was cognitive science and because his ideas are widely influential in the recent enactivist movement. The relevance of Dewey’s thought for csr will be discussed under three headers: embodied- ness, embeddedness and anti-modularity. I will first give a brief overview of the most influential theories in csr. Then I will discuss how existing theories in csr can be improved on the first two points and criticized on the third. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2018 | doi 10.1163/18758185-01503007Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 09:33:53AM via free access 204221 388 Van Eyghen The Cognitive Science of Religion Cognitive science of religion is a fairly young discipline (from the 1990’s on- wards) with the aim of studying the cognitive basis of religious belief. -
Cognitive Biases Explain Religious Belief, Paranormal Belief, and Belief in Life’S Purpose ⇑ Aiyana K
Cognition 129 (2013) 379–391 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Cognition journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/COGNIT Cognitive biases explain religious belief, paranormal belief, and belief in life’s purpose ⇑ Aiyana K. Willard , Ara Norenzayan 1 Department of Psychology, The University of British Columbia, 2136 West Mall, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z4, Canada article info abstract Article history: Cognitive theories of religion have postulated several cognitive biases that predispose Received 4 March 2013 human minds towards religious belief. However, to date, these hypotheses have not been Revised 25 July 2013 tested simultaneously and in relation to each other, using an individual difference Accepted 27 July 2013 approach. We used a path model to assess the extent to which several interacting cognitive tendencies, namely mentalizing, mind body dualism, teleological thinking, and anthropo- morphism, as well as cultural exposure to religion, predict belief in God, paranormal beliefs Keywords: and belief in life’s purpose. Our model, based on two independent samples (N = 492 and Religion N = 920) found that the previously known relationship between mentalizing and belief is Cognitive biases Paranormal belief mediated by individual differences in dualism, and to a lesser extent by teleological think- Purpose ing. Anthropomorphism was unrelated to religious belief, but was related to paranormal belief. Cultural exposure to religion (mostly Christianity) was negatively related to anthro- pomorphism, and was unrelated to any of the other cognitive tendencies. These patterns were robust for both men and women, and across at least two ethnic identifications. The data were most consistent with a path model suggesting that mentalizing comes first, which leads to dualism and teleology, which in turn lead to religious, paranormal, and life’s-purpose beliefs. -
Frontotemporal and Dopaminergic Control of Idea Generation and Creative Drive
THE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE NEUROLOGY 493:147–153 (2005) Frontotemporal and Dopaminergic Control of Idea Generation and Creative Drive ALICE W. FLAHERTY* Department of Neurology, Massachusetts General Hospital and Harvard Medical School, Boston, Massachusetts 02114 ABSTRACT This article presents a three-factor anatomical model of human idea generation and creative drive, focusing on interactions between the temporal lobes, frontal lobes, and limbic system. Evidence is drawn from functional imaging, drug studies, and lesion analysis. Temporal lobe changes, as in hypergraphia, often increase idea generation, sometimes at the expense of quality. Frontal lobe deficits may decrease idea generation, in part because of rigid judgments about an idea’s worth. These phenomena are clearest in verbal creativity, and roughly parallel the pres- sured communication of temporal lobe epilepsy, mania, and Wernicke’s aphasia—compared to the sparse speech and cognitive inflexibility of depression, Broca’s aphasia, and other frontal lobe lesions. The phenomena also shape non-linguistic creativity, as in that of frontotemporal demen- tia. The appropriate balance between frontal and temporal activity is mediated by mutually inhibitory corticocortical interactions. Mesolimbic dopamine influences novelty seeking and cre- ative drive. Dopamine agonists and antagonists have opposite effects on goal-directed behavior and hallucinations. Creative drive is not identical to skill—the latter depends more on neocortical association areas. However, drive correlates better with successful creative output than skill does. Traditional neuroscientific models of creativity, such as the left brain – right brain hemi- spheric model, emphasize skills primarily, and stress art and musical skill at the expense of language and mathematics. The three-factor model proposed here predicts findings in a broad range of normal and pathological states and can be tested in many experimental paradigms. -
The ICD-10 Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders Diagnostic Criteria for Research
The ICD-10 Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders Diagnostic criteria for research World Health Organization Geneva The World Health Organization is a specialized agency of the United Nations with primary responsibility for international health matters and public health. Through this organization, which was created in 1948, the health professions of some 180 countries exchange their knowledge and experience with the aim of making possible the attainment by all citizens of the world by the year 2000 of a level of health that will permit them to lead a socially and economically productive life. By means of direct technical cooperation with its Member States, and by stimulating such cooperation among them, WHO promotes the development of comprehensive health services, the prevention and control of diseases, the improvement of environmental conditions, the development of human resources for health, the coordination and development of biomedical and health services research, and the planning and implementation of health programmes. These broad fields of endeavour encompass a wide variety of activities, such as developing systems of primary health care that reach the whole population of Member countries; promoting the health of mothers and children; combating malnutrition; controlling malaria and other communicable diseases including tuberculosis and leprosy; coordinating the global strategy for the prevention and control of AIDS; having achieved the eradication of smallpox, promoting mass immunization against a number of other -
A Critical and Descriptive Approach to Interictal Behavior with the Neurobehavior Inventory (NBI)
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Repositório Institucional UNIFESP Epilepsy & Behavior 25 (2012) 334–340 Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect Epilepsy & Behavior journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/yebeh A critical and descriptive approach to interictal behavior with the Neurobehavior Inventory (NBI) Guilherme Nogueira M. de Oliveira a,b,⁎, Arthur Kummer a, Renato Luiz Marchetti c, Gerardo Maria de Araújo Filho d, João Vinícius Salgado a, Anthony S. David e, Antônio Lúcio Teixeira a a Neuropsychiatric Unit, Neurology Division, School of Medicine, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte, Brazil b Epilepsy Treatment Advanced Centre (NATE), Felicio Rocho Hospital, Belo Horizonte, Brazil c Department and Institute of Psychiatry, Faculdade de Medicina da Universidade de São Paulo (FMUSP), São Paulo, Brazil d Department of Neurology and Neurosurgery, Universidade Federal de São Paulo (UNIFESP), São Paulo, Brazil e Section of Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, Institute of Psychiatry, King's College London, DeCrespigny Park, London SE5 8AF, UK article info abstract Article history: Purpose: The purpose of this study was to test the psychometric properties of the Neurobehavior Inventory Received 23 July 2012 (NBI) in a group of temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE) patients from a tertiary care center, correlating its scores Revised 21 August 2012 with the presence of psychiatric symptoms. Accepted 23 August 2012 Methods: Clinical and sociodemographic data from ninety-six TLE outpatients were collected, and a neuro- Available online 24 October 2012 psychiatric evaluation was performed with the following instruments: Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE), structured psychiatric interview (MINI-PLUS), Neurobehavior Inventory (NBI), and Hamilton Keywords: Depression Rating Scale (HAM-D). -
NIH Public Access Author Manuscript J Comp Neurol
NIH Public Access Author Manuscript J Comp Neurol. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2008 October 22. NIH-PA Author ManuscriptPublished NIH-PA Author Manuscript in final edited NIH-PA Author Manuscript form as: J Comp Neurol. 2005 December 5; 493(1): 147±153. doi:10.1002/cne.20768. FRONTOTEMPORAL AND DOPAMINERGIC CONTROL OF IDEA GENERATION AND CREATIVE DRIVE Alice W. Flaherty1 1Department of Neurology, Massachusetts General Hospital and Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA 02114, U.S.A. Abstract This paper presents a three-factor anatomical model of human idea generation and creative drive, focusing on interactions between the temporal lobes, frontal lobes, and limbic system. Evidence is drawn from functional imaging, drug studies, and lesion analysis. Temporal lobe changes, as in hypergraphia, often increase idea generation, sometimes at the expense of quality. Frontal lobe deficits may decrease idea generation, in part because of rigid judgments about an idea's worth. These phenomena are clearest in verbal creativity, and roughly parallel the pressured communication of temporal lobe epilepsy, mania, and Wernicke's aphasia--compared to the sparse speech and cognitive inflexibility of depression, Broca's aphasia, and other frontal lobe lesions. The phenomena also shape non-linguistic creativity, as in that of frontotemporal dementia. The appropriate balance between frontal and temporal activity is mediated by mutually inhibitory corticocortical interactions. Mesolimbic dopamine influences novelty seeking and creative drive. Dopamine agonists and antagonists have opposite effects on goal-directed behavior and hallucinations. Creative drive is not identical to skill—the latter depends more on neocortical association areas. However, drive correlates better with successful creative output than skill does. -
Geschwind Syndrome in Frontotemporal Lobar Degeneration: Neuroanatomical and Neuropsychological Features Over 9 Years
cortex 94 (2017) 27e38 Available online at www.sciencedirect.com ScienceDirect Journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/cortex Behavioural Neurology Geschwind Syndrome in frontotemporal lobar degeneration: Neuroanatomical and neuropsychological features over 9 years Laura Veronelli a,b, Sara J. Makaretz a, Megan Quimby a, * Bradford C. Dickerson a and Jessica A. Collins a, a Frontotemporal Disorders Unit, Department of Neurology, Athinoula A. Martinos Center for Biomedical Imaging, Massachusetts General Hospital, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA, USA b Department of Neurorehabilitation Sciences, Casa di Cura Del Policlinico, Milan, Italy article info abstract Article history: Geschwind Syndrome, a characteristic behavioral syndrome frequently described in pa- Received 17 January 2017 tients affected by temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE), consists of the following features: hyper- Reviewed 7 April 2017 religiosity, hypergraphia, hyposexuality, and irritability. Here we report the 9-year-clin- Revised 31 May 2017 ical course of a case of Geschwind Syndrome that developed as a first and salient clinical Accepted 6 June 2017 expression of right temporal lobe variant of frontotemporal lobar degeneration (FTLD). Action editor Stefano Cappa Only one patient affected by frontotemporal dementia has previously been shown to Published online 27 June 2017 present with Geschwind Syndrome. MS presented at age 73 with 3 years of personality and behavioral symptoms. Her early Keywords: symptoms primarily included hyper-religiosity, hypergraphia, and poor emotional regu- Right temporal lobe lation (irritability, impulsivity, disinhibition, egocentric behavior). Over nine years, other Frontotemporal lobar degeneration cognitive functions (word retrieval, memory coding and recall, set-shifting, famous face Geschwind Syndrome and building recognition) became affected; however, hyper-religiosity, hypergraphia, and Hypergraphia scarce emotional control remained her most prominent deficits. -
Cognitive Science of Religion and Christian Faith: How May They Be Brought Together? Justin L
Cognitive Science of Religion and Christian Faith: How May They Be Brought Together? Justin L. Barrett Fuller Theological Seminary Editor’s Note Justin L. Barrett is the Thrive Professor of Developmental Science in the Graduate School of Psychology, and Chief Project Developer for the Office of Science, Theology, and Religion Initiatives at Fuller Theological Seminary, Pasadena, CA. A cognitive and developmental psychologist (Ph.D., Cornell University), his books include Why Would Anyone Believe in God? (2004), Cognitive Science, Religion, and Theology: From Human Minds to Divine Minds (2011), and Born Believers: The Science of Childhood Religion (2012). Barrett describes for us here the latest developments and challenges in the cognitive sciences for Christian faith. The essay is intended as an invitation. Readers are encouraged to take up one of the insights or questions, or maybe a related one that was not mentioned, and draft an article (typically about 5,000-8,000 words) that contributes to the conversation. These can be sent to Dr. Barrett at [email protected]. He will send the best essays on to peer review and then we will select from those for publication in a cognitive science theme issue of Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith. The lead editorial in the December 2013 issue of PSCF outlines what the journal looks for in article contributions. For best consideration for inclusion in the theme issue, manuscripts should be received electronically before 31 March 2016. Looking forward to hearing your perspectives, James C. Peterson Editor of Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith I once participated in an academic conference on a small island in the Baltic Sea that was uninhabited except for a biological research station. -
The Epistemic Parity of Religious-Apologetic and Religion-Debunking Responses to the Cognitive Science of Religion
religions Article The Epistemic Parity of Religious-Apologetic and Religion-Debunking Responses to the Cognitive Science of Religion Walter Scott Stepanenko Department of Philosophy, John Carroll University, University Heights, OH 44118, USA; [email protected] Abstract: Recent work in the cognitive science of religion has challenged some of the explanatory assumptions of previous research in the field. Nonetheless, some of the practitioners of the new cognitive science of religion theorize in the same skeptical spirit as their predecessors and either imply or explicitly claim that their projects undermine the warrant of religious beliefs. In this article, I argue that these theories do no additional argumentative work when compared to previous attempts to debunk religious belief and that these recent debunking efforts are very much motivated by methodological commitments that are shared with canonical research. I contend that these argumentative strategies put debunkers very much on an epistemic par with religious apologists: both advocate responses to the cognitive science of religion that are primarily motivated by methodological commitments. Keywords: epistemology; religious experience; cognitive science of religion Citation: Stepanenko, Walter Scott. 2021. The Epistemic Parity of 1. Introduction Religious-Apologetic and The discourse around the cognitive science of religion (CSR) creates the impression Religion-Debunking Responses to the that religion debunkers are in an epistemically superior position relative to religious Cognitive Science of Religion. apologists. A great deal of philosophical and theological work in the literature is dedicated Religions 12: 466. https://doi.org/ to the construction of debunking arguments motivated by CSR evidence and apologetic 10.3390/rel12070466 responses to these arguments. -
Evolution, Religion and Cognitive Science: Critical and Constructive Essays, Edited by Fraser Watts and Léon Turner
[JCSR 2.2 (2014) 159–163] Journal for the Cognitive Science of Religion (print) ISSN 2049-7555 doi:10.1558/jcsr.v2i2.22826 Journal for the Cognitive Science of Religion (online) ISSN 2049-7563 BOOK REVIEWS Evolution, Religion and Cognitive Science: Critical and Constructive Essays, Edited by Fraser Watts and Léon Turner. Oxford University Press, 2014. 272pp., Hb $99.00/£65.00. ISBN-13: 978-0-19-968808-1. Reviewed by Eva Kundtová Klocová, LEVYNA —Laboratory for the Experi- mental Research of Religion, Masaryk University, [email protected] Keywords evolutionary theory, religion, cognitive science of religion In 1909, at Darwin’s centenary (1809), Jane Harrison argued that it was Darwin- ism that allowed for the emergence of the scientific study of religion. A century later (2009) two conferences were held in Cambridge, to celebrate the same events, attesting the constant inspiration of Darwin’s legacy and focusing on the impact of evolutionary theorizing on the current study of religion. Papers from those conferences inspired publication of an anthology mapping an involvement of the evolutionary theory in the Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR): Evolu- tion, Religion and Cognitive Science, published in 2014. Interestingly, the same year (2014) marks another anniversary and yet another conference—the IACSR conference: Religion Explained? The Cognitive Science of Religion after 25 Years. This conference and the publication of the book coincide not only in time, but also in the emphasis on the ever growing importance of evolutionary theorizing within CSR and its implications for the identity of CSR. The closing address of the conference by Richard Sosis tapped exactly into the same questions and topics surfacing in the anthology, stressing their significance for the CSR. -
Ecopsychology Revisited
Humboldt State University Digital Commons @ Humboldt State University Trade & Scholarly Monographs Humboldt State University Press 2019 Ecopsychology Revisited Jorge Conesa-Sevilla Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.humboldt.edu/monographs Part of the Environmental Sciences Commons, and the Other Psychology Commons Recommended Citation Conesa-Sevilla, Jorge. Ecopsychology Revisited. Humboldt State University Press, 2019. https://digitalcommons.humboldt.edu/monographs/7. This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Humboldt State University Press at Digital Commons @ Humboldt State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Trade & Scholarly Monographs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Humboldt State University. For more information, please contact [email protected]. “Ecopsychology Revisited is a Eco critique of and deconstructive approach to several trends termed “ecopsychology.” This work attempts psychology to bring light to some of the psychology Eco misconceptions that have hardened as “ecopsychology,” as these ideas have Revisited been reinterpreted and sometimes For Whom Do The “Nature” Bells Toll? oversimplified by the general public and some professionals outside mainstream psychology. Part of the confusion arose when “ecopsychology” became inadequately amalgamated with other ideas. Nevertheless, within the social Revisited and behavioral sciences, at least, there is great value in devising and applying evidence-based strategies that track the normative ramifications