DOCSLIB.ORG

What Cognitive Science of Religion Can Learn from John Dewey

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
What Cognitive Science of Religion Can Learn from John Dewey contemporary pragmatism 15 (2018) 387-406 brill.com/copr What Cognitive Science of Religion Can Learn from John Dewey Hans Van Eyghen vu Amsterdam [email protected] Abstract I use three ideas from philosopher John Dewey that are of service for Cognitive Science of Religion (csr). I discuss how Dewey’s ideas on embodied cognition, embedded cog- nition can be put to work to get a fuller understanding of religious cognition. I also use his ideas to criticize csr’s reliance on the modularity of mind thesis Keywords cognitive science of religion – modularity of mind – embodied cognition – embedded cognition, John Dewey – religious cognition Introduction Cognitive science of religion is a fairly young discipline with the aim of study- ing the cognitive basis of religious belief. Despite the great variation in theo- ries a number of common features can be distilled and most theories can be situated in the cognitivist and modular paradigm. In this paper, I investigate how cognitive science of religion (csr) can be improved by using insights from philosopher John Dewey. I focus on Dewey because he offered important in- sights in cognition long before there was cognitive science and because his ideas are widely influential in the recent enactivist movement. The relevance of Dewey’s thought for csr will be discussed under three headers: embodied- ness, embeddedness and anti-modularity. I will first give a brief overview of the most influential theories in csr. Then I will discuss how existing theories in csr can be improved on the first two points and criticized on the third. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2018 | doi 10.1163/18758185-01503007Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 09:33:53AM via free access 204221 388 Van Eyghen The Cognitive Science of Religion Cognitive science of religion is a fairly young discipline (from the 1990’s on- wards) with the aim of studying the cognitive basis of religious belief. Over the years a large number of theories have been proposed. Despite the wide variety, a number of common features can be distilled. According to Claire White the idea that human cognition is necessary (but not sufficient) to ex- plain the presence, persistence and prevalence of human ideas and behaviors deemed “religious” is at the heart of csr (White 2017). This sets csr apart from theories that explain religious belief on a strictly cultural basis (e.g. Durkheim 1971) and from theories that explain it as resulting from power structures (e.g. Marx 1970). White also notes that csr theories share the commitment that the human mind is central to understanding religious belief and that the hu- man mind actively processes religious ideas (White 2017). One of the leading csr theorists, Pascal Boyer, wrote that the human mind is not a blank slate, meaning that it is not susceptible to just any (religious) belief. Humans are by contrast rather picky in their beliefs (Boyer 2002). Boyer’s idea is widely ac- cepted in csr. Most theories in the field focus on cognitive biases or cognitive mechanisms that produce or prepare for religious beliefs. Deborah Kelemen found evidence for a bias towards teleological explanations (Kelemen 1999). Paul Bloom argues that a bias towards mind-body dualism could explain religious beliefs (Bloom 2005). Jesse Bering and David Bjorklund did experiments suggesting that after- life beliefs come natural to young children (Bering and Bjorklund 2004). Others proposed more elaborate theories featuring cognitive mechanisms, which they claim are responsible for religious beliefs. In doing so, they try to sketch a more complete picture of how religious beliefs are produced. No theory claims that there is one designated ‘special’ cognitive mechanism for religious beliefs but most argue that ‘ordinary’ mechanisms that also produce other beliefs lie at its root. Justin Barrett’s theory states that an important factor in the emergence of supernatural beliefs is the ‘hyperactive agency detection device’. As the name suggests, this is the cognitive mechanism responsible for detecting agents. The mechanism is hyperactive because it produces beliefs upon very limited evidence. For example, the sound of rustling leaves or a stick that looks like a snake is enough to conclude that one or more agents are around. According to Barrett, the process, joined by operations of the theory of mind,1 could lead to beliefs about invisible agents and gods (Barrett 2004). Jesse Bering argued that belief in God could result from applying mentalizing tools to meaningful 1 The theory of mind is the mechanism responsible for producing beliefs about other people’s mental states. contemporary pragmatismDownloaded from 15 Brill.com09/25/2021(2018) 387-406 09:33:53AM via free access 204221 What Cognitive Science of Religion 389 events. People would be inclined to interpret events like natural disasters or beautiful sunsets as intentionally created by an ultimate meaning giver (Ber- ing 2002). Kurt Gray and Daniel Wegner claimed that human moral reasoning always takes a dyadic form. In moral situations, people intuitively look for a moral agent (the doer of good or evil) and a moral patient (the receiver of good or evil). In most situations both are easily found but in some there is no appar- ent moral agent. Examples are natural disasters or good things that happen to people like having a baby. In these situations, people infer to an ultimate moral agent, i.e. God (Gray and Wegner 2010). Lee Kirkpatrick argued that beliefs in supernatural beings arise when the attachment system of humans goes astray. Normally people attach to caregivers and partners but sometimes the system overreaches and attaches to invisible attachment figures like gods or spirits (Kirkpatrick 2005). Other theories explain how religious beliefs are transmitted and what makes religious beliefs successful.2 The most influential theory of this kind is Pascal Boyer’s ‘cognitive optimum’. He argued that minimally counterintuitive con- cept have the best chances of being remembered and being transmitted. In his view, people have intuitive ontological categories like ‘Plant’, ‘Animal’ or ‘Person’. These categories allow for predictions. For example, categorizing something under ‘Plant’ allows the inference that the thing will not be able to move and will grow under the right conditions. Minimally counterintuitive concepts violate some of the expectations that come with their intuitive on- tological category. For example, a ghost is usually categorized under ‘Person’ but violates the expectation that persons cannot move through walls. At the same time the majority of expectations is retained and a ghost is expected to perceive things in the same way persons do and to interact with others like per- sons do. Minimally counterintuitive concepts differ from intuitive (concepts that violate no expectations) and maximally counterintuitive concepts (con- cepts that violate many expectations). Intuitive concepts, like ‘John Doe’, are not memorable because they are ordinary. Maximally intuitive concepts, like a man who is 30 meter long, has 11,5 arms and only appears every second Tues- day of the month, require too much cognitive effort to remember. Most super- natural concepts are minimally counterintuitive and thus easily transmitted and remembered (Boyer 2002). Thomas Lawson and Robert McCauley propose that religious rituals serve as means for the transmittance of symbolic repre- sentations. These symbolic representations can be beliefs about supernatural beings or religious beliefs like ‘All men are sinners’. They need not take the form of written texts. Lawson and McCauley argue that rituals have two char- acteristics that make them very suitable to transmit symbolic r epresentations, 2 A belief is successful when it spreads through a large part of the population. contemporary pragmatism 15 (2018) 387-406 Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 09:33:53AM via free access 204221 390 Van Eyghen the frequency of their performance and their stability. Both insure that ritu- als are memorable and hence that the symbolic representations they invoke get transmitted (McCauley and Lawson 2002). Another theory explaining why (some) religious beliefs are successful draws on the adaptive usefulness of supernatural beliefs (Norenzayan 2013; Bering and Johnson 2005; Shariff and Norenzayan 2007). Defenders of the theory3 note that human beings rely on cooperation to a far greater extent than other animals do. This offers many benefits but also makes humans vulnerable to free-riders, people who reap the benefits of cooperation but do not make any contributions themselves. Believ- ing in supernatural beings could help fix this problem. According to defenders of this theory, supernatural beings are commonly believed to have full access to people’s intentions and desires and to be concerned about whether people do the right thing. Believing that a being of this sort is watching will thus make people (far) less likely to free-ride. Because of their adaptive use, religious be- liefs would be transmitted. Finally, some theories highlight the social functions of religious rituals. Other than theories from the last category they do not discuss how the be- liefs themselves get transmitted but what effects these beliefs have on coop- eration or the formation of groups. The costly signaling theory (Bulbulia and Sosis 2011) states that religious rituals are means of signaling one’s commit- ment to social norms. By engaging in costly, hard-to-fake rituals, people would show their commitment to the social norms
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Neuroscience, Psychology and Religion : Illusions, Delusions, and Realities About Human Nature Pdf, Epub, Ebook
    NEUROSCIENCE, PSYCHOLOGY AND RELIGION : ILLUSIONS, DELUSIONS, AND REALITIES ABOUT HUMAN NATURE PDF, EPUB, EBOOK Malcolm Jeeves | 204 pages | 01 Apr 2009 | Templeton Foundation Press,U.S. | 9781599471471 | English | Radnor, United States Neuroscience, Psychology and Religion : Illusions, Delusions, and Realities About Human Nature PDF Book In this volume, Malcolm Jeeves and Warren S. Psychology of Religion Newsletter , 31 , 1—8. To the extent that this relational-deictic stance represents a cognitive default, however, it may still serve as a strong foundation for religious cultural notions. History can be written at any magnification. A critical examination. However, the basic insight that psychological processes depend on neural activity has a clinical base dating back at least to the seventeenth century, to the work of Thomas Willis, whose multifaceted neurological work led him to tie human desires and instincts, memory and imagination, reason and volition to the brain and central nervous system. Religious motivation reduces perceived responsibility for and morality of good deeds. James K. Content Metrics. God is watching you: Priming God concepts increases prosocial behavior in an anonymous economic game. Nov 30, Timothy Wilson rated it really liked it. Of course, questions like this are not only the stuff of film and literature. This article has been cited by other articles in PMC. A historical database of sociocultural evolution. Miles rated it liked it Jun 03, Privacy Statement. Sign in to annotate. Failures to observe the laws of the Kivung are said to delay the miracle of returning ancestors. A latent capacity for evolutionary innovation through exaptation in metabolic systems. Humans should therefore be equipped by natural selection with biased agency-detection mechanisms—what J.
    [Show full text]
  • Cognitive Biases Explain Religious Belief, Paranormal Belief, and Belief in Life’S Purpose ⇑ Aiyana K
    Cognition 129 (2013) 379–391 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Cognition journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/COGNIT Cognitive biases explain religious belief, paranormal belief, and belief in life’s purpose ⇑ Aiyana K. Willard , Ara Norenzayan 1 Department of Psychology, The University of British Columbia, 2136 West Mall, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z4, Canada article info abstract Article history: Cognitive theories of religion have postulated several cognitive biases that predispose Received 4 March 2013 human minds towards religious belief. However, to date, these hypotheses have not been Revised 25 July 2013 tested simultaneously and in relation to each other, using an individual difference Accepted 27 July 2013 approach. We used a path model to assess the extent to which several interacting cognitive tendencies, namely mentalizing, mind body dualism, teleological thinking, and anthropo- morphism, as well as cultural exposure to religion, predict belief in God, paranormal beliefs Keywords: and belief in life’s purpose. Our model, based on two independent samples (N = 492 and Religion N = 920) found that the previously known relationship between mentalizing and belief is Cognitive biases Paranormal belief mediated by individual differences in dualism, and to a lesser extent by teleological think- Purpose ing. Anthropomorphism was unrelated to religious belief, but was related to paranormal belief. Cultural exposure to religion (mostly Christianity) was negatively related to anthro- pomorphism, and was unrelated to any of the other cognitive tendencies. These patterns were robust for both men and women, and across at least two ethnic identifications. The data were most consistent with a path model suggesting that mentalizing comes first, which leads to dualism and teleology, which in turn lead to religious, paranormal, and life’s-purpose beliefs.
    [Show full text]
  • Cognitive Science of Religion and Christian Faith: How May They Be Brought Together? Justin L
    Cognitive Science of Religion and Christian Faith: How May They Be Brought Together? Justin L. Barrett Fuller Theological Seminary Editor’s Note Justin L. Barrett is the Thrive Professor of Developmental Science in the Graduate School of Psychology, and Chief Project Developer for the Office of Science, Theology, and Religion Initiatives at Fuller Theological Seminary, Pasadena, CA. A cognitive and developmental psychologist (Ph.D., Cornell University), his books include Why Would Anyone Believe in God? (2004), Cognitive Science, Religion, and Theology: From Human Minds to Divine Minds (2011), and Born Believers: The Science of Childhood Religion (2012). Barrett describes for us here the latest developments and challenges in the cognitive sciences for Christian faith. The essay is intended as an invitation. Readers are encouraged to take up one of the insights or questions, or maybe a related one that was not mentioned, and draft an article (typically about 5,000-8,000 words) that contributes to the conversation. These can be sent to Dr. Barrett at [email protected]. He will send the best essays on to peer review and then we will select from those for publication in a cognitive science theme issue of Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith. The lead editorial in the December 2013 issue of PSCF outlines what the journal looks for in article contributions. For best consideration for inclusion in the theme issue, manuscripts should be received electronically before 31 March 2016. Looking forward to hearing your perspectives, James C. Peterson Editor of Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith I once participated in an academic conference on a small island in the Baltic Sea that was uninhabited except for a biological research station.
    [Show full text]
  • The Epistemic Parity of Religious-Apologetic and Religion-Debunking Responses to the Cognitive Science of Religion
    religions Article The Epistemic Parity of Religious-Apologetic and Religion-Debunking Responses to the Cognitive Science of Religion Walter Scott Stepanenko Department of Philosophy, John Carroll University, University Heights, OH 44118, USA; [email protected] Abstract: Recent work in the cognitive science of religion has challenged some of the explanatory assumptions of previous research in the field. Nonetheless, some of the practitioners of the new cognitive science of religion theorize in the same skeptical spirit as their predecessors and either imply or explicitly claim that their projects undermine the warrant of religious beliefs. In this article, I argue that these theories do no additional argumentative work when compared to previous attempts to debunk religious belief and that these recent debunking efforts are very much motivated by methodological commitments that are shared with canonical research. I contend that these argumentative strategies put debunkers very much on an epistemic par with religious apologists: both advocate responses to the cognitive science of religion that are primarily motivated by methodological commitments. Keywords: epistemology; religious experience; cognitive science of religion Citation: Stepanenko, Walter Scott. 2021. The Epistemic Parity of 1. Introduction Religious-Apologetic and The discourse around the cognitive science of religion (CSR) creates the impression Religion-Debunking Responses to the that religion debunkers are in an epistemically superior position relative to religious Cognitive Science of Religion. apologists. A great deal of philosophical and theological work in the literature is dedicated Religions 12: 466. https://doi.org/ to the construction of debunking arguments motivated by CSR evidence and apologetic 10.3390/rel12070466 responses to these arguments.
    [Show full text]
  • Evolution, Religion and Cognitive Science: Critical and Constructive Essays, Edited by Fraser Watts and Léon Turner
    [JCSR 2.2 (2014) 159–163] Journal for the Cognitive Science of Religion (print) ISSN 2049-7555 doi:10.1558/jcsr.v2i2.22826 Journal for the Cognitive Science of Religion (online) ISSN 2049-7563 BOOK REVIEWS Evolution, Religion and Cognitive Science: Critical and Constructive Essays, Edited by Fraser Watts and Léon Turner. Oxford University Press, 2014. 272pp., Hb $99.00/£65.00. ISBN-13: 978-0-19-968808-1. Reviewed by Eva Kundtová Klocová, LEVYNA —Laboratory for the Experi- mental Research of Religion, Masaryk University, [email protected] Keywords evolutionary theory, religion, cognitive science of religion In 1909, at Darwin’s centenary (1809), Jane Harrison argued that it was Darwin- ism that allowed for the emergence of the scientific study of religion. A century later (2009) two conferences were held in Cambridge, to celebrate the same events, attesting the constant inspiration of Darwin’s legacy and focusing on the impact of evolutionary theorizing on the current study of religion. Papers from those conferences inspired publication of an anthology mapping an involvement of the evolutionary theory in the Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR): Evolu- tion, Religion and Cognitive Science, published in 2014. Interestingly, the same year (2014) marks another anniversary and yet another conference—the IACSR conference: Religion Explained? The Cognitive Science of Religion after 25 Years. This conference and the publication of the book coincide not only in time, but also in the emphasis on the ever growing importance of evolutionary theorizing within CSR and its implications for the identity of CSR. The closing address of the conference by Richard Sosis tapped exactly into the same questions and topics surfacing in the anthology, stressing their significance for the CSR.
    [Show full text]
  • Ecopsychology Revisited
    Humboldt State University Digital Commons @ Humboldt State University Trade & Scholarly Monographs Humboldt State University Press 2019 Ecopsychology Revisited Jorge Conesa-Sevilla Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.humboldt.edu/monographs Part of the Environmental Sciences Commons, and the Other Psychology Commons Recommended Citation Conesa-Sevilla, Jorge. Ecopsychology Revisited. Humboldt State University Press, 2019. https://digitalcommons.humboldt.edu/monographs/7. This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Humboldt State University Press at Digital Commons @ Humboldt State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Trade & Scholarly Monographs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Humboldt State University. For more information, please contact [email protected]. “Ecopsychology Revisited is a Eco critique of and deconstructive approach to several trends termed “ecopsychology.” This work attempts psychology to bring light to some of the psychology Eco misconceptions that have hardened as “ecopsychology,” as these ideas have Revisited been reinterpreted and sometimes For Whom Do The “Nature” Bells Toll? oversimplified by the general public and some professionals outside mainstream psychology. Part of the confusion arose when “ecopsychology” became inadequately amalgamated with other ideas. Nevertheless, within the social Revisited and behavioral sciences, at least, there is great value in devising and applying evidence-based strategies that track the normative ramifications
    [Show full text]
  • RELIGION EXPLAINED Understan~ Why
    .' Also by Pascal Boyer The Naturalness ofReligious Ideas RELIGION Tradition as Truth and Communication EXPLAINED THE EVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT PASCAL BOYER A Member of the Perseus Books Group .. ' I WHAT IS THE ORIGIN? A neighbor in the village tells me that I should protect myself against.witches. Otherwise they could hit me with invisible darts that will get inside my veins and poison my blood. A shaman burns tobacco leaves in front of a row of statuettes and starts talking to them. He says he must send them on a journey to dis­ tant villages in the sky. The point ofall this is to cure someone whose mind is held hostage by invisible spirits. A group of believers goes around, warning everyone that the end is nigh. Judgement Day is scheduled for October 2. This day passes and nothing happens. The group carries on, telling everyone the end is nigh (the date has been changed). Villagers organize a ceremony to tell a goddess she is not wanted in their villag~ anymore. She failed to protect them from epidemics, so they decided to "drop" her and find a more efficient replacement. An assembly of priests finds offensive what some people say about what happened several centuries ago in a distant place, where a virgin is said to have given birth to a child. So these people must be massacred. Members of a cult on an island decide to slaughter all their live­ stock and burn their crops. All these will be useless now, they say, because a ship full of goods and money will reach their shores very shortly in recognition of their good deeds.
    [Show full text]
  • A Neuroscience Account of Religion As a Motivated Process Michael Inzlicht a , Alexa M
    This article was downloaded by: [Mr Richard Sosis] On: 25 February 2012, At: 22:50 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Religion, Brain & Behavior Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rrbb20 The need to believe: a neuroscience account of religion as a motivated process Michael Inzlicht a , Alexa M. Tullett a & Marie Good a a Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada Available online: 24 Feb 2012 To cite this article: Michael Inzlicht, Alexa M. Tullett & Marie Good (2011): The need to believe: a neuroscience account of religion as a motivated process, Religion, Brain & Behavior, 1:3, 192-212 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/2153599X.2011.647849 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and- conditions This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
    [Show full text]
  • REVIEW ARTICLE the Evolution of Religious Belief in Humans: a Brief
    REVIEW ARTICLE The evolution of religious belief in humans: A brief reviewwith focus on cognition. DHAIRYYA SINGH, GARGA CHATTERJEE Running Title: The evolution of religious belief in humans Keywords: religion, evolution, costly signalling, belief Introduction Religion is defined as belief in god-like entities who are worshipped for possessing superhuman abilities and ultimate power over the fate of human beings. This definition, while popular, is limiting to scholarly study from an evolutionary perspective because it implies that there is something special about religion vis-a-vis which makes it fundamentally different from other kinds of cognition and behaviour. This in turn makes it difficult to explain the evolutionary underpinnings of religion since the first traces of primitive religious ritual in hominins are dated to approximately 225,000 years ago (Pettitt 2002), while organized religion is only estimated to be as little as 11,000 years old (Cauvin and Watkins 2000). Considering the relative ‘youth’ of religion (in its organized form) in evolutionary time scales, evolutionary scholars have tended to provide a much more generalised definition of religion which includes belief in various supernatural phenomena and ritualistic behaviour in service of those beliefs. This paper will also consider religion in this generalised sense. However, this broader ambit, too, does not cover many human behaviours that are associated with the supernatural. Religion, as a term, is insufficient to cover belief systems that deal with non-omnipotent deities which share a more interactive and less power asymmetrical relationship with humans, thus ambiguating the normative hierarchy that religion assumes between the human and the divine.
    [Show full text]
  • Psychologising and Neurologising About Religion: Facts, Fallacies and the Future Transcript
    Psychologising and Neurologising about Religion: Facts, Fallacies and the Future Transcript Date: Wednesday, 23 January 2008 - 12:00AM PSYCHOLOGISING AND NEUROLOGISING ABOUT RELIGION Professor Malcolm Jeeves CBE FRSE Welcome George R. Bush The Revd George R. Bushhas been Rector of St Mary-le-Bowsince 2002. Before coming to St Mary’s he was Vicar of St Anne’s, Hoxton, having held earlier appointments as a curate in inner-city Leeds and a chaplain at Cambridge. He has studied history, history of art, canon law and theology and has published on certain developments in canon law involving a previous Bishop of London, Edmund Gibson (1669–1748). He is a past President of Sion College. In 2007 he co-edited (with Michael Byrne) a 380-page volume of essays - St Mary-le- Bow: A History. When I was a chaplain to students, it fell to me to interview all new entrants individually as part of their initiation. I had a carefully crafted and rehearsed conversation which involved explaining the life of the chapel and the role of the chaplain as an independent non-academic resource. One student replied to this explanation, boldly I thought, ‘Oh you’re a sort of social worker’. Although that may well have amply described what the authorities - for whom my likely pastoral competence was the touchstone - hoped for from me, I felt it as a trivialisation and an offence. I wrote at the time that ‘the display of being approachable and unshockable may be read as giving the nod to unbelief or the absence of personal moral seriousness’.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 the X-Claim Argument Against Religious Belief Stephen Law
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Heythrop College Publications This is the accepted manuscript of an article soon to be published by Cambridge University Press in Religious Studies 2016 ISSN 0034-4125 http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=RES The X-claim argument against religious belief Stephen Law Heythrop College, University of London, Kensington Square, London W8 5HN, UK [email protected] Abstract: This paper outlines an argument against religious belief: the X-claim argument. The argument is novel at least in the sense that it has not yet been clearly articulated or addressed before in the philosophical literature. However, the argument is closely related to two more familiar varieties of argument currently receiving philosophical attention, namely: (i) arguments from religious diversity, and (ii) naturalistic debunking arguments (e.g. Freudian, Marxist, and evolutionary). I set out the X-claim argument, show that it has some prima facie plausibility, distinguish it from these other two arguments with which it might easily be confused, and, finally, explain why it has some significant advantages over these more familiar arguments against religious belief. Introduction This paper outlines an argument against religious belief: the X-claim argument. The argument is novel at least in the sense that it has not yet been clearly articulated or 1 addressed before in the philosophical literature. However, the argument is closely related to two more familiar varieties of argument currently receiving philosophical attention, namely: (i) arguments from religious diversity, and (ii) naturalistic debunking arguments (e.g. Freudian, Marxist, and evolutionary).
    [Show full text]
  • Religion Explained?
    Department of Systematic Theology University of Helsinki Finland Religion Explained? A Philosophical Appraisal of the Cognitive Science of Religion Aku Visala ACADEMIC DISSERTATION To be presented, with the permission of the Faculty of Theology of the University of Helsinki, for public examination in the lecture theatre of Arppeanum (Helsinki University Museum), Snellmaninkatu 3, on 19th December 2009, at 11 am. Finland 2009 2 Abstract This study examines philosophically the main theories and methodological assumptions of the field known as the cognitive science of religion (CSR). The study makes a philosophically informed reconstruction of the methodological principles of the CSR, indicates problems with them, and examines possible solutions to these problems. The study focuses on several different CSR writers, namely, Scott Atran, Justin Barrett, Pascal Boyer and Dan Sperber. CSR theorising is done in the intersection between cognitive sciences, anthropology and evolutionary psychology. This multidisciplinary nature makes CSR a fertile ground for philosophical considerations coming from philosophy of psychology, philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. I begin by spelling out the methodological assumptions and auxiliary theories of CSR writers by situating these theories and assumptions in the nexus of existing approaches to religion. The distinctive feature of CSR is its emphasis on information processing: CSR writers claim that contemporary cognitive sciences can inform anthropological theorising about the human mind and offer tools for producing causal explanations. Further, they claim to explain the prevalence and persistence of religion by cognitive systems that undergird religious thinking. I also examine the core theoretical contributions of the field focusing mainly on the (1) “minimally counter-intuitiveness hypothesis” and (2) the different ways in which supernatural agent representations activate our cognitive systems.
    [Show full text]