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Religion Explained?

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Religion Explained? Department of Systematic Theology University of Helsinki Finland Religion Explained? A Philosophical Appraisal of the Cognitive Science of Religion Aku Visala ACADEMIC DISSERTATION To be presented, with the permission of the Faculty of Theology of the University of Helsinki, for public examination in the lecture theatre of Arppeanum (Helsinki University Museum), Snellmaninkatu 3, on 19th December 2009, at 11 am. Finland 2009 2 Abstract This study examines philosophically the main theories and methodological assumptions of the field known as the cognitive science of religion (CSR). The study makes a philosophically informed reconstruction of the methodological principles of the CSR, indicates problems with them, and examines possible solutions to these problems. The study focuses on several different CSR writers, namely, Scott Atran, Justin Barrett, Pascal Boyer and Dan Sperber. CSR theorising is done in the intersection between cognitive sciences, anthropology and evolutionary psychology. This multidisciplinary nature makes CSR a fertile ground for philosophical considerations coming from philosophy of psychology, philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. I begin by spelling out the methodological assumptions and auxiliary theories of CSR writers by situating these theories and assumptions in the nexus of existing approaches to religion. The distinctive feature of CSR is its emphasis on information processing: CSR writers claim that contemporary cognitive sciences can inform anthropological theorising about the human mind and offer tools for producing causal explanations. Further, they claim to explain the prevalence and persistence of religion by cognitive systems that undergird religious thinking. I also examine the core theoretical contributions of the field focusing mainly on the (1) “minimally counter-intuitiveness hypothesis” and (2) the different ways in which supernatural agent representations activate our cognitive systems. Generally speaking, CSR writers argue for the naturalness of religion: religious ideas and practices are widespread and pervasive because human cognition operates in such a way that religious ideas are easy to acquire and transmit. I raise two philosophical problems, namely, the “problem of scope” and the “problem of religious relevance”. The problem of scope is created by the insistence of several critics of the CSR that CSR explanations are mostly irrelevant for explaining religion. Most CSR writers themselves hold that cognitive explanations can answer most of our questions about religion. I argue that the problem of scope is created by differences in explanation-begging questions: the former group is interested in explaining different things than the latter group. I propose that we should not stick too rigidly to one set of methodological assumptions, but rather acknowledge that different assumptions might help us to answer different questions about religion. Instead of adhering to some robust metaphysics as some strongly naturalistic writers argue, we should adopt a pragmatic and explanatory pluralist approach which would allow different kinds of methodological presuppositions in the study of religion provided that they attempt to answer different kinds of why-questions, since religion appears to be a multi-faceted phenomenon that spans over a variety of fields of special sciences. The problem of religious relevance is created by the insistence of some writers that CSR theories show religious beliefs to be false or irrational, whereas others invoke CSR theories to defend certain religious ideas. The problem is interesting because it reveals the more general philosophical assumptions of those who make such interpretations. CSR theories can (and have been) interpreted in terms of three different philosophical frameworks: strict naturalism, broad naturalism and theism. I argue that CSR theories can be interpreted inside all three frameworks without doing violence to the theories and that these frameworks give different kinds of results regarding the religious relevance of CSR theories. 3 Acknowledgements When I started working on this study, I had no idea what it was about and where I was going with it. I was so far from finding the murderer that I did not even realise a murder had taken place. I could not imagine what my argument would be or even how to approach the problems. At that point, the completion of a dissertation seemed to be a grand achievement which would give life-long bragging rights to anybody superior enough in intellect to achieve this mystical goal. It took me about a year to realise what was going on in the cognitive science of religion, another year to find out a way to approach it and a year and a half to say something about it and write it down. Gradually, the aura of mystique surrounding the idea of obtaining a dissertation withered and finally evaporated. In retrospect, I see that what I actually needed was not so much intellect and inspiration as drudgery and perspiration. I can see now that finishing my dissertation scarcely gave me bragging-rights for life or the satisfaction that I had hoped for; in fact its flaws loom much more largely for me than any of its possible strengths, and I only see what I did not achieve, what this study could have been. I do, however, take pride in the fact that I actually managed to finish it. For the first time, I felt I was facing the real possibility of being defeated by an academic assignment, and pulling through – even if just barely – feels good. In the course of a long project, such as this study, a great many debts of an interdisciplinary and intradisciplinary kind accumulate. I cannot settle them, but I can acknowledge them here. First of all, I must thank my diligent and acute supervisors Prof. Simo Knuuttila and Doc. Ilkka Pyysiäinen for their support and relentless (and sometimes heavy handed) guidance without which this study would not be even half of what it is. Both gave me a hard time when I was getting complacent and reassurance when I hit rock bottom. Very special thanks go to the Cognition, Religion and Theology project and its members – Justin Barrett, Roger Trigg, Emma Cohen, the late Nicola Knight and David Leech – at the University of Oxford for their open-mindedness in welcoming a total novice into their midst for a whole year and letting him see how the cognitive science of religion works from the inside. I was given the opportunity to present many of my ideas to the group and received feedback that helped me to formulate my arguments. I was also given the once- in-a-lifetime opportunity to draw on what was best in Oxford ranging from philosophy to evolutionary psychology. For the experience gained and the lessons learned, I am deeply indebted. In particular, I must extend my gratitude to Dr. David Leech who not only helped me with the intricacies of the English language but also went through the manuscript with a fine tooth-comb without asking anything in return. I also thank him for the countless conversations we have had on topics related to the cognitive study of religion and philosophy (and life) in general. He has been my guide in my adventures through English culture and the Oxbridge system. In the course of this study, I have enjoyed numerous conversations with Prof. Emeritus Heikki Kirjavainen, Prof. Risto Saarinen, Doc. Timo Koistinen, Doc. Sammeli Juntunen and numerous other people working in the Department of Systematic Theology at the University of Helsinki. One could not have hoped for more interesting colleagues. Some of my colleagues I also have the privilege of calling my closest friends. This is the case with my “untalented” friends Rev. Antti Mustakallio, Doc. Olli-Pekka Vainio, Researcher Mikko Sammalkivi and Dr. Topi Heikkerö. I am particularly grateful to these individuals for their continuous attempts to fend off my self-pity, the numerous discussions on philosophical topics and for their faith in the consolations of philosophy. It is hard for me to even imagine my life without my beloved friends who have had to carry some (and occasionally, most) of the psychological spillage produced by the clash of 4 the pressures of my research and my shaky psyche during the past four years. My pains and joys have spilled into to my free time with Markus Ukkola, Aleksi Rytkönen, Antti Peltoniemi, Sauli Hurri and Jani Salomaa who have not only endured, but also helped me to endure. I have been a pain, I know, but I apologise and thank you for your persistence and company during the countless nights of watching bad movies and playing computer games. Without you and our common activities, I would have had no relief. I also have to thank the Trends in Intellectual Integration project run by Professors Uskali Mäki and Petri Ylikoski and the members of the Philosophy of Science group in the Department of Social and Moral Philosophy at the University of Helsinki for introducing me to developments in philosophy of science and giving me the possibility to discuss my feeble ideas. My hanging out with the group turned out to be crucial for my research, because I ended up participating in a week long workshop on philosophy of neuroscience by Carl Craver on September 2007 which gave me a completely new perspective to things – a perspective that paid off in multiple ways. This study has been generously funded by the Finnish Cultural Foundation, Alfred E. Kordelin Foundation, Finnish Graduate School of Theology and the Academy of Finland. Without their generosity, my sleepless nights spent thinking about reductionism, moments of despair at 4am when the arguments fail and the endless, tedious and boring hours day after day after day spent grinding the mill would not have come to pass. Without these desperate and boring hours, there would not be a study for you to read. Finally, my greatest thanks go to my parents Heikki and Eeva-Liisa who have continued to support me throughout my life even though they have not always understood what I was doing.
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