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The Epistemic Parity of Religious-Apologetic and Religion-Debunking Responses to the Cognitive Science of Religion

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The Epistemic Parity of Religious-Apologetic and Religion-Debunking Responses to the Cognitive Science of Religion religions Article The Epistemic Parity of Religious-Apologetic and Religion-Debunking Responses to the Cognitive Science of Religion Walter Scott Stepanenko Department of Philosophy, John Carroll University, University Heights, OH 44118, USA; [email protected] Abstract: Recent work in the cognitive science of religion has challenged some of the explanatory assumptions of previous research in the field. Nonetheless, some of the practitioners of the new cognitive science of religion theorize in the same skeptical spirit as their predecessors and either imply or explicitly claim that their projects undermine the warrant of religious beliefs. In this article, I argue that these theories do no additional argumentative work when compared to previous attempts to debunk religious belief and that these recent debunking efforts are very much motivated by methodological commitments that are shared with canonical research. I contend that these argumentative strategies put debunkers very much on an epistemic par with religious apologists: both advocate responses to the cognitive science of religion that are primarily motivated by methodological commitments. Keywords: epistemology; religious experience; cognitive science of religion Citation: Stepanenko, Walter Scott. 2021. The Epistemic Parity of 1. Introduction Religious-Apologetic and The discourse around the cognitive science of religion (CSR) creates the impression Religion-Debunking Responses to the that religion debunkers are in an epistemically superior position relative to religious Cognitive Science of Religion. apologists. A great deal of philosophical and theological work in the literature is dedicated Religions 12: 466. https://doi.org/ to the construction of debunking arguments motivated by CSR evidence and apologetic 10.3390/rel12070466 responses to these arguments. In this article, I argue that the reality of the epistemic situation is quite different, and that religious apologists and religion debunkers are in Academic Editor: Mark Webb very similar epistemic positions. To make this case, I first explicate some features of Received: 18 May 2021 traditional research projects developed in CSR. I then contrast these projects with more Accepted: 22 June 2021 recent developments in the field. I argue that both projects motivate debunking arguments Published: 25 June 2021 in which methodological commitments rather than first-order scientific evidence are doing much of the argumentative work. I explain that these are commitments that most religious Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neutral apologists reject and that the debate over the implications of CSR comes down to the with regard to jurisdictional claims in viability of various methodological commitments. Insofar as CSR itself cannot settle published maps and institutional affil- these issues and debates over these commitments are philosophically live, I conclude that 1 iations. religious apologists and religion debunkers are on an epistemic par with respect to CSR. 2. Canonical Cognitive Science of Religion The canonical cognitive science of religion (CCSR) can best be described as a research 2 Copyright: © 2021 by the author. program that is committed to the scientific investigation of religion. Defined in this way, Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. CCSR need not involve a commitment to debunk, undermine, or otherwise defeat religious This article is an open access article beliefs.3 In fact, defined in this way CCSR does not necessarily require practitioners to distributed under the terms and develop projects that fix their explanatory scope on religious belief(s). For example, this conditions of the Creative Commons definition of CCSR covers explanatory projects that involve a coarse-grained explanatory Attribution (CC BY) license (https:// scope that is concerned with offering accounts of the ubiquity and/or persistence of reli- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ gious behavior.4 However, many practitioners in CCSR take their work to have implications 4.0/). Religions 2021, 12, 466. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12070466 https://www.mdpi.com/journal/religions Religions 2021, 12, 466 2 of 12 for the warrant of religious belief. For example, Bloom(2009) suggests that CCSR cannot refute theism, but that CCSR can “still tell us something about the rationality, or lack thereof, of religious believers” (p. 126). Nonetheless, different practitioners pursue differ- ent explanatory strategies. Some theorists advocate adaptationist accounts of religion.5 For these theorists, the ubiquity and persistence of religious belief and behavior are explained by appealing to the ways that they contribute to evolutionary fitness. Other theorists advocate by-product accounts of religion.6 For these theorists, the ubiquity and persis- tence of religious belief and behavior are explained by appeal to the accidental outcomes produced by the normal functioning of otherwise adaptive cognitive processes. Despite these differences, there is quite a bit more common theoretical ground than the distinction between these two approaches implies. Many adaptationists fix their explanatory scope on extant monotheistic traditions, while many by-product theorists are most concerned with explaining the ubiquity of beliefs in supernatural persons. In this way, adaptationists often subsume by-product theories and imply that cognitive by-products are later co-opted by organized traditions where they play the role of exaptations. To see this, consider a CCSR account following along lines suggested by Boyer(2002) and Norenzayan(2013): Human beings are animals just like any other animal, and just like every animal constrained by evolutionary processes of natural selection, human beings must survive long enough to reproduce and pass down their genes to the next generation. However, survival is no easy matter. Threats abound in most environments and every animal needs to be prepared to fend them off or evade them. Therefore, an animal will be well-suited for its environment if it is prone to identify threats. This makes agency detection very important. If an animal fails to detect a threat, it will be eaten and therefore unable to reproduce and pass down its genes to the next generation. However, if an animal is very sensitive to possible threats, it might flee more times than it needs to, but the only cost would be calories. Therefore, natural selection would favor trigger-happy animals over agency-insensitive animals, but the trigger-happy animals would be likely to overattribute agency. They would possess minds tailored to identify agents where there are none. If these animals are social animals, they would also possess minds tailored to attribute mental states wherever they detect agency. These animals would be prone to identify agents where there are none and to attribute various goals or desires to these agents. Therefore, these animals would be predisposed for belief in invisible, but imaginary, persons. The existence of such persons is surprising, given that they are like other persons these animals know in most respects except for the fact they are invisible, but the concept of an invisible agent is not so extravagant that it is difficult to remember. Therefore, the recognition of surprising invisible agents would be easy to transmit because the concept is captivating and easy to remember. Thus, belief in such agents could spread across a population. As it does, this belief could ratchet up the solidarity amongst the members. Belief in these invisible agents could then become a sign of one’s group affiliation, but it could also become a way of keeping people in line. Group members cannot always monitor one another’s behavior, but an invisible agent can stand in for them. The more that agent knows and sees, the more it can police, but it can only police that behavior if it has the intention and power to do so. Therefore, a group that believed in one invisible agent with as much power, knowledge, and goodness as possible might be able to coerce cooperation in a way that another group without that belief could not. Groups with such beliefs might therefore outcompete groups without such beliefs, and as a result, they could more successfully reproduce and spread across various regions such that over time and space, an entire race of progeny would exist with the genetic predisposition for their belief system. Such a story captures the most crucial theoretical elements in various theories in CCSR. That it is a coherent story is one reason for its popularity amongst theorists, but what is most important for present purposes is the identification of various theoretical postulates therein. First, we have various cognitive processes producing the “raw materials” for religious belief. Chief among these is the hyperactive agency detection device, or HADD. HADD is the cognitive process that is responsible for producing belief in agents, but it Religions 2021, 12, 466 3 of 12 is unreliable. It detects agents in more cases than those in which an agent is actually present, but that is not all. HADD is expanded by theory of mind (ToM). ToM involves various cognitive processes that are responsible for attributing mental states to agents. Together HADD and ToM dispose individuals to believe in persons who are not there. These beliefs could be transient, but they are minimally counterintuitive (MCI): they violate categorical expectations but in only a few respects. They are surprising, but because they only minimally violate categorical expectations, they are easy to remember. They can therefore
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