[JCSR 2.2 (2014) 159–163] Journal for the Cognitive Science of Religion (print) ISSN 2049-7555 doi:10.1558/jcsr.v2i2.22826 Journal for the Cognitive Science of Religion (online) ISSN 2049-7563 BOOK REVIEWS Evolution, Religion and Cognitive Science: Critical and Constructive Essays, Edited by Fraser Watts and Léon Turner. Oxford University Press, 2014. 272pp., Hb $99.00/£65.00. ISBN-13: 978-0-19-968808-1. Reviewed by Eva Kundtová Klocová, LEVYNA —Laboratory for the Experi- mental Research of Religion, Masaryk University, [email protected] Keywords evolutionary theory, religion, cognitive science of religion In 1909, at Darwin’s centenary (1809), Jane Harrison argued that it was Darwin- ism that allowed for the emergence of the scientific study of religion. A century later (2009) two conferences were held in Cambridge, to celebrate the same events, attesting the constant inspiration of Darwin’s legacy and focusing on the impact of evolutionary theorizing on the current study of religion. Papers from those conferences inspired publication of an anthology mapping an involvement of the evolutionary theory in the Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR): Evolu- tion, Religion and Cognitive Science, published in 2014. Interestingly, the same year (2014) marks another anniversary and yet another conference—the IACSR conference: Religion Explained? The Cognitive Science of Religion after 25 Years. This conference and the publication of the book coincide not only in time, but also in the emphasis on the ever growing importance of evolutionary theorizing within CSR and its implications for the identity of CSR. The closing address of the conference by Richard Sosis tapped exactly into the same questions and topics surfacing in the anthology, stressing their significance for the CSR. Their co-occurrence suggests a necessity to re-evaluate the role of evolutionary theorizing within the study of religion in general and specifically in CSR. To outline those questions and topics, and to show how they challenge the identity of CSR, the review is structured as a brief analysis of the understanding of the three “pillars” of CSR’s identity, as indicated by its name. Cognitive The emergence of cognitivism in the study of religion was associated with the renewed interest in functioning of the mind, mainly represented by Chomsky © Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2015, Office 415, The Workstation, 15 Paternoster Row, Sheffield, S1 2BX 160 Book Reviews (1959), Fodor (1983), and Tooby and Cosmides (1992). Building upon a modu- lar account of cognition, the “standard model of CSR” is a testimony to those foundations. It construes religion as a by-product of normally functioning human cognition, its most prominent subjects are the origins and transmission of religious beliefs and concepts, and its main goal is to overcome previous mind-blind accounts. With research shifting towards new topics and inspira- tions from other disciplines, the following question arises: How “cognitive” is in fact the CSR today? To illustrate the current situation, let us digress back to the IACSR conference. In his talk, Sosis keenly observed that a large amount of research published and presented at different CSR platforms does not focus on truly “cognitive” mechanisms and functions at all, but rather on behaviour and social interactions. Although some notions of evolutionary theory were present within the CSR from its beginning, it was not until evolutionary scientists came along that the truly evolutionary theorizing influenced the change of focus in the CSR. Although by then, the standard model was already in place. Some key evo- lutionary points thus seem to challenge the status quo; not only do prominent evolutionary scientists seem to favour adaptationism (e.g. Wilson, Sosis, Bulbu- lia), their methodology and focus are in many other aspects quite different from those of standard CSR. As the name of the chapter written by Benjamin Purzy- cki and colleagues (“Extending Evolutionary Accounts of Religion beyond the Mind”), suggests, the interest of evolutionary scientists lies “beyond the mind.” It is behaviour, social and environmental interactions, that concern evolutionary approach, and even when ascertaining the importance of the mind, it is under- stood only as a component of dynamic relationship, studied with equal atten- tion as natural and social environments and history (p. 85). The evolutionary theorizing thus challenges cognition’s pivotal position in the spectrum of CSR research. The polemic with cognition as the prominent topic is not the only way the “cognitive” in CSR is challenged. Even kept in the centre of attention, there are many ways to approach cognition apart from the standard model. As the anthology editor Léon Turner (“Introduction: Pluralism and Complexity in the Evolutionary Cognitive Science of Religion”) lists criticisms to other parts of this model (p.9), another question emerges: which cognitive approach should CSR advocate? Fraser Watts claims that “…the particular cognitive approach to the evolution of religion known as the […] (CSR) is in some ways narrower than it needs be, and that it is worth considering a broader range of cognitive approaches to the evolution of religion.” (p. 109). He suggests, for example, to replace the notion of modularity of mind by the central processing mechanisms © Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2015 Book Reviews 161 approach (p. 128). Similarly, Lesley Newson and Peter Richerson (“Religion: the Dynamics of Cultural Adaptations”) advertise a “cognition-lite” position of early acquired, culturally construed concepts against the innate propensity for religion, that is, the “cognition-heavy” position of Pascal Boyer (p. 196). The evolutionary shift brings many incitements, but also a need for rethink- ing boundaries and core theses of CSR. Based on the article by Slingerland and Bulbulia (2011), the editors propose to call the CSR in evolutionary context simply “evolutionary cognitive science of religion” (ECSR). What is not clear, is what proportion of the CSR should be labelled with this acronym, or whether the whole CSR should be renamed. Further on, this new label might not be the best solution how to reflect the growing importance of evolutionary theorizing within the CSR; the standard cognitive and evolutionary approaches are in many traits too dissimilar to be just casually glued together. Science The CSR has always articulated its naturalistic standpoint, stressing scientific principles as the basis of its existence against any theologizing or metaphysical accounts. It also supports interdisciplinarity and open dialogue with other scien- tific disciplines. Contrarily, parts of the anthology and some implications of the Sosis’ talk pose a question where are boundaries of interdisciplinarity, and what still is a scientific dialogue? Aku Visala’s chapter (“The Evolution of Divine and Human Minds: Evolu- tionary Psychology, the Cognitive Study of Religion and Theism”), dedicated to evaluation of religious relevance of (E)CSR, concludes that CSR’s accounts are quite neutral and give “very little reason to prefer atheism over theism.” However, Wentzel van Huysteen (“From Empathy to Embodied Faith? Inter- disciplinary Perspectives on the Evolution of Religion”) talks about “Cognitive science of religion and faith” (p. 146) and “scientific defence of theistic beliefs” (p. 149), while Watts (“Religion and the Emergence of Differentiated Cogni- tion”) ascertains a possibility of fruitful dialogue between theology and nat- uralistic approach to religion (p. 110). Then again, even without an atheistic contribution to the book, this camp also disturbs the integrity of the field. When enumerating possible improvements, Sosis in his talk suggested that CSR should “hug the relevant academic superstars,” namely Dawkins and Dennett. Although he meant just to increase popularity of the CSR and not to embrace their metaphysics, it still shows certain unawareness of possible pitfalls, against which Armin Geertz warns extensively in his 2008 article. The anthology’s title might be misleading, as it could lead to expectation of purely ECSR’s articles. While some chapters fit this description, others are © Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2015 162 Book Reviews rather outsider’s commentaries on ECSR, discussing metaphysical issues. With- out denying the right of metaphysics informed by cognitive science to exist, the anthology’s content shows the necessity to clearly demarcate the ground of CSR as a scientific endeavour. Should atheistic or theological agendas be allowed to play constitutive part of the CSR just as they are involved in the discussion presented in this book? Should the questions of truth and value of religious claims be inseparable parts of CSR research and theorizing? Alternatively, are the chapters posing those questions to be understood as outsider’s comments and expressions of different paradigms’ comprehension of CSR’s work? Those problems also appear in more opaque ways, such as understanding scientific terminology in value-saturated manner. The most striking example is the inter- pretation of by-product by the authors in anti-religious ways as “cognitive mis- take” (Watts, “Religion and the Emergence of Differentiated Cognition,” p. 127) or “accident” (Huysteen, “From Empathy to Embodied Faith? Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Evolution of Religion,” p. 147), while the adaptationism, as observed by Visala (“The Evolution of Divine and Human Minds: Evolution- ary Psychology, the Cognitive Study of Religion and Theism”),