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NIE 11-1-73

SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS

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CONTENTS Page 1 .PRECIS 5 THE ESTIMATE ...... I. GENERAL RATIONALE AND EMPHASIS OF SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS ...... 5 II. PROGRAMS IN SUPPORT OF STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES 6 6 Reconnaissance ...... 7 Surveillance ...... 8 Communications 8 Weapons Support ..... 9 Weapons 9 III. ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS 10 IV. PRESTIGE PROGRAMS 10 Problems to be Overcome Cooperation in Space Programs 13 15 Prospects for Prestige Programs ... Manned and Related Space Stations 15 16 Space Shuttle ... Unmanned Lunar Exploration 16 16 Manned Lunar Landing l7 I Planetary Exploration I 17 V. FUTURE PRIORITIES I

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SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS

PRECIS

The USSR will continue to undertake space programs for a variety of reasons:

- Supporting strategic military objectives by using existing mili­ tary space support systems, and by developing new appli­ cations.

- Enhancing the image of Soviet scientific and technical prowess by undertaking prestige space endeavors, such as manned, lunar, planetary, and scientific programs. - On a lower priority, increasing the use of space for missions with more immediate economic benefits, such as communica­ tions relay and earth resources surveys. Currently, some three-fourths of Soviet activity in space (as meas­ ured by number of launches) is in support of strategic-military ob­ jectives. The strategic-military space programs have been generally successful, while some of the civilian prestige programs have run into major problems. \Veil over 90 percent of the military missions have been successful over the past 6 years, but only some 75 percent of the prestige missions have accomplished their objectives. Moreover, the

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effort devoted to the strategic-military programs has been growing relative to civilian programs. Military space programs, which continues to rely heavily on proven military hardware, are extensive in scope. The major Soviet space effort in support of strategic objectives is the collection of intelligence data by photographic and other satellite reconnaissance systems. A second very important area is communications satellites. Other pro­ grams include navigation, geodetic, and meteorological systems. The USSR has developed a satellite interceptor and a fractional orbital bombardment system. Performance of military space systems will improve as later genera­ tion spacecraft become operational. These are likely to include tactical as well as strategic applications. New systems for warning, intelligence collection, and communications are being developed. By contrast, Soviet manned space and other prestige programs re­ quiring advanced technology have run into disastrous problems, and the USSR has lost its coveted image of predominance in space. In the prestige programs, problems have cropped up throughout the cycle of development and in many technical areas. These problems do not result from inattention or inadequate effort. Rather, they seem to be a consequence of inadequate design, fabrication, instrumentation, and quality control, and of attempting to cover up, rather than to address and solve, fundamental problems. These are failures of technology in the first instance, but they are more fundamentally failures of man­ agement inherent in the Soviet system. In this situation, the Soviets have entered into more extensive co­ operation with the West to enhance the image of Soviet prowess in space and to gain technological know-how. Soviet participation in the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP), which has been entered into also as one element of the broader policy of detente, will be handicapped by secrecy and bureaucratic lethargy, but we believe that, as long as detente is attractive, the Soviets will find ways to keep ASTP alive. The USSR will continue and perhaps expand somewhat its program of politically-rewarding but relatively uncomplicated cooperative ven­ tures in space with countries other than the US.

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We expect more manned Soyuz flights, and a continuation of Salyut flights, in near earth orbit over the next few years. \Ve believe such advanced space endeavors as a manned lunar landing and a large manned space station continue to be Soviet objectives, but progress toward them will be slowed by the weaknesses in the USSR's technical and managerial base, and they are unlikely to be achieved until the 1980s. For the remainder of the 1970s, the Soviets will also con­ duct various unmanned missions to the moon, Mars, Venus, and per­ haps Mercury. They could attempt a Jupiter or Jupiter /Saturn fly-by as early as about 1975, and a more ambitious series of Jupiter missions in the early 1980s. After a period of rapid growth in the 1960s, Soviet funding of space programs is estimated to have leveled off in the 1970s, and will probably continue at approximately present levels for the next few years. As other elements of the Soviet economy make increasing claims on high-quality technical resources, space programs-particularly the prestige programs-may not enjoy their past favored position in com­ peting for these resources. But Soviet space programs almost certainly will not suffer significant long-term cuts in funding.

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Figure 1

Surveillance SL -6 I ~~"-•'t

Environmenlal SL-8

Space Weapons lhird Genmlion Elinl Sl-3 Dual Purpose; I-'")';·_.. , ...... ~--..·~··'*~.,,,~, ..... ~.·.<:.~: ... ~··_,_.) ... Eco~omic/Military [I=·:;:::=:;:;::;::;=:;;.::::'-·' MilitaryiSirategic ~. ]oevelopmenl Support Manned, lunar, Planetary, Radar Reconnaissance Sl-11 Scienlilic-Prestige ,, .. _•:-'!·;.•;.--.'.~··:--·-·· ;:: ;;.·--~_,, ...... •,.. .. :, ....- ... ~.-- •• -:.:~ _,

Sl numbers refer to space launch vehicle ASAI Sl-11 designators, using boosters as indicated: Sl Vehicle Booster Sl-3, 4, 6 SS-6 Sl-7 SS-4 Sl-8 SS-5 Sl-11 SS-9 Sl-12, 13 New Solyul SL-13 c ] New Pbnelory SL-12 --·,... ;

Lunar Sl-12

Sl-9 & SL-12 Oevelripmenl

fOBs Sl-11

L4etsats Meteor Sl-3

Probable Store/Oum~ Communications SL-8 j·:;!"-"~W%-.':..'o;~!<>~L!<.;f~~.. "!f·~·m;;:~Jo:fi;:~;~~~:;.:-.v.;.:i:!" .. \.>...'!~:~~Jo:<-.-...":::!;:.,;_~~~>J--~'+..:.-<:~:o;:!4l~:-.;r._,~ :~·--!

Radar Calibralio.n Sl-7 1--:~. -"'~:'""~K.,Z:"' ;-~-:--n~:.c':Y"~l;ioJ.iO;.-·,,,,,".. ,; ... ~v,;-:.;-~:"'-;.;.:.,~ -:~:cy;,r-_.:~·i.:t•.'.,.·-...:r;~-~:~Y~'!' .:.-.::.}:::·~- ...J

L(olniya _2 SL-6

Development l.lotniyH Sl-6

HH)h Resolution Reconnoissance Sl·l @~A<;;;t.,_,v..,...a<.~~*'·.p:..,rr.u·."<;<..,.~- .£tp@ti~~.;u=~~-.- +&k?Y~~@§:;:@f!~.-q.g~o;:N

Later Reconnaiss~nce Low Resotution Photo & Hint Sl-4 Earl Reconnaissance Low Resolution Photo and Elint Sl-3 ~~~~&-Jv.,:;~·k-$Q~.. ;t.·;w~.'f'il;f'YS:t::~;.~;.\J6.\%,..;~.~~·

Scientific-fnvironmentaf Sl-7

Planetary Sl-6

Vosloks Sl-3 Voskhod Sl-4 Soyuz Sl-4 l''•'·''·c··>.f '"·.. • .: ~·':·I' ~j:;,::_{;,,;. ~:t_:~~ <-,•,'<•• ' Early luniks SL-3 c:::J Sputniks ~

!957 58 59 6! 62 63 64 65 66 67 69 70 71 72 1973

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THE ESTIMATE

I. GENERAL RATIONALE AND port. These satellites co.ntinued to use mili­ EMPHASIS OF SOVIET SPACE tary boosters that had been well-proven; well over 90 percent of the missions have been suc­ PROGRAMS cessful in the past six years. Since .the mid- l. In the early years, Soviet space programs 1960s the majority of Soviet space launches used hardware already available and relied have been for satellites with military- and in­ entirely on boosters developed as ballistic mis­ telligence-related missions, with the result siles. Missions were predominantly those­ that today some three-fourths of Soviet ac­ such as the manned, lunar, and planetary tivity in spa·;e (as measured by number of flights-that could be and were publicized. launches) supports the USSR's strategic mili­ There were also scientific programs for ex­ tary objectives. These programs are currently ploration of space near the earth. (Figure 1, being supplemented by newer programs now opposite, portrays the growth of the major in the development cycle-such as a radar Soviet space programs as represented by reconnaissance satellite and what may be a their flight history. Current Soviet space high altitude surveillance spacecraft. launch ( S L) vehicles are shown in Figure 2 on page 10). This approach provided a series 3. In order to move beyond their earlier of space flights that simultaneously made publicized successes in space, the Soviets had headlines, had a high probability of success, in the late 1960s to develop larger and more and held costs down. The clear intent, for complicated space boosters and spacecraft. the most part, was to enhance an image of This new hardware had serious performance Soviet scientific, technical, and military problems, and Soviet prestige programs conse­ prowess, and the earlier missions were a key quently did not move forward as expected. element in the growth of Soviet prestige. Only some 75 percent of the prestige missions 2. In the mid-1960s, the Soviets broadened have achieved their objecti\·es in the past six their earlier approach by launching, for practi­ years. The US was at the same time suc­ cal military and economic uses, satellites that ceeding in its advanced programs-especially were much more '""idely based in technology Apollo--with the result that the USSR lost and objectives. Some of these programs, such its early image of predominance in space. as those for communications and weather re­ 4. In addition to its strategic military and porting, were not amenable to extensive pub­ prestige aspects, the Soviet space effort has licity. Some could not he publicized at all­ had economic objectives, but so far these ap­ such as those for photographic and ELINT pear to have a much lower priority. The pro­ reconnaissance, radar calibration, intercept­ grams that provide economic benefits do so ing satellites, and providing navigational sup- for both military and civilian users.

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5. Soviet expenditures for space programs loads and boosters and thus cost less per reflect these priorities and years of growth. launch than the publicized systems. Many of Total Soviet annual spending for space is esti­ the publicized systems-such as Salyut and mated to have increased from the equivalent Lunokhod-have used hardware and tech­ of about $800 million in 1960 to the equiva­ nology which required heavy investment in 1 lent of about $8 billion in 1971. The growth research and developmcnt.3 of the military-strategic share from about 15 percent of the total in 1960 to about 40 per­ 6. Annual Soviet space launches have cent today reflects the growing importance leveled off at close to 1971 levels of some of strategic programs.2 For the most part, 90 launches a year, and estimated annual ex­ rcnditures have remained close to the equiv­ strategic-military systems have used existing alent of about $8 billion. By far the largest hardware and technology in standardized pay- annual outlays since 1971-about $3 billion­ ' The estimated Soviet space costs given here in­ have been for man-related progran1s (civil and clude the costs of hardware, launch operations, con­ military) and the associated boosters. Salyut­ struction of facilities, tracking and data acquisition, class space stations have absorbed the greatest administration, and research and development for portion of this totaL The next largest outlays both military and civilian programs. These costs rep­ were for existing photographic and ELINT resent the cost of producing similar systems in the US. Generalized cost models were used, which at­ reconnaissance programs, which absorb about tribute US development

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electronic data, and they arc working on a so as to improve identification and technical new radar satellite system. The photographic analysis. reconnaissance systems arc used to keep track 10. The Soviets in the past few years have of foreign military forces and installations, as been testing a radar reconnaissance satellite. well as for close monitoring of crisis situations The spacecraft uses a side-looking radar that such as the Pakistan/Indian conflict in 1971 can detect large surface ships, such as air­ and the latest Mideast war, during which the craft carriers. This system has a potential Soviets launched 6 photorcconnaissancc satel­ for providing targeting data to combatants lites in 17 days. Since the satellites have rela­ at sea. The -combination of data from such a tively short life times, abo[It 30 are launched system with data from other sources, such as each year. Such frequent launches provide ELINT satellite data, would be highly useful flexibility, because the mission targeting can in targeting antiship missiles. The flight tests be optimized for specific targets, and a satel­ of the radar satellite to date more than likely lite can be recovered after a short period with­ represent developmental work, as opposed out giving up coverage. But the relatively qualification of an operational system. small amount of film carried in each mission C limits coverage and the rapidity with which previously unknown developments can be identified. Moreover, the resolution of the sensors-even on the high-resolution system­ \But the Soviets probably will attempt may limit the usefulness of the imagery for to ~lop a version of this satellite that could detailed technical intelligence. Soviet photo­ be used operationally to obtain information graphic reconnaissance satellites are expected on small ocean areas, and may be able to do to improve in resolution, and perhaps in film so by the 1975-1977 period. If the Soviets recovery flexibility, in order to meet require­ choose to develop a more capable radar re­ ments to cover Communist China, crisis situ­ connaissance satellite or a radar surveillance ations, and-above all-US weapons develop­ satellite for broad continuina ocean coverage ments and compliance in strategic arms agree­ it probably could not appe:r until later. ' ments. 9. Soviet ELINT satellites are more clearly Surveillance 4 understood than in previous years. Second 11. The characteristics of a satellite generation ELINT satellites now monitor pre­ launched in late 1972 and of another launched dominantly ocean and coastal areas. Third gen­ early in November, 1973, suggest the Soviets eration ELINT satellites-still in developmen­ may now be working on a high altitude, sur­ tal testing-are now used mostly over land veillance-type satellite. The most logical areas, but are expected to be used mostly choice of mission-based on our perception over ocean areas in the future. These satel­ of Soviet needs and the probability that the lites appear to be able to contribute directly Soviets have conducted missile launch detec­ to detecting and, in the case of the most tion experiments-would be a system for modern system, locating foreign naval ships. ~·!arcover, they monitor various early warning 'A surveillance satellite provides broad, wide-range­ ing, and continuous or frequent· coverage of a portion radars. !v!ajor anticipated advances include ex­ of the earth. A reconnaissance satellite on the other panded coverage and refinement of the tech­ hand, provides limited coverage of a' small area of nical data that they collect on radar targets the earth, and may not do so frequently.

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detection of missile launches. However, until communications until they are "clumped" to we better understand this program, we arc a specific constmwr. not able to gauge its true mission, its signifi­ cance, or its time schedule. In any case, we Weapons Support believe that the Soviets will develop and in­ 15. Other types of Soviet satellites support troduce early warning satellites. Other areas deployed weapons systems. of possible Soviet advances include ocean sur­ veillance (with greater coverage and longer -[ mission times than the radar reconnaissance system now under development), detection of nuclear detonations, and SIGINT surveillance. The latter two types of satellites would work best in high altitude orbits.

Communications 12. The Soviets have in the past few years greatly expanded, in space and on the ground, their use of satellite systems for the relay of communications. The use of the Molniya 1 high altitude system has expanded with the -The Soviets have relied, at least in part, development of a Moscow-Washington hot on the mapping capabilities of their satel­ lineC lite reconnaissance cameras for geodetic data for targeting missiles. Over the last few years, the Soviets have deployed optical sites at various locations in the 13. Each Molniya 1 satellite has a limited USSR, and at research sites in Antarctica. relay capability, and a large deployment One purpose of these sites is accurate of satellites is required to fulfill the above tracking of a series of satellites specifi­ functions in addition to growing civil com­ cally developed for geodetic purposes. munications requirements. \Ve believe that -Special satellites are also used as targets, Molniya 2 satellites, now in the early op­ probably for the calibration[ erational stages, will eventually take over the bulk of Soviet civil and military satellite com­ munications and provide orders of magnitude increases in satellite relay capacity within the USSR. Tactical applications might appear by -Weather satellites-named in the Meteor the 1975-1977 period. When the geostationary series-collect meteorological informa­ satellite Statsionar becomes operational, per­ tion, presumably from all over the world. haps by about 1975, it will furnish another The information was probably first re­ major level of communications support. ceived by military installations, but the 14. The Soviets now have also deployed ex­ Soviet H ydromcteorological Service now tensively small satellites that probably store receives weather data for civil use.

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Weapons earth's surface and its natural resources. This 16. The USSTI has developed a satellite in­ has already been done to a certain extent in terceptor and a fractional orbital bombard­ the manned pr~gram, and may have been ment system (the SS-9 Mod-3). done as well-to a very limited degree-with "' ...... a special series of photographic-related satel­ lites. Such studies have application for, among 17. The number of launches per year in other objectives, locating new mineral de­ support of strategic goals has leveled off in posits, understanding earthquake phenomena. the 1970s, after a rapid growth in the 1960s. and identifying fishing areas and the effects While these systems will continue to e•·1joy of pollution. They also can be used to survey the same priorities as the military weapons forests, arable land, crops, water resources, systems, the general level of launch activity and to upgrade estimates of national re­ is not expected to pick up in the 1970s. In fact, the prospects are that, as satellites grow sources. The Soviets probably have also used in capability (more time in orbit and more photoreconnaissance satellites to provide in­ film time per reconnaissance mission, for ex­ formation of the breakup of ice in the northern ample), the number of military space launches sea routes. may decline while the number of active satel­ 20. Satellites used in support of strategic lites in orbit will grow. New military ap­ plications and systems will continue to be goals also _play an importa~t econorpic role. developed, however, in the areas of recon­ -Weather observations based on satellite naissance, surveillance, communications, and data are more comprehensive and timely, weapons support. These are likely to include and cover greater geographical areas, tactical applications. The total effort in terms than ground facilities. Satellite data of resources expended is likely to remain are especially useful to agriculture and about the same. shipping as well as in warning of severe storms. The Soviets clearly are following Ill. ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS the West's lead in this area and will con­ 18. Although Soviet activities in space have tinue to use weather information from had relatively little influence on the Soviet non-Soviet sources as well as their own. economy, the potential economic benefits have gro\vn. It is probable that current eco­ -Communications satellites provide a nomic applications will continue and that new much less expensive means of relaying ones will be introduced. The future extent long distance communications in all and value of these applications of space tech­ forms, and are particularly attractive nology, however, are not clear. The Soviets within the USSR, where the distances are likely to utilize satellites even more ex­ between settled areas-especially east tensively as a means for improving communi­ of the Urals-are great. About 80 per­ cations, predicting weather, and studying cent of the country is north of the US­ earth resources. The Soviets may try to utilize Canadian border, and in many areas economic applications-especially earth re­ severe winter weather precludes the use sources studies-in their relations with less of most ground-based relay systems. The developed nations. Soviets have been using relay satellites for years[._ 19. The potentially most rewarding area is We expect the volume the use of satellites to conduct studies of the J of data to increase in the next 10 years,

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figure 2

Current Family of Soviet Space Launch Vehicles·

lunar Planetary •.ooo-1o.ooo lb A

Manned Photo­ reconnaissance 14,000 lb Communications Scientific Planetary Communications Radar 2,000"4,000 lb Eliot Reconnaissance Navigation ASU Geodetic 5,000-9.000 lb Calibration 1.500 lb Scientific 400 lb a A I

'launch Vehicles No longer Used Are: SL-1. Sl-2, Sl-5, SL-9, and SL-10 S6:WU1-lCCIA Note: Missions and weights cited are typical.

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especially as technical cooperation with lo try to leapfrog failures in order to push other nations grows. on. Only in the most obvious of cases, such 21. There has been scant evidence of spin­ as the cosmonauts' deaths in Soyuz 11, have off of Soviet space technology into the civilian they admitted difficulties. In order to enhance economy. There is growing emphasis on the this image of success, the Soviets use the usc of space-as well as space technology-in Cosmos name to cover most aspects of their the economy, but the one example touted space programs. \Vherc the mission is not so far (some medical applications) is not sig­ obvious, the spacecraft is given a number, nificant. Tj1e Soviets clearly are trying, how­ and the announcement provides little or no ever. We expect to see sorTie examples of the informatio>:~ as to its mission. This system of utilization of space technology in the civilian nomenclature has been used to cover not economy over the next 10 years, but the only military-related launchings, but also fail­ secrecy surrounding the space program will ures as well. It has created an image of an limit this process more than in the West. active, successful program, when in fact there are many problems. Even in programs which IV. PRESTIGE PROGRAMS are open, and where it would seem desirable, or at least harmless, for the Soviets to release 22. Although the strategic, economic, and technical information, they have been histor­ scientific applications programs contribute to ically reluctant to do so. This reluctance stems the image of the USSR as a modern and tech­ partly from the Soviet practice of security nologically advanced nation, this reputation and compartmentation, and partly from a de­ rests largely on the highly publicized suc­ sire to hide their limitations. cesses in their early manned space, lunar, and planetary programs. Soviet accomplish­ ments in these areas, however, relative to Problems to be Overcome the US, have been steadily less impressive 25. The problems plaguing Soviet manned since the mid-1960s. At the same time the space, lunar, and planetary programs during US successes in space-especially the Apollo the past few years have appeared largely in and Skylab programs-have enhanced the just those programs which were trying to re­ US image, a very poor Soviet record has con­ furbish the Soviet image and to advance the tributed to the decline of theirs. Soviet leader­ frontiers by using new space launch vehicles ship in space is no longer the accepted public and spacecraft. (See Figure 2, opposite.) The judgment, as it once was, even in the USSR. problems crop up throughout the cycle of pro­ gram development-in planning, design, ma­ 23. The USSR thus is in a difficult position. terials production, test, and evaluation-and Given the earlier successes, it cannot afford in general program management. to allow the US to appear to become pre­ dominant in all areas of space endeavor, yet 26. That these problem areas are so perva­ it cannot now compete with the US because sive is, in general, a result of the fact that So­ of severe technical and managerial limitations. viet technology l"gs the West, in most of the areas related ~o space activities, by some 24. The Soviets have attempted to maintain five years. In part!cular, the problems stem an aura of success about their space program from the manner in which Soviet space by exaggerating the success of their ventures programs evolved. Early Soviet successes, and by playing clown or ignoring their failures. using large cryogenic boosters, which were Even internally, they have shown a tendency built to carry unminiaturized nuclear weapons,

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did not force the early development of im­ that allow the causes of failures to be pin­ proved boosters with high energy upper stages pointed. and of the lightweight, small size technology 29. The Soviets' relative lack of refined in­ that the US developed. These advances in strumentation to determine the cause of fail­ propulsion, electronics, and materials, which ures-together with inadequate quality con­ characterize US programs, now furnish the trol-arc the prime reasons that complex new basis for the US lead in prestige programs. flight test programs have had repeated failures 27. Limitations at each stage in the de­ before successes are achieved. The SL-12/13 velopment cycle, and in many technologies, space booster, used for the Salyut launches compound the problems of the Soviet prestige and the Mars probes, went through a series space programs, but design limitations are of failures before it became reliable. It ap­ certainly fundamental. These are best ex­ pears that ground testing has tended to be emplified by problems in Soviet spacecraft. more of a go/ no-go affair with potential fail­ From the beginning their spacecraft designs ures rcmammg undiscovered until actual have been oversimplified, and they have flight. This results in an "onion peeling" effect, failed to develop separate redundant systems in which the solution of one problem only to provide alternatives for inflight emergen­ reveals another. The Soviets arc now attempt­ cies. Soviet spacecraft are crudely con­ ing to correct this situation with improved structed, have limited instru•;nentation, and, telemetry systems and procurement of more for manned vehicles, reflect little concern for simubtion equipment, but they are late in crew comfort. Even after many years, the doing so. Soviets still use outmoded technology, and 30. In addition to the problems of design, their techniques and materials have become fabrication, and test instrumentation, prob­ inadequate for the complex tasks now being lems show up in the management and control attempted. of the spaceflight itself. These are most ap­ 28. But the designers have to use the tech­ parent in manned missions-probably because nology and materials available. In this con­ of their scope and complexity and their re­ text, flight knclware must be differentiated quire:nent for quick resolution of problems. from laboratory equipment. Soviet scientists .31. Limitations arc also found far back up and engineers have a high degree of compe­ the program mana)~emcnt ladder from space­ tence Ill developing advanced technology flight operations. ll is very difficult in the items in the laboratory, but production USSH to i11trod1tCc new types of production items frequently lack the quality of original cr radically new materials into existing facili­ single-piece hardware. Lack of quality control ties, but this had to be clone if the Soviet space in manufacluri11t( nops up specifically in So­ inclustn· '''nr· to c:-;pand beyond the few viet clcv(·lup:;li'lll of those technologies which origin:~! declic:llcd facilities with the top choicl' nf r'Il)~iJJr·crs and workers. Compouncl­ ha\'(~ CJJ:thk,! th.: l'S to push ahead in high iJI.l~ the· prohln11, supportin~ industries aclc­ e11ergy prup;J!,i(lll ;111d in miniaturized elec­ (jiJatc· l<> provide tlw special equipment, parts, tronics ..SIJ,,I :,·c11ni11.!'.\ ill the latter are felt ;u,d a(k;tiwcd kc:hlli\·al k11o\•:-how arc in rela­ across d Illiill 1!l'r (ll" vital areas-not only in tivch sl1rl!l Stipp!)" i11 tl1c L'SSH.. Soviet proh­ hardware- l

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ment concepts and techniques used in the their competence, and of the growing sophisti­ West. cation of the average person regarding space 32. More fundamentally, they have failed matters. to make the Soviet space program work as 35. The first US-USSR agreement on co­ well as it should because they had to work operation in space was for exchange of weather within the Soviet system. For example, Soviet data and was arrived at in 1962, but the US management is often done by committee. received little Soviet data until the launch of Members are from various parts of the Soviet the Meteor l satellite in 1969. Actual exchange power structure, they appear to each other as of information has also lagged .in other areas approximate equals, and there is no apparent covered by agreements, such as in a long over­ mechanism for the enforcement of solutions due joint review of space biology and medi­ once a problem is recognized and resolved. cine, and in erratic cooperation in the explora­ 33. The Soviets are certainly aware of the tion and use of o.uter space. The thaw in East­ damage that failure to solve these problems West relations over the past few years has, does to their national image. There is evidence however, reduced the political barriers to co­ that extensive basic research supports the operation. space effort. Manned space, lunar, and plane­ 36. The US-USSR agreement on coopera­ tary programs receive the best support from tion in space, signed at the Moscow Summit the technical institutes, and they have been in i\1ay. 1972, to conduct a test docking mission generously funded. The failures thus have not in earth orbit in July 1975, marked a new level come as a result of inattention or inadequate of potential cooperation. As the Apollo-Soyuz effort. Rather they seem to have been a conse­ Test Project (ASTP) is now conceived, a quence of attempting early on to continue to achieve success with minimum effort, and to US-designed docking mechanism will be in­ cover up, rather than adequately to address stalled on a docking module which will also and solve, fundamental problems. These fail­ serve as an airlock and transfer corridor be­ ures are failures, in the first place, of tech­ tw~en the US and Soviet spacecraft. During nology, but more fundamentally they are fail­ the docking period, which may last as long ures of management inherent in the Soviet as two days, the crews will visit each others' system. spacecraft and perform a few experiments. 37. Such cooperative activities in space Cooperation in Space Programs must appear attractive to Moscow for a variety 34. The problems the Soviets have en­ of reasons: countered in their manned space programs have caused them to be increasingly more -As a part of the broader policy of detente, open in their approach to space efforts that the ASTP and other cooperative agree­ do not have a strategic impact and to look ments are indications of easing East­ more favorably on cooperation with other West tension. countries. With the example of the US before -The ASTP project contributes to the pub­ them, the Soviets have released pictures, lic image of Soviet technological equality models, and actual hardware at an increasing with the US by suggesting that, despite rate. This trend has been a function of increas­ the absence of manned lunar expeditions, ing numbers of cooperative programs, of the the ussn is on a scientific and technical need felt by Soviet scientists to demonstrate par with the US in its space programs.

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-Space programs in general arc a subject ticular, will not be solved easily. All these of world-wide popular interest, and co­ problems will crop up to present practical ob­ operative activities promote a favorable stacles in achieving agreement, and in meeting image of the ussn in general. schedules and goals. But we believe ASTP -The US is the source from which the So­ stems from detente, and as long as detente viets can learn a great deal in terms of is attractive, the Soviets will find ways to keep scientific, technological, and managerial ASTP alive. The specific problems will have know-how, so that they can attempt to to be worked through, and the Soviet leader­ close the gap between the space pro­ ship will certainly see to it that ASTP gets grams of the two countries. The USSR the necessary priorities in tenns of technical also lags behind other Western countries and managerial talent. in most of these areas. 40. Moreover, even though there still arc 38. Nevertheless, the Soviet decision to en­ problems with the Soyuz spacecraft, Soyuz gage in the project probably was contested, technology is no longer at the forefront of and approved only when it could be demon­ Soviet space research. It is the Salyut and strated that it held more advantages for the related programs which are most in trouble USSR There were certainly strong arguments in the USSR, not Soyuz. The Soyuz program in the Kremlin against such an undertaking, is now over six years old, and Soyuz 12 retested as well as the usual extensive bureaucratic some of the old approaches. In addition, the problems of resolving policy questions among ASTP mission plan and hardware development divergent scientific, industrial, military, and have been steadily changed to take technical political interests. Cooperative activities must and managerial pressure off the Soviets. The appear unattractive for at least some of the most important new hardware development in following reasons: ASTP is the docking module, and this is the responsibility of the US. The Soviets thus -The USSR remains sensitive about dis­ are taking minimum risk to achieve maximum closing most of the details of its space gain. programs, which remain classified in the USSR, largely because of the close link­ 41. If Soviet-US cooperation goes beyond ages between the military and civilian ASTP to more advanced projects, the Soviets space efforts. will be pressed closer to the limits of their technical and managerial talents. It is likely, -They are aware of their technical short­ however, that the Soviets will learn from the comings, reluctant to expose them, and reluctant to risk public failure in such US as they go, keep the projects within their undertakings. capabilities (or alter them as necessary), and continue to benefit as much as possible from -If the venture is a success, credit will US know-how and world publicity while giv­ have to be shared with political enemies. ing a minimum in return. Until they can under­ 39. These bureaucratic problems have not take major new projects successfully on their been disposed of; they have merely been own-and their technology to do this is now pushed into the background. Moreover, the at least five years behind that of the US­ technical and managerial problems experi­ the Soviets need a US cooperation program enced by the Soviets in their space programs to help bolster their technology and prestige, in general, and in the Salyut mission in par- and will continue to promote such cooperation.

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42. In addition to its dealings with the US, dealings with other natious. Cooperative the ussn has in the past sought, and continues efforts with countries other than the US, as to seck, space cooperation with other non­ well as with the US, will continue and ex­ communists states: pand to some degree in the future. We do not -The extensive Franco-Soviet program, in­ believe, however, that the ussn will try to cluding placement of a French laser re­ undertake truly complex space programs with flector on the moon, is one such effort. countries other than the US. The cost alone Again, political as well as scientific con­ of major space efforts limits the participants, siderations were important. and the US is the only nation with a major space program of potential usc to the USSR. -The USSR has been similarly engaged in cultivating scientific and political ties Prospects for Prestige Programs with India. A forthcoming Soviet project to launch an Indian scientific satellite in 45. As has been noted above, the Soviets 1974 will serve to further that end. arc hindered by the fact that the ussn has not created the necessary technical and man­ - The Soviets also are beginning coopera­ agerial base to keep up with the US in the tive programs with the European Space prestige programs. These limitations will fur­ Research Organization ( ESRO), West ther delay schedules for manned space sta­ Germany, and Sweden. These efforts are tions, manned lunar landings, and planetary still small but are likely to grow. It is exploration. quite possible that cooperative efforts with still more nations will begin in the Manned and Related Space Stations future. 46. The disastrous Salyut 1/Soyuz ll mis­ 43. The USSR's cooperation in space has sion, which ended in the death of three cosmo­ also included ventures with the Warsaw Pact nauts, and the three successive failures of other nations, beginning in the late 1960s. These Salyut type spacecraft have set the Salyut started as technically trivial efforts at public program back at least two years. Investiga­ relations, but recently have grown and have tions carried on Salyut 1 included earth re­ embraced other Socialist nations as well. The sources surveys, astronomical studies, medical overall effort now is to the point that specific and biological studies, atmospheric and mete­ satellites-named in the Intercosmos series­ orological investigations, and other scientific are launched in cooperative projects. Eleven experiments. These were designed to test the of these launches have occurred. This effort, feasibility of the station for a variety of uses. too, has political, as well as technical and pub­ Salyut 2 was different from Salyut 1, had[ lic relations aspects, although there is less l a larger area potential Soviet gain in cooperation with Pact of solar arrays. While the s'Otiets could de­ nations than with the West. Nonetheless, we velop and operate separate civil and mili­ expect the effort to continue for the foresee­ tary space stations, as might be suggested able future at about the current level. by Salyut 1 and 2. it seems equally likely that 44. The outlook for cooperation in general the competition for space resources might is for a continuation of the trend that has seen eventually result in an amalgamation of the Soviets become increasingly open with missions. respect to space activities, including the han­ 47. Although a successful ASTP will shore clling of their own space program and their up the Sm,iet space image to some extent, it

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will not in fact demonstrate Soviet technical the US type might appear. The electronics, parity with the US in manned space flight. materials, and system test problems arc be­ The Soyuz is a remnant from the early­ yond Soviet capabilities now. Any attempts to rnici-19GOs Soviet technology. While it is to bui lei a reusable shuttle would be plagued being modified as well as possible, it is primi­ by problems. Between now and the 1980s, the tive compared to Apollo. And although the Soviets will continue to use ferry spacecraft Soviets touted Salyut as the doorway to and existing launch vehicles. But the Soviets manned orbital spaceflight in the 1970s, it is also may introduce spacecraft and/ or booster technically far behind th~ US Skylab, and.has components that arc reusable after a fashion, yet to fly a wholly successful mission. We ex­ call the combination a "space shuttle", and pect to see continuing Salyut missions, to re­ claim another space first. A desire to reduce solve Soviet problems in manned space sta­ the cost per launch and the Soviet commitment tions, over the next couple of years. We also to a manned space station program may make . expect to see more manned Soyuz space flights development of a truly reusable shuttle at­ with specific, limited objectives that can be tractive to the Soviets during the 1980s. used to demonstrate an on-going Soviet capa­ bility before ASTP. Thereafter Salyut will Unmanned Lunar Exploration probably be the focus of Soviet manned space 50. The Soviet unmanned lunar program­ flight until about 1977, and perhaps longer. almost completely preempted by tlie Apollo 48. A persistent theme in Soviet public program prior to its termination-is expected statements and literature has been that inter­ to continue at its current low level for several mediate ( Salyut) size orbital stations will be years. The success of the two lunar rovers, used to build a larger station by linking Lunokhods 1 and 2, might prompt the So­ modules in orbit. But before this can be done, viets to try more ambitious unmanned lunar there are severe technical problems to be re­ ventures. These flights-such as a dual mis­ solved which require additional developmental sion of a rover and a sample return payload­ advances and substantial overall improve­ might occur in the mid-1970s using two SL- ments in systems reliability. With optimum 12s. Such lunar missions as the Soviets attempt speed and success in resolving these problems, will allow more complex missions and ad­ a manned station of Salyut-like linked mod­ vances in scientific exploration, as well as op­ ules, maintaining successive 6-9 man crews portunities to demonstrate technical compe­ for several months at a time, could be in opera­ tence. The low level effort will grow as the tion by 1980. Soviet performance to date does Soviets make progress toward their own not, however, engender conHdence that these manned lunar landing. problems will be resolved soon enough to meet that date. Manned Lunar Landing 51. It still appears that the Soviets will make Space Shuttle an effort to land men on the moon and return 49. Some Soviet space officials have ex­ them. But the failures, long slippage, and ap­ pressed interest in a US-type reusable space parent low priority conne~ted with the pro­ shuttle and have indicated a desire for such a gram make it unlikely that a specific schedule program. But the USSH is many years from exists. The liming of a manned lunar mission achieving such a shuttle-so far in fact that hinges on the success of [ J If the we cannot predict when a reusable shuttle of [ Jlaunches over the next few years are

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success[ ul, and the Soviets attach a high during the launch windows over the balance priority to the program, a manned lunar mis­ of the decade. A public relations type attempt sion could still take place by the end of the at a Venus swingby with flyby or impact on 1970s. But any major failures of[ J Mercury, could he accomplished next year. will almost certainly push the mission into the A significant scientific venture to obtain scien­ 1980s. The present priorities appear to em­ tific data probably will not occur before the phasize the development of manned space 1976 launch window. stations. 55. The Soviets have shown some interest in exploration of the outer planets. But a use­ Planetary Exploration ful payload requires a more capable launch 52. The impact of the planetary and lunar vehicle, such asC --,or the SL-12 with efforts in the early space program were high energy upper stages~he[ 1ws not enormous. They intensified the feelings that been flown successfully and an upgraded the Soviets were the dominant space power SL-12 has yet to be launched. Attempts at in the late 1950s and early 1960s. As the US a Jupiter or Jupiter/Saturn flyby using one program developed, however, Soviet deep or more high energy stages on the SL-12 space feats had relatively less ~mpact on the could start about 1975, assuming early and world. After a long series of failures and successful testing of such stages. The Soviets partial failures, the Soviets, during 1972, finally might be ready to attempt a series of Jupiter achieved a landing on Venus with a spacecraft missions in the early 1980s using[ J which transmitted multiple measurements that could be read and interpreted. V. FUTURE PRIORITIES 53. New spacecraft were launched toward 56. We expect the Soviets to continue their Mars in July and August 1973 by the SL-12 prestige-related programs at about their pres­ launch vehicle. The higher energy require­ ent rate. These programs will continue to be ments of the 1973 Mars window compounded constrained by Sodet technical and mana­ the weight problems, and the Soviets decided gerial limitations, but the Soviets will con­ to split the missions and use sep·arate landers tinue to try to work around these problem and orbiters; thus four vehicles were sent on areas, borrow from the \Vest, and-if neces­ their way to Mars, rather than two as in 1971. sary-try to leapfrog them. \Ve also expect The 1975 launch window to Mars involves still the Soviets will continue to develop new ap­ greater launch energy requirements and ap­ plications and programs to support military­ proach velocities than those in 1973. Because strategic objectives. \Ve do not expect Soviet of this, the Soviets may forego the 1975 win­ limitations to be as serious in this area because dow, but will probably use the 1977 window, they use technolog~; closer to the state of the which will have less stringent energy require­ art. Further, we believe that the Soviets will ments than the 1975 window. introduce satellites that will be much more useful in the economic area, so that by the 54. The SL-6 and Venus spacecraft can be late 1970s and earlv 1980s, this element of used throughout the 1970s to support a variety the program will become much larger than of Venus missions. It is more likely, however, that the Soviets will usc the SL-12. The Soviets it is today. The prospect is thus for a con­ have discussed Venus upper atmosphere tinued high effort in the military programs, probes using balloons. These might be within with improved performance; a continuation the present Soviet capability and might occur of present efforts in the prestige space pro-

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grams (a It hough probably with greater suc­ hccn and will be much more subject to tech­ cess); and sonte shifting of resources to pro­ nical and managerial constraints, grams wi I It tnore ccottomic return. 59. Based on currently observable programs 57. As program objectives grow, there will and the assumption that there are programs be an increased need for advanced tech­ in the early stages of development that are nology, such as high energy propulsion and unknown to us, we believe that spending for nuclear power sources, for nearly all mission Soviet space programs will continue through areas. Cencrally, this advanced technology 1975 at-or slightly belo\\'-the 1971-1973 will be used first in sttpport of military-stra­ level. Thereafter the Soviets can support an tegic applications. Significant results of this active and vigorous space effort, and intro­ technology will include extension of space­ duce several new programs each year, with­ craft life and development of more multi­ out exceeding the current levels of expendi­ sensor-and multi-function-satellites. The tures. Only if the Soviets contemplate very improved performance inherent in these expensive new programs-such as a manned changes may lead to a reduction in the ~1ars landing-would economic considerations annual number of Soviet space launches. be likely to play a decisive role. But such pro­ 58. There is little doubt that there has been grams are unlikely in 1970s, primarily for and will continue to be economic pressure technical reasons. to reduce the resources put into some aspects 60. On the other hand, Soviet space pro­ of Soviet space programs. \Ve have evidence grams almost certainly will not suffer signifi- · that there is some disillusionment with the cant long-term cuts in funding. The Soviets Soviet manned space program. And com­ have a deep, wide-ranging commitment to the plaints have been heard that space spectacu­ lars deprived the military of much-needed re­ exploration and use of space. Soviet leaders­ sources. The new Five Year Plan in 1970 from Secretary Brezhnev to Academy of called for greater emphasis on space applica­ Sciences President Keldysh-have repeatedly tions-communications, navigation, and earth stressed the importance of space from both resources programs-which used proven hard­ an economic and a scientific standpoint. The ware and had a demonstrable economic re­ long-term nature of the commitment is evi­ turn. But perhaps even more importantly, the dent from the broad nature of the applica­ new plan relied heavily on the application tions programs-both economic and mili­ throughout the Soviet economy of techno­ tary-and froni the high priority accorded logical improvements in productivity to keep space research facilities. And space activities the economy growing. And this required a are consistently among those major accom­ much greater input to the economy of the sophisticated equipment and human talent plishments which the Soviets like to recite that heretofore were being devoured by the on state occasions as demonstrative of socialist space program. A natural consequence of success. In sum, the Soviets have ideological, these developments was that funds for some national, and strategic commitments to space programs \':ere not as easily available as in activity that transcend the economic and the past and some programs were stretched scientific rationales they often cite. Conse­ out. \ \' e be I icve, however, that economic con­ quently, it is likely that the total effort­ straints have not seriously affected the scope military and civilian-will continue at about and timing of the space programs; these have the current levels.

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61. The space industry has lost some of its USSR will not take as large a share in the favored position vis-a-vis other claimants in future. Some of the incremental resources the economy who are now in closer competi­ previously devoted to the space programs tion for budget allocations. The growth in each year, during their period of rapid growth, the space programs that each year took a can increasingly be used elsewhere in the large share of the technical resources of the economy.

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