SANITIZED COPY ~~ ~~~~::~~~~~~~~~:::::.~~~APPEALS PANEL, ~i~~j~:;,7·~·~ '.:;: ·.~: •:.. ,··.. ;-t . :: ·~f. , ~·- ~- "'~: ~--" ~·· ~DECLASSIF ICATION DATE: December 3, 2015 ...... ; .;}<}t+~ -~;~;:\ .·;.. \·._;. "· ·: , _ ·:.~· ·.. .·:--.·.: > .·~":.. : LN~NSC-36~-2-14-6

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NATIONAL . INTELLIGEN ·.· ··

ESTIMATE ce .. ; ..

Soviet Spa · · · .,,· · · •_ . . ce Programs '·: (Supporting Analysis) ..

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NIE I 1.1_73 res 8890B0-7" 20 0 .. ecember 1973 .

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THIS ESTIMATE IS SUBMITIED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND CONCURRED IN BY THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the estimate: · The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Deport­ ments of State and Defense, ond the NSA.

Concurring·: The Deputy Director of Central lntelllgence The Director of Intelligence and Re$earch, Department of Stoto The Director, Defense lnteiligence Agency The Director, National Securi,Y Agency The Assistant General Manager for Notional Security, Atomic Energy Commission

Abstaining: The Assistant Director, Federaf"Bureau of Investigation, cmd the Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, Department of the Treasury, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction .

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·':. WAl!NING NOTICE SfNSITIVE. JNTEUJGENCf SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

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SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS (Supporting Analysis)

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CONTENTS

, Page . I. LAUNCH SUMMARY ...... ·.... ·. ." . .. . ·...... · ...... l II. MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE-RELATED SPACE PROGRAMS . . 1 -:= · Photoreconnaissance Satellites ...... 1 ELINT Reconnaissance .. ~ ...... 5 Radar Reconnaissance ...... 6 Photographic-Related Satellites ...... 8 · Surveillance and Early Warning ...... 9 Calibr~tion/ Checkout Satellites ...... 11 Navigation Satellites ...... 11 Geodetic Satellites ...... 12 Meteorological ...... 13 Communications ...... 15 III. CIVILIAN AND SCIENTIFIC PROGRAMS ...... 18 Manned Earth-Orbital Flights ...... 18 The 1971 Salyut 1 Mission ...... 19 Soyuz 12 ...... 20 General Evaluation of Technical Limitations ...... 21 Manned Lunar ·...... 23 .· Lunar Probes ...... r·...... 24 Planetary Probes ...... : ...... ' ...... 25 Scientific Satellites . 27 Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 -~ .... U.S.C., section 403g) TOP SECRET/ I I / · TCS 889080.73 ".,

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Page IV. COOPERATION WITH OTHER NATIONS IN SPACE ACTIVITIES .. 28 USSR-US Cooperation ...... 28 Cooperation with Other Nations ...... 29 France ...... : ...... 30 India ...... 31 ESRO ...... :...... 31 Sweden ...... ; ...... 31 West . Germany ...... 31 Socialist Nations ...... 32 Rationale and Prospects for Space Cooperation ...... 32 V. ORCANIZATION AND SELECTED TECHNOLOGY AREAS ...... 34 Organization and Management ...... 34 Communfoations, Command and Control ...... ·. . . . . 36 Booster-Related Developments ...... 38 High Energy Propellants ...... , . . . . 39 Other New Programs ...... 39 Nuclear Power, and Nuclear and Electric Propulsion ...... 40 Other Space Technologies ...... , ...... 41

ANNEX: SOVIET SPACE EVENTS (1July1971 to 20 December 1973)

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SOVIET ·sPACE PROGRAMS . (Supporting Analysis)

I. LAUNCH SUMMARY gathering of photographic data is now the 1. The number of Soviet ·space Iannchcs single most active Soviet use of space. declined slightly from a high of 90 in 1971 3. There are two broad categories of pho­ to 79 in 1972. A continuation of the rate in toreconnaissance satellites. The first is. a low the first 354 days of 1973 will .result in about resolution satellite with a "search" mission. 90 launches in 1973. A decline has occurred This satellite probably is used to look for new in many programs, but the largest relative targets and to perform broad· background drop was in thd . I pro­ studies. The second is a high resolution satel­ gram. As has been the case since about the lite used in "spotting" missions. Its primary micl-1960s, the majority of Soviet space use is for photographing targets whose exist­ launches have been for satellites with military ence and locati<>n is knoWn. This type of and intelligence-related missions. The follow­ ing tahle shows the numbers of launches by satellite also has been used in a search role year and by program. The Annex lists Soviet when the rc~solution of the other system was spac~ launches from 1 July 1971 through 20 not adequate. December 1973. 4. Systems. The , low resolution satellites were first launcned in latc-1961, and there II. MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE­ have been no revolutionary design changes RELA TED SPACE PROGRAMS since then. In 1968, the film capacity was in­ Photoreconnoissance Satellites creased, and the nominal mission duratio!l 2. 11ic Soviets have been conducting a pho­ grew from 8 to 12 days. About 7 million square toreconnaissancc program since 1961, and the miles of coverage is achieved with each mis-

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SUMMARY OF SOVIET SPACE LAUNCHES 1968-1973

PRoca.u.t: YEAR RESULTS (1988-1973) 1968 1900 1970 1971 1972. 1973" Launches Successes Failures Unkoowm Military and Intelligence-Rela!led Programa 32 . Photographic Rcconnai.uance ...... -. 29 30 30 ~ 33 182. 174 Ell NT· Rec<>nnaissance . .. . ' ...... 2 3 4 7 5 s 26 11.3 '2 ·1 - Radar Reconnaissance ...... ····· ··· ····· l 2 l 2. 1 l 8 5 3 0 Pbotogniph!c-Rclated .... ·· ··· ··· ···· ·· 0 0 0 1 2 · 2 5 5 0 · o Surveillance and Early Warning ' ...... 0 0 0 0 l 1 2 0 0 2 Communications • .. , .. ·· ······ · ········ 2. 6 7 11 11. -11 38 3 0 Meteorological • .. ·-··· ·········· ·· .. ... 2' 3 4 3 2 18 17 1 o · Navigation• ...... 1 1 '3 2 3 2 · 13 1.2 1 0 Geodetic" ...... 2 2 0 2. 2 l 9 9 0 0 ···· ··- -··· Ground Site Calibntion/Checlcout • ...... 9 13 12 12 11 9 66 60 s 1 Satellite Interceptor ...... 4 2 3 6 l 0 16 14 2. 0 Fractional Orbital Bombardment System .. . 2· 1 2 l 0 0 - 6 6 0 0 - - . ------Sub-Tot:il 56 62 . 65 74. 68 fl1 392 363 21 8 ··· ········ ····· · ········ ·· --,. . Prestige Progr.uns Manned and Manned Related ······ ···· ·· 5 s 1- .. ·3 2 - 6 22 19 3 0 Lunar ··········· ········ ·· ··· 6 7 2 2 l 22 11 11 0 ( Planetary ...... ~ ...... 0 '2 3 2 15 6 s Scientific ...... 9 '2 9 5 5 "4 3' 3.2 2 0 ------Sub-Total ...... 20 18 16 13 11 15 93 66 21 R&D and Uncategorized ······ ·· ··· ······· .2 l 4. 3 0 l 11 8 3 "0 TOTAL ...... · ...... '7R RI R<: "" '71l s~· 496 439 45 12 •Up to and including Cosmos 624 on 19 December 1973; no launches occurred 20 DecembeT 1973. There were five •Jl&c<: launcbel . iJl the remainder of 1973, mallng a total of 88 iD 1973. ~ These programs. or portions of them. also serve civilian or sc:ieUtific funct:ioDI. 'Two additional tells occuned in a depressed ICBM mode. ·

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sion. 1]ie resolution of the camera system is camera systems. The low resolution is ade­ currently assessed at 7-15 ft. The number of quate for small scale mapping purpo.~es. launches of the low resolution system has 8. Use. The programming of the high reso­ declined recently from a h;gh of 15 per year lution satellites clearly reflects their strategic to about 10 per year. The increase in mission purposes. About one-fourth of the known cov­ duration, however, has kept the total days of erage during 1972 and 1973 has been of the coverage per year just about the same. strategic facilities of the US, such as Minute­ 5. The high resolution system also has un­ man, Titan, or Safeguard complexes. Washing­ dergone gradual improvement, but with no to~, D.C., is another favorite target. China revolutionary design changes. When first now receives coverage equal to the US. About launched in 1963, it had a nominal 8-day life. half the coverage is scattered throughout the Modifications introduced in 1968 included world, with the Soviet Bloc and Africa (ex­ more film, extension to 13-day flights, and the cluding the Middle East) getting very little addition of an in-orbit-adjust engine. In 1971, coverage. further changes included an improvement to 9. Activity by several satellites in the sum· the roll pointing subsystem and more accurate mer of 1972 provides an example of high r~so­ vehicle attitt1de control. These changes re­ lution photo satellite usage for Strategic Arms sulted in considerable ·mission flexibility. Limitation (SAL) purposes. Forty-five known 6. The high resolution camera system has camera operations were conducted over US ' . an estimated resolution of 3-5 feet and can Minuteman silos, by six satellites launched obtain up to 200,000 square miles of stereo cov­ from May through August. This was far more than the nonnal degree of observed coverage. erage per mission. The roll capability permits Nearly 20 of these operations occurred in May, it to photograph targets up to about 50 nm prior to and during President Nixon's visit to either side of it-; ground trace. The launch rate Rmsia and the s;gning of the initial SAL agree­ and days of high-resolution coverage peaked in ments. Significant activity occurred over Grand 1971 (at 22 launches and 250 satellite days Forks, Malmstrom, and Ellsworth Air Force respectively). The steady launch rate of abOut Bases. During this period, ABM construction 20 each year shows a heavy cmphasfa con­ projects were underway at both Grand Forks tinues to be placed on this program. and Malmstrom, while Minuteman upgrading was underway at Ellsworth. We believe that 7. Both low and high resolution satellites the current photoreconnais.sance systems can, employ a similar low resolution index camera in general, locate and catcgori:te deployment in addition to the primary cameras. The index of lan:l-bascd strategic systems sufficiently camera has an estimated resolution of 80-120 well to verify numerical aspects of .strategic feet and a swath width of about 120 nm and arms agrnements. However, we are uncertain yields a total coverage of about 15 million whether the Soviets currently have the ph~to­ square miles per mission. The index camera graphic . resolution to verify technical agree­ opcratt>..s independently of the main camera ments on system changes. and is tLo;ed to provide coverage primarily over tropical and other remote areas that are 10. The coverage from mission to mission is not routinely photographed by the primary highly variable. In addition, the Soviets ap-

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parent1y have the capability to launch, or re­ 14. By the early 1980s, a new system (or program, photoreconnaissance satellites on a radical improvement of a current system) relatively short notice should an event of im­ could be developed to cover selected targets : portance occur, such as during the Middle on a daily basis, with on-board data processing East crisis in 1967, the India-Pakistani war of the imagery and transmission of the image in 1971 and the NATO "Strong Express" naval in near real-time to the USSR. exercise during September 1972. During the 15. We believe that the Soviets consider Arab-Israeli war in 1973, a succession pf 7 sat­ targeting objectives world-wide, and balance ellites were used, 6 of which were launched in target priorities, to cany out their satellite .; 17 days. These special missions had short life­ photoreconnaissance program. At present, the :1 times, generally about 6 to 9 days. This pre­ Soviets probably can obtain yearly coverage sumably was the result of a desire to recover of 50 percent or more of the earth's lanp mass the data rapidly. . with low resolution photography. More fre­ 11. The Soviets carry out search activity in quent coverage is -obtained of high interest the PRC with the high resolution camera targets, such as US ABM construction. By the systems, ·probably to detect and identify stra- . late 1970s, coverage could improve to onc·e tegic targets, especially nuclear production every four to six months. This could continue facilities and missile deployment. The target in the 1980s with slight improvements in reso­ patterning suggests that the Soviets consider lution. High resolution coverage of the top this search important, and find the capabilities 100 or so complexes probably is now obtained • •=f of the low resolution system inadequate. at least once every three months. The Soviets probably cover about · 1,500 complexes per 12. Future Developments. While the Soviets year with high resolution photography. By the appear to be generally satisfied with these late 1970s the n·umber of areas covered could satellites launched by the SL-4, and we expect double, and ·it could double again by the them to remain in operation for several years, early 1980s. This could be ·accomplished by we also expect several advances. using more film and longer lifetimes. 13. The Soviets have continued their prac­ 16. The current and mid-term- high reso­ tice of retrieving the entire photographic lution system ( s ) will perform general identifi­ package. The use of multiple film packages cation of most military targets and yield some reentered separately .would increase opera­ technical characterfatics that can be based on tional tlexibility. The new spacecraft Salyut-2 dimensional measurements of 3-5 foot resolu­ (launched in April 1973) may have been re­ tion. These include the strategic weapons of lated to the development of a man-related the PRC and US. It will also identify tactical ... i reconnaissance system. Such a system, or forces that are not interpretable with the 7- one involving deorbit of capsules to the USSR, 15-foot resolution of the low resolution photo­ might be operational in the latter part.of the reconnaissance system. By the 1980's resolu­ 1970s. (If the Soviets chose to orbit multiple tion probably will be improved to the 1-2 feet recoverable photographic packages, they prob­ required for detailed identification and tech­ ably would have to use the SL-13 launch nical asses~m1ent of strategic military equip­ vehicle.) ment.

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. Radar Reconnaissance 25. In late 1967 the Soviets first used the SL-11 launch vehicle ( SS-9) to laurich a 9,000 pow1d satellite possessing a consider~ble ma­ neuver capability to maintain a precise orbit. Since then, a total of nine of these satellites have been launched from Tyuratam. Three failed to reach orbit, including the most recent launched in April 1973. 26. The objectives of this program include, as a major goal, the development of a space-

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borne radar system for the reliable detection of surface ships. The system's present capa­ bility probably permits the detection of large ships-such as aircraft carriers-even under adverse sea-state conditions, and may allow the detection of medium- and a few small-sized ships-such as cruisers and destroyers-under certain favorable conditions. There remain some unexphtj.ned features in the overall test series, however, indicating it may have ob­ jectives in addition to · the development of a spacebome radar system. 21. The facts that the system uses the same I 25Xl, E.0.13526 command system and the same command and ·. control site as the satellite interceptor space­ craft strongly suggest the program belongs to the PVO. The PVO can better fulfill its mission to protect the USSR if it knows where US aircraft carriers are located. The Soviet Navy would also have an interest in the satellite's data.

30. After spending a period in low earth ·· orbit, the satellite separates into three major pieces. This appears to mark the end of the I 25Xl, E.0.13526 satellite's radar reconnaissance role. One ob­ ject maneuvers to an orbit about 525 run high, using its own propulsion and attitude control systems. This object has provided little evi­ dence of its purpose, and we do not know why this sequence always occurs./ . .• I 25Xl, E.0.13526 I

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31. Successful development of an ocean re­ radar reconnaissance satellite, or a radar sur­ connaissance spacecraft will mean the USSR, veillance satellite, for broad continuing ocean if it desires to place a system of tlicse satel­ coverage, it probably could not appear until lites in orbit, would have a capability to de­ later. tect and locate large surface ships-such as aircraft carriers, even when the vessels are Photographic-Related Satellites in periods of electromagnetic emission control 33. The Soviets have in the past two years and in overcast weather. Combined with other launched a series of satellites that apparently data, this capability would significantly ex­ collect basic mapping and/ or geophysical data pand the USSR's overall capability to locate on wor1d-wide ocean and 1and surfaces. They and monitor the movements of such ships. carry a low resolution camera that provides Further, pcsition accuracies on the order of extensive coverage of mountain, jungle, and that required for targeting certain Soviet anti­ desert land areas and of polar ice fields. What ship missi1e$ appear possible. It is doubtful, may be another sensor-more than likely sen­ · however, if the Soviets woi1ld commit these sitive to infrared and/ or microwave-records weapons solely on the basis of these satellites' images on film of ocean areas;· this could per­ data, as they could provide little, if any, target ntit determination of occari temperature gra­ identification. The data from such a satellite .. ; dients and cunent patterns. I could he either collated in the USSR or pro­ vided to a Soviet ship directly. 32. The overall program appears to be in a mid- to late-stage of H&D. The launch rate implies that the program is not being con­ I 25Xl, E.0.13526 ducted with any particular sense of ur enc .

I 25Xl, E.0.13526 .1 34. These satellites share many technical More R&D tests are characteristics with photoreconnaissance satel­ ...... ,---~-~-----'likely, and major changes may be incorpo- lites. The weight ( 13,000 pounds), mnfigura­ j rated-such as larger swath widths and/ or tion, attitude control system, orbits, and re­ · I an improved radar-to improve the satellite's coverable capability are all similar the capability to detect ships. Thus, although the to regular Soviet photoreconnaissancc programs. nature of and the requirement for the system There is either only one camera, probably is clear, it is not clear at what point the Soviets mounted to view vertically, or a system of would consider their developmental goals are cameras which always operate simultaneously. achieved and deployed an operational system. . But we believe the Soviets will attempt to 35. The ·first launch in this series occurred develop an operational version of this space­ . in December 1971, and five have occurred craft that could be used to obtain information thus far, near the winter or summer solstices on. small ocean areas, and may be able to (times of maximum or minimum daylight). do so by the 1975-1977 time period. If the This results in an optimal opportunity to pho­ Soviets choose to develop a more capable tograph polar areas at the onset of the ice

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navigation season and to photograph land and nuclear detonations, of surface ships and areas at opposite extremes of the vegetation high altitude aircraft, or of electronic emis­ cycle. We expect at least one or two more sions or communiaitions. They have, how­ sets of two launches (winter and summer), ever, indicated interest in such missions with but spring and fall launches may be used a few of their recent satellites. Two of these, eventually. Cosmos 520 and 606, may be prototypes of a fuh1re system. 36. The exact purpose and rationale of this satellite program is unclear. Conspicuous is 38. Soviet requirements for such satellites the minimal coverage of the VS, the Soviet exist in varying degrees. Union, and large areas of the Northern Hemi- - The PVO Strany does not currently spheric oceans. I I possess a satellite system that could de­ /tl1e satellites may I tect launches of strategic missiles. A high represent the beginning of a separate Soviet, altitude system, presumably employing economic . earth resources survey program, or infrared sensors, could overcome this they . may be concentrating on less important shortcop1ing and would fill a signifipant areas and represent a continuation of a long· gap in their missile warning. standing effort that ha~ used both manned flights and unmanned satellites. If the satel­ -A satellite capable of detecting nuclear lites do repre .~ent just a beginning, we would detonations would be useful for moni­ expect to see the coverage and life duration toring nuclear testing agreements and in considerably improved. There is one report a battle management role in a nuclear that the Soviets intend to modify a Meteor war. satellite for use as an earth resources satellite - The radar reconnaissance system now i.n 1974; a i;pecially designed earth resources survey satellite (possibly similar to the US being tested does not have the mission ERTS satellite) could be avaHablc by about life or .area coverage to be useful in a 1976. On the other hand, it is possible that surveillance role. A Soviet requirement these satellites represent a continuation of thus might continue to exist for develop­ a longstanding program in which aircraft and ment of a satellite systen1 that would low resolution reconnaissance satellites have keep track of the locations of medium­ already been employed to photograph high and large-sized ships. priority areas. Most of the index camera pho­ tography by Soviet reccmnaissance satellites is expended over non-strategic, particularly equatorial areas, probably reflecting the cur­ rent areas of emphasis of Soviet foreign map­ I 25Xl, E.0.13526 I ping programs.

Surveillance and Early Warning 37. The Soviets have no satellites in high 39. The most attractive way in general to altitude orbits .that can provide effective stra­ perform these missions is with high altitude tegic surveillance of ballistic missile launches orbits. These orbits include the semi-syn-

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. chronous 1 12-hour orbit used by Molniya com­ highly elliptical semi-synchronous Molniya­ munications satellites, the four-day orbits used type orbits, with apogee over the Northern by Prognoz satellites,2 and the synchronous Hemisphere\ (or stationary) orbit used by US-launched Defense Support Program satellites. No Soviet satellites, however, of any kind have thus far been placed in synchronous orbits. 40. We believe the Soviets now have the I 25Xl, E.0.13526 I basic technology for some of these missi.ons and may be capable of the technology for most of them. Sensor development for a mis­ sile launch detection mission may have been the purpose of Soyuz 6 and Salyut 1 ohserva­ I The mission of Cosmos 520 and tions of SS-7 and ss~g launches in 1968 and · ..,.Q(~Jti....,i,...s-1-1n-1d~e...,1termined, but we believe that a 1971. These observations included lock-on, missile detection role is the most likely. ELINT tracking, and data collection of the missiles' collection arid nuclear a'etection roles are con­ exhaust plumes. Although an exact definition sidered less likely unless they play a sec­ of the sensor( s) used for these observations ondary role on a common spacecraft. still is unknown, it is probable that a combined visual and IR capability was used. 43. The Soviets are estimated to be capable of placing at )east 4,000-6,000 pounds into 41. In the area of nuclear detonations, the synchronous orbit with the current version of Soviets have shown an interest in the early the SL-12 booster, and could place even more 1960s in satellite data collection against So­ into a semi-synchronous orbit. 1bese weights viet atmospheric tests, and against the effects should be sufficient to deploy a relatively on the ionosphere of French and Chinese tests sophisticated surveillance system. The sensor in the late 1960s. It is possible that the Prog­ and processing sophistication required to . noz satellites, by virtue of their mission to ob­ utilize a truly effective early warning or in-· serve solar radiation and its effects, and by telligence collection satellite would tax So­ virtue of the satellites' very high orbits, could viet capabilities, especially in the area of be applied to the mission of nuclear detona­ c..-omputers. tion detection. 44. It is likely that PVO facilitie.s in the 42. The characteristics of Cosmos 520 and Moscow area would serve as a ground terminal 606, launched in late 1972 and late 1973, re­ for any smveillance/ earIv warnin{>" tvnc satel­ ' spectively, suggest they may be the first satel· lite. lites in a high altitude strategic surveillance .. .. program. The spacecraft were launched into I 25Xl, E.0.13526 I 1 A satellite in semi-synchronous orbit repeats its earth trace eve1y other revolution and has an orbitnl period of slightly less than 12 hours. ' Three spacecraft placed in highly elliptical 4-day orbitli. · I

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45. Considering their strategic requirements Type 10, both launched by a small booster­ and level of technology, if Cosmos 520 and 606 the SL-7. The program began in 1964 at Kapu­ do not already represent a prototype series of stin Yar, and moved to Plesetsk shortly after satellites in semi-synchronous orbits for early it began. In the past several years there has warning/surveiJlance purposes, we expect the been no significant change in the launch rate Soviets will introduce such a program in the of these satellites, in their orbits, or in thefr next one to three years. The program might apparent missons. The Soviets launch about be operational by 1976-1977. Synchronous 10 of these satellites each year. Use of these orbits, while technically possible, are con­ satellites is expected to continue at the pres­ sidered much less likely for an operational ent level for the next several years. system until later in the 1970s. 48. The Type 5 satellites apparently are 46. In order for an early warning satel­ used as targets for Soviet ABM class radars­ llte--with infrared sensors-to work opti­ most likely small and large Try Add radars­ mally, the area of interest has ·to be looked located at ABM sites around Moscow ·and at at from a high elevation angle. But it would R&D sites at the Sary Shagan Missile Test · not be easy for a USSR-based ground station Center. A few radars for other purposes, such to control a synchronous satellite with a good as a tracker of RVs on Kamchatka, also may viewing angle to the ICBM complexes in the be involved. In addition, these satellites play US. Alternative solutions inch~de use of satel­ a role in observations of the atmosphere's den­ lite-to-satellite· relay, a Cuban ground station, sity in the ionosphere. The satellites appear or more likely, semi-synchronous orbits. Intcr­ relatively unsophisticated. satellite relay is technically difficult for such 49. The Type 10 satellites appear to be used a mission, and we have no evidence that it is for the checkout of gear ~t monitoring sites being considered for the 1975-1980 period. A involved in the satellite interceptor program. Cuban station is unlikely because of the high One site also is used in the radar reconnais­ degree of vulnerability from US intelligence sance program, and may be involved in the collectjon and strategic attack forces. There program to develop a Soviet satellite for sur­ are, nonetheless, areas of the world-such as veillance and early warning. China and the Indian Ocean-that could be . . .. observed optimally by a synchronous satellite which could be easily controlled from the Navigation Satellites USSR The Soviets might wish to introduce 50. The f~rst Soviet navigation satellite flight such a satellite and orbit combination later in was Cosmos 192, launched in November 1987. the 1970s. Since then payloads have been launched from Plesetsk by the SL-8 launch vehicle into near Calibration/Checkout Satellites circular orbits of 400 and 530 nm altitude, 47. Another Soviet satellite program sup~ with orbital inclinations of 74 and 83 degrees. port!> the PVO Strany by orbiting targets to It appears now that in December 1970 a nomi­ calibrate ABM ground radars and to check nal orbit of about 530 nm altitude was selected out command and control equipment for inter­ as standard. This altitude provides a more ceptor satellites. There are two types of these stable orbit than the lower one-a highly de­ satellites, generally referred to as Type 5 and sirable quality for such satellites. Two naviga-

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tion satellite groups, of three satellites each, researchers. The satellites transmit on a lim­ are now in use-one at 74 degrees inclination, ited basis over and near North America, other and one at 83 degrees. · non-Soviet areas around the world, and some ocean areas. 51. These satellites transmit ephemeris data (which describe the satellite's position and 54.I I 25Xl, E.0.13526 I lit is clear velocity) and have two beacons for Doppler that a second subsystem exists on the naviga­ tracking. The~~e data, collected passively, al­ tion satellites, and it has been on them since low the determination of the user's position. the first one in 1967. It is independent of the The accuracy of the ephemeris data, however, navigation subsystem, and is programmed limits the positional accuracy that can be separately. This subsystem operates frequently achieved. Thus far, the Soviets have used data both over and away from the USSR. that are inaccurate to the degree that a user 55. Improvements in the accuracy of the could determine position only to about one satellite-transmitted ephemeris almost cer­ mile. This feature, on seemingly operational tainly will be made· eventually, if improved satellites, has been somewhat puzzling. accuracy does not already exist. The Soviets. 52. The data do not appear good enough are reducing their geodetic uncertainties for all military users and have been inter­ through geodetic satellites that are associated preted as evidence that the program is in­ with the navigation satellites, as well as by tended for civil use only. Moreover, the satel­ other means. The Soviets also may investigate litt>,s are not programmed on Sundays. It is eventually the use of other conc.-epts (such as possible, though, that in a situation of tension, triangulation or direct ranging) for improved the satellites could be programmed with navigation capabilities. Deployment of sets of highly accurate ephemeris data and he avail­ satellites at higher altitudes than 550 nm may able continually. And in that context a user, . occur, and they might provide improved posi- . ~uch as an SSBN, might be able to achieve tion and velocity information for moving positi~nal accuracies as good as 300-600 feet. users. 53. One purpose of these satellites is to pro­ vide positional data to Soviet ships. K.nown Geodetic Sate Ilites example.<> are Soviet missile range instrumen­ 56. The Soviets have gathered rudiment~ry, tation ships, oceanographic research ships, indirect world-wide geodetic data since the· tankers, and Z-class submarines (used in scien­ early 1960s using their photographic recon­ tific expeditions). I naissance satellites. The emphasis was on col­ lecting data over the US. The Soviets have I 25Xl, E.0.13526 I also engaged in optical tracking of non-Soviet satellites-in part under international cooper­ But even if they are not current· users, sub­ ative programs. The launching of a specific marines and surface ships are likely users in Soviet geodetic satellite system in early 1968 the future. It is quite possible, moreover, that was a natural follow-on and complement to other users exist. Examples include mobile their overall effort in geodesy. The satellite land-based ballistic missile elements, geodetic system indicates an intent to provide improved survey elements, and ionospheric propagation world-wide geodetic ties, and to improve

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gravimetric and geodetic models to the extent into the Soviet navigational spacecraft. Al­ that they can support very high accuracy tar­ though no ephemeris data has been inter­ geting of strategic ballistic missiles. It is be­ cepted being either loaded into, or trans­ lieved that the satellite system might be able mitted from, the geodetic satellites, it is judged that these vehicles may have the capability to I I 25Xl, E.0.13526 I I perform a navigational mission. 57. The Soviets have launched nine of these 59. The flashing lights on the geodetic satellites since t11e program began in early spacecraft permit the Soviets to take measure­ 1968. Light flashes were first observed eman-. ments without relying on solar illumination. ating from these vehicles in late 1971. Subse­ The light pulse sessions, and the beacon trans­ uentl these flashes were correlated with · missions, are programmed to occur over se­ lected areas around the world. In con 'unction These sate ites are laune ed frorn with this the Soviets Plesetsk by SL-8 boosters. Until recently, the satellites used a near-circular orbit about 650 nm high, with an inclination of about 74 de­ grees. The two most recent of these satellites use a near-circular orbit about 750 nm high, I 25Xl, E.0.13526 but still with a 74 degree inclination. This higher orbit provides even better earth cover­ age, and both types of orbits allow extensive tracking from the Northern Hemisphere, where the Soviet ICBM launch sites and targets are both located. Several kinds of orbits also per­ 60. This program probably will continue mit more accurate determination of the earth's for several years at about two launches per gravity field. The orbit also provides several year, but new inclinations and additional high opportunities each day for observations in altitudes may be used. The introduction is both the USSR and North America to be mad~ expected in the next year or so of laser rang­ on the same revolution. ing to further improve the data's quality. 58. The geodetic satellites appear to be Along that line, a Soviet physicist announced ve similar to the Soviet navi ation satellites. the development of a laser to photograph and determine the exact di.stance of eartb satellites. I 25Xl, E.0.13526 I In the future, therefore, geodetic satellites may contain retroreflectors i11 addition to, or The satellites have some orm instead of, the active optical system. .__,,__-~~--- of attitude control, probably passive. The de- tails of the spacecraft arc not clear; there arc Meteorological . 25Xl, E 0.13526 61. Only minor changes have bee:ri detected ..______. Thus, additional missions or in Soviet meteorological satelHtes since the functions are possible. In fact, one Soviets began their scrie:o; of operational weather spacecraft in 1969. 11ie progrnm and 25Xl, E.0.13526 the satellites still have certain limitations, in-

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eluding a relatively low altitude orbit (now at photographic transmission system will con­ about 500 nm) and an optical system with a tinue to be developed, and may be used in relatively narrow field of view. This has re­ a continuously transmitting mode by 1974. quired multiple satellites to provide world­ This will increase significantly the utility of wide coverage. And unlike US weather satel­ the system, particularly for users located in lites, which use higher altitude orbits, Soviet remote areas and for ships at ~ea. It will also we·ather satellites do not use orbits which are allow many of the developing nations that. sun-synchronous.3 Thus, the vehicle observes have receiving equipment for US sate1litcs continually changing lighting conditions to receive cloud pictures from Soviet satel­ around the world, a situation which is over­ lites as well. This will enhance Soviet prestige, come in part hy •t television system which can particularly since the quality of the pictures account for variations in light intensity and . ser.ms excellent. particularly by a large network of spacecraft 64. The Soviets also seem to be working in rlifferent orbital planes. (A sun-synchronous on new subsystems. They reported that they orhit for a Soviet wt>.ather satellite would re­ were using ocean buoy-mounted stations for quire a retrograde launch to the northwest or at ieast the relay of meteorological data; the southeast from Plesetsk, which the Soviets Meteor satellites could be used for data relay have never done.)\ from such stations. In February 1972 tWo types of electric jet engines were tested on 25Xl, E.0.13526 Meteor 10; one was referred to· as a plasma engine and the other as an ion engine. The orbital period of Meteor 10 was lowered by 0.3 minutes during a one-week test pe1iod; 62. Some improvement in the satellites' sub­ such tests may lead to an operational station system reliability has been noted. The life­ keeping and attitude control capability on time of the video transmission system, for ex­ future meteorological systems. The microwave ample, appears to have been doubled to about sensors tested on several Cosmos satellites 11 months. The Soviet<; introduced a real-time may appear in future Soviet meteorological photographic transmission capability in 1971 satellites. which wa~ probably preprogrammed. This technique, if linked with ground and satellite 65. Moreover, . we believe· that infrared communications networks, could give the So­ temperature sounders could become standard viets the capability for providing nearly real­ equipment on meteorological satellites before. 1976 or so. These instruments provide very time meteorological data to Soviet military important data on the vertical distribution of units and ships on a global basis. . temperature through the atmosphere, which must be known to produce accurate weather 63. Soviet developments in the meteoro­ . . ~i-· logical satellite field are expected to proceed forecasts. Satellite data of this type are par­ along several fronts. We believe an automatic ticularly impo1tant over remote regions of the globe that are not covered by ground­ • Suc:h orbits compensate natUrally for daily changes based observations; The Soviets reportedly · in the sun's illumination of the earth; these changes also are designing second-generation satellite occur because of the earth's own rotation .and its microwave radiometers for mea~uring sea .· .· motion around the ~un .

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temperatures and for ice reconnaissance, prob­ again, two types have beeri. launched, using ably for meteorological and oceanographic 440 and 800 mile circular orbits. Unlike the uses. Sea temperature data could be used in two versions of Molniya, which have s.ome the futur~ as a data base to support a water similarities, the characteristics of the two differential-temperature system for ship or store/ dump types are _very different. submarine wake detection. 68. Molniya. The first satellite named in 66. It is expected that the ct.uTent Soviet the Molniya l Series was launched in spring weather satellites will continue at their present 1965, although- several developmental satel­ level of activity until 1974-1976 period, when lites in the Cosmos series preceded this. a follow-on spacecraft is expected. It probably Launches using the SL-6 booster have con­ will have improved subsystems (video and tinued regularly, from both Plesetsk and Tyu­ infrared) and will be placed at somewhat ratam, and 26 satellites have been announced higher altitude-perhaps BOO nm or so. The so for. The first of a new series of communi­ Soviets have talk~d about a three-tier meteoro­ cations relay satellitcs--callcd Molniya 2- logical system, using a manned satellite in a was launched in November 1971. Seven of near-eaith orbit, an improved unmanned these satellites have been launched, and all meteor at about 550-800 nm, and a geosta- have come from Plesetsk. Molniya 1 has used . tionary satellite. They also have mentioned a two-way carrier, capable of 60 voice chan­ a geostationary satellite for the Global At­ nels or a single television channel. This low mospheric Research Program in 1976-1977. capacity forces the USSR to have many satel­ Major developments in the 1980s ·could in­ lites active as well as many ground stations. clude a multipurpose vehicle, perhaps com­ Molniya 2 reportedly will have a substantial bining advanced scnsors--such as radars and improvement in flexibility over Molniya 1, lasers-with current subsy~tems. and a 10-fol

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I 25Xl, E.0.13526 I Small L....,-~------'dish antennas that might be usable with Mol- niya satellites have also been seen on several I 25Xl, E.0.13526 I Y-class submarines. 70. There are currently over 45 Orbita re­ ccive-orily stations to provide distribution of television signals rdayed ·by the Molniya I satellites. The Soviets have indicated they will supply a number of these site~ with a 74. When the first Molniya 1 was launched t:ransmitting capability, thereby allowing them in April 1965, the Soviets announced that to function in a two-way mode. the Molniya COMSAT system wa-s to provide for the rday of civil communications signals, . 71. An Orbita 2 ground terminal network i.e., television, telegraph, and telephone. How~ has been announced as being intended for use ever, in June 1965/ with Molniya 2 and eventually with the geo­ stationary satellite called Statsionar. This net­ work apparently is still in the early phase.-; of I 25Xl, E.0.13526 I ~-----~ /The Soviets prob- .__,,...,....--:,------' ably plan 30 or so new Orbita 2 facilities and eventually intend to add Orbita 1 terminals to the network by converting the electronics to the 4-6 GHz frequencies used by Molniya 2. 72. There are several additional sites in the USSR that have medium to large size dish 25Xl, E.0.13526 antennas. These steerable antennas may be I I related to satellite communications relay ac­ tivity, but the full nature and scope of their involvement has not been resolved. 73. The present Molniya 1 system orovides --.

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SL-8 launch vehicles to orbit two types of with the USSR using other than HF or VI.. F store/ d111nn communications satellites from means. ·Moreover, potential international de­ Plcsetsk. \ J ployment of Orbita sites for use by Statsio11ar I I 25Xl, E.0.13526 I will improve communications with friendly nations and also provide propaganda oppor­ tunities. 77. In one of these series, a single store/ dump satellite is launched at a time. The 80. The operational frequencies of Stat­ . current orbits are about 440 miles high. Seven sionar reportedly will be in the same bands have been launched in the current phase; four as Molniya 2. Statsionar, like Molniya 2, also of them are generally active at one time. Each will have two operating modes----0ne for civil spacecraft has at least two subsystems for re­ communications and one for official users. ceiving, rceording, and retransmitting low­ In nddition, tlie two spacecraft reportedly will data-rate communications. One communica­ have the same electrical characteristics. If so, tions subsystem is probably used for trans­ it seems probable that the Soviets will con­ mission from the USSR to users and the other tinue deployment of Molniya 2 ground ter­ subsystem for transmissions from the users minals, and evah1ate the communications ca­ back to the USSR. pacity and capabilities of Molniya 2 before Statsionar is launcbcd. 78. The second store/dump communications series of satellites arc launched eight at a 81. Near the end of i971, the Soviets en­ time on a single booster and placed in an tered into an Intersputnik agreement with orbit 800 miles high. There have been eight Warsaw Pact countrit-.s, Mongolia and Cuba. launches since the first one in 1970, and the This agreement established a Soviet Bloc satel­ Soviets maintain 16, 24, or more, of these lite commnnications f1ctwork that is inde­ satellites active at one time. pendent of the Intelsat consortium. The So­ viets plan to use the Stat~ionar satellite for 79. Statsionar. Frequency registration ap­ Intcrsputnik with the exception of Cuba, plications for the Mulniya 2 and Stat~ionar 1 which · will work through Molniya 2. A ter­ satelliks originally suggested they would be minal in Cuba announced as being for Inter­ deployed at about the same time. lt now ap­ sputnik is nearly complete, whereas there is pears the Soviets will deploy a Stat5ionar in no evidence of comparable European sites. 1975-1976, as they develop ground tcrm\nals. The Cuba site has some of the characteristics The Stntsionar 1 satellite probably will be of sites in the USSR and in Mongolia (at So­ orbited into a geostationary orbit over the viet military installations). Indian Ocean. As they have yet to use such 82. New Systems. The Soviets will likely orbits, the Soviets probably will demonstrate continue the expansion of the Molniya sys­ their ability to plac..-e payloads in geostationary tents, with increased use by military forces and orbit before they are ready to launch Stat­ high~r capacity. Moreover, a communications sionar. Three Statsionar 1 satellites deployed relay capability may be introduced on other 120 degrees apart would give the Soviets types of satellit~. Logical candidates are high full earth communications coverage. Once altitude vehicles-such as Prognoz--or satel­ in orbit, the satellite will allow military lites already serving a support role to military forces in the Indian Ocean to communicate forces. Appropriate new users include lower

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echelons of the Soviet Armed Forces, official pleted successful rendezvous and docking op­ and intelligence related installations abroad, erations. Of these, only the Soyuz 4/5 m\s~ion airborne command posts, ballistic missile sub­ was manned,. and its personnel transfer was marines, and naval command and control carried out by extra vehicular activity (EVA) ships. We expect that new signal frequencies instead of through an internal transfer module and modulation techniques will appear with as on Salyut. these advances. 86. The Soviets thus entered their first Salyut mission in 1971 without a single flight Ill. CIVILIAN AND SCIENTIFIC test of the docking transfer system. Further, PROGRAMS they had conducted only one long duration Manned Earth-Orbital Fiights flight, the 18-day Soyuz 9 mission. And Soyuz 1, Soyuz 2/ 3 and Soyuz 6/7 / 8 all experienced 83. Manned Soviet space programs for the equipment failnres that prevented the com­ 1970s will be primarily space station oriented. pletion of many mission objectives. Thus, while The groundwork for the Soviet space station on at least one occasion the Soviets did ac­ program began with the Soyuz program in complish some of the key operations required 1967. At that time there were at least two for a spac:e station, the Soyuz spacecraft did primary objectives for the Soyuz craft. One not appear reliable enough, hy US standards, was to serve as a circumlunar vehicle that to warrant its use as an operational ferry. would upstage the Apollo manned lunar pro­ Nevertheless, apparently desiring a space first gram. Another was as a ferry vehicle for the and the prestige they expected from such an manned space station program, Salyut. accomplishment, the Soviets proceeded with 84. The circumlunar program never proved Salyut l. fruitful due to delays resulting from the Soyuz 87. The first launch of a Salyut type vehicle 1 cosmonaut death and due to the poor flight occurred in April 1971. Tt was labeled Salyut record of the required booster, the SL-12. It l by the Soviets, and the term now takes on was finally postponed indefinitely when the the meaning of an orbital station which is US succeeded with its manned circumlunar manned by Soyuz ferry vehicles. Soyuz 10 flight, Apollo 8, in December 1968. As a result, attempted, but failed, to accomplish a success· progress on the manned lunar landing pro­ ful dock with Salyut 1. Soyuz 11 docked and gram slowed. Due to repeated failures of the personnel transferred, hut a Soyuz malfunc­ booster for that purpose, the TI-05, a landing tion led to their death on reentry. Two addi­ is still not a reasonable possibility for at least tional launches of Salyut 1 type vehicles have five years. taken place since. Both were failures. The 85. Between the Soyuz 1 flight in 1967 and first, in Juiy 1972, suffered a booster malfunc­ the Salynt 1 launch in 1971, 13 Soyuz craft tion and did not achieve orbit. The second, were launched. During this phase of the pro­ Cosmos 557' in May 1973, did achieve orbit, gram, Soyuz dcmonsh·ated only a vc1y limited but failed very early in flight and was assigned capability to conduct. the critical operations a Cosmos designator. required for maintaining a manned orbital 'This vehicle was larger than the Salyut I and had station. Three pairs of Soyuz vehicles com- a somewhat different configuration.

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88. The purpose of identifying the Salyut manned pro~rarn, being the initial version of 1 type designator is that a sec9nd and differ­ a Soviet earth orbiting laboratory. Although ent Salyut class vehicle, designated Salyut 2 the beginning of a .new program, it was totally by the Soviets, was launched in April 1973. dependent upon Soyuz. Many of the subsys­ \0 Although launched by the same booster as tems on Salyut were the same as on Soyuz. N in Salyut l, and given the name Salyut, it was And the Sa1yut was dependent upon the Soyuz t') ""'" noticeably different in its configuration. The for ferrying men to it. most significant difference was its 0 I I 91. The first Salyut mission began with the ~ L'~~---..,----,-.,--~---.~~-:--:-~~-;:'· Salyut I lannch, followed three days later by ~ mission. At this point the intended mission of the Soyuz 10 _launch. One of the critical phases in Salyut 2 still is not clear. An open source So­ :·: of the mission was to be a st1ccessful docking. . .- ; N viet article suggested a second space station An indicator of the importance the Soviets :·,,': program would parallel the manned station placed on the rendezvous and docking was program (presumably the civilian Salyut 1 pro­ their selection of Cosrnona11t Shatalov-as Soyuz gram). It further suggested that the parallel 10 Commander. Shatalov had gained more program would occasionally include "manned experience than his fellow cosmonauts as the visits" to service scientific experiments, hut commander of the active spacecraft in the that its primary mission was not manned. It only other manned rendezvous mission-the is too early to determine whether Salyut 2 successful Soyuz 5 rendezvous, dock, and EVA rnpresents the first flight in the parallel crew transfer to Soyuz 4 and the unsuccess­ program. ful Soyuz 8 rendezvous with Soyuz 7. As pilot 89. In addition to the Salyut missions since of Soyu7. 10 ShataJov was unable to perform the summer of 1971, there have been five a rigid dock with Salyut. Although the specific other man-related launches. The unmanned cause of the Soyuz 10 failure is not known with .Cosmos 496, in June 1972, was an apparently certainty. there was evidence to suggest it was sufficient checkout of Soyuz 11 problems prior the fault of ground control. to the July 1972 Saly1.1t failure. The more re­ cent flights of Cosmos 573, Soyuz 12, Cosmos 25Xl, E.0.13526 613, and Soyuz 13 had similar flight profiles I and are believed to be for checkout and use of new or modified spacecraft subsystems ....______. Shortly after the w1succcssful "rather than for specific corrections to prqb­ docking attempt, the mission of So}'uz 10 was ]ems which caused the Soyuz 11 disaster. ended and the spacecraft deorhitcd. Although Some of the subsystems may be related to the the Soviets did not say so explicitly, available ASTP. Part of the motivation for the Soyuz evidence suggested that Soyuz 10 was to have 12 and 13 flights probably was to restore US involved a crew transfer for a mission of two confidence in Soviet manned flight in light to four weeks. of the many manned failures. 92. Seven weeks passed before Soyuz 11 rendezvoused and docked, and the crew per­ The 1971 Salyut 1 Mission formed the internal transfer to Salyut. But al­ 90. The April 1971 Salyut 1 launch marked most from the moment the crew hoarded the beginning of a new phase in the Soviet Salyut they were beset by numerous equip-

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ment malfunctions that interfered with the reportedly be limited to two men with suits. program of experiments and routine on-board This configuration was demonstrated on the operations. The experiment schedule began to September 1973 flight of Soyuz 12. slip two days after the transfer to Salyut. Sev­ eral· times at the end of the first week the Soyuz ·12 crew complained of the heavy work load and 95. When the Soviets began their Salyut l insufficient time .to conduct experiments. Soon flight program in 1971, they probably felt it after these complaints a reduced work sched­ would permit th~m to achieve a multitude of ule wa~ initiated. All schedules were dis­ manned spaceflight objectives-including in­ carded a fe.w days later when an electrical creased prestige for the country as a tech­ fire broke out in one of the equipment panels. nologically advanced power, economic bene­ 93. The final sequence of the flight began fits from scientific experimentation, and de­ with the undocking and ended with the fatal velopment of technology for other Sovjet space reentry. The undocking took only 8 mim1tes, programs such as Salyut 2. bnt once again revealed the ground crew in­ 96. Had it not been for the pressures fron1 ahility to react effectively to non-scheduled the US in ASTP for a succcssfnl Soviet events. The crew announced that a warning manned test, the Soviets may not have had light indicatc~d an internal Soyuz hatch, the another Soyuz test until the fourth Salyut 1 one between the reentry capsule and the work­ attempt, expected in early- to mid-1974. How­ ing compartment, was not sealed. After seven ever, the pressures were mounting: the Soviets attempts to oren and redose the hatch in a had had no manned tests, their publicized period of about 6 minutes, and apparently man-related space tests had resulted in failure, satisfied that the light was malfunctio~ing and the ASTP test date was nearing: Thus rather than the hatch, ground control rec­ far this Soyuz checkout series has consisted ommended compromising the contact switch of three tests- the unmanned Cosmos 573 on the latch to enable the automatic undock­ and 613, and the manned Soyuz 12. All appear ing sequence to proceed. to have been successful. 94. Ground control, aware that the commu­

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- Particular attention was paid to ambient ·forward in their manned program they have air pressure in the descent module encountered many problems which they have throughout the flight. not foreseen or which have resulted from deficiencies in such areas as planning, design­ - All experiments appeared to be space­ ing, construction, or the conduct of the mis­ craft-systems-oriented, with the excep­ sion .. The purpose of this section is to examine tion of four photography sessions during the shortcomings we have noted in their revolutions 13-16. manned space flight program that may have - Tenuous evidence that the Soyuz ma.y an impact on the ASTP mission. now have rotatable solar panels. 100. Suhsystems. Chronic failures in the ·The combination of these aspects suggests that manned program have occurred in both pro­ possibly both hardware and gen­ cedures hardware. in µart been ASTP-rclated and This has . -:: eral Soyu~ improvements were tested. The due to the continued use of outmoded tech- docking assembly may be ASTP related, but -nology. The increasing complexity of the mis­ the Soviets have stated they have no plans sions attempted has become too much for their for flight testing of the required ASTP mech- · technology, with its limited techniques a11d anism. More likely it was a test of an improved materials. They frequently have used over­ mechanism for the Salyut/Soyu7. interface­ simplified design approaches and have not one which needed work based on the diffi­ provided sufficient redundancy or alternatives culties encountered during Salyut 1/ Soyuz I.0. for inflight emergencies. Failures of Soviet The rotatable solar panels were an apparent man-related hardware and propulsion and effort to solve their spacecraft clccl'rical prob- vehicle components demonsfrate poor quality . lcrns. The use of solar panels on low-altitude co11trol procedures. Production items fre­ spacecraft (such as Salyut/Soyuz) presents a quently seem to lack the quality of original complex attitude control problem. In the past single-piece hardware, and changes following the whole Soyuz spacecraft has had to con­ operational problems frequently have caused tinually be reoriented toward the sun. With more problems. rotatable panels the Soviets may have elimi­ 101. Soviet man-related onboard systems nated this requirement and thus reduced a po­ have demonstrated a high incidence of tential source of control problems. malfuncticm-p ~uticularly in environmental 98. All of the identified aspects of Soyuz 12 control components, electrical system units, could easily have been tested in conjunction mechanical clements, and biomedical experi­ with a Salyut flight, and it is likely they mentation apparatus. Questions have arisen concerning the integrity and compatibility of would have heen, had there been a successful interface sea1s, connections and latches in So­ 1912 or 1973 Salyut mission. ' viet spacecraft, and the flammability of Soviet materials. Major medical and biotechnological General Evaluation of Technical limitations were demonstrated during the 24- Limitations day mission of the Salyut I/Soyuz II station, :, ._ 99. While the Soviets have conducted nu­ quite apart from the decompression problem merous space flights which have been fully which caused the death of the crew during successful or at least generally so, in moving the descent pha5e. The electrical fire onboard, .J

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which probably was caused by overtaxed elec­ increase the -risk of instrumentation reading trical systems, generated harmful gases and error during docki11g operations as ~ell as of almost caused the station to be abandoned. potential injury to the crew: Another hardware The crew was exposed to atmospheric con­ ·and potential biological effects problem area taminants whose toxic effects- probably fa electromagnetic interference due to high affected their physical and mental stamina. power emissions which can create problems Tl1ere were recurrent breakdowns of the at­ fc->r the effective operatio1). of pctsonnel and mospheric control ventilation system, defi­ instruments. Difficulties have been encount­ cieocit:S in humidity control units, and poten­ ered on many manned flights involving HF tially dangerous over-heating of the oxygcn­ interference with VHF channels. In gtmcraL producing superoxide cl1cmical bcrls. defic.:ient technology and low reliability of ma­ 102. Poor human engineering and outmoded jor man-related subsystems, -as well as poor cockpit display technology have been noted design approaches, have added to the stress on Soyuz capsules. Such configurations ex­ of Soviet cosmonauts and elevated the opera­ plain some of their problems and at the least tional risks.

PoTENTIAL -SOVIET ASTP PROBLEM AREAS - DESIGN AREAS PREFLIGHT AREAS Increased risk of pers011al iniuru or spacesuit damage. Training time in simulators and mockups. Soviet crews. - Human engineering of Soyuz interior is poor. Un­ do not get much experience directly transferable to spaL"eflight. gllardcd powt:r control switches; sh(l.rp corners and edges on 1,'()nsolcs, hat<.:h. passageways and junction Mission and flight pums. The Soviet's mission flight boxes; and unsecured cables and ho.ses could cause plaus oftt:n have bee11 ove1·-optimisti<.: and, in emer­ problems. gencies, have not been comprehensive. Spacecrafr cJ-,eckoul. T)1e continued eri<;tence of Malfunctions in Soyuz hardware for environmental Soviet equipment problems on Soyuz, as well a~ the control .tiJ.ttem, for dockirrg, and fnr ~1Jacecraft inter­ problems' nature, imply preflight checkout is inade­ face becawe of c11angcs for mi.~sivn. Previou:; changes quate. to So}'ll2 have fixed deficiencies from specific flight<:, INFLIGHT AREAS - but the hardware has later fai.le

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103. Procedures. To date there has been con­ Manned Lunar

siderable disparity between operational flight ·, ,' 105. Circumlu.nar. The Soviet manned lunar demands and Soviet c0smonaut capabilities. prowam was planned eventually to inc1udc .. Cosmonaut crews, particularly in the 1971 first a circumlunar flight and then lunar land­ "Salyut 1 operation, have been inadequately ing missions. The lunar Zond program, using trained and have lacked. skill in emergency the SL-12 booster, apparently had as its ulti­ repa.ir and mainteuance as well as in daily on­ mate objective a circumlunar flight with a board operations. Built-in deficiencies in crew crew of two. We believe that this program preparation have stemmed in part from the So­ was intended to gain experience for manned .. ·.: ! viet approach, which makes the crew virtual lunar landings and, as it turned out, to up­ .passengers and greatly limits their inflight re­ stage the US Apollo program. The hardware sponsibilities and spacecraft control options. was first flight tested in late 1967, a few days In the past two to throe years, poor rapport after the beginning of t11e Apollo flight test with-and the ineffectiveness of-ground per­ program. The Soviets were apparently hopefol sonnel during flights have been very apparent, that a speedy man-rating of the SL-12 could particularly in cases of problems and cmer· be ·acc0mplished or that the Apollo program gencies. Dur.jng the Salyut 1 mission, neither would encounter serious delays. They could the crew nor ground control was suffi­ the not have hoped to land a man on the moon, ciently prepared to deal with the tc-.chnological as the SL-12 wonld not have supported this, and medical problems encountered during the but they could have achieved the first manned mission. Crew efficiency was impaired by circumlunar mission had their sh·ategy been highly questionable medical therapy pre­ successful. Rut out of a total of eight ·un­ scribed by ground control during the fire and manned circumlunar flights by the end of descent emergencies, when optimum perform ~ 1970, three were failures. There have been no ance was essential. The crew perfonncd inner circumlunar Zond attempts for the past three hatch operations inefficiently when undock­ years, the SL-12 has never been man-rated, ing Soyuz 11 from the Salyut. Both ground aod the Zond manned circumlunar program control and the crew were unable· to assess apparently has been abandoned. properly the critical hatch seal problems, and 106. Lunar Landings. The Soviet~ have . to take steps to solve them, during prepara· never publicly indicated the existence of their tions for retrofire for reentry. own manned lunar landing program. The evi­ dence of the existence of such a program and 104. Flaws were evident in preparation and its status has stemmed primarily from the de­ implementation of flight plans by crews and velopment of the TT-05 space launch vehicle ground control. Preflight checkouts of vehicle and from current Soviet efforts to develop a subsystems have not been 'thorough, and in· space ·suit for use on the moo~; Since ·; adequate crew training in Soyu:t.: maintenance the catastrophic failwe of the first TT-05 . . ' and engineering has limited inflight check­ launch attempt in 1969,. which destroyed outs. Crews have been reluctant to report all the J-1 pad, the Sovi~ts have twice con­ .. '\ inflight problems and c.-annot take responsi­ ducted a launch from the J-2 pai.l, in June ··;; :~ bility for corrective measures without ground 1971, and again in November 1972. Both of permission, even in emergencies. these ended in failure. In 1971 the failure

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occurred during the first stage operation, and as a leading space power and to gain propa­ in 1972 during separation of the first and sec­ ganda benefits by scorfog spectacular "firsts." ond stages. Repair activity at the J-1 launch Early in the program, the thinly disguised pad now appears to be complete, but the purpose of gathering scientific data played a rate at which the pad was rebi1ilt did not decidedly secondary role. These early Soviet indicate a priority need. efforts were characte1ized by persistence in the face of failure. Five failures preceded the 107. There is little doubt that the TI-05 first successfu 1 impactor; 11 failUTes occurred was designed to support a manned lunar pro­ before the first lunar softlanding was a~com­ gram. The first and last launch attempts were published; and there was one failure before a clearly lunar-related, and like the lunar Zond probe was successfully injected into lunar -. program, were to include earth-return over or orbit. into the ln

. •, to the lunar prohrram higher than indicated launch of Apollo-11, the first n)ission in which by the pace of repairs on the J-1 laurn.:h pad, men landed on the moon .. The Soviet lunar .: ·: ~· : they could still conduct a lunar mission before .probe was scheduled to softland on the moon, . the end of the decade. TI1is would require, gather a soil sample, and return the material however, a consistently successful 1T-05 flight to Earth prior to Apollo-11. The probe crashed, test program, and we doubt that the Soviet.. leaving the Apollo program unchallenged. can do this. Even one addit.ional major failure of the TI-05 will almost certainly push the 112. Soviet propar;anda then took a new mission into the early 1980s. tack, claiming that unmanned lunar explora­ tion was safer and more potentially rewarding Lunar Probes than the manned Apollo program. At the same 109. The Soviets have historically used their time the priority and frequency of launches lunar program in order to enhance their image decreased.

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: ....' 113. Since 1970 one orbiter mission, two soil in the near term. Because of the weights in sampl1~/rcturner missions, and two lunar rover vo)ved, such a mission would require two · · missions have been successfully accomplished. SL-12s to deliver the two payloads. Explora­ The primary objectives of the lunar . orbiter tion of the far side of the moon with a ltmar are to perform scientific studies of the moon rover may be attempted in the mid-to-far and of the solar system from lunar orbit. 'Jbe term using a lunar. orbiter relay satellite for most important experiment was the study of comrm1nications with earth. The Soviets may the lunar gravitational field. Other experi­ introduce, too, a non-returnable, lunar scien­ ments carried by the orbiter are related to tific base, using a radio telescope, deep core solar and galactic radiation, photography of surface samplers, and a seismometer. some of the surface, and lunar magnetic fields. 116. We tliink it unlikely that the Soviets The primary objective of the return missions is could undertake advanced unmanned lunar to extract and return lunar soil sarnple.s to the missions such as a complex scientific or a So~iet Union. Secondary objectives are to pho­ joint rover/return mission before late in the tograph both the landing site and the soil 1970s, even though a suitable latmch vehicle sampling operation and to make.radiation and may he available earlier. The development of temperature measurement!>. the adva;1ced payloads required for such mis­ 114. The Lunokhod rovers returned some sions will be the pacing item. ·· ....=·· prestige to the Soviet lunar program. These rovers continued the Soviet emphasis on un­ Planetary Probes . - ~ "· manned explotation. Two rovers have been . ;.:: 117. The Soviet interplanetary progr.am has ':'-:: landed on the lunar surface in Novcmher been conducted at a much higher level of 1970 and January 197.3. Hoth were c011trolkd effort than the US program. While the US by five-man teams on earth. Lunokhod-1 has launched only 9 interplanetary probes, the traveled 5.7 nm and survived for !Olh months, Soviets have launched 34. The scientific in­ while Lunokhod-2 traveled 20 nm but func­ strumentation on the early Soviet probes was tioned only four months. The primary mission relatively crude, but has improved in recent of the Lunokhod rovers was to perform exten­ missions. The desire to enhance the Soviet sive scientific experiments on the lunar sur­ image, and the desire to achieve interplane­ face: laser ranging from earth; astrophysical tary space firsts, were the primary considera­ observations; solar, galactic, and extra-galactic tions in the early stages of their program. In radiation; · photography of the nearby areas; magnetic field observations; and lunar soil recent years, however, the scientific aspects studies. have assumed increased importance. 115. The Soviets are expected to continue 118. The SMiets have continued to launch their unmanned lunar exploration efforts at spacecraft to Venus and Mars at every op­ about the same level of activity as in the portunity, with the exception of the 1967 past few years, primarily with improved lunar Mars launch window. The earlier planetary rovers and soil return vehicles. Missions in­ spacecraft, as typified by the Venus probes, volving soil collection by a lunar rover and have consisted of a bus and a planetary ~n ­ suhsequent h·ansport of the material to a vehi­ counter . payload and have been launched by cle which would return to earth may occur the SL-6. The bus provided all spacecraft sup-

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port during the cruise phase of the m1ss1on and orbiters, and send four spacecraft to Mars. . ··· \· and was basically the same regardless of the W e of <. expect that each set two spacecraft has < ii: . planetary encounter package. These space- · some improved capability. craft were relatively heavy and have been 121. The SL-12 launched spacecraft are characterized by a limited number of experi- much larger and more .complex than the SL-6 . ments and by .__ ___. ______launched spacecraft. These planetary space­ · 119. After a long series of failures and craft incorporate partial failures, the Soviets during 1972 finally achieved a landing on Venus with a spacecraft d I I 25Xl, E.0.13526 ~ I /Up to that time the Soviet ,..... Venus program had been characterized by mal­ ~ functionin s acecraft and N ...,.______, The spacecra t m - 122. Mars m1ss1ons in the next five years functions can be attributed to the hostile will be severely hampered by energy consid~ Venus environment and a major error in the' erations. A considerably greater escape ve­ original characterization of the Venus atmos­ locity will be required for the Soviet~ to ex­ phere ··:::j ploit the next Mars window, in September .... 1 1975, than has been the case for past probes of that sort. Either the Soviet' will have to I 25Xl, E.0.13526 undertake a different type of traj~tory than they have used in the past, which will sig­ nificantly lengthen the mission and cause co~­ rilunications problems, or they will have to 120. A new generation of _planetary space­ drastically reduce the size of the payload. It craft, launched by the SL-12, was first success­ is possible that the Soviets will skip this win­ fully flown in 1971 for the Mars 2 and Mars 3 dow completely. The 1977 window will have stringent velocity requirements and the missions. (Two unsuccessful launches had less TT-05 or an uprated SL-12 might then be b~n attempted in 1969.) Both Mars 2 and available. Mars 3_combined, on the same spacecraft, a Mars lander and a Mars orbiter with some­ 123.Venus probes have no severe limitations what limited capability ~nd life. In both mis­ from a weight or energy point of view, hut a successful probe is difficult because of the . ,:·:~ sions the lander failed to acquire data. The '·: · ~ very hostile atmosphere. The Soviets skipped Mars · 2 lander cra5hed due to a stce en their opportunity to launch to Venus during . angle, and Mars 3 I 25Xl, E.0.13526 I the window in November 1973. Piscussions are now underway between the Soviets and The somewhat higher energy '---:---:------". the French concerning a project to float bal­ trajectory requirements of the 1973 Mars loons in the dense Venusian atmosphere. Such window compounded the weight problems. To balloons could be part of Venus probes (prob­ reduce landing velocities the Soviets decided ably using the SL-12) launched in the follow­ to split the mi5Sions, use separate Mars landers on window in mid-1975.

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124. Launching one or more space probes energy cosmos rays and low-frequency radia­ to Mercury is a logical extension of the cur­ tion, and high-energy cosmic rays and cosmic . rent Soviet planetary program, but we have dust. •:._.,._ '·::;.! no evidence they intend to do this. Another ... ~ 127. Recently, the Soviets have initiated the Soviet possibility is a Venus swingby mission Prognoz series which has the announced mis­ with flyby or impact on Mercury. We believe sion of studying the results of solar activities that a public relations type attempt could be and their influence on interplanetary space accomplished next year. A significant scien­ and the earth's magnetosphere. Three space­ tific venture probably will not occur before craft have been placed in highly eccentric the 1976 window. 96-hour (four-day) orbits. Prognoz satellites 12.5. Jt i'i unlikely that Soviets wiH launch reportedly collect data on corpuscul;,ir radia­ ...; a mission to the outer planets hefore the 1.976- tion, gamma rays, x-rays, and the near-earth 1978 period. Such a mission might involve magnetic field. Solar plasma fluxes and their a flyby of Jupiter, and then possibly a gravity interaction with outer regions of the earth's assist to another planet. The heaviest payload magnetosphere are also observed. These ob­ the standard SL-12 booster could get to Jupiter serVa.tions· are intended to develop the capa­ is too small for any kind of reasonable mission. bility to predict more accurately solar radiation Consequently, it is unlikely that a Jupiter mis­ ·levels in near-earth space. It is possible that . •I! sion will he forthcoming lmtil new, major de­ the Prog11oz satellites also could be used to ; ::'J velopments occur in the Soviet booster or pro­ monitor nuclear weapon detonations in the pulsion systems. Lifetime limitations and long earth's atmosphere or in space. The few data ' distance communications problems will also available do not allow us to determine what ~~:~ severely hamper Soviet progress in this area. the spacecraft is .doing.

128. In addition to their purely scientific . ·. ·~ Scientific Satellites satellites, the Soviets have continued to launch 126. The Soviets have for many years scientific experiments on board other satellites launched small research satellites to collect. such as their photorcconnaissance, communi­ data on the space environment within 1,200 cations, and geodetic satellites. This practice has ·helped compensate for the small number miles of the earth. The primary investigations of scientific satellites launched, hut has the have been of particle radiation and ionospheric disadvantage that the. mission parameters are characteri5tics. These satellites have al.so tailored to the primary mission rather than the served a~ subsystem test-beds and have laid scientific experiment. the groundwork for other satellite research ·programs. Data collection on the space en­ 129. Prior to Cosmos 605 in November 1973, vironment for the most part has been taken the Sovicto; had not flown a biosatcllitc since the over by the Intercosmos program of coopera­ '--~~~~~~~~~~~~~--I tion between the Soviet Union and East Eu­ 22-day dog mission in 1966 (Cosmos 110). ropean Socialist countries. Jntercosmos satel­ 0 .--J · ~ .. ~ : lites generally perform near-earth environ· I_ . land ~ mental research in four areas: solar emissions, in the past 5 years payloads of several cir- ~ i.n ionospheric and magnetospheric structure, low- cumlunar and earth orbital flights have in- N

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eluded biological specimens. This practice of technical merit. The general thaw in East­ probably will continue. The payload of Cos­ West relations over the past several years mos 605 included white rats, turtles, insects, has reduced the political barriers to Soviet and fungi. Major problems under investiga­ scientific collaboration with other technically tion were the effects of weightlessness on the advanced nations, particuli(rly the US. Soviet function of live systems and biological and Western political decisions to pursue · rhythms, and effects of high energy particles a genera] normalization of relations have from space radiation on nerve cells.\ prompted the USSR actively to seek possible avenues of scientific and technical exc11ange I 25Xl, E.0.13526 as symbols of detente. The Moscow summit agreement on cooperation in space, signed in r May 1972, was primarily a political gesture 3 :i 130. In 1973, during a visit to the US, and only secondarily a promise of joint tech­ ·-=~ prominent Soviet bioa~tronautics authorities nical cooperation. showed marked interest in the methods. and "} . ~ technology used for inflight experiments with USSR-US .Cooperation primates and suggested a joint experiment 133. The record of . accomplishments in ·. launched by a Soviet booster. This would be USSR-US cooperation in space is not impres­ included in the program planned by the USSR sive in absolute terms: In every case the net for at least one unmanned biological space gain has been in favor of the USSR. experiment· per year through 1978. A joint space biology project could be of mutual 134. Up to early 1962, US overtures to the hencfit, . but the severe constraints which the USSR for cooperation in space activities met USSR has imposed on Soviet biologhts who with little response. The first rudimentary step have participated in biosatellite missions in USSR-US space cooperation occurred in would create almost insurmountable problems 1962 with an agreement to establish a dedi­ for US space scientists. cated cominunications link to exchange mete­ orological satellite data. Although the US 131. We expect to see continuing Soviet started to h'ansmit data via this link as soon unmanned space envir61imental research ac­ as it was established in 1964, it was not until tivities on a modest basis. The Soviets will 1969 that the Soviets started to send relatively emphasize the international cooperation as­ significant amounts of their own data. But pects by launching foreign sensors on a fairly even now the Soviet data is not always trans­ frequent basis using the SL-7 antered, as W<~ll as constrained, by con­ prepare an equal number of chapters. The J siderations of both pohtical advantage and review was scheduled to be published in 1969.

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After years of drawn-out discussions on the have been promised by the Soviets for their subject<; to be covered and the selection of current Mars missions. The US has supplied authors for each chapter, a manuscript is now to the Soviets, on request, photographs and scheduled to be published ju 1973. maps of the areas of interest to the Soviets. 136. A milestone in US-USSR space co­ 138. Another area of Soviet-US data ex­ operation was reached in May 1972, when change has been in earth resources surveys. the two countries agreed on the organization, The two countries have agreed to coordinate de.vclopment, scheduling, and conduct of the experiments and to exchange ground, air, and ASTP test docking mission in earth orbit. The space observations from various instruments flight now is scheduled to be carried out in over specified areas in each country. In this July 1975 and wi1J involve an Apollo Com­ agreement, each party is to make observations mand Service module and a Soyuz spacecraft. over its own country. Nothing in the agree­ Each country is to build its. portion of the ments even tacitly · agrees to either party docking mechanism, but the design was done making observations over the· other's country, by the US. The mechanism will he installed although imagery of large areas of the USSR on a docking module that also will serve as has been taken by the US ERTs spacecraft. an airlock and transfer corridor between the (This is available for sale to the public.) two spacecraft. During the docked period­ While considerable data has been supplied which may last as long as two days-the by the Soviets in terms of papers; instrument ·crews will visit each others' spacecraft and output, and photographs, much of the data perform a few scientific and applications­ has not been in original form, and photo­ related experiments. graphic products have been released only after much prodding by the US. The agreement 137. The agreement that provided for the specifics that raw data will be exchanged, ASTP mission also pledged both countries to and the instrument characteristics will he fulfill a Soviet Academy of Sciences and NASA provided. To date this i·eluctance to supply agreement reached jn 1971 for cooperation in raw data and instrnment characteristics has space sciences and applications. As a part of been a severe hindrance to the data exchange this program to increase the exchange of data, program. an agreement was made to exchange informa­ tion on Mars gained by the Soviet Mars 2 Cooperation with Other Nations and 3 spacecraft and by tho earlier US Mar­ iner mission. To this end, a teletype link was 139. In ·addition to its dealings with the . established between the Academy and the US, the Soviet Union has in the past sought, Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) in Cali­ and continues to seek, space cooperation with fornia. During the Mars 2 and Mars 3 missions, other states. The extensive Franco-Soviet pro­ I infomiation was exchanged over this circuit. gram began in 1966 and has expanded slowly In mC>st instances, the data sent. by the Soviets ·since then. in addition, the Soviets have re­ were simply a repeat of Tass announcement<; . cently begun or are beginning progrnrns with . Since completion of these missions, the Soviets other countries-India, Sweden, West Ger­ have forwarded additional data to JPL, hut many-and with the European Space Re­ these have been mostly <.'Opies of papers pre­ search Organization ( ESRO). All of these sented at intemati<>nal meetings. Similar data newer programs are still in relatively early

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stages, but can be expected to grow. In their 143. There also has been some cooperation efforts with these countries, we believe the in a vertical rocket program, using French Soviets probably are principally motivated by instrumentation, for studies of the upper reasons of politics and public relations, atmosphere. Moreover, a program of balloon although in some cases possible gains in tech­ observations by the French has been used by nology may have played a role. the Soviets to correlate some of the data col­ lected by their weather satellites. These pro­ 140. Cooperative ventures with the Warsaw grams have been moderately successful. The Pact nations have been occurring; since the French and the Soviets also arc continuing late 1960s. These started as technically trivial their conjugate point experiments ~nd are efforts at public relations, but have grown to preparing to launch a Soviet particle accelera­ a relatively significant degree in the past few tor from Kergue]cn Island in the Indian Ocean years. Other Socialist nations now arc in­ to project particles along magnetic field lines cluded. For these nations, however, the prac­ to the conjugate point in the USSR. tical, public, and technological gains have not been as fruitful-nor will they be in the 144. One of the more venturesome joint future. · programs· was to involve a Soviet-launched probe to Venus. The probe would have de­ France ployed a series of balloon-like objects intended to float in the Venusian atmosphere and trans­ 141. The French, in their cooperative ef­ mit data back to earth. This program never forts with the USSR, were motivated by a need progressed beyond a proposal and was termi­ for ways to orbit experiments for ,which they nated in about 1971. A similar program has do not have launch vehicles, the desire to recently been reactivated with US assistance improve their prestige and status, and a de­ in balloon technology. Present French-Soviet sire to proceed independently of the US. For cooperative projects include follow-on experi­ their part the Soviets hoped to the enb~nce ments similar to those already undertaken. image of a "special relationship" with France, .. The French and Soviets also have cooperated to gain some publicity, and ·to profit from in television transmissions via the Soviet Mol­ French technology. Program difficulties have niya system of satellite.<>, but, the program been caused by Soviet reluctance to release probably has not progressed beyond the test design interface data, operational informa­ stage. tion, and experimental results, and by French 145. A sp~ce medicine progr.im is being im­ funding problems which have resulted in de­ plemented to study the effect of cosmic radia­ lays, redirections, and cancellations. tion and immunological resistancr. using ex­ 142. Five programs have recently achieved j:,erimental biological packages. The program notable success with Soviet-launched French. will also study the effect of weightlessness scientific experiments: a solar radiation experi­ on the brain. The French .;u-e also developing ment on the Mars 3 probe, laser reflectors on an experiment for studying certain. elements Lu.nokhods 1 and 2, ionspheric equipment ·on in spa<.:e, including hydrogen and deuterium, the Oreol satellite, solar effects equipment on utili:ting an optical resonance method. There Prognoz 2, and a technology applications satel­ has heen no announcement as to the satellite lite launched piggyback with Molniya 1/20. to be used or its launch date. We expect

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. USSR-French cooperative ventures to be con­ HEOS-2, orbited by the US in January 1972. tiirncd over the next several years at about HEOS-A3 is designed to study the interplane­ the current level of activity and degree of tary magnetosphere. This launch stems from technical sophistication. an. agreement made in 1970 between the So­ viet Academy of Sciences and the ESRO. Also, India in September 1972, ESRO technicians at the European Space Research and Technica1 Cen- 146. The USSR has been similarly engaged . ter ( ESTEC) supplied Soviet scientists with in the past few years in cultivating political the information arid equipment necessary to and scientific ties with India. Very limited conduct an electrical field expe..riment. In ex­ Inda-Soviet cooperation begun in the early change, the Soviets were to supply ESRO with 1960s, shortly afteJ· the establishment of the the experiment's data. Another area of coop­ Thumba Equatorial Rocket Launching Sta­ eration concerns the correlation of measure­ tion (TERLS). (The United Nations Commit- ments earned out by ESRO's HEOS-A2 and · . tee on Outer Space later sponsored this site a Soviet Prognoz satellite, which are similar for rocket-launched inve~igations of the upper projects. The possibility also exists for a joint atmosphere in the region of the earth:~ mag­ project for measuring ele.ctrieal field~ in the netic equator.) A second, much larger step magnetosphere and ionosphere by the sound­ was taken in 1971 when the Soviets began ing rockets and satellites. supplying sounding rockets. Well over a hun­ drcti. have now been launched at TERLS. A few Soviet technicians have been stationed Sweden occasionally at Thumba to give technical aid. 149. The Soviets and the Swedes reached an agreement in July ~973 for a Swedish sci­ 147. An even larger · cooperati~e effort is entific experiment to be carried on a Soviet ·.. based on an agreement signed in May 1972. satellite. It is expected to be launched during It calls for the Soviets to launch an Indian the summer of 1975. The purpose of the ex­ . built satellite to carry out ionospheric, neutron, periment is to make detailed studies of the gamma ray, and celestial x-ray measurements. resonance polarization of some of the spectral The 500-pound satelJite is to he placed into a lines of the sun in the ultraviolet area. 49 degree orbit, with an apogee of . about 300 nm. The launch probably will take place from Kapustin Yar near the end of 1974. Con­ West Germany trol of the spacecraft and data collection are 150. In September 1970, a West German to be done at Sri Harikota, near Madras, and minister visited the USSR to discuss a coop­ by the Soviet land and ship network. Many erative program in a number of scientific of the project's details are being handled by fields, including space. Subsequently, an ex­ the Intercosmos organization. change of delegations took place to discuss "'concrete measures and project" which were ESRO to begin in 1972. An agreement was proposed 148. The Soviets will launch ESRO's HEOS­ for a cooperative effort to compare data on _A3 (Highly Elliptical Orbiting Satellite) be­ ground-based observations of space-related fore the end of 1974, probably as a piggyback phenomena, such as trying to detcnnine the payload. This is the backup satellite to the effect of the space envirnmn.ent on the earth's

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magnetic field. Information on the degree ·and politically important symbol of dctente. specifics of the program are not available, but The ASTP agreement was, in fact, a high it is believed to be purely scientific and is ex­ point of the May 1972 Summit meeting. pected to evolve slowly. The program even­ - The Soviets doubtless view any dramatic tually may result in placing a few scientific cooperative enterprise-such as ASTI> experiments on Soviet satellites or, similar to ·. • .: or the exchange of lunar samples-as an the French SRET effort, in the pigi:,ryback "• opportunity to demonstrate scientific and orbiting of small West German satellites with technical parity with the US. Joint US­ Soviet payloads. Soviet efforts, even if based upon rela­ Socialist Nations tively straightforward applications of available technology, will l1clp to refurb­ 151. Except for limited collaboration with ish the international image of the USSR Poland and Czed1oslovakia in background re­ as the coequal of the US in space. search on space physiology, there was little tnie cooperation between the USSR and the - The· USSR recognizes-if oniy pri­ Ea'>t European nations imtil 1969. East Euro­ vately-the technological preeminence of pe;111 scientists often stated that before this the US · space program, and probably time they received more information from the hopes to acquire technology and exper­ US space program than from the Soviet pro­ ience from any space partnei·ship with gram. This dissatisfaction among the East the US. Not only is the US the natural E'uropeans may have contrihuted to the Soviet potential partner for space cooperation, relaxntion which became apparent with the the US also is the country with a space first launchings of the Intercosmos satellites program of sufficient size and diversity in 1969 and the "V<~rtikal" rockets in .1.970. to be most useful to the Soviets. More­ Eleven lntercosmos-type satellites have been over, several European countries also launched through November 1973. Each has lead the USSR in many of the managerial conducted some form of scientific reassess­ techniques and technical disciplines ments of solar radiation and its effect on the needed for advanced space i:irograms, earth. Each flight has included a variety of and the USSR can expect to learn from equipment, mission support, and data analysis them also. · by the cooperating nations. Usnally the satel­ - Space is a subject of world-wide popular . lites repo1t back by data link,. and arc not interest and, ns the Soviets demonstrated recovered, but Intcrcosmos 6 was recovered well in ·the fate 1950s and early 1960s, by the Soviets before its film was analyzed. cooperative activities promote a favorable image of the USSR in general. Rationale and Prospects for Space Cooperation 153. Other considerations, however, serve 1.52. For a variety of reasons, cooperation somewhat to inhibit Soviet efforto; at image in space activities, especially . with the US, building and cooperation with the West in must appear especially attractive to the USSR: space research: -A complex form of space cooperation - The USSR remains sensitive about dis­ with the West, especially the US, is a closing most of the details of its space

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program. In part, these sensitivities stem balance with the West, economic problems. from the relaJ:ively close linkages between internal Soviet political pressures, and criticism the military and civilian spa~e efforts. by other Socialist nations. From the Soviet standpoint, cooperation with the US in space ·-The Soviets are aware of their techno­ has been a result of dctente, not a reason for logical shortcomings, reluctant to expose it. and we believe this subon1iuation will them, and re]uctant to risk public failure continue. in such undertakings. . ·. 156. At the. same time, reversing the trend - The need to share with political adver­ toward d6tente of the past several years saries the credit for cooperative achieve­ would not be easy. The Soviet leadership has ments probably does not hav~ as great a substantial political stake in these develop­ a significance as it once had. The Soviets ments-internally as well as ~:xtcrnally-and wquld like to have a separate program, in the economic and tP-chnical trade

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space cooperation with the US. In addition to 160. A diverse grouping of organizations the cooperative ventures with the US and and individuals · play significant roles -in one other nations, the Soviets also have entered or more aspects of the overa11 program. Re­ into international treaty obligations govern­ flecting the nature of Soviet society, these ing activitie:; in space. entities and persons are found at all levels­ in the upper echelons of the Communist Party 158. On balance, as long as detente is useful (Party Secretary D. F. Ustinov), the national and its pursuit remains central to Soviet policy government (Military Industrial Commission), toward the West, the USSH is likely to en­ the Ministry of Defense ( SRF), industry (the courage collaboration in space With the US Ministry of General Machine Building), and and with friendly third countries. The Soviets the scientific community (the Academy of will publicly exploit joint ventures both as Sciences) . These organizational features ap­ proof of the value of detente and as evidence pear to reflect a continuing separation among of their stature as the equal of the US. At the mission planning; hardware specification, de­ same time, they wm draw what they can sign, production, and use; spacecraft com­ from non-Soviet technology to improve the mand and control; and postflight evaluation value and efficiency. of their own space pro­ and adjustment. It is probably only at the gram. To the degree it feels necessary, the level of the Politburo that all the aspects of USSR will maintain its interest in space co- . the Soviet space program come together. operation. 161. A central role, however, appears to V. ORGANIZATION AND SELECTED reside in the Karas' organization of the Soviet ~ocket Forces ( SRF), which continllcs to TECHNOLOGY AREAS dominate the day-to-day operation of the Organization and Management .USSR's s-pacc program. The Karas' organiza­ 159. The general secrecy surrounding the tion still has its basic functions of: USSR's space program has continued during a. Design coordination of payload specifi­ the past few years, although the Soviets are cations for payload customers. becoming more willing to discuss some pro­ b. Monitoring contract fulfillment and ad­ gram aspects-such as mission length and ob­ herence .to specifications at all stages of ject;ves--of some publicized flight-;. This se­ the production _process, through a net­ crecy has resulted from a number of Soviet work of military representative teams characteristics, including their history of Se- based at major participating industrial . crccy and distrust of foreigners, their desire facilities. to hide sensitive space activity resulting from the close linkages between the military and c. civil space efforts, and their unwillingness to expose weaknesses and failw·es. Consequently, we still have a limited understandiug of the I 25Xl, E.0.13526 organiz:ational structure and dynamics behind all levels of the Soviet space effort-missions, programs, and ..the overall scope and direction.

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together, assembling, and carrying out opera­ tions and systems that are very complex in

design and function. The Soviets know about . . ~ : modern management concepts and techniques d 25Xl, E.0.13526 used in the West-such as project manage­ ment-but these have not had much exposure or us~ in the Soviet space program, and are

in some ways incompatible with Soviet society. . ; ' 164. Moreover, adequate supporting indus­ 162. In the past few years there have been · tries to provide special equipment, parts, and several important new insights into the. man­ advanced technical know-how are in relatively agement of Soviet space programs. The most short supply in the USSR. It is very difficult significant one is the recognition that com­ to introduce new types of production or the ponents of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) use of radically new material.~ in existing ·fa­ other than the SR.F have a ke o eratin role cilities. To build space systems, a few dedi­ in the use of space. cated facilities with essentially the top choice of workers and cn~neers carry out most of the design and fabrication. This was adequate years ago, but no longer. Such evidence as we 25Xl, E.0.13526 have suggests that one of the functions of the SRF's Karas' organization is the expediting of parts, components, assemblies and systems to maintain production flow against plans and schedules. And this sometim~ has been very .____ _,This development may foreshadow difficult to do. the introduction in coming years of other 165. Problems also show up in space flights. satellites with missions directly supportive of­ The most noteworthy cases occur in manned specific military services. missions, probably because of their scope, . ' 163. The way in which the Soviet space complexity, and their requirement for quick effort is sh·uctured creates management dif­ resolution of problems. The fact that we have ficulties,' and it probably makes the solution identified so many problems in these missions of problems more difficult than they might may be, in part, a function of tl1cir be otherwise. Concerned organizations and The diffi­ individuals are from diverse parts of the So­ culties have occurred mostly in the conduct of viet power structure, they appear to each the flight. We have seen )roblems in

otl1er as approximate equals, decisions are ._____ ..,.._~..J preparation o the cosmo- by committee, and there is little mechanism nauts, and in procedtires used at the control for the enforcement of decisions. The basic centers to resolve emergencies. Some aspects ·.-· shortcomings in developing advanced space of these problems are related to technology, systems and in conducting complex missions but others stem from limitations i11 man­ include the management problems of bringing agement.

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Communications, Command and Control 168. The Soviets have stated they are con­ structing a mission control center sornc~ where 166. The USSR's ability to command and near Moscow specifically for the It is control its spacecraft has continued to im rove ASTP. possible tliat the Soviets are modifying and over the past several years, reactivating the old control center near Mos­ cow that was used for the Vostok/Voskhod is largely unified under a component flight:;. The new center will avoid the prob­ SRF's Karas' organi;r.ation. The central control lems of allowing US flight controllers access pojnt for unmanned satc1lites is n ear Moscow. to either the recently established Manned The Manned Flight Control Center is located Flight Control Center in the Crimea, or the in the Crimea. In addition, a few space systems older Coordinating : Computer Center near come wholly, or partially, under the auspices Moscow. The capabilities of this a under construction out­ the USSR that can command most of the ac­ side Moscow. Not all of these antennas are tivity of Soviet reconnaissance satellites. These expected to be integrated into the Soviet conM sites also contro,. scientific spacecraft and trol network, however. Some of these antennas ' calibration satcllit1~s, and co]h~ct data from probably are intended for communications re- manned spacecraft, weather satc.Ilites, and geodetic spacecraft and others. This extensive lay use, a few may be fo~ I deployment of equipment for conh·o] of space­ and others may sec use in radio astronomy. craft gives the Soviets significant redundancy 170. Of particular interest is the conversion in their command and control network for the of a fomier Moscow ABM complex, E21, into older spacecraft systems. This is significant a space-related role and the construction there in terms of mission length, survivability, and of four large dish antennas 82 feet in diam­ in terms of coritrolhng large numbers of space­ eter. This site may command and contro craft. And this is especially useful during periods of tension for the use of photographic or it may relay satellite com- reconnaissance satellites. The newer satellite "------~ systems, developed in the late 1960s or now in munications. In March of this year! R&D, have not shown this redundancy of con­ 0 ~· trol. We expect, however, that the Soviets will continue expansion of their command and con­ trol network, primarily for earth orbital sys­ tems, to furnish the required redundancy.

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I 25Xl, E.0.13S26 · 1 not rule out the possibility that one of the on the recent Mars probes the Soviets have

171. Another former Moscow ABM site, 174. Continued upgrading of the Soviet El5, also is undergoing reconstruction, but it command and control network is anticipated, is too early to determine its role. Construction generally along the lines the Soviets have includes two buildings housing pedestals for demonstrated in the past few years. This in­ antennas not yet observed. If related to a cludes larger and better-equipped control sites, space role, it might be a terminal for com­ more sophisticated roles for the support ships, munications satellites or a command site for expansion of command capabilities of new future spac~-based surveillance systems. satellites, and further deployment of ground terminals for rapid relay of data throu h satel­ 172. The Soviet fleet of support ships also lites. It is also expected tha h~ been upgraded. The two ne:w space opera­ . tions control ships ( SSOCS) Yu.riy Gagarin and Sergi Korolev have been deployed to the By 1980, the Soviets may ·incorporate Atlantic Ocean several times. Both vessels dedicated; data relay satellites for real time, . carry two medium-sized dish antennas ( 40 global transmissions to and from operational feet diameter) ; the Gagarin also carries two spacecraft The Soviets already are involved lai·ge dishes ( 82 feet). W c expect the types of in laser applications for ranging. They arc ex­ support exhibited so far to continue for the pected eventually to make use of lasers for ac­ · foreseeable future, such a5 the Korolev's sup­ curate tracking of spacecraft, and-later on­ port of manned missions from tl1e Nova Scotia for providing high data mtc relay capabilities area and the Gagarin's role as a relay support from spacecraft vessel near Iceland for Brezhnev's visit to the 175. Soviet efforts to improve their flexi­ US. The Gagarin has e4crienced opera~g bil,ity and capability in the ~eneral area of problems, such as errors in antenna pointing, spacecraft command and control has resulted and this has lessened somewhat its usefulness. in the use of several forms \ 173. The Soviets are making progress in flight control. The problems the SSOCS have had-such as f I I . are bc:ing resolved. The Soviets have made . progress too in the broad area of communica­ tions. This is especially significant .in lunar and planetary flight5, where the missions gen­ erally are more constrained by limitations in communications capability. In both cases, the Soviets are using more cff icient ways of trans­ mitting data over those gre-at dista11ces. More­ over, on a rec~nt lunar probe (Luna 19) and

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diet how long it will take. It is doubtful, however, that this can be done before two 25Xl, E.0.13526 more launches occur, thereby pushing the availability date at ]east to 1975. 179. The reconstruction of the J-1 launch Booster-Related Developments pad, continued launches of the 1T-05, and 176. Soviet progress since the late 1960s in continued construction of support and assem­ developing launch vehicles and high energy bly buildings indicate the Soviets are still very tipper-stage continues to be a mixture of suc­ much interested in having available the pay­ cesses, failures and attempts at corrections, load weight capability of this booster. But the and the undertaking of new applications .. unhurried pace of the· repairs at J-1 suggests, among other things, that the USSR does not 177. Soviet space boosters still are charac­ now have a pressing national priority for such terized by those features that allowed the a system . and that ·missions requiring this USSR to gain its lead in space exploration booster- such as planetary and manned through the use of large heavy sateJlitcs, but h.mar~annot be. conducted until later in this · which have now become liabilities. The So­ decade or the 1980s. viet approach-which was adequate for sev­ eral years--ite at Tyuratam for a version of · launch since the first one in mid-1969. This the SL-12/ 13 booster. Thi~ site has .been under construction since early 1971, and might be event, too, was a failure, although the first­ ready for use by late 1974 or early 1975. In !itage apparently performed satisfactorily. The addition to the conventional propellant tanks, second stage did not ignite, and the booster two unique propellant storage buildings are impacted about 100 nm downrange. It is under construction, suggesting the use of high likely the Soviets will persevere in this devel­ energy propellants with the booster's upper opmental effort with about' one launch a year stages. The likely use is in the payload-asso­ until the·booster's problem~ are corrected. We ciated fourth stage, and the likely fuel-oxidizer · know too little about these problems to pre- combination is liquid hydrogen and liquid

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oxygen. The introduction of a high-energy space complexes. Construction of Launch Site ·· .. ,; fourth stage, or even high-energy third and 27 at Plesetsk is proceeding at a rapid pace fourth stages, would raise significantly the and could become operational by mid-197 4. weight that the SL-12 could send beyond earth Thus far, Site 27 most closely resembles the orbit. The weights increase to about 21,000 SL-11 site Gl at Tyuratam, which is used to and 28,000 pounds, respectively for lunar mis­ launch the satellite interceptor and radar re­ sions, and to about 17,000 and 24,000 pounds connaissance payloads. The SL-11 booster for interplanetary missions. · probably will be used there but we cannot identify the spacecraft. High Energy Propellants 185. At Kapustin Yar, the SL-8 launch site 182. In the general area of high energy pro­ 7C has been completed, and the first test pellants, the Soviets are continuing their ex­ launch occurred in January 1973. Missions tensive R&D work begun in the mid-1960s. may include cooperative ventures, many of This work, however, has c.ontinued slowly and which in the past have been launc11ed from still has not been extended into the flight test Kapustin Yar. The introduction of the SL-8 stage. Major liquid hydrogen upper stage pro­ to Kapustin Yar more than doubles the space grams exist at Khimki (Plant 456) and Za­ payload capability of the complex, heretofore gorsk, with other large efforts at Kurumoch, Zelenogorsk, and Nizhnaya Salda. The engine limited to the SL-7 booster and its relatively thnist levels being static tested at these sites small payloads. range from the 15,000-pound class to the 186. In. a key booster-related area of high 150,000-pound cla.~s. Work in toxic propcl­ technology, the Soviets have expressed inter­ lants~such as liquid fluorine or fluorides, est in the US space shuttle and indicated they and in special additives, such as beryllium­ desire such a prograrri. But the USSR is many also is continuing slowly. years from achieving that goal, so far in fact 183. Flight tests of engines of the 15,000- that we cannot predict when a reusable So­ pound thrust class, using, liquid hydrogen, viet shuttle of the US type might appear. The . could occur at any time, although the Soviets · electronics, materials, and system test prob­ may wait until the SL-12/13 variant is ready lems mentioned previously would plague any at Tyuratam. Flight tests of larger engines attempts by the Soviets to build such a shuttle could occur by 1975. Use of a fluo~ne-based quickly. However, we believe that the higher oxidizer might be within current Soviet capa­ Soviet launch rates and their commitment to bilities. Liquid f!uodne/hydrogen engines a manned space station may make develop~ could be available in 1975-1978. Flight testS of ment of a reusable shuttle attractive to them liquid engines with metal additives, and of during the 1980s. In the interim, the Soviets hybrid propulsion systems, are possible in the will continue to use ferry spacecraft and exist­ 1977-1980 time period. ing boosters. They may begin to use space­ craft, and possibly boosters' stages, that are Other New Programs "reusable" to some degree. If so, they could 184. The Soviet~ are constructing new claim the first space shuttle, as they did with launch sites at the Plesetsk and Kapustin Yar their manned space station. ..

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. ' Nuclear Power, and Nuclear and 189. There is no evidence that the Soviets Electric Propulsion have a specific development program for a nuclear rocket propulsion system. However, 187. The Soviets are actively developing they are known to have an extensive tech­ several classes of nuclear electric power nology effort on gas-core concepts, which hold sources whic11 would be useful in long dura­ considerable promise in t11c lo.ng term for tion 1russions, such as those to the planet both power and propulsion. No meaningful Jupiter or beyond, and in long duration earth projc~ d:ion can be made for the USSR's ap­ orbital satellites. They could at any time orbit plication in space of direct nuclear propul­ space . generators employing thermoelectric sion, other than to say that it is highly unlikely or . thermionic conversion technologies, and before the mid-1980s. powered by radioisotopes, developing up to 190. ActUal SoViet uses in space of nuclear abont two kw( e) in power. A small nuclear radioisotope subsystems have been infrequent. thermoelectric reactor also could be use-d in They arc likely to be used during the rest this power range, but probably will not. For of the decade, .but only at 1 kw ( e) or lower power levels in the range of a few. tens of energy levels. Uses identified so far are limited kw ( e), the Soviets seem to prefer in-pile to Soviet announcements. In 1965, several thermionic reactors. Their development and small satellites launched into near earth-orbit operation of the TOPAZ reactor is now unique (Cosmos 80 and 87) used radioisotope power in the world, although the US abandoned such sources. They transmitted for nearly two a system for lack of immediate mission re­ years. The similar long life and small size of quirements. They will prohably have a system the SL-8 launched multiple satellite store/ available for use in space at a power level dump· ·communications .spacecraft suggest in the 10-50 kw( c) range by the 1977-1978 these satellites may ';YCll be using radioisotope period. The Soviets reportedly are planning power sources. The Soviets used radioisotope megawatt-size thtmnionic · systems for the }teat sources for the Lunokhod moon ;overs 1980s. in 1970 and 1973. Moreover, analysis of an unidentified facility west of Complex G at 188. Both Rankine and Brayton cycle dy­ Tyuratam h:.1s led to the conclusion that the namic conversion technologies are also being installation probably is a checkout facility for studied and c'Ould be in a system integration . radioisotope sources for spacecraft heat and phase. Components of such systems have been power. developed to a high state-of-the-art, but even after some 15 years no applications have been 191. In the area of electric p~opnlsion, the identified. For the range above 100 kw( e), Yantar test series of vertical flights o.rerated the Soviet~ a1·e known to be developing thcrm­ ion c11gincs that used argon, nitrogen, and air ion ic reactor systems, as well as nuclear MHD. as propellants. The Soviets' stated objective The Soviets now lea? the US in the areas of for this work wa<; the achievement of con­ thermionic energy conversion for space ap­ trolled flight in the upper layers of the atmos­ plications, and are expected to do so through­ phere. The demonstrated engines did not de­ out the forc.. eeablc future. velop sufficient thrust to overcome the pay-

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load's drag, especially that of the air scoop. impacted in the program acmss tbe board­ Two types of small dectric jct engines we~e in communications, data processing and sen­ tested successfully on Meteor IO: one was sors, among others. In a key area, a problem referred to as a plasma engine, the other as has been the Soviets' relative lack of refined an ion engine. ~he orbital period was lowered instrumentation to . determine the cause of slightly during a one-week test period. This failures. This is probably a prime reason that test, combined with future ones, may·lead to new flight test programs of a complex nature a capability for satellite station-keeping and almost always have several failures of one kind attitude control. In general, the Soviets might or another before successes are achieved. The begin using primary electric propulsion by the SL-12 · space booster went through a long late 1970s for orbital maintenance in earth series of failures between 1967 and 1970 be- orbit, and for trajectory corrections on deep fore it became reliable. And the TT-05 is space probes. Nuclear electric propulsion sys­ going through a similar experience now that tems have for many years been projected for will extend into 1974 at least. Because of use on interplanetary missions, and we still this, it appears to us t11at ground testing has expect the Soviets may eventually use them ·tended to be more of a . go/no-go affair for that purpose. . with potential failure areas remaining undis­ covered until actual flight. This rcsuJtc; in Other Space Technologies . an ··onion peeling" effect, where the solu­ tion of one problem only reveals another. 192. In general, Soviet technology lags the West in most of the areas related to space There is evidence that the Soviets are at­ tempting to improve this with improved activities. The Soviets also suffer now from a telemetry systems, and procurement of more generally shallower base in applying advanc;!d tech.no logy to their space program. W c do simulation equipment for the space program. not see the type of technological prolifera­ 194. S~nsor technology also enters into their tion apparent in Western-and especially capabilities to perform various spac() missions. · uS-spac~- efforts. Since the beginning of the In this context, flight hardware must be dif­ program, they have had relatively large ferentiated from laboratory equipment. We boosters available, and that availability still believe that Soviet sdcntists and engineers has not driven the Soviets toward electromc have a high degree of competence in devel­ miniaturiza.tion and use of low weight ma­ oping radar, optical, magnetic, and radiation terials. With increasing mission requirements sensors in the laboratory. However, fabrica­ and fixed booskrs, the Soviets have been find­ tion and environment" limitations in space­ ing it hard to improve spacecraft performance. craft seriously limit Soviet capabilities to use And it is clear that performance compromises new sensors for earth and space monitoring. have been made to get certain systems- such 195. In addition to those basic hardware as the Molniya and radar reconnaissance areas, we see problems in spacecraft too. The satellites-to work. manned area is of high interest, and chronic 193. The whole field of electronics appears failures in the manned program have involved to us to be a major stumbling block. It has propulsion, payload hardware, as well as man-

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related operations and technology. The So­ alternatives for inflight emergencies. The hard­ viets have continued to use outmoded tech­ ware failures demonstrate poor quality con­ nology, and their techniques and materials trol procedures. Production items frequently have become inadequate for the complex tasks seem to lack the quality of original single­ now being attempted. They frequently have piece hardware, and design changes follow­ used oversimplified design approaches and ing operational problems frequently have have not provided sufficient redundancy or caused mClre prnhlcrns.

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ANNEX

SOVIET SPACE EVENTS (1 Juiy 1971 to 20 December 1973)

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SOVIET SPACE EVENTS (1 July 1971- 20 December 1973)

- · ----- ~· · ·-·- - -- Soviet Li

16 .July Hl71 Meteor 9 Weather PL/RT.- 03 Success 20 .July 1971 Cosmos 429 Photoreconnal88&nee TT/i:>L--04 Success . . :~ . 22 .T uly 1971 ELlNT Reconnaissance PL/ST. 08 Failure 23 July 1971 Coomos 430 Photoreconnai8sance PL/SL--04 Success- 28 July Hl71 Molniya I /18 Communications Relay PL/Sl, -06 Success 30 July 1971 Cosmos 131 PhoLorcconnaissance TT/SL·01 Succeiis . 3 August 1971 Ri6 PhotorP.connaissance PL/SL-04 S1wc.,ss 20 November 1971 Cosmos 157 G.,odctic PL/SL 08 Success 24 November lll71 Molniya 2/1 Communications Relay Pl,/HL--06 Success 29 NovemllP.r 1971 Cosmos 458 Radar Calibr11.tion PL/SL--07 Succexs 29 N ovcruber 1971 Cosmos 459 Satellite lntcrc('pt Target PL/SL--08 Success 30 November 1971 Cosmos 160 ELlNT Reconnai~111.nce PLtsr; 08 Success 2 December 1971 Cosmos 461 Scientific PL/SL 08 Success 2 December 1971 Intercos 5 Scientific KY/SL--07 TT/SL-11 Success 3 December 1971 Co~mos 462 Satellite lnterceptor TT/SL--04. S11ccess 6 Dcccru bcr l 97 l Co~mos 463 Photorr.connaissanee 10 December 1971 Cusmos 464 Photorcconnaissn.nce PL/SL--04 Succea:s Success 15 December 1971 Cosmos 465 Navigation PL/SL-08 Success 16 December 1971 Cosmos 466 Photornconnaissa.nce TT/SL--04 Success 17 December 1971 Cosmos 167 R11.d1

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SOVIET SPACE EVENTS (1 July 1971 - 20 December 1973) (Continued) -· ·--·· -· ·- --- - ·· Soviet Launch Sit•/ Date DeR!gna.tion Mission Vehicle Outcome ' · -- - ·-· ·· ···------·-~ - - --- 29 D ecember 1971 Meteor 10 Weat her PL/ST, 03 Success ,. 12 January 1972 Cosmos 471 PhotoreconnaiAsance TT/SL--0 4 Success 25 January I 972 C osm o ~ 472 Radar Calibration PL/SL-07 Success : 3 Februl< 473 Pbotorcconnaissanee TT/SL-o4 Succe&11 ,. .. 14 February 1972 Luno. 20 Lunar Probe TT/SL- 12 Success 0 .,· ·-· 16 Febru:i.ry 1972 Cosmos 474 Photorecon naissance TT/SL- 04 Succe.116 25 F ebruary 1972 Cosmos 475 Navigation PL/SL--08 Succe&1 .. 1 March 1972 Cosmo11476 ELINT Rcconnaissanca PL/SL--03 Success ;I 4 March 1972 Cosmos 477 Photorcco11ua.issa.ncc · PL/SL--04 Success J 5 March 1972 CosmoB 478 Photoreconnai ~ance PL/ST. 04 Success ·· ~ 22 March 1972 Cosmos 479 : ELTNT Reconnai5sance PL/8T. 08 Succe811 : 25 March I 972 Cosmos 480 Geodetic . PL/SL--08 Success - .:·'. 25 M&rch 1972 Cosmos 481 Ra dar Calibration .PL/SL--07 Success ·_-e ' 27 March 1972 Venus 8 Venus Probe .TT/ST. 06 Succes11 i! 30 March 1912 Meteor 11 W eather PL/SL--03 Succcas !' 31 Mo.rch 1972 Cosmos 482 Venus Probe TT/SL--06 Failure " .., S April 1972 CosmoB 48:i Photoreconnai11Sance PL/SL -04 Succell8 :1 4 April H172 Molniya 1/20 Cornmunic1Ltions Relay PL/SL 06 Succ""a 6 April 1972 Cosmos 484 Phot oreconna.i6sance l'L/SL·--04 Success 7 April Hl72 1n t c r co smu ~ (j Scientifi c TT/SL 04 Success 11 April 1072 Cosmo~ 485 Radar Calibration PL/SL 07 Success 14 April 1972 Cosmos 486 'Photoreconnaissa.nee PL/8L ·04 SuccesB ' 14 April 1972 'Progno1. 1 Scientific TT/SL 06 Success .. , 21 April 1972 Cosmo>< 487 Rada.r Calibration 'Pl./ST. 07 Succee11· .·.. 25 April 1972 - Radar Calibration ' PL/SL-07 Failure 5 May 1972 Cosmos 488 Photo reconnaissance PL/SL-04 Succ<'.as 6 May 1972 Cosmoi; 4R9 Navigation PL/SL--08 Success 17 May 1972 Cosmos 490 Photorcconnaissance PL/SL 04 Success Ill May 1972 Molniya 2/2 Communications Rcll\y PL/SL--06 Success 25 May 1972 Cosmos 491 Pbotoreconna.issance TT/SL-04 Success . . 9 June 1972 Cosmo~ 192 Photoreoonnaissancc TT/SL 04 Su cc ens .. 21 June 1972 Cosmos 193 Pbotoreconnaissancc TT/SL-04 Success 23 June 1972 Cosmos 4~4 Store/Dump Communications.Relay .PL/SL--08 Succc6s 23 June 1972 Cosmos 495 Photoreconnaissance PL/SL-04 Success .. 26 June 1972 Cosmos 496 Unmanned Soyuz TT/SL--04 Success 29 JUllt'· 1972 Prognoz 2 " Sci.,ntific TT/SL--06 Success ., 30 June 1972 Cosmos 497 Comm1md System Checkout PJ,/SL- -07 Success 30 June 11172 lnLcrcosmos 7 Sclentllic RY/SL-07 Success .. 30 June 1972 Meteor 12 Wea ther PL/SL-03 Sucr.e.ss 5 July 1972 Cosmos 498 R1.ib.r Calib~ation PLISL--07 Success 6 July 1972 Cosmos 499 Pho Lorcconna.issa.nee TT/SL-04 Success 10 July 1972 Cosmog !iOO EJ.,INT Reconna.issa.nce PL/SL--08 Success " 12 July 1972 Cosmos 501 Ra.dar Calibration KY/SL ·07 Success .. .. 13 July 1972 Cosmos 502 Photqgraphic-rela.ted PL/ST. 04 Success ' 19 July 1972 Cosmos 503 Photorecon nai55ance PLiSL--04 Success ";. 20 July 1972 .Cosmo~ 504-511 Store/Dump Communications Relay PL/SL--08 · Su cccs~ --·· .. . Footnotes at eTJd of t1Lble.

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. ,j. SOVIET SPACE EVENTS (l July 1971-20 December 1973) (Continued) .. ------·---· ----· ·- - ---· Soviet L .. unch Site/ Date Designation Mission Vehicle Outcome - ·--- -- ··- ---·-·- - 28 .July 1972 Co8mos 512 Photorcconnaissance PL/SL--04 Success 29 July 1972 8,.lyut St11tion TT/SL-13 Failure

2 August 1972 Cosmos 513 Photoreconnaissance TT/SL--04 SuccP~'s ~ : 16 August 1972 Cosmo~ 514 Ne.vip;11tion PL/SL--08 Success 18 Aug~t 1972 Cosmos 515 Photoreconnaiss11nce PL/SL--04 SucceSB 21 August 1972 Coeruo~ Ii 16 R11dar Reconnais~ .. nce TT/Slr-11 Success 30 August J 972 Co5ma8 517 Photoreconuais~ance · T'l'/SL--04 Success 2 September 1972 Photoreconna.issance PL/ST. 04 Failure 15 September 1972 Cosmos 518 Photor e connai~sancc PL/SL--04 Success 16 s.,µtembcr 1972 ca.mos 519 Photoreconnai~~ancc TT/SL---Oi Success HJ September 1972 Cosmos .520 PossibJP. Righ Altitude Surveillance PL/SL--06 Sum:e.lls 29 September 1972 Cosmos 521 Satellite Intercept Target PL/SL--08 8UCCe68 30 September 1972 Molniya 2{3 Cmnmunic11tions Relay PL/SJ,--06 Succe1111 4 Octa ber 1972 Coi;nios .522 Photoreconnaissance PL/SL--04 Succe1Luna 21 Luna.r Probe TT/SL-12 Sur.r.ess 11 .January 1973 Cosmos 543 Photoreconnai...... nce TT/SL 04 Success ... , ~ 20 JH.n\lary Hl73 Cosmos 544 ELl NT Reconn .. issanCfl PJ,/SL--08 Success ··~ 24 J&nwiry J 973 Cosmos 545 Rad.. r Calihriltion PL/ST.--07 Succe~~s 26 .January 1973 Cosmos 546 L11onch Site & Vehicle Teat KY/SL---08 Success .· • I .J:.'<:bruary lll73. Cosmos 547 Pho toreconnaissance TT/ST..---04 Success 3 Fcbrua.ry Hl73 M.olniyH. 1{23 Communicll.tions Relay TT{SL--06 SuccellS .8 February 1973 . Cosmos 548 Pho t.orccon naiSllance PL/SL--04 Succ11ss 15 Febru11.ry 1973 Prognoz 3 Sci~ntific TT/SL·--06 Succcs8 28 Februitry 1973 Co~mos 549 ELINT Reconnaissa.nce PL/SL--08 Success l Marc:h 1973 Cosmos .550 Photoreconnaii;sance PL/SL-04 Succe811 Co~mos Photornconnnissance TTIST.--04 Succes~ -6 -March-.-- 1973 5.51 Footnotes at end of table. ... ,.

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SOVIET SPACE EVENTS (I July l971 - 20 December 1973) (Continued) -- --·--·- -· Soviet Launch Site/ ' Date Designation Mission Vehicle Outcome .. :·. ·----- ·· - - - - · · - ··· ·· · ~ --- .. 1. 20 March 1973 Meteor H Weather PL/SL-03 Success 22 March l 973 Co.mos 552 Photoreconnaiss&nce PL/SL 04 Success ;; 3 April 1973 8ulyut 2 S11.lyut-cl""" 8pa.ce Station, possibly T'T'/SL·· l3 Failure nurn-reh1ted ' .'i April 1973 Molniya 2/5 Communications Relay PL/SL--06 Success 12 April 1973 Co•mos 553 Radar Calibration PL/SL-07 Success 19 April 1073 Copernic:us 500b Sr.i1mtific KY/SL-07 Success 19 A_pril 1973 Cosmos 554 P!Jotornconna.issance PL/SL--04 Failure .} 25 April 1973 Radar Reconnaissance TT/SL- 11 Failure 25 April 1973 Cosmos 555 Photoreconna.issance PT./SL--04 Success ' ~ 5 May 1973 Cosmos 556 Photorecomta.issance PLiSL--04 Success 11 May 1973 Cosmos 557 Salyut-class Space Station TT/SL 13 Fi\ilure 17 May l!l73 Cosmos 558 Radar Calibration PT.ISL 07 Success 18 Mny Hl73. Cosmos 559 Photoreconnaissarice PL/SL 04 Success 23. May Hl73 Cosmos .560 Photoreconnaissancc PL/SL-04 Succesa 25 May 1973 Cosmos 561 Photoreconnaiesance PL/SL 04 Success 29 Me.y 1973 Meteor 15 WP.11.ther PL/SL--03 Snr. c t ! ~S !i .rune 1973 Cosmos 562 Radar Calibration PL/SL--07 Success 6 Junr. Hl71l Cosmos 5fi3 Photoreconne.issance PL/SL-04 su .. cess 8 Ju1w Hl7:1 Cosmos 564 571 Store/Dump Communication6 Relay PL/SL--08 Success 10 June 1973 Cosmos 572 Photoreconnaissanc<: TT/SL--04 Succes~ 15 June 1973 Cosmos 573 Soyuz-related Testing TT/SL-04 Succes5 20 Jun11 1973 Cosmos 574 Navigation PL/SL--08 Success 21 June 1973 Cosmos 575 Pl1otoreconnaissance PL/SL-04 Sut~cess 27 June 1973 Cosmos 576 Photographic-related PL/SL-04 8iwcess 4 July 1973 Unidentified .. . PL/Srr:-04 Fl\llure 11 July 1973 Mol11iy11. 2/6 Communications Relay. PL/SL-06 Success 21 July 11173 Mu.rs 4 Mn.rs Pro be TT/SL-12 Unknown (cnroute) 2.~ July 1973 Cosmos 577 Photorer.nn nalssance PL/ST, 04 Success 25 July 1!)73 Mnrs 5 Mars Probe TT/SL-12 Unknown (enroute) 1 August 1973 Cosmos 578 PhotoreconnaiSBance PL/SL--04 Success 5 August 1973 Mars 6 Mars Probe · TT/SL-12 Unknown (enroute) ii August 1973 . M!lrs 7 Mt.I'll Probe TTISL-12 Unknown (enroute) 21 August 1973 Co~mot1 579 Photoreconnaissance PL/SL-04 Succesa 22 August l!l73 Cosmos 580 Radar Calibration PL/SL 07 Success 21 August 1973 Cosmos 581 Photorecouuaissance PL/ST. 04 Success 28 August 1973 Cosmos 582 ELINT Jlecoun1Lissance PL/SL-08 Success 30 AUKUSt 1973 Molniya. I/24 Communic .. tions Relay PL/SL--06 Success 30 August 1973 Cosmos 583 Photorcconn11.i••1rnce TT/SL 04 Success .=:- 6 September 1973 Cosmo~ 584 Photoreconnaissu.ucc PL/SL-04 Success 8 September 1973 Co~mo11 585 Geodetic PL/SL-08 Success 14 September 1973 . Cosmos 586 Navigation PL/SL-08 Success - ··-·--- Footnotes at end of ta.hlc.

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SOVIET SPACE EVENTS (1 July 1971-20 December 1973) (Continued) ·------.. ·---·------·------Soviet Launch Site/ Da.te Designation Mission Vehicle Outcome --.. --.------·· ---·------21 September 1973 Cosmos .587 Photorc,connaiMa.nee PL/SL--04 Success 27 Septemb•r 1973 Soyuz 12 Man Md TT/SL--04 Success 2 October 1973 Cosmos SSS-595 Stor~/ Dump Communic1er 1073 Cosmos 6(15 Scientific PL/SL--04 . Success 2 November 1973 Cm;mos 606 Po!l>lible High Altitude Surveillance Pl,/SL--06 Unk11uwn 10 Novemh1~r Hl73 Cosmos li07 Photoreconno.issa.nce PL/SL--04 SucceHs 14 November 1973 Mulniya. 1/25 Communications Relay PL/SJ,--06 Succeijs · 20 November 1973 Cosmos liU8 Calibration PL/SL--07 Success 21 November 1973 Cosmos 609 }'hotoreconnaissa.nce TT/SL--04 Succeti s 27 November Hl73 Cosmos 610 ELINT Reconnaissance PL/RL--08 Success 28 November 1973 Cosmo~ 611 Calibration PL/SL--07 Success 28 November 1973 Cosmois 612 Photoreconn1>isaance PL/SL--0~ Success 30 November 11173 Coi;ruos 613 Soyuz-clas~ ~atellite, man-related TT/SL--04 Success

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DISSEMINATION NOTICE

1. This document was disseminoted by the Central Intelligence Agen·cy. This copy is for 1he Information and use ·of the recipient and of persons under his iurisdiction on a need-1o·know basis. Addi1ional e:;sentiol dissemination may be authorized by the follow­ ing offidals within their respective deportments: a. Director of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of Stale b. Direc1or, Defense Intelligence Agency, for the Office of the Secretory of Defense and the organi:otion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff c. Assistant Chief of Stoff for Intelligence, Department of the Asmy, for .the Department of the Army . d. Diredor of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy e. Auistant Chief of Stoff, ln1elllganca, USAF,· for the Department of the Air Force f, Assistant General Manager for National Securl1y, for the Atomic · Energy Commission g. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation h, Director of NSA, for the National Security Agency I. Special ~istcmt lo the Secretary of the Treasury, for the Department of the Treasury • j. Deputy for National Intelligence Officers, CIA, for any other Department or Agency 2. This document may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable 5ecurity regulations, or returned lo the Central Intelligence A"ency by arrangement with the Deputy for National Intelligence Officers, CIA. 3. When this document is disseminated overseas, the oversCIQ$ recipients may retain it for a pe~iod not In excess of one year. At the end of this period, the document 5hould either be destroyed, re1urned to the forwarding agency, or per­ miuion should be requested of the forwarding agency to retain It in accordance with IAC~9/2, 22 June 1953 • .; The title of this document when used s~porately from the text should be clas­ sified: Sl!CRfl'

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