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U S E R M a N U •Introduction 6/04/01 11:09 Page 1 SOYUZ USER’ S MANUAL ST-GTD-SUM-01 - ISSUE 3 - REVISION 0 - APRIL 2001 © Starsem 2001. All rights reserved. •Introduction 6/04/01 11:09 Page 2 •Introduction 6/04/01 11:09 Page 3 SOYUZ USER’S MANUAL ST-GTD-SUM-01 ISSUE 3, REVISION 0 APRIL 2001 FOREWORD Starsem is a Russian-European joint venture founded in 1996 that is charged with the commercialization of launch services using the Soyuz launch vehicle, the most frequently launched rocket in the world and the only manned vehicle offered for commercial space launches. Starsem headquarters are located in Paris, France and the Soyuz is launched from the Baikonour Cosmodrome in the Republic of Kazakhstan. Starsem is a partnership with 50% European and 50% Russian ownership. Its shareholders are the European Aeronautic, Defence, and Space Company, EADS (35%), Arianespace (15%), the Russian Aeronautics and Space Agency, Rosaviacosmos (25%), and the Samara Space Center, TsSKB-Progress (25%). Starsem is the sole organization entrusted to finance, market, and conduct the commercial sale of the Soyuz launch vehicle family, including future upgrades such as the Soyuz/ST. Page3 •Introduction 6/04/01 11:09 Page 4 SOYUZ USER’S MANUAL ST-GTD-SUM-01 ISSUE 3, REVISION 0 APRIL 2001 REVISION CONTROL SHEET Revision Date Revision No. Change Description 1996 Issue 1, Revision 0 New issue June 1997 Issue 2, Revision 0 Complete update April 2001 Issue 3, Revision 0 Complete update ST-GTD-SUM-01 General modifications that reflect successful flights in 1999-2000 and Starsem’s future development plans. Page4 •Introduction 6/04/01 11:09 Page 5 SOYUZ USER’S MANUAL ST-GTD-SUM-01 ISSUE 3, REVISION 0 APRIL 2001 TABLE OF CONTENTS FOREWORD 3 REVISION CONTROL SHEET 4 LIST OF FIGURES 8 LIST OF TABLES 10 LIST OF APPENDICES 11 ACRONYMS, ABBREVIATIONS, AND DEFINITIONS 12 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 15 1.1. PURPOSE OF THE USER’S MANUAL 15 1.2. DESCRIPTION OF THE USER’S MANUAL 15 1.3. SOYUZ LAUNCH VEHICLE FAMILY HISTORY 16 1.3.1. Vehicle Reliability 17 1.4. LAUNCH VEHICLE DESCRIPTION 18 1.4.1. General data 18 1.4.2. Boosters (First Stage) 22 1.4.3. Core (Second Stage) 23 1.4.4. Third Stage 24 1.4.5. Soyuz Avionics 25 1.4.6. Fregat Upper Stage 26 1.4.7. Payload Fairings 29 1.4.8. Key Suppliers 29 1.5. BAIKONUR LAUNCH SITE FACILITIES 31 1.6. PARTNER ORGANIZATIONS 33 1.7. STARSEM LAUNCH SERVICES 36 CHAPTER 2. PERFORMANCE 37 2.1. VEHICLE PERFORMANCE OVERVIEW 37 2.2. VEHICLE PERFORMANCE DEFINITION 38 2.2.1. Launch System Configuration 38 2.2.2. Launch Pad and Azimuths 38 2.2.3. Attitude and Thermal Constraints 39 2.2.4. User-Specified Mission Requirements 40 2.2.5. Launch Windows 40 2.3. TYPICAL MISSION PROFILES 40 2.3.1. PHASE I - Ascent of the First Three Stages 40 2.3.2. PHASE II - Fregat Upper Stage Flight Profile 43 2.3.3. PHASE III - Fregat Deorbitation or Orbit Disposal Maneuver 43 2.4. GENERAL PERFORMANCE DATA 45 2.4.1. Circular Orbits 45 2.4.2. Elliptical Orbits 49 2.4.3. Geosynchronous Transfer and Geostationary Orbit Missions 54 2.4.4. Earth Escape Missions 56 2.5. MISSION DURATION 57 2.6. INJECTION ACCURACY 58 2.7. SEPARATION CONDITIONS 59 2.7.1. Spacecraft Orientation and Tipoff Rates 59 Use or disclosure of the data contained on this sheet is subject to the restriction on the title page of this document. Page5 •Introduction 6/04/01 11:09 Page 6 SOYUZ USER’S MANUAL ST-GTD-SUM-01 ISSUE 3, REVISION 0 APRIL 2001 CHAPTER 3. SPACECRAFT ENVIRONMENT 61 3.1. MECHANICAL ENVIRONMENT 61 3.1.1. Quasi-Static Loads 61 3.1.2. Sine-Equivalent Dynamics 65 3.1.3. Random Vibrations 66 3.1.4. Acoustics 67 3.1.5. Shock 68 3.1.6. Static Pressure Under the Fairing 69 3.2. THERMAL ENVIRONMENT 70 3.2.1. Prelaunch Environment 70 3.2.2. Launch Environment 71 3.3. CLEANLINESS AND CONTAMINATION 74 3.3.1. Cleanliness 74 3.3.2. Contamination 74 3.4. ELECTROMAGNETIC ENVIRONMENT 75 3.4.1 RF Means of LV Lower Three Stages 75 3.4.2 Fregat RF Means 78 3.4.3 LV and Launch Base Radiated Emissions 82 3.4.4 LV Radiated Susceptibility Limits 86 3.4.5 Magnetic Field 87 CHAPTER 4. SPACECRAFT DESIGN AND VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS 89 4.1. INTRODUCTION AND REFERENCE AXES 89 4.2. DESIGN REQUIREMENTS 89 4.2.1. Safety Requirements 89 4.2.2. Mass Properties 91 4.2.3. Spacecraft Allocated Volume 91 4.2.4. Frequency Requirements 91 4.2.5. Mechanical Loads 92 4.3. SPACECRAFT VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS 92 4.3.1. Verification Logic 92 4.3.2. Safety Factors 93 4.3.3. Qualification and Acceptance Tests 93 4.3.4. Interface Tests 95 CHAPTER 5. SPACECRAFT INTERFACES 97 5.1. MECHANICAL INTERFACE 97 5.2. PAYLOAD FAIRINGS 98 5.2.1. Payload Allocated Volume 98 5.2.2. Spacecraft Accessibility 98 5.2.3. Special Vehicle Insignia 98 5.2.4. Fairing Type ST 98 5.2.5. Fairing Type S 101 5.3. ELECTRICAL INTERFACES 103 5.3.1. Standard Launch Pad Configuration 103 5.3.2. Additional Optional Services 106 5.3.3. Intermediate Interface Configuration 111 5.3.4. Electrical Continuity Interface 114 Page6 Use or disclosure of the data contained on this sheet is subject to the restriction on the title page of this document. •Introduction 6/04/01 11:09 Page 7 SOYUZ USER’S MANUAL ST-GTD-SUM-01 ISSUE 3, REVISION 0 APRIL 2001 CHAPTER 6. BAIKONUR COSMODROME 117 6.1. INTRODUCTION 117 6.2. STARSEM PAYLOAD PROCESSING AND LAUNCH FACILITIES: GENERAL PRESENTATION 119 6.2.1. Airports 121 6.2.2. Site 112 121 6.2.3. Site 31 126 6.3. STARSEM PAYLOAD PROCESSING AND LAUNCH FACILITIES: GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS 131 6.3.1. Environmental Conditions 131 6.3.2. Power Supply 132 6.3.3. Communications Network 133 6.3.4. Transportation and Handling 134 6.3.5. Fluids and Gases 134 6.4. LOGISTICS 135 6.4.1. Visas and Access Authorization 135 6.4.2. Security 135 6.4.3. Daily Schedule 135 6.4.4. Personnel Transportation 135 6.4.5. Customs Clearance 136 6.4.6. Medical Care 136 6.4.7. Hotel and Food 136 6.4.8. Training Course 138 6.4.9. Safety 138 6.4.10. VIP Accommodation 138 CHAPTER 7. MISSION INTEGRATION AND MANAGEMENT 139 7.1. STARSEM ORGANIZATION FOR MISSION MANAGEMENT 139 7.2. MISSION MASTER SCHEDULE 140 7.3. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING SUPPORT 141 7.3.1. Interface Management 141 7.3.2. Mission Analysis 141 7.3.3. Preliminary Mission Analysis (PMA) 141 7.3.4. Final Mission Analysis (FMA) 143 7.3.5. Spacecraft Development Verification 145 7.3.6. Postlaunch Analysis 146 7.4. LAUNCH VEHICLE PROCUREMENT AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT/ADAPTATION 147 7.5. LAUNCH CAMPAIGN 149 7.5.1. Introduction 149 7.5.2. Launch Campaign Preparation And Support Documentation 149 7.5.3. Key Milestones and Launch Campaign Reviews 151 7.5.4. Typical Launch Campaign 154 7.6. SAFETY 164 7.6.1. General 164 7.6.2. Safety Submission 164 7.7. QUALITY ASSURANCE 165 7.8. REVIEW AND DOCUMENTATION CHECKLIST 165 7.8.1. Documentation Provided by Starsem 166 7.8.2. Documentation Provided by the User 167 7.8.3. Meetings and Reviews List 168 Use or disclosure of the data contained on this sheet is subject to the restriction on the title page of this document. Page7 •Introduction 6/04/01 11:09 Page 8 SOYUZ USER’S MANUAL ST-GTD-SUM-01 ISSUE 3, REVISION 0 APRIL 2001 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1-1: Soyuz Configuration 20 Figure 1-2: Soyuz/ST Configuration 21 Figure 1-3: Booster Layout and Location 22 Figure 1-4: Core Stage Layout and Location 23 Figure 1-5: Third Stage 24 Figure 1-6: Fregat Overview 28 Figure 1-7: Payload Fairings 29 Figure 1-8: Soyuz and Soyuz/ST Suppliers 30 Figure 1-9: Baikonur Launch Site Facilities 32 Figure 2-1: Location of Baikonur Cosmodrome and Authorized Launch Azimuths 39 Figure 2-2: Phase I: Typical Ascent Profile 41 Figure 2-3: Typical Ground Track for the First Three Stages 41 Figure 2-4: Example of the Flight Parameters During the Ascent Profile of the First Three Stages 42 Figure 2-5: Phases II and III: Example of Fregat Upper-Stage Mission Profile 43 Figure 2-6: Example of Flight Ground Path for 18,000-km Elliptical Orbit with 64.9° of Inclination 44 Figure 2-7: Example of Flight Ground Path for 800-km SSO 44 Figure 2-8: LV Performance for Low Circular Orbits: Hcirc = 400–1500 km 46 Figure 2-9: LV Performance for Medium Circular Orbits: Hcirc = 1500–25,000 km 47 Figure 2-10: Typical Impact on LV Performance for Change of Inclination for Circular Orbits with Reference Value of 51.8 degrees 47 Figure 2-11: LV Performance for SSOs: Hcirc = 400–1700 km 48 Figure 2-12: LV Performance for Polar Orbits: Hcirc = 400 - 1600 km 48 Figure 2-13: LV Performance for Low Elliptical Orbits: Hapogee = 400–1500 km 50 Figure 2-14: LV Performance for Medium Elliptical Orbits: Hapogee = 1500–25,000 km 50 Figure 2-15: LV Performance for a 12-Hour Molniya-Type Orbit: Hperigee = 200–2600 km 52 Figure 2-16: LV Performance for a 24-Hour Molniya-Type Orbit: Hperigee= 1000–20,000 km 53 Figure 2-17: LV Performance for High Elliptical Orbit: Hapogee = 25,000–400,000 km 53 ∆ Figure 2-18: LV Performance for GTO: VGEO = 600–2200 m/sec 56 Figure 2-19: LV Performance for Escape Missions: [C3 = V∞2] 57 Figure 3-1: Coordinate System for the Transportation Case 62 Figure 3-2: Typical Longitudinal Steady-State Static Acceleration (First Through Third Stage Flight) 63 Figure 3-3: Typical Pressure Variation Under the Fairing 69 Figure 3-4: Aerothermal Flux Decay After Fairing Jettisoning 71 Figure 3-5: Heat Flow Distribution Along the Spacecraft Bottom Surface 73 Figure 3-6: Third-Stage Soyuz/ST – Location of Antennas 76 Page8 •Introduction 6/04/01 11:09 Page 9 SOYUZ USER’S MANUAL ST-GTD-SUM-01 ISSUE 3, REVISION 0 APRIL 2001 Figure 3-7: Third-Stage Soyuz – Location of Antennas 77 Figure 3-8: Interstage Section – Antenna Locations 79 Figure
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